A.
Crimes against national security
1. TREASON
PEOPLE vs. GARCIA
FACTS
Three Japanese soldiers and appellant, all
armed, went to the house of Escudero (guerrilla),
ransacked his house and took him with them.
These facts have been proved by three witnesses
(his wife, mother, and Aurelia Escudero)
On the next day, Tagle was apprehended by the
appellant and three Japanese soldiers for
shooting the Japanese sentry at the bridge. Tagle
was release after 26 days. (only one witness)
On October 29, 1944, three Japanese and
appellant, carrying handcuffs and revolvers,
arrested Martinez (also a guerilla) and mistook
him for an American, because Martinez was of
light complexion and had reddish hair. At the time
Martinez was arrested, his brother Fernando
Martinez arrived, to pay a visit to his parents who
were living there. He was also arrested and the
two brothers, with tied hands, were taken away
and confined in several places. Fernando was
released about three days later, but Mario was
never seen again by his family. These facts have
been proved by the testimonies of Fernando
Martinez and Maria Bernardo, wife of Mario.
Six other witnesses for the prosecution also
testified that at about the time above arrests had
taken place, appellant was a spy in the service of
the Japanese military police, and he himself said
so expressly to some of said witnesses and even
invited the two of the witnesses to become spy.
ISSUE
Whether the appellant committed the crime of
Treason for the three arrests?
RULING
Yes, the arrests made were considered as overt
acts of aid and comfort rendered to the Japanese
and, because voluntarily rendered, could have
been done only in pursuance of his adherence to
the enemy.
PEOPLE vs. RACAZA
FACTS
The accused was charged with treason on 14
counts. That during the period between 1944 and
1945, Said accused not being a foreigner but a
Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United
States of America and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines treasonably adhere to the Empire of
Japan with which the United States and the
Philippines were then at war, giving said enemy
the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese
forces in the Philippines, aid and/or comfort.
He mainly acted as a Japanese spy for the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the Imperial Japanese by guiding
and accompanying the arrest and torture of
guerrillas.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of all the
counts and sentenced him to death. It said that
"the prosecution substantiated the overt acts by
two competent witnesses, and the through the
confession of the accused in open Court." (he
pleaded guilty in short)
After several witnesses for the prosecution had
given testimony, defendants counsel informed
the court that his client, upon the latter's
insistence, was willing "to enter a plea of guilty
and ask whatever consideration or mercy the
court will give him."
He also answered yes to the question whether he
was aware of the consequences of a plea of
guilty. However, when the information was read
over again, the accused said that he admitted
some of the charges but not all.
The prosecution then resumed the presentation
of evidence and called witnesses to substantiate
the charges to which a plea of not guilty was
entered. But after three new witnesses, counsel
for the accused reiterated "his petition at he
instance of the accused himself", that the latter be
allowed to changed his plea of not guilty to that of
guilty to all the 14 counts.
The trial court found the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, superior
strength, treachery and employment of means for
adding ignominy to the natural effects of the
crime.
ISSUE
Whether the Trial Court erred in its decision to
sentence the accused to death.
RULING
(treason, the highest crime known to law)
Yes, This court found that the accused was guilty
of Treason on 7 counts.
Yes, the lower court itself was led into serious
errors. The first three circumstances are, by their
nature inherent in the offense of treason and may
not be taken to aggravate the penalty. So are
superior strength and treachery included in the
crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior
strength;
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse
of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the
commission of treason. There is no
incompatibility between treason and decent,
human treatment of prisoners.
For the very reason that premeditation, treachery
and use of superior strength are absorbed in
treason characterized by killing, the killings
themselves and other accompanying crimes
should be taken into consideration for measuring
the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility
irrespective of the manner in which they were
committed. Were not this the rule, treason, the
highest crime known to law, would confer on its
perpetrators advantages that are denied simple
murderers. To avoid such incongruity and
injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted,
within the range provided in the Revised Penal
Code, to the danger and harm to which the culprit
has exposed his country and his people and to
the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his
deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the
Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the
perversity of the mind that conceived and carried
the crime into execution. Where the system of
graduating penalties by the prescribed standards
is inapplicable, as in the case of homicides
connected with treason, the method of analogies
to fit the punishment with the enormity of the
offense may be summoned to the service of
justice and consistency and in furtherance of the
law’s aims.
The judgment appealed from is correct in this
result and the same should be affirmed with
costs. However, as four justices dissent from
the imposition of the death penalty, the
appealed sentence is modified and reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE vs. ROBLE
FACTS
The accused was charged with treason on three
counts,( With the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy and her military forces) in the following
manner;
First count- the accused being a member of the
Philippine Constabulary, guided and
accompanied 10 armed members of the pro-
Japanese constabulary and apprehended
PAULINO OSORIO for having
helped the guerrillas and being the Father of two
guerrilla men After maltreating Osorio, the
accused detained him in the municipal jail of
Dalaguete Accused and his companions also
apprehended MELCHOR CAMPOMANES and 7
others who were then tortured for being guerrilla
supporters and sympathizers, and and the
accused with his firearm shot Campomanes
killing him instantly.
Second Count- the accused guided and
accompanied a patrol of 13 Constabulary soldiers
and apprehended FORTUNATO LINARES for
being guerrillas and/or guerrilla supporters.
Accused then tied and tortured Linares and cut a
portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe
especially with Antolin Rodriguez who effectively
died as a result of said tortures
Third Count- the accused accompanied an
armed group of Constabulary soldiers to
Mambaling and other parts of Cebu City and
apprehended ELEUTERIO PADILLA, a former
USAFFE soldier, for being a guerrilla. Accused
and his companions tied and tortured Padilla,
detaining him at the Constabulary Headquarters
for several days after which he was killed.
He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to DEATH
by the lower court.
ISSUE
Whether the crime of treason can be complexed.
Whether death was the correct penalty to be
imposed on the accused.
RULING
No, the Lower Court erred in its finding that the
facts of this case is a complex crime of treason
with murders, meaning the penalty provided for
the most serious offense was to be imposed on
its maximum degree. It opined that the killings
were murders qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident
premeditation, superior strength, cruelty and
an armed band.
The torture and murders set forth in the
information are merged in and form part of
treason. They were in this case the overt acts
which, besides traitorous intention, supplied a
vital ingredient in the crime.
Emotional or intellectual attachment and
sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the
giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The
defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had
not committed the atrocities in question.
The killings themselves and other accompanying
crime should be taken into consideration for
measuring the degree and gravity of criminal
responsibility irrespective of the manner in which
they were committed. If it were not this the rule,
then treason considered as the highest crime
known to law would confer on its perpetrator
advantage that are denied simple murderer.
To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the
penalty in treason will be adapted within the range
provided in RPC to the danger and harm
and to which the culprit has exposed his country
and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that
resulted from his deeds.
The letter and spirit of the RPC adjust penalties
to the perversity of the mind that conceived and
carried the crime into execution. Where the
system of graduating penalties by the prescribed
standards is inapplicable as in the case of
homicides in connection with treason, the
method of analogies to fit the punishment with the
enormity of the offense may be summoned to the
service of justice and consistency and
in the furtherance of the law's aims.
The appellant’s spontaneous plea of guilty is
sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the
maximum. The appealed decision is MODIFIED
and the sentence REDUCED to reclusion
perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.
PEOPLE vs. ADLAWAN
FACTS
Appellant Adlawan pleaded guilty to a complaint
against charged against him. Said complaint
states that during the year 1943 to 1945, Adlawan
adhered to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and
its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable
intent to give aid and comfort to said enemy by
going out on numerous patrol in company with
Japanese forces in search of guerilla and other
elements resisting the enemy of the Philippines.
In the course of doing so, Adlawan also
committed murder, torture, robbery, and rape.
The accused voluntarily surrendered and entered
the plea of guilty to the information allaged.
The People’s Court convicted Adlawan guilty of
the complex crime of treason with murder,
robbery and rape. He is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death.
The accused assails the conviction and the lower
court should have appreciated his mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, that he is a
witness utilized by the CIC and that he saved
many civilian lives from the Japanese forces. He
further states that the lower court erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances
treachery, murder, abuse of superiority and
unnecessary cruelty. The SC modified the
decision of the lower court to the extent that the
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua and
fine of P20,000.00.
ISSUE
Whether the lower court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstances, and for not taking
into consideration the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.
RULING
Yes, the SC said that the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength should not have been considered. These
are by their nature inherent in the offense of
treason. However, the facts show that in
committing treason, appellant augmented the
wrong by being cruel to captured guerilla
suspects, subjecting them to torture and death.
He also chose to add ignominy by stripping off the
clothes of a guerilla suspect’s wife and abusing
them with other Filipino girls. These two
aggravating circumstances of unnecessary
cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated.
However, Appellant's claim of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilt has not been
satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his
admission that he was "taken" from the house of
his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof that he
was in fact arrested.
There is, however, merit in the contention that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and
abuse of superior strength should not have been
considered. These circumstances are "by their
nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may
not be taken to aggravate the penalty."
(People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts
alleged in the information show that appellant in
committing the crime of treason, deliberately
augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily
cruel to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting
them to barbarous forms of torture and finally
putting them to death, and he also chose to add
ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and
maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his
wife of her clothes and then abusing her together
with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are
by the allegations of the complaint and deemed
admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these two
aggravating circumstances of unnecessary
cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against
him.
The penalty for the crime of treason is reclusion
perpetua to death, and a fine not to exceed
P20,000. Appellant is given the benefit of
voluntary confession of guilty, but appreciating
against him the aggravating circumstances of
unnecessary cruelty and ignominy, the penalty
should be imposed in its maximum. However, 5
members of the court opposed the death penalty.
PEOPLE vs. BASCON
FACTS
Severo Bascon alias "Kid Moro" is appealing from
a decision of the People's Court finding him guilty
of treason and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000, and to pay
the costs.
By his own admission the appellant Severino
Bascon alias Kid Moro is a Filipino citizen.
He was married to a Japanese woman who
according to the evidence and by the very
admission of the appellants. Was employed by
the Japanese as an interpreter.
The accused act as a spy and/or undercover
agent for the Japanese Military Police known as
Kempei Tai and as such, did arrest apprehend
and identify guerrillas and other person engaged
in the resistance movement for the Kempei Tai
torturing and maltreating person thus arrested by
him and did furnish valuable military information
regarding guerrillas and the USAFFE to the
Japanese Imperial Forces.
The appellant claims that after liberation he was
investigated by the CIC (Counter Intelligence
Corps of the United State liberation Forces) and
was cleared by it and given clearance paper.
However he was unable to produce such alleged
clearance papers in support of his claim saying
that he had lost them.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court is correct in sentencing
him to suffer life imprisonment for treason.
RULING
Yes, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court as
to the guilt of the appellants of the crime of
treason. By his acts and conduct duty proven
during the trial he a Filipino owing allegiance to
the United State a and to the Government of the
Philippines Islands adhered to and aided the
Government of Japan represented by its invading
and occupation forces in the Province of Cebu by
accompanying and helping them in confiscating
firearms and obtaining information about the
whereabouts strength and activities of the
guerrilla forces by freely using force intimidation
and torture.
PEOPLE vs. PEREZ
FACTS
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of
treason and was sentenced to death by
electrocution.
TC found the accused, together with the other
Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women
against their will for the purpose of using them, to
satisfy the sexual desire of the Japanese officers.
The Solicitor General submitted an opposite view
stating that the deeds committed by the accused
do not constitute treason. It further discussed that
if furnishing women for immoral purposes to the
enemies was treason because women’s
company kept up their morale, so fraternizing
them, entertaining them at parties, selling them
food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be
treason . Any act of hospitality produces the same
result.
ISSUE
Whether the acts of the accused constituted the
crime of treason.
RULING
No, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds
of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded
country and its inhabitants. What aid and comfort
constitute treason must depend upon their nature
degree and purpose.
As a general rule, to be treasonous, the extent of
the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be
to render assistance to them as enemies and not
merely as individuals and in addition, be directly
in furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs.
His “commandeering” of women to satisfy the lust
of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant
for the enemies and boost their spirit.
Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did
not directly and materially tend to improve their
war efforts or to weaken the power of US.
Whatever favorable effect the defendant’s
collaboration with the Japanese might have in
their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of
disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of
treason, which, in the absence of admission, may
be gathered from the nature and circumstance of
each particular case.
The defendant personally assaulted and abused
two of the offended girls but these assaults are
not charged against him and should be ruled out.
The crime of coercion alleged and founded on
count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the
severity of the penalty for the other crimes which
he must suffer.
The Supreme Court find the accused guilty of four
separate crimes of rape and sentence him for
each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from
10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law,
to indemnify each of the offended women in the
sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being
understood that the total duration of these
penalties shall not exceed forty years.
PEOPLE vs. DE CASTRO
FACTS
Appellant was a USAFFE soldier and upon the
occupation of the Province of by the Japanese
Army he joined the Bureau of Constabulary and
became a regular constabulary soldier under the
government of occupation. He was one of the
constabulary soldiers who accompanied 4
Japanese soldiers in going to the house of Bacani
family in Bulacao. The Japanese Sergeant
investigating the two sisters (Rosario and Anita)
whom they suspected to have relation with
guerrillas. They imprisoned the two together with
their brother but later freed them for lack of
evidence.
After some time, Rosario was taken from her
house by accused and others and was brought to
the house of Sergeant Yoshida made some
amorous advances to Rosario and threatened to
kill her and all the members of her family should
she not consent to live with him. Rosario had to
yield, and from then on Rosario became a
mistress of Yoshida.
Rosario testified that while she was living in the
house of Yoshida, appellant was also living there
and was giving reports Yoshida's interpreter.
There is no evidence, however, of what those
reports were, and their felonious character is not
to be presumed.
The People’s Court convicted him for Treason
and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment.
ISSUE
Whether the acts committed constitute treason.
RULING
No, the facts above stated do not constitute
treason. Appellant's membership in the Bureau of
Constabulary under the government of
occupation is not treason. That institution was
intended for the promotion and preservation of
law and order which were essential during war to
the life of the civilian population. Appellant
personally did nothing serious except his having
taken Rosario Bacani from her house to bring her
to the house of Yoshida, but again this is not
treason. It may be an aid to satisfy the lust of a
japanese officer, an aid which is not treasonous.
Neither is appellant guilty as co-author of rape, for
no rape is alleged in the information and no rape
had been committed by Yoshida against Rosario,
she having yielded her body to him not because
she was afraid that otherwise she might be the
victim of his brutality. It is well settled that when
“some hesitation was shown by the woman or that
she had contributed in some way to the
realization of the act” there is no rape.
PEOPLE vs. CONCEPCION
FACTS
The appellant was charged with treason on three
counts (Count 3, count 5,and count 6) for
arresting three suspected guerrillas. The
evidence for the prosecution shows that the three
individuals were apprehended by the appellant or
at his instigation, due to their guerrilla
connections.
Appellant’s counsel contends that the lower made
an error in allowing the prosecution to present
evidence of appellant's Filipino citizenship after
the prosecution had rested its case and the
defense had moved for dismissal.
Counsel for the appellant argues that the charges
of which the appellant was convicted have not
been approved in accordance with the two-
witness rule. Specifically it is contended that while
prosecution witness Agapito Severino testified
that the appellant, with a Japanese interpreter,
arrived at their house and inquired if his brother
Basilio Severino was at home, and said that the
latter was wanted at the military police
headquarters for questioning, the other
prosecution witness Edgardo Severino did not
corroborate witness Agapito in this respect.
Neither did the latter corroborate Edgardo as
regards the fact that Basilio Severino was taking
a bath and as regards Basilio's statement that the
appellant and his companions should wait. There
may not be corroboration between the two
prosecution witnesses on the points mentioned,
but said witnesses are uniform in their testimony
that Basilio Severino was arrested on December
7, 1944. The latter important detail constitutes the
overt act of treason charged in count 3.
Under the second, third and fourth assignments
of error, appellant’s counsel argues that the
charges of which the appellant was convicted
have not been approved in accordance with the
two-witness rule
Specifically it is contended that while prosecution
witness Agapito Severino testified that the
appellant, with a Japanese interpreter, arrived at
their house and inquired if his brother Basilio
Severino was at home, and said that the latter
was wanted at the military police headquarters for
questioning, the other prosecution witness
Edgardo Severino did not corroborate witness
Agapito in this respect. Neither did the latter
corroborate Edgardo as regards the fact that
Basilio Severino was taking a bath and as regards
Basilio's statement that the appellant and his
companions should wait.
The same consideration may be said regarding
the criticism of appellant's counsel that their is
lack of corroboration on some details between
prosecution witnesses Melchor Ugayong and
Victoriano Cagitla, who, however, testified in
unison on the overt act charged in count 5,
namely, the apprehension by appellant of
Clemente Chica.
As to count 6, it is contended by counsel for the
defense that the testimony of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution is merely to the
effect that the appellant was waiting below the
house of Gavino Moras (who was arrested), and
that it was appellant's Japanese companions who
came down from the house with said Gavino
Moras.
ISSUE
Whether the lower court erred in allowing the
prosecution to present evidence of appellant’s
Filipino Citizenship after the prosecution had
rested its case.
Whether the prosecution failed to observe the two
witness rule.
RULING
No, as the matter of reopening a case for the
reception of further evidence after either the
prosecution or the defense has rested is within
the discretion of the trial court.
No, (under second, third, or fourt assignment)
there may not be corroboration between the two
prosecution witnesses on the points mentioned,
but said witnesses are uniform in their testimony
that Basilio Severino was arrested on December
7, 1944
This argument is also without merit, it having
been established by at least two witnesses that
the appellant and his companions arrived at the
house of Gavino at the same time, from which the
conclusion is inescapable that he actually in a
way aided in the apprehension of Gavino Moras.
PEOPLE vs. PANGANIBAN
FACTS
The defendant was found guilty by the People’s
Court of four counts of Treason, the court
sentenced him to death and to pay a fine in the
sum of P15,000 and the costs.
The defendant was chief of police, remained in
his post and met the Japanese forces, thus
initiating a close contact of collaboration with the
enemy.
First count. — defendant shot Feliciano Godoy
and as a result thereof the victim died at 2 o'clock
the following day, without any help to save his life,
because defendant prohibited members of the
family of the victim from taking his son because
according to him Godoy should die because he
was "a bad and a guerilla."
Second count. — arrested a guerrilla captain
attached to the Fil-American guerrilla forces and
then latter to the PQOG and later taken to the
Japanese garrison and executed on the same
day.
the defendant and his men ransacked their house
and other personal belongings. Defendant admits
that he himself confiscated the arms of the
Americans.
Third count. — the defendant and his men
ransacked the house of four americans and other
personal belongings. Defendant admits that he
himself confiscated the arms of the Americans.
Fourth count. — appellant sent foodstuffs, to
Japanese soldiers that were collected by
defendant from the townspeople who were
compelled to give what they could to feed those
Japanese soldiers formerly stationed in the
poblacion of Lobo.
The defendant argued that he received a note
from Captain Terada, the officer in command of
those Japanese soldiers, demanding that food be
sent to his command quickly, otherwise they will
kill the people and come down from the mountain
to burn the town and massacre its inhabitants.
ISSUE
Whether the acts committed by the defendant is
treasonous.
RULING
Yes, even if we should consider that he cannot be
held responsible for the death of Emilio Boruel, a
guerrilla captain, and regard that the killing of
Felicisimo Godoy was caused by this appellant to
avenge an alleged attempt against his life, yet the
record contains abundant proof that, during the
three years of occupationby the Japanese, he
had done his best to further the war effort of the
enemy to the prejudice of the interest of his
countrymen, because notwithstanding the fact
that he, as a Filipino citizen, owed allegiance to
the United States of American and the
Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, he had made up his mind that the
American sovereignty would not be restored in
the Philippines. In fact, a few days before the
alleged attempt to assassinate him, in a speech
he delivere, he admonished those who had
relatives among the guerrillas, to tell them to
surrender to the Japanese because Japan was
bound to win the war and the Americans could not
be expected to return until after many years.
The Supreme Court sentenced to reclusion
perpetua with the accessories of the law.
PEOPLE vs. MENOR
FACTS
The accused, with the active cooperation of a
group of Filipinos, the Japanese established a
"military cordon" in the barrio of Tipas, in order to
prevent the inhabitants from leaving the place.
They gathered all the inhabitants, particularly the
men, and the accused by a nod of the head,
indicated to the Japanese whether or not a
particular individual was a guerrilla or connected
therewith. Those who were not pointed out as
guerrillas were sent to the Catholic church and
later released. After this, the group of persons
who were classified as guerrillas were never seen
or heard from thereafter.
Another information shows that Ernesto
Buenviaje, then a guerrilla, came from his
mountain hideout to visit his family. His wife
warned him that he was being hunted on account
of his guerrilla activities, whereupon Buenviaje
and his wife hurriedly left their house and took
refuge in the house of their cousin They had been
in that place only a few minutes when the
accused Amado Menor, accompanied by other
Filipinos, pointed his gun at Buenviaje, while his
companions dragged their victim downstairs, and
there tied and thereafter taken away. Since then
nothing was heard of Ernesto Buenviaje.
The People's Court found him guilty of treason
under those counts and, taking into consideration
the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of
lack of education, sentenced him to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of
P7,000 and the costs.
ISSUE
Whether the lower court is correct in taking into
consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack
of education/intelligence.
RULING
No, the accused had shown sufficient intelligence
to be entrusted with the possession of a revolver,
indicating a degree of intelligence and instruction
beyond that of persons who are entitled to the
benefit of said circumstance. In the case at bar,
the acts executed by this appellant show that he
is in possession of that degree of intelligence to
have capacitated him to act as an able and
efficient informer of the Japanese who were bent
on disrupting and destroying the guerrilla
underground movement which was the main
obstacle to the accomplishment of the occupation
of these Islands. The subservience of this
defendant, and his co-members of the Makapili,
and those of his ilk, no doubt greatly enhanced
the chances of the Japanese to carry out their
plan of domain of the Philippines through the aid
and cooperation of Filipinos who played traitors to
their country.
The active participation of this appellant in the
zoning in question and the subsequent arrest of
Ernesto Buenviaje and his disappearance and
possible death by killing, undoubtedly constitutes
the adherence and giving aid and comfort to the
enemy, which constitutes the element of treason
under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE vs. ALVERO
FACTS
Aurelio Sevilla Alvero alias Reli was charged with
treason on twenty-two(22) counts before the
People's Court. After trial, said Court found the
defendant guilty on all counts except the 10th
relative to his interview with Leonardo Garcia,
and the 18th which refers to his alleged ordering,
helping in and causing the burning of the
buildings west of Taft Avenue and south of
Libertad Street in Pasay. Accused appealed from
that decision of conviction.
The People's Court grouped the 22 counts under
three main classifications — economic, political,
and military collaboration. Under economic
collaboration, come counts 2 and 3 referring to
appellant's business or trading activities, buying
war materials and selling them to the enemy,
under his company called ASA TRADING. In
political collaboration are included three groups,
namely: the letter of congratulations to President
Laurel relative to his declaration of war against
the United States and Great Britain (count 4);
defendant's membership in the KALIBAPI (count
1); and the formation and organization of the New
Leader's Association (counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 21,
and 22). Under military collaboration, come five
groups, which are: defendant's relations with and
membership in the MAKAPILI (count 5 and 20);
his organization of the "Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala"
(counts 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17); the meeting at the
Ayuntamiento de Manila ([City Hall], count
17);organization of OUR PEOPLE'S OWN
GUERRILLA ([O.P.P.G.], count 11); and the
burning of buildings in Pasay (count 18).
Thereafter, an amnesty proclamation was
promulgated. Invoking the benefits of said
Amnesty Proclamation, appellant filed a motion
for dismissal of the cultural, political and
economical counts of the information. The Court
granted said motion and dismissed the counts of
the information referring to economic and political
collaboration as above enumerated and
discussed.
ISSUE
Whether or not by reason of the application and
extension of the Amnesty Proclamation to
appellant's acts of economic and political
collaboration, his acts of adherence have also
been wiped out.
RULING
No, the Court finds the appellant guilty of treason.
There is more than sufficient proof of adherence
in the other counts. The entries in his diaries
make mention of his countless Japanese friends
in high officialdom, not only among the Japanese
civilian entities attached to or collaborating with
the Japanese Armed Forces, but also in the Army
and the Navy itself. His diary records almost daily
conferences, interviews, dinners, luncheons,
rides, etc. with such Japanese officials. Some of
his conferences and parleys were by himself
described as secret.
Regarding this same adherence, had appellant
confined himself within the realm of mere
adherence — disloyal state of mind and
treasonous thoughts, intentions, and sympathies,
however great may have been the
disappointment, disapproval, and even hatred of
his countrymen for such disloyalty to them and to
their country, the law and prosecuting officials
could not have taken action against him.
Adherence alone is not indictable. But when he
translated such treasonous sympathies and
intentions into overt acts of treason such as
joining the Makapili, establishing his military
organization Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala and offering
its services to take charge of the maintenance of
peace and order, which included the suppression
of the guerrillas, so that the Japanese could
concentrate their forces in defending the City of
Manila by fighting against the American and
guerrilla forces trying to enter and liberate it, then
he (appellant) breached as it were the walls of
allegiance and loyalty which the treason law has
erected to surround and protect the security and
integrity of the nation, and he may then be held
criminally liable.
CRISOLOGO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
Juan Crisologo a lieutenant colonel in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines was accused of treason
in the People’s Court in 1946.
But before the petitioner be brought under the
jurisdiction of the People’s court, he was already
been tried and convicted of treason before a
military court and was given a sentence of life
imprisonment in 1947.
The People’s court have been abolished in 1948
therefore the case pending in the People’s court
has been transferred under the jurisdiction of the
Court of First instance of Zamboanga.Being
arraigned now in the CFI of Zamboanga,
Crisologo filed then a motion to quash to dismiss
the case pleading Double Jeopardy saying that
he has already been tried and sentenced in the
military court.
OSG opposed saying that this is not Double
Jeopardy. OSG claimed that offense charged in
military court is different from that which is
charged in the civil court… even granting that
they are identical the military court had no
jurisdiction on the matter because the People’s
court is the first one to acquire jurisdiction over
the case… therefore rendering the conviction in
the military court void. OSG added that there are
overt acts added to the complaint of treason filed
in people’s court which makes it different from the
treason filed in the military court.
ISSUE
whether further prosecution in CFI may prosper.
RULING
overt acts specified in the amended information in
the Zamboanga court were not specified in the
indictment in the court martial, they all are
embraced in the general charge of treason, which
is a continuous offense and one who commits it
is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there
are overt acts, because all overt acts "he has
done or might have done for that purpose
constitute but a single offense."
In other words, since the offense charged in the
amended information in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that
the said information contains an enumeration of
additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in
the indictment before the military court is
immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not
in themselves constitute a new and distinct
offense from that of treason, and this Court has
repeatedly held that a person cannot be found
guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty
of overt acts specified in the information for
treason even if those overt acts, considered
separately, are punishable by law, for the simple
reason that those overt acts are not separate
offense distinct from that of treason but
constitutes ingredients thereof.
In the present case no new facts have
supervened that would change the nature of the
offense for which petitioner was tried in the
military court, the alleged additional overt acts
specified in the amended information in the civil
court having already taken place when petitioner
was indicted in the former court.
As to the claim that the military court had no
jurisdiction over the case, well known is the rule
that when several courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first
acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it
to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however,
requires that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall have first been obtained by the
court in which the first charge was filed. The
record in the present case shows that the
information for treason in the People’s Court was
filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet
been arrested or brought into the custody of the
court — the warrant of arrest had not even been
issued - when the indictment for the same offense
was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947.
Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of
the complaint in one court does not give that court
priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being
necessary in addition that the court where the
information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of
the person of defendant.
It appearing that the offense charged in the
military court and in the civil court is the same,
that the military court had jurisdiction to try the
case and that both courts derive their powers
from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by
the military court to the petitioner should, in
accordance with the precedents above cited, be
a bar to petitioner’s further prosecution for the
same offense in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales.
PETITION DISMISSED.
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
FACTS
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and
other appellants were accused of conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other,
as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants
charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. They were accused of being
members of PKP Community Party of the
Philippines which was actively engaged in an
armed rebellion against the government of the
Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP,
they committed the crime of rebellion causing
murder, pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated
in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by
HUKS.
The crimes they committed were Rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies
The Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of
the crime committed required the denial of bail.
Moreover, the complex crime charged by the
government against Hernandez has been
successfully imposed with other arrested
communist leaders and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants
regarding the judgment rendered by the CFI in
Manila that rebellion cannot be a complex crime
with murder, arson or robbery.
ISSUE
Whether the crime of rebellion can be complexed.
RULING
No, the court ruled that “murder, arson, and
robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of
rebellion as means “necessary” for the
perpetration of the offense. Such common
offense is absorbed or inherent of the crime of
rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in
Article 135 constitutes, one single crime it follows
that said acts offer no occasion for the application
of Article 48 which requires therefore the
commission of at least two crimes.
HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE: Rebellion cannot be
complexed with common crimes such as killings,
destruction of property, etc., committed on the
occasion and in furtherance thereof. The thinking
is not anymore correct more so that there is no
legal basis for such rule now. Rebellion
constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME.
PEOPLE vs. VILLANUEVA
FACTS
During the Japanese occupation, appellant Pedro
T. Villanueva, a Filipino citizen owing allegiance
to the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the
enemy aid and comfort by rendering service with
the Japanese Imperial Army as secret agent,
informer and spy, of its Detective Force in the
province of Iloilo, and that in the performance of
such service, he participated actively and directly
in the punitive expeditions periodically made by
the Japanese forces in the guerilla-infested areas
of the province of Iloilo, and committed robberies,
arson and mass-murders. Witnesses, who
themselves were victims of the maltreatment and
torture of the Japanese and others who were able
to escape the raids made by the Japanese forces
with the aid of Villanueva, testified with
corroborated statements against the defendant.
The defendant denied the overt acts imputed
upon him, and avers that if he ever served in the
detective force of the Japanese Army, it was
because he was made to accept the position
under duress, and that his acceptance of such
position was for the good of the people, he having
saved many Filipino lives from Japanese
atrocities. Villanueva was sentenced to death by
the People's Court for the crime of treason. The
case was elevated to the Tribunal for mandatory
review, for judgments of the lower courts
imposing death penalties.

ISSUE
Whether or not his denials and defense of duress
exerted by the Japanese Imperial Army upon him
will suffice to exempt him from the crime of
treason.

RULING
The Court ruled that mere denial by appellant
cannot prevail upon the positive assertion and
corroboration of the statements of witnesses for
the government establishing incriminating facts. It
is a well settled rule of evidence that as between
positive and negative testimony, the former
deserves more weight and credit. With regards to
his defense of duress allegedly exerted by the
Japanese upon him for which he had to serve in
the Detective Force of the Japanese Army, the
defendant was not able to present sufficient proof
that he was indeed coerced or compelled by the
Japanese but merely stated self-serving
testimonies. Duress, force, fear or intimidation to
be available as a defense, the fear must be well-
founded, an immediate and actual danger of
death or great bodily harm must be present and
the compulsion must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity to accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat. A threat of future
injury is not enough. Hence, the decision of the
lower court was affirmed with modifications on the
indemnities imposed and that the penalty of death
be commuted to reclusion perpetua due to lack of
sufficient votes to impose the justifiable penalty of
death.
C. Misprision of Treason
PEOPLE vs. SAAVEDRA
FACTS
The deceased, a foreman at Cummins Diesel
was asked by their quality control manager
(Pavon) to accompany him to a hotel.
It was around 9:00 p.m. when they reached the
hotel. After parking his car, Pavon proceeded to
the lobby where the deceased followed him.
Upon entering the hotel, he heard a commotion
behind him. saw two men running toward a
waiting taxi cab outside. 1According to him, one
"looked at me and smiled and made a thumbs-up
sign." 1He later identified the first as Fernandez
and the one who gave the thumbs-up sign as
Romeo Saavedra (Accused).
Pulmares suffered a stab wound and an inch-long
laceration distal forearm. The victim survived the
operation but developed uremia and later died.
A housemaid at the Cummins Diesel guest
house, testified that Reynaldo Quilala and Romeo
Saavedra (accused) had been shadowing the
guest house premises and that at about the time
deceased arrived, a red taxi cab had been parked
at the gate. She pointed to Quilala, Saavedra, and
an unnamed person as the occupants of the cab.
And when Pavon and Pulmares left, the three
followed them.
Fernandez argued that he was threatened by
Quilala to stab the deceased with a four inch
samurai "Okay, if you will not stab him, I will shoot
you with this Indian pana, Indian target." It was a
threat the accused himself allegedly seconded:
"[Y]ou just go ahead, Rey, so that you will not
meet an accident."
They headed toward the Cebu City Colleges
where they alighted. 87 They boarded a tartanilla
and disembarked at the Pasil Parochial Church.
88 They agreed to drink again.
The lower Court finds, after trial on the merits, the
accused Saavedra GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as co-principal
thereof, and there being present and proven the
generic aggravating circumstances of use of a
motor vehicle and drunkenness which was
intentional without any mitigating circumstances
to offset them, hereby sentences said to suffer the
extreme penalty of DEATH, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify jointly and
severally with his co-accused.
ISSUE
Whether the accused is guilty of misprision of
treason.
RULING
No, The accused-appellant's neglect in
informing the authorities of the incident except
some twelve days thereafter cannot be taken-
against him. Failure to report violations of the
law, save in certain cases — misprision of
treason for one, concealing "evil practices" in
the course of a sedition 167 for another — is
not a crime. But what should not be lost sight
of is the fact that Saavedra, as he claims feared
reprisals from Quilala. It is a natural reaction, to
our mind, and does not of necessity suggest
Saavedra's guilt, let alone, his participation in a
common criminal design.
It should be noted that Saavedra had no motive
to take the life of the victim. The records show that
he did not know him at all.
Saavedra's presence at the locus criminis, we
earlier said, is not enough to make him a
conspirator. Neither is it sufficient to hold him
liable in the character of an accomplice.
Here, Saavedra did not perform such act that
would suggest cooperation on his part in the
killing of the deceased. And as we have stated,
the prosecution has not shown that a mutual
design existed between Saavedra and
Fernandez at the time of that killing.
Neither can it be argued that Saavedra, by his
presence, provided moral aid to Fernandez in
liquidating the victim. Saavedra here merely
stood behind Fernandez. In fact, Fernandez
testified that he was "conversing with somebody"
at that time. That does not amount to the moral
assistance contemplated by law.
While Saavedra is said to have made a "thumbs
up" signal, that is by itself an ambiguous act.
Furthermore, it came after Fernandez had
inflicted the lethal wounds upon the victim. It
could not have therefore served Fernandez any
more purpose, the crime having been completed.
In the light of our findings, the accused-appellant
Romeo Saavedra is entitled to an acquittal.
B. Crimes against the law of nations
a. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high
seas or in Philippine waters
PEOPLE vs. Lol-lo
FACTS
A boat of Dutch possession, after a number of
days of navigation, arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6
vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros
first asked for food, but once on the Dutch
boat, took for themselves all of the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2
of the women. The Moros abducted the 2 women
and put holes on the Dutch boat with the idea that
it would submerge together with the other
persons aboard. During the course of their
abduction, the 2 women were repeatedly violated
but later on were able to escape upon their arrival
at Maruro, another Dutch possession. Lol-lo and
Saraw, 2 of the Moros, later returned to their
home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, where
they were arrested and were charged in the CFI
of Suhn with the crime of piracy.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not the crime of piracy was
committed by the defendants.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the Penal
Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still
in force.
RULING
1. Yes, piracy is robbery or forcible depredation
on the high seas, without lawful authority
and done with animo furandi and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility. It is a crime not
against any particular State but against all
mankind. It may be punished in
the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike
all other crimes has no territorial limits. As
it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor
does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state, “for those limits, though
neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.” (US v.
Furlong)
2. Yes, regarding the effect of transfer of territory,
the political law of the former
sovereignty is necessarily changed. The
municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the US, or the
characteristics of the government, remains in
force.
Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed
to secure good order and peace in the
community, where are strictly of a municipal
character, continue until by direct action of the
new government they are altered or repealed.
PEOPLE vs. BANDOJO
FACTS
The charge in this case was piracy in violation of
P.D. 532. The sentence imposed, on the basis of
guilty pleas, was death.
Eduardo Bandojo and Mamerto Artuz, in
conspiracy with each other, while on board a
pumpboat on the seawaters fatally shot
Consolacion Alfar (deceased) and then took her
money in the sum of P5,000.00. Thereafter, they
threw the dead body into the sea and forced the
other passengers to jump overboard (although
they were fortunately saved by another
pumpboat).
The accused-appellants admitted the above
charge in extrajudicial confessions taken from
them without observance of their rights under
Article IV, Section 20, of the Constitution
The trial judge, upon the pleas being made, did
not immediately impose sentence. On the
contrary, he asked both of the accused many
searching questions to satisfy himself that they
understood the nature and consequences of their
confessions. Not content with his first
examination he questioned them again at still
another hearing. Only after he had assured
himself that the accused-appellants knew what
they were doing did he finally pronounce his
judgment of death.
Bandojo denied the allegation of conspiracy
between him and Artuz and put the blame on the
latter for killing the victim. He said he could not
control Artuz.7He claimed he was only a
companion of Artuz and that it was Artuz who did
the killing and stole the money. He explained that
he entered the plea of guilty "so that the case will
not be dragged.
ISSUE
Whether the lower court erred in convicting the
accused notwithstanding the absence of the
usual reception of evidence in cases involving
capital offenses.
RULING
No, it is not always de rigueur or mandatory upon
the trial court to receive evidence when a plea of
guilty is entered in capital cases. The court has
discretion to dispense with the reception of
evidence.
BUT the general rule is where a plea of guilty is
entered by the defendant, in cases where the
capital penalty may be imposed, the court should
make certain that defendant fully understands the
nature of the charge preferred against him and
the character of the punishment provided by law
before it is imposed. The trial court should
therefore call witnesses for the purposes of
establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of
the defendant, not only to satisfy the trial judge,
but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining
whether the accused really and truly understood
and comprehended the meaning, full significance
and consequences of his plea.
PEOPLE vs. PETALCORIN
FACTS
The 2 victims were riding a pumpboat when the
accused pumpboat bumped into them. Petalcorin
fired at Paden (victim) three times who was hit
at the back and as a he fell into the sea.
Petalcorin then boarded the pumpboat of
Paden and pointed and fired his gun at
Porcadilla (another victim) who was hit on the
right arm. When Petalcorin attempted to fire for
the second time, Porcadilla rushed at him and
grappled for the possession of the gun.
Petalcorin shouted for help.
His co accused boarded the victim’s pumpboat
and and fired his gun at Porcadilla but the gun
jammed. The two sped away in the pumpboat
of Paden. Paden was able to hold on to the
outrigger of the pumpboat and was dragged
along. Abais operated the other pumpboat and
left.
Upon arraignment each of the accused assisted
by a counsel de oficio entered a plea of guilty to
the information. Nevertheless, the trial court
directed the prosecution to present its evidence in
order to establish the guilt and degree of
culpability of the accused.
The accused were sentenced reasonable doubt
of the crime of Piracy, they are hereby sentenced
to the penalty of DEATH
ISSUE
Whether the lower court erred in imposing the
death penalty on the accused notwithstanding the
fact that they did not comprehend the
consequence of their plea.
RULING
No, the case was reset for the reception of the
evidence for the prosecution and to enable the
appellant to ponder on the consequences of his
plea. As above related, the prosecution
presented two witnesses. Porcadilla who was
present during the incident gave a blow by blow
account of what happened and as to the
participation of the appellant. His account is
corroborated by Evardo who investigated
appellant and who executed an extrajudicial
statement admitting his complicity after he was
informed of his constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, even without considering said
plea of guilty on the part of the appellant, as
above discussed there is adequate evidence
on the record on which to predicate the
conviction of the appellant.
PEOPLE vs. ASPILI
FACTS
The M/L Elsa left Puerto Princesa City for
Dumaran, Palawan. All in all, 17 persons were
on board M/L Elsa with some cargoes. The
vessel left Puerto Princesa but due to big
waves and strong winds, the launch was forced
to seek shelter at Balon, Sta. Lucia, Puerto
Princesa City, arriving thereat about 6 to 7:00
o'clock in the morning where they were
stranded because of the bad weather and the
damaged rudder of the launch.
While at the aforementioned place, two
persons went aboard the M/L Elsa. They were
identified as Pacifico Rebutido and Rodolfo
Aspili (accused) It was later established that
said two accused together with the other four.
The same day, the six accused carried out their
agreed plan to escape and, fully armed with
pistols and bolos, placed themselves in
strategic positions.
His co accused suddenly thrust his bolo at
Severino’s (victim) abdomen, at the same time
pointing a pistol at him shouting 'walang kikilos'
(nobody moves).

Witnessing all these hostile acts some

passengers and the rest of the crew who were
frightened jumped into the sea. Only five persons
were left in the launch who did not jump
overboard. The accsed raped two women
(minors) one after the other thereafter left the
launch and boarded their banca.

The lower court find the accused guilty of the

crimes of Rape with Homicide, with the
aggravating circumstances of Robbery in Band,
taking advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse
of superior strength and craft.
ISSUE/S
Whether the trial court erred in holding that the
crimes committed by the defendants-appellants
herein are rape with homicide with the
aggravating circumstances of robbery in band,
nighttime, superior strength, recidivism, and craft

Whether Presidential Decree No. 532 should be

given retroactive effect.

RULING
Yes, the evidence shows that what was
committed is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide aggravated by rape.

The overwhelming evidence reveals that the

original design of the malefactors was to commit
robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the
penal colony. Their original intent did not
comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the
crime of rape cannot be regarded as the principal
offense. In this case, since it attended the
commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is
deemed to aggravate the crime but damages or
indemnification for the victim may be awarded.
Instead of ignominy, it is the rape itself that
aggravates the crime.

No, the Supreme Court find it unnecessary to

retroactively apply the provisions thereof in favor
of the appellants because the acts committed by
them are likewise punishable therein by reclusion
perpetua.
 1. Arbitary Detention
PARULAN vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by Parulan and that petitioner's confinement in
the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, is
illegal, for the reason that the sentence of
conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his
person and of the offense with which he was
charged.
Ricardo Parulan was serving a sentence of life
imprisonment, which was then commuted to 20
years, in Muntinlupa. He was transferred to a
military barracks in Fort Bonifacio (situated in
Makati). He escaped and was recaptured in
Manila. As a result, he was prosecuted for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence. The CFI
of Manila adjudged him guilty. As a defense,
Parulan argued that the court had no jurisdiction
over his person and over the offense charged
since he escaped from prison in Makati, but was
tried in Manila. He thus filed a petition for habeas
corpus.
ISSUE
Whether the CFI of Manila have jurisdiction to try
Parulan’s case.
RULING
The Rule of Court generally provide that in all
criminal prosecutions, the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
of province where the offense was committed or
any of the essential ingredients
thereof took place.
This, however, does not apply to continuing
crimes. There are two classes of continuing
crimes, namely: (1) acts material and essential to
the crime occur in one province and some in
another, and; (2) crimes which although all the
elements thereof for its consummation may have
occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the
very nature of the offense committed, the
violation of the law is deemed to be continuing.
An example of the first class would include estafa
and abduction, while the second class would
include kidnapping and illegal detention.
In this case, evasion of service of sentence
belongs to the second class. Such act of the
escaped prisoner is continuous (or a series of
acts), set on foot by a single impulse and
operated by an unintermittent force,
however long it may be. It may not be validly said
that after the convict shall have escaped from the
place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to
evade the service of his sentence, he is
deemed to continue committing the crime, and
may be arrested without warrant, at any place
where he may be found. Since he was arrested in
Manila, he may be tried by the CFI of Manila.
Evasion of service of sentence is a continuing
crime. As long as the crime subsists, the offender
may be arrested without warrant, at any place
where he may be found. He may also be tried by
the courts of that place.
MONCUPA vs. ENRILE
FACTS
Petitioner Efren Moncupa was arrested in
Quezon City and brought to Camp Bago Bantay,
where he was detained. On the allegation that he
was a National Democratic Front staff member, a
Presidential Commitment Order was issued
against him and 8 other persons. After two
separate investigations were conducted, it was
ascertained that the petitioner was not a member
of any subversive organization. The investigators
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner
only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents under PD
no. 33
Moncupa filed a petitioner for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus. The respondents justified
the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground
that the privilege of the writ had been suspended
as to the petitioner. Subsequently, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that
the petitioner was temporarily released from
detention on orders of the Minister of National
Defense with the approval of the President. The
respondents argued that since the petitioner was
free and no longer under the custody of the
respondents, the present petition for habeas
corpus may be deemed moot and academic.
Attached to the petitioner’s temporary release
were restrictions imposed on him, which were: (1)
His freedom of movement is curtailed by the
condition that petitioner gets the approval of
respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila;
(2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior
approval of respondents is also required in case
petitioner wants to change his place of residence;
(3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the
prohibition that he should not participate in any
interview conducted by any local or foreign mass
media representatives nor give any press release
or information that is inimical to the interest of
national security; and (4) He is required to report
regularly to respondents or their representatives.
ISSUE
Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
becomes moot and academic in view of the
detained person’s release with restrictions.
RULING
No, restraints attached to temporary release of a
detained person warrant the Supreme Court’s
inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint
and relieving him of such restraints as may be
illegal.
Reservation of the military in the form of
restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary
release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the
detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is
inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Temporary release of detainee from detention
with involuntary restraints does not render the
petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and
academic. It is available where a person continue
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are necessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. The person concerned or those
applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of
the privilege of the writ.
MILO vs. SALANGA
FACTS
On April 21, 1972 at around 10pm in Manaoag,
Pangasinan, accused barrio captain Juan
Tuvera Sr., with some private persons (Juan
Tuvera Jr., Bertilli Bataoil, and Dianong)
allegedly maltreated Armando Valdez through
fistblows and by hitting him with the butts of their
guns. Immediately thereafter, accused Tuvera
with members of the police force (Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat), without
legal grounds, detained Valdez inside the
municipal jail for about 11 hours. They were
charged with Arbitrary Detention under Art. 124
of the RPC. Tuvera filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the proofs
adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed
an opposition. Respondent Judge Angelito C.
Salanga, however, granted the motion to quash
by concluding that Tuvera was not a public
officer.
ISSUE
Whether or not a barrio captain is a public officer
who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention.
RULING
Yes, Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public
officer who, without legal grounds,
detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are
the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention
must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused
of a crime. Such public officers are
the policemen and other agents of the law, the
judges or mayors.
RA 3590 (The Revised Barrio Charter) the
duties and powers of a barangay captain
include the following: To look after the
maintenance of
public order; and Enforce laws and ordinances
“He is a peace officer in the barrio considered
under the law as a person in authority. As such,
he may make arrest and detain persons within
legal limits.” (Aruego in his treatise on Barrio)
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was
signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later
named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in
authority. In various cases, this Court deemed
them as persons in authority, and convicted them
of Arbitary detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza: Barrio lieutenant Martin
Salibio and municipal councilor Hilario Braganza
arrested Fr. Feliciano Gomez even if he had not
committed any crime.
In U.S. vs. Gellada: Barrio lieutenant Geronimo
Gellada, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound
and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope
at around 6PM and brought him to the justice of
the peace. Sixto was detained overnight and was
released by 9AM upon order of the justice of
peace because Sixto did not commit any crime.
UMIL v. RAMOS
(consolidated)
FACTS
Separate motions before the Court, seeking
reconsideration.
Umil case
The Court's 9 July 1990 Decision ruled that the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that, within the
contemplation of Section 5(a), Rule 113, Dural
was committing an offense, when arrested,
because Dural was arrested for being a member
of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership is penalized,
and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under
the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing
offense.
At the time of his warrantless arrest, Dural was
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same
admitted that he was an NPA courier.
Amelia Roque et al. case
The military agents received information imparted
by a former NPA about the operations of the CPP
and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house
occupied by one Renato Constantino was being
used as their safehouse. In view of this
information, the said house was placed under
military surveillance and, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the
house was conducted. When Renato Constantino
was then confronted he could not produce any
permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions,
radio and other communications equipment, and
he admitted that he was a ranking member of the
CPP.
The arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence
of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his
possession papers leading to the whereabouts of
Roque. At the time of her arrest, the military agent
found subversive documents and live
ammunitions, and she admitted then that the
documents belonged to her.
As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple they were arrested without warrant when
they arrived at the house of Renato Constantino
and when the agents frisked them, subversive
documents, and loaded guns were found in the
latter's possession but failing to show a permit to
possess them
With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested,
without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May
1988) at the premises of the house of one Benito
Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the
CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a
search warrant duly issued by the court. At the
time of her arrest without warrant the agents of
the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found
ammunitions and subversive documents in the
car of Ocaya.
Espiritu case
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay
Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila.
Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and
sympathizers, where he called for a nationwide
strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) the next day.
Espiritu said, among other things: "Bukas tuloy
ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na."
There were police authorities present during the
press conference held at the National Press Club
(NPC) that day. Espiritu was arrested without
warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing
offense," but for uttering the above-quoted
language which, in the perception of the arresting
officers, was inciting to sedition.
Nazareno case
In the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning
of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the
suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his
companions during the killing of Bunye II. The
police agents arrested Nazareno, without
warrant, for investigation.
ISSUE
Whether the accused were lawfully arrested
RULING
Yes, Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully
arrested for being members of the New People’s
Army (mere membership is penalized), and for
subversion (a continuing offense).
Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness & violence until the
objective of overthrowing organized government
is attained.
Likewise, the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested is the one who committed the offense
(based on actual facts), coupled with good faith in
making the arrest.
The Court reiterates that mere suspicion of being
a Communist Party member or a subversive is
absolutely not a ground for the arrest without
warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the
validity of the arrests on the compliance with the
requirements of a long existing law; probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace
officers; and that the arrest be on the basis of
actual facts and circumstances.
NAZARENO vs. STATION COMMANDER
FACTS
Romulo Bunye II (deceased) was killed by a
group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa. At about
5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988,
Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said
killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions during the
killing of Bunye II. The police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation.
ISSUE
Whether the arrest was valid.
RULING
Yes, it was a valid warrantless arrest. “Evidently,
the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police
without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b) Rule 113,
after he was positively implicated by his co-
accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Bunye and
after investigation by the police authorities.
As held in People vs. Ancheta:
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an
arrest by reason of a crime does not presuppose
as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof,
the indubitable existence of a crime. For the
detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that
the agent or person in authority making the arrest
has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the
existence of an act having the characteristics of a
crime and that the same grounds exist to believe
that the person sought to be detained participated
therein.
MAGNO vs. CA
FACTS
The petitioner was arrested by persons claiming
to be agents of the CID without warrant of arrest.
Petitioner claimed that there are no charges
against her; neither has she committed any
offense for which she may be arrested or
deprived of her liberty without any formal charge
or judicial warrant. She is an American citizen but
by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen, she
was granted permanent resident status in the
Philippines
Answering the petition for habeas corpus, the CID
thru its then Commissioner averred that on a
warrant of Arrest/Deportation was issued in the
exercise of the Commissioner’s powers under
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, which provides
"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after
a determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
Respondent Commissioner revoked the
permanent resident status of petitioner because
the petitioner’s American passport has been
revoked and that she is a fugitive from justice.
As a result of which she was detained even
before the warrant of arrest/deportation had been
issued on July 18, 1991 (which is two days later).
Petitioner filed with this Court an Urgent Motion
for Bail 1. Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which
guarantees all persons, before conviction, the
right to bail, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong.
ISSUE
whether this petition is moot and academic and
that the petitioner has waived her right to question
the legality and regularity of her arrest when her
motion for bail was granted.
RULING
Yes, petitioner’s release from detention has
rendered this petition moot and academic insofar
as it questions the legality of her arrest and
detention. A habeas corpus proceeding." . . shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty.
Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue
especially because a decision in the deportation
proceeding will not result in petitioner’s
permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion
or departure from this country. Her subsequent
commitment to the custody of the CID, if, after the
proceedings before the proper forum, she is
found to be an undesirable alien, will have no
more connection with the questioned warrantless
arrest and subsequent detention.
SUBIDO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
Petitioners Subido and Parina were charged with
Arbitrary Detention. The information alleged that
then Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Bayani Subido Jr. and then BID
Special Agent Rene Parina willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously caused the issuance and
implementation of an arrest warrant dated 25
June 1992 against James J. Maksimuk, in
conspiracy with each other and while performing
their official functions. The said warrant caused
Maksimuk’s detention for forty-three (43) days.
The petitioners alleged that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over their person and the
offense charged and they should be tried in RTC
of Manila, as Arbitary Detention is not covered
under R.A. No. 7975. Also, they argued that R.A.
7975 should be given prospective application
because when the case was filed, Subido was
already a private person since he separated from
government service on 28 February 1995 while
Parina did not hold a position corresponding to
Salary Grade 27.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over the petitioners and the offense of Arbitrary
Detention charged against them?
2.Whether RA. 7975 can be given retroactive
effect.
RULING
1. The Court ruled that as per Sections 2 and 7 of
Rep. Act 7975, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offense, as the information in
Criminal Case 22825 stated that the petitioners
“willfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused the
issuance and implementation of an arrest warrant
dated 25 June 1992 against James J. Maksimuk,
in conspiracy with each other and while
performing their official functions.” Moreover, the
penalty for the Arbitrary Detention due to
Maksimuk’s detention of forty-three (43) days is
prision mayor (6 years 1 day – 12 years), and
under E.O. 184, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over such offense. It also stated that
the petitioners overlooked that the reckoning
point for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction
over them and the offense charged is the time of
the commission of the crime. Moreover, Subido
never denied in the lower court that at time when
he committed the offense, he was classified
under Salary Grade 27 for the position of
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
2. Contrary to the petitioner’s argument, the Court
also ruled that the Sandiganbayan Law (PD 1606,
as amended by RA 7975) is not a penal law which
defines crimes and provide punishment for such
acts, but a procedural law which prescribes rules
and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion. Thus, as a
procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975
may validly be given retroactive effect, there
being no impairment of contractual or vested
rights.
PADILLA vs. CA
FACTS
At 8:00pm, Maranarag and his companion
witnessed a hit-and-run accident involving the
Mitsubishi Pajero of Robin Padilla (D), who was
the unknown driver at the time. As a member of a
civic group, Maranarag decided to report the
incident to the police via VHF radio. Mobile
patrols responded and chased the fleeing Pajero
to the north. They finally caught up with the
Padilla (D) and found several firearms in the
vehicle and in his person.
ISSUE
Whether the warrantless arrest is valid.
RULING
Yes, the Court acknowledges police authority to
make the forcible stop since they had more than
mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that
the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in
criminal activity after the hit-and-run incident was
reported to them. Thus, the warrantless arrest
was proper as Padilla (D) was caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of unlicensed firearms
and ammunition.
PEOPLE vs. ENCINADA
FACTS
SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when he
received a tip from an informant that Roel
Encinada would be arriving in Surigao
City from Cebu City in the morning bringing with
him marijuana. Bolonia was then Chief of the Vice
Control Squad of the Surigao City Police. After
receiving the tip, Bolonia notified the members of
his team as well as his colleague. Because the
information came late, there was no more time to
secure a search warrant.
In the early morning of May 21, 1992, Bolonia,
Iligan and other police officers deployed
themselves to intercept Encinada. From their
various positions, the police officers followed
Encinada immediately boarded a tricycle at
As the tricycle slowly moved forward,
Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop
after identifying himself as a police officer. When
the vehicle stopped, Bolinia identified himself to
Encinada and ordered him to alight from the
tricycle. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the
plastic chairs, to which the latter complied.
Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the
peculiar scent of marijuana. Making a small tear
in the cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and
smell the what appeared to be marijuana, a
prohibited drug. Encinada was brought to the
central police station.
The trial court further emphasized that appellant
was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante
delicto. Hence, the warrantless search following
his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana
obtained was admissible in evidence.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether the evidence sufficiently shows the
possession of marijuana by
accused.
2.Whether the arrest and search of the accused
without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of
warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest;
RULING
1. Proof of ownership of the marijuana is not
necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug
cases; it is sufficient that such drug is found in
appellants possession.
2. No. Generally, a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously securedbwarrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure is subject to
challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of
this provision is legally inadmissible in evidence
as a fruit of the poisonous tree.
The trial judge opined that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto at the time of his arrest.
Hence, it concluded that the warrantless search
conducted after his lawful arrest was valid and
that the marijuana was admissible in evidence. In
this case, appellant was not committing a crime in
the presence of the Surigao City policemen.
Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested had committed an offense.
The search cannot be said to be merely incidental
to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence
information is not a sufficient ground for a
warrantless arrest. Bolonias testimony shows that
the search preceded the arrest: The prosecutions
evidence did not show any suspicious behavior
when the appellant disembarked from the ship or
while he rode the motorela.
The Supreme Court believed that appellant did
not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his
belongings. Appellants silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.
The accused is acquitted.
 2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons
CONTRERAS vs. MONSERATE
FACTS
Respondent is charged of forwarding Criminal
Case No. 3222, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Mario Zabaldica y Morandarte, to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor without first conducting
the requisite preliminary investigation. It appears
that on November 27, 2000, SPO4 Prudente
Belleza of PNP filed a criminal complaint for
frustrated homicide, against one Mario Zabaldica
with the MCTC of Magarao-Canaman. The next
day, accused through counsel, filed for Bail,
which the respondent judge granted.
Complainant laments that said order of
respondent judge violated Section 3, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
requires that in all criminal cases cognizable by
the RTC, but filed before the MTC, the latter must
always conduct a preliminary investigation to
determine probable cause.
Respondent judge contends that he committed
no error since pursuant to section 7, rule 112, an
accused failure to avail of his right to preliminary
investigation could be deemed a waiver. In view
of said waiver, it was but logical that respondent
should forward the records of the case to the
office of the provincial prosecutor for the
filing of the necessary information.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a valid waiver of
preliminary investigation
RULING
No, the only instance where an information for an
offense which requires a preliminary investigation
may be filed directly with the court is when an
accused is lawfully detained without a warrant
and he expressly refuses to waive in writing the
provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
If the accused refuses or fails to sign the requisite
waiver, an information shall forthwith be filed
against him, subject to his right to move for
reinvestigation within 5 days from the time he
learns of the filing of said information. The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over for trial for a criminal
offense and hence at the risk of incarceration or
some other penalty is not a mere formal or
technical right but a substantive right. Hence, any
exception to the enjoyment of said right must be
strictly construed.
In the instant case, nowhere is it shown or
indicated in the assailed order that the accused
refused to waive, expressly and in writing, the
provisions of Art. 125. Moreover, that said
accused did not resist arrest is immaterial, as
voluntary surrender is not among the exceptions
to the mandatory requirement of preliminary
investigation in criminal prosecution. Respondent
judge, therefore, had no valid reason to refuse
conducting the preliminary investigation.
Respondents failure to conduct a preliminary
hearing is further compounded by his order
granting bail to the accused, without the requisite
hearing.
PEOPLE vs. CADLEY
FACTS
The PNP Narcotics Group received information
from a female civilian informant that a certain
"Steve" was a supplier of marijuana.Surveillance
and intelligence investigation was thus
conducted, after which, on June 10, 2000, a buy-
bust operation was conducted wherein Steve
Cadley y Ciano was arrested for having violated
Art. II, R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act).
The judge who originally heard the case was
replaced by a newly appointed judge who
rendered decision, finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE/s
1. Whether invalidity of a warrantless arrest
would affect the validity of the crime imputed
2. Whether unlawfulness of detention (violation
of Art. 125, RPC) would invalidate the crime
imputed
RULING
1.No, when an accused is apprehended in
flagrante delicto, under sec. 5, rule 113,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as a result of a buy-bust
operation, as in appellant's case, the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arest him
even without a warrant.
2.No, while a public officer who thus detains a
person beyond the legal period (provided under
Art. 125, RPC) may be held criminally liable, the
proceeding taken against him for the act he has
committed remains unaffected, for the two acts
are distinct and separate.
It is gathered that after appellant was arrested on
June 11, 2000, and the information indicting him
was prepared by the Provincial Prosecutor on
June 13, 2000 (the day before was a holiday), and
was filed before the trial court on June 14, 2000.
Assuming arguendo that the delay in the filing of
the Information was intentional, appellant should
have taken steps to report or file charges against
the officers, failing which he cannot now rely on
administrative shortcomings of police officers to
get a judgment of acquittal.
SORA vs. DESIERTO
FACTS
Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were
arrested on May 13, 2001 (a Sunday
and the day before May 14 elections) without a
warrant by respondents for alleged illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. One
police identified Bista to have a standing warrant
of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6.From the time
of Soria’s detention up to the time of his release,
22 hours had already elapsed and Bista was
detained for 26 days.
The crimes for which Soria was arrested without
warrant are punishable by correctional penalties
or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or
information should be filed with the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. The
crimes for which Bista was arrested
are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained
for 36 hours without criminal complaints or
information having been filed with the proper
judicial authorities.
Petitioners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint
affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code against herein private respondents.
The office dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Petitioners then filed their motion for
reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit in the second assailed Resolution.
ISSUE
Whether officers of the Office of the Ombudsman
gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code
RULING
No. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
respondents. Their disposition of petitioners'
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been
conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed
up by law and jurisprudence.
Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on
applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election
day or a special holiday, should not be included
in the computation of the period prescribed by law
for the filing of complaint/information in courts in
cases of warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office
day. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention
or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against
the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will
not prosper because the running of the thirty-six
(36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of
the complaint against him from the time of his
arrest was tolled by one day (election day).
Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for
Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he could only be
released if he has no other pending criminal case
requiring his continuous detention.
PEOPLE vs. UY
FACTS
The accused, Uy (Tresurer), Gamus (Manager of
Foreign Exchange) and Ochoa (Senior Financial
Analyst), public officers being employed by the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), was
charged for allegedly diverting and collecting
funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for the
amount of P183, 805, 291.25 was indicted before
the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of
Malversation through Falsification of Commercial
Documents for conspiring, confederating with the
private co-accused where they falsify or cause to
be falsified the NPC’s application for
the managers check with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB).
Sandigan Bayan rendered a decision acquitting
Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty for the said
crime and is ordered to pay the equal amount
malversed solidarily with Uy. Ochoa then
appealed.
Appellant claims that he should be acquitted
since his conviction was based on his sworn
statement, transcript of stenographic notes from
which the sworn statement was taken and the NBI
Report, which are incompetent evidence. He
contends that his sworn statement was taken
without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran [30] in
insisting that the constitutional safeguard should
have been applied notwithstanding that he was
not yet arrested or under detention at the time. He
also invites our attention to the pronouncements
of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas [31] that 'the right to
counsel is available if a person is in custody, even
if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet in custody
but he is a suspect.
Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution states that '
Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
ISSUE
Whether Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution can be applied even before the
custodial investigation.
RULING
Yes, considering that his statement was
taken during the administrative investigation of
NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into
custody. As such inquest was still a general
inquiry into an unsolved offense. Appellant
cannot claim that he is in police custody because
he was confined at the time at Heart Center and
he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to
police authorities. The interview where the sworn
statement is based was conducted by NPC
personnel for NPC’s administrative investigation.
Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a
separate proceeding, distinct and independent
from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused
or lumped together with the latter.
LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA
FACTS
Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged
with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas
before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner was
placed under police custody while confined at the
Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a
bond which the trial court approved, he was
released from detention, and his arraignment was
set.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas
filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor,
an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for
the deferment of the proceedings to allow the
public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on
record or to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of
January 24, 2007 deferring petitioner’s
arraignment and allowing the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper
offense and submit a recommendation within 30
days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of
January 31, 2007 denying reconsideration of the
first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via
certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner posits that the prosecution
has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial
court an investigation or reevaluation of the case
except through a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an
accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner
contends that the remedy of preliminary
investigation belongs only to the accused.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent has the right
to cause the reinvestigation of the criminal case
when the criminal information had already been
filed with the lower court.
RULING
Yes, preliminary investigation is required before
the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at
least four years, two months and one day without
regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide
that there is no need for a preliminary
investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a
warrant involving such type of offense, so long as
an inquest, where available, has been conducted.
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary
investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in
criminal cases involving persons arrested and
detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest
issued by the court for the purpose of determining
whether said persons should remain under
custody and correspondingly be charged in court.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its
summary nature and the attendant risk of running
against Article 125, ends with either the prompt
filing of an information in court or the immediate
release of the arrested person. Notably, the rules
on inquest do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration.

In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable

cause, the private complainant may pursue the
case through the regular course of a preliminary
investigation.

once a complaint or information is filed in

court, the rules yet provide the accused with
another opportunity to ask for a preliminary
investigation within five days from the time he
learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New
Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether
the private complainant could invoke, as
respondent heirs of the victim did in the present
case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.
 1. Violation of Domicile
US vs. MACASPAC
FACTS
Atanacio Macaspac, lieutenant of the barrio, was
tasked by one Pedro Manalandin to look for his
missing goat. Both went to the house of Apolonia
Ico and stated that they wanted to enter the house
and search it. The landlady denied entry but in
spite of her opposition, Macaspac and
Manalandin entered and proceeded to search the
house and inspect some jars and baskets.
ISSUE
Whether the accused, being a barrio lieutenant,
is liable for violation of domicile.
RULING
Yes, tt is an undisputable fact that he, being the
lieutenant of the barrio did enter Apolonia Ico’s
dwelling and against the will and in spite of the
repeated objections of Ico, proceeded to search
the same for a goat, which according to
Manalandin, was missing. Macaspac, as
lieutenant of the barrio, had no authority to make
such search, nor was he provided with a search
warrant.
PEOPLE vs. MALASUGUI
FACTS
Chinese merchant, a victim of robbery was found
lying on the ground, with several wounds in the
head, on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar,
Cotabato. Shortly before the victim’s death he
was able to mention the appellant’s first name,
“Kagui”, when he was asked about assailant.
Appellant was later searched by the investigating
police, without opposition or protest on his part,
and it was discovered that he also had the victim’s
pocketbook, containing P92 in bills, the victim’s
identification card and a memorandum of
amounts with some Chinese characters. In one of
the pockets of his pants was found some change,
making the total amount of money found in his
possession P92.68. The said search was
conducted after the appellant had voluntarily
produced the bracelets Exhibit A and placed them
on Lieutenant Jacaria's table, because, upon
being asked if he had anything, he tremblingly
answered in the negative.
The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant
Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and
through intimidation taken from
Him; the bracelets the pocketbook and all the
money which he and that, but for the printing
thereon, the identification card found in
the pocketbook.
ISSUE
Whether the search and seizure conducted on
the accused legal.
RULING
Yes, SC held that when the search of the person
detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects
found in his possession are incidental to an arrest
made in conformity with the law, they cannot be
considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be
arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to
leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of
the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in
many instances.
The record shows that before proceeding with the
trial in the lower court, the appellant asked for the
return of said effects to him on the ground that
they were unlawfully taken away from him.
Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, his
testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient
to counteract that of the government witnesses,
Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who
testified that when Lieutenant Jacaria asked him
what other things he carried, after having
voluntarily placed the two pairs of bracelets,
Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt
his body, he did not show the least opposition. It
follows, therefore, that the lower court committed
no error in accepting as evidence the items taken
from the accused, not only because the appellant
did not object to the taking thereof from him when
searched, but also because the effects found in
his possession of a person detained or arrested
are perfectly admissible as evidence against him,
if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent
or relevant thereto. It is certainly repugnant to
maintain the opposite view because it would
amount to authorizing the return to the accused
of the means of conviction seized from him,
notwithstanding their being eloquent proofs of
crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise
dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.
 GEROCHE vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
At around 10 pm, Geroche, a barangay captain,
accompanied by Garde and Marfil who were both
CAFGU members, entered the house of the
victim. They mauled Mallo striking him with a rifle
which cause him injuries. They looked for
firearms but instead found and took away his
airgun.

ISSUE
Whether the accused were liable for violation of
domicile.

RULING
Yes, one of the essential elements of the crime of
Violation of Domicile is that the accused be a
public officer or employee.
In the present case, the Court adopted the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA.
In their testimonies and pleadings, Geroche did
not deny that he was the barangay captain.
Likewise, Garde and Marfil did not refute the fact
that they were CAFGU members. By virtue of
their positions, they are considered to be public
officers or employees. Hence, they can be found
guilty of Violation of Domicile, as all the elements
for the crime are met.
 1. Search Warrants maliciously obtained
PEOPLE vs. MOLINA
FACTS
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon
received an information regarding the presence
of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. His
informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to
accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon
had no occasion to see him before the arrest.
Moreover, the names and addresses of the
accused-appellants came to the knowledge of
SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.
In the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a,
Davao City. He called for assistance at the PNP
proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged
pusher to pass by.
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996,
a “trisikad” carrying the accused-appellants
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the
pushers. The police officers then ordered the
“trisikad” to stop. SPO1 Pamplona introduced
himself as a police officer and asked accused-
appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied,
“Boss, if possible we will settle this.” SPO1
Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina
were handcuffed by the police officers.
ISSUE
Whether the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence for having been seized in violation of
appellants’ constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING
Yes. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules
of Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);
(b) (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it
(arrest effected in hot pursuit);
and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another (arrest of
escaped prisoners).
In the case at bar, accused-appellants
manifested no outward indication that would
justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a
trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to
be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime. The response of Molina that
“Boss, if possible we will settle this” is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the
arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to
the arresting officers), accused-appellants could
not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise. SPO1 Paguidopon only learned
Mula’s name and address after the arrest. It is
doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized
accused-appellant Mula.
It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was
able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed
to him by his informer while they were on the side
of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at
accused appellant Mula, considering that the
latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With
respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him
before the arrest.
CABELLES vs. CA
FACTS
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro,
while on a routine patrol in a Barangay in Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with
"kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was
loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. With
appellant's alleged consent, the police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered bundles
of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned
by National Power Corporation (NPC).
Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the
high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the
appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires
which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi.
Thus, the court a quo rendered judgment finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Theft. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the warrantless search and seizure
made by the police officers, and the admissibility
of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof was
valid.
RULING
No. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute but admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view;(3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search);and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.
It is not controverted that the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was not
authorized by a search warrant. The mere
mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give
the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made
within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause.
Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down
because the police officers who were on routine
patrol became suspicious when they saw that the
back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati
leaves which, according to them, was unusual
and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant.
The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for
them to conduct the search leaves much to be
desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged
down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and
he answered in the positive." By uttering those
words, it cannot be said the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be
allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all
intents and purposes, they were informing, nay,
imposing upon Caballes that they will search his
vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty.
PEOPLE vs. MACALABA
FACTS
Based on a verified information that Abdul
Macalaba was driving a carnapped car and was
a drug pusher, the police were ordered to search
Abdul. They went to Abdul’s apartment where he
was allegedly selling shabu but he was not there.
While looking for Abdul, they saw the suspected
carnapped car. The CIDG officers alighted from
their vehicles and positioned and surrounded
themselves around the car. They asked for the
car’s certificate of registration. When Abdul
opened the zipper of his clutch bag, the officers
saw inside it four plastic sachets of what
appeared to be shabu.
ISSUE
Whether the warrantless search and seizure and
the admissibility of the evidence obtained by
virtue thereof was valid.
RULING
Yes. The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless
search and seizure conducted on, ABDUL
constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
requirement. The evidence clearly shows that on
the basis of intelligence information that a
carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who
was also a suspect of drug pushing, the members
of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for
the carnapped car. While ABDUL was fumbling
about in his clutch bag for the registration papers
of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent
sachets of shabu. These sachets of shabu were
therefore in "plain view" of the law enforcers since
there was (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
 PEOPLE vs. LAPITAJE
FACTS
Accused appellants were found guilty of Robbery
with Homicide by the trial court for willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain by
means of force, threat and intimidation, entering
the store of Domingo Colonia and killing one
Nelson Saavedra. Witnesses were presented and
and both parties gave their testimonies and alibis.
Accused appellants were brought into custody
without a warrant of arrest. Subsequently,
firearms were seized by the police without a
search warrant. It was alleged that those were the
weapons used in the perpetration of the crime.
ISSUE
whether the accused was deprived of due
process safeguarded by the Bill of Rights in
relation to the admissibility of evidence.
RULING
Yes, the court held that the firearms seized by the
police was inadmissible as evidence, being
acquired without a warrant. This mentioned, the
trial court erred in convicting the defendants of
Robbery with homicide. The inadmissibility of the
firearms as evidence would cause the failure of
the prosecution to bind all the accused of the
crime charged. Only those proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the testimonies and
witnesses were held guilty of the court.
PEOPLE vs. TUDTUD
FACTS
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report
from a civilian asset about a certain Noel Tudtud,
who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting
to the report, several police officers, conducted
surveillance in the neighborhood in Sapa, Toril,
Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information
and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal
drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana. The civilian asset
informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with
new stocks of marijuana. That same day, a team
of police officers posted themselves at the corner
to await Tudtud’s arrival. All wore civilian clothes.
2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each
other carry a carton. Standing nearby from the
men, the police officers observed that one of the
men fit Tudtud’s description. The same man also
toted a plastic bag. The police officers then
approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers. They had then
informed them that they had received information
that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that
night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s
description denied that he was carrying any
drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see
the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying,
“it wasalright.” Tudtud opened the box himself as
his companion looked on.
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath
which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped
plastic bag and another in newspapers. The
police officer further asked Tudtud to unwrap the
packages. They contained what seemed to the
police officers as marijuana leaves. The police
thus arrested Tudtud and his companion,
informed them of their rights and brought them to
the police station. The two did not resist. The
confiscated items were turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests
on specimens taken from the confiscated items
confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The
plastic bag and newspaper contained marijuana
leaves. The accused were subsequently charged
before the RTC with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right
to question the validity of their arrest and the
seizure of the evidence against them. The
accused, denying the charges against them,
alleged that they were frame-up. The RTC
rendered judgment convicting both accused. On
appeal, the accused assign, among other errors,
the admission in evidence of the marijuana
leaves, which they claim were seized in violation
of their right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Tudtud’s implied
acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all right”
when the police officers requested that the box be
opened) be considered a waiver.
RULING
No. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. A search incidental to a lawful arrest
is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is
significant to note that the search in question
preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds
that the arrest must precede the search; the
process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable cause to make
the arrest at the outset of the search. The long-
standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a
great degree of consistency, is that reliable
information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule
113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. There is an effective waiver
of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures only if the following requisites are
present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist;
(2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; (3)
Said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right. The lack of objection from the accused
to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a
waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no
consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's
lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right
or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's
box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are
inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no
evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the
arresting officers and their informant, the
conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.
The phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connot[es]
penal knowledge on the part of the arresting
officer. The right of the accused to be secure
against any unreasonable searches on and
seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his
liberty being a most basic and fundamental one,
the statute or rule that allows exception to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly
construed. Its application cannot be extended
beyond the cases specifically provided by law.
PEOPLE vs. SUZUKI
FACTS
On April 12, 1994, while P/Inspector Rea
Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. of the
Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM),
PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao, also of the PASCOM,
and SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) (all prosecution
witnesses)were in their respective stations,
Suzuki (appellant) and Takeshi Koketsu, both
Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure
area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. Suzuki was
bound for Manila and was carrying a small
traveling bag and a box marked “Bongbong’s
piaya.” At the pre-departure area, upon the
advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of
the PASCOM, appellant proceeded to the “walk-
through metal detector,” a machine which
produces a red light and an alarm once it detects
the presence of metallic substance or object.
Thereupon, the red light switched on and the
alarm sounded, signifying the presence of
metallic substance either in his person or in the
box he was carrying. This prompted PO3
Poyugao to frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic
object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the
box of piaya and passed it through the machine.
Again, the machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao
then ordered appellant to go to the hand-carried
luggage inspection counter where several
PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were
present. SPO1 Casugod requested appellant to
open the box. He appeared tense and reluctant
and started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called
him. Eventually he consented for the opening of
the box and found therein were eighteen (18)
small packs, seventeen (17) of wrapped in
aluminum foil later confirmed as dried marijuna.
Appellant ran outside but he was captured.
Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes Linsangan were
brought to the office, being suspects as
conspirators with appellant in drug trafficking.
ISSUE/S
1.Whether the search and seizure illegal.
2.Whether the arrest is illegal.
RULING
1. No. Pertinent is Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6235 which reads:
“SECTION 8. Aircraft companies which operate
as public utilities or operators of aircraft which are
for hire are authorized to open and investigate
suspicious packages and cargoes in the
presence of the owner or shipper, or his
authorized representatives if present, in order to
help the authorities in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Act:
Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his
representative refuses to have the same opened
and inspected, the airline or air carrier is
authorized to refuse the loading thereof.”
In line with the afore-cited law, the trial court
correctly upheld the PASCOM’s authority to open
packages and cargoes. ‘Based upon the
Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to
President LOI 399, in relation to R.A. 6235, the
PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the
Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect
luggages or hand-carried bags. This is not the
first time we recognize a search conducted
pursuant to routine airport security procedure as
an exception to the proscription against
warrantless searches.
In People vs. Canton and People vs. Johnson, we
validated the search conducted on the departing
passengers and the consequent seizure of the
shabu found in their persons. In this case,
appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the
search conducted by the PASCOM agents.
2.No, It bears stressing that mere possession of
the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the
burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he
has a license or permit under the law to possess
the prohibited drug. Here, appellant failed to
prove that he has a license to possess the
marijuana. In People vs. Bongcarawan, we held
that such possession constitutes prima facie
evidence of animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation.
Penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.
SALVADOR vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner
Tomas Salvador all aircraft mechanics employed
by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at
NAIA and Manila Domestic Airport, were
apprehended by intelligence operatives of the
Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing 13
packets of smuggled watches and jewelries
valuing at more than half a million pesos. The
officers were conducting routine surveillance
operations at the Airport to act on reports of drug
trafficking and smuggling by PAL personnel. They
were keeping a close watch on an airplane
parked inside Airport Terminal. At around 11:30
pm, the officers noticed 3 persons boarding the
plane, and eventually they disembarked with their
abdominal areas bulging, thereafter boarding an
airplane tow truck. The officers immediately
followed the truck, when they were able to block
it, they asked the persons to alight, the 3 accused
having packages covered by girdles, inside their
shirts. This prompted the officers to arrest the
accused, bringing them to the PAFSECOM office.
Upon examination of the packages, an inventory
was made of assorted watches and gold
jewelries. An information was charged against the
accused, but they denied committing the offense,
alleging that they were framed by the officers.
Despite the defense, the RTC rendered a
decision finding them guilty, which the CA
affirmed. Only accused Salvador filed this petition
assailing the decision.
ISSUE
Whether the seized items are admissible in
evidence.
RULING
Yes. The petitioner contends that the warrantless
search and seizure conducted was illegal, since
they were unaware that a crime was committed
and the officers just engaged in a fishing
expedition in violation of the petitioner’s right
against unlawful search and seizure. The Court
ruled that one of the exceptions in requiring a
warrant before an arrest is when it amounts to a
customs search.
The special mission of the officers was to conduct
a surveillance, to act on reports of drug trafficking
and smuggling by PAL personnel. This is in a
nature of a customs search so a warrant may be
dispensed with. In addition to that, the petitioner
and his co-accused were on board a moving
aircraft tow truck, which is also one of the
recognized exceptions for a warrant to be
dispensed with. It is impracticable to wait for a
warrant to be issued first before a search is
conducted for moving vehicles, since they can
easily be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
were the warrant is sought. Establishing that the
search and seizure conducted was legal, the
pieces of evidence obtained are admissible in
court to sustain the conviction of the petitioner.
DIMACUHA vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
Two information was filed against the petitioner
(1)For Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs
(2) For Sale, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs.
An asset relayed to the policemen about a sale of
illegal drugs to be done between 11:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon of the same day along the corner to
J.M. Basa and Kapwa Streets He likewise
described the seller as "more or less 5'4" in
height, has a long hair and she will be using a (sky
blue colored) car in delivering the shabu." At
once, Senior Inspector Ely Pintang formulated a
plan to conduct the operation of arresting the
suspected seller. A team was formed and
dispatched to the said place.
The police officers positioned themselves along
J.M. Basa Street, while the other members were
at Kapwa Street, Calumpang, Marikina. SPO2
Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan were fronting a house
allegedly owned by a certain alias Rudy
Kalawang was where the sale of the illegal drugs
was to take place. SPO2 Valeroso saw Benito
Marcelo, the confidential informer, walking to and
from that house.
More or less thirty minutes later, two vehicles and
a semi-stainless jeep with plate number parked
near the said house. In the car, there were the
occupants (a female driver, a female companion,
and a male companion) while in the jeep there
were two (a male driver and a male companion).
Moments later, the female driver (petitioner) of
the car, which matched the description of the
seller given by the informant. The confidential
informer, met the female driver and her female
companion. The female driver took out from her
shoulder bag "one small plastic bag x x x" and
gave it to the informant. Immediately, 2 police
officers approached the female driver, her female
companion and Benito Marcelo and recovered
"suspected shabu inside the shoulder bag" of the
female driver "inserted inside the cover of a check
booklet." Then, they were brought to the
headquarters.
ISSUE
Whether the arrest and search conducted on the
person and belongings of the petitioner without a
warrant is valid.
RULING
Yes. In People v. Chua Ho San,the SC pointed
out that the interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures is not absolute and that
warrantless searches and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the
following instances: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally warrantless arrest, for,
while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognizes permissible warrantless
arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2)
arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of
escaped prisoners.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams
and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a
result of an entrapment operation conducted by
the police on the basis of information received
from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal
drug trade. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was
lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag of
shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook
was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule
that an officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested any property found upon his
person in order to find and seize things connected
with the crime. The seized regulated drug is,
therefore, admissible in evidence, being the fruit
of the crime.
Petitioner next argues that no entrapment (buy-
bust) operation ever took place as no payment
was made. This is of no moment. In the crime of
distribution of prohibited drugs, the payment of
any consideration is immaterial. The mere act of
distributing the prohibited drug to others is in itself
a punishable offense. The law defines the word
"deliver" as a person's act of knowingly passing a
dangerous drug to another personally or
otherwise, and by any manner with or without
consideration.
VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30
p.m., he was conducting the routine patrol
along the National Highway together with other
tanods when they noticed petitioner, lugging a
bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods
observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. They thus approached him but the
latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter
brought him to the house of Barangay Captain
Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by
Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his
bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained a pair
of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper
and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was
taken to the police station for further
investigation.
ISSUE
Whether the seized drugs can be admissible for
evidence.
RULING
No. It is obvious that based on the testimonies of
the arresting barangay tanod, not one of the
circumstances under Sec. 5, Rule 113 was
obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By
their own admission, petitioner was not
committing an offense at the time he alighted from
the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing
an offense. The tanod did not have probable
cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless
arrest. petitioner’s act of looking around after
getting off the bus was but natural as he was
finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod
approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself
be construed as adequate to charge the tanod
with personal knowledge that petitioner had just
engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity. More
importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run
away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod
when they approached him. It is not
unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking
the street at night, after being closely observed
and then later
tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt
to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always
be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.
VALEROSO vs. CA
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was
found liable as charged before the RTC of
Quezon City.
The Central District Command served a duly
issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry
Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for ransom.
Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central
Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was
about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched
and after which a firearm with live ammunition
was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm
was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive
Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and
revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner
but to another person.
The defense on the other hand contended that
Valeroso was arrested and searched in the
boarding house of his children in New Era
Quezon City. He was aroused from his slumber
when four heavily armed men in civilian clothes
bolted the room. The pointed their guns on him
and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team
went back inside, searched and ransacked the
room. Moments later an operative came out of the
room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside.
Adrian Yuson, an occupant to the adjacent room
testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr.
testified that the firearm with live ammunition was
issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a
Memorandum Receipt.
ISSUE
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of
the firearm and ammunition valid.
RULING
No. It was evident that the arresting officers
placed him immediately under their control by
pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of
the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the
cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was
locked, could no longer be considered as an
"area within his immediate control" because there
was no way for him to take any weapon or to
destroy any evidence that could be used against
him.
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the
exception (warrantless search as an incident to a
lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer
from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within
reach. The exception, therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its
purpose. In the case before us, search was made
in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to
have been within Valeroso’s immediate control.
Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what
may be considered as an incident to a lawful
arrest.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be
justified under the "plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to
launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures or to extend a general exploratory
search made solely to find evidence of
defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.
Indeed, the police officers were inside the
boarding house of Valeroso’s children, because
they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest
issued against Valeroso. In other words, the
police officers had a prior justification for the
intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they
would inadvertently discover may be used
against Valeroso. However, in this case, the
police officers did not just accidentally discover
the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually
searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation
of Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Consequently, the evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible
in evidence against him.
SALES vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
Petitioner was found in illegal possession of
marijuana
Petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific
plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan. He arrived at the
old Manila Domestic and as part of the routine
security check at the predeparture area,
petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal
Detector Machine and immediately thereafter
was subjected to a body search by a male frisker
on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed
personnel (NUP) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Aviation Security Group (ASG).5
While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something
slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short
pants. When Soriano asked petitioner to bring the
item out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his
hands. Soriano struggled with petitioner as the
latter was nervous and reluctant to show what he
brought out from his pocket. Soriano then called
the attention of his supervisor, who approached
petitioner and asked him to open his hands.
Petitioner finally opened his right hand revealing
two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana
leaves/fruiting tops.
After informing petitioner of his constitutional
rights, a police officer brought petitioner and the
seized evidence to the 2nd Police Center for
Aviation Security and immediately turned over
petitioner to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA).
ISSUE
Whether the warrantless search is valid given, the
appellant had to be meticulously bodily searched
even after he had twice successfully passed
through the detector.
RULING
Yes. Persons may lose the protection of the
search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the
nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors;
their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs,
and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials
or substances are found, such would be subject
to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures
 MARTINEZ vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
On December 29, 2007, while PO2 Roberto
Soque, et. al, conducting a routine foot patrol
along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila, they
heard a man shouting Putanginamo! Limang
daan naba ito?. For purportedly violating Section
844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of
Manila which punishes breaches of the peace,
the man, later identified as Ramon, was
apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In
the course thereof, the police officers were able
to recover from him a small transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. Consequently, Ramon
was charged with possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165.
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and
contented that hile walking along Balingkit Street
to borrow a welding machine, a man in civilian
clothing approached and asked him if he is
Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was
immediately handcuffed by the man who
eventually introduced himself as a police officer.
Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar)
wherethe said officer asked him if he was carrying
illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still
brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter,
PO2 Soque for P20, 000.00 in exchange for his
release, unable to give the money asked for,
Ramon was brought to the Manila City Hall for
inquest proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.
RULING
No. A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a
subsequent search is one that is carried out under
the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court14which requires that the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause to arrest a person caught in
flagrante delicto. The term probable cause,
specifically with respect to arrests has been
understood to mean such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
Based on the records in the case at bar, PO2
Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating
Section 844 (breaches of peace) of the Manila
City Ordinance. Evidently, the gravamen of these
offenses is the disruption of communal
tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest
based on the same, it must be established that
the apprehension was effected after a reasonable
assessment by the police officer that a public
disturbance is being committed. However, PO2
Soques testimony surrounding circumstances
leading to Ramons warrantless warrant clearly
negates the presence of probable cause when
the police officers conducted their warrantless
arrest of Ramon.
Searching domicile without witnesses
PITA vs. CA
FACTS
Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor
Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand
owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic,
and indecent and later burned the seized
materials in public. Among the publications
seized and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff
Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was dismissed
by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he
seeks review with SC, invoking the guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.
ISSUE
Whether the search and seizure was illegal.
RULING
Yes. It is basic that searches and seizure may be
done only through a judicial warrant , otherwise,
they become unreasonable and subject to
challenge.
In Burgos v Chief of Staff , the SC countermanded
the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of
the premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail,
two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a defective
warrant. There is a greater reason in this case to
reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact
that the instant case involves an obscenity rap
makes it no different from Burgos, a political case,
because speech is speech, whether political or
"obscene". The authorities must apply for the
issuance of the a search warrant from the judge ,
if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order.
They must convince the court that the materials
sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action.
The judge must determine WON the same are
indeed "obscene": the question is to be resolved
on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound
discretion. If probable cause exist, a search
warrant will issue.