A.C. No. 10548
The incorporators and
38-49 minutes
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), dated January
3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the
findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which
found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco)
administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the
penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of
law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated
July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline Castañeda Jimenez
(complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations
of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his
Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory conference was
held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco
appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to
complainant was returned with the notation "unknown at the
given address." No new address was provided by the
complainant. Both parties wererequired to submit their
respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco
adopted his Answer. The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez),
filed a complaint for estafa against complainant, her sister
Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio,
Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5
The said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez alleged
that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of
stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation
(Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the
purpose of purchasing a residential house located in Forbes
Park, Makati City (Forbes property).
original stockholders of Clarion were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of
Incorporation, the above-named stockholders, except for
Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of
their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then
Jimenez’s common-law partner.Clarion’s total capitalization
was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated
a loan from the complainant in the amount of
₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes
property in the amount of ₱117,000,000.00 from Gerardo
Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said
amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale,
however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made
to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for
₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the
purchase price was not reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned
their shares in Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust.
On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to
complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining
one (1) share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo.
These transactions appeared in Clarion’s General Information
Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed shares of
Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to
complainant by another deed of assignment, making her the
holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in
the United States in 2004, he learned from Atty. Francisco
that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the
complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United
States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to go after
their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant
to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine
Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again, this
was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that,
through fraudulent means, complainant and her co-
respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for
sale sometimein August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc.
(Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at
₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed
to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for
the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the
proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of
complainant.
Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s
alleged participation in the fraudulent means in selling the
Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with
Jimenez’s money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all
the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial
owner. Complainant and her co-respondents, however,
misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their personal
use and benefit.
In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco
executed an affidavit reiterating its factual averments.6 A
perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following
claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty.
Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant
called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes
property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
asked her if she had secured permission
from Mark Jimenez and complainant
answered in the affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued
a resolution authorizing him to negotiate
the sale of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an
account with Security Bank, San Francisco
Del Monte branch. When the cash payment
was deposited, he withdrew the amount
and handed the same to Rosemarie
Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused
without any consideration. The transfer
taxes, however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the
Philippines, he was able to confirm that the
sale of the Forbes property was without his
knowledge and approval. The proceeds of
the sale had already been farmed out to
different corporations established by
complainant and her sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings
were premeditated in order to steal the
money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the
complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She felt
even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and
Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This
prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty.
Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to
her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the
legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More
significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and
transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty.
Francisco was the one who actively participated in the
transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property.
Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit,
complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the
trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this
reason, complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty.
Francisco.
The Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially
engaged his services in 1998 for the incorporation of Clarion
for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes
Park, where he intended to live with his long-time partner,
the complainant; that the original incorporators and
stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust
for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership of
Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenez’s
orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel
of Clarion, he prepared all the legal documentation togive
effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of
the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez
was imprisoned in the United States for excessive
contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time,
Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again
to changethe ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid
the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax evasion case;
that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in
accordance with Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a result,
almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the
name of Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant
tasked him to talk to prospective buyers and to negotiate the
sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for
₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to
believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they were
in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when
Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the
proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations
set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise
learned of the successive sale of his other properties,
including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the members of his
family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against
the complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud
committed against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the
affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances surrounding
the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule
on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the
ground that complainant was not his client. He was the
lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never
of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some
matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had
given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as
legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship
between him and complainant was formed, as a corporation
has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders.
While he admitted that the legal documentation for the
transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were
prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law
firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his
capacity as the corporate secretary and legal counsel
ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he
served no conflicting interests because it was not a "former
client" and a "subsequent client" who were the opposing
parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his
client, the rule on privileged communication does not apply
to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless
prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege.
When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer, the
complainant should have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed
existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case
was but a truthful narration of facts by a witness, Atty.
Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court ruled
that "the fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had
been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was no
ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely
attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of
which, he defended and served Jimenez as a client. This was
likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal
motives and purposes were not covered by the privilege. It
was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7, 2011,
the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr.
(Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of
violations of the CPR and recommended that he be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law. Initially,
the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent
affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case
did not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD as it
was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or
withdrawals of cases. After weighing on the claims of the
parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
nothing in the records would show that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and Jimenez.11
The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an
original incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was also
the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the said
corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not
include Jimenez as an original incorporator. He became a
stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares
from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s
participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when he
assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as
alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report stated that it would
appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to
Clarion’s ownership to be reported to the SEC through its
GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty.
Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of shares within
Clarion were "without any consideration," ran counter to the
deeds of assignment that he again admittedly executed as
corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have
simulated the loan and undervalued the consideration of the
effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in
violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he executed
the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of
Clarion and complainant, the Investigating Commissioner
held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged
communication and engaged in an act that constituted
representation of conflicting interests in violation of Canons
15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted
and approved, in toto, the findings and recommendation of
the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on
March 26, 2013 and moved for its reconsideration.13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG,
reasoning out that the penalty of suspension of one (1) year is
too severe considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would
warrant the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It
was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a
difficult crisis involving his children and common-law
partner that he experienced a major upheaval in his
professional life. He apologized for his not being too
circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that
his participation in the execution of the documents pertaining
to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his
capacity as Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel,
not to mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He
admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion and Jimenez, but
denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and
shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought
advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no
fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own words, Atty.
Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice
versa."14
Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was
an affidavit executed by Jimenez, stating that he had retained
the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing
Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty.
Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the companies he
owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to
execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these
companies, including Clarion. These documents were in the
possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez
ran for Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted
him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in
prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco who
visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were
then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian
Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He asked Atty.
Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to
wait until he could go home. When he filed the criminal
cases against his children and complainant, the latter even
filed a frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco.
According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes
against him were now exhausting all possible means to keep
Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from
performing his duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10
of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to
laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer
is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid
any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s
personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character
but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the
part of the public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be
observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does
not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the
concept is broad enough to include such element.16 To be
"dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the
proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation,
artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of
the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon.18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known
to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, inorder to promote the public’s faith in the
legal profession.19 "To say that lawyers must at all times
uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
statement can never be over emphasized. Considering that, of
all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly
bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the
law."20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took
an oath to "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion.21
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly
violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters
regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the
SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty.
Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of
these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were
done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions
were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez.
The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out
that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he
executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as
corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that Atty.
Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts,
corporation law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As
corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation
to register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to
advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of
his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to
have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have
undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the
Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat
the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty.
Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions
and was content to have granted the requests of the persons
involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s
wishes, or pursuant to complainant’s misrepresentations, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of
drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements
to be embodied in public documents. If the Court allows this
highly irregular practice for the specious reason that lawyers
are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and
machinations, the Court would, in effect, sanction
wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of
lawyers as officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their
support for the cause of their clients should never be attained
at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of
the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
justice, and mustbe held within the bounds of reason and
common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warranta course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he
lacks candor regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR
provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR
provides that "a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the
court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and
upholding truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act
with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his
duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid
dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to
actwith candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon
10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to
do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and
Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of
conflicting interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the
IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideallybe imbued with the highest level of trust
and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that
must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a
client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this
regard isto avoid representing conflicting interests…"25
Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are
at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if
the same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the
application of the rule on conflict of interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires them to
oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized
various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies
within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-
bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be
opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client,
there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether
the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend
for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case,
one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with
each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of
interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The
purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature
of the ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a
lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and
representing other clients on the ground of conflict of
interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in
favor of a party in the first place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the
rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny of the parties’
submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed
to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client
remains unsubstantiated, considering its detailed refutation.
All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was
Clarion’s legal counsel and that complainant sought advice
and requested documentation of several transfers of shares
and the sale of the Forbes property. This was only successful
in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the
documents pertaining to the transaction and that he was
retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed
explanation as to how she supposedly engaged the services of
Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and
how she communicated with the latter anent the dealings she
had entered into. With the complaint lacking in this regard,
the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied
with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of
Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative
details presented by the parties. Atty. Francisco’s claim
thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the
complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement
executed by Jimenez himself. Complainant’s evidence pales
in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty.
Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity
of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to
file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s answer. This could have
given her opportunity to present evidence showing their
professional relationship. She also failed to appear during the
mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even
updating her residential address on record. Her participation
in the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the
complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the
other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts towhich they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his
entanglement with this fiasco among the members of
Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in
dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could
have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were
performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and
Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion
does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to
discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her
lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion
and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice
it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco
committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not
apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the Court elucidated on the
factors essential to establish the existence of the said
privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if
the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or
the latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to
make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the
lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the
lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.
Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer
pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the
opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the
element of confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not
be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of
seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted
by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal
advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or
personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does
not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court
holds that the evidence on record fails to demonstrate the
claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed
to establish the professional relationship between her and
Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes
property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither
was there a demonstration of what she had communicated to
Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which
the confidential communication was relayed. All that
complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought
legal advice from respondent in various occasions."29
Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at
the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty.
Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not
impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule
on privileged communication. As held in Mercado, such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a
breach of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the
attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that
complainant, who has the burden of proving that the
privilege applies, failed in this regard.
The Penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating of the
lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law
is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of
which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.32 The appropriate penalty on
an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.33
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of
the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation
of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an
attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of
interests and disclosure of privileged communication, the
acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing
Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in
other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco
GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of

Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the

date of his receipt of this Decision so that the Court can
determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take
effect.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,

CASTILLO JR.**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of

Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, who
inhibited himself, as a member of his staff
is closely related to a party, per Raffle
dated December 9, 2014.

** Designated Acting Member in lieu of

Associate .Justice Arturo D. Brion, per
Special Order No. 1888, dated November
28, 2014.
A.C. No. 11504
29-36 minutes
EN BANC
August 1, 2017
A.C. No. 11504
ARIEL G. PALACIOS, for and in behalf of the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),
Complaint,
vs.
ATTY. BIENVENIDO BRAULIO M. AMORA, JR.,
Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM
The instant administrative case arose from a Complaint dated
March 11, 20081 filed by Ariel G. Palacios, in his capacity as
the Chief Operating Officer and duly authorized
representative of the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr. for
alleged violation of: (1) Canon 1, Rules 1.01 to 1.03; Canon
10, Rules 10.01to10.03; Canon 15, Rule 15.03; Canon 17;
Canon 21, Rule 21.01 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR); (2) Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court; (3) Lawyer's Oath; and (4) Article 1491 of the Civil
Code.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), are as follows:
Complainant is the owner[-]developer of more or less 312
hectares of land estate property located at Barangays San
Vicente, San Miguel, Biluso and Lucsuhin, Municipality of
Silang, Province of Cavite ("property"). Said property was
being developed into a residential subdivision, community
club house and two (2) eighteen[-]hole, worldclass
championship golf courses (the "Riviera project"). In 1996,
complainant entered into purchase agreements with several
investors in order to finance its Riviera project. One of these
investors was Philippine Golf Development and Equipment,
Inc. ("Phil Golf'). On 07 March 1996, Phil Golf paid the
amount of Php54 Million for the purchase of 2% interest on
the Riviera project consisting of developed residential lots,
Class "A" Common Shares, Class "B" Common Shares, and
Class "C" Common Shares of the Riviera Golf Club and
Common Shares of the Riviera Golf Sports and Country
Club.
On 02 June 1997, complainant retained the services of
respondent of the Amora and Associates Law Offices to
represent and act as its legal counsel in connection with the
Riviera project (Annex "C" to "C-5" of the complaint).
Respondent's legal services under the said agreement include
the following: issuance of consolidated title(s) over the
project, issuance of individual titles for the resultant
individual lots, issuance of license to sell by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board, representation before the SEC,
and services concerning the untitled lots included in the
project. For the said legal services, respondent charged
complainant the amount of Php 6,500,000.00 for which he
was paid in three different checks (Annexes "D" to "D3" of
the complaint).
On 10 May 1999, complainant entered into another
engagement agreement with respondent and the Amora Del
Valle & Associates Law Offices for the registration of the
Riviera trademark with the Intellectual Property Office
(Annex "E" of the complainant) where respondent was paid
in check in the amount of Php158,344.20 (Annex "F" of the
complaint).
On 14 March 2000, another contract for services was
executed by complainant and respondent for the latter to act
as its counsel in the reclassification by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Silang, Cavite of complainant's agricultural lot to
"residential commercial and/or recreational use" in
connection with its Riviera project (Annexes "G" to "G4" of
the complaint). Under this contract, respondent was hired to
"act as counsel and representative of AFP-RSBS before the
Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, Cavite in all matters relative
to the reclassification of the subject properties from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses." On 21 March 2000,
respondent furnished complainant a copy of Resolution No.
MI-007, S of 2000 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang dated
21 February 2000 ("resolution") approving the conversion
and was paid the amount of Phpl.8M (Annex "H" of the
complaint). Notably, the resolution was passed on 21
February 2000 or a month before the signing of the said 14
March 2000 contract. Clearly, when [the] 14 March 2000
contract was V signed by complainant and respondent, there
was already a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang
approving the conversion of complainant's properties to
residential/commercial. Clearly, the Php 1.8M demanded and
received by respondent is not justifiable for the sole and
simple reason that respondent could not have performed any
service under the 14 March 2000 contract considering that
the result sought by the complainant (reclassification) has
been fulfilled and completed as early as 21 February 2000.
Respondent, must therefore, be ordered to return this amount
to complainant.
On 06 November 2000, complainant entered into another
contract for legal services with respondent for which the
latter was paid the amount of Php 14,000,000.00 to secure
Certificate of Registration and License to Sell from the SEC
(Annexes "I" to "I-5" of the complaint). In addition,
complainant further paid respondent the following checks as
professional fees in obtaining the Certificate of Registration
and Permit to Offer Securities for shares and other expenses:
EPCIB Check No. 443124 dated 13 February 2003 in the
amount of Phpl,500,000.00, CENB Check No. 74001 dated
29 February 2000 in the amount of Php6, 754.00, CENB
Check No. 70291 dated 15 September 1999 in the amount
Php261,305.00, and LBP Check No. 48691 dated 26 January
2001 in the amount of Php221,970.00.
As complainant's legal counsel, respondent was privy to
highly confidential information regarding the Riviera project
which included but was not limited to the corporate set-up,
actual breakdown of the shares of stock, financial records,
purchase agreements and swapping agreements with its
investors. Respondent was also very familiar with the Riviera
project[,] having been hired to secure Certificate of
Registration and License to Sell with the BLURB and the
registration of the shares of stock and license to sell of the
Riviera Golf Club, Inc. and Riviera Sports and Country Club,
Inc. Respondent further knew that complainant had valid
titles to the properties of the Riviera project and was also
knowledgeable about complainant's transactions with Phil
Golf
After complainant terminated respondent's services as its
legal counsel, respondent became Phil Golf’s representative
and assignee. Respondent began pushing for the swapping of
Phil Golf’s properties with that of complainant. Respondent
sent swapping proposals to his former client, herein
complainant, this time in his capacity as Phil Golf’s
representative and assignee. These proposals were rejected
by complainant for being grossly disadvantageous to the
latter. After complainant's rejection of the said proposals,
respondent filed a case against its former client, herein
complainant on behalf of a subsequent client (Phil Golf)
before the BLURB for alleged breach of contract (Annex "R"
of the complaint). In this HLURB case, respondent
misrepresented that Phil Golf is a duly organized and existing
corporation under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines
because it appears that Phil Golf’s registration had been
revoked as early as 03 November 2003. Despite Phil Golf’s
revoked Certificate of Registration, respondent further
certified under oath that he is the duly authorized
representative and assignee of Phil Golf. Respondent,
however, was not authorized to act for and on behalf of said
corporation because Phil Golf’s corporate personality has
ceased.
The Director's Certificate signed by Mr. Benito Santiago of
Phil Golf dated 10 May 2007 allegedly authorizing
respondent as Phil Golf’s representative and assignee was
null and void since the board had no authority to transact
business with the public because of the SEC's revocation of
Phil Golf’s Certificate of Registration.2
Due to the above actuations of respondent, complainant filed
the instant action for disbarment.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After hearing, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a Report
and Recommendation dated June 21, 2010, penned by
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez,
recommending the dismissal of the complaint, to wit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended
that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
Respectfully submitted.3
On review, the IBP-BOG reversed the recommendation of
the IBPCBD and recommended the suspension from the
practice of law of respondent for a period of three (3) years
and ordering the return of the amount of PhPl.8 Million to
the complainant within six (6) months. The dispositive
portion of the Extended Resolution dated December 28,
2015,4 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board RESOLVED
to unanimously REVERSE the Report and Recommendation
dated 21 June 2010 recommending the dismissal of the
Complaint dated 11 March 2008 and instead resolved to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) years and ordered the latter to return the amount of
Php 1.8 Million to the complainant within six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.5
The IBP-BOG found that respondent violated Rules
15.01,15.03,21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR, as well as Article
1491 of the Civil Code.
As provided in Section 12(b), Rule139B of the Rules of
Court, 6 the IBP Board forwarded the instant case to the
Court for final action.
Issue
The singular issue for the consideration of this Court is
whether Atty. Amora should beheld administratively liable
based on the allegations on the Complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court modifies the finding soft he IBP-BOG and the
penalty impose don’t he respondent who violated the
Lawyer's Oath and Rules 15.01, 15.03, 21.01 and 21.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent represented
Conflicting interests
The Lawyer's Oath provides:
I___________of__________do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
false hood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
While Rules 15.01 and 15. 03 of the Code state:
Rule 15.01.-A lawyer ,in conferring with a prospective client,
shall as certain as soon as practicable whether the matter
would involve a conflict with another client or his own
interest, and if so, shall forth within form the prospective
client.
Rule 15.03.-A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
The requirement under Rule 15.03 is quite clear.
A lawyer must secure the written consent of all concerned
parties after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent,
however, failed to present any such document. He points to
the fact that complainant approved several transactions
between him and the complainant. In his Position Paper
dated October 2, 2008,7 respondent argues that AFP-RSBS
gave its formal and written consent to his status as an
investor and allowed him to be subrogated to all the rights,
privileges and causes of action of an investor.8
This purported approval, however, is not the consent that the
CPR demands.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana ,Jr. ,9 the Court ruled that a
lawyer's failure to acquire a written consent from both
clients after a full disclosure of the facts would subject him to
disciplinary action:
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs .David:
xxxx
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down
the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case
cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be
instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they
cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a
present client and a prospective one. Granting also that there
really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses
'case other than him, still he should have observed the
requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with
the prospective client to as certain as soon as practicable
whether the matter would involve a conflict with another
client then seek the written consent of all concerned after
a full disclosure of the facts. These respondent failed to do
thus exposing himself to the charge of double dealing.10
(Emphasis supplied citation omitted)
Absent such written consent, respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainant,
respondent did not merely act as its invest or at his own
behest. In a letter dated April 26, 2007,11 the respondent
wrote AFP RSBS stating: "Further to our letter dated 24
April 2007 and on behalf of my principal, Philippine Golf
Development and Equipment, Inc., xxx" Plainly, respondent
was acting for and in behalf of Phil Golf.
Worse, at Phil Golf’s instance, he caused the filing of a
Complaint dated October 10, 200712 against complainant
with the BLURB, stating that he is the duly authorized
representative and assignee of Phil Golf and that he caused
the preparation of the complaint.13
In Hornilla v. Salunat,14 We explained the test to determine
when a conflict of interest is present thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents in
consistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client."This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential Communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test
of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance thereof.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Without cavil, or further need of elucidation, respondent's
representation of Phil Golf violated the rules on conflict of
interest as he under took to take up the causes of his new
client against the interest of his former client.
In Ylaya v. Gacott,16 the Court was succinct in saying that a
lawyer should decline any employment that would involve
any conflict of interest:
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be
so. Part of the lawyer's duty to his client is to avoid
representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to
decline professional employment, no matter how attractive
the fee offered maybe, if its acceptance involves a violation
of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the
rules of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept
a retainer from a defendant after he has given professional
advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he
accept employment from another in a matter adversely
affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to
decline employment in any of these and similar
circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting
representation of conflicting interests.17 (Emphasis
supplied)
It thus becomes quite clear that respondent's actions fall short
of the standard set forth by the CPR and are in violation of
his oath as a lawyer. By representing the interests of a new
client against his former client, he violated the trust reposed
upon him. His violation of the rules on conflict of interest
renders him subject to disciplinary action.
Respondent used confidential
Information against his former
client, herein complainant
Additionally, by causing the filing of the complaint before
the HLURB, the IBP-BOG correctly points out that
respondent must have necessarily divulged to Phil Golf and
used information that he gathered while he was complainant's
counsel in violation of Rules 21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR,
which state:
CANON 21-A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONIS
TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01-A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or
secrets of his client except;
(a)When authorized by the client
after acquainting him of the
consequences of the disclosure;
(b)When required by law;
(c)When necessary to collect his
fees or to defend himself, his
employees or associates or by
judicial action.
Rule 21.02-A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his
client, use information acquired in the course of employment,
nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a
third person,unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
The IBP-BOG properly found thus:
Using confidential information which he secured from
complainant while he was the latter's counsel; respondent
accused his former client of several violations. In the process,
respondent disclosed confidential information that he secured
from complainant thereby jeopardizing the latter's interest.
As discussed below, respondent violated his professional oat
hand the CPR.
xxxx
xxxx In the instant case, despite the obvious conflict of
interest between complainant and Phil Golf, respondent
nevertheless agreed to represent the latter in business
negotiations and worse, even caused the filing of a law suit
against his former client, herein complainant, using
information the respondent acquired from his former
professional employment.18
In Pacana, Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez, 19 the Court reiterated the
prohibition against lawyers representing conflicting interests:
Rule15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule15.03-A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after full
disclosure of the facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy,
good taste and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the
course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns
all the facts connected with the client's case, including its
weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if
the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof. It behooves lawyers not only to keep in violate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of
justice. It is for these reasons that we have described the
attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and
actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time,
was be leaguered with demands from investors of Multitel,
eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client
relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the
inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying
that the assistances her endered to complainant was only
in the form of" friendly accommodations," precisely
because at the times he was giving assistance to
complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the
opposing parties who had been referred to herby the
SEC.20 (Emphasis supplied)
It is undeniable that, in causing the filing of a complaint
against his former client, respondent used confidential
knowledge that he acquired while he was still employed by
his former client to further the cause of his new client. And,
as earlier stated, considering that respondent failed to obtain
any written consent to his representation of Phil Golf's
interests, he plainly violated the above rules. Clearly,
respondent must be disciplined for his actuations.
No basis for th ereturn of
PhP1.8 Million
Rule 131, Section 3, par. (f) provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.-
The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and over come by
other evidence:
xxxx
(f)That money paid by one to another was due the latter;
xxxx
By alleging that respondent was not entitled to the payment
of PhPl.8 Million, it was incumbent upon complainant to
present evidence to overturn the disputable presumption that
the payment was due to respondent. This, complainant failed
to do.
Complainant alleged that:
At the time of the signing of said contract, there was already
a resolution approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang
approving the conversion of AFP-RSBS' properties to
residential/commercial .Atty. Amorac ould not,thus,have
acteda sAF P-RSBS' legal counsel and representative during
the said proceedings, which was conducted a month before
he was hired by AFP-RSBS. However, he charged AFP-
RSBS and was paid by the latter the amount of 1.8million
pesos for not doing anything. He did not represent AFP-
RSBS and was not instrumental in having the resolution
passed and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Silang.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably complainant never presented any evidence to prove
that the resolution was passed without the intervention of
respondent. This it could have done by asking the
Sangguniang Bayan of Silang whether respondent
represented AFP-RSBS before them. This, complainant did
not do.
The amount of PhP1.8 Million is a substantial amount that, in
normal humane xperience, no person would pay to someone
who did not render any service.
Further, the mere fact that the contract was executed after the
issuance of the resolution does no tips of acto mean that
respondent did not have any hand in its issuance.
Verily, complainant failed to overcome the above mentioned
disputable presumption. Mere allegations can not suffice to
prove that respondent did not render any service to
complainant and, therefore, not entitled to the payment of
PhPl.8Million.
The Court adopts the findings of Commissioner Fernandez of
the IBP-CBD that respondent actually rendered the legal
services in connection with the Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution converting the land from agricultural to
residential/commercial and that respondent is legally entitled
to the payment. The Court finds that the explanation of
respondent is credible and it clarifies why the Agreement
came after the issuance of the Resolution, viz:
The amount of Php1.8 Million was paid by complainant
AFPRSBS for fees and expenses related to the approval of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. ML-007, Series of 2007.
Based on the usual practice during that time, respondent
performed the work upon the instruction of AFP-RSBS even
without any written agreement regarding his fees and
expenses. When respondent secured the Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution, he then sent a billing for the fees and expenses
amounting to Php1,850,000.00.It was addressed to Engr.
Samuel Cruz, the then Project Director of RSBS-Riviera
Project. However, since At That time, AFPRSBS had a new
President, the Head of its Corporation Holding and
Investment Group (Col. Cyrano A Austria) instructed
respondent to draw a new contract to comply with the new
policies and requirements.1âwphi1 Thus, respondent and
complainant entered into a contract for services if only to
document the service already performed by respondent in
accordance with the new policy of AFP-RSBS.22
As such, there is no basis to order respondent to return the
PhP1.8Million.
Respondent did not acquire
Property of a client subject of
litigation
Moreover, with regard to the finding of the IBP-BOG that
respondent violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code,We have
to digress.The Article reads:
Art.1491.The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial uction,either in person or through
the mediation of another:
xxxx
(5)Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession.
xxxx (Emphasis supplied)
On this point, We sustain the respondent's position that the
prohibition contained in Article 1491 does not apply in this
case.
"The subject properties which were acquired by respondent
Amora were allegedly not in litigation and/or object of any
litigation at the time of his acquisition."23
The Court in Sabidong v.Solas, clearly ruled:
"For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property."24
Under the circumstances,
Atty. Amara must be suspended
Notwithstanding the respondent's absolution from liability
under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, the gravity of his other
acts of misconduct demands that respondent Amora must still
be suspended.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC.27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor.-A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do.The practice of soliciting case
sat law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)
While the Court cannot allow a lawyer to represent
conflicting interests, the Court deems disbarment a much too
harsh penalty under the circumstances.1âwphi1 Thus, in
Francia v. Abdon, the Court opined:
In Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, the Court emphasized, thus:
Indeed, the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a
member of the bar.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty
could accomplish the end desired.
Without doubt, aviolation of the high moral standards of the
legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
However, the said penalties are imposed with great caution,
because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action
and their consequences are beyond repair.25 (citation
omitted)
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court pointed out that
jurisprudence27 regarding the penalty solely for a lawyer's
representation of conflicting interests is suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) to three (3) years.While the IP-
BOG recommends the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) years be imposed on respondent,
the Court finds that under the circumstances, a penalty of two b) If he Board, by the vote of a
(2) years suspension from the practice of law would suffice. majority of its total membership,
determines that the respondent
Atty. Amora, however, is warned that are petition of this and should be suspended from the
other similar acts will be dealt with more severely. practice of law or disbarred, it
shall issue are solution setting
forth its findings and
WHEREFORE,the Court finds Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M.
Amora, Jr. GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oat hand recommendations which, together
Canon 15,Rule15.03;Canon21,Rule21.01 and 21.02 of the with the whole record of the case,
shall forth with be transmitted to
Code of Professional Responsibility. Heishereby
the Supreme Court for final
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
action.
(2) years. Atty. Amora is warned that are petition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the

Bar Confidant, to be appended to the persona lrecord of Atty.
Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr. as a member of the Bar;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all trial courts for
theirin formation and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO- DIOSDADO M.
DE CASTRO PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
FRANCIS H.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(on leave)
SAMUEL R.
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
MARTIRES
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

6 Section 12.Review and decision by the

Board of Governors.-xxx
 These are four administrative complaints that were separately
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
A.C. No. 10758 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against
substantially the same parties, particularly:
46-59 minutes
(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice
and gross misconduct filed by Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-
Torres (Atty. Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin
(Atty. Dalangin) and docketed before the Court as A.C. No. l
0758:

(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by

Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty. Dalangin and docketed
before the Court as A.C. No. 10759;

(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation

of the lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin
against Atty. Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres (Atty.
EN BANC Andres), docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10760 ; and

December 5, 2017 (4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty
and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR filed by Atty. Dalangin
against Atty. Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No.
A.C. No. 10758
10761.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL,
The Antecedents
Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent A.C. No. 10758

x-----------------------x CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint1 for gross immorality,

GLENDA ALVARO, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent
x-----------------------x
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES AND
ATTY. AVE.LINO ANDRES, Respondent
x-----------------------x
malpractice and gross misconduct filed against Atty.
Dalangin by the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres; (2)
Felicidad O. Samatra (Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary DF.
Noveras (Noveras); and (5) Generosa S. Camacho
(Camacho).2
The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches
of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was alleged that Atty.
Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a
fellow lawyer groundless suits, which were merely prompted
by his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence
as counsel. By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed gross
misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02
and 1.03, Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR.3

ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-
vs. 3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed against Atty.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, Torres by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and 1V1elody Valdez
Respondent (Valdez), who were clients of Atty. Dalangin and the losing
parties in an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding
DECISION Judge Efren B. Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan
REYES, JR, J.: and Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that the filing of
the disbarment case was orchestrated by Atty. Dalangin, who
prepared the affidavit and instructed them to sign it even
without explaining the contents and tenor of the document.
When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their
affidavit was used to file a disbarment complaint with the
IBP against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the
services of Atty. Dalangin. By their new counsel's advice,
Marzan and Valdez stopped attending the disbarment
hearings, and the case was eventually dismissed by the IBP.
Atty. Dalangin also caused Marzan and Valdez's filing of
administrative cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as
the Clerk of Court of the MTC, which complaints were
nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon
the IBP’s recommendation.4
Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit
and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual (Pascual), a clerk
at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin previously worked as district
public attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he
retained Pascual as his private secretary, who still remained
to be employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a
daughter whom they named Julienne, even when each of
them had existing marriages with some other persons.5 The
affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual, and the paternity
of Julienne, were known to the community, especially the
courts.6 Julienne was nonetheless entered in the civil registry
as Pascual and her legal husband's own child so as to conceal
the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the real father.7 The
foregoing acts allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.
Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts
that dated back to his prior employment with PAO. He
allegedly collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants
who sought his assistance, like complainant Camacho from
whom he demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When
Camacho explained that he could only produce ₱3,000.00,
Atty. Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted,
"Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado [ditto]."8 Without prior
authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully
appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district public
attorney.9
Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to
Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases. It was claimed
that Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he
filed in court, which act constituted a breach of Rule 10.02,
Canon 10 of the CPR.10 In a case for robbery filed by
Samatra against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin also wielded his
influence and prepared perjured statements from supposed
witnesses, a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the
CPR.11 Finally, Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon
10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent
and misleading evidence, particularly a certificate of title
without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the
case.12
Atty. Dalangin filed his Answer and refuted all charges.13
He denied having a hand in the preparation of the disbarment
complaint against Atty. Torres, as he argued that neither his
name nor his signature appeared in the records thereof. His
relationship with Pascual, on the other hand, was only
maliciously misinterpreted. He was only a close friend of the
Pascuals, and some of Pascual’s children, including Julienne,
were his godchildren.14
Atty. Dalangin likewise denied the claim that he collected
attorney's fees while he worked as a PAO lawyer. Although
he admitted appearing as a public attorney in an area that was
beyond his jurisdiction, the appearance 1 was with the
Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority, claimed by Atty.
Dalangin to be sufficient under office practice.15 Finally, the
alleged mistakes that he committed as counsel in specific
cases' presentation of evidence had been rectified in court.16
A.C. No. 10759
CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint17 for gross misconduct,
was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an incident
that happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while
Alvaro was waiting for the start of a hearing at the lobby of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija. Upon seeing Alvaro, Atty. Dalangin allegedly
hurled slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he
spoke at the top of his voice and referred to her as a "certified
swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for her
participation in the filing of CBD Case No. 11-3215, and
then precluded her from visiting the PAO in Talavera, Nueva
Ecija. Atty. Dalangin’s tirade was heard and witnessed by
several persons, and some of them executed their respective
affidavits18 to narrate the incident. The foregoing impelled
Alvaro to seek Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Rule
8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR.
While Atty. Dalangin admitted in his Answer19 the alleged
confrontation, he denied shouting invectives at Alvaro. When
he talked to Alvaro, he merely confronted her for what he
claimed were lies declared in her affidavit in CBD Case No.
11-3215. Atty. Dalangin also warned to seek legal remedies
should Alvaro fail to substantiate the truth of her testimonies.
Atty. Dalangin also admitted that he precluded Alvaro from
visiting PAO, but explained that this was prompted by his
knowledge that Alvaro was a fixer, who used the name of the
office and demanded money from indigent clients. For Atty.
Dalangin, Alvaro filed this complaint to get back at Atty.
Dalangin for banning her at the PAO and depriving her of
earning from her illegal activities.20
A.C. No. 10760
The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD
Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty. Dalangin.
In CBD Case No. 12-3369,21 Atty. Dalangin sought the
disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross
misconduct, violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. He claimed that
both lawyers conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case
No. 11-3215, even as they violated Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo
Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a transcript of a
recorded telephone conversation between Alejo and one
Wilma Pineda (Pineda).22 The recording was without the
prior knowledge and consent of Pineda.23
As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD
Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against
Noveras, who was claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal
case against Pascual. In an affidavit drafted by Atty.
Dalangin for Pineda, the latter complained of Noveras and
Alejo’s failure to return in full the cash bond that she posted
in a case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, even
after the case had been dismissed by the trial court. This
allegation was negated in the disputed transcript, as Pineda
allegedly confirmed receiving the full ₱8,000.00, but decided
to give half thereof to Alejo for a "blow-out" after her case’s
dismissal.24
Both Atty. Andres and Atty. Torres disputed the complaint.
Atty. Andres asserted that CBD Case No. 12-3369 was filed
only to harass and intimidate him, being the counsel of the
complainants in CBD Case No. 11- 3215.25 By way of
defense, he adopted a counter-affidavit26 which he submitted
in a separate complaint for violation of R.A. No. 4200 that
was filed by Atty. Dalangin with the City Prosecutor of Pasig
City. Atty. Andres therein argued that on the basis of Atty.
Dalangin’s allegations, the case should have been filed by
Pineda against Alejo, being the purported victim and the one
who recorded the conversation, respectively.
Atty. Torres, on the other hand, pointed out that Atty.
Dalangin’s reference to R.A. No. 4200 was tantamount to an
admission that the conversation actually transpired. This only
confirmed a fault committed by Atty. Dalangin for the
fabrications in Pineda's earlier affidavit, which was executed
purposely to destroy the credibility of Noveras. The
submission of the transcript was necessary because Atty.
Dalangin’s malpractice was one of the main causes of action
in CBD Case No. 11-3215.27 Moreover, the record of the
conversation between Alejo and Pineda could not be
considered a violation of R.A. No. 4200 because no wire or
cable was used to tap their cellular phones. Neither party in
the conversation also complained of a supposed
wiretapping.28
A.C. No. 10761
The complaint29 docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was
filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct,
dishonesty for violation of Article 18330 of the Revised
Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.
Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD
Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit,31 which
allegedly contained untruthful statements. Marzan and
Valdez knew from the beginning that they were complainants
in a disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres,
however, later made them issue the perjured statements by
using as a leverage her own complaint32 for perjury against
Marzan and Valdez, who were then pressured to sign the
affidavits in exchange for the perjury case’s dismissal.33
In her Answer34 to the complaint, Atty. Torres insisted on
the truth of the statements made by Marzan and Valdez in
their affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner
The four administrative complaints were eventually
consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.
After the parties ’ filing of their respective position papers
and the conduct of a series of hearings, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating
Commissioner) issued a Consolidated Report and
Recommendation35 dated February 11, 2013, which found
sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the
practice of law for three years. Atty. Dalangin’s charges
against Atty. Dela Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other
hand, were recommended for dismissal.
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report
and Recommendation ended as follows:
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing, finding that Respondent
Bayani P. Dalangin violated the provisions of the [CPR] and
his Lawyer's Oath specifically on Gross Immorality, and
Gross Misconduct in CBD Case No. 11-3215 and CBD Case
No. 12-3292, it is recommended that said Respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for the period of three (3)
years from receipt of the order with a warning that similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
It is further recommended that the charges against
Respondent Rosita L. dela Fuente Torres and Respondent
Avelino Andres in CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case
No. 12-3458, for lack of merit be ordered dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.36
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XX-2013-768,37 which adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated
Report and Recommendation. The resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supprted
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent Dalangin is guilty of gross
immorality and gross misconduct, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin
is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for three
(3) years with Warning that repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The case
against Atty. Rosita L. dela [Fuente] Torres and Atty.
Manuel Andres is hereby DISMISSED.38
Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for reconsideration, but this
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution39
dated August 8, 2014, which reads:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent/Complainant Dalangin’s
Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and the Resolution
subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated
June 1, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.40
On February 26, 2015, Atty. Dominic C. M. Solis, Director
for Bar Discipline, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
transmitted the case records to the Court pursuant to Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.41
On even date and before the Court could have rendered its
final action on the disbarment complaints against Atty.
Dalangin vis-a-vis the records forwarded by the IBP, Atty.
Dalangin forthwith filed with the Court a Petition for
Review,42 which questioned the IBP resolutions that, first,
declared him administratively liable in CBD Case Nos. 11-
3215 and 12- 3292, and second, dismissed his complaints
against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres in CBD Case Nos. 12-
3369 and 12-3458.
In a Resolution43 dated June 16, 2015, the Court
consolidated these cases and, without giving due course to
the petition for review, required the filing of Comments on
the petition. Accordingly, a Consolidated Comment on the
Petition44 dated August 5, 2015 was filed by Andres &
Associates Law Office, as counsel for Atty. Torres, et al.,
being the complainants in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215 and 12-
3292, and respondents in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and 12-
3458. Thereafter, Atty. Dalangin filed his Reply45 to the
consolidated comment.
The Court’s Ruling
Procedure from Resolutions
of the IBP Board of Governors
The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of
Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the Court via a
petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of
Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation on his administrative
liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet
taken a final action on the complaints.
When the administrative complaints were resolved by the
IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court, the
procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in
administrative cases was as provided in the former Section
12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the
amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. The old rule read:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by
the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons
on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period
not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record
of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the
disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension
or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it
shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing
such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated
unless upon petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with the Supreme Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the
Supreme Co mi orders otherwise.
d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be
given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases
supplied)
In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court
applied this provision to address the issue therein involved,
and explained its proper application in a Resolution dated
June 17, 2008. The Court set the following guidelines:
In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors
(BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a
sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the
aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration
within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is
denied, said party can file a petition for a review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion.
If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall
become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall
be furnished this Court.
If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of
law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved
party can file a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from
notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall
thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire
case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day
period lapses without any motion for reconsideration having
been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court
the resolution with the entire case records for appropriate
action. (Emphases supplied)
Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify
his immediate filing of the petition for review questioning the
IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could
nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances that Atty.
Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the
forfeiture of his right to question the dismissal of the
administrative cases where he served as complainant, given
that Section 12(c) provides that where the respondent is
exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon a petition of the complainant or other interested party
filed with Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise. For this reason, the Court refused to make an
outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for review
notwithstanding the fact that it questioned the resolve to
suspend him from the practice of law. Considering that the
petition likewise covered the IBP's dismissal of the
disbarment cases against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, the
Court, in a Resolution dated June 16, 2015, directed the filing
of comments on the petition.
In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the
petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension from the practice of law was as yet not among his
remedies, considering that the Court still had to release its
final action on the matter.46 It is the Supreme Court, not the
IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to
discipline lawyers.47 The factual findings of the IBP can
only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties are
also, by their nature, recommendatory.48 In light of these
precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the IBP's
recommendation for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension
notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact,
an examination of the IBP resolutions for his suspension is
warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a
petition, because it is the Court that has the duty to take a
final action on any determination of the IBP for a lawyer's
suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court had in fact been later
amended by B.M. No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. Section
12 thereof now reads:
Sec. 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of
Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by
the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its
total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the
dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary
action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting
of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's
report.
c) The Board’s resolution, together with the entire records
and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten
(10) days from issuance of the resolution.
d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties
through their counsel, if any.
In Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis,49 the Court emphasized that
the amendments reiterated the principle that only the Court
has the power to impose disciplinary action on members of
the bar. Factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors
of the IBP are recommendatory, subject to review by the
Court.50
As the Court now reviews the IBP’s resolve to dismiss the
complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, it then also
enters its final action on the IBP Board of Governors’
recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice
of law for three years, as the IBP cited gross misconduct,
violations of the CPR and breach of the lawyer's oath as
grounds.
A.C. No. 10758
Gross Immorality
Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to
suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three
years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly
maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even when
their marriages with their respective spouses subsisted.
Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child
Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin’s daughter
even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that
could prove the child's true filiation.51
In his report, the Investigative Commissioner specifically
referred to the following evidence to support his finding of
an immoral relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual:
2. That Complainant Alvaro who executed an affidavit
regarding the illicit and immoral relation of [Atty. Dalangin]
with [Pascual] for the reason that she was formerly [close] to
[Pascual] and the latter confided to her that she (Pascual)
[did] not love her husband anymore and the child called
[Atty. Dalangin] "Papa attorney" (Affidavit of Alvaro as Exh.
"F").
3. That Ligaya Agrave[,] a neighbor of [Pascual,] likewise
executed an affidavit that the child ["Julienne"] is the
daughter of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual], that she used to see
[Atty. Dalangin] taking care of [Julienne] when she was still
a baby and when she grew up already, [Atty. Dalangin] used
to accompany the child in their school tour and also her
graduation. That the child as she grew older is a look[-]alike
of [Atty. Dalangin]. (Affidavit of Ligaya Agrave marked as
Exh. "G").
4. That the illicit affair of [Atty. Dalangin] with his former
Clerk in the PAO, Talavera, Nueva Ecija was well known in
Talavera, in the entire judiciary in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and
even in the community of Sto. Domingo, Nueva [E]cija[.]
[(L]etter to the Ombudsman dated Aug. 18, 2011 of Felicidad
Sumatra is marked as Exh. "H").
5. That [Atty. Dalangin] refused when challenged for a DNA
test.
6. Complainants submitted xxx pictures of [Atty. Dalangin
and Pascual] together with their daughter [Julienne] taken in
far away Puerto Prinsesa marked as Exh. I and I-1.
7. That [Atty. Dalangin] continued to publicly and openly
cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife shows his
lack of good moral character.52
Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital
affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the
family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise
constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State."53 When lawyers are engaged in
wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality,
the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from
the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis
to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair with
Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed
between them was not adequately proved.
The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial
evidence. The Court explained in Saladaga v. Astorga:54
Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as the
ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.55
In Reyes v. Nieva, 56 the Court reiterated this rule on the
quantum of proof in administrative proceedings, as it held:
Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is
Cabas v. Sususco, which was promulgated just this June 15,
2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e.,
that 'amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. x x x.
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to
control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the
proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative
cases against lawyers.
The rule is taken in light of other settled principles that apply
for a proper disposition of administrative cases. In Advincula
v. Macabata,57 the Court emphasized:
The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must
establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from
doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that he who asserts not
he who denies, must prove. xxx.58
Further, the Court emphasized in Cabas v. Sususco59 the oft-
repeated rule that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence."60
With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the
Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of
evidence that could warrant the recommended suspension
from the practice of law.
To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as
bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality
harped only on general statements of a supposed personal
and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship between
Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could
have led them to their conclusion were scant and
unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could
offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth
certificate, a public document, expressly indicated the girl’s
father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty. Dalangin.61
Julienne’s baptismal certificate62 also provided such fact,
along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s defense on his
closeness to Julienne for being her godfather.
It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child
whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this case,
for the Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the
IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of the available
evidence. The alleged similarities in the physical appearances
of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but lame and dismal
validations of the complainants’ vehement claim of paternity.
Even the photographs63 of Atty. Dalangin, Pascual and
Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Pue1io Princesa,
Palawan were insufficient to support a conclusion on the
unlawful relations. The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin
appeared with Pascual and Julienne, who were apparently
merely waiting for boarding in an airport terminal, utterly
failed to manifest any romantic or filial bond among them. It
was also explained through an affidavit64 executed by
spouses Dante Capindian and Timotea Jamito that Atty.
Dalangin was a principal sponsor, while Pascual’s family
were guests, in their wedding which was held on August 6,
2011 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos
were taken during the said trip. Pascual’s husband, Edgardo,
was also present for the occasion.
The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally
absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any romantic
relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating
closeness with the latter's family, including her children. It
was such display of affection that could have sparked in the
minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and
belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty.
Dalangin should have been more prudent and mindful of his
actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public,
particularly because he and Pascual were both married. "As
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community."65 As keepers of public
faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs
with great caution."66
The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should
suffice under the circumstances. The following
pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata67 is pertinent:
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a
particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should
ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously
guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact
from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court,
to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the
public.
x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character
should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts
which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of
such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's
unfitness to continue in the practice of law. x x x68
Gross Misconduct and
Malpractice
Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for
suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts
involving use of misleading evidence in court and
preparation of affidavits with pe1jured statements to support
cases and complaints for disbarment. When he still served as
a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded acceptance
fees from indigent clients, and appeared in courts beyond his
area of jurisdiction. Even these charges, however, were not
supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension. And while there were several other charges
included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the
accusations were actually for actions that should be attributed
not to him, but to other individuals like Pascual.
Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully
explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit
that supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the
Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to explain
did not necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein
made. It refers to the joint affidavit executed by Marzan and
Valdez, and which was attached to the complaint in CBD
Case No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely alleged that they
signed the affidavit even when they were not fully apprised
of its contents.69 It was not alleged that they were
fraudulently lured or tricked by Atty. Dalangin into signing
the complaint, and that the charges therein hurled against
Atty. Torres were absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty.
Dalangin knowingly brought a groundless suit against a
fellow lawyer had no leg to stand on.
The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed
demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO
lawyer also remained unsubstantiated by evidence.1âwphi1
Such serious imputation could not have been adequately
established by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a
lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for
₱8,000.00 was allegedly made in 2001.70 Similarly, while
Atty. Dalangin admitted to have appeared in courts beyond
his area of jurisdiction as public attorney, he claimed to have
obtained permission therefor from the Regional Public
Attorney, a defense which the complainants failed to refute.
In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption that the
respondent regularly performed his duty in accordance with
his oath shall prevail,71 especially as the Court considers it
highly improbable for the courts where appearances were
made to fail to notice such patent irregularity, if Atty.
Dalangin was indeed not authorized to perform his acts
before their courts as a public attorney.
Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a
certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF pending
with the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and
entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has been
explained that the error had been corrected at once during the
pre-trial conference.72
Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in
A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his misquote
of jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC,
Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05 entitled
Bangko Luzon v. Diaz. It was narrated in the complaint in
CBD Case No. 11-3215 that:
14. x x x [T]he cited jurisprudence is hereto quoted:
"If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure
sale of the property in question, the issuance of a writ of
possession ceases to be ministerial."
15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing
mentioned about the cessation of the ministerial function of
the court but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are
the following:
"Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is
annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of
a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial
court."73
Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit
of the cited ruling.74 As counsel and officer of the court,
however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the
task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was remiss in
the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule
10.02 thereof provides:
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of paper, the language or the argument of the
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved."
The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be
an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court detests
Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the
statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited
jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the
matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.
A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a
penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty.
Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence.
There was no clear indication that the statement was intended
to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no
brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine that was
embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.
A.C. No. 10759
In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation
on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter was waiting
for the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija, the records include affidavits executed by
witnesses who did not appear to have any reason to falsely
testify against Atty. Dalangin on the incident.
Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be
also then waiting for a scheduled hearing, allegedly saw Atty.
Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a
case against the latter.75 Two security guards stationed at the
trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not
have wrongly testified against Atty. Dalangin, likewise
confirmed that such heated confrontation actually transpired.
Pertinent portions of the guards’ affidavit76 read:
1. Na noong ika-14 ng Nobyembre, 2011, ganap na ika-8:45
ng umaga humigit kumulang, ha bang nakaupo si [Alvaro] sa
"bench", upuang mahaba malapit sa aming kinauupuan dito
sa pintuan ng Hall of Justice, Regional Trial Court, Baloc,
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija at kausap niya ang isa niyang
kasama, dumating si Atty. Bayani Dalangin at pagkakita kay
[Alvaro] ay pinagsisigawan ito at maraming sinabi laban kay
[Alvaro];
2. Na maraming nakarinig, nakakita at nagulat sa
pangyayaring ito;
x x x x77
For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of
the complaint, especially since his outburst was carried out
within the court premises and in the presence of several
persons who readily witnessed his fit of anger. Part of Atty.
Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is
due the profession. Members of the legal profession should
commit to the mandates of Canon 7, particularly Rule 7 .03
thereof, to wit:
CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION XX X.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been
stirred by his frustration or resentment for the disbarment
case filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could
not have absolved him from any responsibility for his
conduct. At most, this only serves to mitigate the penalty that
the Court deems appropriate to impose, as it likewise
considers its finding that Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case
No. 11-3215 on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty.
Dalangin with Pascual were indeed not backed by sufficient
evidence. The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon Atty.
Dalangin a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem warning that a
more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C.
No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still suitable
under the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759,
although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758, is a distinct
administrative case that covers a separate complaint that was
instituted solely by Alvaro. The severity of this offense
likewise varies from the other breaches for which the Court
has determined the admonition to be appropriate.
A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761
The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the
administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin against
Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his
complaint by referring to the supposed participation of Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. He asserted that the act also violated the
lawyer's oath, and breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
the CPR which reads:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that
the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the breach of the
basic and constitutional right to privacy of communication
that inevitably results from the act. In brief, the law prohibits
any person "to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept or
record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder x x x."79 It
likewise forbids any person from possessing, replaying or
furnishing transcriptions of communications that are obtained
in violation of the law.
In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and
Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful recording
of a private communication with Pineda, along with the use
of the transcript thereof to support Alejo’s affidavit in CBD
Case No. 11-3215. However, Pineda's own denial of the truth
of the statements in the transcription lends doubt as to the
allegation of a purported secret recording of an actual
conversation. While Pineda denied knowledge that her
telephone conversation with Alejo was recorded by the latter,
she still refused to acknowledge the veracity of the assertions
that she allegedly made as contained in the transcript,80
which then appears to be a rejection of the supposed
conversation. Given the circumstances, the IBP correctly
ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to substantiate the charges in
his complaint against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
The same conclusion equally applies in A.C. No. 10761. The
commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty. Torres, as the
person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez. As
witnesses in CBD Case No. 11-3215, Marzan and Valdez
claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty.
Torres' disbarment without fully explaining to them the
contents thereof. The fact that Atty. Torres induced the
affiants to make perjured statements, however, was not
established by clear and convincing proof. Even granting that
statements of affiants were eventually determined to be
inaccurate and untruthful, it would be wrong to at once
ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who drafted the
affidavits, in the absence of clear and sufficient proof that
they actively participated in the intentional commission of a
fraud or declaration of fabricated statements.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as
follows:
(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (On leave)
is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the Associate Justice
public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more Footnotes
severely;
*On Official leave
(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED
Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of Rule 7.03,
** On leave.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a
STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed upon him for any repetition of the same or similar *** On leave.
offense in the future; and
1 Rollo (A.C. No. 10758), Vol. I, pp. 2-11.
(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P.
Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The Court 2 Id. at 2.
AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board
of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated June 21, 61.
2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2014, insofar as the
IBP Board of Governors dismissed the following complaints: 30 Art. 183. False testimony in other cases
(1) CBD Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela and perjury in solemn affirmation. -The
Fuente-Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2) CBD Case penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
No. 12-3458 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres. period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon
SO ORDERED. any person, who knowingly makes
untruthful statements and not being
ANDRES B. REYES, JR. included in the provisions of the next
Associate Justice preceding articles', shall testify under oath,
or make an affidavit, upon any material
WE CONCUR: matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Any person who, in case of
solemn affirmation made in lieu of
PRESBITERO J. an oath, shall commit any of the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
VELASCO, JR. falsehoods mentioned in this and
Associate Justice
Associate Justice the three preceding articles of this
In the result, pls. see section, shall suffer the respective
TERESITA J. separate opinion penalties provided therein.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M.
Associate Justice PERALTA
Associate Justice
(On official leave) MARIANO C. DEL
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS- MARVIC M.V.F.
BERNABE LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On leave) ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA CAGUIOA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice Associate Justice
A.C. No. 6486
13-16 minutes
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and
provisions, one requirement remains constant in all
the jurisdictions where the practice of law is
regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he
or she has "good moral character," and once he
becomes a lawyer he should always behave in
accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction
too, good moral character is not only a condition
precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence,
when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral
conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2
In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001,
filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of
her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the
ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation
of professional ethics and law. The case was
docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a
philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in
illicit relationships with two women, one after the
other, and had illegitimate children with them.
From the time respondent’s illicit affairs started, he
failed to give regular support to complainant and
their children, thus forcing complainant to work
abroad to provide for their children’s needs.
Complainant pointed out that these acts of
respondent constitute a violation of his lawyer’s
oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role
model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline issued an Order4 requiring respondent
to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November
19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage
with the complainant and the birth of their
children, respondent alleged that they have
mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years
before after complainant had abandoned him in
their Balintawak residence and fled to San
Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that
when complainant returned after eighteen years,
she insisted that she be accommodated in the place
where he and their children were residing. Thus, he
was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their
children to the best school he could afford and
provided for their needs. He even bought two lots
in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and
gave complainant adequate financial support even
after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this
case in order to force him to remit seventy percent
(70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation
and hearings on the complaint. Complainant
presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,6 to support the allegations in her
Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it
was established that on January 19, 1979,
complainant and respondent were married7 and
lived with the latter’s mother in Balintawak. At
that time, respondent was just a fourth year law
student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged
in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs
from the respondent’s mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely,
Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on
February 20, 1980,8 October 14, 19819 and August
11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that
their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels
because of respondent’s extra-marital affairs.11
Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to
her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work
because respondent had failed to provide adequate
support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked
abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement
between her and respondent to live separately,
complainant asseverated that she was just
compelled to work abroad to support their
children. When she returned to the Philippines, she
learned that respondent was living with another
woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he
did not want to live with her anymore and that he
preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence
consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin,
Darling, and Christian Dave,12 all surnamed
Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his
paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired
three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs
with two different women. Letters of
complainant’s legitimate children likewise support
the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was
deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant, after he failed to appear during the
scheduled hearings despite due notice. He,
however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to
the Complainant’s Formal Offer of Evidence with
Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records
of the Proceedings15 on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent
submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mechanism. Respondent’s motion was
denied because it was filed after the complainant
had already presented her evidence.16 Respondent
was given a final chance to present his evidence on
July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for
being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Respondent submitted his Position Paper on
August 4, 2003.
In respondent’s Position Paper,17 he reiterated the
allegations in his Answer except that this time, he
argued that in view of the resolution of the
complaint for support with alimony pendente lite18
filed against him by the complainant before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the
instant administrative case should be dismissed for
lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through
the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report20 and
Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case
No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that the
respondent be suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above
recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the
Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice
 law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession."
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has
been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary
action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree23 or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.24
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards. If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled
in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good
moral character has three ostensible purposes,
namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the
public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect
prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of
morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but
also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in
this exclusive and honored fraternity.27 They may
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred
for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.28
Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in
illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the
complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions.
Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction
with the documentary evidence, sufficiently
established respondent’s commission of marital
infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent
had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession.
He has made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.29
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for
abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that
abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal
relations with a paramour fall within that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32
that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such, includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community as exemplified by
behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member
of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed.34
However, in the present case, the seriousness of
the offense compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate
penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty.

Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered
in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the

Philippines, and on the Office of the Court

Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales*,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario**,
JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 10911
14-18 minutes
EN BANC
June 6, 2017
A.C. No. 10911
VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for
disbarment dated October 16, 2009 filed by complainant
Virgilio Mapalad, Sr. against respondent Atty. Anselmo S.
Echanez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 1
The Facts
Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of
Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 1635-1-
784 before the Municipal Trial Court in Santiago City,
Isabela, complainant was one of the plaintiffs while
respondent was the defendants' counsel therein. As the said
case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal dated May 22, 2009, in which respondent
indicated his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038 without indicating the
date of issue thereof. 2 On appeal, respondent filed the
appellants' brief, again only indicating his MCLE
Compliance Number. 3
In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573,
respondent, for the same clients, filed a Petition for
Injunction wherein he once again only indicated his MCLE
Compliance Number. 4 Respondent also filed a Motion for
Leave of Court datedJuly13,2009 in the said special civil
action, indicating his MCLE Compliance Number without
the date of issue. 5 1âwphi1
Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant
discovered that respondent had no MCLE compliance yet.
The MCLE Office then issued a Certification dated
September 30, 2009, stating that respondent had not yet
complied with his MCLE requirements for the First
Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14,
2007). 6
Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's
act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts,
parties, and counsels concerned into believing that he had
complied with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had
not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct. 7 The
complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend
respondent's disbarment to this Court. 8
In a resolution dated February 10, 2010, this Court required
the respondent to file a comment on the complaint within 10
days from notice. 9
Despite receipt thereof, however, respondent failed to
comply with the said resolution. 10 This Court, thus, issued
another resolution dated July 11, 2011 requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and, again, to
file a comment to the complaint. 11 However, the respondent
again failed to comply. 12
On August 14, 2013, the IBP Commission- on Bar Discipline
(IBPCBD) issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing. 13 On the date of the hearing, however,
none of the parties appeared despite due notice. 14
Nonetheless, the IBP directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 10 days from notice. 15
only the complainant filed his position paper, reiterating the
allegations and arguments in his complaint. 16
After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP-CBD rendered a report 17 dated December 17, 2013
with the following recommendation, to wit:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the pieces of
evidence submitted by the complainant, it is recommended
that ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be DISBARRED and
that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys upon
finality of the decision.
So ORDERED. 18
On September 28, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the CBD-IBP Investigating
Commissioner, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled· case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and
for Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he falsified his MCLE
Compliance Number and used it in his pleadings in Court,
including his having ignored the Orders and notices of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and his having been
previously sanctioned twice by the IBP, Atty. Anselmo
Echanez is hereby DISBARRED and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys. 19
No motion for reconsideration was filed by either party.
The Issue
Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on
the allegations in the complaint and evidence on record?
The Ruling
We answer in the affirmative,
Preliminarily, let it be stated that there is no denying that the
respondent was given ample opportunity to answer the
imputations against him and defend himself but he did not do
so despite due notices.
At any rate, respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly
manifest, thus, warranting the exercise by this Court of its
disciplinary power.
First. It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar
Matter No. 850 20 . No less than the MCLE Office had
issued a certification stating that respondent had not
complied with the first and second compliance period of the
MCLE. 21
Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly
indicated a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings
before the trial courts. 22 In indicating patently false
information in pleadings filed before the courts of law, not
only once but four times, as per records, the respondent acted
in manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he
indeed misled the courts, litigants - his own clients · included
- professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied
on such pleadings containing false information. 23
Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to
contain false information is a mockery of the courts,
especially this Court, considering that it is this Court that
authored the rules and regulations that the respondent
violated. 24
The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court requires commitment to obeying laws and legal orders,
doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and
client, among others, viz.:
I, x x x do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false,
or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself these, voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (emphasis supplied)
Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR likewise states:
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.
In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings,
respondent also put his own clients at risk. Such deficiency in
pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as pleadings with
such false information produce no legal effect. 25 In so
doing, respondent violated his duty to his clients. 26 Canons
17 and 18 of the CPR provide:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Third. The respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal
orders of the trial court, the IBP-CBD, and also this Court
despite due notice. In the special civil action above-cited, the
trial court directed the respondent to file a comment on a
motion which raised in issue respondent's use of a false .
MCLE compliance number in his pleadings but he did not
file any. 27 This Court also directed respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint but he failed to do so. 28
We then issued a show cause order against the respondent to
explain why he should not be disciplined or held in contempt
for failing to file the required comment but again, respondent
did not heed this court's order. 29 The IBP- Court orders
should be respected not only because the authorities who
issued them should be respected, but because of the respect
and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch
of the
government, which is absolutely essential if our government
is to be a
government of laws and not of men. 31CBD also notified the
respondent to appear before it for mandatory
conference/hearing but the said notice was also ignored. 30
Court orders should be respected not only because the
authorities who issued them should be respected, but because
of the respect and consideration that should be extended to
the judicial branch of the government, which is absolutely
essential if our government is to be a government of laws and
not of men. 31
Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders
despite notice violates the lawyer's oath and runs counter to
the precepts of the CPR. · By his repeated dismissive
conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of
respect for the authority of the Court.
Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact
that, as cited by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution,
respondent had already been sanctioned by the IBP twice. In
a decision dated April 11, 2013 by this Court en bane,
respondent was found guilty of engaging in notarial practice
without a notarial commission, and was thus suspended from
the practice of law for two years with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a
more severe sanction. 32 In another decision dated May 31,
2016, this Court en bane again found respondent guilty of
performing notarial acts without a notarial commission and
was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years
and barred permanently from being commissioned as notary
public with a stem warning that a repetition of the same shall
be dealt with severely. 33 It is noteworthy that in both cases,
respondent already manifested his lack of regard, not only for
the charges against him, but most importantly to the orders of
the IBP and the courts. In the said cases, the respondent
likewise failed to file answers, comments, or position papers,
or attended mandatory conferences despite due notices. 34
Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a
false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings 35 , his
repeated failure to obey legal Orders 36 , and the fact that he
had already been sanctioned twice by this Court On separate
cases 37 , We are constrained to affirm the IBP Board of
Governors' Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, recommending
his disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in legal
practice. 38 It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are
instruments in the administration of justice. 39 As vanguards
of our legal system, they are expected to maintain legal
proficiency and a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing. 40 Also, of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. 41 He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them underfoot and ignore the
very bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office
and sets a detrimental example to the society. 42
WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
AssociateJustice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. DIOSDADO M.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO P. DEL
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS- MARVIC M.V.F.
BERNABE LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

Footnotes

20 BAR MATTER 850: MANDATORY

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION.
"ADOPTING . THE REVISED RULES
ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES. October 2, 2001.

38 Rule 138, Sec. 27. Disbarment or

suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
groundstherefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or any gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so.

A.C. No. 5333
23-29 minutes
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5333 October 18, 2000
ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
MELO, J:
This has reference to a case for disbarment
initiated by complainant Rosa Yap Paras against
her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The
parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their
copious pleadings, hurling invectives, cutting
remarks and insults at each other. Reduced to its
essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband with
dishonesty and falsification of public documents,
harassment and intimidation, and immorality for
siring a child with another woman. Respondent
denied the allegations, contending that his wife, in
cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip
him of his share in their multi-million conjugal
assets.
The parties come from wealthy families in Negros
Oriental. They were married on May 21, 1964 and
have two grown-up children. They have vast
sugarlands and other businesses. Respondent was a
Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor
in their town for 2 terms during the administration
of President Aquino. Complainant is a
businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage
fell apart when due to "marital strain that has
developed through the years," respondent left his
wife and children to live with his mother and sister
in Dumaguete City and thence started his law
practice. Complainant, in the meantime, filed a
case for the dissolution of their marriage, which
case is still pending in court.
The complaint charged:
DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD
… respondent obtained loans from certain banks in
the name of complainant by counterfeiting
complainant's signature, falsely making it appear
that complainant was the applicant for said loans.
Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the
proceeds of the loans.
. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent
mortgaged some personal properties belonging to
the conjugal partnership without the consent of
complainant.
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND
CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and
criminal act of concubinage as he maintained an
illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching,
siring an illegitimate child with her while married
to complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused
his legal skills to frighten, harass and intimidate all
those who take a position diametrically adverse to
his sinister plans by unethically filing complaints
and other pleadings against them. He utilized
strategies to obstruct justice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice.
In the criminal actions initiated against him,
respondent used his legal skills not to prove his
innocence but to derail all the proceedings.
(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following
defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public
Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife
executed in his favor a Special Power of Attorney
to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan
authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for
and secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar
cane from the Bais Rural Bank, Bais City . . ."
(Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262)
(2) On the Charge of Forgery:
That the Report of the National Bureau of
Investigation which found that "the questioned
signatures (referring to the alleged forged
signatures of complainant) and the standard sample
signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one
and the same person…"(Annex "B" of the
Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his
wife filed against him a string of cases for
falsification of public documents because he
intends to disinherit his children and bequeath his
inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his
own mother.
(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct
and Concubinage:
That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by
his brother-in-law, Atty. Francisco D. Yap to
disqualify him from getting any share in the
conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the
complaint for concubinage filed against him by his
wife before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental
as proof of his innocence.
Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother
and sister, are solicitous and hospitable to his
alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching and her
daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own
deceased daughter), by allowing them to stay in
their house and giving them some financial
assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a
secretary in his law office, who was deserted by
her boyfriend after getting her pregnant.
(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:
That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in
defense and offense are legitimate courses of
action done by an embattled lawyer."
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines investigated the
complaint against respondent summarizing the
causes of action as follows:
(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and
misuse of conjugal assets; and
(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage
with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an
illegitimate child with her while married to
complainant, and, abandonment of his own family.
(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)
No actual hearing was conducted as the parties
agreed to merely submit their respective
memoranda, depositions, and other pieces of
evidence attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as
charged and recommended:
(1) Respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for three (3)
months on the first charge; and
(2) Respondent's indefinite
suspension from the practice of law
on the second charge.
(ibid., p. 57)
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal
cases against respondent for falsification and use
of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768)
and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar
the filing of an administrative case for disbarment
against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required for conviction, while
in an administrative complaint, only a
preponderance of evidence is necessary.
The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that
"the questioned signatures (referring to the
signatures appearing in the loan agreements,
contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard
sample signatures of respondent were written by
one and the same person." This affirms the
allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras that her
husband forged her signatures in those instruments.
Respondent denies this but his denial was
unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the
CBD relied heavily on the uncontroverted sworn
affidavit-statements of respondent's children and
three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit
affair with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better
appreciation of their statements, their affidavits are
hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,
"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single,
resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently
living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn
hereby depose and say:
1. I am a nurse by profession. I
finished my BSN degree at the
College of Nursing, Silliman
University.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras
and my father Justo J. Paras. My
father has left the family home in
Bindoy and now lives at his
mother's house at San Jose Ext.,
Dumaguete City.
3. My father has a "kabit" or
concubine by the name of Ma.
Jocelyn Ching.1âwphi1 They have a
child named Cyndee Rose, who was
delivered at the Silliman University
Hospital Medical Center on July 19,
1990.
4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary
of my father and Atty. Melchor
Arboleda when they practice law
together in 1988 to 1989. Their
relationship started in 1989. When
she became pregnant, my father
rented an apartment for her at the
Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete
City.
5. Following delivery of the baby,
my father built a house for Jocelyn
in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros
Oriental. My father spend time
there often with Jocelyn and their
child.
6. I used to visit my father at San
Jose Extension these past years, and
almost every time I was there, I
would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching
TV, serving coffee in my father's
law office, and one time, she was
washing my father's clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee
Rose in 1992, about early May, at
San Jose Extension. I was there to
ask for my allowance. He was there
at the time, and when I looked at
Cyndee Rose closely, I became
convinced that she was my father's
daughter with Jocelyn.
8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister
also named Cindy Rose (now
deceased).
9. In September 1992 when I went
to visit my father, I saw toys and
child's clothes in my father's room.
 10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San
Jose Extension, I wanted to talk to
her or be alone with her, but she
would deliberately avoid me. I
could see that she was hiding
something from me." p. 109,
Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx xxx xxx
1. . . . sometime during the period
of April-September, 1992, I made
several visits to my father at his
mother's house in San Jose
Extension, Dumaguete City, where
he had moved after he left our home
in Bindoy;
2. That these visits were made on
different times and different days of
the week;
3. That most of my visits, I would
meet a woman who was also living
at my father's place. This woman is
now known to me to be Ma. Jocelyn
Ching;
4. That my basis for observing that
Ms. Ching was living in my father's
house is that during my visits,
whether during office hours or after
office hours, I would meet her at
my father's place, not his office; she
was wearing house clothes and
slippers, such as skimpy clothes,
shorts and T-shirt, not street or
office clothes; she was generally
unkempt, not made up for work or
going out; on one occasion, I even
saw her, washing my father's
clothes as well as a small child's
clothing; and she conducted herself
around the house in the manner of
someone who lived there;
5. That on one of my visits, I
confirmed that Ms. Ching was
living with my father from Josie
Vailoces, who was then a working
student living at my father's place;
6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently
confirmed under oath the fact that
my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching
were living together as husband and
wife at my father's place in a
deposition taken in connection with
Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-
Dumaguete City, Branch 30, the
Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo,
presiding. A copy of the transcript
of the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is
already part of the record of this
case. For emphasis, photocopies of
the pertinent portion of the written
deposition of Josie Vailoces is
hereto attached as Annexes "A"and
"A-1." p. 111, Records
Respondent's son has this to say:
"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single,
resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently
living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn
according to law, depose and say:
1. I am a high school student at the
Holy Cross High School,
Dumaguete City.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras,
and my father Justo J. Paras, a
lawyer.
3. My father has left our home in
Bindoy, and now lives at his
mother's house in San Jose
Extension, Dumaguete City. He is
not giving us support any more.
4. However, from October 1991 to
December 1992, I was getting my
allowance of P50.00 a week. I
 would go to their house at San Jose
Extension and personally ask him
for it.
5. In October 1992, between 11:30
AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San
Jose Extension for my weekly
allowance. I asked Josephus, an
adopted son of my father's sister, if
my father was around. Josephus
said my father was in his room.
6. So I went direct to his room and
because the door was not locked, I
entered the room without knocking.
There I saw my father lying in bed
side by side with a woman. He was
only wearing a brief. The woman
was wearing shorts and T-shirt.
7. They both appeared scared upon
seeing me. My father hurriedly gave
me P100.00 and I left immediately
because I felt bad and embarrassed.
8. Before that incident, I used to see
the woman at my father's house in
San Jose Extension. Every time I
went to see my father, she was also
there.
9. I later came to know that she was
Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she
was my father's "kabit" or
concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my
weekly allowance from my father."
p. 112, Records
Added to the foregoing sworn statements of
respondent's children is the damaging statement
under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was
respondent's secretary when respondent was a
mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as
follows:
"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age,
married, Filipino, a resident of Malaga, Bindoy,
Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in
accordance with law, do hereby depose and state
that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras,
having been his secretary during his
incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. In fact, through the
latter's recommendation and
intercession, I was later on
appointed as OIC Mayor of the
same town from December 1986 to
January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to
practice law in Dumaguete City, I
became his personal aide and
performed various chores for the
same. As his personal aide, I stayed
in the same house and room with
the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo
J. Paras confided to me that he felt
attracted to my lady friend named
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then
requested me to invite the latter to a
dinner date at Chin Loong
Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which
was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn
Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and
myself then had dinner at the
above-mentioned restaurant.
5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I
invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on
several occasions, always to a
picnic at a beach in Dauin, Negros
Oriental. Said invitations were
always accepted by the latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned
picnics, I observed that Justo J.
Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching
 had become more and more
intimate with each other.
7. Sometime in March 1989, at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening
on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J.
Paras to the area in front of the
Silliman University Medical Center,
where he said he was going to meet
someone.
8. After waiting for a few minutes,
Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and
immediately boarded at the back
seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was
driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter
then requested me to drive both of
them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn
A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel
somewhere in Sibulan, Negros
Oriental.
9. When we arrived there, Justo J.
Paras asked me to wait for them
outside the room, while he and Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching entered the said
room.
10. I waited outside the room for
about two (2) hours after which the
two of them emerged from the
room. We then proceeded to Chin
Loong to eat supper.
11. After eating supper, we dropped
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front of
the Dumaguete City Cockpit.
12. This meeting was repeated two
more times, at the same place and
always on a Friday.
13. On April 3, 1988, I went home
to Bindoy and stopped working for
Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx xxx xxx
1. Sometime in May 1989, I
returned to Dumaguete City to look
for a job, having been jobless since
I left Dumaguete City to go home to
Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
2. While looking for a job, I stayed
at the house where my friend,
Bernard Dejillo was staying at
Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My
friend Bernard Dejillo was
occupying a room at the second
floor of the said house which he
shared with me.
3. Sometime in the last week of
May 1989, in the course of my job
hunting, I met Justo J. Paras.
Having not seen each other for
some time, we talked for a while,
discussing matters about the
barangay elections in Bindoy,
Negros Oriental.
4. When our discussion was
finished, Justo J. Paras asked me
where I was staying, to which I
answered that I was staying at the
aforementioned house. He then
requested me to find out if there
was an available room at the said
house which he could rent with Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I
would have to ask my friend
Bernard Dejillo about the matter.
5. When I arrived at the house that
evening, I asked my friend Bernard
Dejillo about the matter, to which
the latter signified his approval. He
told me that a room at the first floor
of the same house was available for
rental to Justo Paras and Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching.
6. The next day, I immediately
informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard
Dejillo's approval of his request.
7. Sometime in the first week of
June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching
moved in to the room she had
rented at the first floor of the house
I was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter,
Justo J. Paras would come to the
house and stay overnight. When he
came at night Justo J. Paras and I
would converse and while
conversing, drink a bottle of
Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma.
Jocelyn Ching would join in our
conversation.
9. After we finish drinking and
talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma.
Jocelyn Ching would enter the room
rented and sleep there, while I
would also go upstairs to my room.
10. The next morning I could
always observe Justo J. Paras came
out of said room and depart from
the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to
the house I was staying ceased after
about one (1) month when they
transferred to another house.
12. I myself left the house and
returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental
some time in June 1989.
13. Sometime in January 1993, on a
Saturday at about noontime, I went
to the house of Justo J. Paras to
consult him about a Kabataang
Barangay matter involving my son.
When I arrived at his house, I
noticed that the same was closed
and there was no one there.
14. Needing to consult him about
the above-mentioned matter, I
proceeded to the resthouse of Justo
J. Paras located at Maayong Tubig,
Dauin, Negros Oriental.
15. When I arrived at the said
resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not
there but the person in charge of the
said resthouse informed me that
Justo J. Paras was at his house at
Barangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin,
Negros Oriental. The same person
also gave me directions so that I
could locate the house of Justo J.
Paras he referred to earlier.
16. With the help of the directions
given by said person, I was able to
locate the house of Justo J. Paras.
17. At the doorway of the said
house, I called out if anybody was
home while knocking on the door.
18. After a few seconds, Ma.
Jocelyn Ching opened the door.
Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if
Justo J. Paras was home. She then
let me in the house and told me to
sit down and wait for a while. She
then proceeded to a room.
19. A few minutes later, Justo J.
Paras came out of the same room
and sat down near me. I noticed that
the latter had just woke up from a
nap.
20. We then started to talk about the
matter involving my son and
sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching
served us coffee.
21. While we were talking and
drinking coffee I saw a little girl,
about three (3) years old, walking
around the sala, whom I later came
 to know as Cyndee Rose, the
daughter of Justo J. Paras and Ma.
Jocelyn Ching.
22. After our conversation was
finished, Justo J. Paras told me to
see him at this office at San Jose
Extension, Dumaguete City, the
following Monday to discuss the
matter some more.
23. I then bid them goodbye and
went home to Bindoy, Negros
Oriental.
24. I am executing this affidavit as a
supplement to my affidavit dated 22
July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records
(ibid., pp. 44-52)
The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn
affidavits and the deposition of two other
witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former
repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie
Vailoces, a working student and former ward of
the Paras' family, who both gave personal accounts
of the illicit relationship between respondent and
Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee
Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair
works in the Paras' household he observed Ms.
Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living in the
Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces,
on the other hand, deposed that she was asked by
respondent Paras to deliver money to Ms. Ching
for the payment of the hospital bill after she gave
birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by
respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras'
baptismal certificate after the latter was baptized in
the house of respondent; she further testified that
in said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as
the father of Cyndee Rose which explains why the
latter is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87, Annex
"I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD
are substantiated by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF
COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the
National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures
of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent
Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned
signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the
questioned bank loan documents, contracts of
mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the
following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard
sample signatures JUSTO J.
PARAS were written by one and
the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard
sample signatures ROSA YAP
PARAS were not written by one
and the same person.
(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that
respondent forged the signatures of complainant.
However, an analysis of the above findings lead to
no other conclusion than that the questioned or
falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras
were authored by respondent as said falsified
signatures were the same as the sample signatures
of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his
favor by complainant to negotiate for an
agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank
of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the
presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if
he was so authorized to obtain loans from the
banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's
signatures in the bank loan documents? The
purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the
attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the
principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND Administrator for circulation to all the courts
CONCUBINAGE concerned.

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. SO ORDERED.

The affidavit-statements of his children and three
other persons who used to work with him and have Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more JJ., concur.
than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of
Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named
as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p.
108); his naming the child after his deceased first-
born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing
Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house
in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that
respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character

is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law
(People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda
vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at
hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar
when he forged his wife's signature in the bank
loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a
woman other than his wife. However, the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar
(Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July
30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired
(Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]).

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's
signature in bank documents and other related loan
instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the
practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be
served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision
be spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and
notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and on the Office of the Court