[08] Tagolino v HRET  It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his
G.R. No. 201716 | January 8, 2013 | Velasco post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
PETITIONERS/PROSECUTORS: MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR.
RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R.
VEGA
TOPIC: Term Limits and Recall
FACTS:
 For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.
 In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning
mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
 In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres, who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor.
 Abundo protested Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on
June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
 Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed
each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy, Torres lost no time in
seeking the former's disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive
term limit rule.
 COMELEC First Division: Resolution finding for Abundo, who in the meantime
bested Torres by 219 votes 6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect
 Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted
disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, Ernesto R. Vega commenced
a quo warranto to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised
in his petition to disqualify.
 RTC: declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor
 COMELEC Second Division: AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED
 COMELEC EN BANC: motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
 Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
 September 11, 2012: Vega filed his Comment on Abundo's petition, followed not
long after by public respondent COMELEC's Consolidated Comment. 29
ISSUE and RULING:
 WON Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms – NO
 The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007
term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to
serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
 The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found
in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and is reiterated in Sec. 43 (b) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
 To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
 As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43 (b)
of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local
official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three
consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr.,
however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state
that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not
affect 'continuity of service for a full term' for purposes of the three-term limit
rule."
 Socrates v. COMELEC: the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only
consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term.
o An elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term
for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth
term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
 There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official
after his or her third term.
o An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term,
immediately following the third.
o The basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected."
o This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official
intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or
her third term ends.
o This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary
interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
 The three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the
varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for
three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they
view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their
opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
 Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes:
succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension,
declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest,
declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest,
proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the
official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
Situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or
not considered as having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken":
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, Jose T. Capco, Jr. and Montebon v. COMELEC: effects of
"assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule.
 This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a
higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following
contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
(2) Recall Election
 The remainder of a winner’s term after the recall election during which the
incumbent served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the
three-term limit rule.
 An elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following
the end of the third consecutive term [and, hence], [a]ny subsequent election, like
recall election, is no longer covered . . . ."
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
 The conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of
the incumbent official's continuity of service.
 An incumbent involuntarily relinquishes his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very
instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city
mayor.
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
 The period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension
cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service.
 Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective
official's stay in office beyond three terms.
 A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising
the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.
 The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of
a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.
(5) Election Protest
SUMMARY OF RULES:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his
service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated
as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.).
If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the
higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek
the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election,
had an interruption in the continuity of the official's service. For, he had become in the
interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen
(Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a
city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service
(Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer's
continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this
period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes
office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from
office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired
portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon).
The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part
of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final
after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election
contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from
start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application
of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of
the term (Ong and Rivera).
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY
GRANTED.Accordingly, the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission
on Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case
No. 55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is
accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio
M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of
Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their
original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this
Decision.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
PROVISIONS:
 Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
 Sec. 43 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991: Sec. 43. Term of Office. —xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
I agree with Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.'s conclusion that the proclamation of Jose
Torres, as the "apparent winner" in the 2004 elections, effectively interrupted what
could have been Abelardo Abundo, Sr.'s full term. I write this Opinion to briefly
expound on the Court's ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 1 which the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erroneously relied upon in affirming the grant
of the quo warranto petition against Abundo, and to express my own views on how
our present Decision should be read in light of other three-term limit cases that have
been decided under a protest case scenario.
The Aldovino ruling
The issue in Aldovino was whether the preventive suspension of a local elective official
amounted to an interruption in the continuity of his term for the purpose of applying
the three-term limit rule. The issue arose because an elective local official who is
preventively suspended is prevented, under legal compulsion, from exercising the
functions of his office; thus, the question — is there then an interruption of his term of
office for purposes of the three-term limit rule of the Constitution?
After analyzing the first clause of the three-term limit rule (Section 8, Article X of the
1987 Constitution) which provides:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms.
the Court observed that the limitation specifically refers to the term (or the period of
time an official has title to office and can serve), not to the service of a term.
Complementing the term limitation is the second clause of the same provision on
voluntary renunciation stating that:
[V]oluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The Court construed "voluntary renunciation" as "a loss of title to office by conscious
choice." 2
Based on its analysis of the provision and after a survey of jurisprudence on the three-
term limit rule, the Court concluded that the interruption of a term that would prevent
the operation of the rule involves "no less than the involuntary loss of title to office" or
"at least an effective break from holding office[.]" 3
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right
to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The
latter occurs during an office holder's term when he retains title to the office but cannot
exercise his functions for reasons established by law. . . . .
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X — both by
structure and substance — fixes an elective official's term of office and limits his stay
in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be
read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary
renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective official's voluntary relinquishment
of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of
the exercise of power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants
of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. 4 (italics supplied;
citation omitted)
The Court further concluded that while preventive suspension is involuntary in nature,
its imposition on an elective local official cannot amount to an interruption of a term
"because the suspended official continues . . . in office although he is barred from
exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period." 5
Based on these clear rulings, I consider it a grave error for the Comelec to equate the
situation of a preventively suspended elective local official with the situation of a non-
proclaimed candidate who was later found to have actually won the election. With its
conclusion, the Comelec thereby grossly disregarded the nature and effects of a
preventive suspension, and at the same time glossed over the legal and factual realities
that obtain in a protested election situation where one candidate is proclaimed, only to
lose out later during the term to the winner in the protest case. To state the obvious,
election protests are quite common and it is best for the Court to already provide
guidance on how a reversal decision in a protest case affects the three-term limit rule.
The proclamation alone of an apparent winner (i.e., the candidate immediately
proclaimed but whose election is protested) entitles him to take his oath of office and
to perform his duties as a newly-elected local official. That he may be characterized
merely as a "presumptive winner" 6 during the pendency of a protest against him does
not make him any less of a duly elected local official; for the time being, he possesses
all the rights and is burdened with all the duties of his office under the law. In stark
contrast with his situation, the non-proclaimed candidate cannot but be considered a
private citizen while prosecuting his election protest; 7 he carries no title to office and
is denied the exercise of the rights and the performance of the duties and functions of
an elected official.
It is from these perspectives that Aldovino cannot be used as basis for the conclusion
that there had been no interruption in the case of Abundo — the eventual election
winner who is so recognized only after winning his protest case. Notably in Aldovino,
while a preventive suspension is an involuntary imposition, what it affects is merely
the authority to discharge the functions of an office that the suspended local official
continues to hold. As already mentioned above, the local elective official continuous to
possess title to his office while under preventive suspension, so that no interruption of
his term ensues.
In the present case, Torres (instead of Abundo) was immediately proclaimed the
winner in the 2004 elections and effectively held title to the office until he was unseated.
This circumstance necessarily implied that Abundo had no title to the office of Mayor
in the meanwhile or, at least, had an effective break in the continuity of his term as
mayor; from his first (2001-2004) term, he did not immediately continue into his second
(2004-2007) term and for a time during this term completely ceased to exercise
authority in the local government unit. It was not a mere cessation of the authority to
exercise the rights and prerogatives of the office of Mayor as in the case of Aldovino;
he was not the Mayor and had no title to this office in the meanwhile. No better proof
of his loss of title exists than the need to file an election protest to claim the seat Torres
already occupied after his proclamation. From this perspective, the Aldovino ruling
cannot be used as basis for the conclusion that Abundo enjoyed an uninterrupted 2001-
2004 term.
Election to office
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 8 reiterated in Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections, 9 the Court ruled that a local elective official can seek reelection in the same
local government position unless two requisites concur: the official has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and that he fully served the
three consecutive terms. It is from the prism of these requisites that the three-term limit
rule must be viewed; in Abundo's case, the continuity of his first and third terms are
not at issue; the issue is confined to his second term.
That Abundo has been elected to the position of Mayor in the 2004 elections is a matter
that is now beyond dispute based on the legal reality that he was eventually found, in
his election protest, to be the true choice of the electorate. This legal reality, however,
is complicated by an intervening development — the wrongful proclamation of
another candidate (Torres) — so that he (Abundo) could only take his oath of office and
discharge the duties of a Mayor very much later into the 2004-2007 mayoralty term. As
I have argued above to contradict the use of the Aldovino ruling, the factual reality that
he had no title to office and did not serve as Mayor while he was a protestant cannot
simply be glossed over, and cannot likewise be brushed aside by trying to draw a
conclusion from a combined reading of Ong v. Alegre 10 and Lonzanida v.
Commission on Elections. 11 The Court cannot avoid considering the attendant factual
and legal realities, based on the requirements that Borja Jr. established, and has no
choice but to adjust its appreciation of these realities, as may be necessary, as it had
done in Ong. This, I believe, is the approach and appreciation that should be made, not
the drawing of a forced conclusion from a combined reading of Ong and Lonzanida.
In Lonzanida (where Lonzanida was the protestee), the Court considered both the
requisites for the application of the three-term limit rule absent where a local official's
(Lonzanida's) proclamation, supposedly for his third consecutive term in office, was
later invalidated prior to the expiration of this third term, i.e., from 1995 to 1998. With
the invalidation, Lonzanida could not really be considered as having been elected to
the office since he was found not to be the real choice of the electorate — this is the legal
reality for Lonzanida. Too, he did not fully serve his (supposedly third) term because
of the intervening ruling ordering him to vacate his post. This ruling, no less equivalent
to involuntary renunciation, is the factual reality in Lonzanida's case. Thus, an
interruption of the three consecutive terms took place.
Ong v. Alegre 12 involved facts close, but not completely similar, to Lonzanida. For in
Ong, the ruling ordering the apparent winner and protestee (Francis Ong) to vacate his
post came after the expiration of the contested term, i.e., after Ong's second term from
1998 to 2001. In holding that both requisites were present (so that there was effectively
no interruption), the Court again took the attendant legal and factual realities into
account. Its appreciation of these realities, however, came with a twist to allow for the
attendant factual situation. The Court ruled that while Joseph Alegre was later
adjudged the "winner" in the 1998 elections and, "therefore, was the legally elected
mayor," this legal conclusion "was without practical and legal use and value[.]" 13
[Ong's] contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby
as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and
his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. 14
Effectively, while the Court defined the legalities arising from the given factual
situation, it recognized that the given facts rendered its legal conclusion moot and
academic or, in short, useless and irrelevant; while Ong effectively lost the election, he
had served the full term that should belong to the winning candidate. Based on this
recognition, the Court ruled that no effective interruption took place for purposes of
the three-term limit rule.
From these perspectives, Ong did not "supersede" or "supplant" Lonzanida. Neither
Ong nor the subsequent case of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections 15 says so. The
evident factual variance in Ong simply called for an adjusted appreciation of the
element of "election" under the three-term limit rule. This is what a sensible reading of
these two cases yields.
In considering the case of Abundo with Lonzanida and Ong, a noticeable distinction
that sets Abundo apart is his situation as protestant, as against Lonzanida and Ong
who were both protestees — the presumptive winners whose election and
proclamation were protested. Both protestees lost in the protest and effectively were
not "elected," although this was appreciated by the Court with twist in Ong, as
mentioned above. Abundo, on the other hand, successfully prosecuted his protest and
was thus recognized as the candidate whom the people voted for, subject only to the
question raised in the present case — whether this recognition or declaration rendered
him "elected" from the start of his term.
bodily lifted and applied to Abundo. At the simplest, both Lonzanida and Ong were
protestees who faced the same legal reality of losing the election, although Ong fully
served the elected term; for Abundo, the legal reality is his recognized and declared
election victory. In terms of factual reality, Lonzanida and Abundo may be the same
since they only partially served their term, but this similarity is fully negated by their
differing legal realities with respect to the element of "election." Ong and Abundo, on
the other hand, have differing legal and factual realities; aside from their differing
election results, Ong served the full term, while Abundo only enjoyed an abbreviated
term.
If at all, the parallelism that can be drawn from Ong, that can fully serve the resolution
of Abundo's case, is the practical and purposive approach that the Court used in Ong
when it implicitly recognized that dwelling on and giving full stress to the "election"
element of the three-term limit rule (as established in Borja, Jr.) is irrelevant and
pointless, given that Ong had served the full contested term.
Under this same approach, Abundo should not be considered to have been elected for
the full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule, despite the legal reality that he
won the election; as in Ong, the factual reality should prevail, and that reality is that he
served for less than this full term. Thus, where less than a full term is served by a
winning protestant, no continuous and uninterrupted term should be recognized. This
is the view that best serves the purposes of the three-term limit rule.
||| (Abundo, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 201716, [January 8, 2013], 701
PHIL 135-178)

The differing factual situations of the cited cases and Abundo that necessarily gave rise
to different perspectives in appreciating the same legal question, immediately suggest
that the Court's rulings in the cited cases cannot simply be combined nor wholly be