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Answer 1
Team A
Loss for Team A
Strategy I Strategy II Probability
Strategy 1 0.5 -0.1 x1
Team B Strategy 2 -0.3 0.2 x2
Probability y1 y2 1
i) y 1= 0.272727273
y2 0.727272727
ii) x1 0.454545455
x2 0.545454545
Answer
i) y1 0.272727273
ii) x1 0.454545455
iii) Expected loss of team A (Value of the game) 0.06363636
Answer 2
i) A game with 2 players where whatever one player loses in the game the other
player wins, and vice versa.
ii) Sally Probability
Value to Sally
10 40
10 20 -50 p
Fioana
40 -50 80 1-p
p 0.65
The strategy is optimal for Sally because it produces the same expected payoff
regardless of what Fiona does. Under any other randomized strategy, Fiona can
adopt a strategy that minimizes Sally's expected payoff.
Value of the
iii) -4.5
game
S67532:Non-Life Statistics Decision Theory
Answer 3
Number of faults
Decision
0 1 2 3 4 5
d1 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
d2 0 300 600 900 1200 1500
Probability 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Answer 4
Ans 5
D1 D2 D3 D4 Probability
θ1 10 3 -7 9 0.5
θ2 -5 12 6 -7 0.3
θ3 -8 -3 13 -10 0.2
(i) D4 is dominated by D1
(ii) Decision D1 D2 D3
Min Profit -8 -3 -7
(iii) Decision D1 D2 D3
Expected Profit 1.9 4.5 0.9
Ans 6
Let θi denote the state of the nature when the roll of die is i
θi a1 a2 a3 Probability
1 1.5 0.5 2 0.25
2 3 4 2 0.25
3 4.5 1.5 6 0.25
4 6 8 4 0.25
(iii) Strategy a1 a2 a3
Expected Profit 3.75 3.5 3.5
Ans 7
Player A
I II III IV
I 2 1 4 3
II 7 4 3 2
Player B
III 1 -1 8 6
IV -1 -5 9 4
V 8 6 -1 -3
We find that is no saddle point in the above data so we go for dominance check now.
Player A
I II III IV
I 2 1 4 3
II 7 4 3 2
Player B
III 1 -1 8 6
IV -1 -5 9 4
V 8 6 -1 -3
We find that element in column I > corresponding element in coloumn II, so delete coloumn I
Player A
II IV
I 1 3
II 4 2
Player B
III -1 6
IV -5 4
V 6 -3
Player A
II IV
I 1 3
Player B
II 4 2
III -1 6
V 6 -3
Prob. x1 1-x1
S67532:Non-Life Statistics Decision Theory
x1 V
0 3 Equation to plot the graph of
0 2 value of the game (V) against
0 6 probabilty X1
0 -3 BI = X1 + 3(1-X1) ≤V
1 1 BII = 4X1 + 2(1-X1) ≤ V
1 4 BIII = -X1 + 6(1-X1) ≤ V
1 -1 BIV = 6X1 - 3(1-X1) ≤ V
1 6
4
Value of Game V
3
B1
2
B2
1
B3
0 B4
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
-1
-2
-3
-4
Probabilty Values X1
In the above graph, feasibility region is the common region for all the lines.
The bottom point of the region (I.e intersection of line 2 & 3) corresponds to optimum solution.
Lines BI and Biv will be discarden or remove as they are isolated.
IV -1 6 1-y1 y1 7/9
Prob. x1 1-x1 1-y1 2/9
V 2.888889
Therefore,
Optimum Strategy for player A : (0,4/9,0,5/9)
Optimum Strategy for player B : (0,7/9,2/9,0,0)
Expected value of the cost to player A is V 2.888889