G.R. No.
164748 January 27, 2006 claimed that students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and DR. BENITO TUMAMAO, Schools Division Superintendent of
Isabela, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY, SR., represented by IGNACIA VICENTE, RUFINO DULAY, JR., SUSANA
DULAY, ADELAIDA DULAY, LUZVIMINDA DULAY and CECILIA DULAY, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78314 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City,
Isabela, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 35-2397.
The spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente were the owners of a parcel of land located
in Rizal, Santiago, Isabela, with an area of 29,002 square meters. The lot was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-6776.
On August 3, 1981, the spouses Dulay executed a deed of donation3 over a 10,000-square-
meter portion of their property in favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture (now the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS]). The deed provided, among others:
That for and in consideration of the benefits that may be derived from the use of the above
described property which is intended for school purposes, the said DONORS do by by (sic) these
presents TRANSFER AND CONVEY by way of DONATION unto the DONEE, its successors and
assigns, the above property to become effective upon the signing of this document.4
The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1433375
covering the portion identified as Lot 8858-A was issued in the name of the Ministry of Education
and Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the Superintendent of Schools of Isabela.
However, the property was not used for school purposes and remained idle.
Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started construction of the Rizal National High
School building on a parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The school site was
about 2 kilometers away from the land donated by the spouses Dulay.
In a letter6 to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994, the spouses Dulay requested that the
property be returned to them considering that the land was never used since 1981, or a period
of more than 13 years. On August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of Rizal, Santiago City issued
Resolution No. 397 recognizing the right of the donors to redeem the subject parcel of land
because of the DECS’ failure to utilize it for the intended purpose. It further resolved that the
Rizal National High School no longer needed the donated land "considering its distance from
the main campus and [the] failure to utilize the property for a long period of time."
On December 22, 1994, Rufino Dulay, Sr. passed away at the age of 80.8 His heirs sought the
help of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Santiago City via an undated letter9 requesting the
approval of a resolution allowing them to redeem the donated property. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod denied the request inasmuch as the city government was not a party to the deed
of donation.10
On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein respondents, filed a complaint for the
revocation of the deed of donation and cancellation of TCT No. T-143337 before the RTC of
Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, against the DECS Secretary and Dr. Benito Tumamao, the
Schools Division Superintendent of Isabela. Respondents alleged that there was a condition in
the deed of donation: that the DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property for school purposes,
that is, the construction of a building to house the Rizal National High School. Respondents
alleged that the DECS did not fulfill the condition and that the land remained idle up to the
present. Respondents also averred that the donation inter vivos was inofficious, since the late
Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more than what he could give by will.
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the following defenses:
(a) the DECS complied with said condition because the land was being used by the school as
its technology and home economics laboratory; (b) the donation was not inofficious for the
donors were the owners of five other parcels of land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City; (c) the
DECS acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase made on December 8, 1997 by the
barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in the amount of P18,000.00 as certified by its former Barangay
Captain, Jesus San Juan;11 and (d) the action of the respondents had prescribed. The OSG also
bearing trees; the produce would then be sold and the proceeds used for the construction of a
school building on the subject property.
In their Reply,12 respondents denied that the donated land was being used as a technology
and home economics laboratory, and averred that there were no improvements on the
property. Moreover, the fact that rice was planted on the lot was contrary to the intended
purpose of the donation. The respondents likewise denied that the property had been sold to
the barangay. While the other properties of the late donor had been sold, the deeds thereon
had not been registered, and the tax declarations not yet transferred in the names of the
purchasers.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On March 6, 2001, an ocular inspection of the property was conducted
by the parties and their respective counsels, including the Presiding Judge. It was confirmed
that the land was barren, save for a small portion which was planted with palay. A demolished
house was also found in the periphery of the donated lot.13
On December 26, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondents. The fallo
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby DECLARES the deed
of donation, Exhibit "A," executed by the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. and his wife Ignacia Vicente over
a portion of the land covered by O.C.T. No. P-6776 and now covered by T.C.T. No. T-143337 in
the name of the donee Department of Education and Culture as REVOKED. The defendant
DECS is ORDERED to execute the deed of reconveyance of the land in favor of the plaintiffs
heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr.
SO ORDERED.14
In revoking the deed of donation, the trial court ruled that the donation was subject to a
resolutory condition, namely, that the land donated shall be used for school purposes. It was no
longer necessary to determine the intended "school purpose" because it was established that
the donee did not use the land. Thus, the condition was not complied with since the property
was donated in July 1981. Moreover, the DECS did not intend to use the property for school
purposes because a school had already been built and established in another lot located in
the same barangay, about two kilometers away from the subject land. Finally, the trial court
rejected petitioners’ contention that the donation was inofficious.
Aggrieved, the OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
On July 30, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming the decision. The court held
that the DECS failed to comply with the condition in the donation, that is, to use the property for
school purposes. The CA further ruled that the donation was onerous considering that the
donee was burdened with the obligation to utilize the land for school purposes; therefore, the
four-year prescriptive period under Article 764 of the New Civil Code did not apply. Moreover,
the CA declared that a deed of donation is considered a written contract and is governed by
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides for a 10-year prescriptive period from the
time the cause of action accrues. According to the CA, the respondents’ cause of action for
the revocation of the donation should be reckoned from the expiration of a reasonable
opportunity for the DECS to comply with what was incumbent upon it.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Petitioners seek relief from this Court via petition for review on certiorari, contending that:
I.
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THROUGH THE RIZAL NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, HAD
COMPLIED WITH THE CONDITION IMPOSED IN THE DEED OF DONATION.
II.
RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO SEEK THE REVOCATION OF THE DEED OF DONATION, IF THERE
BE ANY, IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.15
The Court shall resolve the issues raised by petitioners seriatim.
The donee failed to comply with the condition imposed in the deed of donation
The issue of whether or not petitioner DECS was able to comply with the condition imposed in
the deed of donation is one of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query necessarily solicits
calibration of the whole evidence considering mostly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole
and probabilities of the situation.16 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, for the simple reason that
this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for the Court to calibrate the evidence on record, as this
is the function of the trial court. Although there are well-defined exceptions to the rule,
nevertheless, after a review of the records, we find no justification to depart therefrom.
Moreover, the trial court’s findings of facts, as affirmed by the appellate court on appeal, are
binding on this Court, unless the trial and appellate courts overlooked, misconstrued or
misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would change the
outcome of the case. The case has been reviewed thoroughly, and we find no justification to
reverse the CA decision.
Petitioners, through the OSG, maintain that the condition (to use the property for school
purposes) is not limited to the construction of a school building, but includes utilizing it as a
technology and home economics laboratory where students and teachers plant palay,
mahogany seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees. The OSG insists that the donee did not specify in
the deed that the property should be used for the construction of a school building. According
to the OSG, the proceeds of the harvest were used and are still being used by the Rizal National
High School for the construction and improvement of its present school site. Moreover, it was
verified that there was palay planted on the donated property during the ocular inspection on
the property.
In their comment on the petition, respondents dispute petitioners’ contentions, and aver that no
evidence was presented to prove that, indeed, palay, mahogany seedlings and fruit-bearing
trees were planted on the property. Respondents also emphasized that when the trial court
inspected the subject property, it was discovered to be barren and without any improvement
although some portions thereof were planted with palay. Petitioners even failed to adduce
evidence to identify the person who planted the palay.
The contention of petitioners has no merit.
As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to prove that the donated property was
used for school purposes as indicated in the deed of donation:
We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants have complied with the condition of
donation. It is not amiss to state that other than the bare allegation of the defendant-
appellants, there is nothing in the records that could concretely prove that the condition of
donation has been complied with by the defendant-appellants. In the same breadth, the
planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be considered and could not have been the
"school purposes" referred to and intended by the donors when they had donated the land in
question. Also, the posture of the defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as
technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National High School is far from being
the truth considering that not only is the said school located two kilometers away from the land
donated but also there was not even a single classroom built on the land donated that would
reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted therein. These observations,
together with the unrebutted ocular inspection report made by the trial court which revealed
that the land donated remains idle and without any improvement thereon for more than a
decade since the time of the donation, give Us no other alternative but to conclude that the
defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to comply with what is incumbent upon them in the
deed of donation.17
In its Order18 dated March 6, 2001, the RTC reiterated that during the ocular inspection of the
property conducted in the presence of the litigants and their counsel, it observed that "the land
was barren; there were no improvements on the donated property though a portion thereof
was planted with palay [and a demolished house built in 1979.]"
Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that the palay found in the
property was planted by DECS personnel or at its instance or even by students of the Rizal
National High School. No evidence was adduced to prove that there were existing plans to use
the property for school purposes. Petitioners even debilitated their cause when they claimed in
the trial court that the barangay acquired the property by purchase, relying on the certification
of former Barangay Captain Jesus San Juan.
The right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribed when respondents filed their
complaint
Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that respondents’ cause of action
is already barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the
non-compliance with the condition in the deed of donation. Since such failure to comply with
the condition of utilizing the property for school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988
when the DECS utilized another property for the construction of the school building, the four-
year prescriptive period did not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more than
enough time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its
advantage. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was
burdened with the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733
of the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus
governed by the rules on contract.19 We fully agree with the ruling of the appellate court:
xxx With this, [we] decline to apply the four-year prescriptive period for the revocation of
donation provided under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and instead apply the general rules
on contracts since Article 733 of the same Code, specifically provided that onerous donations
shall be governed by the rules on contracts.
Corollarily, since a deed of donation is considered a written contract, it is governed by Article
1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising
from a written contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. In the case
of donation, the accrual of the cause of action is from the expiration of the time within which
the donee must comply with the conditions or obligations of the donation. In the instant case,
however, it must be noted that the subject donation fixed no period within which the donee
can comply with the condition of donation. As such, resort to Article 1197 of
the New Civil Code is necessary. Said article provides that if the obligation does not fix a period,
but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the
courts may fix the duration thereof. Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the condition
of the subject donation, it can be inferred that a period was contemplated by the donors. The
donors could not have intended their property to remain idle for a very long period of time
when, in fact, they specifically obliged the defendant-appellants to utilize the land donated for
school purposes and thus put it in good use. xxx20
In Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals,21 a case squarely in point, we have
established that the legal possibility of bringing the action begins with the expiration of a
reasonable opportunity for the donee to fulfill what has been charged upon it by the donor.
Likewise, we held that even if Article 1197 of the New Civil Code provides that the courts may fix
the duration when the obligation does not determine the period but from its nature and
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule cannot be
applied because to do so would be a mere technicality and would serve no other purpose
than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.22
Altogether, it has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of donation. Petitioner DECS
failed to use the property for the purpose specified in the deed of donation. The property
remained barren and unutilized. Even after respondents sought the return of the property
before the courts, petitioner DECS still failed to draw up plans to use the property for school
purposes. In fine, petitioner DECS has no use for the property; hence, the same shall be reverted
to the respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78314 dated July 30, 2004 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152663 November 18, 2005
EDGARDO D. DOLAR, Petitioner,
vs.
BARANGAY LUBLUB (now P.D. Monfort North) of the Municipality of Dumangas, herein
represented by its Punong Barangay, PEPITO DUA, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, DUMANGAS WATER DISTRICT, 4th ILOILO MOBILE GROUP, ILOILO PROVINCIAL POLICE,
ILOILO REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 68, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Edgardo D.
Dolar seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Orders dated January 3, 20021 and March 5,
20022 of the Regional Trial Court at Iloilo City, Branch 38, in its consolidated Civil Cases No. 98-
033 and 00-140.
The facts:
Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6 hectares,
identified as Lot No. 1, Pcs-06-000744 (Lot No. 1, for brevity), situated in Brgy. Lublub, Municipality
of Dumangas, Iloilo. Said property forms part of Lots No. 4181 and 4183 of the Dumangas
Cadastre.
On September 16, 1981, petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to respondent Barangay
Lublub, subject to the following conditions:
A.) That the area donated shall be for the purpose of con[s]tructing building and/or establishing
public plaza, sports complex, public market, health centers and the like for the use of the
Barangay of Lublub … which area shall be hereinafter be known as DON VENANCIO DOLAR
PLAZA and shall be so designated in a proper landmark;
B.) That the construction and development of the area above-described shall be initiated and
completed within five (5) years from the execution of this Deed of Donation and should the
same be not made or completed then this Deed of Donation shall have no force and effect
whatsoever and the ownership of the above-described property will revert back to the
DONORS including all or any unfinished improvement the DONEE might have placed or
constructed.
C.) That . . . should the use of the area be converted to uses other than herein stipulated, then
this DEED OF DONATION shall be deemed revoked and the ownership shall revert back to the
DONORS .… (Underscoring added)3
Then barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy. Lublub.
Following the execution of the deed of donation, Brgy. Lublub immediately took possession of
the donated property, which soon became the site of several government office buildings and
recreational facilities. For what in hindsight is a typical case of complacency on the part of a
government unit, respondent barangay did not have the donation registered under its name.
On April 12, 1989, or almost eight (8) years from contract execution, petitioner was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1298374 by the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo covering the
donated area.
Sometime in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed5 donating to Brgy. Lublub,
represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla
had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the
same conditions expressly set forth in the first.
Barangay Lublub’s peaceful possession of the donated area remained undisturbed until mother
Lots No. 4181 and 4183 were included in the published list of tax delinquent properties for
disposition. At the auction sale that followed, petitioner emerged as the highest bidder and
was, accordingly, awarded the property.
On May 6, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Iloilo City, petitioner filed against Brgy.
Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession With Damages involving the
4.6-hectare area he had earlier donated. Basically, petitioner claimed that the donation in
question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay having failed to comply with the
conditions of the donation. Impleaded as co-defendants of Brgy. Lublub were entities each
occupying a portion of the donated property, such as the Philippine Long Distance Company
(PLDT), the Dumangas Water District, Branch 86 of RTC-Iloilo and the Iloilo Provincial Police.
Docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 98-033, the complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
10. That ... defendant [barangay] failed to build or establish within the period therein stipulated,
a public plaza, sports complex … and like structures for the use of Barangay Lublub and neither
had it designated in a proper landmark that the area donated is known as the ‘Don Venancio
Dolar Plaza’
11. That … defendant barangay allowed the use of the area donated to be converted to uses
other than those provided in the donation documents when it allowed entities like defendants
PLDT, Dumangas Water District, PNP Mobile Force, and Branch 68 of the RTC of Iloilo, to
construct buildings and occupy portions of the lot in question . . .;
12. That because of the failure of defendant barangay to declare the lot in question in its name
for taxation purposes, the same was sold at public auction for non-payment of real property
taxes . . . .
13. That in the light of the terms and conditions in the Deeds of Donation and actuations of the
defendant barangay in relation to the property donated; the donation . . . has automatically
lost its force and effect whatsoever and the ownership of the property has reverted to the
plaintiff or the donation has been deemed automatically revoked . . .;
14 . That the act of defendant barangay in allowing the construction of buildings by public and
private entities on the donated property and holding offices therein has cast a doubt or cloud
on the title of the plaintiff over the property in litigation . . . .
15. That the plaintiff, as exclusive, absolute, and registered owner of the property in question is
entitled to the possession of the same.6
In its Answer With Counterclaim,7 Brgy. Lublub, after traversing the material allegations of the
complaint, alleged the following as affirmative defenses:
3.2. The said donation was made and accepted on the same public instrument duly notarized
by notary public Nicolas P. Sonalan xxx
3.3. The acceptance of donation was made by then Barangay Captain of Barangay Lublub
Jose Militar with authority from the barangay council;
3.4. After the said deed of donation was executed in compliance with the conditions set forth in
the deed of donation and within five (5) years from its execution thereof several
structures/buildings were constructed thereon for the use and benefit of Brgy. Lublub,
Dumangas, Iloilo. ….;
3.5. Later on . . . (PLDT) was invited to construct an office building on subject property for the
benefit and use of the residents of Barangay Lublub, Dumangas, Iloilo;
3.6. Likewise for the use and benefit of the barangay residents an office building of Dumangas
Water District was constructed . . .;
3.7. Likewise … a PNP Mobile Force was put up on the said place and a PNP office, in line with
this, was constructed . . .;
3.8. Likewise because of the desire of the barangay residents to make the subject property a
plaza and a center place for their needs, Branch 68 of the RTC of Iloilo was established thereon.
All these for the use and benefit of Barangay Lublub, now P.D. Monfort North, . . . .
And, as grounds for its motion to dismiss embodied in the same answer, Brgy. Lublub raised the
matter of lack of cause of action or prescription of the cause of action, if any, thus:
4.3 Plaintiff proceeded with his complaint . . . without first seeking the revocation of the deed of
donation in a proper court . . . as provided for under Article 764 of the New Civil Code;
4.4 What plaintiff did was to unilaterally revoke the deed of donation … and proceeded with
the filing of this case with the assumption that the deed of donation was already validly
revoked. xxx.
xxx xxx xx
4.6 It must be noted that the deed of donation was executed in September 16, 1981. Even if the
donee . . . failed to comply with the conditions of the deed within 5 years or until 1986, plaintiff
should have sought revocation of the donation within 4 years from 1986 or until 1990 only. xxx
xxx;
4.7 The deed of donation having been executed in 1981 yet, the donee . . . took possession of
the same in concept of an owner, with just title, adverse, open, peaceful and continuously up
to the present. Hence, even if the donation is void or conditions were not complied with, the
property is now owned by the donee, … as it can be considered that it has been acquired by
prescription.
On top of its Answer with Counterclaim, Brgy. Lublub, this time renamed and known as Brgy. P.D.
Monfort North, filed with the same branch of the court a complaint for Cancellation of Title,
Reconveyance/Issuance of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Delinquency in the Payment
of Real Property Tax.8 Named as defendants were petitioner and his wife, certain municipal
officials of Dumangas and the Provincial Treasurer and Register of Deeds of Iloilo. In its
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-140, the plaintiff barangay averred having
conducted an investigation which led to the discovery that the spouses Dolar, colluding with
some local officials, engineered the whole levy process which culminated in the auction sale of
what is now a very valuable donated property.
To Brgy. Lublub’s complaint, petitioner interposed a Motion to Dismiss9 on grounds of forum
shopping and litis pendentia, obviously on account of the pendency of Civil Case No. 98-033.
Eventually, the two (2) cases, Civil Cases No. 98-033 and 00-140, wherein the respective principal
defendants have each interposed a motion to dismiss, were consolidated.
In the herein assailed Order dated January 3, 2002,10 the trial court, on the finding that
petitioner’s action was already barred by extinctive prescription under Article 764,11 in relation
to Articles 73312 and 1144 (1)13 of the Civil Code, granted the Barangay’s motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. 98-033 and denied petitioner’s similar motion in Civil Case No. 00-140, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court resolved, as it hereby resolves, the pending
incidents in these two cases, to wit:
1. Defendant Barangay Lublub’s built-in Motion to Dismiss/Affirmative Defenses raised in its
Answer in Civil Case No. 98-033, being impressed with merit, is granted; consequently, said Civil
Case No. 98-033 … is hereby ordered dismissed;
2. Defendants-spouses Edgardo D. Dolar’s and Corazon Yap’s Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No.
00-140, being without merit, the same is herby denied.
With this disposition, this Court shall proceed hearing Civil Case No. 00-140 entitled Barangay
P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas Iloilo, etc. vs. Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, et al.
SO ORDERED.
Explains the trial court in its impugned Order of January 3, 2002:
Stress should be made that the Deed of Donation executed by Edgardo D. Dolar (plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 98-033) in favor of Barangay Lublub xxx clearly imposes the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing conditions, . . . should the barangay donee fails (sic) to comply
therewith, the donor had the right to bring action to revoke the donation (Art. 764, supra) within
a period of ten (10) years after the 5-year period of non-compliance with the conditions in the
deed of donation (Art. 733, supra, in relation to Art. 1144(1), supra). Since the deed of donation
was executed on September 16, 1981, the 5-year period lapsed in 1986; consequently, the
action to revoke should have been brought not later than 1996, however, it appears that Civil
Case No. 98-033 was filed by plaintiff Dolar on May 6, 1998.
Obviously, since the petitory portion of his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033 seeks for quieting
of his title over the subject property and seeks judgment declaring him to be the absolute
owner thereof, plaintiff Dolar also seeks the revocation of the subject deed of donation. xxx..
xxx. Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing jurisprudence, the action to revoke donation was
to have been filed within ten (10) years from the time the action accrued, i.e., from the time of
the non-compliance of the conditions ….
In yet another Order dated March 5, 2002,14 same court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Therefrom, petitioner directly comes to the Court on pure questions of law, submitting issues
which may be formulated in the following wise:
1. Whether or not his action is one for revocation of donation instead of for quieting of title;
whether or not the action for quieting has prescribed.
2. Whether or not the deed of donation in question is (a) valid for defective acceptance and/or
(b) no longer effective by reason of the automatic reversion clause therein.
3. Whether or not respondent barangay had acquired the property in question by acquisitive
prescription.
The petition lacks merit.
It bears stressing that petitioner, at the outset, predicated his action to quiet title on the ground
of ineffectiveness of the donation, albeit he would later add the matter of its invalidity. Indeed,
the make or break issue to be resolved and to which all others must yield turns on the validity
and/or continued efficacy of the subject donation. Valid and effective, the donation virtually
forecloses any claim which petitioner may have over the donated property against the donee
and other occupants thereof, and his action to quiet title is virtually doomed to fail. Invalid and
ineffective, however, the arena is left open for petitioner to recover ownership and possession of
the donated property and have the cloud on his title thereto, if any there be, removed.
According to petitioner, the subject donation is, by force of Article 74515 of the Civil Code, void,
the accepting barangay captain being without sufficient authority for the purpose. On this
point, petitioner cites Section 88 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33716 - the law then in force - and
Sections 91 and 389 the Local Government Code of 199117. In gist, these provisions empower
the punong barangay to enter into contracts for the barangay upon authorization of the
Sangguniang Barangay, or, in the alternative, the Sanggunian may authorize the barangay
head to enter into contracts for the barangay.
Excepting, however, respondent barangay alleged that then barangay captain Jose Militar
accepted the donation "in the same Deed of Donation per authority granted by the barangay
council."18
The question then of whether Militar was clothed with authority to accept the donation for
respondent barangay stands as disputed. Since the present recourse is interposed on pure
questions of law, we need not resolve the factual issue regarding Militar’s authority, or lack of it,
to accept the donation in behalf of respondent barangay. It should be pointed out,
nevertheless, that petitioner is hardly the proper party to challenge the validity of the donation –
which is presumed to be valid - on the ground he presently invokes. The honor to question
Militar’s ultra vires act, if this be the case, belongs to the Sanggunian of Barangay P.D. Monfort
North. And more to the point, even assuming ex gratia argumenti petitioner’s legal standing to
raise such a question, the final answer would still lean towards the validity of the donation. For,
from the allegations of all the parties, it would appear that, through the years, the Sanggunian
of Lublub as well as all the succeeding Sangunians of P.D. Monfort North neither repudiated the
acceptance of the donation by Militar nor acted in a manner reflective of their opposition to
the donation. On the contrary, the respondent barangay has been enjoying the material and
public-service benefits arising from the infrastructures projects put up on the subject property. In
a very real sense, therefore, the Sangguniang Barangay and the good people of P.D. Monfort
North, by availing themselves of such benefits for more than two decades now, effectively
ratified Militar’s acceptance of the donation.
This brings us to the question of the efficaciousness of the donation. Petitioner asserts that the
1981 and 1989 deeds of donation, pursuant to the uniform automatic rescission/reversion
clauses therein, ceased to be effective upon respondent’s failure to meet the conditions for
which it was charged to fulfill. To petitioner, the automatic rescission/reversion clause works, in
appropriate instances, to revoke the donation and revert the ownership of the donated
property to the donor without the need of judicial intervention. In support of this argument,
petitioner cites De Luna vs. Abrigo19 wherein this Court put to rest any lingering doubt as to the
validity of a stipulation providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the
donor upon non-compliance by the donee of the conditions or charges incumbent upon him.
Cited likewise is the subsequent complementary holding in Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila vs. Court of Appeals20, thus:
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of
the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved
herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of
the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary.
De Luna and Archbishop of Manila are, to be sure, apropos. However, petitioner’s argument to
support his thesis on the automatic rescission of the donation in question and the consequent
reversion of the property to the donor is an incomplete presentation of the Court’s
pronouncements on the point.
We shall explain.
If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for automatic rescission and/or
reversion in case of breach of the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply
with the condition, the donated property reverts back automatically to the donor. Such
provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to
rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of going to court and that upon the
happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract,
the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof,
then only the final award of the court can, to borrow from University of the Philippines vs. de los
Angeles,21 "conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not." Or, in the language of
Catholic Archbishop of Manila:22
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and
not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a
contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy,
we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is
valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety
is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in
itself the revocatory act.
In the case at bench, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent barangay denied or challenged
the purported revocation of the donation. In fact, the denial or challenge is embodied in
respondent barangay’s complaint in Civil Case No. 00-140 and in its Answer cum motion to
dismiss in Civil Case 98-033, which similarly prayed for, among other things, the cancellation of
petitioner's title on the subject property.
The foregoing discussion veritably disposes of the second formulated issue.
Now back to the first issue. It is petitioner’s posture that his action in Civil Case No. 98-033 is one
for quieting of title under Article 47623 of the Civil Code, not, as erroneously regarded by the trial
court, an action to revoke donation under Article 764 of the Code which, insofar as pertinent,
reads as follows:
Article 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to
comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.
xxx xxx xxx.
This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be
transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
(Underscoring added)
Petitioner’s posture does not persuade.
As aptly observed by the trial court, the petitory portion of petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case
No. 98-033 seeks for a judgment declaring him the absolute owner of the donated property, a
plea which necessarily includes the revocation of the deed of donation in question. Verily, a
declaration of petitioner’ absolute ownership appears legally possible only when the deed of
donation is contextually declared peremptorily revoked.
Owing to the prescriptive component of Article 764 of the Civil Code, petitioner’s dread of the
invocation and application of said provision is at once apparent as it is understandable. For, an
action to revoke thereunder prescribes after four (4) years from non-compliance by the donee
with any of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation. A little less than seventeen (17)
years separate September 16, 1981, when the Deed of Donation was executed, from May 6,
1998, when petitioner filed his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033. Seventeen (17) years is, in turn,
too far removed, as shall be illustrated shortly, from the 4-year prescriptive period referred to in
Article 764 or even from the 10-year period under Article 1144.24
It cannot be overemphasized that respondent barangay traces its claim of ownership over the
disputed property to a valid contract of donation which is yet to be effectively revoked. Such
rightful claim does not constitute a cloud on the supposed title of petitioner over the same
property removable by an action to quiet title. Withal, the remedy afforded in Article 476 of the
Civil Code is unavailing until the donation shall have first been revoked in due course under
Article 764 or Article 1144 of the Code.
Lest it be overlooked, the rule on the imprescriptibility of actions to quiet title admits of
exceptions. The trial court correctly mentioned one, referring to a situation where the plaintiff in
an action to quiet title is not in actual possession of the land.25 In the case at bench, petitioner is
not in possession of the property. For sure, he is even asking in his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-
033 for recovery of possession of the donated property.
Given the above disquisition, petitioner can hardly fault the trial court for its holding that
petitioner’s action to revoke is time-barred. As may be recalled, respondent barangay had,
under the terms of the deed of donation, five (5) years from the execution of the conveying
deed in September 1981, or up September 1986, within which to introduce and complete the
contemplated development of the donated area. Following Article 764 of the Civil Code,
petitioner had four (4) years from September 1986, or up to September 1990, within which to
seek the revocation of the subject donation on the ground of breach of contract.
The Court can grant that the prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donations, as
here, are governed by the general rules on prescription,26 which, in context, is Article 1144 of the
Civil Code providing that actions upon a written contract shall be brought within ten (10) years
from accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September 1986 – the date when petitioner’s
right to revoke accrued - would be September 1996. Here, however, what partakes as
petitioner’s suit to revoke was filed only in May 1998.
In all, petitioner’s right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed,
regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article 1144 of
the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent barangay had
disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his right to revoke,
claiming it had already complied with the construction and development conditions of the
donation. From the records, it would appear that respondent barangay’s boast of compliance
is not an empty one. As we see it, the establishment on the donated area of telephone service,
a water service, a police mobile force, and a courtroom, all for the benefits of the barangay
residents, substantially satisfies the terms and conditions of the subject donation. The concrete
paving of roads and the construction of government offices, sports complex for public
enjoyment and like infrastructures which, per respondent barangay’s estimate, cost not less
than P25 Million,27 add persuasive dimension to the conclusion just made.
Petitioner's long silence vis-à-vis the kind of development structures that Barangay Lublub had
decided to put up or allowed to be established on the subject area cannot but be taken as an
indicia of his satisfaction with respondent barangay’s choice of public service projects. The
prolonged silence was broken only after the provincial and municipal governments advertised,
then sold the property in a public auction to satisfy questionable tax liabilities.
Much is made by petitioner about his execution of the 1989 deed of donation, which, to him,
should be utilized as a point of reference in determining the prescriptive period28 defined under
either Article 764 or 1144 of the Civil Code. He states:
xxx It has not been explained up to this juncture why the Deed of Donation of June 1989 … is not
being mentioned or considered when it is alleged in the complaint. As will be noted in the Deed
of Donation dated 1981 the property was jointly owned by plaintiff Dolar and Jarantilla, with
separate title; in Annex "B", the Donation of 1989 only plaintiff Dolar signed the same as the only
registered owne[r] of the lot donated; xxx. As previously adverted to, the prescriptive period for
violation or contravention of the terms and conditions of Annex "B" should be reckoned from
1994 and therefore this action filed in 1998 is within the period.
With the view we take of the case, the execution of the 1989 deed of donation is really of little
moment in terms of furthering petitioner’s cause. For, at that time, the property subject of this
recourse was no longer his to donate, having earlier relinquished his ownership thereon. Nemo
dat qui non habet – No one can give what he has not.29 Stated a bit differently, respondent
barangay’s right over the donated area proceeds from the 1981 donation. The legal effects,
therefore, of its action or inaction respecting the donated property should be assayed on the
basis of the 1981 donation.
The last issue raised pivots on whether or not respondent barangay can acquire the subject
property by acquisitive prescription, the petitioner’s thesis being that prescription does not run
against registered land.30
Petitioner’s point is theoretically correct and may perhaps tip the balance in his favor, but for
the fact that the respondent barangay anchors its title and right over the donated lot, first and
foremost, by virtue of the deed of donation. Admittedly, standing alone, adverse, continuous
and long possession of a piece of real property cannot defeat the title of a registered owner.
But, then, this postulate presupposes a Torrens title lawfully acquired and issued. As may be
recalled, however, respondent barangay instituted Civil Case No. 00-140, supra, for
Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance/Issuance of Title precisely because of the dubious manner
by which petitioner allegedly acquired his TCT No. T-129837 over a lot he admits donating.
Parenthetically, petitioner’s contention that the donation was invalid because it was not
registered in the Registry of Property deserves no merit. For, as between the parties to the
donation and their assigns, the registration of the deed of donation with the Registry of Deeds is
not needed for its validity and efficacy. In Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 the Court
emphatically dismissed the notion that registration was necessary to make the donation a
binding commitment insofar as the donor and the donee were concerned.
As a final consideration, let it be made clear that this opinion merely resolves the question of the
correctness of the dismissal by the trial court of Civil Case No. 98-033 on the basis of facts
attendant thereto in the light of applicable laws and jurisprudence. It is not meant to prejudge
the outcome of Civil Case No. 00-140 which, while related to Civil Case No. 98-033, tenders
different issues, foremost of which is the validity of a Torrens title issued over a piece of land to
one who had previously donated the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155810 August 13, 2004
LYDIA SUMIPAT, LAURITO SUMIPAT, ALEJANDRO SUMIPAT, ALICIA SUMIPAT, and LIRAFE SUMIPAT,
petitioners,
vs.
BRIGIDO BANGA, HERMINIGILDO TABOTABO, VIVIANO TABOTABO, BERNARDITA ANIÑON, and
LEONIDA TABOTABO, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and partially annulled the Deed of
Absolute Transfer and/or Quitclaim (the deed) subject of this case.
We quote the appellate court’s findings of fact:
The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat, who contracted
marriage on July 20, 1939, acquired three parcels of land two of which were
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-17842 and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-15826.
The couple was childless.
Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children out of an extra-
marital affair with Pedra Dacola, namely: herein defendants-appellees
Lydia, Laurito, Alicia, Alejandro and Lirafe, all surnamed Sumipat.
On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated
"DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT-CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES"
(the assailed document) in favor of defendants-appellees covering the
three parcels of land (the properties). On the document appears the
signature of his wife Placida which indicates that she gave her marital
consent thereto.
It appears that on January 5, 1983 when the assailed document was
executed, Lauro Sumipat was already very sick and bedridden; that upon
defendant-appellee Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted
the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipat’s)
hand in affixing his signature on the assailed document which she had
brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the same day and
requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed document,
as she did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to
her query on what it was all about.
After Lauro Sumipat’s death on January 30, 1984, his wife Placida,
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, and defendants-appellees
jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to
plaintiff-appellant.
As plaintiff-appellant’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled until
she no longer received any and learning that the titles to the properties in
question were already transferred/made in favor of the defendants-
appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts,
partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal.
Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the
assailed document, she claiming to have acquired knowledge of its
existence only on January 10, 1983 or five days after its execution when
Lauro Sumipat gave the same to her.
Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City decided the case in
favor of defendants-appellees, it holding that by virtue of the assailed
document the due execution of which was not contested by plaintiff-
appellant, the properties were absolutely transferred to defendants-
appellees.4
The trial court found that the subject properties are conjugal having been acquired during the
marriage of Lauro Sumipat and Placida Tabotabo (Placida). However, because Placida failed
to question the genuineness and due execution of the deed and even admitted having affixed
her signature thereon, the trial court declared that the entirety of the subject properties, and
not just Lauro Sumipat’s conjugal share, were validly transferred to the defendants, the
petitioners herein.5
On appeal,6 the appellate court held that since Placida was unlettered,7 the appellees, the
petitioners herein, as the parties interested in enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving
that the terms thereof were fully explained to her.8 This they failed to do.
Under the Civil Code, a contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud is voidable.9 In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should
refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions
which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract.10
The appellate court found that Placida did not understand the full import of the deed because
the terms thereof were not explained to her either by the petitioners or by the notary public
before whom the deed was acknowledged. According to the appellate court, Judge Pacifico
Garcia (Judge Garcia), before whom the deed was acknowledged, did not identify Placida as
having appeared before him on January 5, 1983 to acknowledge the deed. The jurat indicates
that it was only Lauro Sumipat who appeared before Judge Garcia and to whom he explained
the contents of the deed. Further, the appellate court noted that Judge Garcia himself was
under the impression that the deed conveyed the exclusive properties of Lauro Sumipat. Hence,
he could not have explained to Placida that the deed actually transferred the conjugal
properties of Lauro Sumipat and Placida.11
The Court of Appeals, therefore, annulled the deed insofar as it covers Placida’s conjugal share
in the subject properties because the latter’s consent thereto was vitiated by mistake when she
affixed her signature on the document.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds of estoppel, absence of fraud
and prescription. The appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution12
dated October 16, 2002 ruling that the grounds relied upon have been addressed in its Decision
dated April 11, 2002. Anent the ground of prescription, the appellate court held that since the
properties were acquired through fraud or mistake, the petitioners are considered trustees of an
implied trust for the benefit of Placida. Citing jurisprudence,13 the Court of Appeals ruled that
actions based on implied or constructive trust prescribe 10 years from the issuance of a Torrens
Title over the property. Since two (2) of the subject properties were issued Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Numbered T-4003714 and T-4003815 under the petitioners’ names on August 18, 1987,
the Complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, partition, recovery of ownership and possession,
reconveyance, accounting and damages, which was filed on March 3, 1993, was filed well
within the prescriptive period.
The petitioners are now before this Court principally claiming that Placida freely consented to
the execution of the deed and that they did not commit fraudulent acts in connection with its
execution. They also reiterate their argument that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed
the case on the ground of prescription. It is their contention that the present action being one
to annul a contract on the ground of fraud, it should have been filed within four (4) years from
the discovery of fraud or registration of the instrument with the Registry of Deeds.
The respondents filed their Comment16 dated February 7, 2003, essentially echoing the findings
of the Court of Appeals on the matter of Placida’s consent. According to them, Placida was
deceived and misled into affixing her signature on the deed. They further claim that Placida did
not actually appear before the notary public to acknowledge the instrument.
In their Reply17 dated April 29, 2003, the petitioners insist that Placida was not illiterate and that
Lauro Sumipat validly transferred the titles over the properties in question to them. They also
argue that if Placida did not understand the import of the deed, she could have questioned
Lauro Sumipat about it since the deed was executed a year before the latter died.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that the subject properties are
conjugal, having been acquired during the marriage of Lauro Sumipat and Placida. They came
out, however, with disparate denouements. While the trial court upheld the validity of the deed
as an instrument of transfer of all the litigated parcels of land in their entirety on the ground that
Placida failed to question its authenticity and due execution, the appellate court struck the
deed down insofar as the conjugal share of Placida is concerned based on its finding that her mistake, her testimony on the matter actually makes out a case of total absence of consent,
consent was vitiated by mistake. not merely vitiation thereof. She testified in this regard, thus:
At bottom, the crux of the controversy is whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the Q- What have you been doing on that day on January 5, 1983?
surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the A- I was at home boiling water.
petitioners.
Q- While you were boiling water in the house, at that time who arrived, if
A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a donation there was any?
— although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife,
Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for A- Lydia Sumipat arrived.
their subsistence and support. The preliminary clauses of the deed read: Court:-(To the witness)
That conscious of my advanced age and failing health, I feel that I am not Q- Who is this Lydia Sumipat?
capable anymore of attending to and maintaining and keeping in A- The daughter of my husband with his paramour.
continuous cultivation my above described properties;
Q- How old was she?
That my children are all desirous of taking over the task of maintaining my
properties and have demonstrated since childhood the needed industry A- I did not know if she was already 30 years old at that time because he
and hard work as they have in fact established possession over my real was born in 1950.
properties and introduced more improvements over my lands, the fruit of Atty. Legorio:-(To the witness)
which through their concerted efforts and labors, I myself and my family Q- When you said Lydia Sumipat, you are referring to one of the defendants
have enjoyed; in this case?
That it would be to the best interest of my above mentioned children that A- Yes, sir. She is the one.
the ownership over my above described properties be transferred in their
names, thereby encouraging them more in developing the lands to its fullest Q- This Lydia Sumipat you are referring to as one of the principal defendant
productivity.18 and daughter of your husband with his paramour, in January, 1983 what
was her educational attainment, if you know?
The deed covers three (3) parcels of land.19 Being a donation of immovable property, the
requirements for validity set forth in Article 749 of the Civil Code should have been followed, viz: A- She has already finished schooling.

Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must Q- Do you know what she obtained?
be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated A- Teacher.
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. Q- You said she arrived in the afternoon of January 5, 1983 in your house
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a while you were boiling water. What did she do when she arrived there?
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done A- She brought with her a paper.
during the lifetime of the donor.
Q- What did she say to you?
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
A- She told me to sign that paper immediately because there is the witness
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments. waiting and so I asked from her what was that paper I am going to sign. I
asked her because I am unlettered but she said never mind just sign this
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of immediately.
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly
notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the Q- By the way, what is your highest educational attainment?
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the A- I have never gone to school.
deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, Q- Do you know how to read or to write?
made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of
A- I know how to write only my name.
donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.20
Q- You know how to write your name only?
In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself
or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void. A- Yes, sir.
We also note the absence of any proof of filing of the necessary return, payment of donor’s Q- You said she told you to sign that piece of paper and you asked her
taxes on the transfer, or exemption from payment thereof. Under the National Internal Revenue what was that and she told you "you just sign that", what did you do then?
Code of 1977, the tax code in force at the time of the execution of the deed, an individual who A- She was in a hurry to let me sign that document so I signed it without
makes any transfer by gift shall make a return and file the same within 30 days after the date the knowing what was that.
gift is made with the Revenue District Officer, Collection Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of
Q- Did she tell you that piece of paper was a document wherein the land
the municipality in which the donor was domiciled at the time of the transfer.21 The filing of the
including your land in Siayan were to be given to them?
return and payment of donor’s taxes are mandatory. In fact, the registrar of deeds is mandated
not to register in the registry of property any document transferring real property by way of gifts A- I did not give my land.24
inter vivos unless a certification that the taxes fixed and actually due on the transfer had been During cross-examination, Placida again denied any knowledge of the nature of the deed:
paid or that the transaction is tax exempt from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in either
q You are aware that the titles over these lots had already been transferred
case, is presented.22
in the name of the defendants?
Neither can we give effect to the deed as a sale, barter or any other onerous conveyance, in
a They surreptitiously transferred the title in their names, I do not know about
the absence of valid cause or consideration and consent competently and validly given.23
it.
While it is true that the appellate court found Placida’s consent to have been vitiated by
 q You mean to say you signed a document transferring them in their
names?
a There was a piece of paper brought to me to be signed by Lydia; I asked
what’s all about but she did not tell me; I was forced to sign considering that
according to her somebody was waiting for it.
q What do you mean that you are force to sign?
a She told me to sign that paper immediately because there is a witness
waiting that paper but she was alone when she came to me.
q So you signed that paper?
a I signed it because she was in a hurry.
q That was done during the lifetime of your husband?
a Yes, sir.
q And your husband also signed that paper?
a I do not know because I have not seen my husband signed, Lydia only
came to me to let me sign that paper.
q Is it not a fact that you and your husband were brought before the office
of Judge Pacifico Garcia of Manukan, and in the office you signed that
document?
a I have not gone to the Municipal building of Manukan and I do not know
Judge Garcia.
q But what you know now that the titles are transferred in the name of the
defendants?
a It was Lydia who caused the transfer of the titles in their names.
q And you know that fact when you signed that paper?
a At the time I signed the paper, I do not know yet that the title would be
transferred, it was only at the time when I requested my niece to follow it up
because according to them I am no longer entitled to the land.25
In Baranda v. Baranda,26 this Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not
merely voidable (as intimated by the plaintiffs themselves in their complaint for annulment of
the deeds and reconveyance of the lots) but null and void ab initio as the supposed seller
declared under oath that she signed the deeds without knowing what they were. The significant
circumstance meant, the Court added, that her consent was not merely marred by vices of
consent so as to make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.
Parenthetically, as Placida’s Complaint is entitled Declaration of Nullity of Titles; Contracts;
Partition, Recovery of Ownership and Possession; Reconveyance; Accounting and Damages
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Receivership, the validity of the deed was directly
assailed, but its absolute nullity was not specifically raised as an issue. Nevertheless, both the RTC
and the appellate court took the cue from Placida’s theory that the deed is merely voidable as
regards her conjugal share of the properties. However, since the real issue is whether the
questioned deed has validly transferred ownership of the litigated properties, it is appropriate for
the Court to inquire into the form of the deed and the existence of valid consent thereto to
ascertain the validity or nullity of the deed.
From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the objectives to write finis to a protracted
litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all times. Conformably, we have
ruled in a number of cases that an appellate court is accorded broad discretionary power to
consider even errors not assigned. We have applied this tenet, albeit as a matter of exception,
in the following instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the
case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not
specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower
court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned is dependent.27
In the instant case, the validity of the deed was directly assailed although both parties are of
the view that it is not an absolute nullity. The correct characterization of the deed is, therefore,
determinative of the present controversy. Elsewise framed, the issue of validity or nullity is
interwoven with the positions adopted by the parties and the rulings made by the courts below.
Hence, we shall be resolute in striking down the deed especially as it appears on its face to be a
patent nullity.
Having said this, we shall now proceed to the issue of prescription. Being an absolute nullity,
both as a donation and as a sale, the deed is subject to attack at any time, in accordance with
the rule in Article 1410 of the Civil Code that an action to declare the inexistence of a void
contract does not prescribe.
We are thus unimpressed by the petitioners’ contention that the appellate court should have
dismissed Placida’s appeal on the ground of prescription. Passage of time cannot cure the fatal
flaw in an inexistent and void contract.28 The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent
and incurable; hence, it cannot be cured either by ratification or by prescription. 29
Turning now to the effects of the absolute nullity of the deed, it is well-settled that when there is
a showing of illegality, the property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real
owner by the person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the right to sue for
the reconveyance of the property. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible. As long as
the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who
caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property
to the real owner.30
One final note. After this Decision shall have become final and executory, the parties may either
extrajudicially divide the estates of Lauro Sumipat and Placida Tabotabo pursuant to Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court or judicially settle the estates pursuant to Rules 78, et seq., in accordance with
this Decision and the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court dated September 29, 1997 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 11,
2002, as well as its Resolution dated October 16, 2002, are VACATED. In lieu thereof, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the respondents, to wit: (i) DECLARING the Deed of Absolute
Transfer and/or Quitclaim dated January 5, 1983 NULL AND VOID; and (ii) ORDERING the
CANCELLATION of Transfer Certificates of Title Numbered T-40037 and T-40038 (Zamboanga del
Norte) and the tax declaration covering the unregistered parcel of land, all issued in the names
of the petitioners Lydia, Laurito, Alicia, Alejandro and Lirafe, all surnamed Sumipat, and the
REINSTATEMENT of Original Certificate of Title No. P-17842 (Zamboanga del Norte) Transfer
Certificate Title No. T-15826 (Zamboanga del Norte) and the tax declaration covering the
unregistered parcel of land, all in the name of "Lauro Sumipat . . . married to Placida Tabotabo."
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to
recover a realty.
The Facts
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs,3 sued respondents,
spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran
(trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte
(Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through
purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia
Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes
soon after acquiring it.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in
July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May
1965. The two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two
witnesses, reads in full:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of
Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby
depose and say:
That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children, namely:
LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by reason of poverty
which I suffered while our children were still young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas
aware as he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on
never cared what happened to his family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one
of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our
house, and because of the love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land
located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name
of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs,
successors, and assigns together with all the improvements existing thereon, which parcel of
land is more or less described and bounded as follows:
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by
Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to coconuts now
bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of ₱240.00; 5. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that
ownership be vested on her upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in favor
of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia
Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will give
one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.4
Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered respondents
to surrender possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Property’s produce
since 1982 until petitioner’s repossession and the costs.5 The trial court rejected respondents’
claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo
effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold
the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial court’s
interpretation of the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of an inter vivos donation,
passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. While conceding that
the "language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible different
interpretations,"7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as
donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May
1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed’s consideration
was not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the
latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases
her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the
Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the
CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale
between Rodrigo and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of title.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively,
petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly
occupied it for more than 10 years.9
Respondents see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling and pray for its affirmance.
The Issue
The threshold question is whether petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to respondents’.
The resolution of this issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract between the parties’
predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise. If the former,
respondents hold superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If the latter,
petitioner prevails, having obtained title from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of
which impliedly revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez.
The Ruling of the Court
We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its
execution or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from relevant
jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.10
Further –
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by
the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis
causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to
the effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not
controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos
rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.11
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,"
signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to
reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s
acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift
in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13
Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily
stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to
any person or entity the properties here donated x x x"14 or used words to that effect. Instead,
Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to
profit from it, contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact
he is laboring to prove. The question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or a
donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating
fideicommissary substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted
is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the Deed’s text nor the
import of the contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident
from Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve
during her lifetime."17 Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo’s beneficial title. We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as
here, the donor, while "b[inding] herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none
shall question or disturb [the donee’s] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not pass title
to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the
donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor]
guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus
conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to
the two parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there
would be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon
which the appellants base their contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa
[that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of
the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of
herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the
donee would be able to dispose of them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to
reserve partial usufructuary right over it.20
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and
affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA
committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo’s statement of "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve
his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise").
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa"
dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the donor’
are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument,
in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of
dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of
the property subject of the deed."24
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as
proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of
donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give
license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while
founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property
dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.25
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965,
Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand,
respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may
invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s
combined possession of the Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere’s purchase of
the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court in February
1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year
ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of
an owner requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good faith.28 There is just
title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner
thereof, and could transmit his ownership.30
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property
through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed,
Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner" ("como
tag-iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and
seven years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds
Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner.
Indeed, petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she
started paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from
Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from
being a buyer in good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of
ownership by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property
for 30 years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement.1avvphil
Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant
Petitioner brings to the Court’s attention facts which, according to him, support his theory that
Rodrigo never passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely, that Rodriguez
registered the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez obtained from
Vere in 1981 a waiver of the latter’s "right of ownership" over the Property. None of these facts
detract from our conclusion that under the text of the Deed and based on the
contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession of the
Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deed’s
execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax payment is required to perfect donations. On the
relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere had nothing to waive to
Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguez’s motivation in
obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title
Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under the Deed.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the
Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132681 December 3, 2001
RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner,
vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE REYES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in
favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of
94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the
Register of Deeds for Manila.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the
deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor,
Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses.1 The second page contains the
Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed.
There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala
and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and
the other witness.2 The Acknowledgment reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon, Philippines, this
20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared CATALINA QUILALA, with
Residence Certificate No. 19055265 issued at Quezon City on February 4,
1981, known to me and to me known to be the same person who executed
the foregoing instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is her
own free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages, including the
page on which this acknowledgment is written, has been signed by
CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental witnesses at the end thereof and
on the left-hand margin of page 2 and both pages have been sealed with
my notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of Quezon,
Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.
(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No.
17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984.
Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes,
claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity,
executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto
themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro,
the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter
vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17.
Subsequently, respondents withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo T. San Pedro and he
was dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta,
was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there
was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the
donation null and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS records
does it appear that Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as
an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the adoption was legal. On the
other hand, the trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala.
However, since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that
respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be registered. The trial court rendered
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Gliceria
Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes and against
defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter vivos
executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta
Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala and to issue a transfer
certificate of title in the name of the Estate of Catalina Quilala;.
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1,) and the issuance by the Register
of Deeds of Manila of a transfer certificate of title in the names of the
plaintiffs; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for
lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's
alleged last will and testament.4
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATION:
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice
to the filing of the necessary probate proceedings by the interested parties
so as not to render nugatory the right of the lawful heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on February 11,
1998.5 Hence, this petition for review, raising the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION
OF REAL PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS NOT REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S
RULING THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA
QUILALA.6
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta.
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public
instrument in order to be valid,7 specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from
the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,9 provided the donee is not
disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted,
it is generally considered irrevocable,10 and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property.11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor
and the donee.12 It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,13 and
the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well
as the technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was
made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not make a determination of
DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a donation. whether Violeta was the daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These
Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby a person disposes issues should be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings affecting the
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it."16 respective estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation, which we
The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate declare herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771,18
paragraph of the deed, which reads: in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code. Moreover, property donated inter vivos
is subject to collation after the donor's death,19 whether the donation was made to a
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation made compulsory heir or a stranger,20 unless there is an express prohibition if that had been the donor's
in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses her appreciation and intention.21
gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR.17
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed Court of Appeals , is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered dismissing Civil
their signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only Case No. 84-26603.
the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge
her acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private SO ORDERED.
instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and
other voluntary instruments, whether affecting registered or unregistered
land, executed in accordance with law in the form of public instruments
shall be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by
person or persons executing the same in the presence of at least two
witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be
the free act and deed of the person or persons executing the same before
a notary public or other public officer authorized by law to take
acknowledgment. Where the instrument so acknowledged consists of two
or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment is written,
each page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register
of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each page of the copy to
be kept by the notary public, except the page where the signatures
already appear at the foot of the instrument shall be signed on the left
margin thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their
witnesses, and all the pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as
well as the number of pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment. Where
the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or
encumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the number thereof shall
likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment." (italics supplied).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee
and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting
parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute.
The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is
authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the
contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting
party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to
everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that
one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The
purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted
provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does
not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It
cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in
the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second
page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth
on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.