Miami Pedestrian Bridge Collapse:

Computational Forensic Analysis

Ran Cao, S.M.ASCE 1; Sherif El-Tawil, F.ASCE 2; and Anil Kumar Agrawal, M.ASCE 3

Abstract: On March 15, 2018, a pedestrian concrete truss bridge in Miami, Florida, collapsed during construction. The failure of this
bridge caused multiple casualties and raised many serious concerns regarding the design and construction of the bridge, including the
emerging concept of accelerated bridge construction (ABC). The causes of failure of this bridge have not yet been comprehensively
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investigated. This paper used high-fidelity computational simulation to investigate the behavior of critical structural members of the bridge
during construction. Four important construction stages (prestressing, transportation, relocation, and retensioning) were simulated to iden-
tify dominant factors that could have contributed to the failure of the bridge. A recent investigation report from the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) attributed the collapse to flawed design at the failed joint at the northern end of the bridge, but the specific sequence
of mechanisms that led to collapse was not identified. Based on simulation and demand/capacity analysis, this work shows that the hori-
zontal component of the retensioning force overcame the resistance of the joint and caused it to slide with respect to the deck. As sliding
progressed, dowel action between the deck and joint became fully mobilized, crushing and damaging concrete locally within the joint and
the deck. The evolving damage (to the cold joint and adjacent joint and deck concrete) prompted more sliding and led to a vicious cycle
that culminated in the collapse of the entire bridge. Parametric studies investigated the effects of the coefficient of friction at the cold joint,
prestressing forces in the deck, and retensioning forces applied to the northern diagonal member on the collapse behavior of the bridge. The
results from the analysis and simulations provide important insights into the collapse mechanism and highlight lessons that could be learned
for preventing similar catastrophic failures in the future. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)BE.1943-5592.0001532. © 2019 American Society of Civil
Engineers.

Introduction
Fig. 1 is a rendering of the planned FIU-Sweetwater UniversityCity
pedestrian bridge. The completed bridge had the look of a cable-
stayed bridge with a pylon and multiple cables attached to the
canopy. However, the main span of the bridge was designed as
a concrete truss bridge, which was self-supporting without the
cables, i.e., the pylon and cables were just for aesthetic purposes.
The use of concrete trusses in bridges is rather uncommon because
it requires prestressing truss members undergoing tension, because
concrete is weak in tension. The construction of the entire bridge
was scheduled to be finished by early 2019 and was built using the
accelerated bridge construction (ABC) method. After being precast
near the highway, the main span of the bridge was transported and
placed on the bridge piers by two transporters on March 10, 2018.
Fig. 2 shows the bridge during transportation. On March 15, 2018,
5 days after the relocation, the main span of the bridge collapsed
onto US Route 41 (Fig. 3). This accident resulted in six fatalities
and at least eight injuries (NTSB 2018c). The collapsed span was
around 53-m (174-ft) long and weighed 862 Metric tons (950 t).
1
Graduate Student, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
City College of the City Univ. of New York, New York, NY 10031 (cor-
responding author). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7075-9800.
Email: rcao000@citymail.cuny.edu
2
Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.
3
Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, City College
of the City Univ. of New York, New York, NY 10031.
Note. This manuscript was submitted on May 1, 2019; approved on
October 7, 2019; published online on November 7, 2019. Discussion
period open until April 7, 2020; separate discussions must be submitted
for individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Bridge
Engineering, © ASCE, ISSN 1084-0702.
According to the preliminary report from the NTSB (2018c), work-
ers were retensioning tendons in diagonal Member 11 when the
bridge collapsed (Fig. 4).
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has collaborated
with the NTSB to test and evaluate the construction materials col-
lected from the collapse site, including samples of concrete, steel
bars, and one of the posttensioning rods. After initial tests, no sig-
nificant issues were found in the material samples per NTSB
reports (NTSB 2018a, b). A preliminary investigation also was con-
ducted by the NTSB on the recovered bridge deck from the north
end (NTSB 2018c). Reinforcement bars were found to be em-
bedded correctly as prescribed in the design drawings. The NTSB
also released several photographs showing cracks in the joint area
of diagonal Member 11, which occurred before relocating the main
span of the bridge from the ground to the bridge piers (NTSB
2018a, c). The development of these cracks continued after the re-
location of the main span. Based on the latest report from NTSB
(2018b), the design of the concrete joint at the north end was
deemed unconservative. The flawed joint design echoed the col-
lapse of the I-35 truss bridge in 2007, in which joint failure also
was considered to be the main cause of the collapse (NTSB 2008;
Hao 2010). The significance of joint design for concrete truss
bridges was highlighted in many studies (Jung et al. 2010; Xue
et al. 2011; Berman et al. 2012).
Although the NTSB (2018b) investigation identified Member
11’s joint as a likely cause for failure, the report was not clear
about the specific set of mechanisms or sequence of processes
that led to failure. The objective of this study was to critically evalu-
ate the design of this bridge and study the possible failure mech-
anisms through high-fidelity finite-element (FE) simulations. A
detailed FE model of the bridge was created based on as-built draw-
ings (FIU 2017a) and run on the LS-DYNA version R10.0.0 plat-
form (Hallquist 2006). Four different construction stages were

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Fig. 1. Rendering of the FIU pedestrian bridge.

Fig. 2. (a) Aerial photo of bridge location (imagery © 2019 Google, imagery © 2019 Maxar Technologies, Map data © 2019 USGS); and (b) photos
of the FIU pedestrian bridge during construction (image reprinted from FIU 2018).

Fig. 3. Collapse scene of the pedestrian bridge. (Reprinted from NTSB 2018c.)

simulated, namely prestressing, transportation, relocation, and re- collapse resistance of the bridge. The parameters considered in-
tensioning. After developing a theory of how the collapse initiated cluded the coefficient of friction at the cold joint connecting
and progressed, parametric studies were carried out to investigate Member 11 to the deck, the level of prestressing forces in the deck,
how various influential parameters could have influenced the and the level of retensioning forces applied to Member 11.

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 Fig. 4. Initial collapse occurred in the north end. (Images courtesy of Instagram/@o2webdev.)
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Fig. 5. Damage mode of the cold joint before and after relocation. (Images reprinted from NTSB 2018a, c.)

Critical Review of Bridge Design Calculations
According to the NTSB (2018b), the collapse of the bridge was
attributed to design errors made in the joint at the northern end
of the bridge. However, the specific design flaws or the failure
mechanism of the joint were not identified in NTSB reports.
“In this case, a firm was hired to independently review the bridge
design for errors. However, the review conducted by this firm did
not evaluate the nodes of the bridge truss where they connected
with the bridge deck and canopy nor did it consider the multiple
stages the bridge construction involved” NTSB (2019b). Fig. 5
shows physical evidence at the damaged concrete joint from the
NTSB investigation. Concrete cracking developed in the heel of
Member 11, which appeared to be caused by the sliding of the joint
(Fig. 5). In addition, a diagonal crack developed in the concrete
deck adjacent to Member 12, signifying a potential punching shear
failure mode. Based on the observations from Fig. 5 and the NTSB
studies, a critical review of the joint design was conducted in this
study, mainly focusing on the capacity of shear friction, punching
shear, and blowout damage of the concrete joint.
Superstructure Design Provided by FIU
In response to public records requests, Florida International
University has made the design calculations of the bridge, along
with other related documents, available on their website (FIU,
Facilities Management 2019). A review of the design calculations
provided by FIU showed that the northern end joint of the bridge
was a construction joint, i.e., cold joint. The cold joint was de-
signed to connect Truss member 11, Member 12, and the deck
(Fig. 6). In the calculation document, the shear force across the cold
joint was reported to be computed from a FE analysis. However, the
cold joint was not found to be explicitly modeled in the FE model.
Instead, Members 11 and 12 seemed to have been merged with the
deck rather than in frictional contact with the deck in the as-built
situation. In addition, the boundary condition of the main span of
the bridge was supposed to be simply supported (before the pylon
connection), but a sketch of the design model (Fig. 6) did not look
like a traditional simply support boundary condition, raising ques-
tions about the accuracy of the demand calculations. For example,
Fig. 7 shows the shear force and compression force at the northern
end joint of the bridge calculated by the designer (FIU 2017b). The
calculation results of the forces acting on the joints in Fig. 7 do not
seem to be correct based on the geometry of the joint. Hand cal-
culations by the authors showed that the shear demand at the
northern end joint should be 9,168 kN, which is over twice the
shear force of 4,390 kN calculated by the designer. The compres-
sion force on the joint was calculated to be 5,509 kN by the authors

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Fig. 6. Sketch of the FE model of the bridge before pylon connection.
(Adapted from FIU 2017b.)
Fig. 7. Interface shear design of the northern end zone by the designer.
(Data from FIU 2017b.)
(as discussed subsequently) and was close to the design force of
5,485 kN.
Shear Capacity of Construction Joint
In the final plan of the bridge (FIU 2017a), construction joints were
present between the truss members and the slabs (deck and can-
opy). During construction, the concrete deck, trusses, and canopy
were cast separately and in a sequence, i.e., the deck was cast first,
then the truss and the canopy. Because the concrete batches were
cast at different times, construction joints or cold joints were left at
the interface between the truss members and the slabs. Fig. 8 shows
the details of the cold joint at the northern end of the bridge. Mem-
bers 11 and 12 and the deck were connected via the construction
joint (Fig. 8). The axial loading from Member 11 caused a shear
force acting on the cold-joint plane, which was resisted through
friction at the cold joint and dowel action of the steel rebars cross-
ing the joint. Per ACI (2011), the coefficient of friction μ depends
on the roughness of the interface across the joint. In FIU (2017b),
the surface of the cold joint was intentionally roughened to an am-
plitude of 6.35 mm. Therefore, to evaluate the shear capacity of the
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Fig. 8. Detailing of the cold-joint model.
cold joint, the coefficient of friction was assumed to be 1.0 per
ACI (2011).
The frictional capacity of the joint surface is calculated by
Eq. (1), where Fp is the prestressing force in Member 11, FG is
the axial force in Member 11 due to gravity (self-weight), and
α is the inclination angle of Member 11 with the horizontal surface
f ¼ μðFp þ FG Þ sin α
¼ 1.0 × ð2,491 þ 8,205Þ × sinð31°Þ ¼ 5,509 kN ð1Þ
The dowel action associated with the rebars contributes to the
shear capacity of the cold joint. Dowel capacity is computed by
considering the bars as steel shear studs in a composite structure
composed of the deck on one side and the joint connecting
Members 11 and 12 on the other side. Per AISC (2010), the shear
strength of anchors, Qn , is calculated by Eq. (2), where Asa is the
cross-sectional area of the stud (mm2 ); f c0 is the compressive
strength of the concrete (MPa); Ec is the modulus of elasticity
of the concrete (MPa); Rg and Rp are 1.0 and 0.75, respectively,
for solid slabs; and Fu is the minimum tensile strength of the stud
(MPa). The dowel capacity was estimated to be 3,109 kN [Eq. (2)].
The capacity in Eq. (2) does not incorporate a strength-reduction
factor because this was an assessment exercise and not a design
exercise
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Qn ¼ 0.5Asa f c0 Ec ¼ 0.5×10,012× 58×36233 ¼ 7257 kN
> Rg Rp Asa Fu ¼ 1.0×0.75×10,012 mm2 ×414 MPa ¼ 3,109 kN
Qn ¼ 3,109 kN ð2Þ
The shear capacity of the cold joint, C, is equal to the sum of the
frictional and dowel capacities
C ¼ f þ Qn ¼ 5,509 kN þ 3,109 kN ¼ 8,618 kN ð3Þ
The horizontal shear demand acting on the cold joint due to
gravity and prestressing was calculated to be 9,168 kN, which
is larger than the calculated shear capacity [Eq. (4)]. In Eq. (4),
PG is the axial loading in Member 11 from gravity, and PP is
the axial loading from prestressing. The results of the hand calcu-
lation match the conclusion from the NTSB report (NTSB 2018b)
that the demand was underestimated for the cold joint at the
northern end
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Fig. 9. Punching shear in the cold-joint area (vertical Member 12 removed for clarity).

D ¼ ðPG þ PP Þ × cosðαÞ ¼ ð8,205 þ 2,491Þ × cosð31°Þ V ps ¼ ð1 − 0.18Þf ps Aps

¼ 9,168 kN > C ¼ f þ Qn ¼ 8,618 kN ð4Þ ¼ 0.82 × 1,303 MPa × 2 × 1,661 mm2 ¼ 3,550 kN ð7Þ
Per NTSB (2018c), workers were retensioning the tendons in
Member 11 when the bridge collapsed. The retensioning force ap- pffiffiffiffiffi
plied to Member 11 could increase the horizontal shear demand Vc ¼ 4 f c0 Ac
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
acting on the cold joint. For example, per Eq. (5), if the prestressing ¼ 4 58 × 145 × 0.0069 × ð1,159 × 625 þ 2 × 659 × 625Þ
force in Member 11 is increased by 25% of the designed value,
reaching the yield strength of the tendons, the demand will increase ¼ 3,918 kN ð8Þ
from 9,168 to 9,702 kN. In this scenario, per Eq. (6), the retension-
ing force also will increase the shear capacity from 8,618 to where V ps = prestressing force of tendons in deck; f ps = prestress-
8,939 kN. The overall demand:capacity ratio for the cold joint in- ing stress of tendon; Aps = area of tendon; V c = punching shear
creases from 1.06 to 1.09 due to retensioning, making the joint capacity of concrete; fc0 = compressive strength of concrete; and
more vulnerable to sliding. The concrete of the cold joint had been Ac = area of shear planes.
damaged before the retensioning per NTSB (2018a), which could The steel bar reinforcement also contributed to the punch-out
further degrade the assumed frictional capacity of the joint interface capacity
and aggravate the sliding capacity of the cold joint. The loads in
Eqs. (5) and (6) are the design loads without factors V s ¼ f y As ¼ 414 MPa × 3 × 4 × 2 × 129 mm2 ¼ 1,282 kN
D ¼ ð1.25 × Fp þ FG Þ × cosð31°Þ ð9Þ

¼ ð1.25 × 2,491 þ 8,205Þ × cosð31°Þ ¼ 9,702 kN ð5Þ

C ¼ f þ Qn ¼ μðFp þ FG Þ sin α þ Qn
¼ 1.0 × ð1.25 × 2,491 þ 8,205Þ × sinð31°Þ
þ 3,109 kN ¼ 8,939 kN ð6Þ

Punching Shear Capacity of Deck

Another possible failure mode of the cold-joint area is punching
shear. The north end of the concrete deck could punch out under
the effect of compressive axial loading from Member 11 (Fig. 9).
Two diagonal cracks radiating out at 45° (Fig. 9 inset, dashed lines)
could develop from the ends of Member 11 to form a wedge (Fig. 10).
The punch-out wedge geometry (based on 45° cracks) was inspired
by the punching shear design process for flat slabs (ACI 2011).
The two deck tendons adjacent to Member 12 were located
within the punch-out wedge (Fig. 10) and therefore could contrib-
ute to punch-out resistance [Eq. (7)]. An 18% prestress loss due to
time-dependent losses, such as creep and shrinkage of concrete and
steel relaxation (AASHTO 2017), was assumed. The punching
shear resistance due to concrete is computed in Eq. (8). As in
Fig. 10. Calculation diagram of punching shear.
Eq. (2), a strength-reduction factor was not used

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 where V s = capacity of regular steel bars; f y = yield strength of
steel bars; and As = area of steel bars.
Because it is not clear how much the prestressing tendons con-
tribute to the total punching shear strength, the capacity with and
without the tendons was computed (Cases 1 and 2, respectively) to
bracket the capacity.
Case 1: Punching shear capacity, V total , considering the effects
of tendons
V total ¼ V c þ V ps þ V s ¼ 3,918 þ 3,550 þ 1,282 ¼ 8,750 kN < D
¼ 9,168 kN ðdemandÞ
Case 2: Punching shear capacity, V total , without considering the
tendons
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V total ¼ V c þ V s ¼ 3,918 þ 1,282 ¼ 5,200 kN
< 9,168 kN ðdemandÞ
Eqs. (10) and (11) show that the joint may have been defi-
cient regarding this type of failure regardless of how much of
the tendons’ prestressing capacity had been engaged in preventing
punch out.
Axial Loading Capacity of Member 11
Eqs. (12) and (13) compute the axial load capacity of and axial
demand on Member 11 per ACI (2011), in which Pn is the axial
capacity, Ag is the gross area of the concrete section, Ast is the area
of the longitudinal steel rebars, f y is the yield strength of the rebars,
Aps is the area of the prestressing bars, and Dm11 is the axial de-
mand on Member 11 due to gravity and prestressing. As noted pre-
viously, a strength-reduction factor was not used in Eq. (12).
In Eq. (13), the axial loading due to the gravity is 8,205 kN and
the prestressing force applied to Member 11 is 2,491 kN per the
design drawings (FIU 2017a)
Pn ¼ 0.85f c0 ðAg − Ast − Aps Þ þ Ast fy
¼ 0.85 × 58 MPa × 318,961 mm2 þ 3,096 mm2 × 414 MPa
¼ 15,725 þ 1,282 ¼ 17,007 kN
Dm11 ¼ PG þ PP ¼ 8,205 kN þ 2,491 kN ¼ 10,696 kN < Pn
¼ 17,007 kN
Based on the computed results in Eqs. (12) and (13), the axial
capacity appears to be sufficient to resist the axial demand. In ad-
dition, the design capacity was found to be sufficient even when
considering accidental eccentricities (strength reduced by 20%)
per ACI (2011) [Eq. (14)], which also suggests that the design
of Member 11 to support axial load was not flawed. The fact that
Dm11 is close to the design capacity [Eq. (14)] has caused wide-
spread speculation that the axial capacity of Member 11 was the
reason for the collapse. This argument has been bolstered by the
observation that the collapse was sudden and that axial failure typ-
ically occurs without warning. However, as discussed subsequently
in more detail and supported by the design computations discussed
previously, it is unlikely that the axial capacity of Member 11 was
the reason for the collapse
ϕPn ¼ 0.8 × Pn ¼ 13,606 kN > Dm11 ¼ 10,696 kN
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ð10Þ
ð11Þ
Fig. 11. Concrete blowout failure mode of the anchorage area in the
north end.
Blowout Damage from Prestressing Bars
Fig. 11 shows the possibility for blowout damage at the anchorage
points of the prestressing tendons (ACI 2011). The prestressing
bars in Member 11 were anchored just inside the concrete joint area
(Fig. 11). The anchor plates, which were embedded inside the joint
region, had a relatively small size of 200 × 300 mm. Each of the
anchor plates transferred a substantial anchoring force of 1,245 kN.
Although concrete blowout would have been inhibited once the
bridge was placed on its supports, it could have caused internal
damage during transportation, weakening the joint region before
the bridge went into service.
Finite-Element Modeling
General Modeling Considerations
ð12Þ Fig. 12 shows the FE model of the main span of the bridge devel-
oped in LS-DYNA (Hallquist 2006). Nonlinear material models
were used to model the structural members in the northern end
of the bridge where the collapse started (Fig. 12, Nonlinear
ð13Þ material), as observed from the video evidence. To save on the mod-
eling effort, the rest of the bridge was modeled using linear elastic
materials (Fig. 12, Elastic material). The effect of the damage within
the elastic regions on the northern end failure was considered to
be small and was ignored in this study. Prestressing was modeled
in Members 10 and 11, the deck, and the canopy of the bridge. The
deck, canopy, and Truss members 10, 11, and 12 (Fig. 12, Nonlinear
material) were modeled using reduced-integration eight-node solid
elements with hourglass control. Other truss members, prestressing
tendons, and steel rebars were modeled using beam elements. The
steel plates for anchoring prestressing bars were modeled using
fully integrated solid elements to eliminate hourglassing due to
the highly concentrated nature of the applied forces.
The penalty method was used to model contact in LS-DYNA
(Hallquist 2006). When penetration was detected between two
surfaces, a contact force was applied between the surfaces to elimi-
nate the penetration. More specifically, AUTOMATIC_SURFACE_
TO_SURFACE contact was defined between the anchor plates
ð14Þ and structural members with a 0.25 coefficient of friction.
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Fig. 12. FE setup of the bridge: (a) steel rebars detailing; (b) prestressing tendons detailing; (c) FE model of the bridge; and (d) close-up of
reinforcement at the joint.

Fig. 13. Utility conduits at the north end of the bridge. (Images reprinted from Ayub 2019.)

AUTOMATIC_SINGLE_SURFACE contact was defined between Material Models

the joint connecting Members 11 and 12 and the deck, as well as that
between Members 10 and 11 and the canopy to model the cold
joints at those locations. As discussed subsequently, the static co-
efficient of friction for the contact condition was varied from 0.6 to
1.4 and the kinetic coefficient of friction was taken as 0.4. The two
bridge piers were modeled as rigid and fixed at their bottom. The
AUTOMATIC_SINGLE_SURFACE contact was defined between
the superstructure and bridge piers. The utility conduits in Fig. 13
and those located on either side of Member 12 also were modeled
using eight-node solid elements as discussed subsequently. Finite
strains were calculated and reported in the simulations.
The concrete, steel rebars, and prestressing tendons in the Nonlin-
ear material in Fig. 12 were explicitly modeled based on the con-
struction plans (FIU 2017a). Some of the bars and tendons crossed
from Members 10, 11, and 12 into the canopy and deck per the
construction plans (e.g., Fig. 8). Concrete behavior was modeled
by the continuous surface cap model (CSCM MAT159) in
LS-DYNA (Hallquist 2006). The model can capture key aspects
of inelastic concrete behavior, including postpeak softening and
confinement effects. It is based on an elastoplastic damage formu-
lation that accounts for rate effects. Default material parameters

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 Table 1. Material model of bridge
Parts Material model
Concrete CSCM (159)
ELASTIC (1)
Steel bars PLASTIC_KINEMATIC (3)
Prestressing strands (deck) ELASTIC_PLASTIC_THERMAL (4)
Prestressing bars (truss) ELASTIC_PLASTIC_THERMAL (4)
were used in this study, which were generated based on the com-
pression strength and the maximum aggregate size of the concrete
(Murray et al. 2007). The compressive strength of the concrete was
taken as 58 MPa and the maximum aggregate size was assumed to
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be 19 mm, as per the construction plans (FIU 2017a). To avoid
localization due to softening, the fracture energy was maintained
constant for the concrete model regardless of element size
(Murray et al. 2007). This regularization method has been validated
using existing drop hammer tests in the literature that were dis-
cussed in previous studies (Xu et al. 2019; Cao et al. 2019a). Be-
cause it was not clear how the utility conduits in Fig. 13 were
constructed, they were modeled using eight-node solid elements
with low-strength concrete (20 MPa). Steel rebars were modeled
using Hughes-Liu beam elements and were represented using
material MAT 3, which accounts for yielding and kinematic hard-
ening plasticity. Steel rebar elements were assumed to fracture and
were removed after the strain reached 0.20. The general mesh size
used was 38.1 mm (1.5 in.). A perfect bond was enforced between
the steel and concrete components by using the coupling method in
LS-DYNA, *CONSTRAINED_BEAM_IN_SOLID. Key informa-
tion about the material is listed in Table 1.
Prestressing Modeling
The tendons in the deck and truss members were unbonded. In the
FE simulation, the *CONSTRAINED_BEAM_IN_SOLID com-
mand was used to model the tendons and their interaction with
the surrounding concrete. The selected model ensured kinematic
coupling (in displacement, velocity, and acceleration) between
the tendons and concrete only in the direction normal to the ten-
don’s axis, but permitted slip along the tendon’s axis. Prestressing
was achieved by cooling the tendons, which shrank in response and
applied a prestressing force. A similar approach was used in many
studies with reasonable simulation results (Nakalswamy 2010;
Jiang and Chorzepa 2015; Do et al. 2018). The prestressing tendons
were modeled using the ELASTIC_PLASTIC_THERMAL mate-
rial (MAT 4), which can simulate the thermal deformations of the
material based on provided temperature time-history curves and a
given coefficient of thermal expansion.
Validation
The concrete (Mat 159) and rebar (Mat 3) models have been va-
lidated for simulating the flexure/shear behavior of RC specimens
in multiple publications, including Moutoussamy et al. (2011), Liu
(2012), and Murray et al. (2007). These studies used multiple sets
of experimental data of RC beams subject to static or impact load-
ing to prove the effectiveness of the RC modeling scheme. It has
been shown that the selected modeling scheme yielded reasonable
comparisons with the test results. The authors used the same gen-
eral modeling scheme described previously in a number of their
publications where they conducted their own validation studies
(Cao et al. 2019a, b, c; Xu et al. 2019). The validation efforts in
those papers, which are not repeated here in the interest of saving
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J. Bridge Eng., 2020, 25(1): 04019134
Compressive/yielding Modulus of
strength (MPa) elasticity (MPa)
58 36,232
414 200,000
1,675 196,500
896 200,000
space, provide confidence in the authors’ nonlinear modeling ex-
pertise. The NTSB reports (NTSB 2018a, c) included several pho-
tos of concrete cracks in the joint area of diagonal Member 11 and
the deck. As discussed subsequently, these photos show damage
that is consistent with the simulation results, providing additional
evidence in support of the modeling scheme.
Numerical Simulation Results
Based on the FE model, four construction stages, i.e., prestressing,
transportation, relocation, and retensioning, were modeled. In these
simulations, 18% of time-dependent prestress losses were assumed
for the tendons in the deck and trusses as per AASHTO (2017). As
noted previously, because the interface of the joint was intention-
ally roughened, the coefficient of friction for the cold joint of diago-
nal Member 11 was assumed to be 1.0 (ACI 2011). However,
because the shear demand was calculated to be larger than the shear
capacity of the joint and could cause sliding and therefore damage
at the interface as per NTSB (2018a), the kinetic coefficient of fric-
tion was assumed to decrease to 0.4 after slip occurred at the joint.
Prestressing Stage (Before Transportation)
Fig. 14 shows cracking in the cold-joint area after applying the pre-
stressing force in the truss member and deck. The contour plots in
Fig. 14 are of the principal tensile strain of the concrete, a number
that varies from 0.01% (no crack) to 0.02% (cracked). The heel of
Member 11 was damaged under the prestressing force (Fig. 14).
The simulation results captured reasonably well the concentration
of tensile strains in the heel of Member 11, especially where the
computed strain of the concrete exceeded the cracking strain of
the concrete (0.01%).
Transportation Stage
After being assembled on the ground, the main span was trans-
ported onto the piers by two transporters (Fig. 15). After applying
the prestress, gravity loading was applied to the structure and the
nodes at the bottom of the deck were fixed at the transporters to
model the transportation stage. Fig. 16 shows the behavior of
the bridge during the transportation stage. The north end joint did
not show much damage, although minor cracking was observed in
the concrete under the anchor plates (recall the discussion of blow-
out failure). The deflection at the northern end also was found to be
small, less than 3 mm.
Relocation and Retensioning
After the main span was placed on the piers, the joint started sliding
along the interface at the northern end. The dowel action of the
stirrups caused internal damage in the joint of Member 11 and
the concrete deck (Fig. 17). The contour plots in Fig. 17 are of
the damage index of the concrete, a number that varies from 0
(no damage) to 1 (total damage), as defined by Hallquist (2006)
04019134-8 J. Bridge Eng.

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Fig. 14. Comparison of cracks in the joint area of Member 11 after
prestressing. (Image from NTSB 2018c.)
and Murray et al. (2007). The concrete elements eroded (were re-
moved) after the damage index exceeded 0.99 and the maximum
principal strain was greater than 0.1. Fig. 17 compares the damage
mode of the actual joint with that from the simulation. On the east
side of the joint, the heel of Member 11 was severely damaged and
the concrete cracks even reached the first anchorage of the tendon
in the deck [Fig. 17(a)]. On the west side of the joint [Fig. 17(b)], a
severe shear crack developed diagonally in the bridge deck, which
also was well captured in the simulations. The simulated damage
mode in Fig. 17 matches the actual damage of the joint area rea-
sonably well and highlights the potential punching shear failure
mode that was discussed previously in the design calculations
section.
Based on our simulation results, Fig. 18(a) shows that the pre-
stress force in Member 11 decreased to 55% of the original level as
the slip of the cold joint reached 5 mm, which also caused concrete
damage in the anchorage zone. The slip behavior of the cold joint
under gravity loading also was confirmed by a recent investigation
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
(Ayub 2019) [Fig. 18(b)].
It was reported that, at the time when the bridge collapsed, a
construction crew was retensioning Member 11 (NTSB 2018c).
It is not clear how much retensioning was being applied, but
Fig. 15. Transportation stage of the main span. (Base image reprinted from Ayub 2019.)
© ASCE
J. Bridge Eng., 2020, 25(1): 04019134
Fig. 16. Simulated behavior of the main span at the transportation
stage.
apparently the effort was being conducted to reduce the cracking
symptoms observed after bridge placement. Fig. 19 shows a
simulation of the joint being damaged as the prestress level in
Member 11 approached the maximum jacking stress of the tendons,
i.e., 94% of yield strength as per ACI (2011). The horizontal com-
ponent of the retensioning force increased the shear demand in the
joint area, further aggravating the sliding situation [Fig. 19(a)]. As
sliding progressed, dowel action became fully mobilized, crushing
and damaging concrete locally within the joint and the deck
(Fig. 19). The evolving damage (to the cold joint and adjacent joint
and deck concrete) prompted more sliding and led to a vicious
cycle that culminated in the collapse of the entire bridge.
The simulated collapse mode of the structure is compared with
the actual video record in Fig. 20, in which the simulated failure
mode of the bridge matches the actual collapse reasonably well.
In both cases (simulation and actual collapse), severe structural
damage appeared to concentrate at three main locations (Fig. 20),
initiating the collapse process. Member 11 was damaged in flexure
(especially at its upper portion) and did not show signs of buck-
ling under compressive forces as was widely speculated after the
collapse.
Fig. 21 also compares the simulated and actual bridge collapse
processes, in which the simulation results capture the progression
of collapse well. Fig. 21 suggests that as the structure’s geometry
changed drastically in response to sliding of the Member 11=12
joint, the deck’s north end started sliding into the span under
the influence of gravity loading. The relative motion between
the joint and deck resulted in the deck falling off the support, leav-
ing behind a portion of the Member 11=12 joint wedged onto the
pier. As the structure fell, continuing changes in its geometry
caused Member 11 to pull out of its joint, which remained wedged
at the top of the pier (Fig. 22). Evidence of pullout is seen in the
simulation results and physical evidence, in which the rebars at the
end of Member 11 were mostly straight (Fig. 22, ovals). This is
additional evidence that Member 11 did not fail in compression,
because its rebars would have bulged outward if that had happened.
A comparison of videos of the collapse of the bridge based on
simulations and the actual collapse is available in Video S1 in the
Supplemental Data.
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Fig. 17. Cracks in the joint area of Member 11 after relocation: (a) east side; and (b) west side. (Images reprinted from NTSB 2018a.)

Parametric Study
Based on the hand calculations and FE simulations discussed pre-
viously, the design of the cold joint at the north end is deemed
flawed, and therefore was the primary reason for the failure of
the bridge. The three key factors that were recognized to most in-
fluence the behavior of the cold joint were (1) the coefficient of
friction at the cold joint interface; (2) the prestress level in the deck;
and (3) the level of retensioning forces in Truss member 11. Para-
metric simulations (Table 2) (10 cases in total) were carried out to
systematically investigate the effect of these parameters on system
performance to gain further insight into the factors that led to the
collapse. The static coefficient of friction at the cold joint was var-
ied from 0.6 to 1.4 to account for significant uncertainties that may
have occurred in the friction conditions at the joint (Table 2). In all
cases, the coefficient of friction was assumed to decrease to 0.4
(kinetic) once slip occurred. Due to uncertainties regarding the pre-
stress losses, the effects of losses that varied from 18% to 38% were
investigated. Retensioning at the time of collapse is not well doc-
umented because the collapse of the bridge occurred during this
process. Therefore, the retensioning stress in the tendons in
Member 11 was varied from 55% to 100% of the yield capacity.

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Fig. 18. Behavior of cold joint under gravity loading: (a) relationship between prestressing in Member 11 and cold-joint slip; and (b) damage mode of
the cold-joint of the deck and Member 11 (reprinted from Ayub 2019).

Fig. 19. Damage of the cold joint due to retensioning on Member 11: (a) before the retensioning; (b) during the retensioning; and (c) after the
retensioning.

Fig. 20. Failure mode of the north end from (a) FE simulation; and (b) accident video frame (image courtesy of Instagram/@o2webdev).

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Fig. 21. Collapse sequence between the simulation and accident. (Images courtesy of Instagram/@o2webdev.)

Fig. 22. Close-up of failure of Member 11 during the collapse: (a) simulation; and (b) accident photo (reprinted from NTSB 2019a).

Sensitivity Study of Coefficient of Friction between the smooth concrete surfaces of cold joints was 0.6 as per
ACI (2011), Eqs. (1) and (4) suggest that there was insufficient
According to OSHA (Ayub 2019), the designer did not specify in
the construction plans that the cold joints needed to be intention- shear friction capacity. Given the importance of this variable, a
ally roughened. This conflicts with assertions in FIU (2017b) that sensitivity study of the coefficient of friction was conducted.
the surface of the cold joints was indeed roughened to an ampli- Three values were considered, 0.6, 1.0, and 1.4. The first pertained
tude of 6.35 mm. Examination of pre-event photos was not con- to smooth surfaces, the second to roughened surfaces [the nominal
clusive, but appeared to agree with OSHA (Ayub 2019) that the design condition as per FIU (2017b)], and the last considered sit-
cold joint surfaces were smooth. If the static coefficient of friction uations in which the cold joint surfaces were prepared to be highly
slip resistant.
The damage levels at the cold joint for cases with different static
Table 2. Simulation matrix for parametric studies coefficients of friction are shown in Fig. 23. The damage caused by
the dowel action of the rebars mainly was localized around the
Static coefficient Retensioning
anchorage zone (Fig. 23) and was similar to the punching shear
of friction at Prestress losses stress/yield
Case the cold joint in the deck (%) strength (%) damage mode discussed previously and seen in the precollapse
photos. According to the simulation, slip of the joint still occurred
1 0.6 18 N=A even when the coefficient of friction increased to 1.4.
2 1.0 18 N=A
The damage levels in Fig. 23 show that relying on friction is
3 1.4 18 N=A
4 1.0 28 N=A risky for cold joints subject to shear forces in a concrete truss
5 1.0 38 N=A bridge. Shear keys or some other explicit shear-resisting mecha-
6 1.0 18 55 nism should have been placed in the cold joints, and would have
7 1.0 18 80 been more reliable and helpful in meeting the horizontal shear de-
8 1.0 18 90 mand in the joints. Furthermore, retensioning was not applied in
9 1.0 18 95 these three cases and the bridge did not appear to collapse under
10 1.0 18 100 gravity, although the cold joint area had severe cracks for the
Note: N=A = no retensioning applied. assumed conditions.

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Fig. 23. Damage mode of the cold-joint area with different static coefficients of friction: (a) μ ¼ 0.6; (b) μ ¼ 1.0; and (c) μ ¼ 1.4.
Prestressing Losses in Deck
To study the effect of prestressing losses on the behavior of the
cold joint, losses of 18%, 28%, and 38% were considered for the
deck strands. The coefficient of friction in these series of simula-
tions was assumed to be 1.0 before the sliding of the cold joint and
0.4 after sliding. Fig. 24 shows the damage mode of the north end
of the bridge with different levels of prestressing losses. The zone
of punching shear damage expanded as the prestressing losses in-
creased (Fig. 24). This observation also matched the previous
design evaluation of the joint, which noted that the punching shear
capacity could be insufficient when prestressing strands in the deck
were not fully engaged in preventing punch out of the joint.
Retensioning of Diagonal Member 11
The joint of Member 11 was damaged under the effects of pre-
stressing and gravity, and retensioning the tendons in Member 11
could have further aggravated the sliding of the cold joint
[Fig. 19(a)]. In this study, five different retensioning forces were
applied to the tendons in Member 11 to reach a stress level of
55%, 80%, 90%, 95%, and 100% of the yield strength. The coef-
ficient of friction at the cold joint was assumed to be 1.0 before
sliding and 0.4 after sliding, and 18% losses were assumed for the
tendons in the deck. Fig. 25 shows the damage of the north-end
joint of the bridge. Increasing the prestress levels in Member 11
caused more damage in the joint area, specifically more heel
damage and widespread damage in the body of the joint itself
(Fig. 25). Fig. 26 compares the sliding deformations of the cold
joint under different retensioning forces, in which it is clear that
joint slip increased significantly as the retensioning forces in-
creased. After reaching 95% of the yield strength, the joint slid
© ASCE 04019134-13
J. Bridge Eng., 2020, 25(1): 04019134
off the deck, starting the collapse process. The authors simulated
a scenario in which the joint was merged (i.e., there was no cold
joint), and the joint area was found to be almost intact under the
retensioning.
The effect of retensioning on a cold joint could precipitate the
failure process, especially if the joint already was damaged in ear-
lier construction stages (Fig. 26). Even if Member 11 had not been
retensioned, the bridge likely would have failed as creep exacer-
bated sliding at the cold joint. However, because the process would
have been slow and entailed widening cracks that serve as an im-
portant warning sign of structural distress, action could have been
taken to address the situation. The simulation results suggest that
retensioning Member 11 should not have been considered as an
appropriate solution to reduce the cracking symptoms observed
in the cold joint area, because it increased the sliding of the joint
and damaged the integrity of the structure in a catastrophic manner.
“The restressing of member 11 was a manipulation of loads that
constituted a change to the design plan, and, before being imple-
mented, should have been independently peer reviewed and signed
and sealed by a professional engineer” NTSB (2019b).
Influence of Shear Capacity of Construction Joint
It was shown previously that the nominal shear capacity (as per
design specifications) of the construction joint was less than the
applied demand. To meet the demand while conservatively ignor-
ing the contribution of friction, the bar reinforcement crossing the
construction joint was increased from 10,012 mm2 (mix of #6 and
#7 bars) to 30,645 mm2 (mix of #11 and #14 bars) to satisfy
Eq. (15), which is a modified version of Eq. (2). Fig. 27 shows the
simulated damage mode of the northern end of the bridge with the
original joint design, the modified joint design, and a design in
J. Bridge Eng.
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Fig. 24. Damage mode of the cold-joint area with different prestress losses in the deck: (a) 18%; (b) 28%; and (c) 38%.

Fig. 25. Damage mode of the cold joint under different levels of retensioning: (a) 55% yield; (b) 80% yield; (c) 90% yield; and (d) 95% yield.

which the structure is made monolithic at the joint area (i.e., no
construction joint but with the original reinforcement). It is clear
from Fig. 27 that the modified design significantly decreased
sliding-induced damage at the heel of Member 11. The concrete
deck also suffered less damage, although there still was evidence
of cracking associated with the punching failure mode [Fig. 27(b)].
The monolithic joint [Fig. 27(c)] had the best performance in terms
of localized cracking, although that also showed evidence of
punching-related cracking at the northern edge of the joint. Simu-
lation results showed that slip at the construction joint of the
modified design decreased by two orders of magnitude to an insig-
nificant number compared with slip of the original design. These
results indicate that although significantly increasing the shear con-
nectors at the construction joint was beneficial, the joint zone still
was vulnerable to localized cracking, although much less than the
cracking damage observed in the original design

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Fig. 26. Sliding deformation of cold joint under different retensioning
forces in Member 11.
D 9,168,000 N
Asa ¼ 30,645 mm2 > ¼
Rg Rp Fu 1.0 × 0.75 × 414 MPa
¼ 29,527 mm2 ð15Þ
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
The factors affecting the collapse of the partially constructed 53-m-
long (174-foot) section of the FIU-Sweetwater UniversityCity
pedestrian bridge were investigated through a critical review of
design calculations and high-fidelity computational simulation.
Review of the calculations showed that the design was flawed
because of underestimation of the horizontal shear demand on the
cold joint in the northern failed end of the bridge. The joint, as built,
had insufficient capacity to prevent sliding behavior of the joint
during retensioning. The computations also showed that the north
end of the concrete deck could be vulnerable to punch out under the
effect of compressive axial loading from Member 11, and that
likely was a contributing factor for the severe deck cracking
observed prior to failure.
High-fidelity computational simulation was conducted to sup-
port the design calculations and investigate the failure mechanism
Fig. 27. Damage mode of the northern end of the bridge with different shear design: (a) original shear connector design (cold joint); (b) revised shear
connector design (cold joint); and (c) monolithic joint design (with original reinforcement).
© ASCE 04019134-15
J. Bridge Eng., 2020, 25(1): 04019134
of the bridge, with a specific focus on the behavior of Members
11 and 12’s cold joint with the deck during construction. The sim-
ulation results showed that the heel of the joint suffered severe
cracking, as observed in the bridge before the failure. The simula-
tion results also supported the punch-out design calculations and
showed that the computed damage locations coincided reasonably
well with the documented prefailure crack locations. The simula-
tion results suggest that the cold joint at the north end experienced
sliding behavior under the retensioning forces applied to diagonal
Member 11, which precipitated the collapse. The complete process
of the collapse also was simulated and shown to match actual foot-
age of the accident quite well, lending credence to the veracity of
the modeling effort.
To develop a better understanding of the joint behavior, para-
metric studies were carried out by varying the coefficient of fric-
tion at the cold joint, the prestressing forces in the deck, and the
retensioning forces applied to the diagonal Member 11. It was
found that the punching shear damage of the joint was mildly
affected by the coefficient of friction and prestressing forces
applied in the deck.
Based on the detailed analysis and simulations carried out in this
paper, several lessons can be drawn from this accident:
1. The collapsed bridge deck was supported by a concrete truss,
which required prestressing truss members undergoing tension,
because concrete is weak in tension. The use of a concrete truss
for aesthetic reasons unnecessarily introduced complications re-
lated to prestressing and cold joints in the bridge, both of which
likely played key roles in the collapse of the bridge. Aesthetic
goals could have been achieved by using a steel truss (instead
of the concrete truss) encased in nonstructural concrete without
making the design and construction unnecessarily complex and
risky.
2. Simulation results showed that the cold joint between Members
11 and 12 and the deck could have played a significant role in
the collapse of the bridge. This cold joint probably was intro-
duced in construction drawings for construction staging without
accounting for its effect on the bridge behavior through detailed
finite-element analysis. In fact, a review of design calculations
provided by the Florida International University showed that the
cold joint was not considered in the analysis model.
3. Contrary to widespread speculation directly after the collapse,
it appears that diagonal Member 11 did not suffer axial load
failure. Although the hand calculations showed that the axial
J. Bridge Eng.
 capacity was close to (i.e., just less than) the demand, the simu-
lation results did not show crushing or buckling of Member 11
under compressive forces as the initiating event.
4. Relying on friction at the joint between Members 11 and 12 and
the deck was risky in a nonredundant system such as that used
in the bridge. Friction is unreliable by nature and can lead to
sudden failure when the demand exceeds capacity. Shear keys
or some other explicit shear resisting mechanism placed in the
cold joints would have been more reliable and helpful in
meeting the horizontal shear demand in the joint.
5. Retensioning diagonal truss members should not be considered
as an appropriate solution to remedy the cracks in the cold joint
area, because it increased the demand:capacity ratio making the
bridge more vulnerable to collapse. Cracks in the cold joint area
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should be viewed as an important warning sign of impending
collapse and immediate action should be taken to ensure the sta-
bility of the structure after detailed calculations or modeling.
6. The collapse of the bridge does not necessarily imply that ac-
celerated bridge construction is risky, but certainly shows the
need for adequate analysis simulating construction aspects such
as the presence of cold joints or utility conduits to ensure the
safety of the bridge during and after construction.
7. The peer-review of the bridge design plan was reported to be
inadequate due to a limited budget and time frame. Some of
the design flaws, particularly the lack of rebar detailing in
the joint region, could have been identified during an adequate
and more rigorous peer-review.
8. This accident re-emphasizes the lesson that public safety should
never be compromised simply to showcase the application of a
new construction technology, even though the technology itself
may have been shown to be safe in prior applications. Any con-
struction area is by nature hazardous to the public.
Data Availability Statement
Some data, models, or code generated or used during the study
are available from the corresponding author by request. Some
data, models, or code generated or used during the study are pro-
prietary or confidential in nature and may only be provided with
restrictions.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Mohammad Ayub from the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) for his constructive comments
that improved this manuscript. This research was supported, in part,
by National Science Foundation Grant Nos. CNS-0958379, CNS-
0855217, and ACI-1126113 and by the City University of New
York High-Performance Computing Center at the College of Staten
Island. This study also was partially supported by the INSPIRE
University Transportation Center (UTC). Financial support for
INSPIRE UTC projects is provided by the US Department of
Transportation, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and
Technology (USDOT/OST-R) under Grant No. 69A3551747126
through INSPIRE University Transportation Center (http://inspire
-utc.mst.edu) at Missouri University of Science and Technology.
Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the OSHA, the National Science
Foundation, the USDOT/OST-R, or any State or other entity.
© ASCE 04019134-16
J. Bridge Eng., 2020, 25(1): 04019134
Supplemental Data
Video S1 is available online in the ASCE Library (www
.ascelibrary.org).
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