Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
CHAPTER 9
EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT IN
PHILIPPINE SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS:
INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS IN GOOD
GOVERNANCE
INTRODUCTION
Wehner, 2007: 7). Under the LGC 1991, the legislature is charged with the
responsibility of evaluating the legality of the use of LGU funds, overseeing
the budget process and the administration. One component of this
responsibility is receiving, evaluating, and approving the annual audit by the
Commission on Audit (COA) (LGC, 1991, section 468). Yet, the budget
process has become a much debated area in government administration since
the executive has vast control on the budget process. Apparently, the
governor or mayor has the sole mandate to prepare and execute the govern-
ment budget on annual basis, while the role of the legislative branch is to
enact through an ordinance the budget duly prepared by the executive
branch. Although legislatures have nominal power to amend the executive
budget, this is only confined to making minimal reductions but significantly
no increases.
It is disquieting to note that in some sub-national governments, there
has been a huge lack of participation and oversight on the budget process. In
many cases, executive budgets are approved without thorough legislative
review. Upon submission of the executive budget to the legislature, a budget
hearing should be arranged by the committee chair on finance to allow
various departments to explain/defend their budgets. This should provide the
legislature an opportunity to verify the importance of each budget item and
propose feasible recommendations in improving government spending. The
department heads or their representatives are also given the chance to justify
budget increases they deem necessary for the effective operation of the
respective department. However, in some sub-national governments, budget
hearings are shortened due to inability of legislatures to commit ample time
for analyzing budgets. Moreover, some committee chairs no longer conduct
meetings even at the legislative committee level.6 In one province, only the
committee chair on finance meets with the local finance committee7 to dis-
cuss the executive‘s proposed budget. This is a clear violation of legislative
procedures regarding the passage of the annual budget. For instance, a letter
of request coming from the executive was received by the legislature in the
middle of November 2009 requesting for the approval of the annual budget
for 2010. However, the actual budget document was not yet submitted to the
———————
6
Interview with an SP secretary on May 11, 2009 at 11:15 am.
7
The local finance committee consists of the local planning and development officer, the
local budget officer, and the local treasurer. The LFC is tasked to recommend to the
executive proper allocation of expenditures and appropriate tax and other revenue
measures. It serves as the financial auxiliary to the executive.
302 Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries
legislature; hence, except for the committee chair on finance, other members
of the legislature have not even seen the proposed annual budget. The LGC
1991 stipulates that annual budgets of the province and those of component
cities/municipalities should undergo a ‗three-reading rule.‘8 Letter requests
to approve the budget are submitted to the legislature even without the actual
budget document.
Timely submission of the budget is also crucial for careful analysis
and deliberation by the legislature. Many sub-national legislatures complain
that executives frequently tabled the budget to the legislature beyond the
mandated deadline which should be three months before end of the fiscal
year. The budget should be approved by the legislature on or before the end
of the fiscal year and failure to do so would mean that legislatures have to
continue sessions without remuneration for its members (LGC, 1991, section
323). Further, the legislature cannot discuss any other business unless the
budget is passed and approved. This puts the legislature in a compromising
position although the delay in the submission of the budget may occur from
the part of the executive branch. Legislatures may find themselves at the
losing end for failing to oblige the executive to meet the deadline and are
compelled to approve the budget foregoing extensive fiscal scrutiny.
———————
Sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, or disabled persons.
Most LGUs do not have sectoral representatives.
306 Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries
———————
15
http://jlp-law.com/blog/primer-separation-of-powers-inquiry-in-aid-legislation/
Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments 307
———————
16
Interview with a legislator on April 25, 2009 at 11:00 am.
Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments 309
of the 20% local development fund (LDF) after careful evaluation of much
needed programs/projects and services in the local area. However, the PDC
is headed by the local executive. This strategic position enables him to
impose his prerogatives on the development agenda. In principle, the PDC,
after proper and extensive deliberation with its members, shall submit to the
Provincial Governor its recommendations with regards to the allocation of
LDF for various projects. The legislature is represented by one member in
the PDC which should provide the opportunity to oversee the allocation
process. However, in actual practice, the executive controls the PDC agenda
and, as a result, other lower level local governments, NGOs and interest
groups spend much time lobbying to the executive that their requests be
included in his priority list. Categorically speaking, the PDC only operates as
a secretariat that prepares the list of priority programs/projects in accordance
with the executive‘s wishes.
Some ordinances also require funding for its implementation. Legis-
lators must first ensure that there is a source of fund before approving certain
policies, which makes the legislature highly dependent on executive discre-
tion. Some ordinances approved by the legislature remained unimplemented
due to lack of budget. Unfortunately, there are no financial reserves which
can be used to fund programs/policies put forward by the legislature. The
bulk of appropriations under the office of the sanggunian are intended for
personnel services and other maintenance and operating expenses. The
legislature may request for a supplemental budget to finance its policies but
this is sourced out from available savings, and delays are inevitable due to
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. Thus, the legislature is often faced
with difficulty in allocating funds for its policies where it has to constantly
request from the executive branch that has other priorities.
of formulating and analyzing laws, making quality decisions that would lead
to the greater good, and dedicated to their jobs. However, the prevailing
phenomenon of Philippine politics does not encourage the most qualified
members of the society to vie for electoral posts. In the Philippines, the
qualification for running as legislator is also of minimum standard with no
minimum educational level required. The Constitution provides that ―An
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (provincial council), Sangguniang Pan-
lungsod (city council), or Sanggunian Bayan (municipal council), the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.‖ In addition, the candidate
must at least be 21 years of age for municipal and city levels, and 23 years of
age for highly urbanized city and provincial levels.
While the work of the legislature is an intricate job, many are attracted
to the position due to the inherent power and perks attached to it.
Valdehuesa, Jr. (2005: 21) contends that politicians in the Philippines are
elected not on the basis of their professional background or intelligence, but
on certain qualifications irrelevant to the position in which they are elected.
He underscores that politicians are elected based mainly on their ―family
name or dynasty, deep-pocketed or wealthy, well-known or celebrity,
influential or connectivity… but not education, capability, record or charac-
ter.‖ Unfortunately, the country‘s electoral culture has made such attributes
merely incidentals and not imperatives for public office. Professional
politicians are prevalent; they are those that have made politics as their main
profession notwithstanding their lack of education or skills to participate in
the complex works of governance. Many elected legislators even lack know-
ledge on parliamentary procedures which is the governing principle in
passing legislation. This is one of the critical reasons why executive inter-
vention in legislative procedures is rampant, constituting to rubber-stamp
approvals and to the extent of relegating legislative procedures.
———————
19
1 Philippine peso computed against U.S.$1 is equivalent to 0.2333259 (PhP). (based on
foreign exchange rate as of July 8, 2011).
20
Travelling allowances are used for official trips only such as conferences or seminars
subject to the approval of the vice-governor.
21
Interview with a legislator in April 30, 2009 at 4:10 pm.
22
Interview with a legislative staff in April 20, 2009 at 10:45 am.
Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments 313
4.2.4 Capacity-Building
Individually and collectively, legislators must possess a wide know-
ledge base of their functions if they must contribute to the intricate workings
of governance. Many legislators have a considerable lack of understanding
of the essential task placed upon their shoulder that they tend to demonstrate
a lackadaisical approach to lawmaking and oversight. Procedural and
technical competence, among others, is a major pre-requisite for effective
review of ongoing programs, analyze budgetary information and propose
policies.
However, there is no system of formal, nationally established training
for legislators in the Philippines. The Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) is tasked to assist LGUs in capability building of
government officials; however, there is no mechanism for the conduct of
specialized trainings for legislators. Some LGUs invite resource persons to
train new elected officials on parliamentary rules and procedures subject to
Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments 315
———————
25
Principals are political actors who command some measure of loyalty from legislators, and
whose interests a legislator might represent and pursue in an official capacity… these
include political parties, and specifically their leadership within legislative assemblies…
presidents, governors, who may wield substantial resources, including control over sub-
national political party machines; interest groups, which direct electoral resources
(funding, activist volunteers, mobilized volunteers); moneyed campaign contributors; and
even those in a position to bribe or extort politicians (Carey 2008:129).
26
Julio C. Teehankee is an associate professor and chair of the Political Science Department
at De La Salle University, Manila (http://pcij.org/stories/and-the-clans-play-on/)
318 Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries
as well as the failure to develop a truly democratic electoral and party sys-
tem.‖ Elections have been dominated by powerful clans who field local posts
with electoral candidates anointed to pursue oligarchic interests, curbing
democratic rights of other viable representatives. Indeed, the representatives
are not that representative anymore; they are representatives not of the
majority of electors but of small self-interested elites that undermine the
institutions of local democracy.
In many local areas political clans gained massive political power that
has been tested to ensure electoral victory so that candidates for local posts
lobby to be appointed as party candidate. They even finance electoral expen-
ses and supply the political machine for candidates under their party curbing
the autonomy of legislators one elected in office. In some provinces, for
instance, clans acquired the prerogative to choose its candidates for local
posts from mayors, vice-mayors and legislators that will run in the different
municipalities. This is a vivid example of bastardizing democratic norms at
the local level. In order to minimize challengers from other parties, they
arrange local candidates and absorb other displaced officials in the pro-
vincial posts or in the bureaucracy (such as those who already finished their
terms). Some candidates who can no longer run in the local posts were
appointed to run as members of the provincial legislature despite their
perceived inability to perform legislative tasks. An observation made by the
media would point the lack of capacity of some legislators to propose
policies, let alone participate in the legislative debate or exercise oversight.
Moreover, since the executive gains ultimate control for being the strong
patron funding elections and appointing candidates for local posts, the legis-
lature loses its independent stature due to its indebtedness to the executive,
who is often the political party leader at the local level. Thus, the legislature
becomes an easy subject for executive manipulation which obscured the
principle of ‗check and balance‘ in local government administration. Against
this milieu of undemocratic circumstances in many sub-national govern-
ments in the Philippines, legislative vigor is particularly important to combat
suppressive institutions personified by localized dictatorship that quenched
the representative democratic culture and eroded institutional accountability.
A fundamental principle of liberal democracy is that there should be
free and fair elections and citizens have the right to run in any electoral
position in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. It has been noted
that the country‘s ―institutional, legal, electoral, and party systems have pre-
vented the expansion of the base of aspirants and candidates for represen-
tation‖ (Teehankee, 2007). Two things can be identified as an upshot of this
Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments 319
———————
27
Local bossism refers to ―the interlocking, multi-tiered directorate of bosses who use their
control over the state apparatus to exploit the archipelago‘s human and natural resources
… a distinctly American-colonial era institutional structures inherited by the postwar
Philippine state and stresses the often underestimated and poorly understood role of
violence and coercive pressure in shaping economic accumulation, political competition
and social relations in the archipelago. In the Philippines, bosses have included small-town
mayors, provincial governors, congressmen and even presidents‖ (Sidel 1999:6,19).
320 Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries
———————
30
Interview with NGO representative in May 5, 2009 at 1:45 pm.
322 Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries
media provided him a venue to critique the government and keep local
people informed.
CONCLUSION
This article lends support to the argument that legislatures are pillars
of democratic good governance. Yet, the extents in which sub-national
legislatures contribute to good governance have been greatly jeopardized by
the pre-existing legal and political architecture in the Philippine decentraliza-
tion. It is clear that legislative subservience to the executive branch has been
the product of a constitutional design that limits the capacity and autonomy
of legislatures and results to the uneven texture of executive-legislative
relations, which, in turn, undermine their [legislatures] relevance in the
governance process. The vast legislative powers granted by the LGC 1991 to
the executive have marginalized the legislative branch from taking its right-
ful place in the political system and dissipates the notion of co-equality.
Likewise, the legislature‘s procedural arrangements and institutional infra-
structure were impeding the potential to oversee an increasingly powerful
executive. It has also been apparent that electoral incentives faced by indi-
vidual legislators have been the keystone for which legislatures conduct
oversight. The country‘s political environment not only generated disincen-
tives for strong oversight; it also de-motivated legislatures to pursue a
meaningful search for legislative autonomy. As this study underlines, actual
implementation of legislative oversight is rather difficult under the decentra-
lization policy that lacks institutional support to promote effective and
autonomous legislative bodies capable of resisting executive preponderance.
Moreover, the profound implication of the politics of bossism as an
off-putting by-product of the Philippine decentralization policy promoted an
ineffective, if not eviscerated legislative branch and incessantly secures the
subversion of good governance values. A rarely questioned thesis main-
tained in this article is that a dominant executive is ‗bad‘ and undemocratic;
so that a serious rethinking of the imperative for legislative resilience should
be earnestly sought. A far-reaching goal would be the nurturing of a more
programmatic politics. But this may only be achieved in the long run, along
with some advances in the economic and social aspects; where growth of
civil society and media could thrive. Qualified legislators would provide an
important boost to legislative capacity, however, at the current situation,
elections place more emphasis on persona rather than qualifications.
Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments 323
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sidel, John T. 1999. Capital Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philip-
pines. California: Stanford University Press.
Sosmeña Jr., Gaudioso C. 1991. Decentralization and Empowerment.
Makati, Metro Manila: Local Government Development Foundation,
Inc.
Stapenhurst, Frederick., and Ricardo Pelizzo. 2002. A Bigger Role for
Legislatures: Quarterly Magazine of the IMF. 39 (4): 1-6. http://
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/pe/JanSeminar/Course%20Readin
gs/09.%20External%20Accountability/BiggerRoles.pdf. Accessed in
March 22, 2011.
Stapenhurst, Rick, Nakamura, J. and Ricardo Pelizzo, eds. 2006. The Role of
Parliaments in Curbing Corruption. Washington D.C.: The World
Bank.
Teehankee, Julio. 2002. Electoral Politics in the Philippines. In Croissant,
A., ed. Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia. Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung. VI (370): 149-202. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/ 0136-
1006.pdf. Accessed in September 14, 2009.
The Local Government Code of the Philippines.
UNDP. 2000. Assisting Legislatures. Essentials, Evaluation Office (4): 1-15.
http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/essential-on-assisting-leg.pdf.
Accessed in March 14, 2009.
UNDP. 2010. A Guide to UNDP Democratic Governance Practice.
USAID. 2000. Understanding Representation: Implications for Legislative
Strengthening: Second International Conference on Legislative
Strengthening. Center for Democracy and Governance. http://www.
usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pn
ach303.pdf. Accessed in July 16, 2009.
USAID. 2001. USAID‘s Experience in Strengthening Legislatures.
Washington D.C.: Center for Democracy and Governance. http://
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/p
dfs/pnach308.pdf. Accessed in August 30, 2009.
Valdehuesa, Jr., Manuel E. 2005. Trapo Governance and the Cha-Cha
Conspiracy. Manila: Cacho Publishing House.
Verney, Douglas V. 1969. Structure of Government. In Blondel, J., ed.
Comparative Government: A Reader. London: Macmillan Press: 167.
Vicerra, Rodolfo, ed. 2006. Governing the Philippine Bureaucracy:Issues
and Challenges of Legislative Oversight. Quezon City: Congressional
Planning and Budget Department House of Representatives.
Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments 329
Halaman kosong