Pilapil vs CA
The negligence for
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondent’s bus was hit
above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander.
Respondent’s personnel lost no time in bringing him to a
hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost his left eye’s
vision and sustained a permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of
damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
which the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers assume risks to
passengers such as the stoning in this case?
HELD:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to
engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a
common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer
of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely
undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law
imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
xxx
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence
from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers
and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety
of its passengers
xxx
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a
stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the
latter a cause of action against the carrier.
which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent
omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from
being committed when the same could have been foreseen and
prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be
noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful
acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care
essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the
protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a
family.
MAPA vs CA
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Cornelio P. Mapa and Purita S. Mapa are
respectable members of the society.
Plaintiffs Mapa entered into contract of air transportation
with defendant TWA as evidenced by TWA ticket purchased in
Bangkok, Thailand. Said TWA tickets are for Los Angeles-New
York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago
Domicile of carrier TWA is Kansas City, Missouri,
USA. Its principal place of business is Kansas City, Missouri,
USA. TWA's place of business through which the contracts
were made is Bangkok, Thailand. The place of destination is
Chicago, USA.
Plaintiffs Purita and Carmina S. Mapa departed for
Boston, taking a connecting flight on TWA's carrier checking in
seven (7) pieces of luggage at the TWA counter in the JFK
Airport.
The seven baggages were received by a porter who
issued seven TWA baggage receipts
Upon arriving in Boston, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina
proceeded to the carousel to claim their baggages and found
only three out of the seven they checked in
 Plaintiffs immediately reported the loss of their four
baggages to the TWA Baggage Office at Logan Airport. TWA's
representative confidently assured them that their baggages
would be located within 24 hours and not more than 48 hours.
Plaintiffs' counsel wrote TWA demanding
indemnification for the grave damage and injury suffered by the
plaintiffs.
TWA offered to amicably settle the case. Plaintiffs
accepted the check for $2,560.00, as partial payment for the
actual cost of their lost baggages and their contents.
Despite demands by plaintiffs, TWA failed and refused
without just cause to indemnify and redress plaintiffs for the
grave injury and damages they have suffered.
Petitioners then filed with the trial court a complaint[5]
for damages
TWA filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint
raising, as special and affirmative defense, lack of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts over the action for damages in that pursuant to
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the action could only
be brought either in Bangkok where the contract was entered
into, or in Boston which was the place of destination, or in
Kansas City which is the carrier's domicile and principal place of
business.
ISSUES: Whether the contracts of transportation between
Purita and Carmina Mapa, on the one hand, and TWA, on the
other, were contracts of "international transportation" under the
Warsaw Convention.
RULING:
TWA itself, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals impliedly
admit that if the sole basis were the two TWA tickets for Los
Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago, the contracts
cannot be brought within the term "international transportation,"
as defined in Article I(2) of the Warsaw Convention. As
provided therein, a contract is one of international
transportation only if according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a
transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two
High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a
territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate or authority of
another power, even though that power is not a party to this
convention.
There are then two categories of international transportation,
viz., (1) that where the place of departure and the place of
destination are situated within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties regardless of whether or not there be a break
in the transportation or a... transshipment; and (2) that where
the place of departure and the place of destination are within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed
stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty,
mandate, or authority of another power, even though the power
is not a party to the Convention.
The contracts of transportation in this case are evidenced by the
two TWA tickets, No. 015:9475:153:304 and No.
015:9475:153:305, both purchased and issued in Bangkok,
Thailand. On the basis alone of the provisions therein, it is
obvious that the place of departure and the place... of
destination are all in the territory of the United States, or of a
single High Contracting Party. The contracts, therefore, cannot
come within the purview of the first category of international
transportation. Neither can it be under the second category since
there was NO... agreed stopping place within a territory subject
to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power.
Cathay Pacific Airways vs. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Tomas Alcantara was a first class passenger of petitioner
Cathay Pacific Airways from Manila to Hongkong and onward
from Hongkong to Jakarta. The purpose of his trip was to attend the
following day, a conference with the Director General of Trade of
Indonesia. He checked in his luggage which contained not
only his clothing and articles for personal use but also papers
and documents he needed for the conference.
Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that
his luggage was missing. Private respondent was told that his luggage
was left behind in Hongkong.
For this, respondent Alcantara was offered $20.00 as “inconvenience
money" to buy his immediate personal needs until the luggage
could be delivered to him. The respondent, as a result of the
incident had to seek postponement of his pre-arranged
conference.
ISSUE:
1. WoN there was breach of contract
2. WoN Cathay Pacific is liable for damages
3. WoN the Warsaw Convention is applicable to this case
HELD:
1. Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private
respondent when it failed to deliver his luggage at the
designated place and time, it being the obligation of a
common carrier to carry its passengers and their luggage
safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to
delay their transportation, and the evidence shows that
petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
2. Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the
mishap results in death of a passenger, or where the carrier
is guilty of fraud or bad faith. But in the case at bar, the
inconvenience money offered to Alcantara was insulting
considering that he paid for a first class accommodation.
Petitioner or its agents should have been more courteous
and accommodating. The conduct of petitioner's
representative towards respondent justifies the grant of
moral and exemplary damages.
3. Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect
of law in this country, said convention does not operate as
an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a
carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It must not be
construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and
other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating
the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage,
especially if wilful misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established.