Gloria v.

CA
G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000
Ponente: Purisima, J.
Facts:
The respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in September and
October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this
reason they were administratively charged with grave misconduct, gross
violation of Civil Service Rules, gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service
and AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension. Investigation has
been ended before the 90 day period elapse. Margallo was dismissed from the
service of being a teacher. Others were suspended for 6 months from the service.
On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only.
Hence their reinstatement. Teachers are asking for back wages during the period
of their suspension and pending appeal for suspending them, without true
grounds caused them damage.
Issue:
Are the teachers entitled to backwages for the period pending their
appeal if they are subsequently exonerated?
Ruling:
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To comeback
wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension
be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is
actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. They should be reinstated with full pay for
the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the CivilService Decree states that
the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” In the case at bar the respondents
won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal
would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full
pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was
unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still
reprimanded.
 Banda v. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts:

An Executive Order No. 378 was issued by President Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo (President Arroyo) class suit co-employees at the National Printing Office
(NPO)

SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. - There is hereby

created a National Printing Office out of the merger of the Government Printing
Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency.

President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378...
amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of
government agencies and... instrumentalities

SECTION 1... shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing
services requirements of the government... over standard and accountable
forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing of
election paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections
`
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated
for the programs, projects and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional financial support from
the government.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as

employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending
that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by... former President Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners'
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO

Issue:

Is the Executive Order an invalid exercise of legislative power on the part of the
President?

Ruling:
 Sc dismiss the petition.

Here, the petition failed to indicate the number of NPO employees who
were affected by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly
represented by petitioners... about 549 employees... in the NPO... only 20
petitioners effectively instituted the present case.

Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of

Desistance was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office
Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said... manifestation expressed NAPOWA's
opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court.

There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners' interests and those

of the persons whom they claim to represent.

Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of

the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit. Anent
the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit. In
the executive department in line with the President's constitutionally granted
power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation... of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

The Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine
the functions of the Office of the President.
In re: Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

Ponente: Narvasa, CJ.

Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the
President of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the
RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments
appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making
any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Issue:
Is the President nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view
of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Ruling:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term”
the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed
to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is
required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes
into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. They valid in the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify
the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
 De Castro v. JBC,
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections. The JBC, in its en banc meeting unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably
with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the
last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President has the power appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the department of Supreme
Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution;
that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was
not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power
to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
“political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
Issue:
Can the incumbent President appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
Ruling:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article
VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
 Domingo v. Rayala, GR NO. 155831
Nachura
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes Domingo filed a complaint against secretary Laguesma of the
Department of Labor and Employment against the NLRC chairman Rogelio
Rayala. Petitioner alleged that the Respondent called her at her office and
touched her shoulder and subsequently tried tickling her ear. She then
subsequently filed for a leave of absence for what happened and consequently
a complaint was filed for sexual harassment on the basis of AO no. 250. Upon the
receipt of the complaint, it was referred to the DOLE secretary. Thereafter was
received by the executive secretary Ronald Zamora and the latter sought that
the matter be investigated by the then-Secretary Laguesma. The committee that
found Rayala guilty of sexual harassment and therefore dismissed from his duties.
The CA held that the Respondent was indeed guilty of sexual harassment and
likewise the decision of the lower arbiter affirmed in toto. Hence, respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration, which modified the penalty from dismissal to a mere
suspension. Hence the present petition by Domingo.
Issue:
Is dismissal of Rayala the sole prerogative of the President?
Ruling:
Yes. SC found that indeed Rayala was guilty of sexual harassment and thus
it was binding for the SC to decide in favor of the three bodies. It is held that since
Rayala avers that AO 250 does not cover NLRC, because the NLRC was under the
DOLE at that time and second is that, NLRC is not within coverage because he is
a presidential appointee. But the SC stated that the President is indeed the body
that should execute the judgment only in the first offense and not the second as
stated in the case.
 Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135

Cruz
Facts:
Constitutionality of the provision of the LGC specifically Sec. 187 of the said code
is the subject of this case. One taxpayer and four oil companies filed a complaint
against the Ordinance of the Manila Revenue Code specifically the said tax
ordinance before the secretary of Justice. Hence the Secretary of Justice said the
above stated ordinance null and void for non-compliance with the procedures
and that it was contrary to law that it did not under through proper process.
Consequently, RTC averred the said ruling of the Secretary and thus sustained the
ordinance because sec. 187 was unconstitutional because it gave the secretary
supervision powers over Local Government Units. It was contrary to the
Constitution. But later was argued by the Secretary that the said provision was
indeed constitutional and that the said ordinance was the one that was invalid
because it did not follow the procedure as specified in the LGC.
Issue:
Is section 187 of the Local Government Code is Constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes, The SC held that section 187 authorizes the petitioner only to review the
legality and the constitutionality of tax ordinances. And that indeed, the said
ordinance was not contrary to law. And that Secretary has no authority to control,
but merely supervision that laws are passed legally. Hence, the SC said that the
RTC ruling in the Constitutionality of section 187 is revoked and that the trial court’s
ruling of the said tax ordinance legality of procedure was faithfully complied with.
 Pichay v. Office of the deputy executive secretary for legal affairs, et al
GR NO. 196425
Perlas-Bernabe
Facts:
President Aquino issued an EO abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission or PAGC transferring its functions to the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for legal
affairs and that EO was number 13. That on sometime, the then-finance secretary
Purisima later on and filed a complaint against petitioner the Chairman of the
board of trustees of the LWAUA because the purchase of the shares of stocks of
a certain bank. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for dismissal of the same
complaint on the grounds that the case was pending in the office of the
Ombudsman and that it was the only speedy remedy for such. Hence, Purisima
appealed for a petition for certiorari and prohibition thus questioning the
constitutionality of the Executive Order 13.
Issue:
Is EO 13 constitutional?
Ruling:
Yes. Sc held that the constitution and the administrative code of 1987
grants the chief executive the power to reorganize offices at his whim. Transfering
of powers and the abolition of the PAGC to Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for legal affairs is thus
constitutional and that is justified within the power of the president.
 DENR V. DENR Region XII EMPLOYEES GR NO.149724
Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
The regional executive director of DENR, Director issued a memorandum to
transfer DENR region twelve offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal. The
memorandum is inclined with the DENR administrative order no. 99-14, issued by
DENR secretary Cerilles. The said administrative order’s reason was for efficiency
and centralization of government services in the city of Koronadal. In addition,
the employees of DENR region twelve, filed a motion to dismiss the said
memorandum on the ground of its legality, stating that the secretary of
environment has no power to reclassify offices. The Court of Appeals Denied the
Petition of the petitioners.
Issue:
Does DENR secretary has the power to reorganize office?
Ruling:
Yes. The SC that being the alter-ego of the president, the secretary’s action
of reorganizing the office under region twelve and transferring it to Korondal City,
is presumed be the act of the president himself. Hence, it is also stated in the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, that the power to reorganize offices
under the executive department is given to the president. In which in this case,
the act of secretary Cerilles to transfer the said offices is valid, given the
presumption of the alter-ego doctrine and the power to reorganize offices, as
stated in the above mentioned sentence.
 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR NO.181293
Sereno
Facts:
PD 1112 creating the Toll Regulatory Board and that the subsequent PD, PD
1113 thus creating Phil. National Construction Corporation. And that the former
and the latter consolidated authority to construct main toll facilities of Manila
Express ways. PNCC then entered into a contract with PT Citra Lamatoro Gung
Persada. And that the following parties had a toll operation agreement known as
ASTOA and thus revised it with some modifications for the construction of stage 2
of south Manila metropolitan station. Then PNCCT traffic management filed a
motion for strike for unfair labor practices. It alleged that the following contracts
were contrary to law and public policy.
Issue:
Is the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC secretary valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters
on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act
personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through
executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. This
doctrine is rooted in the Constitution and the administrative code of 1987.
 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 637 SCRA 78
Mendoza
Facts:
Executive Order no. 1 was signed by President Aquino establishing the
Philippine Tuth Commission of 2010. PTC’s primary function is to investigate
complaints and cases about graft and corruption committed by public officials
and those who benefitted from the said acts thus, submitting the reports to the
office of the president, ombudsman and the legislature. The PTC had some of
other powers as stated but with it has some limitations. Hence, the petitioners
question the validity of EO no. 1 and thus unconstitutional citing that PTC violates
the separation of powers, in which congress may only be the one to create a
public office and appropriate funds thereof. The second argument of the
petitioners is that the assailed EO that the power of reorganization as mandated
in the constitution and the administrative code does not provide that the
president to create a public office. In reply for the argument against the PTC, the
OSG argued the legal standing of the petitioners and that the power to create a
public office with quasi-judicial power is mandated in RA No. 9970. And that, the
power of appropriation does not conflict with the budgetary powers of congress
since there exist appropriated funds by congress.
Issue:
Is EO no.1 unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create
ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land. SC held Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner.
 Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakat Tan, SCRA 675 482
Sereno
Facts:
Three Red Cross members who were just inspected a water sanitation
project for the Sulu provincial jail, were kidnapped by three Abu Sayyaf members.
Later on, the Governor of Sulu – Tan. Formed a committee tasked to investigate
such incident and thus places the province of SULU under a state of emergency
which he issued Proclamation no.1 and thus invoked the Local Government Code
to justify the said proclamation. In the said proclamation, it stated that and called
for the National Police and other civilian forces to set up checkpoints to ensure
safety and alike. Subsequently, petitioner Jamar Petitioner argues that the said
proclamation was out of his capacity and that it was unjustified for violating a
couple of sections as provided in the constitution.
Issue:
Can a governor exercise emergency powers just like the president?
Ruling:
No. The Governor is not bestowed with the power as stated in article 1 and
18 and thus his acts are ultra vires. The president has the only exclusive power to
issues such power to call upon the armed forces in times of acute crisis and state
of emergency. The said powers are summed up to be executive powers and they
are only vested in the chief executive of the Philippines as stated in section 1,
article vii of the Philippine constitution.
 Gonzales v. Abaya, 988 SCRA 445
Sandoval-Gutierrez
Facts:
A group of more than 300 soldiers entered and occupied Oakwood
Apartments in Makati where they planted explosives. The said group was led Navy
Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV, where they proclaimed their detest against the
administration of president Arroyo and that they demanded that she, together
with her cabinet secretaries, resign.
Proclamation no. 427 was issued by President Arroyo, declaring a state of
rebellion, and general order number 4, which in turn called upon the PNP and the
AFP to suppress lawless violence. After the negotiations, the Trillanes-led group
surrendered and were accused and convicted of Article 96 of the Articles of war
and coup d’état and they were prosecuted accordingly.
Issue:
Is proclamation of president Arroyo constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes, the said proclamation and general order was partially constitutional
because as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Philippines, the
president should call upon the armed forces to suppress lawless violence. And as
the chief executive of the country, he has the power of take over and other
residual powers as the constitution provides.
 Lagman v. Executive Secretary, GR NO.231658

Del Castillo
Facts:
Proclamation no. 216 was issued by the president in Rodrigo Duterte
declaring the whole island of Mindanao under Martial law, invoking article 18
under the 1987 Constitution. The said issuance of the proclamation was to
suppress lawless violence and invasion brought about by the Maute extremist
group. And that petitioners assailed the proclamation of martial because of the
fear of the past that it might turn into an abuse of power by the president. Among
those who petitioned were Edcel Lagman, who was the representative of Albay
and other representatives.
Issue:
Is proclamation reviewable by the court under section 18 of the Philippine
Constitution?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the said issuance was then reviewable.
The challenge of the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and declaration of Martial Law in the island of Mindanao has
sufficient factual bases and that the clear reading of the law at hand is that the
court does have authority to do so.
 IBP V. Zamora, August 15, 2010
Kapunan
Facts:
President called upon the AFP and the PNP especially the marines. Thus
then-president Joseph Estrada invoking his power as the president and as the
commander-in-chief under article VII, section 18 of the Constitution. The said
calling out of the service of the marines was justified by the president because of
its nature that it was temporary and given a reasonable period only so that the
situation shall improve. The petitioners, herein Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
filed a petition stating that the said declaration of deployment of the marines was
null and void thus unconstitutional.
Issue:
Does the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP?
Ruling:
Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution the President has the power to call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power
in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for
their revocation and review without any qualification.

Lacson v. Perez, GR NO. 147780

Melo
Facts:
A mass of armed demonstrators that were planning in barging inside of the
Malacanang palace confronted President Arroyo. In response of the said
demonstration by the people or masses, the president then issued a proclamation
no.38 stating that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
Subsequently, warrantless arrests were given to some of the demonstrator leaders.
Petitioners were filed before the court, the petitioners namely; Lacson et al,
Defensor-Santiago, Lumbao, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
Issue:
Should the Petition be dismissed for being rendered moot and academic.
Ruling:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort
to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in the light of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of
rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of
mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is
not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for
prohibition and mandamus is improper at this time.