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Plan sparks Saudi prolif
Rogers 3/20/13 (Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science, technology and national security
policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change,
environmental cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security
Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen. Dempsey,” Center for New American
Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-
security-despite-changing-relationship-regions-)

America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal
drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville,
crude oil is coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what
Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the

we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average, increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day.¶ Not all of
this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A number of factors matter, most
importantly the crude oil grade. The United States is producing light tight oil, that is, low-
density crude oil, whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from
Saudi Arabia . Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian
Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.¶ Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand for oil (a consequence of slow
economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could
Whether or not one believes that the
conceivably help wean America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable poi nt).¶

United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and partners in the Persian Gulf
are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region . After
all, if the U nited S tates no longer relies on energy from the region, why should American foot the
bill for protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – or so the
narrative goes .¶ The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply shocks will
contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly those in East Asia that have grown more
dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s
mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned
about the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next 20 years because of oil.
That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the world where we had – where we had not, except for a few
bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it, bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the
aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing
called oil but rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where threats could be
managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know,
oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only
speak, as I dress, from the military perspective – that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that
we build by working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –you will find that the
future will be a period of greater commitment.¶ Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and
number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all
about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil.¶ So we have two powerful
This week marks the anniversary of the U.S.
strategic cross-currents that the Obama administration will have to confront in the near term.¶

invasion of Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in
the Middle East, not more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to
Middle East oil, and the domestic narrative speaks for itself. At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security
commitment to our partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about
security challenges in the region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt
Irvine recently published a report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to
Saudi Arabia developing the bomb – Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite
persuasively that a number of factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the

big caveats to this is a credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel
comfortable about this commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access to the
region’s oil? The public perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will have to be managed
carefully. What a tightrope to walk.

Nuclear war
Edelman ‘11
(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S.
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-
evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia.
And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have
long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond
in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also
to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi
government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a
slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to
accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to
the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the
region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from
China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to
sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver
conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had
discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This
“Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell
operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the
Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear
weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has
Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water
reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material
than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively,
Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear
weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has
employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT
since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from
Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim
forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany
the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and
international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth
against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the
most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi
Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear
competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless
of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by
whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations
in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to
do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that
acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of
acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire
nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more
before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses
of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely,
however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more
prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the
other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems
because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for
an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the
costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-
armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-
strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out
its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers
might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or
submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in
the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new
nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis,
to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch
authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and
escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-
control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still.
And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or
attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first
strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this
uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant
risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.
Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from
unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety
measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can
be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to
implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control
over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items.
Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might
hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their
weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be
a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were
engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a
multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military
technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by
selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors,
enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning
systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the
emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be
highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential
client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the
technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to
launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and
other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the
Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.
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5th Fleet key to deter Chinese militarization and string of pearls strategy
Townshend 11—Ashley, Research Associate in the International Security Program at the
Lowy Institute for International Policy, Real Clear World, "Few Reasons to Fear China's
'Pearls'", May 26,
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/05/26/few_reasons_to_fear_china_pearls_99
534.html
What, then, would be the strategic logic behind building these bases in the first place? Many speculate that China's main

objective is to offset the vulnerability of its energy supply-lines by acquiring the capacity
to threaten the sea lanes of adversaries. However, while the Indian Ocean power balance remains tilted in favour of an Indo-US partnership, Beijing
would be hard-pressed to sever trade routes on the high seas.
Indeed,Washington appears to hold the trump card as far as naval blockades are concerned.
Situated at the heart of the Persian Gulf, the US Navy's Fifth Fleet is better placed than any
other player to regulate the flow of Middle Eastern oil. As long as Chinese policymakers
are unable to alter this reality, they're likely to think twice about militarising any "pearls".
None of this is to say that all is well in the Indian Ocean. As China and India continue to rise amid an overall climate

of strategic mistrust, maintaining the security of international sea lanes will be an increasingly
important diplomatic endeavour. This will require greater confidence and compromise on all sides. To allay suspicions and stop us
jumping at shadows, Beijing will need to be more transparent on its Indian Ocean objectives.

String of Pearls causes arms races and nuke war—boosts Indian fears of Pakistani and Chinese
cooperation
Sayler 11—Kelley, CSIS research assistant, MA Baylor, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia”, 2011
,http://csis.org/blog/nuclear-stability-south-asia

The convergence of a number of factors in South Asia – including strategic anxieties,

destabilizing military doctrines, and conventional force disparities – places the region in
growing danger of succumbing to a nuclear arms race. Such was the conclusion of a recent SIPRI report that cited India
and Pakistan’s parallel expansion of fissile material production capacity and nuclear infrastructure as evidence of the countries’ progressive descent into nuclear
competition. Indian, Pakistani, and American experts gathered to discuss this development, as well as other topics in South Asian security, at a Monday event
hosted by the United States Institute for Peace.
Opening the discussion, Vijay Shankar, former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command, offered an overview of India’s nuclear sizing
requirements. Shankar stated that India’s policy of No First Use allows it to maintain a minimal arsenal – the precise size of which is dictated by credibility and
survivability concerns - that provides the country with a cost-effective means of deterrence . Shankar then noted India’s interest in
preserving minimum deterrence, a policy that is further supported by India’s recognition of a point of diminishing returns in nuclear
sizing.
It is not at all clear, however, that India possesses the political will to sustain such a policy
in the face of ever-growing strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan. To be
sure, India’s nuclear sizing requirements are, as Shankar conceded, driven by multilateral

considerations, which are almost certain in the long-term to reflect India’s discomfort with China’s
“string of pearls” strategy for expanding PRC influence into the Indian Ocean and South
China Sea. India is also unlikely to be particularly heartened by the prospect of a joint
Chinese-Pakistani naval base operating in its neighborhood or by reports of a steadily expanding Pakistani arsenal.
For its part, Pakistan has similarly committed to maintaining a policy of minimum deterrence. But the

comments of Shankar’s Pakistani counterpart, Shahzad Chaudhry, former Air Vice Marshall of the Pakistani
Air Force, would seem to belie this intention. Chaudhry noted that India’s robust economic growth rate has enabled it to
aggressively modernize its military forces. As a result, conventionalforce disparity has widened, prompting Pakistan to

increase its reliance on nuclear weapons as a means of achieving strategic parity. It was this policy, Chaudhry argued, that
prevented the Kargil War from escalating into a nuclear exchange.
 Pakistan’s nuclear sizing requirements will be
But given this emphasis on maintaining strategic parity, it would seem that

driven more by India’s force posture than by any inherent comfort with the theory of
minimum deterrence. And as India continues to develop its conventional capabilities - and to uphold the Cold Start doctrine, which many
Pakistani experts believe is intended to generate space for a limited war - it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistani nuclear forces will expand in kind. Indeed,
Pakistan’s development of the nuclear-capable Hatf-9 would seem to indicate an interest in both growing and diversifying the country’s arsenal, thereby moving it
away from a policy of minimum deterrence.
Following Shankar and Chaudhry’s discussion of the potential for a South Asian nuclear build-up, Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory
Authority, continued with a presentation on the relationship between civilian and military nuclear programs. Hashmi argued that there has always been a separation
between these programs in Pakistan, but that separation in India is insufficient to ensure the absence of material diversion. In addition, Hashmi denounced the U.S.-
India Civil Nuclear Agreement, saying that it legitimized the use of nuclear power plants for non-peaceful purposes.
Toby Dalton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace then highlighted the intimate connection between
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons/doctrine in South Asia. While Pakistan’s nuclear energy needs are different from those of India’s, he argued, both states desire
the prestige that is associated with having advanced nuclear technology and, for this reason, will continue to seek to legitimize their respective nuclear
programs. Given this condition, as well as the likely expansion of regional arsenals, nuclear security and transparency measures will be increasingly important to
implement in the coming years.
was pessimistic about the prospects for escalation control in
In contrast to the South Asian discussants, Dalton

the event of a future crisis and questioned the assumption that the presence of nuclear
weapons had had a moderating effect on the Kargil War. He instead argued that time pressures
and the lack of reliable dialogue channels will increase the potential for misperception in
future crises. Dalton additionally noted the possibility thatsustained American discussion of Pakistani nuclear security could exacerbate fears of a
disarming first strike, thereby driving
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Withdrawal leads to Israeli preemptive strikes – causes major regional war
Metz 13 (10/22, Dr. Steven Metz is Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He
also serves as the research director for the Joint Strategic Landpower Task Force, and co-
director of SSI's Future of American Strategy Project. He has been with SSI since 1993, previously
serving as Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies and Chairman of the Regional Strategy
Department. Dr. Metz has also been on the faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He has been an advisor to political
campaigns and elements of the intelligence community; served on national security policy task
forces; testified in both houses of Congress; and spoken on military and security issues around
the world. He is the author of more than 100 publications including articles in journals such as
Washington Quarterly, Joint Force Quarterly, The National Interest, Defence Studies, and
Current History. “A Receding Presence: The Military Implications of American Retrenchment”,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13312/a-receding-presence-the-military-
implications-of-american-retrenchment)

So much for the regions of modest concern. The

Middle East/North Africa region, by contrast, is a part of the world
where American retrenchment or narrowing U.S. military capabilities could have extensive
adverse effects . While the region has a number of nations with significant military capability, it
does not have a functioning method for preserving order without outside involvement . As U.S.
power recedes, it could turn out that American involvement was in fact a deterrent against Iran taking a more adventurous regional posture, for
instance. With the United States gone, Tehran could become more aggressive, propelling the
Middle East toward division into hostile Shiite and Sunni blocs and encouraging the spread of
nuclear weapons. With fewer ties between regional armed forces and the United States, there
also could be a new round of military coups . States of the region could increase pressure on
Israel , possibly leading to pre-emptive military strikes by the Israelis, with a risk of another major
war. One of the al-Qaida affiliates might seize control of a state or exercise outright control of at least part of a collapsed state. Or China might see
American withdrawal as an opportunity to play a greater role in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf.
The United States has a number of security objectives in the Middle East and North Africa: protecting world access to the region's petroleum, limiting
humanitarian disasters, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, limiting the operating space for al-Qaida and its affiliates,
sustaining America's commitment to long-standing partners and assuring Israel's security. Arguments that the U.S. can disengage from the region and
recoup savings in defense expenditures assume that petroleum exports would continue even in the event of domination of the region by a hostile
power like Iran or a competitor like China, state collapse or even the seizure of power by extremists. Whoever exercises power in the region would
need to sell oil. And the United States is moving toward petroleum self-sufficiency or, at least, away from dependence on Middle Eastern oil. But even if
the United States could get along with diminished petroleum exports from the Middle East, many other nations couldn't. The economic damage would
cascade, inevitably affecting the United States. Clearly disengagementfrom the Middle East and North Africa would entail
significant risks for the United States. It would be a roll of the strategic dice .

Strikes fail and cause WWIII

Reuveny 10 – professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University
(Rafael, “Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression” Gazette Xtra, 8/7, - See
more at: http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-
war-iii-/#sthash.ec4zqu8o.dpuf)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences,
including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must
be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. ¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of

some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep
underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now,
Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning
systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. ¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—

could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a
second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt and the
Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. ¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of
weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. After years of futilely fighting Palestinian irregular armies, Israel has lost some of
its perceived superiority—bolstering its enemies’ resolve.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to

a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its
alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still
attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments

would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling
oil to the United States and Europe.¶ From there, things could deteriorate as they did in the 1930s. The world economy would head into a tailspin;

international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops.¶
Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey—all of which essentially support Iran—could be tempted to form an
alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel,
and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on

nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United
States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. ¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons but
would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an

American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III .
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Plan leads to Asia pivot
Kay 13 (Sean Kay, Ph.D. is Director of the Arneson Institute for Practical Politics and Public
Affairs, and also Robson Professor of Politics and International Studies Chair at Ohio Wesleyan
University. He is the author of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power
and the Search for Peace.) “Getting the Asia Pivot Right,” War on the Rocks, December 10, 2013,
http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/getting-the-asia-pivot-right/
America has a new grand strategy – the Asia pivot. The idea of a prioritization of American interests in Asia is prominent

in official documents and has been reinforced by senior officials – emphasized last week by Vice President Joe Biden’s trip
to Japan, South Korea, and China. The logic of the pivot is obvious – measured in terms of volume of trade and significant security challenges, the need for this policy shift is
the Obama administration has failed to explain the policy to the public and
clear. In practice, however,

Congress, and to drive the policy into American’s foreign policy culture in Washington, D.C. China’s recent establishment of an air control zone that extends close to
Japan (while heightening territorial disagreements) and the American air force’s flight of nuclear-capable B52 bombers through that area in response, is a serious warning signal

that the Asia pivot needs urgent attention and will require far more engagement than a short trip
by the Vice President.¶ For the Asia pivot to succeed, a major shift in American foreign policy concepts has to
occur. For the last twenty years, the United States had focused on a global strategy of primacy – embraced by liberal interventionists on the political left and
neoconservatives on the right. This loose coalition was built on a sense that America had to be all things in all places or risk credibility of its commitments. The result was

American overstretch that committed the United States to costly conflicts defending peripheral national interests while incentivizing free-riding among allies. The Asia

pivot is a major challenge to this worldview because at its core, it is a new prioritization guided by realism that sees the
world as it is, not as we wish it might be. The global shift of economic and latent military power is clearly
moving towards Asia – while Europe is capable of handling its own security challenges and America’s interests in the Middle
East are narrowing. Yet the pivot is dangerously adrift, in large part because the Obama administration has failed to articulate,
and implement, the many moving parts that are necessary for success, which has created uncertainty and could cause the concept to

fail before it even starts.¶ First, it is essential to “get the pivot right”. So far, the primary image of the pivot to Asia has been military. In reality,

not that much has happened in this regard –the president mainly declared that as other regions
of the world are cut, Asia would be protected in the defense budget. Even if the pivot were to “get” the military
dimension right, , Asia has suffered from a vacuum of diplomatic and economic engagement by senior U.S. officials. Secretary of State John Kerry has been knee-deep in Europe
The Administration has neglected a
and the Middle East The President unwisely cancelled essential trips to the region in the last two years.

sustained effort to build norms of cooperation and predictability in the region and has yet to
produce a major new trade agreement, leaving the pivot incomplete – and potentially dangerous — if misread by China as entirely military in
nature. Vice-President Biden’s trip was a timely success – but mainly at managing an immediate crisis exacerbated by a vacuum that has been allowed to persist in Asia while the
United States found itself strategically distracted elsewhere over the last year.¶ Second, the pivot to Asia requires realigning America’s
role in other parts of the world. The United States is cutting its military presence in Europe, but has yet to develop an integrated approach to helping
the NATO allies better pool their resources to assume lead responsibility for their security. Contrary to critics’ complaints about abandoning allies, the administration has
invested in the first major increase in collective defense in NATO with its missile defense systems and a new emphasis on a US-EU trade accord. Still, America’s permanent
core interests in the Middle East are
military presence in Europe continues to work against the goal of getting allies there to do more. Meanwhile,

being narrowed to keeping access to oil supplies open (while also advancing new ways to be less reliant on it), addressing concerns
over nuclear proliferation, and disrupting terrorist networks. As the president said in his September UN speech, there are many remaining diplomatic challenges in the region –
but the United States cannot and should not solve them alone.¶ Third, the United States must dramatically realign budget
priorities. A defense budget that doubled since 2001 – largely to fuel wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – will need a new set of priorities to reflect the challenges in Asia. This
will put significant pressure on the U.S. Army – which understandably argues that its readiness for land wars will be hurt if it is cut further. The Army leadership, however, fails to
needlessly sustaining 30,000 landforces in Europe or fighting new counterinsurgency
answer the question of “readiness to do what?” –

wars around the Middle East? Neither fit with near or long-term American national security priorities. The challenges for the Asia
pivot are primarily naval and air oriented – with the clear exception of North Korea. Realigning generations of military planning and
budgets to support this reality means very difficult, but necessary, choices in the Pentagon.¶ Fourth, the
pivot requires sustaining and bolstering America’s Asia presence, but realigning from other
regions because major defense cuts are needed to liberate money for domestic investments at
home. An essential element of the pivot’s success is to invest in the internal foundations of American power and competitiveness. While making debt reductions, America
will further reduce its global position if it fails to simultaneously invest in human capital and infrastructure of future competitiveness. Other nations are doing this – China in
particular – and a failure to conceptualize investments in research and development, broader access to affordable higher education, and the infrastructure to meet 21st century
economic and security challenges will cause the United States to lag as other powers rise. America today is cutting its major advantages in human capital which can amount to
unilateral disarmament in addressing the security and economic challenges of the twenty-first century at the same time that competitors in Asia are advancing.¶ Fifth, the pivot
needs a prominent advocate. The primary architects of the concept are gone from government. Kurt Campbell, Tom Donilon, and Hillary Clinton were central to the concept but
have left. While there is excellent Asia talent in the Obama administration among the professional staff, there is no one with the high-profile status and mandate needed to
promote the concept in the region or at home. The president has to own the policy and sell it in a prominent way to the American public. A major presidential statement, well-
suited for the upcoming State of the Union address, on the importance of the pivot would provide reassurance and clarity abroad and at home. This would best be accompanied
by appointing a high-profile special envoy to camp out in Asia and drive the policy through the interagency process in Washington, D.C.¶ To date, some of these key elements
are happening – but some is not good enough for success. The United States is reducing its forces and realigning priorities in the transatlantic relationship, but much more can
be done. The US wisely avoided the Syrian war – but at the same time allowed the conflict to distract from key priorities for months. The new dialogue with Iran over its nuclear

program is an important step towards managing Persian Gulf dynamics , which will be necessary to allow for a
greater focus in Asia . The United States is clearly failing, however, on other essential elements which are mainly located in Washington, D.C. As tensions rise
,
between China and Japan North Korea remains a serious concern, and progress on new trade agreements stagnates, the pivot is at risk. If Barack Obama, Congress, and the

foreign policy bureaucracies cannot break through these serious internal constraints, then America’s ability to identify and implement

strategy will be increasingly in doubt at one of history’s most important moments of global
transition.

Nuclear War
Klare 12/6/11 (Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author of
Resource Wars and Blood and Oil, “Michael Klare, A New Cold War in Asia?”,
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175476/tomgram%3A_michael_klare,_a_..)

Indeed, as President Obama said in Canberra, the U.S. is now in a position to begin to refocus its military capabilities elsewhere.
“After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly,” he declared, “the
United States is turning our
attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region.” For China, all this spells potential
strategic impairment . Although some of China’s imported oil will travel overland through pipelines
from Kazakhstan and Russia, the great majority of it will still come by tanker from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America over sea lanes policed by the U.S. Navy. Indeed, almost every tanker bringing oil to China
travels across the South China Sea , a body of water the Obama administration is now seeking to
place under effective naval control. By securing naval dominance of the South China Sea and
adjacent waters, the Obama administration evidently aims to acquire the twenty-first century energy
equivalent of twentieth-century nuclear blackmail. Push us too far, the policy implies, and we’ll
bring your economy to its knees by blocking your flow of vital energy supplies. Of course, nothing like
this will ever be said in public, but it is inconceivable that senior administration officials are not thinking along just these lines, and
there is ample evidence that the Chinese are deeply worried about the risk -- as indicated, for example,
by their frantic efforts to build staggeringly expensive pipelines across the entire expanse of Asia to the Caspian Sea basin. As the
underlying nature of the new Obama strategic blueprint becomes clearer, there can be no question that the Chinese
leadership will, in response, take steps to ensure the safety of China’s energy lifelines. Some of
these moves will undoubtedly be economic and diplomatic, including, for example, efforts to court regional
players like Vietnam and Indonesia as well as major oil suppliers like Angola, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia. Make no mistake,
however: others will be of a military nature. A significant buildup of the Chinese navy -- still small
and backward when compared to the fleets of the United States and its principal allies -- would seem all but inevitable.
Likewise, closer military ties between China and Russia, as well as with the Central Asian member
states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), are
assured. In addition, Washington could now be sparking the beginnings of a genuine Cold-War-style
arms race in Asia, which neither country can, in the long run, afford. All of this is likely to lead to greater
tension and a heightened risk of inadvertent escalation arising out of future incidents involving
U.S., Chinese, and allied vessels -- like the one that occurred in March 2009 when a flotilla of Chinese naval vessels
surrounded a U.S. anti-submarine warfare surveillance ship, the Impeccable, and almost precipitated a shooting incident. As
more warships circulate through these waters in an increasingly provocative fashion, the risk
that such an incident will result in something far more explosive can only grow. Nor will the
potential risks and costs of such a military-first policy aimed at China be restricted to Asia. In the
drive to promote greater U.S. self-sufficiency in energy output, the Obama administration is
giving its approval to production techniques -- Arctic drilling, deep-offshore drilling, and
hydraulic fracturing -- that are guaranteed to lead to further Deepwater Horizon-style
environmental catastrophe at home. Greater reliance on Canadian tar sands, the “dirtiest” of
energies, will result in increased greenhouse gas emissions and a multitude of other
environmental hazards, while deep Atlantic oil production off the Brazilian coast and elsewhere
has its own set of grim dangers. All of this ensures that, environmentally, militarily, and
economically, we will find ourselves in a more, not less, perilous world. The desire to turn away from
disastrous land wars in the Greater Middle East to deal with key issues now simmering in Asia is understandable, but choosing a
strategy that puts such an emphasis on military dominance and provocation is bound to provoke
a response in kind. It is hardly a prudent path to head down, nor will it, in the long run, advance America’s interests at a time
when global economic cooperation is crucial. Sacrificing the environment to achieve greater energy independence makes no more
sense. A
new Cold War in Asia and a hemispheric energy policy that could endanger the planet: it’s a fatal
brew that should be reconsidered before the slide toward confrontation and environmental
disaster becomes irreversible. You don’t have to be a seer to know that this is not the definition of good statesmanship,
but of the march of folly.
 1NC
The ontology of security creates a reinforcing cycle of insecure anticipation and violent action
– calculative order is the root cause of extinction threats
Burke 07 – (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney,
and author of many books, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Truth &
Existence, 10:2)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against
excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature,
or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge
about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an
idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an
international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in
fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have
come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger
argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues
Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other
possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter
into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87
What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies
of political existence and security -- is a view that the
challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of
weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and
understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive
features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics,
economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by
policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of
scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such
an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their
actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die . Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we
give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous,
becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It
creates both discursive constraints --
available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints
that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then
preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective,
dysfunctional or chaotic.

The alternative is to non-violently refuse the 1AC’s call to action – an approach of “letting be”
allows us to coexist peacefully with the world.
Joronen 11 – (2011, Mikko, PhD, Department of Geography, University of Turku, “Dwelling in the Sites of Finitude: Resisting the
Violence of the Metaphysical Globe,” Antipode Volume 43, Issue 4, pages 1127–1154, September 2011, wiley)

The historical emergence of the contemporary planetary-wide conquest of the earth—the globalisation
phenomenon—is perhaps nowhere as profoundly demonstrated as in the thinking of one of the twentieth
century's most influential philosophers, Martin Heidegger. In spite of Heidegger's deep-rooted and, it could be argued, far-
reaching understanding of the planetary completion of the legacy of Western metaphysical thinking in terms of what he calls the
onto-historical framework of “machination” (Machenschaft), it
was not until the end of the twentieth century
that we were to witness the full scope of machination in terms of spatial magnitude. Current
economy and technology seem to span the whole of the earth as nothing other than a big
marketplace subjugated under the domination and logic of calculative orderings. Heidegger,
however, did not just contrive to discuss the spatial implications of the calculative operations of machination already at the end of
1930s; he also managed
to show how the emergence of machination leads to a whole new era of
gigantic computing in which the whole of the earth eventually turns into a global resource to be used
and used up by way of greater ordering and efficiency. Given this, it is rather curious that over the decades,
Heidegger's views of globalisation have been almost entirely absent from geographers’ reception of Heidegger (nonetheless, see
Elden 2005a, 2005b; Joronen 2008; Mugerauer 1994:118–119; on Heidegger's legacy among geographers see Relph 1976, 1981;
Schatzki 2007:80–81, 56–90; Seamon 1993; Seamon and Mugerauer 1985; Strohmayer 1998). In this paper it is shown how, in
particular, the critical aspect of Heidegger's thinking can be better understood on the basis of the
comprehension of his deconstructive critique of the grounding conditions of the present age. In addition
to its many benefits, Heidegger's critique of the violent and coercive underpinnings of planetary
machination can offer an important ontological addition to existing critiques of globalisation (see for instance Dicken 2004; Doel
2009; Harvey 2005; Taylor 2000; Thibault 2007).
The present paper concentrates on showing how lack of awareness about the grounding dimension of
machination eventually leads to the uncritical oblivion of the fundamental condition of
possibility constitutive for globalisation: the metaphysical scaffolding of the calculative ordering
of space that has reached a climax under the contemporary rubric of planetary economics. Accordingly,
even though the contemporary powers of capital have become far more capable and flexible at
ordering and utilising the earth than Heidegger imagined in the late 1930s, these forces present only one of
the manifestations grounded upon the omnipotent power of machination and its calculative orderings.1 One
of the core arguments of the paper is that due to this fundamental condition of machination we also need to sharpen our
ways of criticising and resisting the totalitarian and violent tendencies of contemporary capitalism.
Resistance of things such as the capitalist means of production or the globalisation of neoliberal ideologies is not
radical enough; we also need to enter into the resistance of the violence already promoted at
the ontological level of calculative machination, the manipulative ordering and production of beings.
In order to fulfil these aims, the paper begins with a preliminary discussion about the general possibility of overcoming the
metaphysical condition of planetary machination. Machination is understood as a world-historical disclosure of
being, as a metaphysical constituent of an entire epoch of planetary being. After showing how this metaphysical constitution of
machination poses a violent unfolding of entities, by making everything from the earth to ourselves orderable for its own
overpowering, circular and self-strengthening power of manipulation and mastery, thepaper turns to discuss the
possibility of a radical resistance of the planetary outgrowth of machination in relation to alternative politics
proposed particularly by Hardt and Negri. The paper continues with a construction of a non-violent way of resistance
based both on a non-metaphysical dwelling in the earth-sites of finite being and on Heidegger's
radical critique of the manipulative power of machination—a critique that consists in a “power-free” (Macht-los)
“letting-be” (Gelassenheit) of the “earth”, a thinking free from the metaphysical violence posed by
machination. In order to avoid the passive sense of such “letting-be”, in the third part of the paper it is
argued that we should not see power-free letting-be as an end in itself, but as a resistant way of
negating the violence implicit in metaphysical longing to grasp earth in terms of coercive power
(Macht) and violence (Gewalt) of machination (Machenschaft). Hence, power-free letting-be is seen as a
fundamental chance for a dwelling free from the contemporary ontological mastery of the
technological and economic powers of planetary machination, and, further, as letting that allows self-
emergence for the earth of things, for “nature”. It is argued that power-free letting-be signifies a
radical leap of resistance—a leap of nihilating emancipation taken over the groundless
plenitude, a leap promoted by the emergency and distress about our prevailing unfolding of
being. Without this leap (of distress) the mastery of being as a power of machination remains, while
with the help of the leap we may become grounders of the open earth and abundant being.
Thus, the fourth section continues by discussing our awakening to abyssal being as a possibility for the “other
beginning” of pacifist and anarchist thought capable of constituting groundless dwelling that lets the earth of things come to
presence without violent manipulation and gigantic ordering. The main argument of the paper is that it is not
our subject- and will-centred resistance, but our non-violent refusal of the manipulative power
of calculative orderings, that is capable of putting aside the violent capturing of the earth—
namely, the capturing that destroys the earth upon which we dwell by turning it into a mere
“planet” ordered through the networks cast upon it. Thus, such refusal lets what has already fled our calculative
apparatuses become in power: the earth-site(s) of abyssal being.
 Adv 1
What if US military presence in the Persian Gulf stagnates or even shrinks…?
Mead 8/5 – (2015, Walter Russell, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and
Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University, “The
Strategic Impact of the Iran Deal,” written testimony delivered to the United States Senate
Committee on Armed Services, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/05/the-
strategic-impact-of-the-iran-deal/)

The United States may not be dependent on the Middle East for our domestic energy supply, but the American
economy remains profoundly and permanently entangled in the global economy. Prosperity will not
endure here if the global economy suffers massive disruption, and interruptions or severe constrictions in the
flow of oil and gas from the Middle East will remain capable of causing this kind of unacceptable
disruption for the foreseeable future.
Some might argue that , given the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the rest of the world, the United States could reduce our
involvement in the Middle East with the assurance that other countries would step in to fill the vacuum. Why, some ask, should the United States assume the costs and risks
of ensuring the flow of oil to other rich and powerful states around the world?
The answers to this question go to the heart of American grand strategy for the last 100 years. As the bloodshed and
destruction of warfare has increased, Americans have sought above all else to prevent wars between great powers

from breaking out. While all war is destructive and horrifying, wars in which great powers, with
their enormous technological and economic capabilities, turn their full strength against one
another, have the potential to destroy civilization or human life itself . To make such wars less likely, the United States has
worked to create an interdependent global system in which all countries depend so heavily on global flows of trade and investment that no country can contemplate cutting itself off from this system through
starting wars. At the same time, the United States has worked to ensure the safe and secure passage of commerce across the world’s oceans, taking questions like energy out of the realm of geopolitical
competition.

In the Middle East, these policies have meant that since World War Two the United States has
acted to prevent any power or combination of powers either inside or outside the region from
gaining the ability to blackmail the world by threatening to interrupt the flow of oil to the great markets of Asia
and Europe. Whether the danger came from external powers like the Soviet Union (which occupied part of Iran and threatened Turkey in the early years

of the Cold War) or from ambitious leaders within the region (like Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait), the United States has acted to

ensure the security and political independence of the oil producing states of the region.
These policies have helped create the longest era of great power peace in modern times . They
have also reduced the cost of America’s military commitments. Because other countries do not feel the need to maintain large forces
with an intercontinental capacity to protect their global trade, the United States has been able to maintain a global presence at a far lower cost than would be feasible if the world’s major economic powers were

A strong American presence in the Middle East and on the high seas has the
engaged in competitive military build ups.

effect of suppressing security competition worldwide, enabling America’s most important

interests to be secured with much less cost than would otherwise be possible.
Should the United States withdraw from this role, the world would likely see increased
competition among other powers . China , for example, would see a greater need to protect its oil security, accelerating the build up of its armed forces.
Japan and India would both likely see this build up as a threat to their own energy and maritime security and would accelerate build ups of their own. Trust among these
powers, already weak, would erode, and the dynamics of a zero-sum competition for security
and access to resources would drive them towards greater hostility and more dangerous
policies. Under those circumstances, American prosperity and security would be much harder to defend than they are now, and the risks of great power conflict would intensify.. America’s
Middle East policy is not just about the Middle East; it is about America’s global interest in a
peaceful and prosperous world
The starting point for any American strategy in the Middle East today must be the basic approach that has served us well since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. America’s vital interests require us to look to
the safety and the security of the Middle Eastern oil producing states, ensuring that no power, either external or regional, gains the power to interfere with the smooth and stable supply of oil and gas to the great
economic and industrial centers of the world.
 Today’s Middle East is threatened by conflicts
As we look at the region today, these vital American interests are not as well secured as one would wish.

that could lead to immense humanitarian disasters against which the horror of the Libyan and Syrian civil conflicts would appear small scale. Whether
considered from the humanitarian standpoint or from the perspective of vital American interests, the dangers facing us in the Middle East today are

immense, and it is against this background that the value of the JCPOA or indeed of any major policy step involving the region needs to be understood.
One danger is presented by the rise of Iran and the consequences of its efforts to increase its power in Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and beyond. Iran is the one country at the moment that appears to believe that it has both the capacity and the will to establish a hegemonic position in the region. Iran could challenge vital American

interests in two ways. It could come close to success in this regional strategy, presenting the United States with the choice of accepting Iranian hegemony or engaging in conflict. Alternatively, an
Iranian bid for control, while ultimately falling short, could create such chaos and upheaval in the region that normal governance would break down and some oil exporting countries could be paralyzed by
international or civil conflict.

Another danger comes from the surge in fanaticism among some Sunni groups, in part because of the fear inspired by
what many see as an Iranian-backed surge of Shi’a power across the region. Under the wrong circumstances fanatical movements like ISIS could either conquer or make ungovernable wide stretches of the Middle

East, including important oil producing provinces and countries. The successful establishment of a ‘caliphate’ or some other form of radical and revolutionary governance across strategically important areas
could present the United States with the choice between military intervention or accepting the establishment of a hegemonic regional power. Short of that, insurrections or guerilla conflicts involving fanatical
groups could destabilize key countries. Additionally, groups based in territory controlled by these forces and accessing financial and other resources under their control could plan and carry out major attacks
against western targets as Al Qaeda did from Taliban controlled territory in 2001.

there is the danger that the sectarian conflict between Sunni radicals and Shi’a
Beyond the danger of Sunni radicalism,

radicals aligned with Iran now taking shape would so seriously destabilize the region and important countries in it that the oil supply could not be secured.
In this scenario, even if neither side in the sectarian war achieved anything like dominance, the social upheavals, economic distress and surge in violence and hate fueled by an escalating religious conflict could
lead to conditions in which the oil industry could no longer function in a stable and orderly way.

No Iran-GCC reconciliation
Mead 15 [WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, EDITOR-AT-LARGE, THE AMERICAN INTEREST ONLINE, Why
the White House Is Getting Lonelier on Iran, February 6, 2015, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2015/02/06/why-the-white-house-is-getting-lonelier-on-iran/]
The Strategic Alignment Problem
The offshore balancer question leads to the next issue that troubles informed skeptics of the current negotiations with Iran. Supporters of a
new relationship argue that the United States and Iran can work together for the long term
because their interests are broadly aligned.
That may be true—and it may not be. It seems, for example, that Iran would be a much more hawkish
leader of OPEC than the Saudis have been. With a larger population and an ambitious regional policy, Iran would likely use
its enhanced influence in OPEC to push prices higher.
More fundamentally, for Iran to hold its position as a regional strongman, it would have to
overcome deep-seated Sunni Arab prejudices against both its Shi’a faith and its Persian culture. Being identified
as Uncle Sam’s closest regional ally and hired gun would not exactly strengthen Iran’s soft power
in the Middle East.
So far, Iran has consistently cast its quest for regional power as a movement of “Islamic
Resistance” against the United States and its sidekick in Jerusalem. It casts American allies like the Saudis
and others as pawns and puppets of the anti-Islamic “Crusader-Zionist” alliance. Iran and its
allies (Syria, Hezbollah, and, in the past and once again perhaps in the near future, Hamas) have identified themselves as the
“Resistance Front,” and have consistently taken the hardest possible line against both the United
States and Israel.
Perhaps the administration has solid grounds for the belief that a stronger Iran would be a friendlier power. To the naked eye, however, it would

seem that the larger Iran looms in the region, the more it will need the image of anti-
Americanism and anti-Zionism to legitimate its position.
The Obama administration will not be able to address rising skepticism about its Iran policy unless and until
it can show why it makes sense to think that a stronger Iran will choose alignment with the
United States when its own political interests would benefit from a more anti-American posture.

US commitments dissuade proliferation and cause lashout against Iran which tanks stability
Goldberg 15 (7/23, Ilan, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the
Center for a New American Security. He is a foreign policy and defense expert with extensive
government experience covering Iran’s nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the
broader challenges facing the Middle East. He has a master's degree in International Affairs from
Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, “Implications of a Nuclear Agreement With
Iran”, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Testimony_Goldenberg-
final.pdf)
Maintain and deepen U.S. commitments to regional partners to deter Iranian aggression and
dissuade American partners from taking destabilizing steps The United States should find ways
to signal to its regional partners that it remains committed to their security. It is still important
to maintain a robust conventional military presence in the Middle East after an agreement to
deter Iran from aggressively pursuing its destabilizing activities in the region, violating the nuclear agreement and
threatening freedom of navigation and the flow of energy resources. Despite the regional focus on the unconventional Iranian threat, a conventional

presence will also reassure partners that the United States remains committed to their
security . Providing the Arab states greater confidence in American commitments will be a useful
tool for dissuading them from lashing out more aggressively at Iran in ways that may
exacerbate the sectarian divide. It could also reduce the likelihood that the Arab states would
pursue their own domestic enrichment capability in response to Iran . In pursuing this approach, the United States
will have to maintain a careful balance. A major influx of U.S. assets to the region could be provocative, undermine both Iran’s confidence in the agreement and American

any significant withdrawal of assets would shake the

intentions, and reduce the likelihood of increased cooperation over time. But

confidence of both the Arab states and Israel. The guiding principle should be to maintain an
American force posture that is essentially the same or slightly enhanced. The United States could consider forward
stationing a limited number of more advanced manned and unmanned aircraft and missile defense assets in the region, but should not go too far beyond that. If the agreement
takes hold and over time Iran’s behavior moderates, there is the potential for a “peace dividend” in the long term.

Presence solves Iran war

Selva ’15 [Air Force Gen. Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman of JCS, July 14, 2015 at his Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/jul/18/us-military-officials-
iran]
“Iran’s authoritarian regime poses both a regional and global security threat. The world’s foremost state sponsor of
terrorism seeks to export its revolutionary ideology in the Middle East through a large
conventional army; terrorist proxies; weapons trafficking; ballistic missile proliferation; and maritime
weapons and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. Through its emergent nuclear and established cyber programs, Iran can

threaten and undermine the international institutions and conventions that underpin global
security . The Supreme Leader will continue to take advantage of opportunities to enable Iran’s
domestic, hardline political factions’ malign policies that value regime survival over international
integration.”
“Iran’s ambitions in Iraq are not to help create a sovereign, functional government. Iran wants to influence Iraq through the lens of a Shia-dominated
buffer state. Currently, Iran is using its influence vis-à-vis Shia militias to offset ISIL behavior. This comes with the risk that one day these militias could
possibly threaten Iraqi or U.S. forces. In the future, expect
Iran to utilize its political and military instruments of
power to control Iraq along sectarian lines”
“ Real or perceived U.S. disengagement from the Middle East could create opportunity for Iran

to increase its support to terrorist organizations . Right-sized U.S. military presence in the Middle
East demonstrates not only a commitment to the region, but a commitment to our regional
security partners . As a result, a continued U.S. military presence in the region will further deter
Iran from conducting nefarious activities such as blocking the Strait of Hormuz or threatening
other Gulf States . Finally, a continued U.S. military presence in the region is the single most
important indicator of our overall commitment to a secure , peaceful and prosperous Middle East .
“From a security standpoint, important outcomes
include rolling back Iran’s nuclear program providing the
international community with necessary access and transparency, while preserving the
sanctions imposed on conventional arms and ballistic missiles.”
“Saudi Arabia’s and other Gulf countries’ decisions on whether or not to enrich uranium are not solely
tied to a deal with Iran; under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories are allowed enrichment programs as part of a
peaceful nuclear program. Unlike Iran, which endures sanctions, isolation, and economic distress due to a covert attempt intent on developing nuclear
weapons, our Gulf partners could choose to pursue nuclear energy in compliance with the NPT. The
U.S. military will continue to provide options in support of the overall U.S. strategy”
“DoD’s role is to support an interagency and regional effort to deter and counter Iran’s support of international terrorism. We deter Iran by
maintaining a responsive military capability in the region and ensuring a robust defensive infrastructure for ourselves
and our allies. To counter Iran, we work by, with, and through partner nations by conducting counter terrorism training, providing equipment sales,
participating in multi-national exercises, and sharing information. When
combined, these efforts—along with those of
our partners—help to weaken terrorist groups and hinder Iran’s ability to support them.”
“Iran maintains a layered A2AD capability through the employment of road mobile ballistic missiles, an integrated air defense system, anti-ship cruise
missiles, and naval assets stationed in the Persian Gulf.”

No US-Iran miscalc.
Al-Monitor 12 [Al-Monitor, Between the US and Iran, War Looks Unlikely, Peace Seems
Impossible, Январь 30, 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/security/01/01/the-us-and-
iranbetween-an-unlike.html#]
After [Iran’s] threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and its warning to the Americans not to return
their ships to the Persian Gulf, Tehran delivered several signs of appeasement that kept the door open
for various possibilities. Iran's United Nations Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee announced that his country would
only seek to close the strait if a foreign power attempts to “tighten the noose” on Tehran over its
nuclear program. Also, deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Hossein Salami said
that US warships and military forces “have been in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region for
many years. Their decision in relation to the dispatch of a new warship is not a new issue, and
it should be interpreted as part of their permanent presence.”
These signs of appeasement, however, didn’t change the situation at the Strait of Hormuz, which saw the crossing of the USS
Abraham Lincoln, a nuclear-powered carrier capable of deploying 90 aircraft and six warships, [escorted by HMS] Argyll, a frigate
from the [British] Royal Navy. The US move demonstrated the West’s seriousness about being prepared for all eventualities,
including the option of war. It also came as a direct practical response to Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement that
the Americans are “flexing their muscles in public, but they are also secretly saying ‘come talk with us.’”
A set of facts emerges from this foggy and worrying scene, rendering the option of armed
confrontation--which a large number of US experts, analysts, politicians and military personnel warn against-- unlikely for
the foreseeable future . This is despite all the uproar associated with the calls to war and incitement
against Iran. Among these facts are the way US withdrawal from Iraq took place; the way the Obama administration
handled the issue of the seizure of the US stealth aircraft by Iran; and the weak US reaction to military
friction between the US and Iran in the Gulf--including the shooting down of US reconnaissance planes, the dispatch
of Iranian spy planes to photograph US fleets, and Tehran’s success in disrupting a US satellite--according to European sources--not
to mention its Velayat 90 naval maneuvers [in the Persian Gulf] and the experiments and events that accompanied them.

No oil spike.
Kilian 14 – (February, Lutz, PhD in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania, Professor of
Economics at the University of Michigan, “Oil Price Shocks: Causes and Consequences,” Center
for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP9823, http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/arre011114_cepr.pdf)

Hamilton (2003) suggested that this identification problem may be ignored for all practical purposes to the extent that all major fluctuations
in the price of oil can be attributed to disruptions of the flow of oil production triggered by
political events in the Middle East that are exogenous with respect to the U.S. economy. Potential examples of such political events
include the 1973 Yom Kippur War followed by the Arab oil embargo in 1973/74, the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79, the
Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, the Persian Gulf War of 1990/91, the Venezuelan crisis of 2002 and the Iraq War of 2003, and the Libyan
uprising of 2011. Exogeneity with respect to the U.S. economy here means that these events did not occur in response to the current or past state of the U.S. economy.
There are three problems with this explanation. First, it frequently does not fit the data . For example, while
the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 clearly was exogenous with respect to the U.S. economy, it did not constitute a shock to the flow
of crude oil supplies, because the war was not fought on the territory of oil producing economies
and no oil production facilities were damaged. The Arab oil embargo of 1973/74, in contrast, did affect the flow of oil supplies, but the embargo decision was taken explicitly

with reference to the state of the U.S. economy (Kilian 2008a). In the case of the Iranian Revolution the timing is off in that the oil
price only surged starting in May 1979 after the exogenous oil supply disruption in Iran was over. Finally, following the flow supply disruptions associated with the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in late 1980, the Venezuelan crisis of late 2002 and the Iraq War of early 2003, the price of

crude oil hardly increased . Second, more formal regression analysis confirms that quantitative
measures of exogenous oil supply shocks associated with political events in the Middle East
invariably have little predictive power for the percent change in the real price oil (Kilian 2008a,b). Third,
numerous subsequent empirical studies have shown that most major oil price increases since
late 1973 have had an important endogenous component associated with the global business
cycle .
A case in point is the 1973/74 episode, which constituted the perhaps most dramatic surge in the real price of crude oil in modern history. The
nominal price of oil quadrupled over the course of half a year. Measures of exogenous oil supply shocks as proposed in Hamilton (2003) and Kilian (2008a),

however, explain at most 25% of the observed oil price increase in 1973/74. This raises the question of what explains the

remaining oil price increase. The answer is that by construction at least 75% of that oil price increase must be attributed to shifts in the demand for oil. This answer is

quite different from that proposed in Hamilton (2003), but is supported by independent evidence. As observed in Barsky and Kilian (2002), there was a
global demand boom in the early 1970s in all industrial commodity markets across the board, reflecting the fact
that, for the first time in postwar history, there was a simultaneous peak in the business cycle in the U.S., in Europe and

in Japan. Between November 1971 and February 1974, the price of industrial raw materials and metals increased in real terms by about 95%, whereas the real price of oil
increased by 125%. Thus, real non-oil industrial commodity prices in the absence of supply shocks cumulatively increased by about 75% as much as the real price of oil, which
corroborates the 75% increase attributed to oil demand shocks according to the direct evidence based on exogenous oil supply shocks. Moreover, because much of the non-oil
commodity price increase occurred while institutional constraints kept the price of crude oil low, we can be sure that the commodity price increases of the early 1970s were not
themselves driven by higher oil prices.

Only demand, not supply shocks exist.

Kilian 09 – (2009, Lutz, PhD in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania, Professor of
Economics at the University of Michigan, “Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: Disentangling
Demand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market,” American Economic Review, 99:3, 1053–
1069)

The evidence in Figure 4 shows thatnot all oil price shocks are alike. There are important differences in the
relative contribution of the three structural shocks to the real price of oil between the Iran-Iraq War and the Iranian
Revolution, for example, or between the Persian Gulf War and the period following the Iraq War and the civil unrest in Venezuela. Nevertheless, there are some

regularities in that all major oil price increases appear driven primarily by demand shocks in the oil
market. This is true even during episodes commonly associated with oil supply shocks in the

Middle East . My results paint a very different picture of how exogenous political events in the
Middle East affect the real price of oil than postulated in the existing literature. The traditional approach has been to quantify exogenous
variation in actual crude oil production in OPEC countries and to relate this variation to changes in the price of crude oil (see, e.g., Hamilton 2003; Kilian 2008a). That approach
fails to capture shifts in market expectations that are not reflected in observed changes to crude oil production. Not surprisingly, as has been documented in Barsky and Kilian
(2002, 2004) and Kilian (2008a), production-based accounts of oil price shocks do not match up well with the timing of oil price changes and with historical accounts of the crude
oil market during oil crises such as the Iranian Revolution. The results of this section, in contrast, suggest that the most important channel by which exogenous events such as
wars or revolutions affect the real price of oil is through their effect on precautionary demand for oil. The latter channel can produce immediate and potentially large effects on
This point has been
the real price of oil through shifts in the uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, even when crude oil production has not changed.

recognized for a long time, but it has never been quantified before, the fundamental difficulty
being that expectation shifts related to uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls are not
observable and not linearly related to observables.

Inventories are high and futures markets are in contango, which means that can’t happen.
EIA 8/24 – (2015, US Energy Information Administration, “Growing global liquids inventories
reflect lower crude oil prices,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=22632)

Growing oil inventories typically put downward pressure on near-term prices and increase
contango in the futures market , meaning contracts for delivery in the future show higher prices
than contracts in the near term. Since global liquids inventories began to consistently grow in
the third quarter of last year, the difference between futures prices and near-term contracts has
increased from nearly zero to $5/b-$10/b over the past year, reflecting the increased supply of crude oil and the
associated costs of growing storage needs in the near term as well as the expectation of reduced oil supply growth in future months. Over
the same period, Brent crude oil spot prices have fallen from an average of $102/b in August 2014 to a range between $55/b and $65/b for six consecutive months between
February and July in 2015.

No resource wars
Victor 08 – professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy
and Sustainable Development. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
where he directed a task force on energy security (David, “Smoke and Mirrors”, The National
Interest, 1/2, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16530)

resource wars – hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources – are

MY ARGUMENT is that classic

increasingly rare. Even where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the root cause usually lies in various failures of governance. That argument – in both
its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnation – is hardly a straw man, as Thomas Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do

conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis

social scientists and policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I’ve triggered this debate because

on resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often even larger implications for
public policy.

Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource
Michael

conflict in recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars
are becoming rare – they’re expensive and rarely work. (And even in Kuwait’s case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt
insecure with its only access to the sea a narrow strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, Saddam lost resources on the order of $100 billion (plus his
country and then his head) in his quest for Kuwait’s 1.5 million barrels per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid $80 billion to get Mobil’s 1.7 million barrels per day of oil and gas production
– a merger that has held and flourished. As the bulging sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.
Klare takes me to task for failing to acknowledge the role of “lootable” resources as a motive for war. My point is that looters loot what they can – not just natural resources, but also foreign aid and anything else
that passes within reach. (Paul Collier’s research, which Klare cites for support, finds that a sizeable share of African military budgets is, in effect, aid money that is looted and redirected from foreign aid.) I suspect
that we don’t differ much in our assessment of the effects of lootable resources within weak and failed states, but where we do part company is in the implication for policy. Fixing the problems in the Niger River
Delta – the case he uses – requires a stronger and more accountable government. That means making it harder to loot resources, taming official corruption, lending a hand with law enforcement in places where
oil is produced and stolen, and engaging reformist forces in the Nigerian government. Resource looting and misallocation are severe, but they are symptoms whose cures require focusing on governance.

The realities of global resource depletion are somewhat different from Klare’s story. It is true that primary
resources, such as oil in the ground, are now more concentrated in “armpit” countries because more readily available resources are being depleted. That fact, though, only serves to further support my conclusion:
That we must redouble our efforts to improve governance because all oil-consuming countries have a stake in the good governance of their oil producers. What really matters is not theoretical oil thousands of
feet underground but actual oil produced and delivered to markets. And on that front, the armpit-country story isn’t so bad because those countries tend to put themselves out of business. Witness Venezuela,

High prices soon follow. And with those higher

where production is declining even though the country is one of the world’s richest in untapped resources.

prices, a spate of “new” resources becomes viable – oil sands in Canada and shale in the
western United States, for example. Moreover, many oil-rich countries actually have good governance systems (at least concerning their oil), such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates and notably the bright new star among oil-majors, Brazil. Nonetheless, I echo a conclusion from my original article – one that Klare surely shares as well – that current patterns of oil consumption are not
sustainable, and urgent efforts to tame demand are also needed.
I find it striking that none of the three have attacked my characterization of China’s behavior in Africa, for it is the Chinese resource scramble that most animates fear among the punditry and threat industry of a
coming resource war. My original article makes a strong argument for why the conventional wisdom about China is wrong and why all oil consumers (including China and the United States) actually have strong
common interests. If, indeed, that argument is widely shared among experts then some radically different policy strategies would follow.
Nobody can disagree with Paul Kern and Sherri Goodman’s maxim that “wars are best avoided by preparing ahead of time for potential threats. . . .” My concern isn’t with the principle but, rather, putting this
bromide into practice – exactly what they accuse me of ignoring. Just as Eisenhower warned of the industrial threat industry at the end of his administration, so too must we be concerned about the arrival of
military planning to the problem of natural resources. These are broader concerns I have flagged, not specifically directed at CNA (Kern and Goodman’s organization), and they merit careful attention because the
generous instinct of environmentalists is to welcome all who share concern about resource depletion and stress. Yet, the threat industry is notoriously bad at setting priorities for interventions that involve the
broader society and economy.
The CNA report they cite (and co-authored) rightly says that climate change is a threat multiplier, but all stresses on governance systems are threat multipliers, and real security policy is about setting priorities and
matching responses to threats. I have a feeling that we agree on the implications for policy, although for different reasons. I am not much worried about climate change triggering hot conflict, but I am deeply
concerned about the unequal impacts on poor societies and the severe impacts on fragile ecosystems. The solutions include deep cuts in emissions (exactly how that can be done is a subject I have addressed for
most of my professional career) and also much better governance systems, so that societies do a better job of coping with the changes in climate that are inevitable. Thinking about climate change as a security
problem inspires a logic of hardening, securing and protecting. What’s really needed is flexibility, adaptiveness and fair systems of governance – all conclusions that are broadly consistent with the CNA report.
Homer-Dixon’s critique is unabashedly misleading and wrong. Like Kern and Goodman he makes much of the “hard security” dangers in climate change – imagining all manner of ways that climate disturbances
can ripple into hot conflicts. Such thinking is pernicious. Good imagination can find threat multipliers everywhere. Good policy is about setting priorities where leverage is greatest. Looking only at the disturbances
– weakened rural economies, increased unemployment, dislocated people – just perverts policy. The world is already destined to face a lot of climate change that won’t be reversed for a century or more. So now,
we must look not only at avoiding disturbances but also at improving governance. (At the same time, we must be modest in realizing that outsiders often have little useful leverage on how countries govern
themselves.)
He claims that I have ignored complex causation when, in fact, that’s the centerpiece of my argument, and it is precisely the voluminous work in this area that gives me trouble. The problems in Darfur and Rwanda
stem from many factors, but what matters for social science, and especially for policy, is getting cause and effect right. Indeed, radical Hutus pointed to resource inequities to mobilize support, but radicals, like
looters, make do with whatever irredentism is available. Had someone reallocated the cropland, the problem would not have disappeared. Hutu grievance was rooted in Rwanda’s system of governance-by-
minority, the inability of that governance system to make decisions that commanded broad respect, and ultimately, the inability of those in power to provide security.
Nearly all of the vast literature that Homer-Dixon applauds suffers from the affliction of severe selection bias and failure to assign proper weights to causal factors. Put a microscope on any big conflict looking for

to Klare’s point about

resources, and you’re sure to find exactly what you’re looking for. Nobody doubts that causation is complex; the dispute is on the central forces. And

methodology, my article focuses narrowly on hot conflict – that is, “war” – because the best way to get
causation right usually requires starting narrowly. However, technological change and economic shifts
away from resource-intensive industries and the globalization of most resources into
commodities implies that a broader version of my hypothesis probably also holds – natural resources matter less and thus are
less important for conflict, except where lootable resources coincide with exceptionally poor governance.

No oil shocks.
Decressin 12 (Jorg, IMF Research Department, 5/25/12, “Global Economy Learns to Absorb Oil
Price Hikes” International Monetary Fund)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/num052512a.htm

Despite a fourfold increase in oil prices over the past decade, the world has absorbed the price hikes with
relatively little disruption due to fundamental changes in the workings of the global economy, and the use of
macroeconomic policy to mitigate the effects of rises. During the current economic downturn, the price of oil hit over
$100 a barrel, and prices rose close to levels only seen in the 1970s. But the increases have not triggered global recessions
as they did in the 1970s and 80s. In new research, IMF economists attribute this resilience to five
underlying factors: 1. Stronger demand The reason for the current price hikes differs from the
past. Increases in the 1970s and 1980s were caused largely by sharp disruptions to world supply. In contrast, a prime reason for the increases since
2000 has been stronger-than-expected demand from emerging market economies. The strong growth of emerging markets
has benefited both them and the global economy: raising living standards and increasing their demand for products made abroad. A
side-effect of this may have been an increase in oil prices, but this has not derailed the benefits of increased

growth. 2. Central bank policies Central banks and economies have become more adept at
dealing with price shocks. In the 1970s and 1980s, oil price rises triggered fears of inflation, and workers would try to protect themselves
by demanding higher nominal wage increases. This had the effect of setting off wage-price spirals. Now, greater awareness of the
impact of high wage increases—including lost employment and reforms to labor markets—have
led to more job-friendly wage setting. Central banks have become more adept at convincing
workers that oil price increases will not feed through into inflation. Today, headline inflation temporarily
increases after an oil price increase, but nominal wages hardly respond. Workers have grown to expect this rise in headline inflation, and anticipate that
it will be temporary. Given the experience of the past, more recently many oil-importing economies with strong central banks have experienced little
impact on core inflation and wage increases, despite oil price rises. This has allowed central banks to be more supportive of promoting recovery in the
economy after an oil price increase, rather than having to raise interest rates to dampen inflationary expectations. 3.
Recycling the
benefits of oil profits The revenues from oil exports are flowing back to oil-importing
economies. This helps bring down interest rates for households and firms, and so supports
investment and growth in these economies. 4. Greater efficiency Oil price shocks do not have
the same impact as in the past because economies have become more efficient in the use of
energy. The amount of energy it takes to produce a dollar of income has been steadily declining for 40 years. This decline in energy intensity is
expected to continue. Major emerging markets are also becoming more efficient in the use of energy, and they are expected to continue to make
5.
efficiency gains. By 2030, the major regions of the world—the United States, China, and India—are projected to have the same energy intensity.

Diversification Countries have increasingly diversified their energy sources over recent decades.
They import energy from many more places than in the 1970s. They also use more varied forms of energy. This makes them less vulnerable to
disruptions from any one supplier or source of energy. The United States, for example, buys crude oil and gasoline from more than 40 countries and jet
fuel from more than 25 countries. Countries have also increased their use of natural gas, and are importing it from many more countries. Norway has
continued to grow in importance as an exporter of natural gas, and several new producers have emerged, including Qatar, Turkmenistan, Nigeria,
Egypt, and Australia. By 2030, it is expected that energy use will be even more diversified. Oil, coal, and gas are predicted to each have a 30 percent
world market share, with hydro, nuclear and renewables accounting for the remaining 10 percent.

Containment inevitable
Pollack 14 – (9/30, Kenneth, PhD in Political Science from MIT, senior fellow and former director
(2009-2012) in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, former analyst on
Iraqi and Iranian military issues for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995), former Director
for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Director for Persian Gulf Affairs, with the United
States National Security Council, former professor at the National Defense University,
“Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy,” p. 146)

The more difficult challenge will be to diminish the conventional military threat posed to Iran by
American forces in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean without sacrificing America's
commitments in the region. The United States has vital interests in the Pe rsian Gulf, and Washington intends to maintain
significant conventional military forces in the region for the foreseeable future. Given the power of the American
military, those forces will always constitute a threat to Iran .
The United States could make unilateral concessions to Tehran related to military
deployments, such as agreeing to station no more than one aircraft carrier battle group in the GuJf or Arabian Sea
at any time. However, Tehran is unlikely to view this a rrangement as much of a concession because

of how easy it would be for the U nited S tates to break that agreement if it ever chose to do so . The
problem is further compounded by Washington's understandable unwillingness not to go much beyond that (assuming it is willing to go even that far) for fear of jeopardizing its

A new security architecture in the Persian Gulf is probably the

ability to respond to problems in the fragile Gulf region.

only realistic way to meet Iran's legitimate security concerns in a manner that would be palatable to the United States and
its allies in the region . A Gulf security process could follow the successful Cold War European model by starting with security discussions, building to confidence-building
measures, and eventually reaching arms control agreements. Thus the United States ought to be willing to offer the inauguration of just such a process, using the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a starting point. Such a process would hold out the potential for Iran to secure constraints on the deployment and operation of
American military forces in the region in return for their agreement to take on equivalent limitations on their own forces.72 Interestingly, a senior Iranian diplomat has already
suggested the same in a Western newspaper.

Empirics prove security dilemma with Iran doesn’t escalate

Al-Monitor 12 [Al-Monitor, Between the US and Iran, War Looks Unlikely, Peace Seems
Impossible, Январь 30, 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/security/01/01/the-us-and-
iranbetween-an-unlike.html#]
After [Iran’s] threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and its warning to the Americans not to return
their ships to the Persian Gulf, Tehran delivered several signs of appeasement that kept the door open for
various possibilities. Iran's United Nations Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee announced that his country would only seek
to close the strait if a foreign power attempts to “tighten the noose” on Tehran over its nuclear
program. Also, deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Hossein Salami said that US
warships and military forces “have been in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region for many years.
Their decision in relation to the dispatch of a new warship is not a new issue, and it should be
interpreted as part of their permanent presence.”
These signs of appeasement, however, didn’t change the situation at the Strait of Hormuz, which saw the crossing of the USS Abraham Lincoln, a
nuclear-powered carrier capable of deploying 90 aircraft and six warships, [escorted by HMS] Argyll, a frigate from the [British] Royal Navy. The US
move demonstrated the West’s seriousness about being prepared for all eventualities, including the option of war. It also came as a direct practical
response to Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement that the Americans are “flexing their muscles in public, but they are also secretly
saying ‘come talk with us.’”
A set of facts emerges from this foggy and worrying scene, rendering the option of armed
confrontation--which a large number of US experts, analysts, politicians and military personnel warn against-- unlikely for the
foreseeable future . This is despite all the uproar associated with the calls to war and incitement against
Iran. Among these facts are the way US withdrawal from Iraq took place; the way the Obama administration handled the issue of the
seizure of the US stealth aircraft by Iran; and the weak US reaction to military friction between
the US and Iran in the Gulf--including the shooting down of US reconnaissance planes, the dispatch of Iranian spy planes to photograph
US fleets, and Tehran’s success in disrupting a US satellite--according to European sources--not to mention its Velayat 90 naval maneuvers [in the
Persian Gulf] and the experiments and events that accompanied them.
 Adv 2
Even major basing changes like the US withdrawal from Iraq don’t stop radicalization
Lynch 13 [Marc Lynch, Foreign Affairs, The Persistence of Arab Anti-Americanism: In the Middle
East, Haters Gonna Hate, May/June 2013 Issue,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/persistence-arab-anti-americanism]
A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys
showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world -- a
sentiment expressed all too clearly by massive crowds burning American flags and the growing prominence of Islamist extremists and terrorist groups.
Many Americans, not surprisingly, saw this development as a serious threat. In a 2008 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, when
U.S. citizens were asked to rank the importance of Washington's goals, more placed a higher priority on restoring the country's standing in the world
than on protecting jobs, combating terrorism, or preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
When Barack Obama replaced George W. Bush as president in 2008, however, the perceived crisis of anti-
Americanism faded away. Obama pledged to engage with foreign publics and repair the United States' image abroad, an effort that
peaked with his June 2009 Cairo address to the Muslim world. Early in Obama's first term, opinion surveys in the Arab world
recorded a surge of more positive attitudes toward the United States, mostly in response to the popular new president. But
the reprieve did not last long. Obama's relatively conventional approach to foreign policy, especially in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, proved a disappointment to Arab publics, and criticism quickly resurfaced.
In 2011, the Arab Spring sparked expectations that a shakeup in domestic politics would help the
region move past its reflexive anti-Americanism and stop blaming others for its woes. Pundits marveled at the
absence of burning American flags and anti-American chants among the masses demonstrating in Cairo's Tahrir
Square; for once, it seemed, the anger was not about the United States. But like Obama's appeal in the Middle East, this hope also
proved fleeting, as Islamist parties swept elections in Tunisia and Egypt, violent protests targeted U.S. embassies across the
Middle East after an anti-Islamic video was posted on YouTube, and four American diplomats were murdered by jihadists
in Libya.
It is now clear that even major changes , such as Bush's departure, Obama's support for some of the Arab revolts of 2011,
the death of Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq , have had surprisingly little effect on Arab

attitudes toward the United States . Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily, but it is
once again flowing freely . Meanwhile, Islamism is on the rise, and jihadist subcultures are
flourishing. And the liberal and secular factions that might have seemed like natural American allies are now voicing some of the loudest
complaints: they are angry at the United States when its military intervenes in the region (in Libya) and

when it does not (in Syria), and they are outraged when Washington supports democratic elections
(in Egypt, where Islamists won) and when it does not (in Bahrain, for example).

No ISIS threat.
Mueller 15 – (7/23, John, PhD in Political Science, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist and
Chair of National Security Studies Emeritus at the Mershon Center for International Security
Studies, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University, “Why the ISIS threat is
totally overblown,” https://theweek.com/articles/567674/why-isis-threat-totally-overblown)

Outrage at the tactics of ISIS is certainly justified. But fears

that it presents a worldwide security threat are not. Its
numbers are small, and it has differentiated itself from al Qaeda in that it does not seek
primarily to target the "far enemy," preferring instead to carve out a state in the Middle East for
itself, mostly killing fellow Muslims who stand in its way. In the process, it has alienated virtually all outside
support and, by holding territory, presents an obvious and clear target to military opponents.
A year ago, the main fear was that foreign militants who had gone to fight with ISIS would be
trained and then sent back to do damage in their own countries. However, there has been
scarcely any of that.
In part, this is because, as Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro have detailed in a Brookings Institution report, foreign
fighters tend to be
killed early (they are common picks for suicide missions); often become disillusioned, especially by in-fighting in the ranks; and
do not receive much in the way of useful training for terrorist exercises back home. It might also be added that ISIS videos
exultantly show foreign fighters burning their passports to demonstrate their terminal commitment to the cause — hardly a good idea if they want to
return. In May 2015, an audio message apparently from the leader of ISIS exhorted Muslims either to join the ISIS ranks in the Middle East or to fight at
home "wherever that may be." There was nothing about training people to return home to wreak havoc.
More recently, the focus of fear has shifted from potential returnees to potential homegrown
terrorists who might be inspired by ISIS's propaganda or example. However, ISIS could continue to be an inspiration
even if it was weakened or destroyed. And, as terrorism specialist Max Abrahms notes, "lone wolves have carried
out just two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist incidents over the last four decades."
There has also been a trendy concern about the way ISIS uses social media. However, as Byman and Shapiro
and others have pointed out, the foolish willingness of would-be terrorists to spill their aspirations and
their often childish fantasies on social media has been, on balance, much to the advantage of
the police seeking to track them.
However, ISIS's savvy use of social media and its brutality have had a major impact on two important American groups: public officials and the media.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein has insisted, "The threat ISIS poses cannot be overstated" — effectively proclaiming hyperbole on the subject to be impossible, as
columnist Dan Froomkin observes. Equally inspired, Sen. Jim Inhofe, born before World War II, has extravagantly claimed that "we're in the most
dangerous position we've ever been in" and that ISIS is "rapidly developing a method of blowing up a major U.S. city." And on Michael Smerconish's
CNN program last weekend, former Homeland Security chief Tom Ridge issued the evidence-free suggestion that the recent tragic killings in
Chattanooga followed a "directive" from ISIS.
The media have generally been more careful and responsible about such extrapolations, and sometimes articles appear noting that some American and
foreign intelligence officials think that "the
actual danger posed by ISIS has been distorted in hours of
television punditry and alarmist statements by politicians." But the media remain canny about
weaving audience-grabbing references about the arrestingly diabolical ISIS into any story about terrorism.
And there is the revealing slip of the editors at The Daily Beast, which recently published a thoughtful article entitled, "How ISIS's 'Attack America' Plan
Is Working." The teaser for the article left out the word "how," inadvertently revealing precisely how ISIS has caused such unjustified
alarm in this country.

ISIS collapse inev.

Gartenstein-Ross 15 – (1/6, Daveed, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security-studies program, “ISIS Is
Losing Its Greatest Weapon: Momentum,”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/the-decline-of-isis-syria-
iraq/384261/)

Where has ISIS overplayed its hand? The group already had an impressive array of foes when a June blitzkrieg extended its reach into Iraq—enemies that included the Iraqi government, the Iranian
regime, and even other jihadist groups like the Nusra Front, with whom it frequently skirmished in Syria. This offensive wasn’t solely the work of ISIS, which fought alongside a coalition of Sunni insurgent groups that included former members of Saddam Hussein’s
Baath party. The offensive was also widely backed by Iraq’s disaffected Sunni elite.

once its initial gains were secured, ISIS quickly betrayed the very groups that had aided its
But

advance. ISIS declared the reestablishment of the caliphate

Most prominently, , with the group’s spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani claiming that “the legality

it had usurped the authority of its

of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah’s authority.” The statement clearly signaled that ISIS believed

allies ; indeed, in early July it rounded up ex-Baathist leaders in Mosul (doing so proved particularly problematic for ISIS because the ex-Baathists were also managing the actual governance and administration of the northern Iraqi city, and their arrest
hastened the rapid disintegration of basic services).

ISIS committed a more damaging error at the beginning of August, when it launched a surprise incursion into
Iraq’s Kurdish territory and promptly engaged in a campaign of genocidal slaughter and enslavement against the Yazidi minority sect. The moves were pointless from a military perspective, since the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s Peshmerga forces weren’t fighting ISIS and the Yazidis didn’t pose a threat to the incipient caliphate. These decisions, along with the beheading of the American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff, helped draw even mor e enemies into the
theater, including the United States and an international coalition backing U.S. military action.

The most obvious sign of ISIS’s decline is that the group is no longer conquering territory , seizing no major
towns or cities since Hit (and this hasn’t been for lack of effort on its part). ISIS continues to capture villages from time to time; for example, on December 27 it gained control of 14 villages in Anbar after Iraqi security forces withdrew from the area. But those villages
aren’t equivalent to a major urban area and had been taken from ISIS by Iraqi forces just two days earlier. In October, ISIS advanced ominously on the Syrian city of Kobane; the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy declared in The New Republic that “Kobane will
fall. In a matter of hours.” It has yet to fall, and Kurdish forces now appear to have the advantage, though the town remains c ontested. ISIS has even been losing ground, albeit unevenly. In December, the group pulled its forces from Iraq’s Sinjar district, home to one
of ISIS’s main resupply routes from Syria into Iraq (the other being Tal Afar). This has threatened to isolate ISIS-held Mosul.

ISIS’s brutality has proven isolating Local opposition

also including by Sunnis, is mounting in . against the group,

Mosul and Anbar These uprisings are certain to grow if ISIS

, although ISIS did recently succeed in suppressing a revolt against it in Syria’s Dayr al-Zawr.

weakens . Meanwhile, the group’s leaders seem increasingly paranoid, reportedly executing many of their own fighters in Mosul and elsewhere. In December, for example, Muammar Tawhlah, ISIS’s top official in Mosul, was killed by firing squad for
suspected espionage. And ISIS’s bureaucratic mismanagement has alienated local populations, leaving them with a lack of job opportunities and essential services. As a resident of Mosul told the Financial Times, “When I was seven years old the war against Iran
started. Since then, we’ve been at war. We’ve endured international sanctions, poverty, injustice. But it was never worse than it is now.”
ISIS’s financial and military resources have also shrunk as U.S. airstrikes have destroyed the group’s materiel and capacity to refine oil. The Islamic State is still able to sell unrefined oil on the black market, but the difference between the price it can set for unrefined
versus refined oil is significant. Reports this week indicated that ISIS expects a $250-million surplus in its $2-billion budget, but these figures are entirely self-reported: Accountants aren’t exactly lining up to get into ISIS-controlled territory and perform an outside
audit.
ISIS lacks an industrial base capable of sustaining its military efforts
, moreover, (Ninawa and Salahaddin governorates have a number of factories, but

It cannot build its own heavy armor, armored personnel carriers,

the group has a shortage of qualified technical personnel to man and supply them).

Humvees, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, or radar stations . Only
through military raids can the organization capture the equipment it needs for battle, and the last time it did this successf ully was in August.

All of these setbacks seriously threaten ISIS because of its reliance on momentum —a dependency articulated in a
recent issue of the group’s English-language magazine Dabiq. An article carrying the byline of the British journalist John Cantlie, ISIS’s forcefully conscripted propagandist, noted that “as an entity enjoys success, it attracts more to its fold, thereby causing expansion

ISIS is not yet self-sustaining Drawing a

and breeding more success until it achieves some sort of critical mass, the point at which it becomes self-perpetuating, self-sustaining.” .

steady flow of zealous recruits remains a necessity for the group, not a luxury.

ISN’T AN IMPACT
Moore 14 – George M. Moore, Scientist in Residence and Adjunct Faculty Member at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies' James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
M.S., Ph.D. Nuclear Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, 2014 (“Is ISIL a Radioactive
Threat?” Federation of American Scientists, November 7th, https://fas.org/pir-pubs/isil-
radioactive-threat/)

In the past several months, various news stories have raised the possibility that the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL, also commonly referred to as ISIS) could pose a radioactive threat . Headlines such as “Dirty bomb fears after
ISIS rebels seize uranium stash,”1) “Stolen uranium compounds not only dirty bomb ingredients within ISIS’ grasp, say experts,”2) “Iraq rebels ‘seize
nuclear materials,’” 3) and “U.S. fears ISIL smuggling nuclear and radioactive materials: ISIL could take control of radioactive, radiological materials”4)
have appeared in mainstream media publications and on various blog posts. Often
these articles contain unrelated file
photos with radioactive themes that are apparently added to catch the eye of a potential reader
and/or raise their level of concern.
Is there a serious threat or are these headlines over-hyped? Is there a real potential that ISIL could produce a “dirty
bomb” and inflict radiation casualties and property damage in the United States, Europe, or any other state that might oppose ISIL as part of the
recently formed U.S.-led coalition? What are the confirmed facts? What are reasonable assumptions about the situation in ISIL-controlled areas and
what is a realistic assessment of the level of possible threat?
As anyone who has followed recent news reports about the rapid disintegration of the Iraqi
Army in Western Iraq can appreciate, ISIL is now in control of sizable portions of Iraq and Syria.
These ISIL-controlled areas include oilfields, hospitals, universities, and industrial facilities, which may be locations where various types of radioactive
materials have been used, or are being used.
In July 2014, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released
a statement indicating that Iraq had notified
the United Nations “that nuclear material has been seized from Mosul University.”5) The IAEA’s
press release indicated that they believed that the material involved was “ low-grade and would
not present a significant safety, security or nuclear proliferation risk.” However, despite assessing the risk
posed by the material as being low, the IAEA stated that “any loss of regulatory control over nuclear and other radioactive materials is a cause for
concern.”6) The IAEA’s statement caused an initial flurry of press reports shortly after its release in July.
A second round of reports on the threat of ISIL using nuclear or radioactive material started in early September, triggered by the announcement of a
According to a Department of State
U.S.-Iraq agreement on a Joint Action Plan to combat nuclear and radioactive smuggling.7)
(DOS) press
release on the Joint Action Plan, the U.S. will provide Iraq with training and equipment
via the Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) that will enhance Iraq’s
capability to “locate, identify, characterize, and recover orphaned or disused radioactive
sources in Iraq thereby reducing the risk of terrorists acquiring these dangerous materials.”8)
Although State’s press release is not alarmist, it does state that the U.S. and Iraq share a conviction that nuclear smuggling and radiological terrorism
are “critical and ongoing” threats and that the issues must be urgently addressed.9)
While September’s headlines extrapolating State’s press release to U. S. “fears” might be characterized by some as over-hyping the issue, it is clear that
both statements from the IAEA and the State Department have indicated that the situation in Iraq may be cause for concern. Did IAEA and DOS go too
far in their statements? In their defense, it would be highly irresponsible to indicate that any situation where nuclear or other radioactive material
might be in the hands of individuals or groups with a potential for criminal use is not a subject for concern. However, we need to go beyond such
statements and determine what risks are posed by the materials that have been reported as possibly being under ISIL control in order to determine
how concerned the public should be.
According to the IAEA’s press release, the
material reported by Iraq was described as “nuclear material,” but
this description does not imply that it is suitable for a yield producing nuclear weapon . In fact, the
IAEA’s description of the material as “low-grade” indicates that the IAEA believes that this
material is not enriched to the point where it could be used to produce a nuclear explosion.
Furthermore, although the agency has not provided a technical description of the nuclear material, it is highly unlikely that this is anything other than
low enriched uranium or perhaps even natural or depleted uranium, all of which would fit under the IAEA’s definition of “nuclear material.” If the
material is not useful in a yield producing device, is it a radioactive hazard? All forms of uranium are slightly radioactive, but the
level of
radioactivity is so low that these materials would not pose a serious radioactive threat, (either to
persons or property), if they were used in a Radioactive Dispersion Devices (RDDs). Even a “Dirty Bomb,” which is an RDD dispersed by

explosives, would not be of significant concern .

Other than the nuclear material mentioned in the report to the United Nations, there are no known open source reports of
loss of control of other radioactive materials. However, a lack of specific reporting does not mean that control is still
established over any materials that are in ISIL -controlled areas. It would be prudent to assume that all materials in these areas are out of control and
assessable to ISIL should it choose to use whatever radioactive materials can be found for criminal purposes. How do we know what materials may be
at risk? Hopefully the Iraq Radioactive Sources Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) has/had a radioactive source registry in Iraq. If so, authorities should know
in some detail what materials are in ISIL-controlled territories. The Syrian regulatory authority may have at one time had a similar registry that would
indicate what may now be out of control in the ISIL-controlled areas of Syria. Unfortunately, there is no open source reporting of any of these materials
so we are left to speculate as to what might be involved and what the consequences may be should those materials attempt to be used criminally.
It is doubtful that any radioactive materials in ISIL controlled areas are very large sources . The
materials that would pose the greatest risk would probably be for medical uses. These sources
are found in hospitals or clinics for cancer treatment or blood irradiation and typically use cesium 137 or
cobalt 60, both of which are relatively long-lived (approximately 30 and five years respectively) and produce energetic gamma rays. It is also possible
that radiography cameras containing iridium 192 and well logging sources that typically use cesium 137 and an americium beryllium neutron source
may also be in the ISIL-controlled areas. Any technical expert would opine that these sources are capable of causing death and that dispersal of these
materials would create a cleanup problem and possibly significant economic loss. However, experts almost uniformly agree that
such materials do not constitute Weapons of Mass Destruction , but are potential sources for disruption and for
causing public fear and panic. Furthermore the scenarios that pose the greatest risk for the United States or

Europe from these materials are difficult for ISIL to organize and carry out .
If ISIL were to attempt to use such materials in an RDD, they would need to transport the
materials to the target area (for example in the United States or Europe), in a manner that is undetectable and
relatively safe for the person(s) transporting or accompanying a movement of the material. Although in some portions of a
shipment cycle there would be no need to accompany the materials, at some point people
would need to handle the materials. Even if the handlers had suicidal intent, shielding would be required in
order to prevent detection of the energetic radiations that would be present for even a weak
RDD. Shielding required for really dangerous amounts of these materials is typically both heavy and bulky and therefore the shielded materials
cannot be easily transported simply by a person carrying them on their person or in their luggage. They would probably need to be shipped as cargo in
or on some sort of vehicle (car, bus, train, ship, or plane). Surface methods of transport might reach Europe, but carriage by ship or air is necessary to
reach the United States.10) Aircraft structures do not provide any inherent shielding and so the most
logical (albeit not only), method of transportation to the United States or Europe would be by ship,
probably from a Syrian port. Even though ISIL controls a significant land area, the logistics of shipping an item that
is highly radioactive to the United States or Europe would be a complex process and need to
defeat significant post-9/11 detection systems . These systems, although perhaps not 100 percent effective for all
types and amounts of radioactive material, typically are thought to be very effective in the detection of high-
level sources.
Any materials from ISIL-controlled areas could only be used in the United States or Europe with
great difficulty . It is highly probable that the current radiation detection systems would be effective in
deterring any such attempted use even if there were no human intelligence that would
compromise such an effort. Even if ISIL could use materials for an RDD attack, the actual damage potential of these
types of attacks is relatively low when they are compared to far simpler and often used terrorist
tactics such as suicide vests and truck and car bombs. The casualties that would result from any theoretical RDD
would be probably less than those resulting from a serious traffic accident and that is
probably on the high end of casualty estimates. Indeed, many experts feel that most, if not all, of the
serious injuries from a “dirty bomb” would result from the explosive effects of the bomb, not
from the dispersal of radioactive materials. The major consequence of even a fairly effective
dispersal of material would be a cleanup problem with the economic impact determined by the area contaminated and
the level to which the area would need to be cleaned.
Efforts by the United States to work with the ongoing government in Iraq in improving detection
and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials appear to be a prudent effort to minimize
any threat from these materials in the ISIL-controlled areas. To date, ISIL has not made any threats
to use radioactive material. That does not mean that ISIL is unaware of the potential, and we should be prepared for ISIL to use their
surprisingly effective social media connections to attempt to make any future radioactive threat seem apocalyptic. Rational discussion of

potential consequences and responses to an attack scenario should occur before an actual ISIL
threat, rather than having the discussion in the 24/7 news frenzy that could invariably follow an
ISIL threat.

No cyberterror – no capabilities.
Hirsh 11 – (7/23, Michael, chief correspondent, National Journal, former foreign editor, Newsweek, “Here, There Be Dragons,”
National Journal)

It all sounds terrifying until one begins to look a little more closely at the facts. Lynn cites only one
successful penetration of U.S. classified computers used by the Defense Department or the intelligence
community. That was in 2008, when a flash drive infected by a “foreign intelligence agency” was inserted into a
U.S. military laptop in the Middle East and uploaded a spybot onto a network run by the U.S. Central Command. “That code
spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, establishing what amounted to a digital beachhead, from which data
could be transferred to servers under foreign control,” Lynn wrote in Foreign Affairs last year.
But little
seems to have come of that beachhead. The vast majority of cyberattacks against the United
States amount to spying or misguided mischief, without anything like the consequences envisioned in War
Games. Warnings about cyberspying and malevolent hacking have been around for more than 10 years .
Even today, however, most experts believe that known rogue actors, such as al-Qaida and other
terrorist groups , don’t have anything close to the technical sophistication to infiltrate the U.S. defense or
intelligence computer system.
The occasional global hackers who have cropped up—one prominent example was “Lulz Security,” a pirate hacker group that
appeared suddenly this year and then abruptly disbanded—have done little but paralyze servers and act as an
annoyance. (WikiLeaks succeeded in breaking into the State Department computers, but only because it had an inside
accomplice: Army Pvt. Bradley Manning, according to authorities.) As far as nation-states go, the Cold War principle of
deterrence is still operative: What you do to us, we can do to you—and more. Indeed, China, which
desperately seeks to restrict Internet freedom and this year arrested hundreds of people for fear that a “Jasmine Spring” could
imitate the Arab Spring, seems more worried about battening down its own cyberhatches even as it
probes our own.

Zero impact to grid failures, even ones caused by cyber attacks

Douglas Birch 12, former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on
technology and public policy, 10/1/12, “Forget Revolution,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution?page=full

Government officials sometimes describe a kind of Hieronymus Bosch landscape when warning of the possibility of a cyber
attack on the electric grid. Imagine, if you will, that the United States is blindsided by an epic hack that
interrupts power for much of the Midwest and mid-Atlantic for more than a week, switching off the lights, traffic signals,
computers, water pumps, and air conditioners in millions of homes, businesses, and government offices. Americans swelter in the dark. Chaos
reigns!
Here's another nightmare scenario: An electric grid that serves two-thirds of a billion people
suddenly fails in a developing, nuclear-armed country with a rich history of ethnic and religious conflict. Rail
transportation is shut down, cutting off travel to large swathes of the country, while many miners are trapped underground.
Blackouts on this scale conjure images of civil unrest, overwhelmed police, crippled hospitals, darkened military
bases , the gravely injured in the back of ambulances stuck in traffic jams.
The specter of what Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called a "digital Pearl Harbor" led to the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, which is tasked with
developing both offensive and defensive cyber warfare capabilities, and prompted FBI Director Robert Mueller to warn in March that cyber attacks
would soon be "the number one threat to our country." Similar concerns inspired both the Democrats and Republicans to sound the alarm about the
cyber threat in their party platforms.
But are cyber attacks really a clear and present danger to society's critical life support systems, capable of
inflicting thousands of casualties? Or has fear of full-blown cybergeddon at the hands of America's enemies become just
another feverish national obsession -- another of the long, dark shadows of the 9/11 attacks?
Worries about a large-scale, devastating cyber attack on the United States date back several decades, but escalatedfollowing attacks on Estonian
government and media websites during a diplomatic conflict with Russia in 2007. That digital ambush was followed by a cyber attack on Georgian
websites a year later in the run-up to the brief shooting war between Tbilisi and Moscow, as well as allegations of a colossal, ongoing cyber espionage
campaign against the United States by hackers linked to the Chinese army.
Much of the concern has focused on potential attacks on the U.S. electrical grid . "If I were an attacker and I
wanted to do strategic damage to the United States...I probably would sack electric power on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt
to cause a cascading effect," retired Admiral Mike McConnell said in a 2010 interview with CBS's 60 Minutes.
But the scenarios sketched out above are not solely the realm of fantasy. This summer, the United States and
India were hit by two massive electrical outages -- caused not by ninja cyber assault teams but by force majeure. And, for
most people anyway, the results were less terrifying than imagined . First, the freak "derecho" storm that
barreled across a heavily-populated swath of the eastern United States on the afternoon of June 29 knocked down trees that crushed cars, bashed
holes in roofs, blocked roads, and sliced through power lines.
According to an August report by the U.S. Department of Energy, 4.2 million homes and businesses lost power as a result of
the storm, with the blackout stretching across 11 states and the District of Columbia. More than 1 million customers were still without power five days
later, and in some areas power wasn't restored for 10 days. Reuters put the death tollat 23 people as of July 5, all killed by storms or heat stroke.
The second incident occurred in late July, when 670 million people in northern India, or about 10 percent of the world's
population, lost power in the largest blackout in history . The failure of this huge chunk of India's electric grid was attributed
to higher-than-normal demand due to late monsoon rains, which led farmers to use more electricity in order to draw water from wells. Indian officials
told the media there were no reports of deaths directly linked to the blackouts.
But this cataclysmic event didn't cause widespread chaos in India -- indeed, for some, it didn't even interrupt their
daily routine. "[M]any people in major cities barely noticed the disruption because localized blackouts are so common that many businesses, hospitals,
offices and middle-class homes have backup diesel generators," the New York Timesreported.
The most important thing about both events is what didn't happen . Planes didn't fall out of the sky.
Governments didn't collapse . Thousands of people weren't killed. Despite disruption and delay, harried public officials, emergency
workers, and beleaguered publics mostly muddled through.

The summer's blackouts strongly suggest that a cyber weapon that took down an electric grid
even for several days could turn out to be little more than a weapon of mass inconvenience .
That doesn't mean the United States can relax. James Lewis, director of the technology program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
believes that hackers threaten the security of U.S. utilities and industries, and recently penned an op-ed for the New York Times calling the United
States "defenseless" to a cyber-assault. But he told Foreign Policy the
recent derecho showed that even a large-scale
blackout would not necessarily have catastrophic consequences.
***2NC***
Regionalism
 No Reconciliation
No Iran-GCC reconciliation
Mead 15 [WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, EDITOR-AT-LARGE, THE AMERICAN INTEREST ONLINE, Why
the White House Is Getting Lonelier on Iran, February 6, 2015, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2015/02/06/why-the-white-house-is-getting-lonelier-on-iran/]
The Strategic Alignment Problem
The offshore balancer question leads to the next issue that troubles informed skeptics of the current negotiations with Iran. Supporters of a
new relationship argue that the United States and Iran can work together for the long term
because their interests are broadly aligned.
That may be true—and it may not be. It seems, for example, that Iran would be a much more hawkish
leader of OPEC than the Saudis have been. With a larger population and an ambitious regional policy, Iran would likely use
its enhanced influence in OPEC to push prices higher.
More fundamentally, for Iran to hold its position as a regional strongman, it would have to
overcome deep-seated Sunni Arab prejudices against both its Shi’a faith and its Persian culture. Being identified
as Uncle Sam’s closest regional ally and hired gun would not exactly strengthen Iran’s soft power
in the Middle East.
So far, Iran has consistently cast its quest for regional power as a movement of “Islamic
Resistance” against the United States and its sidekick in Jerusalem. It casts American allies like the Saudis
and others as pawns and puppets of the anti-Islamic “Crusader-Zionist” alliance. Iran and its
allies (Syria, Hezbollah, and, in the past and once again perhaps in the near future, Hamas) have identified themselves as the
“Resistance Front,” and have consistently taken the hardest possible line against both the United
States and Israel.
Perhaps the administration has solid grounds for the belief that a stronger Iran would be a friendlier power. To the naked eye, however, it would

seem that the larger Iran looms in the region, the more it will need the image of anti-
Americanism and anti-Zionism to legitimate its position.
The Obama administration will not be able to address rising skepticism about its Iran policy unless and until
it can show why it makes sense to think that a stronger Iran will choose alignment with the
United States when its own political interests would benefit from a more anti-American posture.

Sunni security alliance proves

Stavridis 15 [JAMES STAVRIDIS, Foreign Policy, Aug 9, 2015, The Arab NATO,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/09/the-arab-nato-saudi-arabia-iraq-yemen-iran/]
Syria is in flames, Iraq is at war, Libya is unraveling, and Yemen has basically disintegrated. While it
might not be novel to say that the Middle East is once again beset by crises, the collective response of Middle Eastern nations to this unique set of
overlapping and interwoven conflicts certainly is. The Arab League is creating a new “response force” of some 40,000
military professionals from a variety of nations, and will reportedly be formally adopted in a couple of weeks at the next

summit. While not remotely at NATO levels of professional capability, this is a fascinating and important development in the
world’s most troubled region. The initial force will be composed of troops mostly from Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan (and a smattering of others from Gulf nations), and will be based in Egypt. It will be
commanded by a Saudi general, and will boast a structured and permanent command structure. The idea is to pull together a

multinational force that could be ready to react to future crises, in the same way that several Arab nations are
currently conducting operations today in Yemen. Reports indicate that 500 to 1,000 men will be members in the air command; up to 5,000 service
members will constitute the naval command; and roughly 35,000 will be part of the land forces. Like the NATO command structure, this Arab force will
have specified warfighting components: air, sea, land, and special forces. The troops will be paid for by their respective countries, and the command
structure will be financed by the Gulf Cooperation Council. There is a fair amount of precedent for this type of operation, including, of course, the
various Arab coalition attacks against Israel in the 20th century and the 1962 Arab coalition operation in Yemen. Why is this happening and
what should we in the West do about it? It is clearly not simply because of events in Yemen, although that is the proximate trigger. In simple

terms, the Arab League — essentially a Sunni club at this point given the political meltdowns in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria —
is creating this army to face Iran . This is particularly important for the Sunni Arab world given
the distinct possibility of Tehran’s return to the world stage, if sanctions are indeed lifted. If that occurs, billions of
dollars will flow into Iran’s coffers as its ability to trade freely internationally comes back online. While Iran may or may not be
prevented from ultimately building a nuclear weapon, it most certainly will have a windfall of
resources shortly, assuming the nuclear deal is finalized. Iran will use those resources as it has for a couple of
decades: to push the Shiite religious agenda, sponsor terrorism directed against Sunnis, Israelis, and the West (in roughly that
order), and strengthen its already capable armed forces. Iran already effectively controls five capitals in the Middle East — Tehran, Damascus, Beirut,
Baghdad, and most recently Sanaa. The mullahs’ goal is to push their version of Islam and to diminish the stature and status of their Sunni opponents:
notably Saudi Arabia (which they see as vulnerable), Bahrain (which has an oppressed Shiite majority), and the Gulf States (which are small and close
enough to be dominated). As I have written before, we are looking at an event in Islam not unlike the reformation in the Christian faith — which ended
up killing huge numbers of Europeans in the wars between Catholics and Protestants. Such is the likely future of this part of the Islamic world, unless
cooler heads prevail. This emerging coalition operation in Yemen will include Saudis, Egyptians, soldiers from the Gulf States, and,very, possibly
Pakistan. So far, the United States is supplying information, intelligence, and air refueling capacity. The
announcement of the Arab
response force — which builds on this relationship — is a startling new development, but a logical extension of
the massive defensive buying program Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have been engaged in
for two decades. They have significant technological military muscle, especially in the air and on the sea. And
with Egyptian troops, they can mount a formidable campaign ashore. What should we be doing about it? The United
States should support this emerging Sunni coalition, to include not only intelligence and logistics, but cyber, special forces training, unmanned vehicles,
and other “new triad” systems that can be brought to bear without huge manpower commitments. Obviously, our well-developed military assistance
programs — in the form of grants to Egypt and sales to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States — should continue. And our training and exchange programs
should be strengthened as well. Is there a role for NATO? It’s too early to tell. But NATO does have warm relations with many of the Sunni states as part
of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. At a recent conference in the region, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said, “NATO has a
solid record of cooperation with countries here in the Gulf. The launch of our Istanbul Cooperation Initiative ten years ago was a strong demonstration
that the security and stability of this region is of strategic interest to NATO — just as the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area matter to the
Gulf region.” Building on existing ties (to include ongoing good work together in Afghanistan) makes sense. Granted, it is quite unlikely that these
nations will be clamoring for NATO help, but the Western alliance should make itself available — no pressure, just an offer — for advice, joint exercises,
shared intelligence, material support, and general assistance. Finally, the delicate question of Israel should be considered.
Is it possible that, over time, Arab concerns over Persian power grabs may actually supersede their antipathy for Israel? That seems unlikely, yet worth
thinking about as this Sunni-Shiite divide unfolds. Egypt and Jordan have peaceful relations with Israel — and clearly the Gulf nations share Israel’s fear
of a nuclear armed Iran. It is possible that, despite the nasty precedents of 1967 and 1973 ,
a Sunni military coalition poised to
counter Tehran might provide the basis for cooperation with Israel over threats from the Shiite world. Sadly, it
seems likely that we are headed toward a significant Sunni-Shiite war in the region, one in which
much blood may be shed. And it is worth considering how the United States and NATO could interact with our friends in the region as they face
a significantly strengthened Iran coming out of the nuclear negotiations.

Iran influence causes major radicalization and sectarian violence- turns Iraq into
a client state and draws in Sunnis
Shelton ’15 [HUGH SHELTON, LA Times, Iran is a Dangerous ‘ally’ in Syria and Iraq, Jan 5, 2015,
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shelton-islamic-state-iran-20150106-story.html]
Indeed, the fog of war seems to have muddied Iran's role in this dark chapter of regional affairs.
Is Tehran an ally or a nemesis in the fight against Islamic State? At least initially, the U.S.
believed that Iran could play a constructive role in combating a mutual adversary. Secretary of
State John F. Kerry, touting the age-old axiom “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” suggested
that Iran could be part of the solution.
The only trouble is that Iran is a major part of the challenges we face.
Islamic State, also known by the acronym ISIS, rose out of the sectarian conflict that exploded in
Iraq in 2004, shortly after the U.S.-led occupation. Iran immediately backed Shiite Muslim
militant factions with training, money, weapons and intelligence, sparking a vicious Sunni
Muslim militant counter-reaction that nourished Al Qaeda and, later, ISIS. The rise to power of
Nouri Maliki, an inept and corrupt Shiite prime minister with strong ties to Tehran, sealed Iraq's
fate not only as a breeding ground for Sunni extremism, but as an Iranian satellite state.
Iran now has more than 7,000 Revolutionary Guards and elite Quds Force members in Iraq,
according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition organization. The
killing of Iranian military advisor Hamid Taqavi, a brigadier general in the Revolutionary Guard,
in December in Samarra put an exclamation point on the scope and significance of the
Revolutionary Guard's presence in Iraq. As the most senior commander of the Quds Force to die
abroad since the Iran-Iraq war ended 26 years ago, Taqavi played a key role in Tehran's training
and control of Shiite militias in Iraq.
Amnesty International has pointed to the presence of Iran's proxy militias in Iraq as a key
source of instability and sectarian conflict there. In an October report called “Absolute
Impunity, Militia Rule in Iraq,” Amnesty found that the growing power of Shiite militias has
contributed to a “deterioration in security and an atmosphere of lawlessness” and that the
Shiites “are ruthlessly targeting Sunni civilians ... under the guise of fighting terrorism, in an
apparent bid to punish Sunnis for the rise of the ISIS and for its heinous crimes.”
Iranian clerics' paranoia over domestic discontent has made meddling in regional countries, Iraq
in particular, a cornerstone of Tehran's foreign policy and survival strategy. Speaking at Taqavi's
funeral, top Iranian security official Ali Shamkhani said, “Taqavi and people like him gave their
blood in Samarra so that we do not give our blood in Tehran.”
Iran's reasons for “fighting” ISIS diverge considerably from U.S. objectives. Whereas we seek a
stable and nonsectarian government in Iraq, the mullahs' interests are best served by the
ascension of a subordinate Shiite leadership, enabling them to use the neighbor to the west as a
springboard for their regional hegemonic, anti-Western designs. The Iranian government sees
an opening in the turmoil in Iraq for consolidating its grip on that country, weakened by the
ouster of Prime Minister Maliki.
Iran's role in the civil war in Syria is following a similar dynamic: Through its proxy Hezbollah —
the Shiite Muslim political and paramilitary organization — Iran has served as Syrian President
Bashar Assad's battering ram against his people, killing and enraging Sunnis and fueling ISIS'
exponential growth.
Aiding and abetting Iran's destructive role in Iraq or Syria would be a strategic mistake for the
U.S. that only exacerbates a profound crisis. It is a dangerous irony to even consider allying
with Iran — which the U.S. State Department still considers the world's most active state
sponsor of terrorism — to fight the terrorism inspired by ISIS.
Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi, who is well versed in the agenda and ambitions of
Tehran's mullahs, rightly describes a potential Western alliance with Iran against ISIS as akin to
“jumping from the frying pan into the fire.” The eviction of the Iranian government from the
region, especially from Syria and Iraq, must be part of the U.S. strategy for countering ISIS and
resolving the sectarian divides that drive extremism throughout the region, Rajavi says.
She's right. The U.S. must think beyond ISIS to what kind of region will be left in its smoldering
wake. As the U.S. weighs its policy options, any scenario that leaves Iran in control of large
swaths of the region must be rejected outright.

Iran is fundamentally aggressive – withdrawal opens the floodgates

Miller 15 (5/1, Aaron David, vice president at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former
Middle East analyst and negotiator in Republican and Democratic Administrations. “Why the
U.S. Can’t Ride the Iranian Tiger”, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/05/01/why-the-
u-s-cant-ride-the-iranian-tiger/)
Iran Is an Expansionist Power Iran’s pragmatism must not be confused with its expansionist goals. Teheran is not a status quo
power . The marriage of ideology, grandiosity, and insecurity that has long shaped Iran’s post-
revolutionary self-image guarantees a dynamic and aggrandizing foreign policy and the need
to maintain tight control at home. Iran seeks stability, but one that is geared to a distinctly
Iranian vision of the region that differs fundamentally from America’s. We should not conflate a
temporary coincidence of interests, such as the need to make common cause against IS, with the
fundamental differences between Teheran’s and Washington’s hopes for the Middle East. Iran’s
regional vision means the following: an Iraq led by a relatively weak Shi‘a regime beholden to Iran; a
Lebanon in which Hezbollah remains the most powerful actor always willing to confront Israel; a more stable Syria, perhaps without Assad
and decentralized, but with a Shi‘a component open to Iran and not controlled by a U.S.- or Saudi-backed Sunni regime; an Arabian Peninsula where Iran, through Yemen and other Shi‘a allies, can keep the Saudis

and a Persian Gulf where Iran, even though it would be constrained by a U.S. military presence, remains the dominant regional
off balance;

power. Iran’s rise represents the most consequential development in the region since the U.S.
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed together with the Arab spring, they have facilitated the Persian
spring. And Iran has achieved its spring under very difficult circumstances, including an increased
U.S. military presence in the region and tough sanctions that have wrecked its economy. One can only imagine its capacity if Iran is
freed from those constraints . To date, the U.S. has lacked both the staying power and the influence to thwart Iran’s reach. In pursuit of a nuclear deal that it believes will
constrain Iran’s rise, Washington may well be enabling it further.
 Containment Inevitable
Containment inevitable
Pollack 14 – (9/30, Kenneth, PhD in Political Science from MIT, senior fellow and former director
(2009-2012) in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, former analyst on
Iraqi and Iranian military issues for the Central Intelligence Agency (1988-1995), former Director
for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Director for Persian Gulf Affairs, with the United
States National Security Council, former professor at the National Defense University,
“Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy,” p. 146)

The more difficult challenge will be to diminish the conventional military threat posed to Iran by
American forces in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean without sacrificing America's
commitments in the region. The United States has vital interests in the Pe rsian Gulf, and Washington intends to maintain
significant conventional military forces in the region for the foreseeable future. Given the power of the American
military, those forces will always constitute a threat to Iran .
The United States could make unilateral concessions to Tehran related to military
deployments, such as agreeing to station no more than one aircraft carrier battle group in the GuJf or Arabian Sea
at any time. However, Tehran is unlikely to view this a rrangement as much of a concession because

of how easy it would be for the U nited S tates to break that agreement if it ever chose to do so . The
problem is further compounded by Washington's understandable unwillingness not to go much beyond that (assuming it is willing to go even that far) for fear of jeopardizing its

A new security architecture in the Persian Gulf is probably the

ability to respond to problems in the fragile Gulf region.

only realistic way to meet Iran's legitimate security concerns in a manner that would be palatable to the United States and
its allies in the region . A Gulf security process could follow the successful Cold War European model by starting with security discussions, building to confidence-building
measures, and eventually reaching arms control agreements. Thus the United States ought to be willing to offer the inauguration of just such a process, using the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a starting point. Such a process would hold out the potential for Iran to secure constraints on the deployment and operation of
American military forces in the region in return for their agreement to take on equivalent limitations on their own forces.72 Interestingly, a senior Iranian diplomat has already
suggested the same in a Western newspaper.

Small footprint
Vine 13 (assistant professor of anthropology at American University, in Washington, DC)
(David, Tomgram: David Vine, U.S. Empire of Bases Grows,
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175568/)

While relying on smaller bases may sound smarter and more cost effective than maintaining huge
bases that have often caused anger in places like Okinawa and South Korea, lily pads threaten
U.S. and global security in several ways: First, the “lily pad” language can be misleading, since by design or otherwise, such
installations are capable of quickly growing into bloated behemoths. Second, despite the rhetoric about spreading democracy that
still lingers in Washington, building
more lily pads actually guarantees collaboration with an increasing
number of despotic, corrupt, and murderous regimes. Third, there is a well-documented pattern of damage that
military facilities of various sizes inflict on local communities. Although lily pads seem to promise insulation from local opposition,
over time even small bases have often led to anger and protest movements. Finally, a proliferation of lily pads means
the creeping militarization of large swaths of the globe. Like real lily pads -- which are actually aquatic weeds --
bases have a way of growing and reproducing uncontrollably. Indeed, bases tend to beget bases, creating “base
races” with other nations, heightening military tensions, and discouraging diplomatic solutions
to conflicts. After all, how would the United States respond if China, Russia, or Iran were to build even a single lily-pad base of its
own in Mexico or the Caribbean? For China and Russia in particular, ever more U.S. bases near their borders
threaten to set off new cold wars. Most troublingly, the creation of new bases to protect against an
alleged future Chinese military threat may prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy: such bases in
Asia are likely to create the threat they are supposedly designed to protect against, making a
catastrophic war with China more, not less, likely. Encouragingly, however, overseas bases have recently begun to
generate critical scrutiny across the political spectrum from Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and Republican presidential
candidate Ron Paul to Democratic Senator Jon Tester and New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. With everyone looking for
ways to trim the deficit, closing overseas bases offers easy savings. Indeed, increasingly influential types are recognizing that the
country simply can’t afford more than 1,000 bases abroad. Great Britain, like empires before it, had
to close most of its
remaining foreign bases in the midst of an economic crisis in the 1960s and 1970s. The United
States is undoubtedly headed in that direction sooner or later. The only question is whether the
country will give up its bases and downsize its global mission by choice, or if it will follow Britain’s path as
a fading power forced to give up its bases from a position of weakness. Of course, the consequences of not choosing another path
extend beyond economics. If
the proliferation of lily pads, special operations forces, and drone wars
continues, the United States is likely to be drawn into new conflicts and new wars, generating
unknown forms of blowback, and untold death and destruction. In that case, we’d better prepare for a lot
more incoming flights -- from the Horn of Africa to Honduras -- carrying not just amputees but caskets.
 Lashout Link

Link turn outweighs on timeframe. Sanction relief is a critical window. Strikes

occur before Iran can rebuild its economy. Condensed decision window creates
use-or-lose pressures which are the largest internal link to miscalc
Juneau 15 (7/7, Thomas Juneau is an assistant professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs. From 2003 to 2014, he was an analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. He is the author of
Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy (Stanford University Press, 2015). “IRAN IS CUTTING ITS
LOSSES WITH A NUCLEAR DEAL”, http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/iran-is-cutting-its-losses-with-a-nuclear-deal/)
Yeta nuclear deal would not lead to a reversal of regional pushback against Iran . The Islamic
Republic would remain the main geopolitical competitor for Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the other
Arab states of the Persian Gulf. For Tehran’s rivals in the Middle East, the nuclear program has been a symptom,
not a cause, of its ambitions . As such, regional states would remain concerned at the prospect of an
Iran unshackled by the removal of some sanctions. Its actions would therefore still provoke
resistance. In addition, the U.S. security architecture in the Gulf and the Middle East, partly aimed at containing Iran, would remain in place. Even after a comprehensive
deal, in sum, major constraints on Iran’s ability to project power would remain or even intensify. A nuclear deal would not by any means compound the “nightmare” of Iran’s
alleged “domination” of a “satellite Shiite crescent.”

Allies sabotage the deal post plan

The Economist 15 (6/6, “A dangerous modesty”,
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21653617-america-has-learnt-hard-way-it-cannot-
fix-problems-middle-east-barack)
But if America retains an interest in the region’s overall stability, such disengagement would not
serve it well . Even if a deal strengthens Iran’s doves, its hawks may either try to sabotage the
deal or demand greater latitude to expand their influence abroad as the price of acquiescence.
On the evidence of the Saudi-led coalition’s actions against the Houthis Iran supports in Yemen, nervous Gulf allies can be
expected to react forcefully, even overreact, to perceived Iranian adventurism. They may, despite
American entreaties, seek to develop a nuclear capacity to match Iran’s; a deal to halt nuclear
weapons proliferation may lead instead to the proliferation of nuclear-threshold states. And Israel
makes no secret of the fact that another round of fighting with Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Iran’s main proxy, is only a matter of time.

Withdrawal escalates security competition and arms racing – forward presence

solves allied aggression
Brands 15 (August, Hal, a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, serves on the
faculty of Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy. He is author of What Good is Grand
Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush
(Cornell University Press, 2014). “Retrenchment Chic: The Dangers of Offshore Balancing”,
http://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/08/retrenchment-chic-dangers-offshore-balancing)
These issues touch on a broader problem of offshore balancing—that contrary to what its
proponents claim, it is likely to cause greater international instability and reduced U.S. global
influence. The reason for this is quite simply that both international stability and U.S. influence
have long been thoroughly interlinked with America’s forward presence. Regarding influence,
the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has also given the United States great
sway over those allies’ policies, just as American-led alliances have served as vehicles for
shaping political, security, and economic agendas across key regions and relationships.
Regarding stability, the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the competitive
geopolitical dynamics that can so easily foster conflict and violence. U.S. presence has limited
arms races and counter-productive competitions by providing security in regions like Europe and
East Asia; it has also soothed historical rivalries and provided a climate of reassurance more
conductive to multilateral cooperation in these areas. Overall, American presence has induced
caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and checking other
types of destabilizing behavior. As even John Mearsheimer has acknowledged, Washington “acts
as a night watchman,” giving order to an otherwise anarchical environment.[10]
If Washington abandoned this role, the most likely byproduct is that U.S. influence and global
stability alike would suffer. The United States would effectively be surrendering its most
powerful source of leverage vis-à-vis friends and allies, and jeopardizing its position of
leadership in key regions. It would also be courting pronounced turmoil in those areas. Long-
dormant security competitions might revive as countries felt forced to arm themselves more
vigorously; historical rivalries between old enemies might resurge absent U.S. protection and
the reassurance it offers. Even more dangerously, countries that aim to challenge existing
regional orders—think Russia in Europe, or Iran in the Middle East—might feel more
empowered to assert their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key
regions, one scholar notes, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big
trouble.”[11]
Looking at the global horizon today, one can readily discern where such trouble might occur. In
Europe, Putin’s Russia is already destabilizing and threatening its neighbors, and challenging the
post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, fears of Iranian
ascendancy have stoked region-wide tensions and rivalry, even as U.S. partners also face a
profound threat to regional stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, an increasingly
powerful China is rubbing up against the regional status quo, raising concerns among its
neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against one another. In these
conditions, removing the American pacifier would not produce low-cost stability, but rather
increased turmoil and upheaval.
Over time, such turmoil and upheaval could conceivably lead to a scenario in which a hostile
power threatened to gain primacy in a key geopolitical region. Yet even if this nightmare
scenario did not come to pass, increased geopolitical instability could be quite damaging to U.S.
interests. It is not hard to imagine, for instance, how increased conflict might undermine the
multilateral cooperation that is required to address transnational threats from piracy to
pandemics. Nor is it hard to imagine how a complex and interdependent global economy
might be disrupted by escalating geopolitical competition in regions of great commercial and
financial importance. Nor, for that matter, is it hard to imagine how increased global tumult
might prejudice prospects for the continued international spread—or consolidation—of
democracy. Were a turn to offshore balancing to produce a less stable global environment, a
whole range of essential American goals and objectives could easily be jeopardized.

Arms racing magnifies our miscalc link.

McInnis 15 (7/19, J. Matthew McInnis is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the former Senior Expert
for Iran at the United States Central Command. “The Persian Gulf Wars to Come”,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/19/the-persian-gulf-wars-to-come.html)
The GCC will also consolidate its collective external security posture by moving toward
integrated and collective defense responses in view of a more assertive Iran and a less active
United States. Such integration will re-enforce Riyadh’s heightened willingness to take risks and
the GCC’s willingness to take aggressive action to counter regional threats . If the U.S. navy pulls
back, insecurity in the Persian Gulf may force these states to develop more naval capacities. Such
capabilities will further contribute to the GCC’s inevitably defensive, scaled-back security posture, leaving fewer resources to pursue
as many expeditionary operations as they once did in Libya and recently, in Syria to counter-ISIS. In this Middle East of the 2020s,
likely flash-points include: Challenge to U.S. naval power: Tehran will likely continue to assert that Middle East security should be left
to local powers and that the U.S. navy should not be in the Persian Gulf. As Iran modernizes its cruise missile and naval arsenals
during the next decade, Tehran will test U.S. military vulnerabilities and willingness to remain in the region. Arab-Iranian conflict in
the Persian Gulf: The
Gulf states may feel compelled to contest Iran’s ability to control the Persian
Gulf and Strait of Hormuz if America’s presence decreases . This contestation could include the
Arab States amassing the latest generation anti-ship cruise missiles and mines in addition to
becoming more proficient in surface naval operations. Backed up by growing ballistic missiles
arsenals on both sides of the Gulf, this is an environment rife for miscalculation and escalation .
 No Impact Proxy War
No risk of larger proxy war
Frolov 12
Vladimir Frolov, President of LEFF Group, a government-relations and PR company. The Moscow
Times. March 25, 2012. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-and-obama-
will-be-friends--for-now/455446.html
On Syria, the risk of United States and Russia sliding toward a war by proxy is gone.
Washington has concluded that an armed intervention is untenable because President
Bashar Assad's regime retains a significant war-fighting capability. Moscow is relieved that
the United Nations Security Council will not vote again to sanction regime change in a
sovereign country. UN mediation efforts in Syria look promising.
***1NR***
 impact
War.
Kroenig 8/16 (2015, Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor and International Relations Field
Chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a Nonresident Senior
Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is an
expert on US national security policy and strategy, international relations theory, nuclear
deterrence, arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, Iran, and counterterrorism. He is the author
or editor of several books, including A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat
(forthcoming 2014) and Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons (2010), which won the International Studies Association Best Book Award, Honorable
Mention. His articles on international politics have appeared in such publications as American
Political Science Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Organization, The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. He regularly provides
commentary on BBC, CNN, C-SPAN, NPR, and many other media outlets. From May 2010 to May
2011, he served as a Special Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, where he worked on defense policy and
strategy for Iran. In 2005, he worked as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
where he authored the first-ever, US government strategy for deterring terrorist networks. For
his work, he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding
Achievement. Dr Kroenig regularly consults with the defense, energy, and intelligence
communities. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The History of
Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?”, Taylor and Francis)

proliferation optimists present an oversimplified view of nuclear deterrence theory .

First and foremost,

Optimists argue that since the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), any nuclear war would mean national suicide
and, therefore, no rational leader would ever choose to start one. Furthermore, they argue that the requirements for
rationality are not high. Rather, leaders must value their own survival and the survival of their nation and understand that intentionally launching a nuclear war would threaten
those values. Many analysts and policymakers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and question whether the leaders of potential proliferant states are fully
rational.34
ng nuclear deterrence theorists believe that nuclear
Yet, these debates overlook the fact that, apart from the optimists, leadi

proliferation contributes to a real risk of nuclear war even in a situation of MAD among
rational states .35 Moreover, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not depend on peculiar beliefs about the possibility of escaping MAD.36 Rather, as we will
discuss below, these theorists understand that some risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for deterrence to

function . To be sure, in the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that MAD rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon
advanced beyond that simple understanding.37 After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear

weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot
credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries.
This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent?
Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.38 And their answers do not give us reasons to be
optimistic.
Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-
armed opponents.39 He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal
nuclear war, but they can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’. 40 They can engage in a process, the
nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis

there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an
inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater
than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, however, threats to escalate nuclear
crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest
risk of nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis, as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that
Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a ‘ competition in risk taking’. 41 This does
not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but
only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear
exchange.
By asking
Since 1945 there were have been 20 high stakes nuclear crises in which ‘rational’ states like the United States run a frighteningly-real risk of nuclear war.42

whether states can be deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong
question . The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run
against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that a nuclear-armed Iran will not intentionally
commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however.
Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable
that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run some risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel
were to have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hizballah, the US presence in the Persian Gulf, shipping
through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly brandishing
nuclear weapons in an attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the latter, there is a risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war and proliferation optimists are wrong to
dismiss it out of hand.
An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation,
because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are
not used. But this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures .
Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have strong incentives to convince their adversaries that
nuclear weapons might be used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in crises, such as
placing nuclear weapons on high alert and delegating nuclear launch authority to low-level
commanders, to purposely increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force less-
resolved opponents to back down.
Moreover, not even the optimists’ first principles about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be

equally devastating.43 Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt,
but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane leader would
rather face a country with five nuclear weapons than one with 5,000. Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run
a greater risk of nuclear war against the former state than against the latter. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that states are willing to run greater risks and are, therefore,
Proliferation optimists might be correct that
more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents.44

no rational leader would choose to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but, depending on the context,
any sane leader would almost certainly be willing to risk one .
Nuclear deterrence theorists have also proposed a second scenario under which rational leaders would be willing to instigate a nuclear

exchange: limited nuclear war.45 For example, by launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city, a

nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to escalate a crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to lose to
deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between China and the United States, for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear
strike on a US military base in East Asia to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-
scale nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many American cities? Or would it back down? China might decide to strike after calculating that Washington
would prefer a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. If launching a limited nuclear war could be a rational strategic
move under certain circumstances, it then follows that the spread of nuclear weapons
increases the risk of nuclear use . To be sure, some strategic thinkers, including Henry Kissinger, advocated limited nuclear war as a viable strategy
only to recant the position later due to fears of uncontrollable escalation. Yet, this does not change the fact that leading nuclear deterrence

theorists maintain that limited nuclear war is possible among rational leaders in a MAD world.46

Nuclearization itself causes war even if its not successful.

Guzansky 15 (7/22, Yoel, is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Security Studies,
Tel Aviv University and former Iran Coordinator in Israel’s National Security Council. “Could the
Iran Deal Drive Saudi Arabia to Go Nuclear?”, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-
1.667189)
Current Saudi policy is based on the presumption that its right to enrich uranium should be
recognized, as in Tehran's case. Developing a nuclear program including the ability to enrich
uranium would be only a long-term option for Saudi Arabia, due to the kingdom's current lack of
knowledge and facilities. From Riyadh’s point of view, however, the agreement with Iran gives it
10 years of Iranian nuclear restraint, and in this time, the kingdom will be able to choose from
various nuclear options permitted under the NPT.
In order to develop a civilian nuclear program, the kingdom will likely seek to partner with
countries including Pakistan, with which the kingdom has close defense relations. Differences
have emerged recently between Riyadh and Islamabad regarding the war in Yemen, but if
Pakistan becomes convinced that its ally – which not only financed a large part of its nuclear
program but provides the country with significant economic aid – needs long-term assistance to
build an enrichment facility, it would help, even if unofficially.
Because the process of building independent nuclear capability is prolonged and demanding,
the kingdom must find a medium-term response to cope with the challenge posed by Iran’s
nuclear status. One such possibility is that Saudi Arabia may ask Pakistan to station its own
nuclear warheads on Saudi territory as sort of an extended deterrent arrangement, should Iran
openly build a bomb. And even if Saudi Arabia’s path to nuclear capability is not guaranteed,
its very presence in the arms race is liable to set in motion various processes with negative
consequences for regional stability in general, and for Israel in particular.

Causes Israel strike.

Al-Tamimi Spring 2013 (Naser al-Tamimi is a U.K.-based Middle East analyst with research
interest in energy politics and Middle East-Asia relations. He holds a PhD degree in International
Relations from Durham University, U.K, Middle East Quarterly, “Will Riyadh Get the Bomb?
Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions”, http://www.meforum.org/3509/saudi-arabia-nuclear-bomb)

Providing Riyadh with a Pakistani nuclear umbrella would also increase the likelihood of
convergence between New Delhi and Tehran as both nations might view the move as part of a
larger Sunni threat. In addition, Saudi nuclear acquisition could prompt a preventive strike by
Israel—especially if the sale became known before the weapon was activated. Finally, although
relations with Islamabad are improving, the House of Saud has no great trust in Pakistan's
intentions; on the contrary, many of the WikiLeaks documents revealed Saudi dissatisfaction
with Pakistani politicians and policies.[44]

Prolif causes nuclear terrorism

Kroenig 8/16 (2015, Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor and International Relations Field
Chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a Nonresident Senior
Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is an
expert on US national security policy and strategy, international relations theory, nuclear
deterrence, arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, Iran, and counterterrorism. He is the author
or editor of several books, including A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat
(forthcoming 2014) and Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons (2010), which won the International Studies Association Best Book Award, Honorable
Mention. His articles on international politics have appeared in such publications as American
Political Science Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Organization, The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. He regularly provides
commentary on BBC, CNN, C-SPAN, NPR, and many other media outlets. From May 2010 to May
2011, he served as a Special Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, where he worked on defense policy and
strategy for Iran. In 2005, he worked as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
where he authored the first-ever, US government strategy for deterring terrorist networks. For
his work, he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding
Achievement. Dr Kroenig regularly consults with the defense, energy, and intelligence
communities. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The History of
Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?”, Taylor and Francis)

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September
11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had
Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al-
Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it
permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be
more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they
would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have
argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57
Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in
order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility
that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer
nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are
good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as
nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist
group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah,
might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no
state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state,
with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist
groups or corrupt or ideologically motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to
terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy
establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59
Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a
loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this
problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a
government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long
dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a
breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal.
 link debate
No prolif now – unless alliance commitments change.
Guzansky 15 [Yoel Guzansky is a scholar at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at
Tel Aviv University and the school of political sciences, Haifa University, May 2015, Washington
Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 1]
While a deal with Iran is unlikely to lead Saudi Arabia to immediately launch a full nuclear military
program, it may cause the Kingdom to accelerate its nuclear hedging strategy—building up
nuclear infrastructure to keep future options open.1 Saudi Arabia declared the foundation of its (civilian)
nuclear intentions as early as the conclusion of the December 2006 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) annual summit, and since then
has been investigating the use of nuclear technology for a variety of purposes. In 2011, Saudi Arabia
announced its ambitious plan to build no fewer than sixteen nuclear power plants at an estimated cost of over $100
billion.2 One of the concerns associated with such civilian programs is that they could serve as a basis to
develop military programs should political circumstances, threat perceptions, and allies’ commitments
change .3 Moreover, well before any agreement’s conclusion, some of the most senior Saudi
princes stated in recent years that if Tehran were granted the “right” to enrich uranium, that
would obligate the Kingdom to examine its own nuclear path.4 In other words, Saudi Arabia wants whatever
Iran gets: “I think we should insist on having equal rights for everybody, this is part of the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] arrangement,”
said Saudi Prince Turki al Faisal, the Kingdom’s powerful former intelligence chief.5 Thus, a major probable consequence of any
international deal with Iran was that Saudi Arabia would likely demand equal terms. Although reaching an agreement with Iran on
the nuclear issue has probably become the Obama administration’s most important priority in the Middle East, reaching the deal,
paradoxically, may actually increase, not lower, the probability of a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race. Whatever the case is, a
Saudi civilian nuclear program might be hard to reverse, and a deal might not change its course.
At this stage, Saudi Arabia is far enough down the road that it is at least committed to a civilian
nuclear program. In other words, the cat is out of the bag, or the genie is out of the bottle…choose your cliche´ for a nascent
slow-motion Middle Eastern nuclear arms race.

Now key.
Shayji 14 (9/3, Abdullah, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the American
Studies unit, Kuwait University, Kuwait, “The GCC-U.S. Relationship: A GCC Perspective”, Wiley)
The Gulf states also need far more than simple rhetorical reassurance from Washington. The crux
of the tenuous relationship between the GCC states and the Obama administration centers around their deep frustration over U.S.
policy toward détente with Iran and the possibility of a grand bargain, which the GCC considers a sellout of their interests and well
being. It is clear that a
resetting of the strategic partnership is urgently needed to advance the
enduring relationship, without exaggerating the abandonment dilemma . CONCLUSION There are
few options available for either side; abandonment would be counterproductive for both the
United States and its GCC partners. And both sides, at heart, realize this. There have been some
recent positive steps on the American side to strengthen the relationship. After 34 years since the GCC
formation in 1981, the United States has started for the first time to deal with the six states seriously,
and to embark on a strategic approach by treating them as one bloc. In March 2012, the United
States launched with its GCC partners the “U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum.” In the fall of
2013, Secretary of State Kerry hosted his Gulf counterparts as a group in New York during the UN General Assembly meetings as part
of that forum. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced in Manama in December 2013 an expansion of the forum to include, for the
first time, an annual meeting of defense ministers. Under Secretary Burns said, “These
high-level gatherings have
allowed our senior diplomats and defense officials to define a shared set of priorities and
practical steps we can take to address threats to our security.”25

Military presence is the only thing preventing Saudi prolif

Al-Tamimi Spring 2013 (Naser al-Tamimi is a U.K.-based Middle East analyst with research
interest in energy politics and Middle East-Asia relations. He holds a PhD degree in International
Relations from Durham University, U.K, Middle East Quarterly, “Will Riyadh Get the Bomb?
Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions”, http://www.meforum.org/3509/saudi-arabia-nuclear-bomb)
A major deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations—especially if Washington fails to stop Tehran's nuclear
program or decides to scale back its military presence in the Middle East due to its recent energy
discoveries —could force Riyadh to reconsider nuclear weapon acquisition to avoid having to
face foreign aggression without U.S. security assurances. However, the relationship between
Riyadh and Washington has thus far provided the Saudis with an unprecedented level of
protection. From Washington's perspective, conventional wisdom holds that U.S. security commitments can keep
Iran in check, prevent U.S. allies in the Middle East from submitting to Tehran's demands, and
dissuade them from pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet both the willingness and the ability of the U.S.
government to defend its partners in the region against a nuclear-armed Iran have been questioned.[4] As
an Israeli observer argued recently:
The lack of American will to confront the ayatollahs and stop them in their tracks has given various Arab leaders plenty of incentive,
as well as a good excuse, to proceed down the nuclear trail ... If the Iranians aren't stopped, and soon, we may wake up a few years
from now to discover that Saudi Arabia and other unfriendly regimes have decided to upgrade their "civilian" nuclear programs into
weapons-making industries.[5]
Additionally, the
Saudis are increasingly nervous about the strength of any U.S. commitment in light
of the Obama administration's abandonment of such a long-standing regional ally as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak.[6]

US commitments dissuade proliferation and lashout against Iran which tanks stability
Goldberg 15 (7/23, Ilan, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the
Center for a New American Security. He is a foreign policy and defense expert with extensive
government experience covering Iran’s nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the
broader challenges facing the Middle East. He has a master's degree in International Affairs from
Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, “Implications of a Nuclear Agreement With
Iran”, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Testimony_Goldenberg-
final.pdf)
Maintain and deepen U.S. commitments to regional partners to deter Iranian aggression and
dissuade American partners from taking destabilizing steps The United States should find ways
to signal to its regional partners that it remains committed to their security. It is still important
to maintain a robust conventional military presence in the Middle East after an agreement to
deter Iran from aggressively pursuing its destabilizing activities in the region, violating the nuclear
agreement and threatening freedom of navigation and the flow of energy resources. Despite the regional focus on the
conventional presence will also reassure partners that the United
unconventional Iranian threat, a
States remains committed to their security . Providing the Arab states greater confidence in
American commitments will be a useful tool for dissuading them from lashing out more
aggressively at Iran in ways that may exacerbate the sectarian divide. It could also reduce the
likelihood that the Arab states would pursue their own domestic enrichment capability in
response to Iran . In pursuing this approach, the United States will have to maintain a careful balance. A major influx of U.S.
assets to the region could be provocative, undermine both Iran’s confidence in the agreement and American intentions, and reduce
the likelihood of increased cooperation over time. But any
significant withdrawal of assets would shake the
confidence of both the Arab states and Israel. The guiding principle should be to maintain an
American force posture that is essentially the same or slightly enhanced. The United States could
consider forward stationing a limited number of more advanced manned and unmanned aircraft and missile defense assets in the
region, but should not go too far beyond that. If the agreement takes hold and over time Iran’s behavior moderates, there is the
potential for a “peace dividend” in the long term.
Retreat causes GCC lashout and Iranian aggression
Pollack 15 (7/9, Kenneth, an expert on Middle Eastern political-military affairs, with particular
emphasis on Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other nations of the Persian Gulf region. He is
currently a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He
served as the director of the Center from 2009 to 2012, and its director of research from 2002 to
2009. “Regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran”,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/07/09-pollack-iran-nuclear-agreement)
Inevitably with any question related to the geo-politics of the Middle East, the question eventually turns to the United States. The
preceding analysis all points to the centrality of the American response to a nuclear agreement
with Iran as potentially determining whether such a deal is beneficial or detrimental to regional
stability , and thus to American interests themselves. As always, the United States is master of its own fate to
a much greater extent than any country on earth, even in the turbulent and unpredictable
Middle East.
Two points seem to stand out to me from the preceding analysis and the modern history of the region. The first is that while
Iranian strategy is anti-American, anti-status quo, anti-Semitic, aggressive and expansionist, it
is not reckless and typically quite wary of American power . When the U.S. exerts itself, the
Iranians typically retreat. The exception that proves the rule was in Iraq in 2007, when initially the Iranians did not back
down from their support to various anti-American Iraqi militias, only to have those militias crushed and driven from Iraq particularly
during Operation Charge of the Knights and subsequent Iraqi-American campaigns along the lower Tigris. As
we see in Iraq
today, the Iranians apparently recognize that they misjudged both America’s will and its capacity
to act then, and are once again content to battle Washington for political influence in Baghdad,
but unwilling to challenge U.S. power militarily, even by proxy.
The second is the other side of the coin from the first. In the absence of American engagement,
leadership and military involvement , the GCC states (led, as always, by the Saudis) become frightened
and their tendency is to lash out and overextend themselves . Again, the unprecedented GCC air
campaign in Yemen is a striking example of this. As the Gulf Arabs see it, they have never seen the United States so
disengaged from the region—at least not in 35 years—and so they feel that they have had to take equally exceptional action to
make up for it. I
continue to see the GCC intervention in Yemen as a wholly unnecessary and
unhelpful move, a rash decision meant to check what the GCC sees as a looming Iranian
”conquest” of Yemen. In private, GCC officials make no bones in saying that they felt compelled to
do so because the United States was embracing Iran rather than deterring or defeating it. While
all of that is a set of overstatements and exaggerations , it drives home the point that in the
absence of a strong American role in pushing back on Iran, the GCC’s default mode is to attack
on their own, and that only makes the situation worse, not better .
 yes prolif
No tech barriers – can easily develop an indigenous military capability
Obaid 15 (6/19, Nawaf Obaid is a visiting fellow and associate instructor at Harvard
University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His also a senior fellow at the
King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and a distinguished fellow at the National
Council on U.S. Arab Relations. “Actually, Saudi Arabia could get a nuclear weapon”,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/middleeast/obaid-saudi-nuclear-weapon/)
Now that the Obama administration has largely given up its resistance to Iran's development of
some kind of nuclear program, the Middle East is poised to see a change in the balance of
power. As the Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom recently stated, should Iran acquire a
nuclear weapon, "all options" could be on the table when it comes to the Saudi response. That
could include an indigenous nuclear program. And although some commentators remain
skeptical about the Kingdom's ability to produce nuclear weapons, I would argue that it actually
has the will and the ability to do so. There are six core components that a country must possess
in order to create a nuclear program capable of being weaponized: 1) an adequate educational
system, 2) skilled scientists, 3) financial means, 4) technological infrastructure, 5) belief there is
a pressing security threat, and 6) the national will and leadership to do so. Saudi Arabia
possesses each of these. For a start, the Saudi educational system, especially in the sciences, has
improved in recent years, and is undergoing changes that should see even greater progress.
Meanwhile, the Kingdom's education budget has more than doubled since 2005, with more
than $350 billion spent on education since then. Indeed, in 2014, spending on education and
training represented about a quarter of the governmental budget, and the Saudi leadership has
funded a massive foreign scholarship program that has seen more than 200,000 Saudis studying
abroad. As a result, Saudi Arabia is the third largest student "exporter" after China and India. In
addition, Saudi Arabia has had nuclear physicists with PhD's from Harvard, MIT, Stanford and
other top U.S. universities conducting advanced research in nuclear physics at the King Abdulaziz
City for Science and Technology (KACST) for decades before the King Abdullah Atomic Energy
City (KACARE) was created and took over all nuclear matter. As detailed in a 2011 KACARE white
paper on the government's civil nuclear strategy, a select committee of Saudi nuclear scientists
has already conducted groundbreaking research on an elaborate civil nuclear program. With this
in mind, as a Washington Institute for Near East Policy policy brief notes, plans are in place for
the "construction of sixteen nuclear power reactors over the next twenty years at a cost of
about $80 billion." King Salman is expected to give his final blessing before the end of this year.
Depending on how the Iranian negotiations conclude, the Saudi leadership will form a similar
select committee to draft a white paper on a weaponized nuclear program. One of the
underlying fundamentals of Saudi nuclear strategy has been to have a program based on
indigenous technology to ensure that the entire fuel cycle remains under Saudi control. In
short, the country doesn't want to buy nuclear weapons from countries like Pakistan. The
current Saudi nuclear scientific community is perfectly capable of mastering the complexities of
such a program. Since the end of World War II, the technology associated with producing
plutonium and highly enriched uranium has become more efficient and has served as the
cornerstone of most civilian nuclear programs around the world.

The Saudis would purchase nukes from North Korea if they lose confidence in the U.S. over
Iran.
Ramani 8/24 [Samuel Ramani is an MPhil student at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford
in Russian and East European Studies. He is also a journalist who is a regular contributor to the
Huffington Post Politics and World Post verticals, The Diplomat, Could North Korea Benefit from
Middle East Shifts?, August 24, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/could-north-korea-
benefit-from-middle-east-shifts/]
North Korea’s history of missile shipments to the Middle East is well known, with Iran, Syria and
Palestine among its clients. Nevertheless, the longevity and relative consistency of the DPRK’s relationship with Yemen is striking. The Yemen-
North Korea partnership is based on a combination of the DPRK’s desperate need for foreign capital and Yemen’s insatiable thirst for arms to combat
instability at home.
In addition to these factors, North Korea’s recent wave of Scud missile shipments to Yemen is being triggered by Saudi Arabia’s enhanced security
Saudi-South Korean relationship premised on shared anti-nuclear
cooperation with South Korea. The
proliferation efforts appears secure, but the diplomatic balance could change profoundly if Saudi Arabia attempts
to become a nuclear power in its own right.
A Special Relationship
The Yemen-North Korea alliance was born out of South Yemen’s history of communist rule. South Yemen refused to establish diplomatic relations with
South Korea until the former reunified with North Yemen in 1990. North Korea also backed South Yemen’s secession attempt in the 1994 civil war.
According to a North Korean security expert who defected, the DPRK sold missiles to Yemen during the 1990s and even sent missile engineers to help
strengthen Yemen’s defensive capacity.
While North Korea historically backed South Yemeni forces, North Korea attempted to thaw its relationship with President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s North
Yemen-dominated regime during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Even though the Clinton administration supported Saleh’s Yemeni unity efforts in
1994, Yemen’s support for Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War deeply strained relations with the United States. North Korea sought to capitalize on
this mutual discontent. Yemen was a viable market for North Korean arms at a time when the DPRK’s economy was ravaged by famine and the
aftershocks of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The DPRK-Yemen marriage of common hostility became increasingly untenable after the Bush administration re-engaged Yemen on counter-terrorism
efforts following the 9/11 attacks. When Spain intercepted a ship carrying North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen in 2002, Yemen announced that it
would suspend all military links with the DPRK and justified its acceptance of North Korean weapons on the grounds that it was fulfilling preexisting
contracts.
North Korea’s military support for Houthi rebels in Yemen is the latest manifestation of its support for anti-American forces. The Houthis overthrew the
U.S. backed government in Yemen and have received significant support from Iran.
The DPRK and Saudi Arabia have had a historically tense relationship, given Saudi Arabia’s long-standing alliance with the United States and staunch
anti-communist stance during the Cold War. While Saudi Arabia and North Korea collaborated in assisting South Yemeni separatists in the 1994 civil
war, Saudi support for South Yemen was solely premised on its fear that a united, stable Yemen would upset the balance of power in the Gulf. As Saudi
Arabia has not recognized North Korea’s right to exist, it is unsurprising that the DPRK will seek to undercut Saudi security interests by supporting the
Yemeni rebels.
Saudi-South Korean Security Cooperation
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia signed a deal with South Korea to build two smaller nuclear
reactors. This move grabbed the attention of the White House, as it symbolized Saudi dissatisfaction with U.S.
attempts to forge a nuclear deal with Iran. The fact that the deal coincided with North Korea’s missile shipments to Yemen and
North Korea’s defiant rejection of Iran-style nuclear talks with the U.S. is therefore intriguing. Pyongyang’s extension of assistance to Yemen could be
its way of retaliating against Saudi nuclear cooperation with South Korea, which will probably increase should the U.S. Congress ratify the Iran deal.
It is important to emphasize that tensions between Saudi Arabia and North Korea on the nuclear issue will
hold only as long as the Saudis are seeking to contain the Iranian nuclear program by upholding
non-proliferation principles. The nuclear issue could actually be a potential source of
cooperation between North Korea and Saudi Arabia, should Saudi frustration with the U.S. over
the Iran deal reach the point that the kingdom decides to purchase nuclear weapons for itself.
Zachary Keck outlined this scenario in a recent article for the National Interest. Keck contends that North Korea is avidly seeking out
foreign capital, as evidenced by Kim Jong-Un’s massive expansion of the DPRK’s policy of sending North Korean guest workers abroad.
Saudi Arabia’s energy wealth would make it an ideal patron for North Korea. Also, the Saudis do
not regard the North Korean nuclear program as a threat to their own security. Therefore, they
could purchase nuclear weapons from the DPRK instead of from Pakistan should Iran breach the terms of
the nuclear deal.
The changing nature of the North Korea-Yemen relationship adds an additional dimension to Keck’s scenario. North Korea’s alliance with Yemen is
much weaker than it was during the Cold War, as common ideological bonds have evaporated. North Korea’s ability to impact the Yemen conflict is also
more limited than in past wars as it is shipping relatively ineffective Cold War-era Scud missiles. Forty percent of these missiles were shot down by the
Saudi military before landing on Saudi soil.
North Korea’s ability to expand its military shipments to more sophisticated forms of weaponry is stymied by crippling UN sanctions against the DPRK
North Korea will back away from its unprofitable
regime. In light of these shortcomings, it is definitely possible that
venture in Yemen if it is given an offer of patronage from Saudi Arabia.
Therefore,the prospect of North Korea and Saudi Arabia transforming their relationship from
adversaries to partners is improbable but not impossible. Western policymakers should keep a much closer eye on North
Korean conduct in the Gulf. Should Saudi-U.S. relations deteriorate further over Iran, and Saudi-Russia ties strengthen,
North Korea could be the unlikeliest benefactor from its spot at the center of a truly
monumental geopolitical shift.

Saudis can purchase nuclear weapons from North Korea

Keck 15 (6/22, Zachary, formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The
Pacific Realist blog. Former associate at the Center for a New American Security and a
researcher for Congress on defense issues. “The Ultimate Nightmare: North Korea Could Sell
Saudi Arabia Nuclear Weapons”, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-
north-korea-could-sell-saudi-arabia-13162?page=2)

But while Saudi Arabia couldn’t purchase a nuclear weapon from Pakistan, it might have more
luck with North Korea. In fact, there are a number of compelling reasons to believe North Korea
might be amenable to such a request. Most obviously, North Korea has a troubling history of
proliferating nuclear technology, including to the Middle East. There have long been persistent
(albeit largely unconfirmed) rumors that North Korea has provided Iran with nuclear technology,
and Pyongyang also helped Syria build a nuclear reactor (which Israel destroyed in airstrikes in
2011). More generally, North Korea has a long track record of selling advanced military
technology like ballistic missiles to numerous pariah nations. Moreover, Saudi Arabia would be
an extremely valuable patron for North Korea. Currently, Kim Jong-un is trying to improve the
economy especially for North Korean elites in order to shore up support for his rule. This effort
has been made extremely difficult by the more hardline stance China has taken against North
Korea ever since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Pyongyang has been scrambling to find
suitable replacements for China, but so far it has had little luck. Russia appears to want to
improve ties with North Korea, but its growing financial woes will limit its ability to provide
North Korea with enough economic assistance to offset the loss of Chinese aid. Meanwhile,
South Korea appears intent on limiting its economic relationship with North Korea absent
significant concessions from Pyongyang on the latter’s nuclear program. Saudi Arabia would face
none of these constraints. Unlike South Korea, Saudi Arabia is not overtly threatened by North
Korea’s nuclear program. And unlike Russia, it does not face enormous financial difficulties. In
fact, Saudi Arabia is awash in petrodollars, boasting the third largest foreign currency reserves in
the world after only China and Japan. Although it has been using these to soften the impact of
lower oil prices, it still has $708 billion in FX reserves, more than enough to provide significant
support for North Korea. Saudi Arabia could also provide North Korea with other kinds of
valuable assistance. For instance, foreign workers make up over half of Saudi Arabia’s labor
force, and North Koreans working in Saudi Arabia could provide the Hermit Kingdom with
another significant source of hard currency. Indeed, this is one of the Kim regime’s favorite
tactics for skirting international sanctions. As the Asan Institute of Policy Studies has explained:
“Earnings are not sent back as remittances, but appropriated by the state and transferred back
to the country in the form of bulk cash, in clear violation on UN sanctions.” Some estimate that
as many as 65,000 North Koreans are working abroad in 40 different countries, and that this
number has doubled or even tripled since Kim Jong-un took power. Yet, according to Asan, Saudi
Arabia doesn’t even rank in the top ten nations in terms of North Korean laborers. Changing that
would be a huge boon to the Kim regime. Finally, besides hard cash, North Korea faces a chronic
energy shortage, with China accounting for nearly 90 percent of North Korea’s energy imports in
recent years. Saudi oil and natural gas could significantly reduce North Korea’s reliance on
China for its energy needs, while also helping to stimulate the North Korean economy. All of this
suggests that if Saudi Arabia purchases off-the-shelf nuclear weapons, they are more likely to
come from North Korea than Pakistan.
 ***2NR***
No sanctions
Askari 12 (6/28, Hossein Askari is Professor of Business and International Affairs at the George
Washington University. “OPEC and the sanctions highway”,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NF28Ak01.html)
An important lesson for the US and others who would sanction major oil exporters is that under
certain conditions the oil exporters retaliation could be devastating. Moreover, while the US is
freewheeling in its use of economic sanctions, it should consider what others might do in the
future. US economic sanctions today could beget an oil exporter's (or OPEC's) oil sanctions
tomorrow.
Economic sanctions are most effective when they are multilateral, or the sanctioning country
(sender) is a large economy and has significant economic and financial dealings with the
targeted country (target); the policy that is objectionable is also objectionable to the citizens of
the target; the target is economically weak, undiversified, and reliant on crucial imports, and has
exports that can be easily made up by other countries.
The US, or a large group of countries along with the US, or even the rest of the world would not
sanction Saudi Arabia or Russia. If they did, Saudi or Russian retaliation would be devastating
for the global economy. Oil prices would explode and the sanctions would boomerang back
on the world.
The obvious lesson is that countries that are major oil exporters (relative to global excess oil
capacity) cannot be readily sanctioned. The world is in dire need of what they export. The
world should note this simple fact. Recently, it was on global display as the US tried to get major
buyers of Iranian oil to desist from their purchases. Refiners needed time to contract for similar
crudes and reconfigure refineries, traders time to balance their contracts and, most important,
purchasers of Iranian crude had to be assured that Saudi Arabia (or fellow members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council - Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain) could and would make up for
Iranian export shortfalls.

Sanctions fail – Saudi econ too strong and retaliation deters

Yashar 15 (7/21, Ari, “Nuclear Arms Race: Saudi Source Reveals Plan for the Bomb”,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/198436#.VdONCBNVikp)
If Saudi Arabia were to go for a nuclear bomb it would likely face international sanctions, but it
remains unclear if the Saudi economy could actually be threatened given the global dependence
on Saudi oil; Saudi Arabia is the leading oil exporter in the world.
"I'm sure Saudi Arabia is ready to withstand pressure. It would have moral standing. If the
Iranians and Israelis have it, we would have to have it to," said Khashoggi regarding Saudi ability
to withstand sanctions, arguing that the oil export would protect it from pressure.
Strengthening that argument is past evidence, as back in 1973 a Saudi oil embargo proved
incredibly detrimental to the global economy, meaning global powers may be loathe to try
and pressure Saudi Arabia for fear of a trade backlash.