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Foreign Policy Analysis Advance Access published February 2, 2016

Foreign Policy Analysis (2014) 0, 1–22

What Friends are Made of: Bilateral


Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign
Policy Alignment with China1
G E O R G S T R Ü V E R
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies

With China’s emergence as a global power, it is commonly assumed that


the Chinese leadership’s influence in international politics has increased
considerably. However, systematic studies of China’s impact on the for-

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eign policy behavior of other states are rare and generally limited to
questions regarding economic capabilities and the use of coercive power.
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on China’s global politi-
cal rise by taking a broader perspective. Drawing on voting data from the
UN General Assembly for the last two decades, it explores the plausibility
of different explanations for foreign policy similarity: economic, diplo-
matic and military linkages; domestic institutional similarities; and paral-
lel problem-solving processes. The logistic regression analyses find that
high levels of foreign policy similarity correlate with shared regime char-
acteristics and comparable patterns of political globalization. The results
further indicate that foreign aid seems to help buy support in global
politics.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a key player in interna-


tional politics. Regardless of whether the years 2004 and 2005 are cited as a “turn-
ing point in Chinese diplomacy” (Lam 2006:160) or whether the first evidence of
the state leadership’s “growing assertiveness” in global politics is dated back to
2006 (Medeiros 2009:187–188), Beijing is reaping the rewards of three decades of
an economic rise and of foreign policy adjustments in the 1990s, both of which
laid the foundation for “increased international activism” (Goldstein 2005:119)
and the country’s “emergence as an active player in the international arena”
(Medeiros and Fravel 2003:22). Be it through the world climate talks, the reform
of the global economic and financial system or international security challenges,
the country’s leadership is seizing its chances to frame itself as a responsible great
power and stakeholder in the international system and to protect and pursue its
interests in global politics.
In advancing its objectives, China’s leadership does not operate by itself. A cen-
tral feature of the country’s rise in international affairs has been its ability to align
and cooperate with other states. In recent years, Beijing has coordinated policy
positions and jointly enhanced diplomatic leverage by drawing on intergovern-
mental clubs with (re)emerging powers in the context of BRICS and BASIC, and

1
The author thanks Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Niu Haibin, Anja Jetschke, Xue Lei, Zhou Shixin, Johannes Vüllers,
and Tim Wegenast, and the journal’s three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and valuable comments. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the XXII World Congress of Political Science in Madrid, 2012. The re-
search for this study is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

Strüver, Georg. (2014) What Friends are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with
China. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12050
C 2014 International Studies Association
V
2 What Friends are Made of

with Russia and its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO)—although with varying degrees of success. Within the
BRICS group, for instance, China finds rhetorical support for its commitment to
multilateral diplomacy and the foreign policy principles of nonaggression and
noninterference in domestic affairs. In 2011, Brazil, Russia, India, and China ab-
stained from the vote on the “No-Fly Zone” resolution in the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC 2011), claiming that the Libyan crisis should be ended
using diplomatic means.2 Although this consensus crumbled in early 2012 when
the council began voting on Syria, the BRICS members still managed to insist that
any solutions to the crises in Syria and Iran should be based on political dialogue
(Lakshmi 2012; UN Security Council 2012).
However, support for Chinese foreign policy objectives does not just stem from
other (re)emerging powers. Besides Russia, more than a quarter of the UN mem-
ber states reflected China’s position on Syria by not attending the respective UN
General Assembly’s (UNGA 2012) plenary meeting in February 2012, by abstain-
ing from the vote, or by voting against the Arab-backed resolution. In Latin

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America, for instance, the member states of the Alianza Bolivariana, with the ex-
ception of Antigua and Barbuda, demonstrated their disagreement with the UN
resolution in one way or another. Half of the Southern African Development
Community’s members did the same.
For China, a helping hand in pursuing core interests has not been restricted to
global high politics. When China boycotted the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in
2010, another 16 states joined in. Not only were the usual suspects—such as
Russia, Pakistan, Cuba, and Sudan—absent, but Argentina and Colombia also
might have wished to express sympathy with Beijing’s position by sending only
low-ranking representatives and not their ambassadors to Oslo’s City Hall (Page
2010; The Norwegian Noble Institute 2010). In addition, since the early years of
this century, an increasing number of states, especially in the Global South, have
been granting China full market economic status within the World Trade
Organization—a core interest of the Chinese leadership not only for status rea-
sons but also because it cushions against the penalties of WTO dispute settle-
ments (Medeiros 2009:64, 85).
The time in which China was “bereft of friends,” “a beacon to no one—and, in-
deed, an ally to no one” is thus certainly over (Segal 1999:33; Sutter 2003).
Although this claim faces only limited objections in the academic and political de-
bates and has attracted substantial attention within the “China rise” literature, lit-
tle systematic research exists on why other states align with China. The few studies
that do exist not only come to contradictory conclusions but also merely focus,
narrowly, on the question of whether or not China’s economic power is translated
into direct political influence. They treat alternative causes, if at all, as secondary.
This article contributes to the literature on China’s international rise by asking
what factors most often explain the similarities between other states’ foreign pol-
icy choices and China’s diplomatic interests. It argues that two states’ foreign pol-
icy similarity can be driven by institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural affinities;
parallel problem-solving processes; and economic, diplomatic, and military link-
ages. To test the plausibility of the different explanations, I employ logistic regres-
sion estimations on a large panel of countries using available observations for the
period from 1990 to 2008. To measure the dependent variable, I draw on voting
outcomes in the UNGA and calculate a novel chance-corrected similarity measure
for the period from 1978 to 2011.
The study proceeds as follows: First, I review the literature on China’s rise, fo-
cusing on studies that assess the country’s regional and global influence and

2
Although it initially voted in favor of the UNSC resolution, South Africa later adopted the BRIC(S) members’
position (Muni 2011).
GEORG STRÜVER 3

relevant diplomatic strategies. Second, I discuss different explanations for foreign


policy similarity, drawing mainly on literature on vote buying in the UN and on
policy convergence, and formulate corresponding hypotheses. In the third sec-
tion, I present the research design and provide a more detailed description of the
dependent variable, foreign policy similarity with China, and its development over
the period from 1978 to 2011. In the fourth section, I present and discuss the
quantitative results. The conclusion summarizes the article’s findings and points
out further areas of research.

China’s Political Sway: Existing Research


Studies within the “China rise” literature address Beijing’s ability to win other
countries’ support for its political objectives in global and regional affairs mainly
as a consequence of its trade and financial power. Lampton (2008:88) identifies
five economic dimensions of China’s growing international heft: the “power of
the buyer, the seller, the investor, the development assistance provider, and the innova-

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tor” (italics original). According to Zhu (2010:2), the country’s economic resil-
ience and its stockpile of foreign exchange reserves makes “it possible for China
to expand trade and investment and enhance its political influence in every cor-
ner of the world.” Due to its trade relations with weak and fragile states, China is
in a particularly beneficial position to use its economic leverage to influence such
countries (Hart and Jones 2010:72–73). In Africa, both trade and largely untied
foreign aid (except for the One-China policy) translate into political power as
they “help to cultivate the goodwill of African leaders who provide Beijing with
diplomatic support and valuable contracts as a matter of reciprocity” (Tull
2006:476, 468; Luo and Zhang 2009). In other regions, however, the payoff of
such economic strategies seems less obvious. As Jenkins (2010:830) has observed,
except for the smaller countries in Central America and the Caribbean, “there are
limited opportunities in Latin America for China to increase its influence through
grants and concessionary loans.”3
At a closer look, even in Asia, evidence of China’s economic leverage is less con-
clusive than is often assumed. After conducting several case studies on Chinese at-
tempts to exert power in Southeast Asia, Goh (2011:24) finds that “the most
notable elements of China’s growing power—its economic strength and integra-
tion into the world economy—are manifested in structural, and often uninten-
tional, ways” and stresses that “China does not thus far have a significant record
of managing to get its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors to do what they would
not otherwise have done.” A quantitative cross-national study conducted by
Kastner (2010) equally calls into question a straightforward link between China’s
growing economic might and its political influence. Drawing on the states’ depen-
dence on Chinese in- and outbound foreign investments and exports to the PRC
in 2007 as key explanatory variables, the study has found no systematic and signifi-
cant relation between these economic ties and a state’s propensity to meet
Beijing’s interests with regard to the referendum on Taiwan’s UN participation in
2008, Beijing’s Tibet policy, and the recognition of China’s status as a market
economy.
Outside the economic realm, China’s rise in international affairs and its ability
to win political support has been often related to the Communist leadership’s em-
bracing of soft-power strategies and its appeal as a development model, particu-
larly to authoritarian countries in less developed world regions (Lampton
2008:141–142). For instance, with the exception of Singapore and Vietnam, the
Southeast Asian countries did not approve Tokyo’s bid for a permanent seat on

3
On the potential and limitations of China using its financial might as a tool of statecraft see also Drezner
(2009) and Breslin (2011).
4 What Friends are Made of

the UNSC, and thus gave in to Beijing’s diplomatic campaigns (Yoshimatsu


2008:15). Soft power is further believed to have helped China’s leadership gain in-
fluence both in Asian and African countries, and to a lesser degree also in Latin
American countries (Sutter 2003; Kurlantzick 2007, 2009; Ellis 2011b).4
For other authors, China’s emergence as an influential power in international
politics has been facilitated by a general shift from a “responsive” to a “proactive
diplomacy,” state and public diplomacy, and attempts to reshape regional orders
(Zhang 2010:41; Zhu 2010:6–7). In particular, during the last decade, China’s for-
eign policy interests seem to have moved beyond the mere search for raw mate-
rials and markets (Cai 2012). Similarly, the promotion of the country’s national
interests in global politics as well as the upgrading of its diplomatic relations to
other emerging powers and developing countries have gained importance in
China’s foreign policy outlook (Wei and Fu 2010; Chen 2012). One aspect of this
shift has been the establishment of comprehensive and strategic partnerships with
individual countries, which serve as diplomatic instruments for China to expand
international influence and “generate bargaining leverage in its bilateral interac-

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tions” (Medeiros 2009:86; see also Cheng and Zhang 2002). This logic is also
translated to the multilateral context, where it takes the form of “forum diplo-
macy,” through which Beijing has been able to engage large groups of countries
and facilitate Chinese influence in the respective regions (Medeiros 2009; Su
2009; Zhang 2010).

Drivers of Foreign Policy Similarity: Hypotheses


The above-cited works provide a great deal of knowledge on China’s use of diplo-
macy and economic statecraft to achieve its foreign policy objectives.
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence supporting these assumptions is often anec-
dotal and, with regard to the more systematic studies, the results are not only am-
biguous but also restricted to tools of economic statecraft as the main explanatory
factors. This article argues that a better understanding of China’s rise in interna-
tional politics, its use of diplomacy and economic statecraft and other countries’
support for the PRC’s foreign policy priorities is gained by taking a step back and
considering the Chinese government’s ability to coerce other states into accom-
modating its interests as just one of several explanatory factors. Similarity of for-
eign policy choices may indeed result from asymmetrically distributed economic
or political power in bilateral relations exploited by China to shape the foreign
policy choices of other states. Similar interests, however, may also be rooted in
shared institutional and socioeconomic characteristics in domestic and interna-
tional affairs and develop through diplomatic coordination and cooperation at
the bilateral and multilateral level of interstate relations.

Shared Institutional and Socioeconomic Attributes


Influence through bilateral linkages is regarded as an important driving force be-
hind foreign policy similarity. However, the likelihood of the transmission of in-
fluence within bilateral relations depends on country-specific conditions as well:
Studies on policy convergence, for instance, cite shared institutional characteris-
tics, similar socioeconomic structures, and cultural likeness as factors which facili-
tate cross-national policy transfers (Knill 2005). Countries integrated in
comparable ways in global political and economic processes and exposed to simi-
lar problems, for instance, should be more likely to formulate parallel policy

4
Other authors, in contrast, argue that generally and despite the importance the Chinese leadership attaches to
soft power and public diplomacy, the soft-power strategy has so far had only limited success (Gill and Huang
2006:26; Li 2009:16).
GEORG STRÜVER 5

responses, especially in a context of shared institutional, socioeconomic, and cul-


tural attributes (Holzinger and Knill 2005).
The writings on interstate alliances may help to understand why states of similar
regime types tend to have converging interests. On the one hand, Steven Walt has
suggested that due to “ideological solidarity” a “tendency for states with similar inter-
nal traits to prefer alignment with one another to alignment with states whose do-
mestic characteristics are different” exists (cited in Simon and Gartzke 1996:619–
620; italics original). Comparable social values such as identities, interests and
norms can further enable (democratic) states to overcome the collective action
problem and to form a “collective-oriented conception of interest” which eventu-
ally facilitates international cooperation such as the establishment of interstate al-
liances (Lai and Reiter 2000:207). On the other hand, similar domestic regime
characteristics may not only lead to a higher probability of cooperation between
democracies due to the high audience costs when state leaders choose alliance
partners or adapt external policies that run against the expectations of their con-
stituencies and powerful elites or are harmful to a state’s international position

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(Bennett 1997:849–850; Gibler and Wolford 2006:132). Also governments of non-
democratic countries can be expected to align with powerful peers to legitimate
their policies internally and externally, as well as to stay in power and preserve
their status.
That said, foreign policy similarity may exist independently from bilateral
linkages. Empirical studies on voting behavior in the UNGA demonstrate that
democratic governments are more inclined to vote with the United States (and
other G7 countries) because of shared liberal political values (Voeten 2000, 2004;
Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008).5 Taking the reverse of this argument,
it can be assumed that countries characterized by nondemocratic principles
and values such as restrictions on freedom of expression, limited possibilities to
participate in the political process, low competitiveness of representation
and weak rule of law tend to vote the same as China—independently of the state
of economic, military, or diplomatic ties. Many politically like-minded countries,
for instance, voted together with China against the UNGA resolution on the hu-
man rights situation in Myanmar in 2010 (UNGA 2010). With its concern that “in-
formation transmitted via the Internet could threaten the ‘stability’ of states,”
China figures among several other authoritarian countries in the list of states
which have cosponsored Russian resolutions on cyber security in the UNGA
(Gjelten 2010).
To investigate the plausibility of the above-made arguments the following two
assumptions will be tested empirically:

Proposition 1a: Countries with domestic political principles and values that are compa-
rable to China’s are more likely to show high levels of foreign policy similarity with China.

Proposition 1b: Comparable patterns of insertion in the international system lead to


higher levels of foreign policy similarity with China.

Economic, Military, and Diplomatic Linkages


For the transmission of influence, bilateral linkage, understood as dense ties, is
nevertheless a precondition (Way and Levitsky 2007:53–54). It is anticipated that

5
Wang (1999:205) argues that “developing countries with higher levels of democracy would vote more fre-
quently with the US in the UNGA than less democratic countries” because they “share such principles as free
speech, private property, elected representation, and other political interests.” See Kim and Russett (1996) for fur-
ther evidence that more democratic countries support resolutions on human and political rights whereas less demo-
cratic countries are more inclined to favor self-determination.
6 What Friends are Made of

influence transmitted through bilateral ties is not limited to the direct imposition
of policies but also operates on more indirect terms through the facilitation of an-
ticipatory obedience as well as lesson-drawing, transnational policy coordination
and political cooperation (Bennett 1991; Holzinger and Knill 2005).
Seen from this perspective, strong economic linkages enable the Chinese gov-
ernment to revert to tools of economic statecraft (for example, control of im-
ports, facilitation of trade, and direct investment) and, in particular, to exert
influence over the policy decisions of economically weaker partners (Baldwin
1985; Mastanduno 2008). High levels of foreign policy alignment should thus be
expected in less developed countries where China has a significant presence as a
buyer of natural resources, a provider of foreign investment, or as an aid donor.
In the run-up to the 2005 World Summit, for instance, the Chinese government
demonstrated how its economic power may have contributed to convincing
African states not to support India’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security
Council (Hart and Jones 2010:73).
Quantitative studies on the influence of US aid disbursements and UNGA vot-

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ing corroborate this mechanism: increased levels of development assistance and
the provision of aid indeed buys votes in the UNGA (Wang 1999; Dreher et al.
2008).6 In addition, trade dependence increases the responsiveness to external
demands, including unspoken ones, due to fears of losing market access and
other economic benefits, and causes the economically weaker states to accommo-
date the foreign policy interests of the more powerful one (Dreher et al. 2008).
Similar mechanisms should function through military trade. Sullivan, Tessman,
and Li (2011) argue that controlling arms transfers enables the more powerful
state in a dyad to impose foreign policy choices on the (weaker) recipient state ac-
cording to the former’s core interests. The link between arms trade and foreign
policy alignment should, thus, be observable in “small, poor countries (mainly in
Africa) who cannot afford more advanced systems, and countries such as Burma
and Sudan whose access to the global arms market is restricted” (Medeiros
2009:91–92). In addition, in those cases where China’s arms trade is associated
with further military activities such as high-level official visits and exchange pro-
grams, foreign policy similarity becomes even more likely due to the increased
level of bilateral exchange (Ellis 2011a:5–6).
Finally, the availability of manifold diplomatic links enables the exchange of
nonmaterial goods such as knowledge and information, which may also facilitate
bilateral policy coordination and thus higher levels of policy alignment in particu-
lar with like-minded countries (Holzinger and Knill 2005; Hafner-Burton, Miles
Kahler, and Montgomery 2009). In addition, in the context of an asymmetrical
distribution of political power, the mechanisms operating through diplomatic ties
are not restricted to transnational communication, but can include political con-
ditionality and coercion as well.
Summarizing the assumptions made above lead to the following expectations
regarding bilateral linkages and foreign policy similarity with China:

Proposition 2a: Countries maintaining dense bilateral and/or multilateral political ties
with the Chinese government tend to show higher levels of foreign policy similarity with
China.

Proposition 2b: Countries with high trade dependence on the PRC are more likely to
align with China in international politics and, thus, show higher levels of foreign policy
similarity.

6
See, for instance, Rai (1980) for a comparative study analyzing the effects of US and Soviet aid and Roeder
(1985) and Imai (1992) on Soviet aid and trade.
GEORG STRÜVER 7

Proposition 2c: Countries that receive foreign aid and/or military goods from the PRC
are more likely to align with China in international politics and, thus, show higher levels of
foreign policy similarity.

Research Design
The data set used to test these assumptions includes annual observations on the
voting practices of all UN member states except China for the period from 1978
to 2011.7 The main sample period from 1990 to 2008 accounts, on the one hand,
for the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and changing alignment patterns
in the post-Cold War international system (Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000).
On the other hand, it includes the period during which China’s external relations
entered a phase of normalization and adjustment (in the 1990s) and Beijing be-
gan to promote its diplomatic interests by entering into the first special partner-
ships with individual countries as well as by stepping up bilateral and multilateral
cooperation in general (Goldstein 2005).

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Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Similarity
The study’s dependent variable measures foreign policy similarity with China on
the basis of UNGA voting records compiled by Strezhnev and Voeten (2012). The
variable is based on a yearly similarity score ranging from 1 (least similar inter-
ests) to 1 (most similar interests) using the three main categories of UN voting
data (approval, disapproval, abstentions). Drawing on this similarity score, I calcu-
lated three binary dependent variables to group the UN member states according
to their voting alignment with China: The first group contains countries with high
and very high levels of foreign policy similarity. The binary variable takes a value of
one for all countries belonging to the group of nations in the 75th and 90th per-
centiles, respectively. A third variable controls for high levels of dissimilar policy
choices and takes a value of one if a country belongs to the group of countries in
the 25th percentile of foreign policy similarity.8
For the calculation of the similarity score, I draw on chance-corrected agree-
ment indices (Häge 2011).9 The procedure addresses the question of affinity in
the same way as the widely used S score by measuring distances between state posi-
tions and then converting the dissimilarity into a similarity score (Signorino and
Ritter 1999). Häge (2011:294–295, 302), however, follows a different approach
with regard to the standardization of dissimilarity values: For the “case where for-
eign policy ties are cheap” (for example, UNGA voting), he takes into account
the fact that some differences between two countries’ policy positions are
“‘harder’ to achieve in the face of symmetrically unbalanced distributions (that is,
prevalence) than in the face of balanced marginal distributions” and, thus, cor-
rects dissimilarity proportions upwards. The main consequence of this correction
is that agreement indices are on average lower than the widely used S score, do
not concentrate at high levels of similarity, and, thus, are expected to provide a
more realistic and balanced depiction of foreign policy similarity with China.

7
The population of the data set was generated using the EUGene software and has a total of 5,938 observations
(Version 3.204; Bennett and Stam 2000). Replication files and supporting material for this article are available at
the journal’s website.
8
Table S1 of the Supporting Material provides a list of countries according to the country groups with high
(p75) and very high (p90) levels of voting similarity with China for the years 1978, 1991, 2001, and 2011.
9
For the calculation of the index I follow the STATA code provided by Häge (2011) which is available at
http://www.frankhaege.eu/downloads. In contrast to the procedure, I did not recode a country’s absence from a
roll-call vote as expression of its disapproval but dropped these observations (Voeten 2012).
8 What Friends are Made of

.6
.4
Foreign Policy Similarity
.2
0
-.2
-.4

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1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Africa Americas
Asia Europe
Oceania World average

Fig. 1. Foreign Policy Similarity with China by Geographical Subregion, 1978–2011

Using UNGA votes to calculate the similarity of the states’ foreign policy posi-
tions with China offers the advantage that data is available for all states in the in-
ternational system, and for a long time period. Although the votes in the General
Assembly are often criticized as being purely symbolic, the data comes with a fur-
ther advantage: It is precisely because of the more symbolic nature of UNGA reso-
lutions that voting in the General Assembly exhibits a higher level of variance
than other foreign policy decisions (for example, a country’s choice of alliance
partners) and thus contains more information on a nation’s foreign policy inter-
ests (Voeten 2000; Gartzke 2006). However, one has to bear in mind that the reso-
lutions’ topics concentrate on international security, humanitarian, and other
political issues. Resolutions falling within the purview of the UNGA’s Economic
and Financial Committee account for only a small fraction of votes and, thus, the
data have little meaning in terms of foreign policy similarity in this policy field. In
addition, the data indicates that foreign policy similarity with China basically cor-
responds with voting on social and humanitarian issues.10
With regard to the regional development of the similarity score since 1978, the
data reveals two noteworthy patterns (Figure 1). On the one hand, during the last
decade of the Cold War foreign policy similarity with China unfolded in all major
world regions except Europe along a relatively narrow path close to the world av-
erage. This picture has changed considerably since the 1990s. With the end of the
Cold War, the regions’ alignment patterns became more diverging. In particular,
African and Asian countries experienced a sharp increase in voting similarity
whereas the Oceanian countries shifted away from Chinese positions. Concerning
the development of foreign policy similarity in geographical subregions, the data
further reveals that, in the more recent past, high degrees of affinity with China
are found mainly in Southeast Asia and South Asia, as well as in Central Asian
countries and North, South, and West African states (Table S2).

10
Figure S1 provides an overview of the development of voting similarity with China by policy issues over the pe-
riod from 1978 to 2011.
GEORG STRÜVER 9

Independent Variables
To explore the validity of the study’s assumptions, two groups of variables will be
put to an empirical test in the next section. On the one hand, I include variables
to measure the extent of shared institutional and socioeconomic attributes corre-
sponding to the first set of hypotheses on the effect of parallel policy choices on
foreign policy similarity. On the other hand, the study takes into account differ-
ent measurements of a country’s diplomatic, trade, aid and military links with
China. In line with previous studies on voting alignment in the UNGA, I control
for the effects of country size, and the temporal dependence of foreign policy sim-
ilarity and further include controls for geographic proximity and the countries’
membership in the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM).11

Regime Similarity
Countries that uphold domestic political norms and values resembling those of
China should be more likely to pursue similar interests in international affairs. I
have constructed an ordinal variable, regime similarity, on the basis of Freedom

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House’s average ratings of civil liberties and political rights, and compared each
country’s score with China’s (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2011).
The resulting variable ranges from zero (totally opposing political beliefs) to six
(very close match in shared political norms and values).

Comparable Patterns of Global Involvement


To compare a country’s political, social, and economic insertion with China’s in-
ternational enmeshment, I have drawn on the KOF Index of Globalization
(Dreher 2006).12 The KOF Index includes data on the number of embassies in a
country, its memberships in international organizations, the participation in UN
peace missions, and the number of intergovernmental treaties it has signed to
measure the scale of a country’s integration into the international political system
(political globalization). It further contains information on a country’s overall trans-
national interpersonal contacts and information flows, as well as on cultural prox-
imity (social globalization); and on economic flows, trade and capital restrictions
(economic globalization). For each dimension of the index of globalization, I con-
structed an ordinal variable ranging from zero (very low equivalence) to seven
(high equivalence) to measure in how far a country is involved in comparable
ways as China into the international system.

Diplomatic Exchange and Bilateral Partnerships


Turning to the bilateral relations, I first control whether a country maintains dip-
lomatic ties with Beijing at the level of chargé d’affaires, ministers, and ambassa-
dors or not at all (diplomatic exchange, diplomatic exchange [level]; Bayer 2006). As
this constitutes a very weak indicator of the density of diplomatic ties, the effects
are expected to be low. Thus, an additional binary variable partnership measures
whether a country maintains a cooperative, comprehensive, or strategic partner-
ship with China.13 As argued above, the establishment of specialized partnerships
with other countries might provide channels for China to expand its regional and
international influence.

11
The variables’ sources and definition, descriptive statistics, and a correlation matrix of the main explanatory
variables are reported in the Tables S3–S5.
12
The KOF Index of Globalization. (2011) Available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. (Accessed February 24,
2012.)
13
The variable has been coded by the author on the basis of information from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ webpage, newspaper articles, and secondary literature (Medeiros 2009:79–81, 83–85).
10 What Friends are Made of

Shared Membership in International Organizations


This variable measures diplomatic linkages with China through joint membership
in international governmental organizations (IGO) and draws on data collected
by Wallace and Singer (1970) and Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004).14
The variable shared IGO membership is a four-point scale that takes a value of one if
a country maintains weak multilateral ties with China (0–15 joint memberships)
and four if ties are strong (46–64 joint memberships).

Trade Dependence
With regard to economic linkages, I measure trade dependence on China assess-
ing the volume of trade with China as a proportion of a country’s total external
trade (trade dependence). To test for Beijing’s “power as a buyer and seller,” similar
measures are calculated for a state’s export and import dependence (export depen-
dence, import dependence).15

Aid Recipients

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To examine whether or not Chinese aid functions as a channel for the transmis-
sion of influence, I include a binary variable that takes the value of one if a coun-
try received funding for any Chinese aid projects (aid projects) as well as a variable
counting the number of aid projects in a given year (aid recipient [projects]). As for-
eign aid is expected to be used to influence foreign policy behavior on the part of
recipient states ex ante as well as to reward or punish partner countries ex post, I
have added variables measuring the 2- and 3-year moving average of the number
of Chinese aid projects reported by AidDATA (aid recipient [2 year average], aid re-
cipient [3 year average]).16

Arms Transfers
Arms trade includes transfers of major conventional weapons from China to a
country as reported in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Following the coding
and reasoning regarding aid projects, I have included a binary and a continuous
variable on the existence and volume of arms trade (arms recipient, arms recipient
[volume]). I have further calculated variables measuring the 2- and 3-year moving
average of the estimated value of a country’s arms imports from China in million
US dollars (arms recipient [2 year average], arms recipient [3 year average]).17

National Capabilities
Various studies suggest that more resourceful states experience less difficulty than
weaker states in resisting influence attempts by third parties (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2007; Dreher et al. 2008; Sullivan et al. 2011). To control for this
factor, I use a disaggregated index containing three categories for measuring
a state’s industrial resources (capabilities [resources]), demographic attributes (capa-
bilities [population]), and military power (capabilities [military]), respectively
(Singer 1988; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).18

14
International Governmental Organization Data (v2.3). Available at http://correlatesofwar.org. (Accessed
September 26, 2011.)
15
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. Available at http://comtrade.un.org/db/. (Accessed
September 26, 2011.)
16
The date includes project-level aid data reported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce for the period from
1990 to 2005 (excluding 2002). China foreign aid data set. Available at http://www.aiddata.org/weceem_uploads/_
ROOT/File/china_data_032010.xlsx. (Accessed September 7, 2011.)
17
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database. Available at http://www.
sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. (Accessed September 5, 2011.)
18
National Material Capabilities data set (v4.0). Available at http://correlatesofwar.org/. (Accessed January 6,
2012.)
GEORG STRÜVER 11

Geographic Proximity and Temporal Dependence


Different studies on policy diffusion suggest that geographical proximity eases
learning processes and emulation among neighboring states (Solingen 2012:635).
In addition, neighboring states should exhibit a higher cultural affinity than
more distant ones. To control for geographic proximity, I resorted to the Eugene
software to include a variable measuring the physical distance between a country’s
capital to Beijing in miles (distance). Further, it is expected that voting coinci-
dence in the UNGA has a high level of duration dependence. Under normal cir-
cumstances, states do not change their foreign policy priorities overnight. To
minimize the problem of temporal dependence, I include a variable that counts
the years from the previous time a country had a positive outcome on the depen-
dent variable. In addition, the regression applies cubic polynomial approxima-
tions to time dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010).

Empirical Strategy

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The study employs logistic regression estimation with robust standard errors to
test the hypotheses. The basic assumption is that the effects of the explanatory
variables on the outcome become stronger among the group of countries with
(very) high levels of foreign policy similarity and insignificant and/or negative in the
case of highly dissimilar policy choices (foreign policy dissimilarity [p25]).
Furthermore, I separately estimate dynamic logistic models to test whether the ex-
planatory variables affect the onset of foreign policy similarity, its duration, or
both. The model’s independent variables are all measured with a temporal lag of
1 year, as it is assumed that the existence of interstate linkages and similarity in
state attributes has to precede the outcome of interest.19

Quantitative Findings
With regard to the study’s first set of hypotheses, the statistical evidence strongly
supports the assumption that, at least since the end of the Cold War, much of a
country’s foreign policy similarity with China is related to comparable domestic
regime characteristics and similar levels of insertion into the international politi-
cal system (Models 6–8 in Table 1). Although a positive effect of regime similarity
and political globalization is evident in the period from 1978 to 2008 as well, re-esti-
mating the models for the years from 1978 to 1989 shows that both variables have
not been good predictors for foreign policy similarity during the last 12 years of the
Cold War. In fact, a country’s membership in the NAM appears to be a much bet-
ter explanation for similar policy choices with China than shared domestic regime
characteristics or comparable patterns of global political involvement (Models 1–
5 in Table 1).
However, when estimating the models for the time period from 1990 to 2008,
the variables regime similarity and political globalization show to be both positive and
highly significant (see Models 6–8 in Table 1). In addition, it seems fair to con-
clude that the effect of similar patterns of global involvement is restricted to the
political realm as the variables social globalization and economic globalization do not
reach statistical significance in almost all models.
These findings are not only corroborated when controlling NAM membership,
but also when choosing foreign policy dissimilarity as the dependent variable. In
the latter case, the coefficients of regime similarity and political globalization change
numerical signs to become negative. Expressed in odds ratios, a one-unit increase

19
This assumption will be relaxed when testing the 3-year moving averages of aid and arms trade to account for
the fact that both can be made an instrument for ex ante inducement and ex post reward or punishment.
12

Table 1. Logistic Regression Models of Foreign Policy Similarity and Parallel Policy Choices

1978–2008 1978–1989 1990–2008

Model 1 (p75) Model 2 (p90) Model 3 (p75) Model 4 (p90) Model 5 (p75) Model 6 (p75) Model 7 (p90) Model 8 (p75)

Regime Similarityt  1 0.313 (0.0422)*** 0.370 (0.0710)*** 0.173 (0.0531)** 0.112 (0.0859) 0.0820 (0.0562) 0.438 (0.0608)*** 0.634 (0.0927)*** 0.403 (0.0646)***
Political Globalizationt  1 0.0676 (0.0392)þ 0.0285 (0.0465) 0.0366 (0.0654) 0.0171 (0.0775) 0.0523 (0.0698) 0.164 (0.0491)*** 0.181 (0.0524)*** 0.122 (0.0515)*
Social Globalizationt  1 0.0640 (0.0363)þ 0.0652 (0.0558) 0.0169 (0.0619) 0.0264 (0.0947) 0.00246 (0.0617) 0.0657 (0.0500) 0.0910 (0.0661) 0.0791 (0.0497)
Economic Globalizationt  1 0.0439 (0.0405) 0.0648 (0.0524) 0.131 (0.0605)* 0.0862 (0.0784) 0.115 (0.0592)þ 0.0317 (0.0549) 0.0249 (0.0703) 0.0164 (0.0575)
Capabilities (Population)t  1 26.90 (9.342)** 18.21 (7.188)* 29.01 (12.81)* 21.23 (11.30)þ 18.57 (10.58)þ 29.64 (9.536)** 25.72 (6.450)*** 22.54 (9.879)*
Capabilities (Resources)t  1 51.72 (17.84)** 30.57 (20.14) 46.09 (27.38)þ 26.82 (26.03) 19.79 (21.29) 70.91 (30.73)* 70.81 (25.06)** 53.13 (31.82)þ
Non-Alignment Movement 2.479 (0.590)*** 0.829 (0.415)*
Distance 0.0000314 0.0000849 0.00000517 0.00000451 0.0000511 0.0000410 0.000168 0.0000822
(0.0000254) (0.0000493)þ (0.0000408) (0.0000658) (0.0000400) (0.0000366) (0.0000577)** (0.0000420)þ
Years (p75) 0.802 (0.0700)*** 1.125 (0.160)*** 1.050 (0.158)*** 0.784 (0.0786)*** 0.773 (0.0790)***
Years (p90) 0.666 (0.0789)*** 0.992 (0.269)*** 0.586 (0.0767)***
Constant 1.494 (0.330)*** 2.400 (0.438)*** 1.430 (0.503)** 1.712 (0.656)** 2.577 (0.622)*** 1.808 (0.467)*** 3.554 (0.630)*** 2.155 (0.558)***
Observations 3,698 3,698 1,165 1,165 1,165 2,533 2,533 2,533
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.580 0.452 0.440 0.263 0.504 0.644 0.627 0.634
Wald v2 518.3 332.3 220.0 96.78 211.0 409.4 264.9 429.6
What Friends are Made of

Pseudo R2 0.329 0.268 0.223 0.151 0.246 0.401 0.367 0.406

(Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. No event polynomials are omitted from the table. þp < .0.1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.)

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GEORG STRÜVER 13

in regime similarity and political globalization reduces the chance of dissimilar for-
eign policy portfolios by approximately 25% and 3%, respectively. In contrast, a
one unit increase of the respective variables increases the likelihood of policy
alignment (foreign policy similarity [p75]) with China by 50% and 13%,
respectively.20
The remaining control variables also operate largely in line with the findings of
previous studies. According to the expectations, the dependent variable exhibits
high temporal dependence. Each year that a country did not reach a high level of
foreign policy similarity reduces the likelihood of future alignment. The cubic poly-
nomials generally support this claim. Also, resourceful countries share, on aver-
age, Chinese foreign policy positions less often. This effect, however, is restricted
to industrial resources (capabilities [resources]). A large population, in fact, in-
creases the likelihood of foreign policy similarity.21 Finally, the coefficients of the
measure for geographical distance indicate a slightly reduced chance of policy
alignment with China for distant states.
Turning to the impact of diplomatic links, the statistical evidence provides de-

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cent support for proposition 2a. The measurements for diplomatic exchange, spe-
cialized partnerships and the co-membership in intergovernmental
organizations—although not adding much explanatory power to Model 8—are
all positively correlated with the dependent variable and statistically signifi-
cant at the 10%-level of confidence or higher (Models 9–11 in Table 2).
Rather surprisingly, however, partnership and shared IGO membership are also posi-
tively correlated with foreign policy dissimilarity.22 Exploring the results in the case
of countries’ specialized partnerships with China not only sheds light on these at
a first glance contradictory results, but also points to the pivotal role of shared do-
mestic regime characteristics in explaining policy similarity in international
affairs.
Identifying influential observations within the models on specialized partner-
ships with China encourages the assumption that the successful implementation
of a partnership’s objectives—such as “coordination in international affairs,”
“adopting common foreign policy positions,” “cooperation on nontraditional se-
curity issues” and “promoting China’s concepts of ‘democracy and equality in in-
ternational relations’” (Medeiros 2009:86)—seems to be limited to countries in
the Global South with medium to high levels of regime similarity. For instance, in
the models estimating foreign policy similarity (p75) the “on the line” cases, that is
well predicted observations with low residuals, include less democratic countries
such as Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. With re-
gard to foreign policy dissimilarity, the model best predicts observations of demo-
cratic European countries such as Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Concerning trade relations, models 12–14 of Table 2 indicate that alignment
with Chinese foreign policy positions stems less from its position as a major export
destination in bilateral relations and more from its “power as a seller”.23
Expressed in odds ratios, an increase of import dependence by one percentage point
makes it 5% more likely that countries show high foreign policy similarity levels
with China. Typical country cases for this observation include Algeria,

20
The coefficients and odds ratios of the main models are summarized in Table S6.
21
The military dimension of national capabilities is not included due to its high correlation with capabilities (re-
sources). Furthermore, when tested in a separate model, it was not significant at conventional statistical levels.
22
The results are reported in Table S7.
23
In addition, I tested for economic dependence as an alternative measurement. The trade volume with China
as a percentage of a country’s GDP showed no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of foreign policy
alignment with China (Models S5 and S6 in Table S7).
14

Table 2. Logistic Regression Models of Foreign Policy Similarity and Bilateral Links (Post-Cold War Era)

Diplomatic Linkages Trade Dependence Aid & Arms

Model 9 (p75) Model 10 (p75) Model 11 (p75) Model 12 (p75) Model 13 (p75) Model 14 (p75) Model 15 (p75) Model 16 (p75)
þ
Diplomatic Exchange 0.188 (0.0973)
(Level)t  1
Partnershipt  1 0.793 (0.328)*
Shared IGO Membershipt  1 0.247 (0.132)þ
Trade Dependencet  1 0.0306 (0.0204)
Export Dependencet  1 0.0113 (0.0143)
Import Dependencet  1 0.0485 (0.0244)*
Aid Recipient (3 Year 0.290 (0.157)þ
Average)t  1
Arms Recipient (3 Year 0.00485 (0.00295)
Average)t  1
Regime Similarityt  1 0.385 (0.0618)*** 0.399 (0.0646)*** 0.415 (0.0683)*** 0.414 (0.0810)*** 0.419 (0.0805)*** 0.369 (0.0734)*** 0.395 (0.0682)*** 0.406 (0.0651)***
Political Globalizationt  1 0.105 (0.0550)þ 0.109 (0.0509)* 0.115 (0.0525)* 0.0998 (0.0677) 0.0943 (0.0669) 0.0848 (0.0657) 0.136 (0.0579)* 0.119 (0.0517)*
Social Globalizationt  1 0.0609 (0.0519) 0.0767 (0.0496) 0.0756 (0.0510) 0.0416 (0.0601) 0.0293 (0.0601) 0.0496 (0.0574) 0.0949 (0.0521)þ 0.0705 (0.0498)
Economic Globalizationt  1 0.00532 (0.0622) 0.0193 (0.0573) 0.0288 (0.0629) 0.0261 (0.0644) 0.0197 (0.0639) 0.00298 (0.0607) 0.0315 (0.0646) 0.0184 (0.0583)
Capabilities (Population)t  1 28.81 (10.89)** 24.12 (9.872)* 29.13 (10.54)** 19.07 (8.825)* 19.06 (8.930)* 18.43 (8.386)* 29.25 (11.66)* 22.08 (9.162)*
Capabilities (Resources)t  1 86.05 (39.30)* 63.68 (33.28)þ 94.34 (37.84)* 43.64 (29.32) 43.62 (29.11) 43.44 (28.86) 87.90 (42.08)* 52.40 (30.64)þ
What Friends are Made of

Distance 0.0000942 0.0000859 0.0000910 0.0000938 0.000101 0.0000860 0.000129 0.0000636


(0.0000412)* (0.0000412)* (0.0000426)* (0.0000449)* (0.0000446)* (0.0000403)* (0.0000459)** (0.0000425)
þ
Non-Alignment Movement 0.537 (0.409) 0.843 (0.411)* 0.609 (0.427) 1.090 (0.437)* 1.080 (0.443)* 1.025 (0.403)* 0.736 (0.442) 0.764 (0.411)þ
Years (p75) 0.818 (0.0892)*** 0.766 (0.0767)*** 0.806 (0.0898)*** 0.843 (0.0862)*** 0.848 (0.0898)*** 0.789 (0.0821)*** 0.858 (0.0928)*** 0.766 (0.0791)***
Constant 2.075 (0.626)*** 2.076 (0.553)*** 2.455 (0.686)*** 2.100 (0.625)*** 1.963 (0.633)** 2.087 (0.560)*** 1.830 (0.590)** 2.197 (0.552)***
Observations 2,207 2,533 2,267 1,892 1,912 2,010 2,192 2,533
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.708 0.653 0.719 0.643 0.639 0.631 0.716 0.632
Wald v2 467.1 430.3 469.1 335.5 337.0 355.7 408.0 466.6
2
Pseudo R 0.420 0.408 0.421 0.453 0.449 0.439 0.433 0.408

(Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. No event polynomials are omitted from the table. þp < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.)

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GEORG STRÜVER 15

Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria,


Venezuela, and Viet Nam.
A positive effect of foreign aid disbursements on foreign policy alignment,
as reported in studies on US aid and voting in the UNGA, also seems to be valid
in the Chinese case, although the results are not very robust (Model 15 in
Table 2). The link is demonstrated by the 3-year moving average of the
number of Chinese aid projects a country receives: Aid recipient (3 year average) is
highly correlated with foreign policy similarity (p75) (Model 10). A one unit increase
of the average number of aid projects increases the likelihood of interest similar-
ity by 34%.24 The positive result, thus, may be driven by the fact that, for many aid
projects, there is a considerable time lapse between the first agreement and the
project’s realization and that recipient countries like Benin, Cambodia, Cap
Verde, Namibia, Pakistan, Syria, Viet Nam, or Zimbabwe might have considered
aligning with China politically at different stages of the process of aid
disbursement.
In the case of military links, the empirical findings are more conclusive: Both,

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the fact that a country receives any number of major conventional weapons from
China, as well as the volume and the moving averages of arms transfers are posi-
tively correlated with foreign policy similarity (p75) and reach statistical significance
around the 10%-level of confidence. Whereas an increase of the volume of arms
trade by one million USD increases the likelihood of foreign policy alignment by
0.5%, the fact that a country received Chinese arms per se increased the chance of
foreign policy similarity by 42% on average.25 Thus, taking together the results on
China’s trade, aid, and military ties, the data provides general support for the
plausibility of the propositions 2b and 2c.
Finally, the results from estimating combined models containing indicators
for diplomatic links on the one hand and trade, aid, and military ties on the
other hand are presented in Table 3. In general, the combined models confirm
the previous findings. In addition, the separate estimations of dynamic logistic
models allow for some preliminary conclusions with regard to the question
of whether the different explanatory factors are more likely to impact on for-
eign policy alignment with China in the form of ex ante inducements or ex post
rewards.
The results of models 18 and 19 as well as models 21 and 22 in Table 3 suggest
that the explanatory variables can be divided into three groups with different ef-
fects on foreign policy similarity: First, initial evidence is provided that political
ties through specialized partnerships with China (significant only at the 16%-level
of confidence) and shared membership in a large number of intergovernmental
organizations as well as import dependence on China might be less a prerequisite of
foreign policy similarity than a consequence that could contribute to its perpetua-
tion. Second, high levels of regime similarity appear to be the most important facili-
tating factor of foreign policy similarity, independently from the focus on onset
or duration. Third, some evidence is provided that the existence of diplomatic
contacts is a prerequisite of a country’s policy alignment with China and that the
implementation of Chinese aid projects (aid recipient [3 year average]) might help
to induce political support.

Discussion of Results
The results have two major implications for the study of China’s impact on global
affairs and of the sources of the country’s potential political clout. First, the statis-
tical analysis supports the first set of assumptions on the importance of shared

24
All other operationalization of Chinese aid disbursements do not reach statistical significance.
25
Model 16 in Table 2 reports the regression results for arms recipient (3 year average).
16

Table 3. Onset and Duration of Foreign Policy Similarity (Post-Cold War Era)

Diplomatic Linkages Trade, Aid & Arms

Model 17 (p75) Model 18 (p75) Model 19 (p75) Model 20 (p75) Model 21 (p75) Model 22 (p75)
in t1 = 0 in t1 = 1 in t1 = 0 in t1 = 1

Diplomatic Exchange (Level) 0.171 (0.0989)þ 0.293 (0.132)* 0.0528 (0.173)


Partnership 0.807 (0.468)þ 0.167 (0.901) 1.563 (1.133)
Shared IGO Membership 0.136 (0.136) 0.0875 (0.183) 0.479 (0.232)*
Import Dependence 0.0676 (0.0339)* 0.0134 (0.0473) 0.188 (0.0753)*
Aid Recipient (3 Year Average) 0.152 (0.167) 0.524 (0.272)þ 0.136 (0.300)
Arms Recipient (3 Year Average) 0.00335 (0.00380) 0.000349 (0.00358) 0.00454 (0.00543)
Regime Similarity 0.391 (0.0637)*** 0.379 (0.0734)*** 0.369 (0.0956)*** 0.367 (0.0808)*** 0.331 (0.0952)*** 0.390 (0.109)***
Political Globalization 0.0831 (0.0527) 0.135 (0.0588)* 0.0306 (0.0775) 0.103 (0.0762) 0.148 (0.0828)þ 0.0533 (0.103)
Social Globalization 0.0583 (0.0520) 0.107 (0.0646)þ 0.0225 (0.0836) 0.0851 (0.0644) 0.120 (0.0802) 0.0260 (0.106)
Economic Globalization 0.0149 (0.0620) 0.00709 (0.0708) 0.0664 (0.0836) 0.0218 (0.0713) 0.0115 (0.0818) 0.000173 (0.0930)
Capabilities (Population) 30.47 (10.80)** 43.20 (17.77)* 16.81 (15.40) 24.81 (9.964)* 48.92 (24.40)* 10.93 (12.76)
Capabilities (Resources) 99.93 (39.20)* 140.4 (61.52)* 45.24 (66.55) 76.92 (38.47)* 172.3 (87.71)* 1.869 (55.95)
Distance 0.0000898 0.0000965 0.0000578 0.000125 0.000176 0.0000728
(0.0000407)* (0.0000456)* (0.0000625) (0.0000498)* (0.0000664)** (0.0000594)
What Friends are Made of

Non-Alignment Movement 0.485 (0.401) 0.839 (0.402)* 0.374 (0.743) 0.785 (0.478) 0.830 (0.546) 0.975 (0.794)
Years (p75) 0.800 (0.0887)*** 0.524 (0.130)*** 0.839 (0.0985)*** 0.488 (0.148)***
Constant 2.266 (0.748)** 3.388 (0.786)*** 1.280 (1.263) 1.869 (0.568)** 2.507 (0.617)*** 2.282 (1.151)*
Observations 2,207 1,690 499 1,725 1,371 347
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.728 0.778 0.147 0.703 0.833 0.214
Wald v2 472.6 179.2 34.32 321.1 150.7 38.12
Pseudo R2 0.422 0.263 0.080 0.464 0.274 0.121

(Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. No event polynomials are omitted from the table. þp < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.)

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GEORG STRÜVER 17

regime characteristics and, albeit to a lesser degree, on comparable patterns of


global political involvement in explaining parallel policy choices. While it has
been argued that such a “harmony of interests” might render further cooperation
obsolete (Keohane 2005[1984]:51–53), the results suggest that foreign policy
alignment with China goes beyond mere parallel policy choices with other nonde-
mocratic countries: Strong bilateral links as well play a role in explaining high lev-
els of foreign policy alignment. China, thus, may profit from other countries’ like-
mindedness as a facilitating factor for intergovernmental cooperation and policy
coordination.
Initial support of this claim is given by the fact that even when looking at a sub-
sample of states with high levels of shared regime characteristics, political links
with China still have a positive impact on high levels of foreign policy similarity.26
Also, Chinese weapon sales might function as a channel of influence in the case
of like-minded, authoritarian recipient countries. Policy imposition by means of
other tools of economic statecraft, for example, by making use of the “power as a
seller” and being a foreign aid donor, however, might be limited to countries with

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low and medium levels of regime similarity. Albeit these observations need further
validation, they point to China’s potential ability to mobilize supporters among
like-minded countries by exploiting diplomatic ties for policy coordination and
intergovernmental cooperation.
It has been already suggested above that, during the Cold War era, bloc mem-
bership superposed the effects of shared domestic regime characteristics making
policy alignment between different regimes, such as authoritarian regimes vot-
ing with the US, more likely. In the post-Cold War era and in an increasingly
multipolar world, however, the importance of shared regime characteristics and
strong bilateral ties seems to be of particular relevance to explain parallel policy
choices. This observation also holds after including controls for anti-
Americanism and the post-9/11 period in the main model and, thus, account-
ing for the possibility that a country’s policy alignment with China is more an
act of “soft balancing” against the global hegemon US and expression of grow-
ing anti-Americanism, in particular in the 2000, than the result of other coun-
tries bonding with the PRC (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Katzenstein and Keohane
2007).27
Second, this study complements previous efforts to establish a link
between China’s economic power and other countries’ alignment with the PRC’s
diplomatic interests by providing initial statistical evidence for the concurrence
of economic ties and foreign policy similarity. On the one hand, aid projects
and the supplying of arms enable China to buy influence from recipient coun-
tries. As prior studies have found that, for instance, at least in Latin America the
opportunity to employ economic statecraft is limited, with the exception of
smaller countries in Central America and the Caribbean (Jenkins 2010:830), fu-
ture research could investigate in how far the effects of aid disbursements are con-
tingent upon the recipient country’s size, developmental stage, or regime
characteristics.
On the other hand, it seems that China’s trade influence is not based on its
“power as a buyer” but on its position as a seller. The results further indicate that
a good political understanding might be conducive to higher levels of economic
exchange with China. Thus, contrary to common wisdom, the assumption that
economic interdependence only provides a source of direct political influence in

26
See Tables S8 and S9 of the Supporting information. While the coefficients of the variables accounting for the
level of diplomatic exchange and the number of shared memberships in international organizations are highly sig-
nificant, the coefficient of partnership only yields significance at the 20%-level.
27
See models S1 to S4 of Table S7, for further information on the relation between anti-American sentiments
and pro-Chinese feelings, Yang and Zweig (2009).
18 What Friends are Made of

asymmetrical relations, which goes back to Hirschman’s (1980 [1945]) work on


state power and international trade patterns, may be only one side of the story
(Wagner 1988:472). If we extend the liberal peace argument, we can expect that
trade interdependence leads to converging foreign policy interests in the long
run because it eases interstate cooperation (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum
2003:374; Dreher et al. 2008:155).28

Conclusion
The study’s primary aim has been to assess the plausibility of different explana-
tions for similarities between a state’s foreign policy choices and China’s diplo-
matic interests. It has been argued that a better understanding of China’s rise in
international affairs and of the underlying patterns of international support is
gained by taking a step back and considering the Chinese government’s ability to
coerce other states into accommodating its interests as just one of several explana-
tory factors. Thus, in addition to China’s economic dealings with other countries,

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I have included diplomatic and military linkages as well as shared institutional
and sociopolitical characteristics in domestic and international affairs in the
investigation.
The empirical findings support the claim that China’s exertion of direct influ-
ence over other states’ diplomatic choices is only one possible explanation for
other countries’ interest similarity with China in international politics. Important
prerequisites for foreign policy alignment are rooted in shared regime character-
istics and, albeit to a lesser degree, in comparable levels of political globalization.
Despite the reported statistical evidence for this claim, the results should not be
overinterpreted, nor should the analysis be regarded as a definite test of specific
causal channels. It has not been the primary goal to establish a causal link be-
tween foreign policy similarity and the different explanatory factors. The main
contribution of this study is rather the provision of a broader perspective on possi-
ble explanations for foreign policy similarity with China and initial statistical tests.
It should also be highlighted that the present study is concerned with general pat-
terns of support for China’s political interests and principles in international poli-
tics and less with incidences of China’s exertion of direct power over other states.
In addition to more detailed quantitative and qualitative analyses of the mecha-
nisms at hand, there are many interesting directions for future research. With re-
gard to China’s bilateral political relations, on the one hand, the scope of the
analysis could be broadened by considering data on China’s leadership travel as
provided by Kastner and Saunders (2012) and by including more refined mea-
surements of diplomatic linkages. For instance, Beijing has also stepped up efforts
to engage states in multilateral institutional settings, not only in Asia but also in
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Such “forum diplomacy” allows
Beijing to engage large groups of countries and facilitates China’s influence glob-
ally and in the respective regions (Medeiros 2009:77–78, 159–60; Zhang 2010:40).
Thus far, little systematic research has been done on the PRC’s ability to exert in-
fluence over political outcomes in regional and global affairs through such fo-
rums and as a result of its position in intergovernmental networks. Future
analyses could further test the robustness of this article’s results by drawing on dif-
ferent measurements of the dependent variable, such as key votes and resolutions
that have been proposed or sponsored by China, and alternative
operationalizations.

28
In a classical realist’s world, this is especially likely as “economic relations between states strengthened ‘like-
minded’ groups at the expense of others, and influenced the trajectory of how the national interest was defined”
(Kirshner 2012:69).
GEORG STRÜVER 19

Despite the reservations, it seems fair enough to conclude that China nowadays
is hardly “bereft of friends” and that it is a beacon at least to many leaders of de-
veloping countries in the Global South—a beacon to them not only because of its
growing material capabilities and its attractiveness as an economic partner, but
also due to its appeal as a potential political partner upholding compatible do-
mestic and international interests. Stepping up its diplomatic ties with like-
minded countries and mobilizing supporters among these “friends” to achieve its
goals in international politics will be an important asset for China not only to pur-
sue its interests in global politics but for status consideration as well. To explore
these processes contributes to our understanding of how South–South coopera-
tion may shape the distribution of power in multipolar world politics at the begin-
ning of the 21st century.

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Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this
article:

Table S1. Countries’ Levels of Foreign Policy Similarity with China.


Table S2. Foreign Policy Similarity with China by Geographical Subregions.
Table S3. Variable List, Definitions, and Sources.
Table S4. Summary of Descriptive Statistics.
Table S5. Correlation Matrices of Main Explanatory Variables.
Table S6. Summary of Effects of Main Explanatory Variables.
Table S7. Logistic Regression Models of Foreign Policy Similarity, Parallel
Policy Choices, and Further Controls.
Table S8. Logistic Regression Models of Foreign Policy Similarity and
Diplomatic Linkages (split samples).
Table S9. Logistic Regression Models of Foreign Policy Similarity and Trade,
Aid, and Arms (split samples).
Figure S1. Foreign Policy Similarity with China by Policy Issues.

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