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1
The author thanks Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Niu Haibin, Anja Jetschke, Xue Lei, Zhou Shixin, Johannes Vüllers,
and Tim Wegenast, and the journal’s three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and valuable comments. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the XXII World Congress of Political Science in Madrid, 2012. The re-
search for this study is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.
Strüver, Georg. (2014) What Friends are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with
China. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12050
C 2014 International Studies Association
V
2 What Friends are Made of
with Russia and its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO)—although with varying degrees of success. Within the
BRICS group, for instance, China finds rhetorical support for its commitment to
multilateral diplomacy and the foreign policy principles of nonaggression and
noninterference in domestic affairs. In 2011, Brazil, Russia, India, and China ab-
stained from the vote on the “No-Fly Zone” resolution in the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC 2011), claiming that the Libyan crisis should be ended
using diplomatic means.2 Although this consensus crumbled in early 2012 when
the council began voting on Syria, the BRICS members still managed to insist that
any solutions to the crises in Syria and Iran should be based on political dialogue
(Lakshmi 2012; UN Security Council 2012).
However, support for Chinese foreign policy objectives does not just stem from
other (re)emerging powers. Besides Russia, more than a quarter of the UN mem-
ber states reflected China’s position on Syria by not attending the respective UN
General Assembly’s (UNGA 2012) plenary meeting in February 2012, by abstain-
ing from the vote, or by voting against the Arab-backed resolution. In Latin
2
Although it initially voted in favor of the UNSC resolution, South Africa later adopted the BRIC(S) members’
position (Muni 2011).
GEORG STRÜVER 3
3
On the potential and limitations of China using its financial might as a tool of statecraft see also Drezner
(2009) and Breslin (2011).
4 What Friends are Made of
4
Other authors, in contrast, argue that generally and despite the importance the Chinese leadership attaches to
soft power and public diplomacy, the soft-power strategy has so far had only limited success (Gill and Huang
2006:26; Li 2009:16).
GEORG STRÜVER 5
Proposition 1a: Countries with domestic political principles and values that are compa-
rable to China’s are more likely to show high levels of foreign policy similarity with China.
5
Wang (1999:205) argues that “developing countries with higher levels of democracy would vote more fre-
quently with the US in the UNGA than less democratic countries” because they “share such principles as free
speech, private property, elected representation, and other political interests.” See Kim and Russett (1996) for fur-
ther evidence that more democratic countries support resolutions on human and political rights whereas less demo-
cratic countries are more inclined to favor self-determination.
6 What Friends are Made of
influence transmitted through bilateral ties is not limited to the direct imposition
of policies but also operates on more indirect terms through the facilitation of an-
ticipatory obedience as well as lesson-drawing, transnational policy coordination
and political cooperation (Bennett 1991; Holzinger and Knill 2005).
Seen from this perspective, strong economic linkages enable the Chinese gov-
ernment to revert to tools of economic statecraft (for example, control of im-
ports, facilitation of trade, and direct investment) and, in particular, to exert
influence over the policy decisions of economically weaker partners (Baldwin
1985; Mastanduno 2008). High levels of foreign policy alignment should thus be
expected in less developed countries where China has a significant presence as a
buyer of natural resources, a provider of foreign investment, or as an aid donor.
In the run-up to the 2005 World Summit, for instance, the Chinese government
demonstrated how its economic power may have contributed to convincing
African states not to support India’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security
Council (Hart and Jones 2010:73).
Quantitative studies on the influence of US aid disbursements and UNGA vot-
Proposition 2a: Countries maintaining dense bilateral and/or multilateral political ties
with the Chinese government tend to show higher levels of foreign policy similarity with
China.
Proposition 2b: Countries with high trade dependence on the PRC are more likely to
align with China in international politics and, thus, show higher levels of foreign policy
similarity.
6
See, for instance, Rai (1980) for a comparative study analyzing the effects of US and Soviet aid and Roeder
(1985) and Imai (1992) on Soviet aid and trade.
GEORG STRÜVER 7
Proposition 2c: Countries that receive foreign aid and/or military goods from the PRC
are more likely to align with China in international politics and, thus, show higher levels of
foreign policy similarity.
Research Design
The data set used to test these assumptions includes annual observations on the
voting practices of all UN member states except China for the period from 1978
to 2011.7 The main sample period from 1990 to 2008 accounts, on the one hand,
for the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and changing alignment patterns
in the post-Cold War international system (Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000).
On the other hand, it includes the period during which China’s external relations
entered a phase of normalization and adjustment (in the 1990s) and Beijing be-
gan to promote its diplomatic interests by entering into the first special partner-
ships with individual countries as well as by stepping up bilateral and multilateral
cooperation in general (Goldstein 2005).
7
The population of the data set was generated using the EUGene software and has a total of 5,938 observations
(Version 3.204; Bennett and Stam 2000). Replication files and supporting material for this article are available at
the journal’s website.
8
Table S1 of the Supporting Material provides a list of countries according to the country groups with high
(p75) and very high (p90) levels of voting similarity with China for the years 1978, 1991, 2001, and 2011.
9
For the calculation of the index I follow the STATA code provided by Häge (2011) which is available at
http://www.frankhaege.eu/downloads. In contrast to the procedure, I did not recode a country’s absence from a
roll-call vote as expression of its disapproval but dropped these observations (Voeten 2012).
8 What Friends are Made of
.6
.4
Foreign Policy Similarity
.2
0
-.2
-.4
Using UNGA votes to calculate the similarity of the states’ foreign policy posi-
tions with China offers the advantage that data is available for all states in the in-
ternational system, and for a long time period. Although the votes in the General
Assembly are often criticized as being purely symbolic, the data comes with a fur-
ther advantage: It is precisely because of the more symbolic nature of UNGA reso-
lutions that voting in the General Assembly exhibits a higher level of variance
than other foreign policy decisions (for example, a country’s choice of alliance
partners) and thus contains more information on a nation’s foreign policy inter-
ests (Voeten 2000; Gartzke 2006). However, one has to bear in mind that the reso-
lutions’ topics concentrate on international security, humanitarian, and other
political issues. Resolutions falling within the purview of the UNGA’s Economic
and Financial Committee account for only a small fraction of votes and, thus, the
data have little meaning in terms of foreign policy similarity in this policy field. In
addition, the data indicates that foreign policy similarity with China basically cor-
responds with voting on social and humanitarian issues.10
With regard to the regional development of the similarity score since 1978, the
data reveals two noteworthy patterns (Figure 1). On the one hand, during the last
decade of the Cold War foreign policy similarity with China unfolded in all major
world regions except Europe along a relatively narrow path close to the world av-
erage. This picture has changed considerably since the 1990s. With the end of the
Cold War, the regions’ alignment patterns became more diverging. In particular,
African and Asian countries experienced a sharp increase in voting similarity
whereas the Oceanian countries shifted away from Chinese positions. Concerning
the development of foreign policy similarity in geographical subregions, the data
further reveals that, in the more recent past, high degrees of affinity with China
are found mainly in Southeast Asia and South Asia, as well as in Central Asian
countries and North, South, and West African states (Table S2).
10
Figure S1 provides an overview of the development of voting similarity with China by policy issues over the pe-
riod from 1978 to 2011.
GEORG STRÜVER 9
Independent Variables
To explore the validity of the study’s assumptions, two groups of variables will be
put to an empirical test in the next section. On the one hand, I include variables
to measure the extent of shared institutional and socioeconomic attributes corre-
sponding to the first set of hypotheses on the effect of parallel policy choices on
foreign policy similarity. On the other hand, the study takes into account differ-
ent measurements of a country’s diplomatic, trade, aid and military links with
China. In line with previous studies on voting alignment in the UNGA, I control
for the effects of country size, and the temporal dependence of foreign policy sim-
ilarity and further include controls for geographic proximity and the countries’
membership in the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM).11
Regime Similarity
Countries that uphold domestic political norms and values resembling those of
China should be more likely to pursue similar interests in international affairs. I
have constructed an ordinal variable, regime similarity, on the basis of Freedom
11
The variables’ sources and definition, descriptive statistics, and a correlation matrix of the main explanatory
variables are reported in the Tables S3–S5.
12
The KOF Index of Globalization. (2011) Available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. (Accessed February 24,
2012.)
13
The variable has been coded by the author on the basis of information from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ webpage, newspaper articles, and secondary literature (Medeiros 2009:79–81, 83–85).
10 What Friends are Made of
Trade Dependence
With regard to economic linkages, I measure trade dependence on China assess-
ing the volume of trade with China as a proportion of a country’s total external
trade (trade dependence). To test for Beijing’s “power as a buyer and seller,” similar
measures are calculated for a state’s export and import dependence (export depen-
dence, import dependence).15
Aid Recipients
Arms Transfers
Arms trade includes transfers of major conventional weapons from China to a
country as reported in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Following the coding
and reasoning regarding aid projects, I have included a binary and a continuous
variable on the existence and volume of arms trade (arms recipient, arms recipient
[volume]). I have further calculated variables measuring the 2- and 3-year moving
average of the estimated value of a country’s arms imports from China in million
US dollars (arms recipient [2 year average], arms recipient [3 year average]).17
National Capabilities
Various studies suggest that more resourceful states experience less difficulty than
weaker states in resisting influence attempts by third parties (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2007; Dreher et al. 2008; Sullivan et al. 2011). To control for this
factor, I use a disaggregated index containing three categories for measuring
a state’s industrial resources (capabilities [resources]), demographic attributes (capa-
bilities [population]), and military power (capabilities [military]), respectively
(Singer 1988; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).18
14
International Governmental Organization Data (v2.3). Available at http://correlatesofwar.org. (Accessed
September 26, 2011.)
15
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. Available at http://comtrade.un.org/db/. (Accessed
September 26, 2011.)
16
The date includes project-level aid data reported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce for the period from
1990 to 2005 (excluding 2002). China foreign aid data set. Available at http://www.aiddata.org/weceem_uploads/_
ROOT/File/china_data_032010.xlsx. (Accessed September 7, 2011.)
17
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database. Available at http://www.
sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. (Accessed September 5, 2011.)
18
National Material Capabilities data set (v4.0). Available at http://correlatesofwar.org/. (Accessed January 6,
2012.)
GEORG STRÜVER 11
Empirical Strategy
Quantitative Findings
With regard to the study’s first set of hypotheses, the statistical evidence strongly
supports the assumption that, at least since the end of the Cold War, much of a
country’s foreign policy similarity with China is related to comparable domestic
regime characteristics and similar levels of insertion into the international politi-
cal system (Models 6–8 in Table 1). Although a positive effect of regime similarity
and political globalization is evident in the period from 1978 to 2008 as well, re-esti-
mating the models for the years from 1978 to 1989 shows that both variables have
not been good predictors for foreign policy similarity during the last 12 years of the
Cold War. In fact, a country’s membership in the NAM appears to be a much bet-
ter explanation for similar policy choices with China than shared domestic regime
characteristics or comparable patterns of global political involvement (Models 1–
5 in Table 1).
However, when estimating the models for the time period from 1990 to 2008,
the variables regime similarity and political globalization show to be both positive and
highly significant (see Models 6–8 in Table 1). In addition, it seems fair to con-
clude that the effect of similar patterns of global involvement is restricted to the
political realm as the variables social globalization and economic globalization do not
reach statistical significance in almost all models.
These findings are not only corroborated when controlling NAM membership,
but also when choosing foreign policy dissimilarity as the dependent variable. In
the latter case, the coefficients of regime similarity and political globalization change
numerical signs to become negative. Expressed in odds ratios, a one-unit increase
19
This assumption will be relaxed when testing the 3-year moving averages of aid and arms trade to account for
the fact that both can be made an instrument for ex ante inducement and ex post reward or punishment.
12
Table 1. Logistic Regression Models of Foreign Policy Similarity and Parallel Policy Choices
Model 1 (p75) Model 2 (p90) Model 3 (p75) Model 4 (p90) Model 5 (p75) Model 6 (p75) Model 7 (p90) Model 8 (p75)
Regime Similarityt 1 0.313 (0.0422)*** 0.370 (0.0710)*** 0.173 (0.0531)** 0.112 (0.0859) 0.0820 (0.0562) 0.438 (0.0608)*** 0.634 (0.0927)*** 0.403 (0.0646)***
Political Globalizationt 1 0.0676 (0.0392)þ 0.0285 (0.0465) 0.0366 (0.0654) 0.0171 (0.0775) 0.0523 (0.0698) 0.164 (0.0491)*** 0.181 (0.0524)*** 0.122 (0.0515)*
Social Globalizationt 1 0.0640 (0.0363)þ 0.0652 (0.0558) 0.0169 (0.0619) 0.0264 (0.0947) 0.00246 (0.0617) 0.0657 (0.0500) 0.0910 (0.0661) 0.0791 (0.0497)
Economic Globalizationt 1 0.0439 (0.0405) 0.0648 (0.0524) 0.131 (0.0605)* 0.0862 (0.0784) 0.115 (0.0592)þ 0.0317 (0.0549) 0.0249 (0.0703) 0.0164 (0.0575)
Capabilities (Population)t 1 26.90 (9.342)** 18.21 (7.188)* 29.01 (12.81)* 21.23 (11.30)þ 18.57 (10.58)þ 29.64 (9.536)** 25.72 (6.450)*** 22.54 (9.879)*
Capabilities (Resources)t 1 51.72 (17.84)** 30.57 (20.14) 46.09 (27.38)þ 26.82 (26.03) 19.79 (21.29) 70.91 (30.73)* 70.81 (25.06)** 53.13 (31.82)þ
Non-Alignment Movement 2.479 (0.590)*** 0.829 (0.415)*
Distance 0.0000314 0.0000849 0.00000517 0.00000451 0.0000511 0.0000410 0.000168 0.0000822
(0.0000254) (0.0000493)þ (0.0000408) (0.0000658) (0.0000400) (0.0000366) (0.0000577)** (0.0000420)þ
Years (p75) 0.802 (0.0700)*** 1.125 (0.160)*** 1.050 (0.158)*** 0.784 (0.0786)*** 0.773 (0.0790)***
Years (p90) 0.666 (0.0789)*** 0.992 (0.269)*** 0.586 (0.0767)***
Constant 1.494 (0.330)*** 2.400 (0.438)*** 1.430 (0.503)** 1.712 (0.656)** 2.577 (0.622)*** 1.808 (0.467)*** 3.554 (0.630)*** 2.155 (0.558)***
Observations 3,698 3,698 1,165 1,165 1,165 2,533 2,533 2,533
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.580 0.452 0.440 0.263 0.504 0.644 0.627 0.634
Wald v2 518.3 332.3 220.0 96.78 211.0 409.4 264.9 429.6
What Friends are Made of
(Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. No event polynomials are omitted from the table. þp < .0.1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.)
in regime similarity and political globalization reduces the chance of dissimilar for-
eign policy portfolios by approximately 25% and 3%, respectively. In contrast, a
one unit increase of the respective variables increases the likelihood of policy
alignment (foreign policy similarity [p75]) with China by 50% and 13%,
respectively.20
The remaining control variables also operate largely in line with the findings of
previous studies. According to the expectations, the dependent variable exhibits
high temporal dependence. Each year that a country did not reach a high level of
foreign policy similarity reduces the likelihood of future alignment. The cubic poly-
nomials generally support this claim. Also, resourceful countries share, on aver-
age, Chinese foreign policy positions less often. This effect, however, is restricted
to industrial resources (capabilities [resources]). A large population, in fact, in-
creases the likelihood of foreign policy similarity.21 Finally, the coefficients of the
measure for geographical distance indicate a slightly reduced chance of policy
alignment with China for distant states.
Turning to the impact of diplomatic links, the statistical evidence provides de-
20
The coefficients and odds ratios of the main models are summarized in Table S6.
21
The military dimension of national capabilities is not included due to its high correlation with capabilities (re-
sources). Furthermore, when tested in a separate model, it was not significant at conventional statistical levels.
22
The results are reported in Table S7.
23
In addition, I tested for economic dependence as an alternative measurement. The trade volume with China
as a percentage of a country’s GDP showed no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of foreign policy
alignment with China (Models S5 and S6 in Table S7).
14
Table 2. Logistic Regression Models of Foreign Policy Similarity and Bilateral Links (Post-Cold War Era)
Model 9 (p75) Model 10 (p75) Model 11 (p75) Model 12 (p75) Model 13 (p75) Model 14 (p75) Model 15 (p75) Model 16 (p75)
þ
Diplomatic Exchange 0.188 (0.0973)
(Level)t 1
Partnershipt 1 0.793 (0.328)*
Shared IGO Membershipt 1 0.247 (0.132)þ
Trade Dependencet 1 0.0306 (0.0204)
Export Dependencet 1 0.0113 (0.0143)
Import Dependencet 1 0.0485 (0.0244)*
Aid Recipient (3 Year 0.290 (0.157)þ
Average)t 1
Arms Recipient (3 Year 0.00485 (0.00295)
Average)t 1
Regime Similarityt 1 0.385 (0.0618)*** 0.399 (0.0646)*** 0.415 (0.0683)*** 0.414 (0.0810)*** 0.419 (0.0805)*** 0.369 (0.0734)*** 0.395 (0.0682)*** 0.406 (0.0651)***
Political Globalizationt 1 0.105 (0.0550)þ 0.109 (0.0509)* 0.115 (0.0525)* 0.0998 (0.0677) 0.0943 (0.0669) 0.0848 (0.0657) 0.136 (0.0579)* 0.119 (0.0517)*
Social Globalizationt 1 0.0609 (0.0519) 0.0767 (0.0496) 0.0756 (0.0510) 0.0416 (0.0601) 0.0293 (0.0601) 0.0496 (0.0574) 0.0949 (0.0521)þ 0.0705 (0.0498)
Economic Globalizationt 1 0.00532 (0.0622) 0.0193 (0.0573) 0.0288 (0.0629) 0.0261 (0.0644) 0.0197 (0.0639) 0.00298 (0.0607) 0.0315 (0.0646) 0.0184 (0.0583)
Capabilities (Population)t 1 28.81 (10.89)** 24.12 (9.872)* 29.13 (10.54)** 19.07 (8.825)* 19.06 (8.930)* 18.43 (8.386)* 29.25 (11.66)* 22.08 (9.162)*
Capabilities (Resources)t 1 86.05 (39.30)* 63.68 (33.28)þ 94.34 (37.84)* 43.64 (29.32) 43.62 (29.11) 43.44 (28.86) 87.90 (42.08)* 52.40 (30.64)þ
What Friends are Made of
(Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. No event polynomials are omitted from the table. þp < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.)
Discussion of Results
The results have two major implications for the study of China’s impact on global
affairs and of the sources of the country’s potential political clout. First, the statis-
tical analysis supports the first set of assumptions on the importance of shared
24
All other operationalization of Chinese aid disbursements do not reach statistical significance.
25
Model 16 in Table 2 reports the regression results for arms recipient (3 year average).
16
Table 3. Onset and Duration of Foreign Policy Similarity (Post-Cold War Era)
Model 17 (p75) Model 18 (p75) Model 19 (p75) Model 20 (p75) Model 21 (p75) Model 22 (p75)
in t1 = 0 in t1 = 1 in t1 = 0 in t1 = 1
Non-Alignment Movement 0.485 (0.401) 0.839 (0.402)* 0.374 (0.743) 0.785 (0.478) 0.830 (0.546) 0.975 (0.794)
Years (p75) 0.800 (0.0887)*** 0.524 (0.130)*** 0.839 (0.0985)*** 0.488 (0.148)***
Constant 2.266 (0.748)** 3.388 (0.786)*** 1.280 (1.263) 1.869 (0.568)** 2.507 (0.617)*** 2.282 (1.151)*
Observations 2,207 1,690 499 1,725 1,371 347
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.728 0.778 0.147 0.703 0.833 0.214
Wald v2 472.6 179.2 34.32 321.1 150.7 38.12
Pseudo R2 0.422 0.263 0.080 0.464 0.274 0.121
(Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. No event polynomials are omitted from the table. þp < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.)
26
See Tables S8 and S9 of the Supporting information. While the coefficients of the variables accounting for the
level of diplomatic exchange and the number of shared memberships in international organizations are highly sig-
nificant, the coefficient of partnership only yields significance at the 20%-level.
27
See models S1 to S4 of Table S7, for further information on the relation between anti-American sentiments
and pro-Chinese feelings, Yang and Zweig (2009).
18 What Friends are Made of
Conclusion
The study’s primary aim has been to assess the plausibility of different explana-
tions for similarities between a state’s foreign policy choices and China’s diplo-
matic interests. It has been argued that a better understanding of China’s rise in
international affairs and of the underlying patterns of international support is
gained by taking a step back and considering the Chinese government’s ability to
coerce other states into accommodating its interests as just one of several explana-
tory factors. Thus, in addition to China’s economic dealings with other countries,
28
In a classical realist’s world, this is especially likely as “economic relations between states strengthened ‘like-
minded’ groups at the expense of others, and influenced the trajectory of how the national interest was defined”
(Kirshner 2012:69).
GEORG STRÜVER 19
Despite the reservations, it seems fair enough to conclude that China nowadays
is hardly “bereft of friends” and that it is a beacon at least to many leaders of de-
veloping countries in the Global South—a beacon to them not only because of its
growing material capabilities and its attractiveness as an economic partner, but
also due to its appeal as a potential political partner upholding compatible do-
mestic and international interests. Stepping up its diplomatic ties with like-
minded countries and mobilizing supporters among these “friends” to achieve its
goals in international politics will be an important asset for China not only to pur-
sue its interests in global politics but for status consideration as well. To explore
these processes contributes to our understanding of how South–South coopera-
tion may shape the distribution of power in multipolar world politics at the begin-
ning of the 21st century.
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