CRAMER v.

UNITED STATES
65 S.Ct. 918, 89 L.Ed. 1441, April 23,1945
JACKSON

Facts:

On the night of June 12, 1942, several specially trained saboteurs were put ashore from a
German submarine near Amagansett, New York, with orders to disperse throughout
the United States and to sabotage the American war effort. Anthony Cramer, a
naturalized American citizen of German background, befriended two of the saboteurs,
met with them, and was suspected of assisting them in their mission. However, the only
overt acts to which two witnesses could testify were two meetings between Cramer and
one of the saboteurs, who was an old friend of Cramer's. The prosecution was unable to
produce the testimony of two witnesses concerning what took place at the meetings or to
establish that Cramer gave information, encouragement, shelter, or supplies to the
saboteurs. Cramer was tried for and convicted of treason, and he appealed his
conviction to the Supreme Court.

The Cramer case marked the first time that the Supreme Court passed on the meaning
of the treason clause of Article III, section 2, of the Constitution. Justice robert h.
jackson, for a 5–4 Court, held that the overt acts testified to by two witnesses must be
sufficient, in their setting, to sustain a finding that actual aid and comfort was given to
an enemy of the United States. Although there was other evidence of Cramer's Nazi
sympathies and of his assistance to the saboteur, the overt acts—the meetings—were not
in themselves treasonable, and the conviction could not stand.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an overt act in convicting of treason

Ruling:

"Overt acts are such acts as manifest a criminal intention, and tend towards the
accomplishment of the criminal object. They are acts by which the purpose is
manifested and the means by which it is intended to be fulfilled. [Footnote 4]"

The Government, however, contends for, and the court below has affirmed, this
conviction upon a contrary principle. [Footnote 5] It said:

"We believe, in short, that no more need be laid for an overt act of treason than for an
overt act of conspiracy. . .. Hence, we hold the overt acts relied on were sufficient to be
submitted to the jury, even though they perhaps may have appeared as innocent on their
face."
A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. Fricke; [Footnote 6] it is: "An overt
act, in itself, may be a perfectly innocent act standing by itself; it must be in some
manner in furtherance of the crime."

As lower courts thus have taken conflicting positions, or, where the issue was less clearly
drawn, have dealt with the problem ambiguously, [Footnote 7] we granted certiorari,
[Footnote 8] and, after argument at the October 1943 Term, we invited reargument
addressed to specific questions. [Footnote 9] Since our primary question here is the
meaning of the Constitutional provision, we turn to its solution before considering its
application to the facts of this case.

The Cramer case marked the first time that the Supreme Court passed on the meaning
of the treason clause of Article III, section 2, of the Constitution. Justice Robert h.
jackson, for a 5–4 Court, held that the overt acts testified to by two witnesses must be
sufficient, in their setting, to sustain a finding that actual aid and comfort was given to
an enemy of the United States. Although there was other evidence of Cramer's Nazi
sympathies and of his assistance to the saboteur, the overt acts—the meetings—were not
in themselves treasonable, and the conviction could not stand.

People vs. Marcaida

79 Phil. 283, G.R. No. L-953, September 18, 1947
PABLO, J

FACTS: The case is an appeal by Pedro Marcaida, who was convicted of the crime of
treason. He points out three errors incurred by the Court of Pueblo, one of which is that
his citizenship was sufficiently tested. The defense contends that the evidence of record
does not prove citizenship. The defense argues that the witness testified in Tagalog saying,
"Taga Lopez", referring to Lopez, Quezon Province, and that he was born in Lopez.
However, no such thing is found in the record, therefore, his Philippine citizenship is not
properly tested.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant shall be convicted of treason

HELD: No. The defendant then, according to the evidence of record, may be a Filipino
or a foreigner. His Philippine citizenship is not sufficiently tested or proven. The
defendant is called Pedro Marcaida. By his name, he can be a Filipino, Spanish or South
American. There is no proof of the citizenship of his parents. He can be a descendant of
Spanish subjects who opted to remain Spanish and retain their loyalty to the Crown of
Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. It may also happen that
he is a descendant of a South American, with his father refusing to use the provisions of
the naturalization law, thereby acquiring the nationality of his father. Certainly, his
citizenship cannot be ascertained. Foreigners owe allegiance to the government of
America during the time of the defendant's residence. Furthermore, Article 114 of The
Revised Penal Code, which reads "Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the
Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines
or elsewhere...", is guilty of treason, has excluded the foreign nationals in its scope.
However, Executive Order No. 44, recognizing that it was not possible under the Revised
Penal Code to punish foreign residents in the Philippines that have helped the enemies,
for the crime of treason, amended Article 114, by adding the paragraph, "Likewise, any
alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in
paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished..." But in the case at bar, the events took place
in 1944, a year before Executive Order No. 44 has taken effect on May 31, 1945. If the
defendant is Filipino, owing allegiance to the Commonwealth Government, he must be
condemned for treason, but if he is a foreigner, he cannot be punished for acts committed
prior to the amendment of Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. As the evidence clearly
established that the defendant is either Filipino or a foreigner, he cannot be criminally
responsible for the crime of treason.

RATIO: Under the first paragraph of Article 114, the offender in treason must be a
Filipino citizen, as he should not be a foreigner. Before Article 114 was amended by
Executive Order No. 44, it was not possible under the Revised Penal Code to punish for
treason, resident aliens who aided the enemies. Now, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code punishes a resident alien who commits treason.
U.S. vs. Abad
G.R. No. L-976, October 22, 1902
Ponente: Ladd, J.

Facts:
 Maximo Abad was charged with violation of oath of allegiance when he denied to an
officer of the United States Army the existence of certain rifles at the time of his
surrender in April 1901 when in fact, he was aware of the existence and whereabouts
of such rifles. Section 14 of Article 292 of the United States Philippine Commission
states that: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer
under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such official so
administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath
the affiant is substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the
United States of America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by its duly
constituted authorities and who shall, after the passage of this act, violate the terms
and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or provisions, shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years,
or both."
 Abad is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of
amnesty if the offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies. The denying
of the whereabouts of the rifles can be considered an act of treason, as being an act of
adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort, the offense
in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be covered by the amnesty as being,
in substance, treason though prosecuted under another name.
 Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the
United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere.
Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act as the rising publicly and tumultuously
in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods certain enumerated objects of a
political character.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the category of
“treason and sedition.”
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
 The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses
defined in Act No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," as used
in the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902.
 The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include: treason, misprision of treason, insurrection,
conspiracy to commit treason or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
seditious words and libels, the formation of secret political societies, and violation of
oaths of allegiance. When the framer of the proclamation used the words "treason and
sedition" to describe the purely political offenses covered by the amnesty, we think it
was his intention, without specially enumerating the political offenses defined in Act
No. 292, to include them all under the terms “treason and sedition.”
Ruling: The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation of amnesty, and
upon filing in the court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below
with directions that he be discharged.

CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH

G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945

FERIA, J.:

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of
Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case
which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and
that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese
occupation were no de facto government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur
declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before
them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de
facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving
their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus
summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The
right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in
its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the
right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for
the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.
Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as
established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists
and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws
of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in
force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed
by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make
new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his
proclamation October 23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic
 of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become re-
established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the
proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a
law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other
governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old
place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies
to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to
the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE

GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED

PENAL CODE.

HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the unending
allegiance owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person who owes
permanent allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated
(repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government
or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the
legitimate government. (Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.")
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant.
The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of
government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.

The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government
does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an
offense to the same government and same sovereign people. (Art. 114. Treason. — Any
person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the Philippine
Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies,
giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished
by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.)

People vs. Manayao G.R. NO.L-322, July 28, 1947 Hilado, J.

FACTS: The three accused were charged with treason complexed with multiple murder
in the People’s Court. They participated in the massacre of several citizens who were
suspected to have been helping the guerillas. The accused claimed that they cannot be
tried since the Court has no jurisdiction. Furthermore, they claimed that they had
renounced their Filipino citizenship after joining the Japanese paramilitary Makapili,
and then swearing allegiance to Japan.
Issue; Whether Manayao lost his Filipino citizenship by owing allegiance to the
Japanese and whether he is guilty of treason?

HELD/RATIO: The accused were found guilty. The Makapili is not a part of the
Japanese army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the accused swore to an oath of allegiance when they entered the said
organization. Furthermore, it is the lone prerogative of the State to allow or deny one’s
change of citizenship.

G.R. No. L-9529 August 30, 1958

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

During the Japanese occupation, appellant Pedro T. Villanueva, a Filipino citizen owing
allegiance to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave
the enemy aid and comfort by rendering service with the Japanese Imperial Army as
secret agent, informer and spy, of its Detective Force in the province of Iloilo, and that in
the performance of such service, he participated actively and directly in the punitive
expeditions periodically made by the Japanese forces in the guerilla-infested areas of the
province of Iloilo, and committed robberies, arson and mass-murders.

Witnesses, who themselves were victims of the maltreatment and torture of the Japanese
and others who were able to escape the raids made by the Japanese forces with the aid of
Villanueva, testified with corroborated statements against the defendant.

The defendant denied the overt acts imputed upon him, and avers that if he ever served
in the detective force of the Japanese Army, it was because he was made to accept the
position under duress, and that his acceptance of such position was for the good of the
people, he having saved many Filipino lives from Japanese atrocities.

Villanueva was sentenced to death by the People's Court for the crime of treason. The case
was elevated to the Tribunal for mandatory review, for judgments of the lower courts
imposing death penalties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not his denials and defense of duress exerted by the Japanese Imperial Army
upon him will suffice to exempt him from the crime of treason?

RULING:

The Court ruled that mere denial by appellant cannot prevail upon the positive assertion
and corroboration of the statements of witnesses for the government establishing
incriminating facts. It is a well settled rule of evidence that as between positive and
negative testimony, the former deserves more weight and credit. With regards to his
defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon him for which he had to serve
in the Detective Force of the Japanese Army, the defendant was not able to present
sufficient proof that he was indeed coerced or compelled by the Japanese but merely
stated self-serving testimonies. Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a
defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great
bodily harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave
no opportunity to accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. A threat of future
injury is not enough.

Hence, the decision of the lower court was affirmed with modifications on the indemnities
imposed and that the penalty of death be commuted to reclusion perpetua due to lack of
sufficient votes to impose the justifiable penalty of death.

83 PHIL 314
People vs. Perez

Facts: Seven counts of treason were filed against Susano Perez aka Kid Perez, the
accused, for recruiting, apprehending, and commandeering women (Eriberta Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, and Flaviana Bonalos) against their will to satisfy the
immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and otherJapanese of Officers.

Only counts 1,2,4,5,6 were substantiated. In the 4th and 5th counts, the accused
personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls.

Susano Perez was convicted of treason and sentenced to death by electrocution by the
People’s Court.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of the accused constitute a crime of treason
Held : NO. There is a dilemma in trying to draw a line between treasonable and
untreasonable assistance, since the scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive,
and its requirement indeterminate, but as a general rule acts providing aid and comfort
to the enemies are considered treasonable when the aid and comfort rendered are
directed to them as enemies not as mere individuals. To lend or give money to an enemy
as a friend so that he may buy personal necessities is not technically traitorous, but to
lend or give money to an enemy to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use against
the government of the giver is treason.

The act of the accused of providing the enemies with women andentertainment,
boosting their (the enemies’) morale and making their lives more pleasant, is not
treason. Sexual and social relations withthe Japanese did not directly and materially
tend to improve their war efforts or weaken the power of the government. Any
favourable effect toward the Japanese that the accused might have made was trivial,
imperceptible and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vitalingredient in the crime of
treason, which in the absence of admissionmay be gathered from the nature and
circumstances of each case. In this particular case, it was not evident that the intent of
the accused in providing the enemies with women was to help them overthrow
thegovernment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLLY ADRIANO (G.R. No. 205228,

July 15, 2015)
SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY
Subject: Criminal Law 1- Aberratio Ictus (Accidental Harm)
Ponente: Justice Jose P. Perez
Doctrine: One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether
foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the
doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado’, or he who
is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
FACTS: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others,
overtook a policecar and Honda CRV. With intent to killd, treachery, and abuse of
superior stregth, willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes, the driver of CRV, resulting from his
instant death.
The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray bullet and
eventually die.

Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended up arresting
Adriano. RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulana.

CA affrimed the decision of RTC.

ISSUES: (1) WON Adriano is responsible for the death of Bulanan.

(2) WON treachery can be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

RULING: (1) YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However,
during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan.
Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the
import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People
v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful
act be different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom,
whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine,
‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado‘, or he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.
(2) YES. The accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of
two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet.
The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified
both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus,
we follow the Flora doctrine.
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U.S vs. Francisco Bautista, Et. Al.

March 20, 2016

Case Digest
G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellants.

Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

Facts: In 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of
Filipinos in Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing a new government.

Francisco Bautista (1), a close friend of the chief of military forces (of the conspirators)
took part of several meetings. Tomas Puzon (2) held several conferences whereat plans
are made for the coming insurrection; he was appointed Brigadier-General of the Signal
Corps of the revolutionary forces. Aniceto de Guzman (3) accepted some bonds from
one of the conspirators.

The lower court convicted the three men of conspiracy. Bautista was sentenced to 4
years imprisonment and a P3,000 fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years imprisonment
and P1,000.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of conspiracy?

Ruling: Judgment for Bautista and Puzon CONFIRMED. Judgment for de Guzman
REVERSED. Yes, Bautista and Puzon are guilty of conspiracy. Bautista was fully aware
of the purposes of the meetings he participated in, and even gave an assurance to the
chief of military forces that he is making the necessary preparations. Puzon voluntarily
accepted his appointment and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance. This may be considered as an evidence of the criminal connection of the
accused with the conspiracy.

However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. He might have been helping the
conspirators by accepting bonds in the bundles, but he has not been aware of the
contents nor does he was, in any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to those
bonds.

Estrada vs. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

Petitioner:JosephEjercitoEstradaR e s p o n d e n t s : S a n d i g a n b a y a n ( T h i r d
D i v i s i o n ) a n d P e o p l e o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s Ponente: J. Bellosillo

FACTS: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime ofPlunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that
any public officer whoamasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt orc r i m i n a l a c t s i n t h e a g g r e g a t e
amount or total value of at least fifty million
p e s o s (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada,being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its
constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that itabolishes the element of mens reain
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code;and as such, a violation
of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to beinformed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a
malumprohibitum.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in sewhich requires proof
ofcriminal intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder
is a heinousoffense implies that it is amalum in se. The predicate crimes in the case
of plunder involve actswhich are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are
committed “willfully, unlawfully andcriminally” by the offender, alleging his
guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder isa malum in se.1
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES
C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, andJOHN DOES,
accused-appellants.

Facts: In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular
gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates includingthe
accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and
completely took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where
the cargoes were unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused
Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the Philippines.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged
with qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal.
Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing
him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippinecourts of jurisdiction
to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.
ISSUE:WON the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the
Philippine waters and territory?

RULING:We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants. Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on
the high seas byany person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof.
Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, thecoverage of the pertinent provision
was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand,under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on
piracy embraces
any person
including "apassenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of thecomplement or not, any person is
covered by the law.Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. Thereis no contradiction
between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpretthe law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of
the law, in keeping with the intent to protect thecitizenry as well as neighboring states
from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clausesof
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of allcountries." For this reason, piracy under the
Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532
existharmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of accused-appellantHiong since the crime was committed
outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the
attackon and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the
pirates) and its cargo were committed inPhilippine waters, although the
captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo
wasoff-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.Although Presidential Decree
No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committedin Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel
and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need
not be committed in Philippine waters.

People vs Lol-lo and Saraw

27 February 1922 | Ponente: Malcolm

Overview: Moros surrounded a boat, took its cargo, took two women and left
it for it to sink. The marauders, Lol-lo and Saraw, who were in Tawi-Tawi, were
arrested for piracy. They questioned the jurisdiction of the Philippines to the case,
but the court ruled that piracy is a crime against all mankind, so every court also has
jurisdiction to try these cases. In addition,the Spanish Penal Code is still in force in the
Philippines.
Statement of Facts:
-On or about 30 June 1920: Two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for
Peta, another Dutch possession.- B o a t 1 h a d o n e D u t c h s u b j e c t -
B o a t 2 h a d 1 1 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , l i k e w i s e f r o m H o l l a n d . -After
several days, at 7pm, Boat 2 arrived in Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies.- H e r e , t h e b o a t w a s s u r r o u n d e d b y 6 v i n t a s , m a n n e d b y 2 4
armed Moros.-The Moros first asked for food, but once in the boat,
t o o k a l l t h e c a r g o , a t t a c k e d s o m e o f t h e m e n , a n d brutally violated 2 of the
women.-The Moros took the 2 women with them, placed holes in the ship to
let it sink, and left the people there.- A f t e r 1 1 d a y s , t h e M o r o s a r r i v e d
a t M a r u r o , a D u t c h p o s s e s s i o n . -The two Moro marauders were identified
as Lol-lo, as the one who raped one of the women, and Saraw.-
While in Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
-
One day, Lol-lo and Saraw went home to South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. Here, they were
arrested and charged withpiracy at the CFI.
The Moros interposed a demurrer, saying that the charge was not within
the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court in the Philippines.
They were saying that the facts did not constitute a public offenseunder Philippine
laws.- T h e d e m u r r e r w a s o v e r r u l e d , a n d L o l -
lo and Saraw were found guilty, and were both sentenced
t o l i f e imprisonment, together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, two
other defendants in another case. In addition toimprisonment, they were ordered
to return the 39 sacks of copra they robbed, or to indemnify the offended parties924
rupees, and to pay one-half of the costs.
Issue:
Did the CFI in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw?
YESRationale
-First of all, the facts can’t be disputed. All the elements of the crime of
piracy were there.-Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas,
without lawful authority and done animo furandi,and in the spirit and intention
of universal hostility.
-
The CFI has jurisdiction because pirates are in law
hostes humani generis.

Piracy is a crime against all mankind,therefore, it can be punished in any competent

tribunal of any country where the offender may be found.-The jurisdiction
of piracy has no territorial limits. The crime is against all mankind, so it is
also punished by all.-It doesn’t matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state. Those limits,though neutral to
war, are not neutral to crimes.
Issue:
Are the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with piracy still in force?
YESRationale
-Art. 153 of the Penal Code refers to the crime of piracy “committed against
Spaniards, or subjects of another nationnot war with Spain shall be punished with
a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crimeis against
nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shell be
punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.”-Since Spain already ceded the
Philippines to the US, the rule is that “the political law of the former
sovereignty isnecessarily changed. But corollary to this rule, laws subsisting
at the time of transfer, designed to secure goodorder and peace in the
community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of
thenew government they are altered or repealed.- T h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f P r e s i d e n t
McKniley on May 19, 1989 to General Wesley Merrit, Commanding
G e n e r a l o f t h e Army of Occupation in the Philippines, was clear that municipal laws
that provide for the punishment of crime, areconsidered continuing in force so far as
they are compatible with the new order of things until superseded.-
Background on the laws of piracy:
-The Spanish Penal Code was applicable to the Philippines because of Art.
156 of the Penal Code.- G r o t i u s : P i r a c y b y t h e l a w o f n a t i o n s i s t h e s a m e
t h i n g a s p i r a c y b y t h e c i v i l l a w . P i r a c y i n t h e p e n a l c o d e as similar to the
concepts of civil law, especially since the Penal Code found its inspiration from the
Novelas,Partidas and Novisima Recopilacion.-The US Constitution itself defines
and punishes piracy – that whoever on the high seas, commits the crimeof
piracy as defined by the law of nations, shal be imprisoned for life. This
definition rests its conception of piracy on the law of nations. This further shows
that the Penal Code is not inconsistent with the provisions inforce in the US.

People V Siyoh GR No. 57292

Qualified Piracy
An automatic review of the decision imposed by the defunct Court of First Instance Basilan in
CriminalCase No. 318, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW
JAMAHALI wereaccused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder
said to have been committed.On July 14, 1979, the above accused, armed with firearms and taking
advantage of their superiorstrength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one
with the other, with intent togain and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons
and force upon things, attacked apumpboat carrying Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman.After robbing the occupants of their belongings,
the accused fired at the boat, injuring Antonio andkilling the other passengers.An order of arrest
was issued but only Siyoh and Kiram were apprehended. The court then rendered itsdecision finding
the two guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with TripleMurder and
Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No.532; but
due to the provisions of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu on extreme poverty, their deathsentence was
commuted to life imprisonment.The accused contended that the court erred in finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. They claimthat they were also victims of the incident; that there was no
evidence regarding the death of Anastacio;and that the claim of a lone witness is not credible.

ISSUE
: WON the accused are guilty of piracy beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD
: The accused are guilty of qualified piracy and murder beyond reasonable
doubt.Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence
of the defense so farpresented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or
fabricate or manufacturesuch heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated
murder? The point whichmakes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to
whom the report was allegedlymade by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense.
Instead of helping the accused,the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the
report of the accused or believingin the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de
Guzman, acted consistently with thelatter's report and placed the accused under detention
for investigation. The testimony of Antonio alsosufficiently established conspiracy
between Indanan, Jamahali, and the accused.The accused also claim that there is no evidence
Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfode Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his
remains were never recovered. There is no reason to supposethat Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or
that he died in a manner different from his companions. Theincident took place on July 14, 1979 and
when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastaciode Guzman was still missing. But the
number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material.P.D. No. 532 considers qualified
piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on theoccasion of piracy, as a
special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.

ARBITRARY DETENTION (ART. 124)

ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE (
G.R. No. 154130)
Facts:
On September 1, 1997, a team was sent to the island of Daram, Western Samar to
conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the
government’s
campaign against illegal logging.
Upon investigation of the group, Mayor Astorga was found to be the owner of two boats.
A
heated altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called for reinforcements. Ten
armed men
arrived in the scene. The offended parties were then brought to Mayor Astorga’s house
where
they had dinner and drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go
down
from the house, but not to leave the barangay.
On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest
just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave.
1awphi1.nét
Issue:
Whether Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention.
Held:
Yes. Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention. Arbitrary Detention is committed by
any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person.The
elements of
the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the
witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home.
This refusal was
quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed
with
military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at
the
complainants and the witnesses.
Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1
Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders.
It was not just
the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the
actions
of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team
members, to
the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent
the
departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

People vs Camerino
GR-No. L-13484
Facts:
The accused, Dominador Camerino together with the other 86 were being charged of the
crime o=f sedition in the cout of first instance. They said that it was committed during
the period comprised by betweenOcotber 1953 to Novemeber 1953 wherein thet have
been allegedly perpetrated the political and social ends,insistent, repeated and
continuously done the acts of terrorism and revenge against private
person,leader,members and sympatahizers of the nacionalista party in the town of
cavite.Before the arraignment, Dominador Camerino and the other 86 accused filed a
motion to quash theinformation on the ground of double jeopardy claiming that they
have been previously convicted in the samenature of the court. However, the asst,
provincial fiscal filed a written opposition saying that although they havebeen charged
with various crimes under different and separate information, it would not be called
double jeopardy.
Issue.
1.Whether or not Dominador camerino and the other 86 accused is guilty of sedition?
2.Whether or not it could be considered as double jeopardy?

Rulings:On March 14, 1956, the trial court issued an order sustaining the reasons of the
motion to quash anddismissing the information on the grounds:(1) that the information
charged more than one offense, (2) that it wasvague, ambiguous and uncertain, (3) that
it described crimes for which some of the accused had either beenconvicted or acquitted,
and (4) some violation of the election law described in the specification had
alreadyprescribed. A motion for reconsideration filed by the Fiscal was denied. The
Government is appealing from thatorder of dismissal, as well as the order denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Papa vs. Mago G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 22 SCRA
857 (1968)
Facts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila
Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to
the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of
Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of
Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about
4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit
went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The
load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized
on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of
the goods and showed to the policemen a “Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in
Informal Entry No. 147-5501”, issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain
Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the
two trucks and their cargo, Private Respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition “for mandamus with restraining order. That the goods were seized by
members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a
competent court; Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte
restraining the petitioners from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same
time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966.
However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had
already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago.

Issue: Whether a warrant issued by a competent court is required to search and seize a
moving cargo or vehicle.

Held: No, The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant
case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the
Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in
the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said “dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. The
court view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without
a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. the court defined the difference
made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when
concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in course of transportation
and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a
search warrant. In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks
and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the court below
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. But
even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant
would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. he guaranty of
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect
of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat,
wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.

G.R. No. L-14752 April 30, 1963

FRANCISCO R. CARIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (1st
Division), respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner allegedly acted as an accomplice of the Communist Party of the
Philippines who provided food and other supplies to the rebels per the request of his friend who
was a top leader of the organization. He was also approached by a member of the special unit of
CPP to aid in the conduct of loots and hold-ups to raise funds for the CPP. Francisco also
changed the money obtained from those loots into pesos and assisted in opening an account in
the bank where he works as a ranking employee.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was an accomplice in the crime of rebellion by the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
Ruling:
No, Francisco was not an accomplice. The Supreme Court held that the abovementioned
acts of the appellant did not constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the act of
overthrowing the government. If appellant's acts may be considered an indirect help or aid in the
rebellion, the same cannot constitute acts of uprising or rebellion.
In the case of People vs. Tamayo, SC held that the acts done by a person alleged as an
accomplice to a crime should be efficacious enough to help in the successful prosecution of the
crime of insurrection or rebellion so as to make him an accomplice therein The act of sending
food supplies does not prove intention to help him in committing rebellion. Neither is the act of
changing foreign money to pesos nor in helping rebels to open accounts, by themselves show an
intent or desire to participate or help in an uprising. Hence, since the assistance extended by
Francisco to the communists did not meet the condition stated in the mentioned case, he was not
proven as an accomplice by the CPPs.
BUSCAYNO VS MILITARY COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 58284, 19 NOVEMBER 1981

FACTS: Petitioners Bernabe Buscayno Jose Ma. Sison And Juliet Sison, were charged with
subversion by the Military Commission in different charge sheets on different dates for acts
committed prior to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 885 on May 11, 1976 amending
Republic Act No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. The three petitioners were all charged with
rebellion in an amended charge sheet but only the subversion and murder cases against Buscayno
were decided by the Military Commission with the penalty of death by firing squad although the
decision is still subject to review. Bernabe Buscaynoalias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison
alias Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives classified as "PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional
Armed Group personalities," were wanted by the authorities since 1971. Buscayno and Sison were
included in the so-called "National Target List" of active participants in the conspiracy to seize
political and state power and to take over the government by force whose arrest was ordered under
General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972. The list was prepared by Colonel Hamilton B.
Dimaya. (p. 95, Rollo of L-47185) On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the
instant omnibus, catchall petition forhabeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in
repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory verbiage. They prayed that the decision of Military
Commission No. 2 dated May 4, 1981, convicting Buscayno of subversion and murder and
sentencing him to death by firing squad, be declared void because he was denied his constitutional
right to present evidence and that he be released from detention. They also prayed that the charges
of rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the rule on double jeopardy,
that Military Commissions Nos. 1, 6 and 25 be enjoined from proceeding with the trial of the
petitioners and that the petitioners be released. They also prayed that they be granted bail. The
petitioners also asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the three
Commissions from trying the petitioners, enjoining Military Commission No. 1 from continuing with
the perpetuation of testimonies and from requiring the petitioners to attend the perpetuation
proceedings and enjoining the Review Board-AFP from reviewing the decision in the subversion and
murder cases. Petitioner contends that criminal liability for subversion was extinguished when
Presidential Decree No. 885 (which took effect on May 11, 1976, 72 OG 3826) repealed Republic
Act No. 1700.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, criminal liability for subversion be extinguished for acts committed prior to the
effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 885 amending Republic Act No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion
Law.

RULING:Petition dismissed. The acts committed before the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 885
shall be prosecuted and punished under Republic Act No. 1700.Revised Anti-Subversion Law (P.D.
No. 885), in repealing or superseding Republic Act No. 1700, expressly provides in its Section 7 that
"acts committed in violation'' of the former law before the effectivity of said decree "shall be
prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of the former Act" and that nothing in
said decree "shall prevent prosecution of cases pending for violation of" Republic Act No. 1700. That
saving or transitory clause is re-enacted in Section 14(i) of the National Security Code.

People v. Lava et al.

G.R. No. L-4974-8 May 16, 1969

FACTS: Lava et al were charged with the commission of the crime of rebellion complexed with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Seized documentary and other articles were placed in
the custody of the Philippine Constabulary because they had to be presented as evidence in the
trial of rebellion cases pending in other courts. Most of the originals of the documentary evidence
were burned during the fire that gutted the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary on
September 10, 1958. The Solicitor General filed a petition for the reconstitution of the burned
exhibits. The petition for reconstitution was given by the Court. The appellants assail the
reconstitution of the exhibits that were destroyed, and claim that the reconstituted exhibits
should not be considered.
In. GR. No. L-4974, in the course of the trial in the RTC, the evidence relied upon were
only documents that were seized during raids on different places were Lava had been. Some of
these documents were Lava's handwriting, or were signed by him using his alias names. These
were clearly established by the testimony of a handwriting expert that was presented by the
prosecution. The conclusion of the handwriting expert was based on the specimens of Lava's
handwriting which were used as standards in comparing with the handwriting and/or signature
(in alias) of the appellant that appear in the documents that were presented as evidence against
him. Some documents were presented for comparison on Lava’s signature are:
1. An application for employment signed by Jose Lava. The signature thereon was testified
to by witness Eduardo Romualdez (now Secretary of Finance) as looking "like the
signature of Jose Lava." Eduardo Romualdez was acquainted with the handwriting of Jose
Lava, having received reports, parts of which were in the handwriting of Jose Lava "not
less than three or four times" while Jose Lava, was a bank examiner; and
2. A cardboard containing a list of books requested by Jose Lava while the latter was
detained in Bilibid Prison. Buenaventura Villanueva, to whom the list was given, testified
that he saw Lava writing the list on the cardboard.
Lava’s counsel contended that no genuine specimen of Lava's handwriting was presented as
standard for comparison.

ISSUE:
1. Would reconstituted documents be admitted as evidence?
2. Would the conclusion of the handwriting expert that it was Lava’s handwriting suffices?

HELD:
1. Yes. The reconstitution was made in accordance with the provisions of Act 3110, which
provides for the procedure in the reconstitution of court records. Section 59 of said act provides
that destroyed documentary evidence shall be reconstituted by means of secondary evidence
which may be presented to any Justice of the Supreme Court or any other officer commissioned
by the Court. Section 14 of the act provides that the destroyed or lost documentary evidence
shall be replaced by secondary evidence. A photostatic copy of an original document is
admissible as a secondary evidence of the contents of the originals and they constitute evidence
of a satisfactory nature.

2. Yes. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write. Evidence respecting the handwriting
may also be given by comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine
to the satisfaction of the judge. The handwriting expert who made the comparison in this case
positively identified the handwriting of Jose Lava on the documents presented as evidence
against Lava, especially the handwritten names of Gregorio Santayana, Gaston, Gaston Silayan,
Gavino and Greg.

People v Continente August 25, 2000 De Leon, Jr., J.

Facts: US Col. James Rowe was ambushed and killed while driving his car. The CIS agents
established through a confidential intelligence information the involvement of appellant Donato
Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian in U.P and the other appellant Itaas. With counsels
present, they executed extrajudicial confessions admitting to the crime. The Trial court convicted
them based on the testimony of the star witness and their confessions. They claim that their
confessions are inadmissible.

Issue: W/N Statement admissible?

Held/Ratio:
YES. See case for transcript of confession. It must be noted however, that far from being a mere
enumeration of the custodial rights of an accused, the aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the
written statements contain an explanation as to the nature of the investigation that is, regarding the
respective participations of the appellants in the ambush on April 21, 1989that resulted in the
killing of U.S. Col. James Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. They also
include an advice that the appellants may choose not to give any statement to the investigator and a
warning that any statement obtained from the appellants may be used in favor or against them in
court. In addition, they contain an advice that the appellants may engage the services of a lawyer
of their own choice. If they cannot afford the services of a lawyer, they will be provided with one
by the government for free. Thereafter, both appellants manifested to CIS Investigator
VirgilioPablico their intentions to give their statements even in the absence of counsel. Despite the
manifestations of the appellants, Investigator Pablico requested for the legal services of Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala to act as counsel for appellant Continente and Atty. FelimonCorpuz for
appellant Itaas. Significantly, Investigator Pablico disclosed that appellant Continente conferred
with Atty. Manansala in his presence for about half an hour before the investigation started.
Nevertheless, the appellant (Continente) maintained his decision to give a statement even in the
absence of counsel. As proof thereof, the appellant signedthe "Pagpapatunay" that contains an
express waiver of his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Manansala who also signed the
same as counsel of the appellant. No basis for torture They admitted they were members of
CPP/NPA Another issue: Witness testimony is straightforward, and taken in conjunction with
admission, ruling must be affirmed.

PEOPLE vs. UMALI

G.R. No. L-5803
November 29,1954

TOPIC: SEDITION (Art. 139)

PRINCIPLE: “What distinguishes sedition from rebellion is not the extent of the territory covered by
uprising but rather the object at which the uprising aims.”

FACTS: On the eve of election, at the house o Pasumbal’s father, then being used as electoral
headquarters, Congressman Umali instructed Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng
so that Punzalan would be killed. Pasumbal, complying with the order of his Chief (Umali), went to the
mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would
seem that Umali and PAsumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the election the next
day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from electoral fight.

In the evening of the same, Pasumbal reported to Umali about his conference with Commander Abeng,
saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and even outlined the manner of attack.

After waiting for some time, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garlands and
cabines, arrived. Congressman Umali, holding a revolver, was seen in the company of Huks Commander
Torio and about 30 armed men. Then shots were heard. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions
leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are guilty of rebellion?

HELD: No, the Court is convinced that the principal and main, though not necessarily the most serious
crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of Sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act
of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the
purpose of doing things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. The raiders did not even attack
the Presidencia, the seat of the local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means o force,
intimidation, etc., one object , to wit: to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property o a
public official, namely Punzalan who was then mayor o Tiaong.

July 31, 1929 G.R. No. 31268 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GUARDIANO MARQUEZ, defendant-appellant. Maambong & Logarta for appellant. Attorney-General
Jaranilla for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:

The defendant admits, that he killed his wife, Oliva Sumampong; but he alleges that he
caught her in the act of adultery, and so took her life.
This allegation of the defendant does not agree with his statements before the justice of
the peace during the preliminary investigation. According to both Exhibit B and the
testimony of the justice of the peace who conducted said investigation, the defendant
had been fishing on the night of the crime * * * "and when he came back at midnight, the
house was closed; he knocked at the door but his wife did not awake, so he knocked
again, but still she slept on; then he went to the part of the house where his wife usually
slept, and knocked on the wall; she awoke then and opened the door; and when he went
up, there was a man who jumped out of the window, and when he asked his wife why
there was a man inside the house, she answered that there was no man, but as he
insisted that there had been one, and that he had jumped out of the window, and as his
wife would not tell the truth, for that reason alone he killed her." (P. 13, t. s. n.)

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide?

Ruling:
The penalty fixed by law for the crime of parricide is life imprisonment to death, and the
penalty next below it in this case is cadena temporal, inasmuch as the penalty fixed by
law is composed of two indivisible penalties (rule 2, article 75, Penal Code).

Taking into account the details of the case, and the character of the mitigating
circumstances present in the act prosecuted, and availing ourselves of the discretion
granted us by law in cases like the present one (rule 5, article 81, Penal Code) we declare
that the penalty to be imposed upon the appellant is twelve years and one day cadena
temporal.

Wherefore, with the provision that the defendant is sentenced to the personal penalty of
twelve years and one day cadena temporal instead of life imprisonment as held by Ong
Chiongchi vs. Judge of 1st Ins. of Oriental Negros the court below, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of both instances
against the appellant. So ordered.

[ GR No. 46310, Oct 31, 1939 ]

PEOPLE v. MARCIANO GONZALES +
DECISION
69 Phil. 66

CONCEPCION, J.:
Marciano Gonzales appealed from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas which found him guilty of parricide and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased, Sixta Quilason, in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the
costs.
The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife in the afternoon of
the date in question, under circumstances indicative that she had carnal
intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article
247 of the Revised Penal Code providing: "Any legally married person who,
having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill either of them or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (Italics ours.)
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can avail himself of the privilege of Article 247
of the RPC?
Ruling:
We do not believe that the accused can avail himself of the aforesaid article,
because the privilege there granted is conditioned on the requirement that
the spouse surprise the husband or the wife in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; the accused did not surprise his wife in
the very act of carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any such there was,
because from the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his
drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had
committed the carnal act.
We cannot, therefore, entirely accept the defense sought to be established
by the accused, first, because his testimony is improbable. Secondly,
because even assuming that the accused caught his wife rising up and
Isabelo already standing and buttoning his drawers, the accused cannot
invoke the privilege of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did
not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of committing adultery,
but thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had committed the carnal act.
(3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 96; People vs. Marquez, 53 Phil, 260).
People of the Philippines vs Francisco Abarca (Criminal Law II)
January 31, 2016
Fahima Abobakar
FACT:

One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife having sexual
intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The two also
caught Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled.
One hour later, Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh
usually stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died instantaneously.
However, two more persons were shot in the adjacent room. These two other persons
survived due to timely medical intervention.

Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder with
frustrated double murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.

HELD: No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall
suffer the penalty of destierro.

Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements
are present in this case.

Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife with
Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s
rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh.

However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons he shot
in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first
place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not also
committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art. 247. Abarca
was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one
else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical injuries through
simple negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the
adjacent room when the incident happened.
 US v. ALANO
32 Phil. 381; 383-384, G.R. No. L- 11021, December 1, 1915
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: Accused Alano, feeling tired, went to bed, while his wife remained at the window looking out and a little
while afterward told her husband that she would go down for a moment to the Chinese store nearby, which she did.

As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child was crying, Eufrasio Alano left the house to look for her
in the Chinese store situated on the corner of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and, not finding her there, went to look
for her in another Chinese store nearby, with the same result. He therefore started to return home through an alley
where he tripped on a wire lying across the way. He then observed as he stopped that among some grass near a
clump of thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but they
both hurriedly arose from the ground, startled by the noise made by the defendant in stumbling. Alano at once
recognized the woman as his wife, for whom he was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzalez, who immediately
started to run. He was wearing an undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower garment he held and pulled up as
he ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he had in his pocket and pursued Martin
Gonzalez, although he did not succeed in overtaking him, and, not knowing where he had filed, returned to the
house, where he found his wife Teresa in the act of climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her for her disgraceful
conduct and immediately stabbed her several times, although she finally succeeded in entering the house, pursued
by her husband and fell face downwards on the floor near the place where a sick woman Ricarda Garces was lying.
The latter on seeing this occurrence, began to scream and started to run, as did also Teresa Marcelo who had arisen
and gone down the stairs out of the house; but her infuriated husband again assaulted her and when she reached
the ground she fell on one of the posts beside the stairs. When the defendant saw her fall, he entered the house,
took some clothes and started out in the direction of Fort McKinley.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused killed her wife “immediately thereafter” the act of sexual intercourse to entitle
him to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: Yes. The unfaithful wife was not killed in the very place where she was caught, for the reason that the wronged
husband preferred first to attack the despoiler of his honor and afterwards the adulterous wife who succeeded in
getting away from the place where she was caught with her paramour. The assault upon the woman must be
understood to be a continuation of the act of the wronged husband's pursuit of her paramour, who had the good
fortune to escape and immediately get away from the place of the crime. Consequently, although the deceased did
not fall dead in the place where she was caught, but in another place nearby, logically it must be understood that
the case at bar comes within the provisions of the said article.

The discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing must all form part of one continuous act.

[ GR No. L-2228, Feb 28, 1950 ]

PEOPLE v. FRUCTUOSO RABANDABAN +

DECISION

85 Phil. 636

REYES, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, convicting
Fructuoso Rabandaban of parricide.
The evidence shows that appellant and the now deceased Florida Hapala were husband
and wife living together in a house in one of the barrios of the municipality of Abuyog,
Leyte. Coming home one night from his camote plantation, appellant found his wife
lying in bed with another man. The man was able to escape through the window, but the
wife received a severe scolding from her husband and was ordered to leave the house.
Calling her husband names, the wife gathered her clothes and picked up a bolo in the
kitchen, and when her husband followed her there, she attacked him with the bolo,
wounding him twice in the abdomen. Wresting the bolo from his wife, appellant stabbed
her with it in the breast. She died from her wound that same night. But appellant,
though seriously wounded, survived and is now being made to answer for the killing of
his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant can avail the benefit of Article 247 of the RPC.

Ruling:
We are with the trial court in not giving appellant the benefit of Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code, it appearing that although he found his wife in bed with another
man, he did not kill her on that account. For her reprehensible conduct he merely
unbraided her and bade her leave the house.

But we think that the trial court erred in not finding that appellant had acted in self-
defense. The evidence shows unlawful serious aggression on the part of the victim
without sufficient provocation, and it also seems apparent that there was reasonable
necessity for the means employed to repel the assault. But speculating that appellant
could have perhaps saved himself by throwing away the bolo after wresting it from his
wife, the trial court opined that there was no need for him to stab her once she was
disarmed. To this we cannot agree. When appellant got possession of the bolo he already
must have been in a precarious condition because of his wounds, one of which was
described by the sanitary inspector as"fatal" since the large intestine came out of it. And
appellant, we think, was justified in believing that his wife wanted to finish him off
because, according to the evidence, she struggled to regain possession of the bolo after
he had succeeded in wresting it from her. With the aggressor still unsubdued and
showing determination to fight to the finish, it would have been folly on the part of
appellant, who must already have been losing strength due to loss of blood, to throw
away the bolo and thus give his adversary a chance to pick it up and again use it against
him« Having the right to protect his life, appellant was not in duty bound to expose
himself to such a contingency.
People of the Philippines vs. Felix Ortoa y Obia

G.R. No. February 23, 2009

Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness

Facts:

The accused has two daughters, Victim 1 and Victim 2. When Victim 1 was only
three years (3) old, the accused would make her lie down and insert his finger into her
vagina until she cries. As she grew older, these incidents were repeated a number of
times. When Victim 1 turned the age of six (6) the accused started to have sexual
intercourse with her by undressing her and inserting his penis into her vagina, making
push and pull movements until he ejaculates. The last time the accused did this was
when Victim 1 was already 13 years old. Insofar as Victim 2 is concerned, the accused
started to have sexual encounter with her when she was already eight (8) years old. In
one instance, the accused partially inserted his penis into the labia of her vagina and in
another instance, fully penetrated her. On appeal, the accused contended among many
others that it is inconceivable for the Victims to not report the crimes immediately after
each incident considering that as children the natural reaction would have to report it
immediately to a relative. Furthermore, he argued that the physical examination of the
victims have shown that their hymen are still intact.

Issue:
Were the two counts of rape and acts of lasciviousness proven beyond reasonable
doubt under the facts of the case?

Held:

Yes. The Court is not persuaded by appellant's arguments that it is inconceivable

for VICTIM to only report her rape and molestation to the authorities when she was
already 13 years old, considering that she claimed that appellant started to sexually
assault her when she was only 3 years old; that her natural reaction would be to tell her
ordeal to her mother right away; that if complainants really wanted to protect
themselves, it was uncharacteristic for them not to tell their molestation to anyone as
there was no threat to their lives, nor was there anything that would have prevented
them from divulging their sufferings.

The Court is not persuaded by appellant's contention that VICTIM was never sexually
abused because the medico-legal findings showed that she was still in a virgin state
when she was examined. The medico-legal expert who examined VICTIM testified that
it was possible for a male organ to penetrate the labia minora and leave the hymen still
intact. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape.53 Even the fact that
the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of
rape.54Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no
significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus.

With respect to the crime of acts of lasciviousness, it is settled that the lone testimony of
the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.63 Such
are the testimonies of victims who are young, immature, and have no motive to falsely
testify against the accused, as in the instant case. Against the overwhelming evidence of
the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial. Categorical and
consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial.

People v. Campuhan

G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000

FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for
her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in
the freezer located at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo
Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or
"jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his
knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times.
He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to
block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her
brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the
Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she
suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an

indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated

• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet
as underdeveloped
• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing
that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what
Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!
• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the
victim

CASE No. 35 (Rape) G.R. No. 182094 August 18, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee, vs.
EFREN ALFONSO,
Appellant
FACTS:
Appelant Efren Alfonso was charged of two counts of rape for allegedly sexually
molesting his two daughters AAA and BBB, 3 years old and 5 years old respectively. On
the night of April 7, 2002, while CCC, the mother of the victims, was away with two of
her sons to have one of them treated by a quack doctor in nearby municipality. Efren
molested AAA by inserting his forefinger in her vagina and thereafter sexually assaulted
BBB by having carnal knowledge with her. CCC came home the next day with her
daughters crying and in a state of shock. She brought them to the hospital for a medical
examination and upon being asked what happened, they told her that their father had
sexually molested them while she was away. Days later, she filed a rape case before the
regional trial court against her husband. During trial, the two minor victims testified
and positively identified their father as the perpetrator and corroborated
each other’s statement against their father.
The results of the medical examination and the statement of the examining physician
was also presented as evidence in court. Appellant avers that it was his step-son who
raped the victims and not him. Moreover, he alleges that his wife was only coaching her
daughters to testify against him so that his step-son will evade the case. The RTC did not
find credence on the testimony of Efren and placed more weight on the testimonies of
the minor victims as supported by the results of the medical examination conducted by
the physician witness following the date of the discovery of the crime. The RTC found
Efren guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape by Sexual Assault and
Statutory Rape, both with the qualifying circumstances under number 1 of Article 266-B
of Republic Act 8353 that the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent
and under number 5 thereof that the victim is a child below seven years old as charged
in the Information; and to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum, to 17 years,4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and the penalty of death, respectively. The Court of Appeals dismissed their
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications as to the amount of
indemnity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in giving full credence to the statements of the
two minor victims and for disregarding his defense that the allegations were fabricated
by his wife.

RULING:
The court held that it is highly improbable that the allegations were fabricated by his
wife. It would be unlikely for a mother to coach her daughters to testify falsely against
their father and allow them to go through the rigors of a public trial just to have her
husband convicted for a crime he did not commit. Moreover, despite their young age,
the court finds the minor victims competent witnesses considering the manner they
testify, and the way they perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, and appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court. The victims both testified in
a straightforward and credible manner despite the rigid cross-
examination by the appellant’s
counsel they remained steadfast throughout her narration and positively identified their
father as the perpetrator of the crime. The court found it unusual that the appellant did
nothing at all upon learning of the sexual molestations suffered by his daughters which
were allegedly committed by his step-son hence the court disregards the insinuation by
the appellant that it was his step-son who did the crime.
People vs. Lindo Gr No.189818
Facts:
the private complainant, was 11 years old at the time, and accused-appellant Lindo was
her neighbor. AAA attended a pabasan at a neighbor’s place, during which she fell asleep
under a platform that served as a stage. While AAA was sleeping, Lindo took her away to
a place near a creek where clothes are placed to dry. It was there that AAA woke up, as
Lindo removed her short pants and underwear, and also undressed himself. He tried
inserting his penis into her vagina, whereupon his penis made contact with her sex
organ but there was no complete penetration. Not achieving full penile penetration, he
then made her bend over, and inserted his penis into her anus, causing her to cry out in
pain. Lindo then sensed the arrival of a friend of AAA, so he discontinued his act, and
told AAA to put on her clothes and go home. These AAA did, and related the incident to
her parents, who reported it to the barangay authorities. Lindo was arrested the same
day. Lindo raised the defenses of denial and alibi, claiming that as a painter his usual
work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.He claimed that on the day of the
incident, he reported for work at 8:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m., and that when he came
home from work at 6:00 a.m., he was arrested by a barangay official and was brought to
the police precinct, where he was investigated for rape.

Issue: Lindo appealed to the CA, assailing the credibility of AAA.

Ruling: The evil in man has no conscience the beast in him bears no respect for time and
place, driving him to commit rape anywhere, even in places where people congregate
such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where
there are other occupants.
[6] There is no rule that rape can only be committed in seclusion.
[7] The commission of rape is not hindered by time or place as in fact it can be
committed even in the most public of places.
[8] Clearly, the argument of accused-appellant that there could be no rape as the place
was in full view of the public does not have a legal leg to stand on. The fact that the area
was in the public eye would not prevent a potential rapist from carrying out his criminal
intent. The RTC found the witness to be credible, and it had the best opportunity to
observe her testimony. She testified in a straightforward and clear manner, detailing
how accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. It has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant Lindo had carnal knowledge of AAA. The
insertion of his penis into the vagina of AAA, though incomplete, was sufficient.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINADOR SORIANO, SR., appellant.

FACTS:
The prosecution charged appellant with raping his then 12-year old daughter AAA, in an
Information2 that reads:
“That sometime between October 2000 to December 11, 2001, at Barangay San
Leonardo, Municipality of Bambang, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
by means of force, threat, intimidation and grave abuse of authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own daughter AAA, 12
years old, against the latter’s will and consent, to her own damage and prejudice.”
The Information specified Article 266-A of Republic Act No. 8353, Section I, paragraphs
(a) and (c) in relation to Republic Act No. 7659, as the law violated.3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.4Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the affidavit of desistance presented by
appellant could not exonerate him especially since AAA refused to validate the due
execution and veracity of said affidavit in open court.

ISSUE:

Can the Appellant be guilty of multiple rape?

HELD:

Duplicity of Offenses: Where the accused did not seasonably object to the multiple
offenses in the information, the court may convict him of as many as are charged and
proved.—The Court observes that the information charged more than one offense in
violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Considering that appellant did not seasonably object to the multiple offenses in the
information, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved.

STATUTE: Sec. 13 Rule 110 — A complaint or information must charge only one offense,
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses

We note, however, that both the trial court and the appellate court merely found the
appellant guilty of “multiple rape” without specifying the number of rapes that appellant
is guilty of. While this may have been irrelevant considering that appellant would have
been sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death even if only one count of rape was
proven, the same is still important since this would have bearing on appellant’s civil
liability. Further, there is no such crime as “multiple rape.” In this case, appellant is
guilty of two counts of rape qualified by the circumstances that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the parent of the victim.

CASE No. 64 (Rape)

G.R. Nos. 141773-76 January 22, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSENDO LAYOSO @ SENDONG, accused-appellant.
-------- ======== // ========--------
FACTS:
Rosendo “Sendong” Layoso was charged with four counts of rape for sexually assaulting
Marlene B. Nitoya, who was 14 years old when the first three incidents of rape happened
and just turned 15 when that last incident happened.
During the trial, Marlene’s parents and uncle corroborated her accusations against
Sendong. The results of the physical examination and the statements of the attending
physician was also presented as evidence in court. The accused presented alibis that he
was not at the crime scene when the rape incidents happened and that Marlene’s family
accused him of the rape to avenge an incedent that happened between him and
Marlene’s cousin. The trial court, however, found Sendong guilty on all four counts of
rape charged against him. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay indemnity and exemplary damages.
On appeal, the defense questioned the inconsistencies on the time and dates of the rape
incidents stated by the victim and those stated by other witnesses including conflict on
the date and time of the last rape incident and the time when the report was made to the
Police. Accused also makes issue on the victim’s failure to make adequate resistance
considering that the incidents happened near inhabited places.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the victim to exert adequate resistance and the
inconsistencies as to the place, date and time of incident on the statements of the victim
and other witnesses are material in a rape case.

RULING:
The Court held that Marlene’s failure to shout or offer adequate resistance against
accused-appellant is of no moment. Physical resistance need not be established in rape
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will
to the rapist’s lust out of fear for her life and personal safety.
Furthermore, the alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses do not in any way
detract from the fact that Marlene was raped by accused-appellant. These alleged
inconsistencies are diminimis in nature and in no way destroy their credibility. What is
important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent in relating the significant
and indispensable components of the principal occurrence of rape.
Rape, by its very nature, is committed with the least possibility of being seen by the
public. More often than not, this crime is committed in the presence of only the victim
and her defiler. The commission of the four acts of rape were established by the
testimony of Marlene Nitoya herself. In the face of his positive identification by
Marlene, accused-appellant’s self-serving denial and alibi cannot prevail. The testimony
of the victim, who is a minor, deserve full credence and should not be so easily
dismissed as a mere fabrication especially that she has absolutely no motive to testify
against the accused.
Thus, the Court does not hesitate to uphold the conviction of the accused on the basis of
the lone testimony of the private complainant who testifies in no uncertain terms that
Sendong was the author of the acts of rape committed upon her person.
Sendong was nevertheless found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four counts of rape
and is also sentenced to pay Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages for each count.
Exemplary Damages is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.

People vs. Majuri 96 SCRA 472 (1980) Declaration Against Interest (Exception to
Hearsay)
FACTS:
Jan 28, 1972: Airol Aling, 35, stabbed his wife, Norija Mohammad, 30 in the chest and
diaphragm. She died 2 days later. (Note: They were married in Musilim rites.) February
21, 1972 affidavit of Girlie Aling (Airolâs relative): She and Darla Aling (Norija's
daughter) brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija
was stabbed by her husband March 24, 1972: Airol was investigated by the police. He
declared in the Chavacano dialect that he killed his wife. He recounted the killing in this
manner: At or about one o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1972, I was at the
seashore of Calarian relaxing since I have just arrived from Jolo, Sulu that particular
day. At that time, I was already running away from the authorities because I am an
escapee from San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm. Later on, I proceeded to my father's
house which is just near the seashore, Upon reaching the house, I saw Nori Mohamad
but I had no time to talk to her because immediately after seeing me, Nori ran away,
going to the direction of the street. Armed with the bolo which I had been carrying with
me, I chased after Nori and I catch up with her at the street where I started stabbing her
with the bolo, hitting her on the different parts of the body. When I saw Nori fell down
on the street badly wounded, I hurriedly left the place and ran towards the far end of
Calarian. (Exh. 2). March 24, 1972: 2policemen in their affidavit, affirmed that Airol
admitted to Sergeant Antonio Macrohon in their presence that he stabbed his wife
because she had been going with many men (Exh. 1). April 19, 1972, CFI Zamboanga:
Charged Airol with parricideThe arraignment was postponed thrice until April 30, 1974
when the accused finally pleaded guilty. (The information was translated into Tausug,
the accusedâs spoken dialect.) In the witness stand: Again he recounted the same story
of how he killed his wife when he was examined by his counsel. Also, He declared that
after he was informed by his counsel that the penalty for parricide is death or life
imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the killing of his wife because that was the
truth. In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he understood that by
pleading guilty he could be sentenced to death or reclusion perpetua because he was
an escaped convict.

ISSUE: WON the accusedâs previous statements bind him?

HELD: YES. RATIO: Defense: Marriage was not indubitably proven. SC:
UNMERITORIOUS. Accused already admitted it and it was an admission against his
penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonioÂ
and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law that he had 5 children with Norija. That
implies that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her
infidelity. Her failure to visit him n prison and her neglect of their children are other
circumstances confirmatory of their marital status. Accused fully understood the effect
of his plea of guilty. He stood firm even if the arraignment was postponed 3 times so
that his lawyer can explain to him the effect of pleading guilty His confession and the
affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were presented in evidence.
[ GR No. L-29776, Aug 27, 1975 ]

PEOPLE v. JOSE ECHALUCE +

160 Phil. 911

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:

In Criminal Case No. 1895 of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, Jose Echaluce,
Bonifacia Echaluce and Jose Sabas were charged with the crime of parricide in an
information filed against them by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, which reads as follows:

"That on or about the 25th day of April, 1968, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in
the barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Bagamanoc, Province of Catanduanes,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping together for a common purpose did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident remeditation,
that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill one Severiano Echaluce, with whom
accused Bonifacia Echaluce was united in lawful wedlock, Jose Echaluce, being the son
of the victim and Jose Sabas as stranger in the execution of the crime, cooperating as
principal, armed with a piece of wood (bogus) hammered the victim with the said piece
of wood several times on the head, throat, knee and other parts of the body, employing
means, manner and form in the execution of the crime, which tended directly and
specially to insure its commission without danger to the persons of the aforementioned
accused and as a result of which attack, the said Severiano Echaluce received several
mortal injuries which directly caused his death.

"That in the commission of the offense the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
dwelling were present."

Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed constitutes murder.

Ruling:
There is no question that the crime committed is murder. Since only the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling may be properly appreciated against the appellant, and the
same is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the penalty for the crime
in its medium period, which is reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed by the
trial court.

We agree with the Solicitor General that in addition to the foregoing, provision for
indemnification of the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 should have been
included in the judgment. However, Jose Echaluce, who has been convicted of parricide
for the murder of his father, should be excluded as beneficiary of this indemnification.
WHEREFORE, modified as to the penalty, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and
as to the indemnification of the heirs of the victim, except Jose Echaluce, in the sum of
P12,000.00, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y
RAMONES, defendant-appellant
GR No. L-38511
October 6, 1933

FACTS
On July 24, 1932, Manila, the accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, without any just
cause therefor and with intent to kill and treachery, assaulted and attacked Yu Lon by
suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head, treacherously, under
conditions which intended directly and especially to insure, the accomplishment of his
purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make,
thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated
wound in the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region, which were
necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu Lon.
Defendant was found guilty of murder in the CFI, for which the defendant made an
appeal. Counsel enumerated the following assignment of error: (1) that the trial court
erred in finding the true assailant of Yu Lon, (2) assuming that the appellant is such
person, the trial court erred in finding that the appellant struck his supposed victim, (3)
assuming that the appellant is such person, and that the appellant did indeed strike Yu
Lon, the trial court erred in that the blow was struck in the rear, (4) the trial court erred
in finding that the identity of the appellant was fully established, (5) the trial court erred
in convicting the appellant of murder (Art 248) rather than maltreatment (Art 266).
DECISION – COURT OF ORIGIN
Defendant was found guilty of murder by Judge Luis P. Torres
ISSUE
W/N a naturally resulting injury from a direct consequence of an unlawful act would
make the aggressor criminally liable
DECISION – APPELLATE COURT
J. Vickers. Regarding the contention of the appellant that striking Yu Lon at the back of
the head would not possibly cause him to fall forward on his face to the pavement, the
Court declared that the expert testimony shows that the victim had undergone a natural
phenomenon of falling backwards on the pavement in an attempt to regain balance.
Another consideration was the slope of the sidewalk, which could have made Yu Lon fall
the opposite direction from which he was struck, as he tried to straighten up. The Court
referred to paragraph 1, Article 4 of the RPC which provides that criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from what he intended; but in order that a person be criminally liable, the
following requisites must be present: (1) that a felony was committed, and (2) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed
by the offender. There is no doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon, which occurred
as the direct consequence of the blow dealt by the appellant, and the fact that the
defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the
consequence of his unlawful act but is merely a mitigating circumstance (US vs
Rodriguez, 23 Phil 22).
[ GR No. 81404, Jan 28, 1991 ]
PEOPLE v. ISRAEL CARMINA +
DECISION
271 Phil. 454

CRUZ, J.:

The victim was Jose Billy Agotano, who was only twenty years old when he was killed in
cold blood. According to the prosecution, the killers were Valero Carmina, the herein
accused-appellant, and his son Israel Carmina, also known as Boy.

The two were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental, in an
information reading as follows:
That on or about November 15, 1986, in the Municipality of Tarragona, Province of
Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with garand rifles and sharp-pointed
bolo (pinuti), and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said garand rifle one JOSE BILLY AGOTANO,
thereby inflicting upon the latter wound which caused his death, and not contented with
that, with the use of the said bolo, accused slaughtered the dead body of said Jose Billy
Agotano.

The commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength and adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime. In his brief,
the accused-appellant contends that he should not be blamed for the killing of Billy
Agotano, granting arguendo that it was Israel who killed the victim and dismembered
his corpse. Israel, if at all, should be held accountable alone for his act. The fact that the
accused-appellant did not try to escape but yielded when he was arrested should
indicate his innocence, which should be presumed in the absence of proof of his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed was murder.

Ruling:
the crime would still be murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One
of the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal
Code is "outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse" of the victim. There is no
question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with
the cutting off of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the
intestines, lungs and liver. The kilter scoffed at the dead when the intestines were
removed and hung around Victoriano's neck "as a necklace" and the lungs and liver were
facetiously described as "pulutan."It is not certain that when early in that afternoon,
Valero told the captives in Megriño's house that they would die, the Carminas had
already definitely resolved to commit the murder. In fact, although the threat was made
to all of the captives, only Billy was killed in the end. Moreover, there was no showing
that they had coolly and dispassionately planned the execution of the offense. The
events leading to the murder suggest that the Carminas were from the start busy with
oppressing the Agotanos or drinking tuba, leaving no time for that detached and
undisturbed premeditation of the murder. It was only when they were in Katiad's house
that the decision to kill Billy was made, the justification being that "we have already
maltreated him, this time we will just finish him because he might retaliate."

What possessed the killers in the commission of their nauseating acts can only be left to
incredulous conjecture. What is certain is that whether it was caused by fanatic
ideology, or plain intoxication, or an innate bestiality, the bizarre desecration of the
corpse was utterly disgusting and deserves the strongest if helpless condemnation. The
penalty prescribed by law, which is only reclusion perpetua, does not seem severe
enough.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17666. June 30, 1966.]
ISIDORO MONDRAGON, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent
FACTS:
July 11, 1954, while complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening the dike of his
ricefield to drain the water therein and prepare the ground for planting the next day.
he heard a shout from afar telling him not to open the dike, BUT continued opening the
dike, and the same voice shouted again, 'Don't you dare open the dike.
he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards him. Nacionales informed appellant that he
was opening the dike because he would plant the next morning.
Without much ado, Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged the blow.
appellant drew his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of his body.
Complainant backed out, unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked appellant on the hand
and forearm and between the middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself. The
appellant retreated, and the complainant did not pursue him but went home instead.
petitioner filed an appeal to this court contesting the decision of Court of Appeals in
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted homicide and not of the crime of less
serious physical injuries.
Petitioner contested that he had no intention to kill the offended party.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED

HOMICIDE.
Ruling:
We have carefully examined the record, and We find that the intention of the petitioner
to kill the offended party has not been conclusively shown.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, in our opinion, do not establish the intent to
kill on the part of the petitioner.
We consider that under the circumstances surrounding the fight between the petitioner
and the offended party, the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party was not
manifest.
The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted
homicide, said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
We hold that the facts brought out in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present
case do not justify a finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended
party.
The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the
injuries suffered by the offended party were not necessarily fatal.
we hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only that of less serious
physical injuries
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby, modified that the
petitioner is declared guilty of the offense of less serious physical injuries.
People vs Kalalo
FACTS: Nov. 1932, appellants were tried for three criminal cases: the first two for
murder and the last for frustrated murder. Marcelo Kalalo was cultivating a land in
Calumpang, San Luis, Batangas from 1931 to 1932. However, when harvest time came
Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted thereon. Kalalo then filed a complaint
on Sept. 28, 1931 an on Dec. 8, 1931 but both cases were dismissed by a motion filed by
Holgado Prior to Oct. 1, 1932, Kalalo and Holgado had a litigation over a parcel of land.
On Oct. 1, Holgado and her brother (one of the deceased) Arcadio employed several
laborers and had the land plowed. They (laborers and Arcadio) went to the land early
that day. But apparently, Kalalo was aware of this so him and 6 others waited for them,
5 of which were armed with bolos. Upon arrival, they ordered them to stop. The laborers
did in view of the threatening attitude of the appellants. Shortly after 9am, Isabela and
two others arrived and distributed food to the laborers. (one of the deceased) Marcelino
Panaligan arrived and ordered them to continue their work. The appellants then
approached them (Marcelino and Arcadio) and after a remark by Fausta (mother of
Kalalos), what is detaining you? they simultaneously struck with their bolos. Marcelo on
Arcadio Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalolo and Gregorio Ramos on Marcelino Arcadio and
Marcelino died instantly from the wounds received. Arcadio bore six wounds and
Marcelino garnered an astounding number of 14 wounds. After the two dropped dead,
Marcelo Kalalo took a revolver from Marcelino and fire four shots at Hilarion Holgado
who was fleeing from the scene. Their sentences: In case No. 6858: (murder of
Marcelino) 17 years, 4 months and one day of reclusion temporal. Accessory penalties:
indemnify the heirs in the sum of P1,000 In case No. 6859: (murder of Arcadio
Holgado) 17 years, 4 months and one day of reclusion temporal. Accessory penalties:
indemnify the heirs in the sum of P1,000 In case No. 6860: Court of First Instance of
Batangas, held that the crime committed was simply discharge of firearms (not
frustrated murder), and Marcelo kalalo was sentenced to 1 year, 8 months, and 21 days
of prision correccional and to pay proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings

ISSUE: Whether or not said sentences were in accordance with the law

Ruling:
TC was correct in finding them guilty The fact that they were not arrested until after
several days because they had been hiding is corroborative evidence of their guilt. They
were actuated by the same motive which was to get rid of all those who might insist on
plowing the land On the issue of whether they are guilty of murder or of simple
homicide The circumstance of abuse if superior strength, if proven to have been present,
raises homicide to murder. The Attorney-General maintains that they are guilty of
murder in view of the presence of abuse of superior strength. Trial court is of the
opinion that they are guilty of simply homicide but with the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. SC: This is not apparent here since the deceased were also
armed, one with a revolver and the other with a bolo. Therefore, the two cases are mere
homicides with no modifying circumstance to be taken into consideration. On Case No.
6860: Since Marcelo fired four successive shots, it shows that he was bent on killing
Hilarion. He performed everything necessary to on his part to commit the crime but he
failed by reason of causes independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or
because victim simply was successful in dodging the shots. This constitutes attempted
homicide with no modifying circumstance Sentences were modified: Case 6858: crime is
homicide, sentenced to 14 years, 8 months and one day of reclusion temporal each.
Minimum is fixed at 9 years Case 6859: crime is homicide, sentenced to 14 years, 8
months and one day of reclusion temporal each. Minimum is fixed at 9 years Case 6860:
crime is attempted homicide, sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and one day of prision
correccional. Minimum penalty is 6 months.
U.S. VS. ABIOG
G.R. No. L-12747; November 13, 1917

FACTS: The chance remarks of the deceased made the defendant Vicente indignant at
its allusions, which prompted the latter to vindicate. Thus, Vicente immediately went to
his house to get a revolver but while returning to the scene, his brother attempted to
prevent him of his plan by gaining the possession of the revolver which accidentally
fired and killed the latter. This incident further infuriated Vicente and caused him to
cling on his intention of killing the deceased whom he actually wounded in the stomach
by firing his weapon. Running in his succor, his brother Luis also attacked the deceased
with a bolo. The mortal wounds sustained by the victim caused his untimely death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were liable to the crime of homicide.

HELD: Yes. The Court said that since the mortal wounds inflicted by the defendants
upon the deceased caused the latter’s immediate death, they are guilty of homicide.
In the absence of conspiracy, the criminal liability resulting from different acts
committed against one and the same person is individual and not collective and each
one of the culprits is responsible only for his own acts (U.S. vs. Magcomot).

People vs Felipe Kalalo, et.al.

G.R. Nos. 39303-39305
March 17, 1934

Facts:

On November 10, 1932, the appellants namely, Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan
Kalalo, and Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Batangas jointly with Alejandro Garcia,
Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the
first two for murder, and the last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties
said three cases were tried together and after the presentation of their respective
evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia
Abrenica, and sentenced the other appellants.

Issue:

W/O accused-appellants are liable of the crimes of murder and discharge of firearms?

Held:

The first case is, for the alleged murder of Marcelino Panaligan, to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties,
and to indemnify the heirs of the said deceased Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of
P1,000, with the costs.

The second case is, for the alleged murder of Arcadio Holgado, to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties,
and to indemnify the heirs of the aforesaid victim, the deceased Arcadio Holgado, in the
sum of P1,000, with the costs.

In the third case, that is, the court held that the crime committed was simply that of
discharge of firearm, not frustrated murder, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo was sentenced
to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional and to pay the
proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings. Felipe Kalalo and Juan Kalalo, as well
as their co-accused Fausta and Alipia Abrenica, Gregorio Ramos and Alejandro Garcia,
were acquitted of the charges therein.

In all other respects, the appealed sentences in the said three cases are hereby affirmed
without prejudice to crediting the appellants therein with one-half of the time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code. So ordered.

DISCHARGE OF FIREARM
(ART. 254)
DADO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 131421)

Facts: The present case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso guilty
of the crime of homicide. The information charged both Dado and Eraso with murder
allegedly committed by said the accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and treachery, and sho tSilvestre Balinas thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instant death.The antecedent
facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga were as
follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station
formed three teams to intercept some cattle rustlers. The Team composed of the
petitioner SPO4Geronimo Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Aflredo Balinas
and54 Rufo Alga waited behind a large dike. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were
both armed with M14 armalite rifles, were positioned between the petitioner,
who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who was
carrying an M16 armalite rifle. At around 11:00 of that same evening, the team saw
somebody approaching at a distance of 50meters. When he was about 5 meters away
from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso was making some
movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinascould beam his flashlight,
Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately
thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim turned out
to be Silvestre “Butsoy” Balinas, thenephew of Alfredo Balinas. Eraso embraced Alfredo
Balinas to show his repentance for his deed.

Issue: Whether accused is guilty of homicide instead of illegal discharge of firearm only.

Held: In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner Dado and accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer
necessary to establish who caused the fatal wound in as much as conspiracy
makes the act of one conspirator the act of all. Although the agreement need not be
directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso’s seemingly
concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather
than the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Evidently, the prosecution failed to
prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim were particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. Hence,
the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide and acquitted the petitioner of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. A new decision was entered finding
petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.

[G.R. No. 11653. August 19, 1916. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENOVEVA AQUINO and LAZARO

CASIPIT, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

FACTS:
Genoveva Aquino shore that according to her calculation she had been pregnant since
she ceased menstruating, eight months prior to the date of her childbirth; that when she
felt the pains of approaching childbirth in the afternoon when she was working in the
fields, two days had elapsed during which she had noticed that the child she carried in
her womb did not move; that at about six o’clock in the evening of that day, realizing
that she was in danger of giving birth, she went with her companions to beg lodging in a
house nearby and she gave birth to a child therein at a late hour that night; that the child
was born dead, which she knew to be a fact because it did not cry, nor move, nor show
any signs of life; that it was therefore wrapped in a skirt, together with the placenta, and
she directed her companion Casipit to bury it; that she afterwards learned that he had
deposited and left it in a small pit containing a little water.

Lazaro Casipit corroborated the testimony of the defendant Aquino, and stated that the
child to which the latter gave birth was born dead, did not move and showed no signs of
life, as it did not cry; that therefore, in compliance with the directions given him by its
mother he proceeded to bury it, not in the grounds of the house where they had taken
lodgings, but in a pit 150 meters away which he had discovered in spite of the darkness;
that he put the child’s corpse in this pit and covered it with earth; and that the owners
and inmates of the house remained lying down and did not get up. This witness’ wife,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant intended to bury the child and is guilty of the article 334
or 581 of the Penal Code.

Ruling:
With respect to the defendant, Casipit, the record discloses no circumstantial evidence
of his having had any malevolent intention of burying a live child. In compliance with
the instructions given him by Genoveva Aquino, he proceeded to inter the dead child
which she had given birth to, and as in the darkness of the night he found a shallow pit
containing a little water, he took advantage of it to save himself the trouble of digging
grave to comply with his instructions to bury the child’s body. At most, the defendant
Casipit may have incurred provided in article 334 and 581 of the Penal Code for having
violated the laws relating to the burial of the dead.

Therefore, in view of the evidence taken in the investigation of the criminal charges
against the defendants, and as it was indisputably proven that the child delivered of
Genoveva Aquino at a late hour of the night of January 1 of the present year, was
stillborn and showed no signs whatever of life, it is evident that the record contains no
proof whatever of the commission of any acts that would constitute parricide,
infanticide, or the crime of the abandonment of a child under 7 years of age to the
danger of death, or of the crime of murder; in consequence, strict justice demands the
defendant’s acquittal.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is reversed and Genoveva
Aquino and Lazaro Casipit should be, as they hereby are, acquitted of the crimes of
which they were prosecuted, with the costs of both instances de officio. The defendants
will be set at liberty forthwith, if not held for any other crime. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 4779. November 20, 1908. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTORIA VEDRA, Defendant-Appellant.

Mariano Escueta, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

FACTS: Defendant, an unmarried woman, gave birth to a child and a short time
thereafter carried the infant a distance of 150 meters from the house and buried it. The
body was disinterred and found to be that of a child born in perfect condition of health,
but with an abrasion on both sides of the nose, apparently caused by heavy external
pressure: Held, That the facts proven with respect to the acts of the accused and the
condition of the body are sufficient to sustain a conviction for infanticide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the infant’s death.
Ruling:
The defense alleges that the above facts do not prove that the death of the infant was
caused by the accused; it might very well, it is alleged, have been the result of some
unforeseen accident. No proof has been offered, however, that an accident of any sort
had occurred which might have produced the death of the child. Inasmuch as it was
born alive and in a healthy condition, it is not to be presumed, without some just reason
therefor, that it died a natural death within the extremely short time that elapsed
between its birth and its burial. The latter took place immediately after without further
interval of time than that which was strictly necessary to carry the child a distance of
about 150 meters from the house of the defendant to the site where the infant was
buried. On the contrary, all of the acts related above, performed by the accused
immediately after her confinement, reveal in a clear and unquestionable manner her
decided intent to kill the newly born child in order to conceal her dishonor; and the
signs of violence found on the body demonstrate that she actually effected her purpose.
The aforesaid signs, together with the above mentioned conduct of the accused,
constitute conclusive proof of her guilt as the author of the crime of infanticide herein
prosecuted.

In view of the foregoing facts, the judgment appealed from is confirmed, and the
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of two years, four months and one day of
prision correccional, with the corresponding accessory penalties and costs, provided,
that she shall be credited with one-half of the period of the prision preventiva that she
may have suffered, with the costs of this instance against her. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 5597. March 5, 1910. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D. B. JEFFREY, Defendant-Appellant.

TORRES, J. :

FACTS:
On the evening of March 1, 1909, while Teodorica Saguinsin was in a Chinese shop
situated in Guadalupe, municipality of San Pedro Macati, Rizal Province, a man named
D. B. Jeffrey appeared therein, and, without any apparent reason whatever, struck the
woman three times on the hip with a bottle that he was carrying, in consequence of
which the woman fell to the ground with an abundant hemorrhage from the womb; she
was immediately taken to her home in a carretela, and being three months pregnant she
had a miscarriage on the following day, according to the examination made by the
president of the municipal board of health. The woman was ill and unable to attend to
her usual duties for forty-five days.

Therefore a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the Court of First Instance
of said province on the 5th of June, 1909, charging D. B. Jeffrey with the crime of
lesiones menos graves, whereupon these proceedings were instituted. The trial court
sentenced the accused, on the 19th of August, 1909, to the penalty of forty-five days of
arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, to indemnify the injured woman in the sum
of P50, and, in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine and the indemnity, to suffer
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not, however, to exceed one-third of the
main penalty, and to pay the costs. From this judgment defendant’s counsel has
appealed.

Issue:
Is the crime committed lesiones or abortion?

Ruling:

From the facts above related it is clearly shown that the crime of abortion, defined and
punished by article 411 of the Penal Code, has been committed, inasmuch as, in
consequence of the maltreatment received.

Even though it was not the criminal intent of the defendant to cause the abortion, the
fact that, without any apparent reason whatever, he maltreated Teodorica Saguinsin,
presumably not knowing that she was pregnant, as author of the abuse which caused the
miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment but also for the consequences
thereof, to wit, for the abortion; and it was also proven that on the said occasion the
defendant was drunk, which circumstance explains how he came to strike the woman
with a bottle without any known motive. It does not appear that he is an habitual
drunkard. The penalty of prision correccional as fixed by the aforesaid article should be
imposed upon him in the minimum degree, owing to presence of circumstance 6 of
article 9 of the Penal Code, there being no aggravating circumstance to counteract its
effect.

With respect to the question as to whether or not D. B. Jeffrey, having been accused of
the crime of lesiones menos graves, can be lawfully sentenced for the crime of abortion,
one which is distinct from that of lesiones, it is proper to consider that the complaint
filed by the fiscal.

For the reason above set forth, and holding that the crime committed is that of abortion
and not that of lesiones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be set
aside, and that the accused should be and he is hereby sentenced to the penalty of eight
months of prision correccional, to indemnify the injured woman in the sum of P50, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of both instances. So
ordered.

PEOPLE vs. SALUFRANIA 159 SCRA 401, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988
PARRICIDE WITH UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION

FACTS:
Filomeno Salufrania and his wife Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening of 3 December 1974, in their small house at a far away sitio in barrio
Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte. During said quarrel, he boxed his pregnant wife on
the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, he strangled her to death; that blood oozed
from the eyes and nose of his wife and that she died right on the spot where she fell.
Pedro Salufrania, the spouses’ son, testified as an eyewitness to the crime. He further
testified that after
killing his mother, the accused- appellant went out of the house to get a hammock; that
his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed how the accused killed their
mother because his sister and other brothers were already asleep when the horrible
incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly woke up after
the death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers body while their father was
away; that their father arrived early the next morning with the hammock and after
placing their dead mother on the hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and
brought the cadaver to the house of his sister Conching, located at a populated section of
Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines
Norte for burial. Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now living
with his uncle Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-
accused, because the latter has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister
should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death. The accused denied the allegations
and contended that his wife died due to a stomach ailment and headache. The defense
presented witnesses in favor of the accused. However, the trial court decided and found
the accused guilty of the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion. He
further assigns several errors allegedly committed by the trial court and one of which is
that the latter erred in convicting him of the complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion, assuming arguendo that the evidence for the prosecution is credible and
sufficient.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion.

HELD:
No. There is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. He
should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion
but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of
Unintentional Abortion are as follows: 1) That there is a pregnant woman. 2) That
violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3) That the
violence is intentionally exerted. 4) That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either
in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. The Solicitor General's brief
makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his
pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find
that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere
boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a
fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant
must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.

G.R. No. 12694 September 6, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BALDOMERA ESPARCIA, Defendant-

Appellee.
Leopoldo Rovira for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The defendant and appellant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Negros with the crime of serious physical injuries as punished by article 46, paragraph 1,
of the Penal Code. She was convicted and sentenced under this provision. The facts
established at the trial are so filthy that we feel that it will serve no good purpose to set
them forth. We merely content ourselves with the statement that the findings of the trial
court as to the sufficiency of the proof should be.
Issue:
whether or not the crime committed is that defined and penalized by article 414 of the
Penal Code.

Ruling:
At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is the mutilation known
by the name of "castration" which consists of the amputation of whatever organ is
necessary for generation. The law could not fail to punish with the utmost severity such
a crime, which, although not destroying life, deprives a person of the means to transmit
it. But bear in mind that according to this article in order for "castration" to exist, it is
indispensable that the "castration" be made purposely. The law does not look only to the
result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or
attack, a person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act, although voluntary, not
being intentional to that end, it would not come under the provisions of this article, but
under No. 2 of article 431. (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4
Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)

The fact that the fiscal erroneously classified the crime is of no importance since the
body of the complaint sufficiently describes the crime penalized by article 414. There
were present in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity, of being the spouse of the offended party, and of premeditation. Since the
defendant is less than eighteen years of age, the penalty must be reduced one degree.
Accordingly, the appropriate penalty is prision mayor in its maximum degree.

The defendant and appellant is found guilty of a violation of article 414 of the Penal
Code and is sentenced to twelve years of prision mayor, with the costs of this instance.
So ordered.

PEOPLE V LLANTO
January 20, 2003 || Puno, J.

TOPIC: Institution of actions arising from crime; criminal aspect; form and content;
substantive; cause of accusation
DOCTRINE: Both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged in
information to warrant imposition of penalty.

FACTS

November 1999 – rape committed by Captain Marcial Llanto to his minor niece (12yo at
the time of commission of offense)
February 2000 – information filed against accused before RTC. Information reads:
“That on or about (the) twelfth day of November, 1999 at Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust, with
use of a knife, through force, violence and intimidation, and by taking advantage of his
moral ascendancy over his twelve (12) year old minor niece MARIA CRISTY T. BALISI,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma.
Cristy T. Balisi against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever
amounts may be awarded to her under provisions of the Civil Code.”

RTC convicted him of qualified rape. Death penalty.

ISSUE
W/N death penalty should be imposed to accused for the crime of qualified rape?

RULING: NO. Under Article 266-B RPC, death penalty shall be imposed when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be alleged in
information. The rule is retroactive because it is favorable to accused.

In this case, the allegation that the accused is the uncle of the victim and the latter is his
niece is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship
under Art. 266-B RPC. It must also allege that he is a ‘relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree’ (People v Lachica). Consequently, because of the
defect in the information, the accused can only be held liable for simple rape.

The prosecution also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the kinship between the
accused and the victim. The prosecution failed to corroborate Cristy’s testimony that the
accused is her uncle, being the husband of her father’s sister. The accused himself
admitted that his wife, Felicitas, is the sister of Cristy’s father, Raul. Felicitas and her
sister, Dolores, confirmed the accused’s testimony. However, we cannot consider their
testimonies corroborative of Cristy’s testimony. Well-settled is the doctrine that the
prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, including the
qualifying circumstances, thus the testimonies of the defense witnesses cannot be used
to benefit the prosecution, to the disadvantage of the accused.

GUILTY OF SIMPLE RAPE.

PEOPLE VS VILLAPANA
People v. Orita

G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990

Lessons Applicable: No frustrated rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at
the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her
home from a party. She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent
visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for
her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st
floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he
dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded herwith
the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then
pushed her hitting her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed
himself. He then ordered her to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra,
pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He
made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as
told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid
down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis
was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed
out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the
partition, she ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a window.
• Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding
house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building
and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building
opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took
off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed
to the boarding house where they heard and saw somebody running away but failed to
apprehend him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital
where she was physically examined.
• Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
• RTC: frustrated rape

ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.

HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it
is his intention to perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ
by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the
sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration
of the genital organ of the victim.

[ GR No. 177752, Feb 24, 2009 ]

PEOPLE v. ROBERTO ABAY Y TRINIDAD +
599 Phil. 390

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
On March 8, 2000, appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad was charged with rape in relation
to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 4[1] under the following Information:
That sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, [appellant] A’s
mother's live-in partner by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct against
A, a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there kissing her breast and whole body, lying
on top of her and inserting his penis into her vagina, thus succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her, against her will and consent thereafter threatening to kill her should
she report the incident, thereby gravely endangering her survival and normal growth
and development, to the damage and prejudice of A.

AAA testified that appellant, her mother's live-in partner, had been sexually abusing her
since she was seven years old. Whenever her mother was working or was asleep in the
evening, appellant would threaten her with a bladed instrument[2] and force her to
undress and engage in sexual intercourse with him.

BBB corroborated AAA's testimony. She testified that she knew about appellant's
dastardly acts. However, because he would beat her up and accuse AAA of lying
whenever she confronted him, she kept her silence. Thus, when she caught appellant in
the act of molesting her daughter on December 25, 1999, she immediately proceeded to
the police station and reported the incident.

According to Dr. Guerrero-Manalo, AAA confided to her that appellant had been
sexually abusing her for six years. This was confirmed by AAA's physical examination
indicating prior and recent penetration injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of rape.

Ruling:

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed
against her. The Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the
time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of both
crimes, the prosecution's evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the
person of AAA through force and intimidation[22] by threatening her with a bladed
instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was
established.[23]

Indeed, the records are replete with evidence establishing that appellant forced AAA to
engage in sexual intercourse with him on December 25, 1999. Appellant is therefore
found guilty of rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, to conform with existing jurisprudence, he is
ordered to pay AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity ex-delicto[24] and P75,000 as moral
damages.[25]

WHEREFORE, the January 18, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01365 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Appellant Roberto Abay y
Trinidad is hereby found GUIILTY of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity ex-
delicto, P75,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138456 : October 23, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, v. ROLANDO DEDUYO Y PIRYO alias
BATMAN AND ISAGANI MAAGO (ACQUITTED), accused.

ROLANDO DEDUYO Y PIRYO alias BATMAN, Appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

FACTS OF THE CASE: The accused feloniously kidnap and detain thereby
restraining the liberty of a minor with threats to kill him for the purpose of extorting
ransom from his parents.
The appellant contends that there was no kidnapping because the victim voluntarily
went with him. It was ruled that the fact that the victim voluntarily went with the
accused did not remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went
with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done
so. - the victim, a boy 16 years of age, would not have voluntarily left with the appellant
if not for the false assurance that his mother had supposedly permitted him to
accompany the appellant to the airport “to get the baggage” and bring it back to the
victim’s house. Moreover in kidnapping, the victim need not be taken by the accused
forcibly or against his will. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the
victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody.
In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention can either be made forcibly or fraudulently.
Given all these circumstances, the court finds that the victim was effectively restrained
of his liberty - the primary element of the offense of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention.
ISSUE: whether or not there was restrained on the liberty of the victim.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: The appellant, Rolando Deduyo alias Batman,
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty
of death.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
confinement or restraint of the victim, or the deprivation of his liberty. It is not
necessary for the victim to be locked up or placed in an enclosure; it is sufficient for him
to be detained or deprived of his liberty in any manner. In the present case, the
testimony and sworn statement of the victim showed that he was effectively restrained
of his liberty.