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FACTS:
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the
vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at
the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio
Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman
Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve
(12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim
filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized,
from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati to avoid miscarriage of
justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent
court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be
issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary
inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its
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personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima
facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt,
pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant
shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been
personally convinced of such probable cause.
ISSUE :
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation
that a probable cause exists.
HELD:
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this
case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she
has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is
made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has
not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
MANALILI VS. CA
GR 113447, OCT. 9, 1997
Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of
Kalookan City conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of
the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information
that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is
unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure
is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in
violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in
any proceeding.
3
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility
of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or
object thereto during the trial.
Facts:
Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to
monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be
selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house.
Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times.
These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer
was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as
Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the
area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St.
Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at
Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center.
Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the
ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of
the chapel.
Issue:
Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.
Held:
Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
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or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller) The failure of the police
officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for
its issuance. However, warrantless search and seizures are legal as long
as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge
of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the
activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their
duties.
FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating
Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante
delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured
seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was
arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the
present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
2. Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against
the accused.
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
4. Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.
HELD:
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In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination of the existence of probable cause given the
fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection
against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only
under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent
and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue,
which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for
the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search
and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part
of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana
plants as evidence to convict appellant.
In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must
adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or
fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an
accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
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PEOPLE VS. CHUA HO SAN
G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999
FACTS:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La
Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call
at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay
Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked
different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there
conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a
lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the
speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored
strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers,
the man changed direction. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him
from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers;
however, Chua did not understand what they’re saying. And by resorting
of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his
bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain
several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances,
which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was
provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted
by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
requirement.
RULING:
The Court held in the negative.
The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue
of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules.
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However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases,
to wit:
(1) search of moving vehicles,
(2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consent searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient
to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
9
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN
G.R. No.L-63630, April 6, 1990
Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting
surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around
9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag
who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and
there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the
Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben
guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search
warrant.
Held:
No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person
may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing
possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even
without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency
on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an
informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused
was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there
was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
Facts:
Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have
in her possession more than 500 grams of shabu when she was initially
frisked by a security personnel at a gate in the airport. The security
personnel felt something hard in respondent’s abdominal area and when
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asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation.
Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her supervisor.
Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent, packets of shabu
were seized from her.
Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
WON a valid search was made.
Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was
never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested
without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
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Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
Facts:
In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael
Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for
violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
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Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the
Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had
visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his
arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to
Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the
morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front
going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner
riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
13
The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But
before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling
bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers
got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside
the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the
officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For
his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He
also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him,
but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met
in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take
the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in
said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take
charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt
established beyond reasonable doubt.
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Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him
guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his
personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant
and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the
illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore
the RTC ruling be reversed.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances.
FACTS:
As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
ISSUES:
a. What constitutes a reasonable search?
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b. Whether checkpoints violate the right against searches and/or
seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
RULING:
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
Facts:
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989,
Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region
Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA, together with his
team and was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by
the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of
the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. After a while, a group
of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards
the car of the surveillance team drew their guns and fired at the team,
which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh.
Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they
sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at around
6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team raided the Eurocar
Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate contrabands inside one
of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the
right portion of the building. On February 22, 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and
sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. That judgment
of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Issue:
Whether in a state of emergency circumstances exist, the arrest of
the accused involved in rebellious act is valid without securing an arrest
and search warrant.
Held:
Yes, under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion
that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
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against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The
trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid
was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. While it
is true that the officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for
said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the
facts of each case.
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec.
36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar
as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office;
(2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees
of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article
282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
ISSUES:
RULING:
The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Court thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied
the following principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody
and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being
of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
Facts:
An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil
Service Commission Chairperson alleging that an officer of the CSC has
been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in
information technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to
back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV]
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in
the hard disk of computers at the PALD and the Legal Services Division.
Within the same day, the investigating team finished the task. It was
found that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson
David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged
him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). On 24 July
2007, the CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of the same
merits and meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all
its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by
herein petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the search conducted and the copying of petitioner’s
files without his knowledge and consent lawful?
Held:
Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all
searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
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Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to
privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of
communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded
to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the
government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find
no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child
pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer
was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files
stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly
falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in O’Connor.
FACTS:
On the evening of August 6, 2002, member of Drug Enforcement
Group together with a female informant went to the parking area of
McDonalds to conduct an entrapment operation.
PO3 Corbe was able to grab Edaño, causing the latter to fall on the
ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a “knot-tied” transparent plastic bag from
Edaño’s right hand.
ISSUES:
Whether the search and seizure that followed warrantless arrest is
valid.
29
HELD:
NO, the warrantless arrest of Edaño was not valid. Consequently, the
search and seizure that followed the warrantless arrest was likewise not
valid.
Informant and Edaño were just talking to each other, there was no
exchange of money and drugs as the police approached the car.
FACTS:
The brothers Raymond and Reynald Manalo, farmers from Bulacan
were abducted, detained in various locations, tortured by Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were
members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen
(18) months of restrained liberty, torture, and other dehumanizing acts,
they were able to escape. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition
for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the
Supreme Court to prevent military officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Existing petition was
treated as Amparo petition. The Supreme Court granted the Writ of
Amparo and ordered the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary
hearing and decide the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not statements from the victims is sufficient for amparo
petitions.
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2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary to invoke
the right to security of a person
RULING:
1. Yes. Much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come
from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and oral
statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered
or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained.
REYES VS GONZALES
G.R NO. 182161, DECEMBER 3, 2009
WRIT OF AMPARO
DEFINITION:
Is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, or
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
31
FACTS:
Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel
Seige and were charged of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal
Code. DILG issued Hold Departure Order in the interest of national
security and public safety.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO
since despite the dismissal of the crime of rebellion, he was held by the
BID officials at NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List.
This happens every time he left for abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or
threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which
would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD:
No. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private person or entity.
Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the right to be free
form arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed from
arbitrary into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
32
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities
he has been endowed by his Creator.
RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO
G.R. NO. 191805, NOVEMBER 15, 2011
FACTS:
Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as
an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him
to confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA).
Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to
the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado,
PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa,
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog,
George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition
sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of
the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue
of her presidential immunity from suit.
2. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of
amparo and habeas data cases.
HELD:
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity
from suits only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”
“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for
acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling
therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within
or beyond the power of the incumbent. The intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during
their tenure (and not term).
“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential
immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would
assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case
is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W.
Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and
Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
Facts:
Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of
Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law partner. According to
him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and rested for
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a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera
missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex
video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another
woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera,
but she refused. They had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed
Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed
several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act
9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilizing the said
video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy
and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the
petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data. After finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and directed Joy
to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the
original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days
from receipt. In her return, Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the
digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in
the cases she filed against Neri.
Rationale:
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas
Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and
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available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to
control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about
one self.” As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of
habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner
the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported
by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it
bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently
allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be
violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy
interest in the suppression of this video–which he fears would somehow
find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption–he failed to explain the connection between such interest
and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts
cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the
rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent
rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much
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so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
petition dismissible, as in this case.
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