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G.R. No.
184478 Case Digest

G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012
James Perez
vs Spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda Pante
Ponente: Villarama
Facts:
Spouses are registered owners of a residential property in Green Heights Subdivision,

Marikina City. In 1989, spouses built their house thereon and enclosed it with concrete
fence and steel gate.
1999, James Perez as Chief Demolition Officer sent a letter to the spouses ordering
them to remove the fence encroaching the public drainage. As response, Madrona sent
a response letter to Perez condemning the order of demolition with the following
contention: (1) contained an accusation libellous in nature as it is condemning him and
his property without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court
order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not
expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation
since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.
Respondents likewise sought the issuance of TRO to enjoin petitioner and all persons
acting under him doing any act of demolition on the property. Petitioner filed a motion to
lift the order of default, but the RTC denied the motion. Perez filed a petition for
certiorari before CA assailing the default order, CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit.
The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled
to the peaceful and open possession of every inch of their property and petitioner’s
threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is tantamount to a violation
of their rights as property owners who are entitled to protection under the Constitution
and laws. The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is a
nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor is
there basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to
justify its summary demolition.
Issues: (1) Did the trial court err in reinstating the complaint of respondents? (2) Are the
requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction present? and (3) Is petitioner liable to
pay attorney’s fees and costs of suit?
(1) For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be
protected and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right. Here, the two requisites are clearly present: there is a right to be
protected, that is, respondents’ right over their concrete fence which cannot be removed
without due process; and the act, the summary demolition of the concrete fence, against
which the injunction is directed, would violate said right.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Page 1
(2) Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the
health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of
respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by
respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents’ fence
indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its
summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.
(3) Petitioner argues that he was just performing his duties and as public officer, he is
entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official functions.
Unless there is clear proof that he acted beyond his authority or in evident malice or bad
faith, he contends that he cannot be held liable for attorney’s fees and costs of suit. As
respondents were forced to file a case against petitioner to enjoin the impending
demolition of their property, the award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit is justified.
Clearly, respondents wanted to settle the problem on their alleged encroachment
without resorting to court processes when they replied by letter after receiving
petitioner’s first notice.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN,
G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014
DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial
powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the
LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the
LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR.
The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly
speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural
resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the
structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should not be
diverted from the root cause of this debacle compliance.
FACTS
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company
applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While
the company was already operating a resort in the area, and the application sought the
issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a
parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed
construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance
2000-131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no
action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued
by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7,
2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a

nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
ISSUE
Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in question.
RULING
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such
a thing is a nuisance per se.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still

find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition.
This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after
satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its
function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to
hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective
order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government
Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner
to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of
Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to
regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic
Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the
MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the
Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it
has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the
State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public
traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power.
Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power
may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority
and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
because it cannot be delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower
the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that
grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
United States vs Luis Toribio
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a permit to have his carabao slaughtered for
human consumption. His request was denied because his carabao was found not unfit
for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He
was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel argued that the
law requiring one to acquire a permit before slaughtering a carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of
the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be
so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and
interests of the community.” The wisdom behind said law: the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a “reasonably necessary” limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by
their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or
by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be
applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up
a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to
be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room
or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this
for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police
power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation
of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and
the judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same
time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which
the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite
to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness
is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure
to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed
a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed
purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the
sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous
and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
TAXICAB OPERATORS V. BOT
Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation

composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience
to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible
to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum

Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No.
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as
well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with
the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of
the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners’ constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by
old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded”.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
DECS and Dir. of Educational Measurement vs. Roberto Rey San Diego and
Judge Dizon-Capulong
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree
of B.S. Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was
applying to take another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only
three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the
petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality
education.
RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to

those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of protecting
the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of
achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical
schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the country” It is the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal
protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who
have also qualified are denied entrance.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been
reversed.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON
Facts:
On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days
after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of
Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August
1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for
violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4
and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the
national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their
professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the
Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and
the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional,
hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over
which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public
interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead.
Issue:
Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of
similar import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.
Held:
Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the
constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the
people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost” (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or
words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand
name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and
the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-
name drug with “no substitution,” the patient’s option to buy a lower-priced, but equally
effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the
impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country
like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004
FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso, who was then 43
years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement
benefits under the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole beneficiary. GSIS
approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump
sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for survivorship
pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim because, under section 18 of PD
1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on
17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory
relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension
and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits including interest. Citing Articles 115and
117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner
has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through
monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are
property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property. The
trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for
being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive
effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the Family Code, a later
law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this appeal.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted
GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. However, the Court will still resolve the issue
despite the manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest demand
the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso.
ISSUE:
Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of PD
1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such
dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
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qualified for the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies
equal protection of the law.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that
[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for
survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner
within the three-year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive
and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and
their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty
of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and
regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates
against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners
death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage
took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of
the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or
purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed
marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from
the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died.
The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification
lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified
for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of
pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason
Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as
the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS
(PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married
the member immediately before the members death is still qualified to receive
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survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three
years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of
survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the
survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS
member within three years before the members retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is void for being
violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
CHAVEZ VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three
billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said
establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Senator.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which

contained Section 32:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings
on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the
name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a
candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these
implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television
station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the
COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be
informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter,
this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32,
considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot
be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the
billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking
that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges the
Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a
gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3)
in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5)
invalid due to overbreadth.
Issue:
Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?
Held:
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Police power
Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all
announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from
the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election
propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope
of the powers of the COMELEC.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and
the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two
questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the
means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to
prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public
office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and
lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying
undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product
endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the
Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an
act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to
a public office. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or
against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse
certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name
and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political
character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the
COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to
discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be
allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise
commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance
of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image
models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few
months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the
intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the
campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against
premature campaigning.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Non-impairment of contract
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment

clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public.
The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time
and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can
be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it
entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount
police power.
Ex post facto law
Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an
election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said
advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person,
whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature
campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty
for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are
favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the
assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as posters,
streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image
or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing
the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an
offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who
subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an
offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to
endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The
offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the
described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda
materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the
assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto
law in this case.
Fair Elections Act
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According
to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda.
He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards
as a form of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair
Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points
out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election
propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to
equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular
and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account
of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of such election
propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.
Overbreadth
A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the

constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only
disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and advertisements
after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period.
Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.
There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements.

During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations
necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature
campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. The
provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth. Chavez vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 162777, Aug 31, 2004
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
CHAVEZ VS ROMULO
G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004
o A mere license is always revocable
FACTS:
This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to
deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to
property.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

o Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right
HELD:
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether
life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license
authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right.
In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we
held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.”
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful
holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the American
doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to
be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees
fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege
within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court,
in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a
permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State
is always revocable.”
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Beltran vs Secretary of Health GR 133640 25 November 2005
Facts:
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of
the people is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was
enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve
public health and safety.
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law
on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently
published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23,
1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-
out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over
a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period
of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. — The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of
two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of
R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and
review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.”
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have
already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled
“An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.”
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation
by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed
a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules is valid on the ground
that it violates the equal protection clause.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Decision:
Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and
valid. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a
question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never
intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and
inequality shall be allowed.
To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood
banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and
reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. The
former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the
latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Second, the classification, and
the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial
blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared
to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine
blood banking system. Third, the Legislature intended for the general application of the
law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation
nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.The promotion of public health
is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern.
Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s
police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to over overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law.
As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised
by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO
G.R. No. 118127 – 455 SCRA 308 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Police
Power
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited
establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the
Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill
seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as
it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or
entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as
tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate
motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a
valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise
emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to
the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise
must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
CARLOS SUPERDRUG ET. AL V. DSWD - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CARLOS SUPERDRUG ET. AL V. DSWD G.R. No. 166494 June 29, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the

Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the
DILG, specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate
the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and
prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as
the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a)
the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the
utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive
use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to
grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because according to them
drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines, and the law
failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the
discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an
exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and
capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no
basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen
discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time
to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been
able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to
their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses.
However,petitioner’s computation is clearly flawed.
For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be
deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before
deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to
show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income
statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss)
for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their
income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that
they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the
computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted
wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the
amount of the discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations
of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
WHITE LIGHT CORP VS. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 122846 – 576 SCRA 416 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Police
Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights
FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila”. White Light Corp is an operator of mini
hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled
that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of
police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not or 7774 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there
for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
OFFICE OF SOLICITOR GENERAL v. AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, GR No.
177056, 2009-09-18
Facts:
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping
malls in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates,
and leases out commercial buildings and other structures, among which, are SM City,
Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta.
Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Piñas.
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all
kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in
separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as parking
spaces.
Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective parking
facilities.
The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the
stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the
vehicles parked in respondents' parking facilities.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a joint investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the
legality of the prevalent practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2)
assuming arguendo... that the collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to find
out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and
(3) to determine the legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases
of theft, robbery, or carnapping,... by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the
parking tickets.
In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by
shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal.
While it is true that the Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without...
specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the reasonable and
logical interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for free.
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate
Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of
Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas intended to institute, through the OSG, an action to
enjoin respondent SM Prime and... similar establishments from collecting parking fees,
and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No.
1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National
Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR).
The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for
damages.
The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208
and No. 00-1210 that:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons
Land Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and SM Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or public in
general,... free of charge.
The fallo of the 25 January 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED. Accordingly,
appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED into.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF

THE LOWER COURT THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT OBLIGED TO PROVIDE
FREE PARKING SPACES TO THEIR CUSTOMERS OR THE PUBLIC.
Ruling:
The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.

There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term "parking fees" cannot even be found at all in the entire
National Building Code and its IRR.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the
regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of
privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of
such facilities... of parking fees from the public for the use thereof.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no
longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent
domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon... payment of just compensation to the owner.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s
with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public,
for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their...
properties.
The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter's
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public
access to said parking spaces for free.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees
from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building
Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally
invoking police... power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents'
property without payment of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED.
Principles:
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not
include the... power to prohibit.
Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception
of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to...
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
BSP MONETARY BOARD vs HON. VALENZUELA
G.R. No. 184778 October 2, 2009
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD and CHUCHI

FONACIER, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, in her capacity as Regional Trial Court
Judge of Manila, Branch 28; RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.; RURAL BANK
OF SAN JOSE (BATANGAS), INC.; RURAL BANK OF CARMEN (CEBU), INC.;
PILIPINO RURAL BANK, INC.; PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, INC.;
RURAL BANK OF CALATAGAN (BATANGAS), INC. (now DYNAMIC RURAL
BANK); RURAL BANK OF DARBCI, INC.; RURAL BANK OF KANANGA (LEYTE),
INC. (now FIRST INTERSTATE RURAL BANK); RURAL BANK OF BISAYAS
MINGLANILLA (now BANK OF EAST ASIA); and SAN PABLO CITY
DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC.,Respondents.
DOCTRINE: The issuance by RTC of WPI is an unwarranted interference w the powers

of MB. The actions of MB under Sec. 29 and 30 of New Central Bank Act “may not be
restrained or set aside by the court except on petition of certiorari on the ground that the
action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or w such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 The Supervision and Examination Dept. (SED) of BSP conducted examinations

of the books of respondent banks.
 Deficiencies were discovered during examinations.
 These banks were then required undertake the remedial measures stated in the
List of Findings/Exceptions, including the infusion of additional capital.
 The banks claimed they made the necessary capital infusion, but Petitioner
ChuchiFonacier (OIC of SED) sent separate letter to the BOD of each bank,
informing them that the banks failed to carry out the required remedial measures.
 The banks requested that they be given time to obtain BSP approval to amend
their Articles of Incorporation, to seek new investors, and that the basis for the
capital infusion be disclosed.
 They also noted that none of them had received the Report of Examination
(ROE) wc finalizes the audit findings.
 Respondent banks filed a complaint for nullification of ROE against
petitioners, w TRO and WPI (Writ of Preliminary Injunction) enjoining BSP
from submitting the ROE to the Monetary Board (MB) contending that the failure
to furnish the bank w the ROE violated their right to due process.
 Petitioners filed MD on procedural grounds.
 RTC: ruled in favour of the banks. It had been the practice of SED to provide
ROEs to the banks before submission to MB. As banks are subject of
examinations, they are entitled to copies of the ROEs. The denial by petitioners
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
of the banks’ requests for copies of ROEs was held to be a denial of the banks’
right to due process.
 CA: affirmed the RTC decision, finding no grave abuse of discretion.
 SC:issued a TRO, restraining CA, RTC and respondent banks from
implementing and enforcing the CA decision. By reason of this TRO, the SED
was able to submit their ROEs to MB. MB then prohibited the respondent banks
from transacting business and placed them under receivershop under Sec. 53 of
RA 8791 and Sec. 30 of RA 7653.
ISSUE: WON
I. Injunction issued by RTC violated Sec. 25 of New Central Bank Act and
effectively handcuffed the BSP from discharging its functions to the great and
irreparable damage of the country’s banking system;
II. Respondent banks are entitled to be furnished copies of the respective ROEs
before the same is submitted to MB
HELD:
I. YES
II. NO
1. Requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are:
a. Invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial
b. Right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable
c. There is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage
2. These requirements are absent in the present case.
3. Respondent banks have failed to show that they are entitled to copies of the
ROEs. No provision of law, nor a section in the procedures of the BSP shows
that BSP is required to give them copies of the ROEs.
4. Sec. 28 of the New Central Bank Act, wc governs the examinations of banking
institutions, provides that the ROE shall be submitted to the MB; the bank
examined is not mentioned as recipient of the ROE.
5. The contents of the ROEs are essentially the same as those of the List of
Findings/Exceptions provided to said banks, wc were furnished to the them,
hence they cannot claim that their right to due process was violated. The ROEs
would be superfluities.
6. The issuance by RTC of WPI is an unwarranted interference w the powers of
MB. The actions of MB under Sec. 29 and 30 of New Central Bank Act “may not
be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition of certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or w such grave abuse
of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
7. As to the 3rdreqt, the serious damage contemplated by RTC is the sanction of
closure of the banks. Under the law, the sanction of closure could be imposed
upon a bank by BSP even w/o notice and hearing, to prevent unwarranted
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
dissipation of bank’s assets and valid exercise of police power to protect the
stakeholders of the banks (“close now, hear later” doctrine). Thus, there is no
serious damage to speak of.
8. “Close Now, Hear Later” Doctrine: the closure of bank may be considered as
an exercise of police power. The action of MB on this matter is final and
executory, but may be subject to judicial inquiry and can be set aside if found to
be in excess of jurisdiction or w grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
9. The issuance of WPI would violate this doctrine.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
ROXAS v. DAMBA-NFSW, GR No. 149548, 2009-12-04
Facts:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas,
namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of
Nasugbu, Batangas.
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988.
Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No.
229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed... under compulsory acquisition by
... DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J.
Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of ...DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the...
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result,
petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543 nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1520 which was issued on November 28, 1975 by then President
Ferdinand Marcos.
The PP reads:
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon

and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism
value... hereby declare the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and
Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a... tourist zone
under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential
tourism value,... Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three
haciendas from argricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of
PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to
non-agricultural uses.
Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the
three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993
covering 513.983 hectares,... the subject of G.R. No. 167505.
The application for conversion of Roxas & Co. was the subject of the above-stated
Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals which the Court remanded to the DAR for the
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
observance of proper acquisition proceedings. As reflected in the above-quoted
statement of facts in... said case, during the pendency before the DAR of its application
for conversion following its remand to the DAR or on May 16, 2000, Roxas & Co. filed
with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6,
Series of 1994[3] which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial,
or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance... from
the DAR.
It bears mentioning at this juncture that on April 18, 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu enacted Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 (Nasugbu MZO No. 4) which was
approved on May 4, 1983 by the Human Settlements Regulation Commission, now the
Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Issues:
1520
Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu

tourism zone to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.'s three haciendas in
Nasugbu from CARP coverage
Whether Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982 exempted certain lots in Hacienda Palico
from CARP coverage
Whether the partial and complete cancellations by the DAR of CLOA No. 6654 subject
of G.R. No. 167505 is valid
Ruling:
I. PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN

THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING NASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL
LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each
constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore,
converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.
The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector
comprising the [three Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated
the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to
achieve its purpose.
Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what
those potential tourism areas are.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,[9] the Court made it clear that the "power
to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural,
hence, exempt from the coverage of the [Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court.
The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October

22, 2001, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it... finding that PP 1520
did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their
original uses. I... t appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the "specific
geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending... tourism development
projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and
other crops.[11]
Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,[12] came up with
clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that
B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities,

barangays, islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that merely:
(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area
declared as tourist zone... could not be regarded as effecting an automatic
reclassification of the entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. This is so
because "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and
"providing for the manner of... their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local
Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the
land use plan."
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within
the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend
the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does
said... proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already
be used for purposes other than agricultural.
C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances,

assuming [these] took effect before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis for
exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP coverage x x x x.
The DAR's reading into these general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost
consideration, more especially in the present petitions which involve vast tracts of
agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value"
of certain areas... within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify
the areas to non-agricultural use.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Even so, Roxas & Co. turns to Natalia Realty v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde to support its
position. These cases are not even closely similar to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540
and 167543. The only time that these cases may find application to said petitions is...
when the PTA actually identifies "well-defined geographic areas within the zone with
potential tourism value."
II. ROXAS & CO.'S APPLICATION IN DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97
FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 179650
CANNOT BE GRANTED IN VIEW OF DISCREPANCIES IN THE LOCATION AND
IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF
LAND.
Since PP 1520 did not automatically convert Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad and Palico
into non-agricultural estates, can Roxas & Co. invoke in the alternative Nasugbu MZO
No. 4,... which reclassified in 1982 the haciendas to... non-agricultural use to exclude
six parcels of land in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage?
By Roxas & Co.'s contention,... n, the affected six parcels of land which are the subject
of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 and nine parcels of land which... have
been reclassified to non-agricultural uses via... n, the affected six parcels of land which
are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 and nine parcels of land
which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 involved in G.R.
No. 167505, all in
Hacienda Palico, have been reclassified t... ural uses via Nasugbu MZO No. 4 which
was approved by the forerunner of HLURB.
Roxas & Co.'s contention fails.
To be sure, the Court had on several occasions decreed that a local government unit
has the power to classify and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to
the effectivity of the CARL.
The DAR Secretary[26] denied the application for exemption of Roxas & Co.,
however,... [A] review of the titles, however, shows that the origin of T-49946 is T-783
and not
T-985. On the other hand, the origin of T-60034 is listed as 59946, and not T-49946.
The discrepancies were attributed by [Roxas & Co.] to typographical errors which were
"acknowledged and initialled" [sic] by the ROD. Per verification..., the discrepancies . .
. cannot be ascertained.
In denying Roxas & Co.'s motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary held:
The landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification
dated February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB] , the Certification dated September 12, 1996
issued by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications...
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority. The
certifications were issued for Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34. Thus, it was not even
possible to issue exemption clearance over the lots covered by TCT Nos. 60019 to
60023.
Furthermore, we also note the discrepancies between the certifications issued by the
HLURB and the Municipal Planning Development Coordinator as to the area of the
specific lots.[
In affirming the DAR Secretary's denial of Roxas & Co.'s application for exemption, the
Court of Appeals
But these certifications contain nothing to show that these lots are the same as Lots
125-A, 125-B, 125-C, 125-D and 125-E covered by TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021,
60022 and 60023, respetively. While [Roxas & Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24
and
31 correspond to the aforementioned TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was

presented to substantiate such allegation... oreo
Moreover, [Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 which it claims covers DAR Lot Nos.
28, 32 and 24.
....a... scrutiny of the said Ordinance shows that only Barangays Talangan and
Lumbangan of the said municipality were classified as Industrial Zones...Barangay
Cogunan was not include
Its foregoing findings notwithstanding, the appellate court still allowed Roxas & Co. to
adduce additional evidence to support its application for exemption under Nasugbu
MZO No. 4.
In granting the application, the DAR Secretary[30] examined anew the evidence
submitted by Roxas & Co. which consisted mainly of certifications from various local
and national government agencies.
Even as the existence and validity of Nasugbu MZO No. 4 had already been
established, there remains in dispute the issue of whether the parcels of land involved in
DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 subject of G.R. No. 179650 are actually
within the said zoning... ordinance.
The Court finds that the DAR Secretary indeed committed grave abuse of discretion
when he ignored the glaring inconsistencies in the certifications submitted early on by
Roxas & Co.
Notably, then DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, on one hand, observed that the
"landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated
February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB], the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued
by the Municipal Planning... and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications dated
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority." On the
other hand, then Secretary Hernani Braganza relied on a different set of certifications
which were issued later or on September
19, 1996.
In this regard, the Court finds in order the observation of DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas &
Co. should have submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pointed therein the
exact locations of the properties to prove that indeed they are within the area of
coverage of Nasugbu MZO
No. 4.
III. ROXAS & CO.'S APPLICATION FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-008-98 FOR THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO
SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 167505 SHOULD BE GRANTED.
The Court, however, takes a different stance with respect t... nine parcels of land... in
Hacienda Palico,... Location and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;
Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas,
stating that the subject parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone as specified in
Zone A. VII of
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), under Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;
Two (2) Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II, Director,
HLURB, Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within the
Residential cluster Area as specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4,...
By Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR Secretary granted the application for
exemption b
DAMBA-NSFW moved for reconsideration but the DAR Secretary denied the same
IV. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-008-
98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No. 179650 TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES INVOLVING
THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO MUST BE CANCELLED.
Turning now to the validity of the issuance of CLOAs... ssuance of CLOAs in Hacienda
Palico vis-à-vis the present dispositions: It bears recalling that in DAR Administrative
Case Nos. A-9999-008-98 and A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 179650), the Court ruled for
Roxas & Co.'s grant of exemption... in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 but
denied the grant of exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 for
reasons already discussed. It follows that the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries
in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 must be... cancelled.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
But first, the Court digresses. The assertion of DAMBA-NSFW that the petitions for
partial and complete cancellations of the CLOAs subject of DARAB Case Nos. R-401-
003-2001 to R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001 violated the earlier order in Roxas
v. Court of Appeals does... not lie. Nowhere did the Court therein pronounce that the
CLOAs issued "cannot and should not be cancelled," what was involved therein being
the legality of the acquisition proceedings.
gs. The Court merely reiterated that it is the DAR which has primary jurisdiction to rule
on the... validity of CLOAs.
Unlike courts of justice, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body, is not bound to strictly
observe rules of procedure and evidence. To strictly enforce rules on appeals in this
case would render to naught the Court's dispositions on the other issues in these
consolidated... petitions.
In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs issued for the nine
parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which
are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico
(or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). As for the rest of
the CLOAs, they should be respected since Roxas & Co., as shown in the discussion in
G.R. Nos. 167540, 167543 and 167505, failed to prove that the other lots in Hacienda
Palico and the... other two haciendas, aside from the above-mentioned nine lots, are
CARP-exempt.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
People vs. Siton, et al.,
GR 169364, 18 Sept. 2009
Facts:
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were found
wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without
any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. Respondents
filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202 (2) is unconstitutional for
being vague and overboard. The municipal trial court denied the motions, directed
respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on
vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power (or the power of promoting
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property) and justified
by the Latin maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” (which calls for the subordination of
individual benefit to the interest of the greater number). Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the constitutionality of the anti-
vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause. The
RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2)
unconstitutional.
Issue: Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?
Ruling:
No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither
does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order
laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for
conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or
cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a
license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Remman Enterprises, Inc., and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders’ Association vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real
Estate Service and Professional Regulation Commission
G.R. 19767
Petition for injunction

Remman Enterprises, Inc., and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Association
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional

Regulation Commission
Villarama Jr., J.
February 4, 2014
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to
declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was signed aims to
professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers,
appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its
enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and
Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions.
Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created
under the new law. The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were
promulgated by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
Petitioners filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, asking the court to
declare as void and unconstitutional Sections 28 (a), 29 and 32, of R.A. 9646 that the
trial court denied thus, this petition.
Issues:
1. W/N R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule
under Section 26 , Article VIof the Philippine Constitution
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Ruling:
1. NO. The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the
Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane
to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title. It is also well-settled that the "one
title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect. R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice
of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes." The new law extended its coverage to real estate developers
with respect to their own properties. The inclusion of real estate developers is
germane to the law’s primary goal of developing "a corps of technically
competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service
practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally
competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." R.A. No.
9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.
Decision:
Petition is DENIED.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
ADORACION CAROLINO v. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, GR No. 189649, 2015-04-20
Facts:
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband, retired[3] from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) with the rank of Colonel under General Order
No. 1208 dated November 29, 1976, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1(A) and
10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340,[4] as amended.
He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the amount of P18,315.00 in
December 1976 until the same was withheld by respondents in March 2005.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was done pursuant to Disposition
Form[7] dated October 29, 2004, which was approved by the Chief of Staff and made
effective in January 2005. In the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge Advocate
General... opined that under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340,
retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving pension benefits once
incapable to render military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to a
foreign country. It was also mentioned... that termination of retirement benefits of
pensioner of the AFP could be done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1638[8] which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired... list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss. It being in consonance with the policy consideration that all
retirement laws inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and
modified accordingly.
On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision[10] granting the petition for
mandamus
Respondents sought reconsideration,[12] but the RTC denied the same in an Order
Jeremias died on September 30, 2007[15] and was substituted by his wife, herein
petitioner.
On May 25, 2009, the CA granted respondents' appeal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 10,
2009.
Issues:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE
AND REVERSED THE 26 FEBRUARY 2007 DECISION OF THE QC RTC BECAUSE:
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot be used against petitioner as her
husband's retirement and pension were granted to him by the AFP under RA 340 which
was not superseded by PD 1638, a later statute.
Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to compel the reinstatement of
his pension and benefits from the AFP under RA 340 as PD 1638 was not applicable to
him.
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioner's husband retired in 1976 under RA No. 340. He was already receiving his
monthly retirement benefit in the amount of P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it
was terminated in March 2005. Section 5, RA No. 340
We find that the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638 to the retirement benefits of
petitioner's husband.
PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979.
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future only and... has
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some
legal provisions;[17] that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a...
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect.[18]
These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the
same may be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly
provides that the decree shall take effect upon its approval.
PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in 1979. The rule
is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with
regard to all rights that had accrued prior to... such amendment.
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the retirees to whom the
law shall be applied,... Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above-
enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA No. 340... the petition is
GRANTED.
Principles:
after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights
that had accrued prior to... such amendment.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
G.R. No. L-7995 – 101 Phil. 1155 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties
May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
FACTS:
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For
some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local
market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail
Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to
engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act
on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according
to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a
Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the
income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally

accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with
RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “”does not demand absolute equality
amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced””;
and, that the equal protection clause “”is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who
fall within such class and those who do not.””
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict
with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through
the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his
market stalls in the Pasay city market.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu
Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the
enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law
and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be
employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without
due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Forbes v. Tiaco
W. CAMERON FORBES v. CHUOCO TIACO
G.R. No. L-6157, July 30, 1910
FACTS:
April 1, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila against the plaintiffs alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909, under
the orders of the said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,
he was deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China, by the aforesaid J. E. Harding and
C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of the police and of the secret service,
respectively, of the city of Manila, and that having been able to return to these Islands
he feared, as it was threatened, that he should be again deported by the said
defendants, concluding with a petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued
against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the defendant, Chuoco,
and that they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an indemnity.
Respondent argued that It is true that the said defendant Chuoco Tiaco, was, with 11
others or his nationality, expelled from these Islands and returned to China by the
plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, under the orders of the plaintiff W.
Cameron Forbes, but the said expulsion was carried out in the public interest of the
Government and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese Government
in these Islands.
The said complaint having been filed with the defendant A. S. Crossfield, he, granting
the petition, issued against the plaintiffs the injunction requested, prohibiting them from
deporting the defendant Chuoco Tiaco.
The plaintiffs filed a demurrer against the same and presented a motion asking that the
injunction be dissolved, the grounds of the demurrer being that the facts set out in the
complaint did not constitute a motive of action, and that the latter was one in which the
court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction against the plaintiffs for the reasons
set out in the complaint; notwithstanding which, the defendant A. S. Crossfield overruled
the demurrer and disallowed the motion, leaving the complaint and the injunction
standing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can take jurisdiction in any case relating to the exercise of this
inherent power in the deportation of aliens, for the purpose of controlling this power
vested in the political department of the government.
HELD:
Under the system of government established in the Philippine Islands the Governor-
General is "the chief executive authority," one of the coordinate branches of the
Government, each of which, within the sphere of its governmental powers, is
independent of the others. Within these limits the legislative branch cannot control the
judicial nor the judicial the legislative branch, nor either the executive department. In the
exercise of his political duties the Governor-General is, by the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands, invested with certain important governmental and political powers
and duties belonging to the executive branch of the Government, the due performance
of which is entrusted to his official honesty, judgment, and discretion. So far as these
governmental or political or discretionary powers and duties which adhere and belong to
the Chief Executive, as such, are concerned, it is universally agreed that the courts
possess no power to supervise or control him in the manner or mode of their discharge
or exercise.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
PERALTA vs. COMELEC Case Digest
PERALTA vs. COMELEC
82 SCRA 30
Facts:
Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by
the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the
Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately
preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners
questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was
decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by
Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They
argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the election period
shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.”
Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional
Held:
The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed
in the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang
Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the
Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution,
the same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner
of election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and
regulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue
to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted. Moreover, the
election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of
emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority
and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country
within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the
nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix
the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the
Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the
1978 Election Code.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Ceniza v. Comelec, 96 Scra 763 (1980)
FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted

Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise
provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and
component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The
City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a
highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that
cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB
51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting
being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that
political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51
and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu
is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716
registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu
would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza
also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise
aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly
urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the
provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is
not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect
provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such
unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy
of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated
that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation
of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of
a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in
character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came
into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis
of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a
city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a
relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether
the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need
thecontinued support of the provincial government thus justifying
the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincialofficials in some
instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied
equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to
vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing
voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same
privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which
violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
95 SCRA 392
L-52245
January 22, 1980
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed
his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of
January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that “….Any
retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.”
He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based
on “purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation.
Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the
same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The
need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government
work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but,
which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision.
Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such
denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is
a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to
the same class.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

declared valid.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they
file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,
filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the
afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto
resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection
clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created
equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the
present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And,
under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence
on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity,
and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to
the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision
cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent
is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law.
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any
Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-
President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past,
elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of
his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions
of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public
officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for
excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective
ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the
purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the
equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
_____
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions
satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected
officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from
the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to
the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is
outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring
as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2)
the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and
(3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
_____
The ruling basically paves the way for justices, judges, election officials, military and
police officers, members of the cabinet and all appointed civil servants to continue
exercising the functions of, and holding on to, their appointive office while campaigning
to get elected for an elective position.
The legal ramifications are of great significance. As Justice Carpio pointed out in his
dissenting opinion, imagine if the Provincial Commander of the AFP files his COC for
governor on 1 December 2009 for the 10 May 2010 elections. If he is not considered
automatically resigned from office, he has until the start of the campaign period on 26
March 2010 to remain in his post, in command of hundreds, if not thousands, of fully-
armed personnel. The same is true for judges, cabinet secretaries, and other heads of
offices who have some kind of influence and control over certain personnel and
government resources. There are even reports that some Comelec officials themselves
have filed their COCs for certain elective positions.
Next elections, it would then be possible that the Chief Justice, the Comelec
Chairperson or the AFP Chief of Staff become a candidate for President, Vice-President
or Senator while serving the office to which they were appointed.
The decision does not seem to prevent the evil that the Constitution, in so many words,
seeks to prevent. In fact, Article IX(B), Section 2(4) of the Constitution expressly
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
provides that “No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.”
Furthermore, if they lose, they just continue occupying their appointive posts. This is
illogical because Section 6, Art. IX(B) of the Constitution provides that “No candidate
who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to
any office in the Government of any government-owned or controlled corporations or in
any of its subsidiaries.”
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment
of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection
of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.”
Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended
to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of

Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being
an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.
RULING:
“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order
to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017
G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian
tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an
intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of
the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than
their so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its
punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due
process and it is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
 No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
 Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification
rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the
religious belief, but in a way to the geographical and more directly to the natives of
the Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to
insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the past
and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-
Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of
the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is
intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood
that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go
measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of
same class.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Conference of Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA
THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER

INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC., CREAMSHIP MANAGEMENT INC., EL GRANDE
SHIPPING CORP., EASTGATE (INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS
KALAYAAN OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP., INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP., JZEL
COMPANY, INC. , LAINE SHIPPING AGENCY CORP., MARINERS SERVICES,
CORP., MARITIME SERVICES & MGT., INC., MID OCEAN (PHILS.) MARINE
AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-PHIL. GROUP, INC., PHIL.
MARINE CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM SHIPPING
(PHILS.) INC., TRANS-MED (MANILA) CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR AND
THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, respondent.
Facts:
 Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated

association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series
of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No.
05.
 Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
 Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend
and increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II,
Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers
Issue/Held: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative
power. Yes.
Ratio:
 The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on

impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by
the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
vs. POEA.
o The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).
o To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular
fields assigned to them.
 While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law. (Principle of Subordinate Legislation)
 That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further
amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the
sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed
in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Himagan vs. People
“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was

charged for the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975,
Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that
“Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed
the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be
a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of
the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and
the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them,
as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman
criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of
RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Almonte v. Vasquez
Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and
Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to
Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from
enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the
EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued
by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally
disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a
concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished
several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate
headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of
the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when
the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were
released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of
EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate
monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]
In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations
written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the
subpoena duces tecum but was denied.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an

agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative
to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge
of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being"
and this could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services

and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified
without violating their equal protection of laws.
Held:
YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with

respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in
addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation
of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed,
EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in
cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse
can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled
by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal
purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as
the designated “protectors of the people” of the Constitution.
Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners
complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale
respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully
disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous
letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this
procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate
petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents
required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the
subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or
custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the
EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no
reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent
Ombudsman.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF
ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C.
CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. G.R.
No. L-23794. February 17, 1968. 20 SCRA 739.
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, imposing "on any and all
productions of sugar milled at petitioner's, municipal tax of 1% per export sale.
Petitioner paid but were under protest.
Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being
in violation of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside
from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative
Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which
Ormoc City its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, or the Local Autonomy
Act, is authorized to impose; that it also violates RA 2264 because the tax is on both the
sale and export of sugar.
ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid.
RULING:
NO. The SC held that it violates the equal protection clause for it taxes only sugar
produced and exported by petitioner and none other. Even though petitioner, at the time
of the enactment of the ordinance, was the only sugar central in Ormoc, the
classification should have been in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as petitioner, for the coverage of the tax.
Though, petitioner can be refunded, they are not entitled to interest because the taxes
were not arbitrarily collected as the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan
January 30, 1982

G.R. No. L-50581-50617
FACTS:
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the
Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such
respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial document
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.
The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979.
Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on
constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court denied such
motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative
of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection
and ex post facto clauses of the Constituiton, thus decraling it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No, The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree
cannot be adjudged. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke
the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far
from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in term of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on
the rest.
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2)
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3)
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the
claim of petitioner.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of
law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an
accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation,
upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the
authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.” This Court holds
that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1606.
Petition dismissed. No costs.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]
15
AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation
from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization.
Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from
1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A
recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing
that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and
thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No.
89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No.
6683.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,

like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why
the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not.
It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement
to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from
the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can
be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this
case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said
law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she
served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the
law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)
The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment
of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business
enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone
(SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
which upheld the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case:
The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are
excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and
thus violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals
upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo,
(2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the
Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area
within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present
“fenced-in former Subic Naval Base” only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the
first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has
effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in
contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA
7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of
the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid
classification.
Decision:
Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid and
reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to
the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class.
Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven
persons, believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner was
one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said that what happened was a rub-
out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues that Republic Act (R.A.)
8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive effect and is plan
from the facts and was made to suit the petitioner’s case, thus, making it an ex-post
facto law that would affect the right of the accused to procedural due process. Hence,
the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto
law that may affect the petitioner’s right to due process?
HELD: No.
REASONING: There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 – an ex post facto law
generally provides for a retroactive effect on penal laws. However, the Court explains,
R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, ‘Penal laws are those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or those that
defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment’. Republic Act
8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, may not
be considered an ex post facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the
law in question has retroactive effect and may affect his right to due process is wrong.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
De Guzman vs. Comelec
GR No. 129118. July 19, 2000
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters
Registration Act of 1996". De Guzman vs. Comelec
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who,
either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at
least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned
by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district.
Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to
different stations by the COMELEC. De Guzman vs. Comelec
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal
protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City
and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the
same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no
substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there
is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause. De Guzman
vs. Comelec
HELD:
No.
The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De
Guzman vs. Comelec
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a
policy of all or none".
This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may
be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to
the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be
discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently
served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each
and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the
highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality.
It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters can hardly be carried out. De Guzman vs. Comelec
The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
PHILRECA v. Secretary of Interior
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Interior
and Local Government
G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003
FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to annul as unconstitutional sections
193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A class
suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric
cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who are members of petitioner
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). Petitioners
contend that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, as amended, and the provision
in the loan agreements of the government of the Philippines with the government of the
United State of America, they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including
payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local Government Code,
however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In
particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on
the ground that the said provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal
protection clause. Further, they submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional
because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and
the United States Government.
ISSUE:
Did Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code violate the equal protection
clause?
HELD:
NO. The pertinent parts of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code
provide:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-
stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon
the effectivity of this Code.
Section 234. Exemptions from real property tax. The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A.
No. 6938; and
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons whether natural or juridical, including all
government-owned and controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of
this Code.
Petitioners argue that the above provisions of the Local Government Code are
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. Allegedly, said provisions
unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered cooperatives under P.D.
No. 269, as amended, and not under R.A. No. 6938 or the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines. The Court holds that there is reasonable classification under the Local
Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives
covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 on two material points, to wit – 1) the
capital contributions of the members, and 2) the extent of government control over
cooperatives. Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power
by local governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government
unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its
broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing powers of
local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy. Section 193 of the
Local Government Code is indicative of the legislative intent to vest broad taxing powers
upon local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities
specifically provided therein. Section 193 provides:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-
stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon
the effectivity of this Code.
The above provision effectively withdraws exemptions from local taxation enjoyed by
various entities and organizations upon effectivity of the Local Government Code except
for a) local water districts; b) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938; and c)
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions.
Further, petitioners argue that as beneficiaries of the loan proceeds all the assets of
petitioners, such as lands, buildings, distribution lines acquired through the proceeds of
the Loan Agreements are tax exempt. The Court holds otherwise. A plain reading of the
provision readily shows that it does not grant any tax exemption in favor of the borrower
or the beneficiary either on the proceeds of the loan itself or the properties acquired
through the said loan. It simply states that the loan proceeds and the principal and
interest of the loan, upon repayment by the borrower, shall be without deduction of any
tax or fee that may be payable under the Philippine law as such tax or fee will be
absorbed by the borrower with funds other than the loan proceeds.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No. 147387, 2003-12-10
Facts:
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point
out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of... the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on... elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not... embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive... officials, thus:
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon... filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even
as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other
hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -
... they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
Creation of two (2) sets of BCC
No communication from the Senate... without copies thereof being furnished the
members;
The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings,... There was no meeting actually
conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC... nl... y of the first one that convened o
The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment,"
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bil
Issues:
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners' allegations
that "irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the
certification... signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress,
constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
Ruling:
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the...
irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress,
Principles:
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of... both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING
333 SCRA 13
G.R. No. 128845
June 1, 2000
FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires
including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance
and a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic
disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its
claim of parity.
RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the
rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive
more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence
here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to
justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004
FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso, who was then 43
years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement
benefits under the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole beneficiary. GSIS
approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump
sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for survivorship
pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim because, under section 18 of PD
1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on
17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory
relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension
and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits including interest. Citing Articles 115and
117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner
has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through
monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are
property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property. The
trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for
being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive
effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the Family Code, a later
law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this appeal.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted
GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. However, the Court will still resolve the issue
despite the manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest demand
the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso.
ISSUE:
Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of PD
1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such
dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies
equal protection of the law.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that
[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for
survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner
within the three-year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive
and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and
their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty
of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and
regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates
against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners
death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage
took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of
the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or
purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed
marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from
the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died.
The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification
lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified
for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of
pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason
Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as
the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS
(PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married
the member immediately before the members death is still qualified to receive
survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three
years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of
survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the
survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS
member within three years before the members retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is void for being
violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Case Digest #2-1 | GR No. 148208 | Central Bank Employees (Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) Association vs Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary |
Dec 15, 2004
FACTS:
The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA
No 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND:
July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.
Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an
integral component of the Bank Sentrals human resource development program.
Provided that the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as
possible with the principles provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization
Act). Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under RA No 6758.
7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of

Government Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP,
RA No 8282 (1997) – SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No
8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No 8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul
of the constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the
laws”
HELD:
The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.
RULING:
With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government
financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art
II of RA No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file
employees of Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable
because there were substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2
classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance

that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of
Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications
between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not
only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The
provisio may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between
persons who are without differences.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption rests on the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination
argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the
officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-
and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are similarly situated.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of
Congress inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the
7 other GFIs. The challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is
premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its
treatment of persons similarly situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed. For the principles is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstance which, if not identical are analogous.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the

accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the
“mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of
inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not
a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Beltran vs Secretary of Health GR 133640 25 November 2005
Facts: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The
health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services
Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and
preserve public health and safety.
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law
on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently
published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23,
1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-
out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over
a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period
of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. — The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of
two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of
R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and
review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.”
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have
already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled
“An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.”
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation
by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed
a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
Issue: Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules is valid on the
ground that it violates the equal protection clause.
Decision: Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are
constitutional and valid. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case
can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial

distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never
intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and
inequality shall be allowed.
To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood

banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and
reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. The
former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the
latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Second, the classification, and
the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial
blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared
to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine
blood banking system. Third, the Legislature intended for the general application of the
law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation
nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.The promotion of public health
is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern.
Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s
police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to over overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law.
As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised
by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Dycaico v. SSS
G.R. No. 161357
November 30, 2005
FACTS:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-
employed data, he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their 8 children as his
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly
pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed
away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married
the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for
survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under the
Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as
of the date of his retirement.
The petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her survivors
pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children
as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that
only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries.
The SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the petitioners claim. The
SSC refuted the petitioner’s contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate
family members by citing the definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSCs February 6,
2002 Resolution. In the assailed Decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition.
The CA declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio
at the time of his retirement, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries
in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that Bonifacios children
with the petitioner could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have all
reached 21 years of age.
ISSUE:
WON Dycaico can be considered as a beneficiary.

WON there is a violation to equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
Classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor’s pension

based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the
other spouse bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law.
Indeed, the SC does not find substantial distinction between spouses whose
assignment as a beneficiary was made after the marriage and spouses whose
assignment as a beneficiary was made before the marriage. The statute violates equal
protection clause when it grants surviving pensions only to the spouses belonging to the
former case and not to than the latter.
A statute, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two
groups:
(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted prior to the latters retirement; and
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted after the latters retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective

marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The
distinction between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The
petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to
Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated
do not qualify as primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and,
therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension under the same provision by reason of
the subject proviso.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective
marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for
the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial
distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as
of the date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses
whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latters
retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham
relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing
upon the death of the other spouse.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and
Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section
12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot
deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this
invalid proviso.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
MIRASOL V. DPWH G.R. No. 158793 June 8, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment with application for
temporary restraining order and injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000
(Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998
Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as
limited access facilities.
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought

the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.
The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal
Road) toll Expressway under DO 215.
RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction
conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the amount of P100, 000 which
petitioners complied.
DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400
cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).
Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the petitioners and
respondents were required to file their Memoranda.
The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
ISSUE:
Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata?

Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000.
Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that
order, the petitioners presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.
The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would
trigger res judicata.
A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a
provisional remedy.
2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation
issued under them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to
regulate toll ways.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning
curbings or central dividing sections.
They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways
and not to determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”.
The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to
declare certain expressways as limited access facilities.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws,
rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue
regulations governing limited access facilities.
The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first
place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public
Works and Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under
Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual
devolution of its powers to the DOTC.
Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the
presumption of validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality
rested on the party assailing it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the
test of reasonableness. The Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not
impose unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right to use the facilities.
It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within those
limited-access facilities.
The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway.
Petitioners were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However,
the mode in which they wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway,
was a subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to
drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily regulated.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON

S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing
a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives
only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as
to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section
7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore
be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the

ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function
is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in
the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of
a congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which
states that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1)
the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it
sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.
It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that
has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA
9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct
primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the
collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to
the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and
the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law
under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as
sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function
of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
FELICIANA L. MORGAN

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G.R. No.

184478 Case Digest

Spouses are registered owners of a residential property in Green Heights Subdivision,

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which

Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe

Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment

Ex post facto law

Fair Elections Act

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements.

o A mere license is always revocable

o Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the

Whether or not or 7774 is valid.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF

The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD and CHUCHI

DOCTRINE: The issuance by RTC of WPI is an unwarranted interference w the powers

VELASCO, JR., J.:

 The Supervision and Examination Dept. (SED) of BSP conducted examinations

WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon

Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu

I. PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN

The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October

B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities,

(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas

C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances,

Roxas & Co.'s contention fails.

31 correspond to the aforementioned TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was

Petition for injunction

Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally

Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER

 Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated

 The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on

“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies