[ G.R. NO.

152375, DECEMBER 13, 2011 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH
DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), MANUEL H. NIETO,
JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, AND POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H.
Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile,
and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution,and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged that the respondents
illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose
Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations
they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. This case
docketed as Civil Case No. 0009. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa, was not
impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009. Civil Case No. 0009 spawned
numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130. The present respondents were not
made parties in Civil Case No. 0130.

Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No.
0130), seeking to nullify the order of the Sandiganbayan for the former to account for his
sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights. During the
pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the PCGG had been “illegally ‘exercising’ the rights of stockholders of ETPI,
especially in the election of the members of the board of directors and prayed for the issuance of
an order for the “calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting under the court’s
control and supervision. Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion.

The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 107789 (PCGG’s petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to
vote.[14] In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from
implementing its assailed resolution.

The Sandiganbayan ordered for the consolidation of Civil Cases Nos. 0009 and 0130, with
the former as the main case and the latter as an incident.
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), A “Very Urgent Petition
for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for the Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPI’s]
Authorized Capital Stock” (Urgent Petition) was filed by PCGG. In our May 7, 1996 Resolution,
we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence
and immediate resolution which will be in Civil Case No. 0130.
 To resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and
treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance for the purpose for Bane to
identify and testify on the facts in his affidavit so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the
petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s Class A
stock in support of the Urgent Petition. The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane
deposition “in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009. On the scheduled deposition
date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.

The Sandiganbayan granted the Urgent Petition hence, Africa went to this Court via a
petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa’s petition). The court resolved the
PCGG and Africa’s petition and were REFERRED to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence
and to decide it within 60 days from receipt of this resolution.

In Civil case 0009, the pre trial conference was scheduled and concluded only on
November 29, 1996 and March 17, 1997. Among the witnesses offered was Maurice V. Bane –
representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was organized. After the
trial of Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses
in Civil Case No. 0130, including Bane. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the 1998 Resolution
which denied the adoption of oral deposition of Bane because he was not available for cross-
examination.

The petitioners did not question the 1998 resolution, and instead they made its Formal Offer of
Evidence. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. In
order to correct this, they filed a second motion with prayer for re-opening of the case for the
purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the court to take judicial notice of the
facts established by the Bane deposition. This was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its November
6, 2000 resolution. A third motion was filed by the petitioners on November 16, 2001 seeking once
more to admit the Bane deposition which the Sandiganbayan for the reason that without plaintiff
having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained
finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the SB committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the 1998 resolution has
already attained finality and in refusing to re-open the case.
2. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the rules of court and under the principle of
judicial notice.

RULING:
1. The court ruled that the SB’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous
but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion due to the absence of a clear showing that its action
was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. The
SB’s ruling, although an erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an
abuse of discretion but not a grave one.

The 1998 resolution is an interlocutory decision, thus petition for certiorari is still premature since
the rules of court provides that certiorari should be availed in a situation where neither an appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the
aggrieved party except if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party
of the injurious effects of the order complained of. At the time of the 1st motion, the presentation
of evidence has not yet concluded. The remedy after the denial of the 1st motion should have been
for the petitioner to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the
admission of the Bane deposition. But upon denial of the 2nd motion, petitioners should have
already questioned it by way of certiorari since it effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it
for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed
the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and
proceeded to file its 3rd motion.

However, the court ruled that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately
refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane
deposition. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to
present additional evidence even after it has rested its case provided that the evidence is rebuttal
in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from
one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly
discovered evidence. At the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not
yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been
prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly
omitted “through oversight.”

2. Despite the cases being closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply
with the rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different
proceeding. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a
party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing otherwise, the adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay. Cross-examination
will test the truthfulness of the statements of the witness; it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy
and completeness of a testimony. Depositions from the former trial may be introduced as evidence
provided that the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later
proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner failed to establish the identity of interest or privity
between the opponents of the two cases. While Victor Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose
Africa, the deposition is admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed Civil Case
No. 0130.

Further, the rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create confusion between
the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court
the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on
the court.