In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates of 1946 to 1953;

Albino Cunanan, Et Al.,

Facts: Unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage

lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which reduced the passing general
average in bar examinations to 70 percent effective since 1946.

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers
Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for
Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%

The examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of
75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and
the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING: Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of

not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should
affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional,

while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion
that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who
flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due
to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the

court on the petitions of the said candidates;

3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to

determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore,
 in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment
of the court on who can practice law; and

4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class

legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster
enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to
take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of petitioner. The same may also
rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify
rules of admission to the practice of law.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.

MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

FACTS:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding
due notice.

In his comment, Atty. Edillon reiterated his refusal to pay the membership
fees due from him. He argued that the provisions of the law constituted an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-payment of membership dues can be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

RULING:
YES. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court.

The SC further ruled that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.

The SC see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that
the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

[A.C. NO. 5738 : February 19, 2008]

WILFREDO M. CATU, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICENTE G.

RELLOSA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

FACTS:
Complainant filed an administrative complaint against respondent as
the latter committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer
when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided
over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that he performed his task with

utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The
parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina
and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his
legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free
because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of professional misconduct for his
oath as a lawyer.

RULING:
YES. A lawyer in government service who is not prohibited to
practice of law must secure prior authority from the head of his department.
As punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations. A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not
require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in
the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of
the department concerned.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required

written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated the civil service rules which is a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For not living up to his
oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.