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ARTICLE 114 – TREASON legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the
Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio
Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered
to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified
and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance,
which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government
or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or
sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary
of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in
the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs a body
politic or society which constitute the state) must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto,
and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another,
but it cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the
so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied
by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over
them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II
Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by
necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim
is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on
which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the
United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision
in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253,
decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of
sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto
therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the
occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory
adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the
military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the
sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains
vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the
occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the
second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to
the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete
after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and
therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily
allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as
descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the
territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be
considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and
permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign
country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a
citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by
the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his
own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if
the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or
sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for
the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one
hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life,
in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other
hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be
bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or
sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the
protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military
forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern
has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal
rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason
that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate
government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against
national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war,
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country,
as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition,
and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of
political complexion because they bear relation to, and are
penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the
legitimate government, are also suspended or become
inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be
committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,
supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be
preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as
offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless
adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted
government for the latter was not responsible for the
preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet
article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory
were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy
occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to
respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at
his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones
when the exigencies of the military service demand such action,
that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the
control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to
the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations,
the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity
and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director
of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76,
77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the
inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the
laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted,
as well and those which, though continued in force, are in
conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be
considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said
inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to
repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential
for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to
their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give
aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is
not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not
necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and
protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to

the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an
inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by
the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to
give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die
if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a
traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and
weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would
allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants
of the occupied territory to fight against their own government
without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for
treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their
military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus
deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty —
such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the
people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government
of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the
Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against
said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign
people of the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the United
States, was made, upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the
Government of the Philippines established by authority of the
people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI
thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . .
. shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this
Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a
sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to
certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was
recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress
of the United States in approving the Independence Law above
quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains
the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II),
but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that
the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to
Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943,
the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having
now the status as a government of other independent nations —
in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood"
(Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is
a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in
many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of
sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of
the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was
one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not
away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same
way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own
sovereignty although limited by that of the United States
conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason
may be committed against the Federal as well as against the
State Government, in the same way treason may have been
committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the
change of our form of government from Commonwealth to
Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the
same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution
provides that "The government established by this constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence,
the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more
extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby
denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be
stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring
opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros
dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a
separate opinion.
G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of
treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu
City and sentenced to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the
prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all
of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a
unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other
Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous
girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them,
as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and
sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate
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victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and
Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the
victims of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly
the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15,
1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her
that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she
was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her
hometown; that the accused came again and told her that
Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did
not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to
Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls
Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor
Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife;
that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing
on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a
sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she
was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that
finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three
weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left
Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That
accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos took
Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home
in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor
of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in
order that said Japanese Colonel might select those first who
would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by
means of threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned
two sister were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese
Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where
Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All these facts
alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnesses
Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not
necessary here to recite once more their testimony in support of
the allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that
the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the
evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two
girls named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were
taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his
companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the
Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite,
but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion
Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese
Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez
raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente Bullecer,
the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying,
said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused though
force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that
she resisted with all her force against the desire of the accused,
but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was

delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also
raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the
accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take
her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that
the accused threatened her with a revolved if she refuses to go;
that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that
while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of
the car, and their companion Bullecer took the other witness
(Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda returned
to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that
later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that
on arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor
Hontanosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for these
girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad
against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that
the said Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to the
Japanese "; that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls
to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one
room by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she
(Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another
Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap
while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S.
Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4
were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said
accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister
Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee taken as
witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a
case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving at
Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two girls to
the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese
Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and
intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual
intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused
subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and
intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
against her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of
conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused
brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and
violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the
accused came to get her on the pretext that she was to be used
as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel
Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in a
car driven by the accused; they were brought to the house of
Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and
after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with
her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her
immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel Mini;
that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap
officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there
by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her;
that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying;
that the following day while conducting the two girls back to their
hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an
uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos)
testified as following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came
and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters to be
witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that
understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went to
Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the
office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both
daughters wept and told her that they were turned over to the
Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her
(the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the accused
also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the
accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on the
pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and in the
meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that
when her daughter returned to her house ultimately, they related
to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told her
they would have preferred death rather than to have gone to
Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused
had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in
evidence as a part of the res gestae regardless of the time that
had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the
information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in court,
there could be no doubt that they were telling the absolute truth.
It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume and admit
the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The
Court is fully convinced that all the allegations contained in Court
No. 5 have been proven by the testimonies of these two
witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino
companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora
Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial
hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception
organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and
other Japanese high ranking officers, which was held in
Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought
the Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the
latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to
attend another banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers
Mini and Takibayas might make a selection which girls would
suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible
invitations was to lure them to the residence of said Japanese
Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length.
She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and companion
nurses, saw the accused coming to the hospital with a revolver
and took them on a car to the office of the Puppet Governor
where they were severely reprimanded by the latter for not
attending the dance held on June and receptions was to select
from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of
Colonel Mini for immoral purposes that she and her companions
were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to
said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on
perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her room,
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laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused,
not satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and
pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling her that it
was only her pretext that she was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by
that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said testimony need not be
reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not
questioned, but it is contended that the deeds committed by the
accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits
the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the
morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a
fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of
rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the
morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of the Chief of
Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was
treason because women's company kept up their morale, so
fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them
food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act
of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result.
yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of
sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are
punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds
of social, business and political intercourse between the
belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants.
In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy
is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and
the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must
depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line
between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not
always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is
comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate as was said
Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and
comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to
them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition,
be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To
make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy
as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy
personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not
technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him
money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in
waging war against the giver's country enhance his strength and
by same count injures the interest of the government of the
giver. That is treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F.,
673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first
assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering" of women
to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though
the women and the entertainment helped to make life more
pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty
any more than the women themselves would have been if they

voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or
organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their
war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts
herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to
strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the
defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable
effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might
have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible,
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the
crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular
case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as
principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the
manner above stated, these rapes could not have been
committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds
express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682,
which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not
sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the People's
Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for
any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and
established by the evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and
substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as
violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution,
which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him." The contention
is not well taken. The provision in requires that the private
crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must
be averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In the
light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard
that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of
treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet
them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In
facts under the general law of criminal procedure convicted for
crime different from that designated in the complaint or
information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such
crime "is included or described in the body of the information,
and afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial."
(People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the
offended girls but these assaults are not charged against him
and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and
founded on count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the
severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and
sentence him for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of
from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify
each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay
the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these
penalties shall not exceed forty years.
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-
appellant.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason
on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty
to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to
counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence
only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he
did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant
was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and
was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements
do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first
witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other
Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American
aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a
sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked
behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster
than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai
headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the
flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in
March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American and the
accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions.
The last witness stated that the American was walking as well as
his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see
Juanito Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink
of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two
witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole
overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz.,
4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder
and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances
mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the
murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision
except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion,
the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of
treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a
member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as
undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
4
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese
soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for
the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their
hideouts; that said accused and his companions did
apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give
him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the
accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu,
where he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his
shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent back to the
Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as
an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino
undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
guerrilla suspects; that the herein accused and his companions
did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from
their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the
hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their
backs, giving them first blows on the face and in other parts of
the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following
day while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more
was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the
Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an
enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol
of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an,
municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending
guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact
apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained
for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the
accused did bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy
with the enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused
did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco
for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in
these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are
not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine
treason law and under the United States constitution defining
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must
concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of
a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be,
and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal
statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an

element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and
can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be
punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the
identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be
made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course,
preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if
the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically
for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of
treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are charged as
overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded separately
under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries
were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance.
Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims
instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be
taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of
article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they,
as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties
unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded
not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be
substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the
judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another
attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of
the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial)
that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in
favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the
trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not
denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It
is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been
observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary.
(U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney
appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense
expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the
present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the
defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this
presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below
did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to
protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the
present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin
did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We
do not discern in the record any indication that the former
counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if
Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the
present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not
cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the
rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and
guilty of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being
an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be
modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the
same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance
against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO
BAUTISTA, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellants.
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put
down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States
in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the Philippine
Islands, as defined and penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years'
imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto de
Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of them, to three years'
imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all and
each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate share of
the costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in
the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective
fines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the
latter part of the year 1903 a junta was organized and a
conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in the
city of Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by
force of arms and establishing in its stead a government to be
known as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina; that one
Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy
and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the military forces to the
organized in the Philippines in the furtherance of the plans of the
conspirators; that toward the end of December, 1903 the said
Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in hidding on board the
steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he
held a number of meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining
provinces whereat was perfected the above-mentioned
conspiracy hatched in Hongkong that at these meetings new
members were taken into the conspiracy and plans made for the
enlistment of an army of revolution and the raising of money by
national and private loans to carry on the campaign; that to this
end bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the
revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators,
empowering the officers thus appointed to raise troops and take
command thereof; and that the conspirators did in fact take the
field and offered armed resistance to the constituted authorities
in the Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing the
Government because of their failure to combat successfully with
the officers of the law who were sent against them and of the
failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their
propaganda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco
Bautista, a resident of the city of Manila, was an intimate friend
5
of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and notified Bautista of his
coming to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey, Bautista
forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of
Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking part in several of the
above-mentioned meetings whereat the plans of the
conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of
these meetings Bautista, in answer to a question of Ricarte,
assured him that the necessary preparations had been made
and that he "held the people in readiness." chanrobles virtual
law library
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with
the conspirators through the agency of one Jose R. Muñoz, who
was proven to have been a prime leader of the movement, in the
intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to
distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain officials,
including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed
revolutionary forces; that at the time when the conspiracy was
being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several
conferences with the said Muñoz whereat plans were made for
the coming insurrection; that at one of these conferences Muñoz
offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-general of the signal
corps and undertook to do his part in organizing the troops; and
that at a later conference he assured the said Muñoz that he had
things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly organized
in accordance with the terms of his
commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with
the conspirators; that he had accepted the appointment as
brigadier-general of the signal corps of the revolutionary forces
with no intention of ever taking any further action in the matter,
and merely because he did not wish to vex his friend Muñoz by
refusing to do so, and that when Muñoz offered him the
appointment as brigadier-general he did so in "a joking tone,"
and that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila
organizing the conspiracy at that time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate
the testimony of Muñoz as to the fact that he had several
interviews with Puzon at which plans were entered into for the
advancement of the cause of the conspirators), can not be
accepted as true in the light of a written statement signed by
Puzon himself at the time when he was first arrested, part of
which is as follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence,
and occupation? - A. My name is Tomas Puzon; born in Binondo
in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age; married; by
profession a teacher of primary and secondary schools, and
residing in Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of
Quiapo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? - A. Personally I do not
know him, but by name, yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in
these Islands and with what object he came here? And if you
know it to be true, through whom did you get such information? -

A. In the first place I had notice of his coming to the Islands as
well as his object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and
secondly because J. R. Muñoz told me the same on one
occasion when I was in his house to visit
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other
person? - A. No, sir; I have no more information than that which I
have mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by
Ricarte? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in
this organization, and who is it who invited you to join it? - A. J.
R. Muñoz, who is general of division of this new organization,
spoke to me with much instance, asking me to accept
employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to which
I, on account of his request and in view of the fact that the said
Muñoz is a friend of mine from my youth, acceded; nevertheless
I have organized absolutely nothing in respect to this
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you
any commission for it? - A. Yes, sir; I accepted said employment
and although they gave me an order to organize in my brigade I
did not do it, because I had neither the confidence nor the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the
will to carry out what was intrusted to you, why did you accept
employment as general of the brigade? - A. I accepted it on
account of friendship and not to vex a friend, but I never have
the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that
he made this statement, but he attempted to explain it away by
saying that when he made it he was so exited that he did not
know just what he was saying. He does not allege that improper
means were taken to procure the confession, and it was proven
at the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the
result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of
reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an intelligent
man and was for eighteen years a school-teacher and later a
telegraph operator under the Spanish Government, and during
the insurrection he held a commission as an officer in the signal
corps of the revolutionary army. His confession is clear and
intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he was so
excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it,
and its truth and accuracy in so far it inculpates him is sustained
by other evidence of record in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an
appointment as an officer of the military forces of the conspiracy
should not be considered as evidence against him in the light of
the decisions of this court in the cases of the United States vs.
Antonio de los Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs.
Silverio Nuñez et al. 2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs.
Eusebio de la Serna et al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United
States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the
case at bar is to be distinguished from these and like cases by
the fact that the record clearly disclose that the accused actually
and voluntarily accepted the apppointment in question and in
doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of
conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the
appointment is taken into consideration merely as evidence of
his criminal relations with the conspirators. In the first of these
cases - the United States vs. De los Reyes - the accused was
charged with treason, and the court found that the mere
acceptance of a commission by the defendant, nothing else
being done either by himself or by his companions, was not an
"overt act" of treason within the meaning of the law, but the court
further expressly held that -
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing
of the game of government like children, the secretaries,
colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags and seals and
commission, all on proper, for the purpose of duping and
misleading the ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be
dignified by the name of treason.
In the second case - the United States vs. Nuñez et al. --
wherein the accused were charged with brigandage, the court
held that, aside from the possession of commissions in an
insurgent band, there was no evidence to show that it they had
committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they
had never united with any party of brigands and never had been
in any way connected with such parties unless the physical
possession of these appointments proved such relation," and
that it appeared that each one of the defendants "were
separately approached at different times by armed men while
working in the field and were virtually compelled to accept the
commissions." chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was
contended that de la Serna had confessed that "he was one of
the members of the pulajanes, with a commission as colonel,"
but the court was of opinion that the evidence did not sustain a
finding that such confession had in fact been made, hence the
doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession of
such an appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor
executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not
constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies
only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom the only
evidence of record was "the fact that a so-called appointment of
sergeant was found at his house."chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there
was testimony that four appointments of officials in a
revolutionary army were found in a trunk in the house of one
Valentin Colorado, and the court in said case reaffirmed the
doctrine that "the mere possession of the documents of this kind
is not sufficient to convict," and held, furthermore, that there was
"evidence in the case that at the time these papers were
received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of
the assistant councilmen of the barrio in which lived, a witness
for the Government, showed him the envelope, and stated to
him he had received these papers; that he didn't know what they
were and requested this councilman to open them. The
coucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent
6
it to the councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this
envelope contained the appointments in question and that the
appellant did not act under the appointment but immediately
reported the receipt of them to the authorities." chanrobles
virtual law library
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint
a person in no wise connected with them to some high office in
the conspiracy, in the hope that such person would afterwards
accept the commission and thus unite himself with them, and it
is even possible that such an appointment might be forwarded in
the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the
person thus nominated, and that such appointment might be
found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person
in whose possession the appointment was found might be
entirely innocent of all intention to join the conspiracy, never
having authorized the conspirators to use his name in this
manner nor to send such a commission to him. Indeed, cases
are not unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein
it has been proven that such appointments have been
concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the accused
persons, so that when later discovered by the officers of the law
they might be used as evidence against the accused. But where
a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case,
and it is proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an
appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this
fact may properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his
relations with the conspirators.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision
requiring the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same
overt act, or confession in open court, to support a conviction for
the crime of treason should be applied in this case, but this court
has always held, in conformance with the decisions of the
Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring
to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the
crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not
applicable in such cases. ( In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs.
Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of
Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest substantially
upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from one of the
conspirators, such bonds having been prepared by the
conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out the
plans of the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively appear that
he knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that,
when he received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what
the contents of the bundle was, nor that ever, on any occasion,
assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds. He,
himself, states that when he opened the bundle and discovered
the nature of the contents he destroyed them with fire, and that
he never had any dealings with the conspirators in relation to the
conspiracy or the object for which it was
organized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence
before us, in so far as it affects the said Aniceto de Guzman,
should be reversed, with his proportionate share of the costs of
both instances de oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman

should be acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and
set a liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence of the
trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and
Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far
as it imposes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency
and failure to pay their respective fines, and, there being no
authority in law of such provision, so much of the sentence as
undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby
reversed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith,
when the record will be returned to the trial court for execution.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by
the People's Court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment,
P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces,
in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island
of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a
foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of
said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and
treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the
Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States
were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the
manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization
established and designed to assist and aid militarily the
Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's
war efforts and operations against the United States and the
Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and
assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in
armed conflicts and engagements against the United States
armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth
in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of
Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines,
sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate
any of the facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined
the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that
the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids
and in confiscation of personal property. The court below,
however, said these acts had not been established by the
testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as
evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did find
established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the
accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the
enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in
Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that
he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . .
that during the same period, the accused in Makapili military
uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the
American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to
the mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in
hand, later surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not
borne out by the proof of two witnesses. No two of the
prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various
acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who
gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of
personal property, and performed sentry duties and military
drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates
without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed.
There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that
the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili
uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said
that one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration
means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least
one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or
eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili
organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and
giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his
will, membership in the Makapili organization imports
treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the
organization was created, which, according to the evidence,
were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by
the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;"
"to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to
eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate
unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army
and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common
enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by
the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may
be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature
of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an
overt act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose of
increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to
battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or
countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed
himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when
the opportune time came even though an opportunity never
presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the
enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological
comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the
country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in
that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his
courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on
men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike
at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference
from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be
established by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the
7
evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-
witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness
who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one
day, another witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so
we have to look for guidance from American sources on its
meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on
the two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative
text writers have commented on it. We cull from American
materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp
of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282,
says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring
both witnesses to be to the same overt act, was held to mean
that there might be one witness to an overt act and another
witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and,
in one case it has been intimated that the same construction
might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly
observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the
testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their
variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting them to
speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by
all the constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly
requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act.
This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act;
or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of
the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D.,
N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea: "It is necessary
to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be
possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit
must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer
vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent
World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine:
"The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a
treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the
accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused
actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act,
movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two
witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside
the judgment of the trial court. To the possible objection that the
reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of
sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the
constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy
purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely
restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising
in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more
witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is

believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and
held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction
of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and
natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth.
Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from
other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other
sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed
corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another
eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in
the path of the prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of
two witnesses but said that the founders of the American
government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not
merely in spite but because of the objections. (Cramer vs.
United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the
members of the Constitutional Convention "as one of the few
doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against
legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039,
p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention,
Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the
majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not
difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this
Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in
psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a
quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of
evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of
innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle
to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is
severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that
"'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to
render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous
correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not
merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution
but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but
because one of the most venerated of that venerated group
considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally
virulent.'"
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the
American Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who
introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must
be understood to have intended that the law should operate with
the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers
meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs
charged de oficio.
[G.R. No. 138456. October 23, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLANDO
DEDUYO Y PIRYO alias BATMAN AND ISAGANI MAAGO
(ACQUITTED), accused.
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 20, 1998,
of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in
Criminal Case No. 94-10874 finding the appellant, Rolando
Deduyo alias Batman, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The information charged the appellant, Rolando Deduyo, and his
co-accused, Isagani Maago, with the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of January 1994, in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused,
including one alias Bayani who is still at large, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and
detain thereby restraining the liberty of one Johnny Mauricio y
Patasin, a minor 16 years of age, with threats to kill him while
carrying knives, for the purpose of extorting ransom in the
amount of P100,000 or P50,000 from his parents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on June 7, 1994, the appellant, Rolando
Deduyo, and his co-accused, Isagani Maago, with the
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[3] Before the trial proper which was scheduled to start
on September 20, 1994, the appellant escaped from the Rizal
Provincial Jail in a mass jailbreak at dawn on July 29, 1994.[4]
As he had already been arraigned, trial on the merits ensued
(trial in absentia). On February 19, 1998, the warden of the Rizal
Provincial Jail informed the court of appellants re-arrest and
detention. On March 30, 1998, in the presence of the appellant
and his counsel, the court promulgated its decision dated
February 20, 1998:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused
Isagani Maago has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt
and he is hereby ACQUITTED from the charge.
However, the Court finds the accused Rolando Deduyo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer and undergo imprisonment of reclusion
perpertua, and to pay the costs.
Let alias warrants of his arrest be issued furnishing with copies
thereof the NBI Director, Manila; the Chief, CIG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City; the PNP Provincial Director, Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal;
the PNP Station Commander, Sariaya, Quezon and the Station
Commander, Antipolo PNP Station, Antipolo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The facts of the case follow.
At about 4:00 p.m. on January 30, 1994, Johnny Mauricio, a
sixteen-year-old boy, was on board his tricycle waiting for
passengers beside Mercury Drug Store, Sumulong St., Antipolo,
Rizal. Appellant Rolando Deduyo alias Batman approached and
asked Johnny to accompany him to the airport to get a baggage
which they would bring back to Johnnys house.[6] Johnny
refused because he had not asked permission from his mother.
Appellant told him that he already did on his behalf. Since
Johnny knew the appellant, a former lessee of their other house
at General Luna St., Antipolo, Rizal for more than a year, he
trustingly went with the appellant and left his tricycle with an
acquaintance named Baby.[7]
8
Appellant and Johnny boarded a passenger jeep and alighted at
Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. They proceeded to a house
where two persons were drinking gin. The two persons were
appellants co-accused, Isagani Maago, and a certain Bayani.
Appellant joined the drinking session. An hour after, appellant
told Johnny that he and Isagani would be the ones to get the
baggage at the airport. Johnny asked permission to go home but
appellant told him to stay behind and wait for the baggage.
Johnny was left with Bayani who continued drinking alone. While
drinking, Bayani took out his fan knife, played with it and
threatened Johnny that ang puma pasok dito ay hindi na
nakakalabas ng buhay (whoever enters this house will never
come out alive). Johnny was afraid of what he heard but he did
not run away because Bayani might do what he had just said.[8]
An hour after, appellant and Isagani returned. They resumed
drinking with Bayani and some people in the neighborhood.
Appellant introduced Johnny as his nephew. Around 10:00 p.m.,
they went to sleep. There was no partition or bed in the small
house which measured only about 3 x 4 square meters. They
slept on the floor with Johnny between appellant and Isagani,
and Bayani beside the door. Johnny noticed that Bayanis knife
was tucked in his waist. When Johnny woke up the next day,
Isagani, Bayani and the appellant were already awake, talking to
each other. Johnny again asked permission from the appellant
to go home but the appellant assured him that they would go
back together to Antipolo with the baggage.[9]
Johnny wanted to go home but he did not have any money.
While Bayani was preparing their meal, he noticed that the door
was closed. When he asked permission to urinate, Bayani
accompanied him outside the house. He was afraid of Bayani
because of what latter had told him the night before.[10]
Around noontime, appellant and Isagani again left to get the
baggage at the airport. Around 3:00 p.m., appellant returned
without Isagani. He first talked to Bayani alone and thereafter
called Johnny and gave him P12 as his fare to go back to
Antipolo. He accompanied Johnny to where he could take a ride
home.[11]
Once home, Johnny was surprised to know that the appellant
demanded ransom from his family. In his anger, Johnny went
wild and threw all his clothes. The victim did not even know he
had been kidnapped. The police fetched Johnny and brought
him to the police station where they took his statement. During
trial, Johnny identified and affirmed his sworn statement.[12]
Johnnys mother, Salvacion Mauricio testified that around 5:00
p.m. on January 30, 1994, she was tending her clothing store at
the second floor of the Antipolo public market when her co-
vendor handed her a handwritten letter. The letter demanded a
ransom of P100,000, or at least P50,000, otherwise she would
not see her son again. The letter instructed her to be ready with
the money the next day and bring it to the Antipolo Church
around noontime. The letter warned her not to tell the police
otherwise itutumba namin kayong lahat (we will kill all of you).
The kidnap group claimed that they were members of the New
Peoples Army (NPA) and warned Salvacion that her house and
store were being watched by them. Salvacion was too frightened

to report the incident to the police. However, after conferring with
her family, they secretly alerted the police.[13]
The next day, as instructed in the ransom letter, Salvacion
proceeded to the Antipolo Church around noontime. She
brought money with her but only in the amount of P5,100
because that was all she was able to borrow. She waited inside
the Church but nobody approached her. On her way out at
around 1:30 p.m., a man wearing a green shirt walked beside
her and asked lnang, dala mo bang pera? She answered yes
but asked to see her son first. But the man immediately ran
away. He was chased by a police officer in plain clothes. The
man was later identified as Isagani Maago.[14]
When asked by Salvacion who kidnapped her son, Isagani told
her that it was Batman (the appellant). Thereafter, Salvacion and
the police officers proceeded to Bagong Ilog, Pasig to look for
Johnny. They did not find him there but they were able to catch
and arrest the appellant who was about to escape on board a
tricycle. Appellant told Salvacion that Johnny was already in
Antipolo. Salvacion knew the appellant since he used to rent
their other house in Gen. Luna St., Antipolo, Rizal from 1991 to
1992 and he was the husband of her store helper. Appellant and
Johnny were close friends. At about 1:00 p.m. on January 30,
1994, Salvacion recalled that she saw the appellant at the
second floor of the Antipolo Public Market. He even went to her
store and asked about the whereabouts of her brother.[15]
PO3 Eduardo Salabit testified that he was a member of the
surveillance team which monitored the kidnapping. He
positioned himself in front of the Antipolo Church at about 11:00
a.m. on January 31, 1994. He saw Salvacion Mauricio enter the
church and when she came out two hours later, a man followed
her closely and talked to her. As the man was acting
suspiciously, he called his attention but he immediately ran
away. He gave chase and, together with Police Officer
Dominador Demdam, he caught the man later identified as
Isagani Maago. He handcuffed and frisked the man, and
retrieved a fan knife from him. He turned over the knife to their
investigator, SPO2 Delfin Grutta. At the station, lsagani Maago
told them that he had companions and the mastermind was the
appellant. He told them they could find the appellant in Barangay
Bagong Ilog, Pasig. Upon proceeding there, they caught the
appellant in the act of escaping on board a tricycle. His team
was able to identify the appellant as one of them knew him.[16]
SPO3 Dominador Demdam corroborated the testimony of PO3
Eduardo Salabit. Their surveillance team positioned themselves
near the church. After a short while, he noticed PO3 Salabit
running after a man. He joined the chase and together they
caught the man who was later identified as Isagani Maago. They
recovered a fan knife from him which they turned over to the
custodian of Rizal Provincial Prosecutors Office in Pasig City.
During investigation at the police station, Maago told them he
had other companions who were in Barangay Bagong Ilog,
Pasig. With this information, they immediately conducted a
follow-up operation in Bagong Ilog where they caught the
appellant while trying to escape. He frisked the appellant and
recovered a fan knife which his team turned over to the
custodian of the Prosecutors Office.[17]
SPO2 Delfin Grutta testified that he was the one who took the
sworn statements of the victim, his mother Salvacion Mauricio,
and Police Officers Salabit and Demdam. He identified in court
the statements he took. He presented in court the ransom note
and the knife turned over to him by the apprehending officers.
He kept the note and the knife in a locked filing cabinet to which
only himself and their chief investigator had access.[18]
Appellant was at large during the trial so he was not presented
to testify. The defense presented appellants co-accused, Isagani
Maago, and Romulo Amargo.
Romulo Amargo testified that he was a resident of
Muntingbayan, Sariaya, Quezon for about ten years. He had
known lsagani Maago for the same period of time as the latter
was also a resident of Sariaya, Quezon. In the afternoon of
January 29, 1994, he was with Isagani on their way home from
work. Isaganis house was along his route in going to and from
work. When they arrived at Isaganis house at around 6:00 p.m.,
appellant was there waiting. He heard appellant ask Isagani to
accompany him to pick up a package at the airport in Manila.
After a short while, Amargo went home and did not see either
Isagani or the appellant anymore the following day. He
remembered the day he saw the appellant with Isagani Maago
because it was the day he paid for the installment of his pants
and t-shirt.[19]
Isagani Maago denied participation in the kidnapping. He
testified that, on January 30, 1994, he was with the appellant in
the house of Bayani at Bagong Ilog, Pasig. He arrived there with
the appellant at around 8:00 a.m. from his hometown in Quezon
Province. Appellant left and returned in the afternoon with
Johnny Mauricio whom he introduced as his nephew. The next
day, appellant asked lsagani to accompany him to Antipolo to
get a package. They arrived in Antipolo around lunchtime.
Appellant told Isagani to wait for him in front of the Antipolo
Church. When appellant failed to return, he decided to go back
to Bagong Ilog, Pasig but, on his way to the jeepney terminal, he
heard somebody shouting at him. When he looked, a man was
running towards him holding a gun. He ran but the man caught
up with him and boxed him. He told the man he did not do
anything wrong but they still brought him to the PNP
headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal. Upon investigation by the
police, he told them the appellant could be found in Pasig. He
was made to go to Pasig with the policemen and, once there, he
saw appellant inside a mobile car lying face down with his mouth
bleeding.[20]
After weighing the evidence presented, the trial court found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom but acquitted appellants co-accused,
Isagani Maago:
The court believes that the conspiracy of accused Deduyo and
Maago as alleged in the Information was not convincingly
established. The only damaging circumstance against accused
Maago was that he accompanied Deduyo from Sariaya, Quezon
to Pasig, Metro Manila and that he was apprehended near the
Antipolo Church after asking Salvacion Mauricio if she had the
money. What bothers the mind of the court was the manner
Maago testified. He appeared so frank and confident in denying
the charge against him. He did not stammer during his entire
9
testimony, and the court did not observe any mannerism that
would betray his innocence. He claimed that he did not do
anything wrong - that he did not know anything about the whole
incident.
However, with regard to the prosecution evidence against
accused Rolando Deduyo who was tried in absentia the court is
convinced that he masterminded the crime charged - and he
alone appears to be criminally liable. The court is moreover
convinced of his guilt, because of his escape from Rizal
Provincial jail during the pendency of this case. His flight is
clearly indicative of his guilt. The ransom note (Exh. C)
demanding for the sum of P100,000 for the safety of Johnny
Mauricio characterizes the crime as one of kidnapping for
ransom.
Aggrieved, appellant Rolando Deduyo filed the instant appeal
with a lone assigned error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM.
The appeal has no merit.
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659. The elements are: (1) that the offender is
a private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) that the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days or (b) that it is committed simulating public authority
or (c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or
(d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or
public officer. It is not necessary that any of the foregoing
circumstances (letters a to d) be present if the kidnapping is
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.[21]
The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
confinement or restraint of the victim, or the deprivation of his
liberty. It is not necessary for the victim to be locked up or
placed in an enclosure; it is sufficient for him to be detained or
deprived of his liberty in any manner.[22] In the present case,
the testimony and sworn statement of the victim showed that he
was effectively restrained of his liberty. He candidly testified that
he went with the appellant in the belief that, with his mothers
permission, they were going to get a baggage from the airport
and bring it back to their house in Antipolo. When they
proceeded instead to Pasig, the victim thought they would just
be dropping by. When the appellant told him to stay in the house
in Pasig while he and his friend, Isagani Maago, instead got the
baggage, the victim immediately asked permission to go home.
To make him stay, the appellant assured him twice that they
would return to Antipolo together with the baggage - first, on the
night of January 30, 1994 and second, in the morning of January
31, 1994. In addition to being tricked by the appellant to stay in
Bayanis house in Pasig, the victim was also so afraid of Bayani
that he could not leave the place even if he wanted to. Bayani
had a knife in his waist even while sleeping and even threatened

the victim ang pumapasok dito ay di na nakakalabas ng buhay.
Bayani guarded him on the two occasions that appellant left,
even accompanying the victim to urinate outside the house.
Given all these circumstances, the victim was effectively
restrained of his liberty - the primary element of the offense of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Pertinent portions of his
sworn statement and testimony follow.
SWORN STATEMENT:
Tanong Ng ikaw ay mapilitang sumama kay Batman, siya ba ay
may hawak na anumang uri ng patalim?
Sagot Wala po.
T Bakit ka sumama sa kanya (Batman)?
S Dahil sa nagpapasama siya na may kukuning baggage sa
airport at di umano ay dadalhin sa bahay namin sa Carigma St.,
Antipolo, Rizal.
xxx xxx xxx
T Kayo ba ay nakarating sa airport?
S Hindi ho, dahil niloko lang nila ako na pupunta sa airport pero
sa Pasig lang pala ang punta namin.
T Ng nalaman mong sa Pasig lang pala ang punta ninyo, ano
ang ginawa mo?
S Ang ginawa ko ho ng sabihin ko sa kanilang uuwi na ako ng
Antipolo ay hindi ako pinaalis at ang sabi nila Batman at Isagani
ay hindi ako pwedeng makaalis at sila ang pupunta sa airport.
T Nakaalis ba naman sila Batman?
S Oho.
T Ng makaalis sila Batman, bakit hindi ka umalis din para
makauwi?
S Hindi ho ako makaalis dahil binabantayan ako ni Bayani at isa
pa ay wala akong perang pamasahe dahil kinuha lahat ni
Batman ang aking pera pati na ang aking singsing.
xxx xxx xxx
T Ng ikaw ay magising hindi ka ba nagsabi sa kanila na ikaw ay
uuwi na?
S Nagsabi ako sa kanila na uuwi na, subalit ang sabi nila ay
isasabay ako pauwi sa Antipolo kapag nakuha na nila ang
bagahe sa airport.
T Ang ibig mong sabihin ay umalis uli sila papuntang airport?
S Oho, si Batman at si Isagani.
T Bumalik ba silang dalawa?
S Si Batman lang ho ang bumalik.
10
T Ng makabalik si Batman, anong oras ito? Q: When you were left with Bayani what did Bayani do?
S Mga magaalas-3:00 :00 ng hapon. A: He put out a knife and told me that Ang pumapasok dito ay
hindi na nakakalabas ng buhay.
T Sinabi ba niya kung bakit hindi niya kasama si Isagani?
xxx xxx xxx
S Sangayon sa kanya ay iniwan siya ni Isagani at tinawag niya
si Bayani subalit hindi nila ako pinapalapit at nag-usap sila ng Q: Was Batman or Rolando Deduyo and Isagani able to return
mga ilang sandali at narinig kong sinabi ni Bayani na pupunta that same day?
siya sa Makati at si Batman naman ay tinawag ako at binigyan
ako ng P12.00 pamasahe pauwi sa Antipolo at di umano ay A: Yes sir.
pupunta siya ng Olongapo.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At about ten oclock in the evening what happened then?
T Ng ikaw ay makauwi, ano ang nalaman mo?
A: Bayani invited us to go to sleep.
S Nalaman ko na lang ng makauwi ako na ako pala ay
ipinatutubos ng isandaang libong piso.[23] xxx xxx xxx
DIRECT TESTIMONY: Q: Where?
ATTY. CORNAGO: A: We slept together and I was surrounded by them when we
sleep (Sic).
Q: What time was it when you arrived at that house in Bagong
Ilog? Q: What do you mean you were cornered?
A: At about six oclock in the evening. A: I was placed in the middle when we went to sleep.
Q: You were referring at the same day January 30, 1994? xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes sir. Q: How about the three, Batman, Bayani, and Isagani where did
they lie down to sleep also?
Q: How long did the drinking last?
A: Isagani and Batman were beside me, I was in the middle
A: About an hour, sir. while Bayani was near the door.
xxx xxx xxx Q: At the time you lied (sic) down did you notice where the knife
of Bayani, which you was (sic) shown earlier was (sic)?
Q: After that what happened then, if any?
A: It was still stuck to his waist.
A: Batman and Isagani left.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you know where they leave for (sic)?
Q: And how far was Bayani in relation to the door of the house
A: According to them, they were going to get the baggage. where you slept?
Q: Did you go with them to get the baggage? A: Bayani was beside the door.
A: They did not let me go with them. xxx xxx xxx
Q: Why? Q: When did you wake up?
A: According to them they will be the ones to get the baggage. A: About seven oclock of the following morning.
xxx xxx xxx Q: When you woke up where were the three, Batman, Isagani,
and Bayani?
Q: And when Rolando Deduyo and Isagani Maago left to get the
baggage purpotedly (sic) who was left with you in that house? A: We were still beside each other.
A: Bayani, sir. Q: What were they doing if they were doing anything?

A: They were talking with each other.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Why? Did you not try to go home in Antipolo at that time?
A: Because Bayani told me not to and I felt threatened when
Bayani uttered ang pumapasok dito ay hindi na lumalabas ng
buhay. Also, I did not have the money for my fare.
ATTY. CORNAGO:
That morning of January 31, what did Bayani, Isagani and
Batman do if they did anything?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Batman and Isagani leave (sic) again and Bayani was left
with me.
Q: When you were left alone with Bayani what happened if any?
A: We stayed inside the house, sir.
Q: For how long was (sic) Isagani and Batman away?
A: Batman arrived at about three oclock in the afternoon.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said that you were brought to a house at Bagong Ilog in
the evening of January 30, 1994, for how long did you stay in
that house?
A: Up to January 31, in the afternoon.
Q: You stayed there up to the afternoon of January 31 why did
you not leave that house earlier?
A: I was afraid because of the threat of Bayani.
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
ATTY. MENDOZA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said Bayani pulled out a small knife?
A: Yes sir.
Q: He did not open the said knife in front of you?
A: He opened the knife and he also played with it.
Q: At that time Bayani in your opinion was drinking, is that
correct?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And when he uttered the statement ang pumapasok dito ay
hindi nakakalabas ng buhay He did it jokingly, is that correct?
A: He was serious when he uttered those remarks.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: From the time you arrived in that house up to the time you left
you did not urinate?
A: I did.
Q: Where did you urinate?
A: Just outside the door.
Q: While you were urinating where were Bayani, lsagani Maago
and Rolando Deduyo?
A: Bayani was following me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While Bayani was cooking lunch in the kitchen you remained
in the sala?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why did you not ran away from Bayani and shouted that you
were being kidnapped?
A: I could not ran (sic) because the door was closed.[24]
(emphasis ours)
The appellant contends that there was no kidnapping because
the victim voluntarily went with him. This contention holds no
water. In the case of People vs. Santos,[25] we ruled that the
fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not
remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim
went with the accused on a false inducement without which the
victim would not have done so. Such is the situation in the
present case - the victim, a boy 16 years of age, would not have
voluntarily left with the appellant if not for the false assurance
that his mother had supposedly permitted him to accompany the
appellant to the airport to get the baggage and bring it back to
the victims house. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that, in
kidnapping, the victim need not be taken by the accused forcibly
or against his will. What is controlling is the act of the accused in
detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is
able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the carrying away
of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention can either be made forcibly or fraudulently.[26]
Since the crime charged is kidnapping in its qualified form, that
is, committed for the purpose of exacting ransom, the abduction
must in addition be shown to have been committed for such
purpose. Actual demand for, or payment of, ransom is not
necessary; it is enough if the crime is committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom.[27] In the present case, there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence on record to prove that appellant
abducted the victim for ransom, thus:
11
1. in the afternoon of January 30, 1994, appellant tricked Johnny
into accompanying him to the airport allegedly to get a baggage;
2. instead of going to the airport, appellant brought Johnny to his
friends house in Pasig where his co-accused Isagani Maago
was waiting;
3. at the same time that appellant enticed Johnny to go with him,
Johnnys mother received a ransom letter demanding P100,000,
or at least P50,000, for Johnnys release;
4. before the mother received the ransom letter, she saw
appellant at the public market; he even talked to her, looking for
her brother;
5. around noon the next day, appellant and his co-accused
Isagani Maago, left allegedly to go to the airport leaving Johnny
behind in the house of Bayani;
6. at around the same time, Johnnys mother, as instructed in the
ransom letter, went to the Antipolo church;
7. after she had waited for two hours inside the church, she went
out and Isagani approached her asking if she brought the
money;
8. Isagani ran away when a police officer shouted at him;
9. when apprehended, Isagani pleaded innocence and pointed
at the appellant as the mastermind, revealing where he could be
found, and
10. the police went to Bagong Ilog, Pasig where they caught the
appellant as he was about to escape on board a tricycle.
While appellant was not the one who approached Johnnys
mother at the Antipolo Church to get the ransom, there was
enough circumstantial evidence that it was the appellant who
planned the entire kidnapping for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victims parents. The defense evidence itself
showed that the appellant went to Sariaya, Quezon Province,
the day before the kidnapping to persuade his co-accused,
Isagani Maago, to help him carry out the kidnapping. This the
appellant did not controvert nor deny in his appeal before us.
And, as aptly observed by the trial court, appellant was in a
position to know the financial capacity of the victims family since
he was the husband of their store helper and he stayed in their
other house for more than a year. All these circumstances,
coupled with the victims positive testimony that it was the
appellant who kidnapped him, lead us to no other reasonable
conclusion than that it was the appellant who planned and
executed the kidnapping for ransom.
It is well settled that direct evidence of the commission of the
crime is not the only matrix from which the court may draw its
conclusion and make a finding of guilt. Conviction can just as
well be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the
established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading
to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the
author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others.[28] Such is the
situation here.

Moreover, the flight of the appellant only served to strengthen
the finding of guilt. He escaped from jail and was able to evade
arrest for nearly three years (July 29, 1994 to March 26, 1997).
His flight clearly evinced a consciousness of guilt and a silent
admission of culpability. Indeed, the wicked flee, when no man
pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion.[29]
Because the appellant escaped, trial in absentia proceeded
against him. Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution allows trial in
absentia provided the accused has been arraigned and his
failure to appear after due notice is unjustifiable. In the present
case, trial in absentia was properly conducted by the trial court
inasmuch as the appellant had already been arraigned when he
escaped. By escaping, the appellant waived his right to be
present on all subsequent trial dates until his custody was
regained.[30]
The crime was committed after the death penalty was reimposed
by RA 7659 on December 31, 1993. Since kidnapping for
ransom carries the penalty of death under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, no other penalty
can be imposed on the appellant. Thus, we modify the penalty
imposed by the trial court from reclusion perpetua to death.
Lastly, the trial court correctly did not award any damages.
Article 2219, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code provides that moral
damages may be granted in cases of illegal or arbitrary
detention. Nothing in the records, however, shows that the victim
or his family suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety or other
similar injury. Inasmuch as moral damages are granted not to
enrich but rather to compensate the victim for the injury suffered,
proof of moral suffering must be introduced, failing in which such
an award is not proper.[31]
Three members of the Court maintain their position that RA
7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that
the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 94-1 0874 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the penalty imposed.
The appellant, Rolando Deduyo alias Batman, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of RA 7659, upon finality of this
decision, let the records of these case be forwarded to the Office
of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2321 January 31, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARSENIA NUÑEZ, defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal by Arsenia Nuñez from a judgment of the
People's Court which convicted her of the crime of reason on an
information consisting of one count, and after proper trial
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of P10,000 and
the costs.
In the brief filed in her behalf by counsel de oficio it is contended
that the alleged overt acts alleged in the information and which
were made the basis of her conviction were not clearly proven to
establish the guilt of appellant was predicated merely on
circumstantial evidence and that the accused in accordance with
the requirement of the treason law.
The charge brought against Arsenia Nuñez before the People's
Court appears in the following:
That during the period comprised between December 8, 1941,
and March, 1945, more specifically on or about the dates
hereinbelow mentioned, and in different places in the Philippines
hereinafter designated, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, not being a foreigner but a Filipino
citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines in violation of the said oath of
allegiance, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and
treasonably adhere to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, against which the
United States and the Philippines were then at war, by
extending, facilitating and giving assistance, aid and comfort to
the above-mentioned enemy, in the following manner and form
to wit:
The herein accused, with intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy, on about July 32, 1944, wilfully, unlawfully and
treasonably acted as the finger-woman when the barrio of Tapia,
General Trias, Cavite, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, was "zonified" by the Japanese, pointing out to
the Japanese several men whom she accused as guerrillas,
among whom were Carlos Guarin, Cayetano Asistores, Dionisio
Carandang, Carlos de los Reyes, Dionisio Asistores and
Severino Portugues, who were then and there loaded in a truck
and taken away by the Japanese and were never heard of since
that time; on the same occasion the herein accused wilfully and
treasonably pointed to the Japanese soldiers several women
whom she accused as wives of or connected with guerrillas,
among whom were Balbina Rosa whom she pointed out as the
wife of a guerrilla and as a result of which the said Balbina Rosa
was imprisoned by the Japanese for two months and seven
days.
Contrary to law.
It appears from the evidence that Arsenia Nuñez, according to
her own admission, a native-born citizen of the Philippines, was
a resident of barrio Pasong Kawayan, municipality of General
Trias, Province of Cavite, where she lived with her family up to
the month of July, 1944. She was married to Albino Torres, but
her husband having abandoned her, she moved to the City of
Cavite where, in consonance with he loose morals, particularly
during the Japanese occupation, she became the mistress of
Magno Garcia, a Japanese mestizo and a notorious spy in the
service of the Japanese Kempei-tai in Cavite.
No less than four witnesses took the stand before the People's
Court to substantiate the allegations made in the above-quoted
12
charge. They are Teodoro Guarin, Marcelina Reyes, Perpetua
Cadava, Florencia Luneta.
Teodora Gluarin, a sexagenarian and a merchant of Pasong
Kawayan, General Trias, Cavite, stated that one afternoon in the
month of July, 1944, Arsenia Nuñez, in company with a man
named Garcia and four truckloads of Japanese soldiers arrived
in Pasong Kawayan for the zoning of the barrio. The Japanese
soldiers rounded up the inhabitants, including women and
children, and herded them into a pre-designated place; they also
rounded up Ceferino Portuguez, son of the witness, and Carlos
Guarin. During the process of zoning, the appellant pointed out
those two persons to her Japanese companions by telling them
that they are bad men and guerrillas. Immediately thereafter, the
Japanese soldiers tied the hands of Portuguez and Guarin and
loaded them on a truck, and the two prisoners, with other
persons from the same barrio, were taken away by the
Japanese and brought to the City of Cavite. Teodora Guarin said
that after that she never saw her son Ceferino again. She also
testified that Garcia, known as "the fat man," was accompanying
the appellant and the Japanese soldiers in the zoning of that
place and was a notorious Japanese spy in Cavite. Appellant
was living in Cavite with Garcia as his mistress, and, during the
zoning of the barrio of Pasong Kawayan, she saw the appellant
wearing a Japanese cap and clothing similar to that worn by
Japanese soldiers.
Marcelina Reyes, a resident of barrio Tapia, General Trias,
Cavite, testified that she knew the appellant since her childhood.
In July, 1944, Arsenia Nuñez was in company with Japanese
soldiers when they conducted a zona in her barrio and arrested
Perputua Cadava, Ceferino Portuguez, Carlos de los Reyes,
Dionisio Colanting and a man who answered to the name of
Tano. The witness was also arrested by the Japanese pursuant
to the indication of appellant who informed them that her
husband, Alonso Saliba, was a guerrilla. Marcelina was
therefore loaded on a truck together with Ceferino Portuguez
and a few others, and brought to the Military Police garrison in
Cavite City, where she was investigated regarding the guerrilla
activities of her husband. While she was detained in Cavite for
two months and seven days, she saw the appellant sitting on a
chair and holding office at the Kempei-tai headquarters in
Cavite. Appellant was married to a guerrilla by the name of
Albino Torres and the accused joined the Japanese to compel
the surrender of her husband. When the prisoners were brought
to the City of Cavite, appellant was on the front seat of the
vehicle, next to the chauffeur, and on that occasion she was
wearing a Japanese uniform. Marcelina further stated that
Carlos de los Reyes, one of those arrested and taken to the City
of Cavite from the place of the zona, has never returned nor
seen after his arrest; likewise, her brother Carlos de los Reyes
and many others who were arrested have never to their
respective homes.
The third witness Perpetua Cadava declared that she was
acquainted with the appellant since her childhood. She narrated
practically the facts testified by the two previous witnesses and
added that when she was arrested together with Marcelina
Reyes, Ceferino Portuguez and others, her hands were tied and
she was loaded on a truck together with those persons already
mentioned. They were taken to Kempei-tai garrison in the City of
Cavite and investigated regarding her guerrilla connections.

During her questioning in the Kempei-tai garrison, appellant was
pacing up and down the floor of the premises and once
approached her saying, "Is it true that your house is being used
as headquarters of Magirog and is it also true that your husband
is a guerrilla?" after which, she was slapped on the face by
appellant. Perpetua corroborated the other two witnesses when
she stated that appellant was dressed in Japanese uniform, was
wearing sun glasses, and frequently pointed out by her were
immediately tied by the hands and loaded on trucks by the
Japanese. This witness kept in the Kempei-tai garrison for one
month and one day.
The fourth witness is Florencio Luneta, a merchant in the town
of Tanza, Cavite. According to her, in 1944, she lived with the
appellant and some guerrillas in the same house in the barrio of
Tapia, General Trias. In July, 1944, the appellant suddenly left
the house and lived with some Japanese in the City of Cavite.
One afternoon, appellant came to the barrio of Tapia with
Japanese soldiers traveling in four trucks and in order to conduct
a zona in that place. The appellant pointed out the witness to the
Japanese as the laundry woman of Magno Mairoguin, a guerrilla
leader in Cavite; she also pointed out the Japanese Marcelina
Reyes, Perpetua Cadava and Balbina Posas. In fact, these
women were wives of guerrillas and being pointed out by
appellant their hands were tied and they were loaded by the
Japanese on trucks and brought to the Kempei-tai headquarters
in the City of Cavite. Florencia was investigated regarding her
connections with guerrilla she leader Magno Mairoguin, and
during her questioning she was confronted by her accusers, the
appellant herein. She told the appellant, "Woman you might be
mistaken; I am not a laundry woman of the guerrillas." She was
detained in the Japanese garrison for one month and a half.
During her confinement therein she saw appellant frequently in
the Japanese headquarters. She saw appellant wearing a cap
and a suit similar to that worn by the Japanese soldiers and
when going out on a expedition with the Japanese, she usually
sat near the chauffeur.
In the light of the above-stated facts, it is undeniable that this
appellant has been acting as the "finger woman" of the
Japanese when the latter zoned the inhabitants in the barrios of
Tapia and Pasong Kawayan, municipality of General Trias,
Cavite. All the witnesses for the prosecution have attested that
she was always in the company of Japanese soldiers, that she
was always in the company of Japanese soldiers, and that
appellant was wearing sun glasses, a Japanese cap and
uniform, and that she was the one who pointed her accusing
finger at the persons already mentioned above who were
immediately put under arrest by the Japanese members of the
Kempei-tai and transferred to their headquarters, investigated
and tortured.
It is distinctly shown that in taking part in the zoning activities of
the Japanese, appellant was responsible for the arrest of several
persons such as Ceferino Portuguez, Carlos Guarin, Carlos de
los Reyes and others, with the added circumstance that the
three named persons have never bee seen alive again, and
although it is not the purpose of the prosecution to make her
directly and personally responsible for the disappearance, and
perhaps the killing by the Japanese, of Ceferino Portuguez,
Carlos Guarin, and Carlos de los Reyes, yet the conclusion is
inevitable that, by pointing them out to her Japanese masters,
she had greatly cooperated in their arrest, detention,
disappearance, and perhaps death, by the positive act of
accusing them and pointing them out to Japanese kempei.
Appellant admitted that she pointed out to the Japanese and
caused the arrest of Ceferino Portuguez and three other
persons; she also admitted that she had been living in the house
of Magno Garcia, a notorious Japanese spy in the City of Cavite
from July, 1944 up to the date of liberation thereof. She alleged,
however, that a group of armed bandits locally known as
"Texas" kidnapped her from the home of her parents in Pasong
Kawayan, General Trias; that Ceferino Portuguez, a rejected
suitor, was a member of that band; that her kidnappers brought
her to a place called Santol where she was outraged; that after
abusing her, her kidnappers brought her to the house of
Perpetua Cadava where she was made to stay overnight
guarded by Portuguez and three others. The day following the
zoning referred to by the witnesses for the prosecution, the
house of Perpetua Cadava was raided by the Japanese soldiers
and they found her there in premises with Ceferino Portuguez
and the latter's companions. When she was investigated by the
Japanese, she reported to them what happened to her, and that
she was kidnapped by the "Texas" band; but the Japanese did
not believe her story and instead brought her to the City of
Cavite and placed her under the custody of Magno Garcia. Upon
the arrival of the American troops she escaped from the house
of Garcia and proceeded to Batangas, Batangas, and stayed in
the house of a friend. Then an American member of the CIC
(Counter Intelligence Corps) arrested her on the charged of
being a Japanese spy.
The above denials and assertions made by the defendant fail to
counteract the evidence presented by the prosecution. For
instance, one Felix Cubal who claims to be a next-door neighbor
of the Nuñez family, testified that one day previous to the zoning
of Pasong Kawayan, the appellant was kidnapped by the
"Texas" band, but the appellant's father, Placido Nuñez, put on
the witness stand by the defense, declared that he had no close
neighbors, that his house was isolated and very far away from
others, that he was working on his land when this happened and
learned about it when he returned home. Alleging that he was
afraid of the Japanese, he said, however, that he did not notify
the local authorities about it nor take any steps to ascertain the
whereabouts of his daughter, and that it was only on the
following year, when the American forces were already
occupying the province of Cavite, that the witness learned that
his daughter, the appellant, was in the city of Cavite. The
attitude of utter indifference shown by Nuñez in the connection
with the matter of the alleged kidnapping of his daughter is so
unnatural, so contrary to the well-known strength and closeness
of the family ties of the Filipinos, that we hardly believe the
accuracy of this story of the kidnapping, and that appellant
voluntarily left her home for the city of Cavite to join the
Japanese.
This shows that the evidence of appellant is based on a shaky
foundation. In fact, even assuming that her contention that she
was criminally assaulted and kidnapped by the "Texas" bandits
is true, yet, we fail to understand how such acts could justify her
treasonable acts and adherence to the enemies of her country
and fellow citizens. We find that the testimonies of the four
women who were put on the stand by the prosecution ring, true,
13
and it is unbelievable that they would have concocted such
accusations against this appellant, one of their own sex, if the
facts related by them on the witness stand were mere
fabrications.
The Solicitor General, agreeing to the plea of counsel for
defendant, invites our attention to the attendance of the privilege
mitigating circumstance of minority of this offender when she
committed those treasonable acts. (Rev. Penal Code, art. 13,
par. 2.) The transcript of her testimony shows that this appellant,
answering to questions of her counsel, said that, according to
her mother, she was born on the 17th of August, but she did not
know what year." Her mother just told her that she "was 18
years old." However, when on January 5, 1948 she was put on
the stand, after being sworn as a witness, she said that she was
21 years of age. Considering that the evidence shows that her
treasonable acts were committed after her alleged kidnapping
and raping by the "Texas" bandits in July, 1944, we may safely
conclude that she was over 15 and under 18 years of age when
she violated the treason law, and in the absence of evidence to
the contrary (Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of June
9, 1890, Viada, Vol. 2, page 14, cuestion 2; U.S. vs. Agadas, 36
Phil., 246) when the culprit is over 15 and under 18 years of age,
"the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period," upon this culprit (Art.
68, par. 2, Rev. Penal Code).
Treason is punished by reclusion temporal to death and a fine
not to exceed P20,000. According to the rules for graduating
penalties provided in article 61 of the Revised Penal Code,
"when the penalty prescribed for the crime in composed of two
indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be
imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree
shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." In this instance,
the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, to be imposed
in its medium period, on account of the absence of modifying
circumstances.
Pursuant to section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended, this appellant, herein convicted of treason, is,
however, not entitled to the benefits of the said law.
In view of all foregoing, Arsenia Nuñez is, therefore, sentenced
to ten years of prision mayor. Thus modified, the judgment
appealed from is otherwise affirmed, with costs.
THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AURELIO ALVERO
(alias RELI), Defendant-Appellant.
Aurelio Sevilla Alvero alias Reli was charged with treason on
twenty-two(22) counts (Annex A) before the People's Court.
After trial, said Court in a 45-page decision penned by Judge
Jose S. Bautista, Associate Judge of said Court, concurred in by
Associate Judges Dizon and Tancinco, and found the defendant
guilty on all counts except the 10th relative to his interview with
Leonardo Garcia, and the 18th which refers to his alleged
ordering, helping in and causing the burning of the buildings
west of Taft Avenue and south of Libertad Street in Pasay, and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the
law, to pay a fine of P10,000 plus costs, crediting him with one-

half of the preventive imprisonment he has already
suffered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Appealing from that decision of conviction, Alvero in a 112-page
brief, assails the decision, assigning forty-two (42) errors said to
have been committed by the trial court, asking that the judgment
of conviction be totally reversed and that he be acquitted. The
Solicitor General in a103-page brief examines and reviews the
voluminous record of the evidence, analyzes and discusses it in
detail in connection with the information, count by count,
endeavors to refute the allegations andarguments of appellant in
support of his assignment of errors and recommends that the
judgment be affirmed. Considering the gravity of the offense
charged, the time spent and the efforts made by both appellant
and the appellee in analyzing the evidence and later embodying
their views and contentions in their briefs, we have devoted
considerable time and accorded much attention and care in
studying this case, scrutinizing the extensive and voluminous
evidence both oral and documentary, and given careful
consideration of the questions of fact and law raised before us.
In our decisions, we shall try to follow the order and sequence
adopted by the trial court in the consideration and determination
of the different counts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The People's Court grouped the 22 counts under three main
classifications - economic, political, and military collaboration.
Under economic collaboration, come counts 2 and 3 referring to
appellant's business or trading activities, buying war materials
and selling them to the enemy, under his company called ASA
TRADING which trade-name stands for his name Aurelio Sevilla
Alvero. In political collaboration are included three groups,
namely: the letter of congratulations to President Laurel relative
to his declaration of war against the United States and Great
Britain (count 4); defendant's membership in the KALIBAPI
(count 1); and the formation and organization of the New
Leader's Association (counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 21, and 22).
Under military collaboration, come five groups, which are:
defendant's relations with and membership in the MAKAPILI
(count 5 and 20); his organization of the "Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala"
(counts 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17); the meeting at the Ayuntamiento
de Manila ([City Hall], count 17);organization of OUR PEOPLE'S
OWN GUERRILLA ([O.P.P.G.], count 11); and the burning of
buildings in Pasay (count 18). The last seven pages of the
decision of the trial court are devoted to discussion and findings
on the appellant's adherence to the
enemy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After the submission of the briefs by both parties, Amnesty
Proclamation No. 51 dated January 28, 1948, was promulgated.
Invoking the benefits of said Amnesty Proclamation, appellant
filed a motion for dismissal of the cultural, political and
economical counts of the information. The Solicitor General
appears to be agreeable to said motion, having signed at the
bottom of said motion under the word "conforme". In a resolution
dated March 17, 1948, this Court advised the parties that said
motion for dismissal will be acted upon when the case is
considered on the merit. Said motion will be passed upon and
considered later in this decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant admitted in open court that he is a Filipino citizen.
ECONOMIC COLLABORATION
Under this heading, count 2 and 3, the People's Court found that
in the month of August, 1943, Alvero established a business in
the "buy and sell" of automobile spare parts, considered as war
materials, at the corner of Dasmari�as and Marikina Streets,
Manila under the name ASA TRADING. He began with a capital
of P15,000 and when he closed his business about the end of
the year 1944, he had accumulated a net profit of P2,000,000.
With this he bought a house in July 1944, costing P300,000 and
he allegedly subsidized or undertook to subsidize his New
Leader's Association from these
profits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While appellant claims that he did not want to deal in war
materials and bought and sold only clocks, hinges, hasps,
books, clothing, and small auto and truck spare parts, the
evidence which consists mostly of the testimonies of his own
officials and employees of the ASA shows that he sold mostly
automobile spare parts, rotors, brake arms, carburetors, pumps,
diaphragms, tires, batteries, automobile bulbs, lamps, spark
plugs, electric wires, bolts, compressors, chain blocks, locks,
hinges, and other electrical equipment and hardware, bought
and acquired from agents. Defendant in his testimony admitted
that his stock consisted of automobile parts which were needed
for transportation and that no car will run without any of said
parts. The appellant insists that in his business he did not want
to deal with the Japanese and that he had instructed his
employees not to sell any of his stock to them, but there is
abundant evidence to prove and the People's Court rightly found
that the only purchasers of materials from his stocks were the
Japanese, and on a big scale, and that it was he who in most
cases, personally closed the deals with the Japanese
purchasers and collected the sales price. For instance, he made
several sales to Captain Ohasi of the Japanese Navy which is all
amounted to P2,000,000. Takatori of the Philippine Commodities
Purchasing Association, which was the procurement agency of
the Japanese Imperial Forces bought from the defendant during
the latter part of 1944 materials valued at half a million pesos
(P500,000). An entry in his diary (Exhibit ZZ) dated November
16, 1944, at 9:35 a. m. states:
I arrived in the office with Sato Koyzo and his soldiers preparing
for the report of half of my bodega stock. I am thankful to Major
......................... and Mr. Takatori for their kindness and
cooperation, which will enable me to concentrate on my work for
my country.
Koyzo was an agent of the Kobe Marine. On December 11,
1944, he noted down in his own diary (Exhibit ZZ) at 3:30 p. m.
the following:
After completing the itemization of the remaining stock for Mr.
Wasizuka I went with Mr. Kawa to Kobe Marine, the buying
house of Akatsu Kubatai. Mr. Uta informed us that we need the
signature of Captain Ukamoto at the Kumiyan (?).
On November 15, 1944, at 10:35 a.m., he noted down in his
diary Exhibit X the following:
14
Virgy (Virginia Floro Claudio) informed me at the Nippon Bunka
Kaikan that Maj. Yorisiko Moriyama and Mr. Takatori were in my
office to buy up my remaining stock.... As I was walking to the
office, I felt gratified by the thought of the spirit of cooperation of
Major Moriyama and Mr. Takatori. Very incidentally I had told
Mr. Takatori the reasons for my absence from my office and my
attendance to my business, namely, my activities in the "League
of Patriotic Filipinos" and in the "New Leaders Association".
Interested in my endeavors he communicated the matter to
Major Moriyama, who, without losing time, ordered that my
entire stock be bought up so as to give me the freedom which is
needed for my patriotic work.
It will be seen later that for lack of identification, we held Exhibit
X to have been improperly admitted: however, during the bail
hearing, appellant admitted that the portion of the diary
reproduced regarding the coming of Takatori to his office and
waiting to buy his remaining stock, was correct, and he told the
court that for that remaining stock he demanded P850,000
based on his inventory and the current
prices.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Then on November 16, 1944, at 3:45 p.m. we find this entry in
his diary Exhibit ZZ:
Proceed to the Kobe Marine for business. Met Mr. Takatori who
offered me once again his assistance in order to close my
business.
This refers to and confirms the contents of the next preceding
entry.
POLITICAL COLLABORATION
Under this heading, count 4, the evidence shows and the
People's Court found that the day following the declaration of
war or state of war made by President Laurel of the Puppet
Republic, the appellant addressed the following letter in Tagalog
which translated into English reads as follows:
22 P. Manahan, Pasay
City of Manila
24 September 1944
To His Excellency
President Jose P. Laurel
Republic of the Philippines
Malaca�an, Manilachanrobles virtual law library
His Excellency:chanrobles virtual law library
Permit this humble servant to extend to His Excellency his
wholehearted congratulations for the brave, just and proper
declaration of war against the United States of America and
Great Britain, and permit further to offer to Him and to His
Government the services of this one that now implores, without
pay or compensation and in any capacity that He may desire to
designate to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
During these very dangerous moments when even the
independence and nationhood of the Philippines are at stake,

doubt and reverence for the relationship of one another to the
enemy nations should not reign, but rather all the citizens should
dedicate not only their properties but their entire wealth including
blood and life.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
For this reason, this humble offer of service is sent to His
Excellency together with this small contribution of P10,000 in
order to start a campaign to raise funds for the national
defense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
He can always command,
His servant,
AURELIO ALVERO
The corresponding check of P10,000 was inclosed in the letter,
all of which he delivered to Arsenio N. Luz, then Chairman of the
Board of Information of Malaca�an asking him to deliver it to
President Laurel and later to publish it in the papers. The letter
with the check was eventually delivered to the addressee and
was published in the Tribune, then owned and controlled by the
Japanese. On September 30, 1944, he wrote to Pio Duran thus:
22 P. Manahan, Pasay
30 September 1944
Hon. PIO DURAN
National Assembly
Manilachanrobles virtual law library
My dear Mr. Duran:chanrobles virtual law library
By means of this letter, I am letting you know that I have not
been able to recruit the young men you need to study at
Tagaytay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Most of those I talked to have already evacuated to the
provinces as a result of the raids that our city has suffered. Of
the few that remained I was made to understand their reason
that at the present critical situation they no longer have the
desire to study.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Because of this fact, I have no face to meet you because I
consider my shortcomings the reason for their failure to respond,
because if I was truly noble they would have not
rejected.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Perhaps this is the fruit of the utter failure of my heart and soul,
a thing I endured because of the difference in spirit of our times.
I have not yet told you that I voluntarily offered my services to
President Laurel relative to the war against the United States of
America and Great Britain, and at the same time contributed a
little amount within my means in order that I could add to the
strength of our war efforts. However, up to the present instant I
have not yet received any response whatsoever and perhaps
criticism will be my reward.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
My spirit is indeed completely estranged from those of my
contemporaries, and because of this and also because of my
failure in my present venture, besides being prostrate, I have no
longer the strength of heart in order to face
you.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
However, please command again,
Your servant,
Aurelio Alvero
On September 25, 1944, the defendant wrote his mother Rosa
Sevilla the following:
Through this I am letting you know as I told you on the afternoon
of the day before yesterday that I have already sent to President
Jose P. Laurel my voluntary offer of
service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I don't know if you will consider the steps I chose as right and I
don't know what response the President will give me ... from the
moment the declaration of a state of war with the United States
of America and Great Britain is proclaimed, it is but right for
every citizen to cut his relations with the enemy, not only
because it is right but also because it is the dictate of the spirit.
And whoever takes side with the enemy is not only against
Japan but it can also be said that he is a traitor to our dear
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
So don't regret the steps I took because it may endanger my life,
you should rather rejoice because your son has learned to
comply with his duties. (Exhibit XXX, pp. 139-140; Exhibit J, pp.
29-30, Rec. of exhibits.)
Under count No. 1 the evidence reveals and the trial court found
that Alvero joined the KALIBAPI (Kapisanan sa Paglilinkod sa
Bagong Pilipinas), on December 20, 1942, first acting as
supervisor of the Educational and Scientific Sections of said
association and later on acting as head of its Cultural Division of
the Bureau of Political Affairs. One of the main objectives of said
association was to assist the Filipinos in comprehending the
significance of the principles of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, strengthen their adherence thereto secure to
the New Philippines its rightful place in said sphere, adhere
strictly to the policies of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines in their administration, render service in the
establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,
and contribute to its advancement. As a high official of the
KALIBAPI the appellant lectured before its Labor Institute about
three times a week, urging and preaching that the Filipino
culture can be saved from the destruction by the Occidentals
only through joining hands with other Orientals to establish a
new order under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
He said that the new order demanded the dissolution of the
institutions which in their nature and in their organization recall
the past regime. He proposed the creation of an Institute of
Spiritual Training to carry out the purposes of the KALIBAPI
stating that "342 years of indoctrination towards things and
thoughts Occidental and the 42 years of the inculcation of blind
confidence in America make of spiritual regeneration a task that
demands doing immediately and within the shortest possible
15
time." He urged that the said institution should take charge of
the orientation of the members of the USAFFE who were
released without such training in internment camps and the
destruction of the pernicious influence of thoughts occidental. He
suggested as subjects for lectures before said institution topics
like "Retreat of America," the "Fallacy of Educational Policies of
the American Regime," the "Fallacy Philippine-American Political
Relations," "Betrayal of a Promise," "The Philippines and the Co-
Prosperity Sphere" and "Eyes to the Rising Sun." However, on
July 30, 1943, he wrote a letter of resignation to Pio Duran,
resigning from the KALIBAPI stating his disappointment and
disgust with the manner the KALIBAPI was being run and
because he was not given the opportunity to further promote and
develop the policies of said association. After stating his opinion
that "the KALIBAPI stands and will stand always as far as I am
concerned, the symbol, the dream that must some day be
realized" he said among other things:
Before the Institute of Labor, I delivered speeches for the New
Order, and immediately after those speeches, I have heard my
immediate 'bosses' applaud my oratory but dispute my
arguments for the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Quo vadis? Under
such circumstances, I really can not
continue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
... I was so isolated by Anti-New Philippines elements that I
found myself face to face with a desk with nothing to do and
nothing to be responsible for.
Under counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 21, and 22, the record shows
and the People's Court found that about November, 1944, the
appellant together with Pio Duran, Kawamoto, and Saburo
Yoshida who was connected with the Political Bureau of the
Japanese Army and at the same time Director of the Nippon
Bunka Kaikan, an organization in charge of dissemination of
Japanese Propaganda, unit of the Hodobu of the Department of
Information of the Japanese Army, later attached to the
Japanese Embassy in Manila, organized the New Leader's
Association among whose objectives according to its Articles of
Association were: to unify and encourage the ideals and
aspirations of young people who are taking an active part in the
noble task of nation building in close collaboration with the
various Japanese organization in other East Asia countries so
that the people of Asia may actually participate in all out efforts
to win the present war and therefore establish the Co-Prosperity
Sphere. The appellant redrafted the Articles of Association
which were later approved, and then signed by him, Duran,
Yoshida and others. Alvero was first designated and acted as a
member of the Board of Directors of the Association, but later on
the Board passed a resolution prompting him to the post of
Assistant Director General, next to Yoshida who gave him full
authority to organize the offices of the association and to make
appointments according to his best judgment. The appellant
according to himself became the factotum of the association. To
show the close relation between this New Leaders' Association
and the Japanese Armed Forces, the evidence shows that the
offices of the association were furnished by the Nippon Bunka
Kaikan next to its offices in the Heacock Building and during the
period of organization its expenses were subsidized by the
Nippon Bunka Kaikan. The funds of the association came from
contributions of Japanese individuals and Japanese commercial
houses and were then paid out by Kawamoto, the cashier of the

Nippon Bunka Kaikan. The budget of the association was
submitted to said cashier for auditing and approval. Next to the
offices of the New Leaders' Association were housed the
different propaganda agencies of the Japanese Armed Forces
such as the Nippon Bunka Kaikan, the broadcasting radio
station PIAM, and the Eiga Haikusha, a Japanese motion picture
company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Among other things the by-laws of the New Leaders' Association
prepared by the accused himself provided that the Board of
Advisers shall be composed of three representatives of the
Imperial Japanese Army, a representative of the Imperial Navy,
the Director of the Department of Information, three
representatives of the Japanese Embassy, a representative of
the Japanese Military Police and nine prominent Filipinos
popularly known for their pro-oriental attitude. According to his
diary (Exh. ZZ) he entered into negotiations with Yoshida and
the Japanese Embassy regarding the transfer of the office and
activities of the Nippon Bunka Kaikan, which was the Japanese
entity in charge of Japanese propaganda, to the New Leaders'
Association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The following entries in the appellant's diary (Exhibit ZZ) show
the intimate relations maintained by the appellant with the
Japanese high officials and the interest taken by the latter in the
organization of the New Leaders' Association:
Went to Director General Yoshida's apartment where I had the
pleasure of meeting very encouraging men like..................
Nakashima, director of the New Philippine Cultural Institute, Mr.
Uno of the PIAM, Mr. Togo of the Army and a Mr. ................ of
the Navy. I took up with Director General Yoshida the question
of appointment as also my plan of gradation in membership. I
find working with Director Yoshida a great pleasure for he is a
very encouraging man. (Exh. ZZ, p. 24, entry at 5:05 p.m., Nov.
25, 1944.)chanrobles virtual law library
I could not leave immediately though because I was having a
conference with Mr. ................. Uno of the Hodobu. He turned
over to me the broadcasting material of the Patriotic Guerrilla
Association. (Id., p. 1, entry at 2:10 p.m. Nov. 16,
1944.)chanrobles virtual law library
Went to Nippon Bunka Kaikan and conferred with Mr.
Kawamoto. Introduced me to a Mr. ................. of Manila
Simbunsya and the Mr................. of .................... they told me
that they would be good collaborators with us in our works. (Id.,
p. 7, entry at 2:00 p.m., Nov. 18, 1944.)chanrobles virtual law
library
Before we parted, Director General Yoshida took me to his room
to discuss important secret matters. (Id., p. 9, entry at 3:30 p.m.,
Nov. 19, 1944.) (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual law library
After dinner I had a conference with Director General Yoshida
and Mr. Kawamoto, and Director General Yoshida in that parley
supported my views and pledged me his backing in the activity
of the NLA. (Id., p. 19, entry at 5:30 p.m., Nov. 23,
1944.)chanrobles virtual law library
At the Manila Hotel I met Mr. ........ Taka, the only new man to
me in the gathering as the others were already known to me. Mr.
Yasta, Director General Yoshida and Mr. Kawa. We discussed
many points. ... They inquired much about my plans and my
philosophy.... (Id., p 27, entry at 6:35 p.m., Nov. 27,
1944.)chanrobles virtual law library
Mr. Okahashi arrived and he was a nice humored man and we
talked about a lot of things, our plans, our aims, etc." (Id., p. 35,
entry at 10:20 p.m., Dec. 2, 1944.) (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles
virtual law library
Mr. Mori dropped in so we could go out together ... and I
exchanged views on activities for the youth movement. (Id., p.
39, entry at 11:25 a.m., Dec. 8, 1944.)chanrobles virtual law
library
I had a closed door conference with Director General Yoshida,
Mr. Kawa, Mr. Yasta and Mr. Kobayashi regarding the financial
and underground work of the Assn. (Id., p. 41, entry at 6:05
p.m., Dec. 10, 1944.) (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual law
library
Punctually, I was fetched by the Navy car to go to Col. Aoyama's
home for a parley. I explained my philosophy, my ideology for
the NLA, as also my plan of objectives.... Mr .............................
and Mr. ................. as also Col. Aoyama were very appreciative
of my plans. (Id., p. 42, entry at 6 p.m., Dec. 11,
1944.)chanrobles virtual law library
I was further delayed by discussing with Mr. Fuzi and Mr. Kawa
as they were insistent on expanding immediately and I was
adamant on central organization first. (Id., p. 45 entry at 7:45
p.m., Dec. 15, 1944.)
Appellant prepared the 5-point program of objectives for the
New Leaders' Association (Exhibit I) which was submitted to and
approved by Director General Yoshida on December 3, 1944
(Exhibit L). One of the objectives in that 5-point program was
"collaboration with the Government, the Imperial Japanese Army
and Navy in the safeguarding of Public Works and
Communication facilities." Other objectives were "pacification
efforts", establishment of a rejuvenation center, propagation of
Nippongo (which he himself had been teaching), and a
movement for the changing of the names of all the people for the
obliteration of Western Dominance (Exhibit
I).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In this connection, one may pause and observe, as the People's
Court also well points out, that while President Osme�a at the
time was urging the Filipinos to "strike when the tide of battle
reaches your town or barrios. On that day, strike hard against
the enemy - wherever you find him - and fight - fight as did
Lapulapu and Dagohoy and Gregorio del Pilar - without counting
the cost," the appellant through his New Leaders' Association,
was preaching and trying to secure pacification; and while
General MacArthur was urging the people to "avoid any
assistance to the enemy, but on the contrary, harass him
incessantly, disrupting his means of communication and his
essential lines," one of the objectives of defendant's New
Leaders' Association was to collaborate with the Japanese Army
and Navy in the safeguarding of their public works and
16
communication facilities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Under count No. 19, the evidence shows and the People's Court
found that on December 1, 1944, Alvero granted an interview
with a Japanese named Kobayashi, and answering questions
already prepared referring to the position of the Philippines in
the Pacific War, he said:
The Philippines, as a vital part of Asia, can not maintain herself
apart from the East Asian Nations in their struggle in the Greater
East Asia War. On the contrary, the Philippines, considering the
fact that she achieved her liberation as an early fruit of the
Greater East Asia War, is honor bound to make her cause one
with the other nations of the East. (Exh. U.)
Under counts Nos. 21 and 22, the People's Court found and the
evidence supports the finding that on December 4, 1944,
appellant prepared a resolution which he had the New Leaders'
Association adopt and which he in the company of Pio Duran,
Artemio Ricarte, Benigno Ramos and other leaders of the
Association presented to a commander of a certain unit of the
Japanese Navy, presumably of the Air branch. We quote the
resolution as follows:.
WHEREAS, the war of Greater East Asia is a war being waged
by all Great Asian Nations for the liberty and happiness of their
peoples..chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREAS, every triumph and every sacrifice for the ultimate
victory of the East becomes part of the great tradition of glory of
every nation in the East.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREAS, the Kamikaze Special Attack Squadron of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in Tagala is blazing glory for the
entire East in defense of the rights of the East in general and of
the liberty and independence of Tagala in
particular.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREAS, on the 25th day of October, 1944, the Sikisima Unit
of the Kamikaze Special Attack Squadron, in oblivion of all
personal considerations, sacrificed life and all by crash-diving
against the vessels of the American task force in a sublime
offering for the greatness of the East and for the freedom and
independence of Tagala.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREAS, such gallantry and spirit of self-sacrifice is worthy of
emulation by the youth of all the nations of the East,chanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREAS, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the
congratulations and admiration of the New Leaders' Association
be conveyed to the proper authorities of the Imperial Japanese
Forces in Tagala so that the gratitude of Tagalan youth may be
made patent for the great sacrifice of the Kamikaze Special
Attack Squadron. (Exhibit M-1.)

The presentation, including the resolution was duly published in
the December 7, 1944 issue of the Tribune under the following
heading and item:
NEW LEADERS GROUP INSPIRED BY KAMIKAZE
SQUADRON'S EXPLOITS
Reflecting the Filipinos' admiration for the gallant attack carried
out by the death-defying members of the Kamikaze Special
Attack Squadron, the New Leaders' Association yesterday
adopted a resolution expressing gratitude and admiration. The
resolution was presented to the naval authorities.
On December 15th the defendant prepared another copy of the
resolution in tagalog and delivered it to General Tominaga, Chief
of the Japanese Air Forces in the presence of a delegation of
the New Leaders' Association. Pictures of the presentation of
the resolution to the Navy leader were taken and published in
the Tribune. In this connection, the People's Court referring to
the diary of the appellant himself said:
Coincidio ademas, que, en la misma manana de dicho dia 15 de
Diciembre hubo un bombardeo aereo en esta ciudad, y segun
dijo el General Tominaga al acusado y sus companeros, el se
iba en aquel dia a Leyte para dirigir personalmente la contra-
ofensiva aerea contra los americanos (vease testimonio de
Rosendo Aterrado y el diario Exhibit ZZ, pags. 44 y 45.) Fue tan
grata, tan oportuna, tan alentadora la presentacion de dicha
resolucion, que el General japones estrecho efusivamente la
mano de todos y cada uno de los miembros de la delegacion
(Exhibit ZZ, pags. 44 y 45.) Decision of People's Court, p. 14.)
To shield himself from responsibility for the preparation and
presentation of this resolution of congratulations, appellant
claims that he acted under pressure and was compelled to make
the presentation of the resolution by a Japanese Kawamoto who
had previously prepared it. The People's Court however,
rejected this defense, saying that the text of the resolution
shows the presence and use of the word tagala, a name by
which the accused alone designated this country; whereas even
the Japanese still knew and considered our home land as
Filipinas and would, undoubtedly, have used said word Filipinas
instead of tagala if the resolution had really been drafted by a
Japanese. Furthermore, the very diary of the defendant (Exhibit
ZZ) which we quote below disproves his assertion and on the
contrary shows that it was he who prepared the resolution and
voluntarily and even with enthusiasm delivered it to the
Japanese High Command:
After dinner, I immediately proceeded to the preparation of the
resolution of gratitude and admiration for the exploits of the
Kaori Unit. (Defendant's diary of December 14, 1944, at 8:30
p.m.)chanrobles virtual law library
6:20 a.m.- Woke up early to the droning of airplanes and the
booming of anti-aircraft guns. Dressed up in haste as there was
the presentation of the Kaori resolution to be
done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
7:20 - Mr. Maniya came to the house for a copy of the
resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
8:30 - After a breakfast amidst the booming and noise of air-
raids, Pat and I started on my bike for the meeting place of the
NLA. The air-raid was in full blast, but we had to go on as we
had agreed to meet in spite of the air-
raid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
9:20 - I was the first at our meeting place at the corner of Daitoa
and Padre Faura. While waiting for the others I met a dark
beauty by the name of Aurora Zablan. After a minute of
conversation with her my companions
arrived.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
9:35 - We proceeded to the Villamor Hall which was the
headquarters of the High Commanding Officer of the Air Corps,
General ..............Tominaga. He received us with affability and
after counter-reading (?) of the resolution of gratitude and
admiration for the exploits of the Kaori Unit, Japanese Special
Attack Squadron, he even shook the hands of each and every
member of the delegation. The presentation was solemn and
particularly significant because of the fact that there was an air-
raid when the presentation was being made. (Exhibit ZZ, pp. 44-
45, December 15, 1944.)
MILITARY COLLABORATIONchanrobles virtual law library
Under counts 5 and 20, it has been duly established by the
evidence and found by the People's Court that in November,
1944, the appellant helped found and organize the MAKAPILI
(Makabayan Kalipunan Ng Mga Pilipino) Patriotic League of
Filipinos at the New Philippine Cultural Institute in San Juan,
Rizal. Pio Duran invited appellant to this meeting of the
organization. Among those present at the were Benigno Ramos,
Artemio Ricarte and several officials of the Political Division of
the Japanese Army, such as Kagiyama, Hayashida, and
Kodama. Alvero acted as secretary and took down the minutes.
Besides acting as secretary Alvero took an active and important
part in the discussion. One of the objectives of the association
was to replace the Constabulary reorganized by the Japanese
regime after the surrender of Bataan, which presumably,
because of its pro-guerrilla leanings and because of many
desertions to the resistance forces, was being disarmed by the
Japanese. Among the aims of the MAKAPILI were to accomplish
the fulfillment of the obligation assumed by the pact of alliance
with the Empire of Japan, to shed the blood and sacrifice the
lives its people with the lives of other East Asian nations in order
to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia; to mobilize the
population for the purpose of attaining self-sufficiency in food
and other vital materials necessary for the victory in the Asiatic
War (Pacific War); to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly
with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines, in
such ways and means as may in the joint judgment of the
Imperial Japanese Forces and the Association be deemed
necessary and fruitful; and to propagate throughout the country
the principles for which the Empire of Japan and the other
Asiatic nations are now fighting in that great Pacific War.
Because of the non-arrival of a high ranking Japanese official
scheduled to supervise the meeting, the same was adjourned.
The name of the association was first agreed to be "Kalipunan
Ng Mga Makabayang Pilipino." At the second meeting at Christ
the King Convent in Espa�a Extension about ten days later and
attended by the same persons with the addition of Maj. Sato, it
17
was agreed to have President Laurel head the organization but
Kagiyama insisted that the intervention of or information to
Laurel was not necessary because the Japanese Army will go
ahead with the organization whether Laurel liked it or not. Alvero
signed the Articles of Association as well as the by-laws. After
the signatures, the signers including the appellant went to the
house of Representative Pedro Vera in San Juan, Rizal where
Gen. Nishimura, assistant chief of staff of Gen. Yamashita was
waiting for them. Pio Duran told Nishimura that they were going
to advise Laurel of the existence of the association. Nishimura
answered that they may do so but he said that whether Laurel
liked it or not the Japanese Army will support them. Later the
name of the association was changed to Makabayang Kalipunan
Ng Mga Pilipino (MAKAPILI).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Paragraph 10 of the minutes taken down by the appellant at the
first meeting reads as follows:
The Chair opened the period for discussion after the motions
had been considered, and the important problem about the
feeding of the soldiers of the `League' was discussed. Mr.
Ruperto Santiago, Jose I. Baluyot, Paulo Capa and others gave
their views.
The number of high Japanese army officers attending the
meeting of organization and the determination of the said Army
expressed through its officials to back the organization whether
Laurel liked it or not shows the intimate connection and relation
between the MAKAPILI (League of Patriotic Filipinos) and the
Japanese Armed Forces. Paragraph 10 of the minutes above-
quoted shows that the MAKAPILI was to be composed of
soldiers, and the Articles of Association clearly shows that it was
to be a military or semi-military organization purposely organized
to fight side by side with Japan against the American forces and
the members of the Filipino resistance
movement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The appellant insists that he joined the MAKAPILI against his
will and was forced to sign the Articles of Association, and that
after signing the same he abstained completely from taking part
in its activities. The evidence, however, completely refutes this
claim and as the People's Court well asserts, appellant took
quite an active part in the organization of the association,
participated in its activities after the organization and he even
had plans and aspirations of occupying a high and important
position in it. During the first meeting of the association, where
he acted as secretary and took down the minutes, of seven
motions, 5 of them were fathered by him and he seconded
another one. He voluntarily signed by-laws and in compliance
with orders of Benigno Ramos he prepared identification cards
for members of the MAKAPILI. It was first planned to give him
the rank of colonel and chief of the Department of Enlightenment
but when this same post was given to another Mr. Lumbre, he
(defendant) was keenly disappointed. The following entry in his
diary (Exhibit ZZ) is enlightening.
On my way to the office, I met Major Sato who was introduced to
me by Mr. Pio Duran at the first parley of the League of Patriotic
Filipinos. He was asking me to go with him to the headquarters
of the league (MAKAPILI), but I could not go because of my

appointment with Saito Koyzo in the office of the Kobe Marine.
(Exhibit ZZ, entry at 1:25 p.m., Nov 17, 1944.)chanrobles virtual
law library
Proceeded to the Kobe Marine to keep my appointment. There I
met Major......and Captain..............The Major inquired about our
league activities and he asked me what my rank would be in the
newly organized league army. I answered him that according to
plans I was to be designated colonel and he jokingly answered
that in that event I would be two ranks his senior officer.... (Id., p.
4, entry at 2:20 p.m.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The meeting of the Directors of the PL of F (Patriotic League of
Filipinos - Makapili) was opened with the announcement of the
Plantilla of the association. I was disappointed by the men of Mr.
Ramos in the plantilla, as many of them were green and
incapable ones. To top this the headship of the Department of
Enlightenment which was reserved for me by the agreement
between General Ricarte, President Duran and Executive
General Ramos had been handed over to Mr. Lumbre by the
Executive General Ramos. I was hurt by this action inspite of the
reason that they gave that I was not in the office for some time. I
knew that it was only a reason being given by Mr. Ramos in
order to put in his men for the reason could not hold water as I
was in position to go because of my activities in the NLA (New
Leader's Association) which fact was known to him. I did not
express my disappointment in an effort to hide my emotions, but
General Ricarte objected to my being deprived of the position.
He however replied that it was not a very important matter as I
could render services without being head of any department.
Executive General Ramos sensing objections against the
injustice from any quarters, immediately replied that if I could
attend to the work, then I should be retained as head of the
Department of Enlightenment while Mr. Lumbre was to be
transferred to the Secretariat. Various reports were read and
finally the question of manner of address was brought up and
General Ricarte proposed that the Tagalog title `Tandis' be used
in addressing Executive General Ramos. On the other hand I
proposed that General Ricarte, as `Tayog' and Vice General
Duran should be addressed as `Tayuyog'. The manner of
address were unanimously approved. It was already dark and
the moon was already up when the meeting was adjourned.
President Duran took me home in his car. (Id., p. 25, entry at
5:40 p.m., Nov. 26, 1944.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Debated with myself whether I should resign or not as Director
of the Department of Enlightenment of the Patriotic League of
Filipinos. Finally decided to leave the matter for the next day.
(Id., p. 30, entry at 10:30 p.m., Nov. 28, 1944.)
Rejecting the claim of the appellant as to his alleged involuntary
joining the MAKAPILI and of his abstaining from participating in
its activities the People's Court ironically gives us this picture:
He aqui un hombre, que despues de haber sido forzado a firmar
la Escritura Social de una asociacion, acepta de la misma, de
buen gana, rangos, honores y distinciones, y hasta se resiente
cuando le postergan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
2. La activa y valiosa participacion del acusado para el mayor
lustre de la inauguracion de la MAKAPILI, no se compagina con
la alegada coaccion. Dice el diario:
Back at the NLA headquarters I gave instructions regarding the
MAKAPILI inaugural to those who were attending. (Exhibit ZZ, p.
38, entry at 3:30 p.m., Dec. 8, 1944.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Arrived in front of the Legislative Building where the ceremonies
of the MAKAPILI were to be held. We helped out as much as we
could, helped arrange the chairs and divided the work of
ushering. (Id., entry at 4:10 p.m., of the same day.)chanrobles
virtual law library
The speech of General Yamashita was short and forceful and I
tried my best to give the translation which I did as much power
as I could. I was rather surprised by my voice which was at that
moment very powerful instead of being hoarse as I expected it to
be. (Id., entry at 5:10 p.m., of the same day.)
Finally, appellant tries to create a distinction between the
Kalipunan Ng Makabayang Pilipino, the first name agreed upon
at the first meeting, and Makabayang Kalipunan Ng Mga Pilipino
to which it was later changed and from which the word
MAKAPILI was derived. The People's Court found that there
was no distinction or difference between the two for they mean
the same thing. This aside from the fact that at the hearing of his
application for bail appellant admitted that the organization
Kalipunan Ng Makabayang Pilipino was the same one
inaugurated on December 8, 1944, which in point of fact was the
Makabayang Kalipunan Ng Mga Pilipino
(MAKAPILI).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Continuing with the appellant's military collaboration under
counts 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, regarding the organization of the
Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala, the record shows and the trial court
found that the appellant organized said Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala
as a military unit or body whose members were recruited from
those of the New Leaders' Association. Its main objectives were
to maintain peace and order and to procure foodstuffs for
distribution to the public. The objectives of that organization as
planned by the defendant were embodied in his memorandum
(Exh. HH) dated December 30, 1944, and addressed and
delivered to Colonel Zusuki of the Manila Defense Corps from
which memorandum, we are making the following quotations:
We, therefore, approach you in all humility to offer the
assistance of the New Leaders' Association in these difficult
times in accordance with our plans which we herein take the
liberty to set forth.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
In the struggle against the Americans, it would be rather a
stretch of fancy to expect the bulk of the "Filipino" nation to fight
them beside the Japanese soldiers. The truth must be faced: the
"Filipino" is not ready for that. At best, there will be some loyal
unto death to the ideals of the East, but one who says that all
will rally as a body against the Americans is really trying "to pull
somebody's leg".
18
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
The most that the Japanese, therefore, should ask is this: That
the "Filipinos" maintain their equanimity and keep peace and
order. With this achieved, a great assistance will have been
given to the Japanese forces, for, instead of training guns
against the riotous people in distraction of the arms of defense,
peace and order in Manila will mean full liberty for defense,
concentration towards defense by all the forces of Japan.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
"A satisfied stomach is not anxious to revolt." Conscious of this
physiological-psychological truth, the second problem that must
be met is the maintenance of food supply for the people.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
If the people had been trained in the past along that discipline of
the spirit which brings great glory to the men of the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy, then perhaps there would be no need
for our fears nor for this memorandum. It is rather the misfortune
of this Country to have had three hundred and more years of
Spanish mis-education and forty more years of American mis-
education, the consequence of which is the unhappy corrosion
of that moral fiber vital for the maintenance of nations in times of
storm and stress.
TOO LATE TO MARSHALL THE PEOPLEchanrobles virtual law
library
Were there sufficient time, the re-education of the people by
means of a nationalistic and Asiatic philosophy would solve the
whole mess. But now - education is too long a process in the
face of the short time left for preparations.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
It is for this reason that the New Leaders' Association, through
the undersigned, petitions for an opportunity to prove their worth
in the face of the impending crisis.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
For the past month and a half, we have been training a few
young men towards that lofty idealism which is the most
important fiber of character. Our original group of young men
was bolstered by the adhesion, voluntary and upon knowledge
of our principles, by graduates of the New Philippine Cultural
Institute. With this group, compact and unified, as the nucleus,
we propose the organization of the "Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala" (Iron
Arms of Tagala).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We propose the concentrated training for a period of two weeks
of all the graduates of the New Philippines Cultural Institute and
the best elements of the New Leaders' Association.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

These men shall undergo training in a barracks to be
established at a centric place in the City, and immediately after
the training period, the men shall be assigned to assume
leadership in four other training barracks at strategic points in
the City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With an initial body of fifty men as the nucleus, there would be a
standing body of five hundred men at the end of the short one-
month period of preparation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
In one month time, the Imperial Japanese Army may count on
the support for the maintenance of peace and order by the five
hundred bisigbakal of the New Leaders'
Association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Simultaneous with the training of these bisigbakal, fifty other
men of the New Leaders' Association will undertake a campaign
for the instruction of the people and their organization into civic
assistance bodies." (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual law
library
This memorandum Exhibit HH was supplemented by another
memorandum (Exh. II) the following day, December 31, 1944,
from which we quote:chanrobles virtual law library
Having reached an agreement regarding the basic and general
plan for the organization of the Bisigbakal Ng Tagala, we are
now concerned with the delineation of details.
BASIC PRINCIPLES REITERATEDchanrobles virtual law library
It is, however, proper that we should briefly state the basic
principles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The problems to be coped with are:chanrobles virtual law library
First : Maintenance of peace and order;chanrobles
virtual law library
Second : Food Procurement and
Distribution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
We shall organize:chanrobles virtual law library
To solve the first : The Bisigbakal Ng Tagala, a nationalistic
military body;chanrobles virtual law library
To solve the second : A Civilian Assistance Corps as
support of the Bisigbakal.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Salaries for the bisigbakal shall be according to rank, to be fixed
later. We are asking the Imperial Japanese Army to entrust us
with an initial capital of one million pesos (P1,000,000),
disbursements to be duly accounted for and subject to the
approval of the Military Advisers.
In this second memorandum (Exh. II) the defendant goes in two
details such as the uniforms and insignias to be worn by the
soldiers and officers of the Bisigbakal, their arms, their food,
salaries, means of transportation, etc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
On January 1, 1945, the appellant called the members of the
New Leaders' Association to a meeting and announced to them
that the association was being converted into a military
organization to be called Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala, and urged them
to join it. Some of the members like Celso Ilagan and Rosendo
Aterrado refused to join the new organization, because they felt
that eventually, as members thereof, they would be called upon
and compelled to fight against their own people. The Bisigbakal
was actually organized. It received a limited amount of arms and
ammunitions including uniforms and food from the Japanese
Army and was drilled by Japanese military instructor. Members
of the force were quartered at Espa�a Street and at the Union
Theological Seminary at Tennessee Street and were inspected
regularly by Yoshida. The appellant had the rank of a
major.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
About the middle of January and in the month of February, 1945,
the Japanese Army left the La Salle College and the Legarda
Elementary School buildings where they left a considerable
amount of supplies and equipment. The appellant and his
soldiers of the Bisigbakal, armed and in uniform took over these
buildings, guarded the same and began to distribute some of the
food and supplies therein to the public. In the course of the
distribution, particularly in the Legarda Elementary School the
appellant told the beneficiaries of the distribution that "he was
not a pro-Japanese, neither was he a pro-American, but he was
a pro-Filipino" and he urged and enjoined them "to fight anybody
that will take their country." It must be borne in mind that at that
time the American Forces of Liberation had already landed on
the coasts of Lingayen Gulf and were on their way to occupy
central Luzon with Manila as their main objective. So, the
appellant could not have had in mind or referred to any one
taking the country except the Americans and the Filipino
Guerrillas guiding and helping them in the act of liberation. As
the People's Court well said, the appellant could not have
referred to Japan and its forces because they were already in
the Philippines, well entrenched in the same. As a matter of fact,
the appellant and his Bisigbakal forces were closely cooperating
with the Japanese in defending
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under count No. 17, there is evidence to show and the People's
Court correctly found that during the last half of January, 1945,
Colonel Hashimoto of the Japanese Armed Forces, charged with
the defense of Manila, called a meeting at the City Hall, presided
over by Military Governor Leon Guinto. Attending that meeting
were Pio Duran representing the Makapili, Manuel de la Fuente
representing the Home Guards, Eduardo Quintos and Gregorio
Lugtu representing the Manila City Police, and appellant Alvero
representing the Bisigbakal. Alvero and the members of his staff
who accompanied him were all in uniform and were armed.
Officers of the Japanese Army, Navy and the Military Police also
attended. Hashimoto proposed to those present the fusion of the
different organizations they were representing into one body in
order to cope with the problem of peace and order, and asked
them to express their opinions. Alvero, the first to speak fully
19
supported the proposed fusion in order, according to him, to
better maintain peace and order and suppress the subversive
elements like the guerrillas inasmuch as the City Police did not
seem to be doing anything then to suppress them. De la Fuente,
Quintos, and Lugtu testified that maintenance of peace and
order in the City of Manila was, at that time, understood to
include the suppression of the guerrillas because these were
considered subversive elements who disturbed peace and order
by killing Japanese soldiers and Japanese
spies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under count No. 11, there is evidence to show and the People's
Court found, although we find said evidence to be short of the
two-witness rule, that the appellant about the latter part of
November, 1944, prepared the pamphlet (Exhibit T) with a
drawing on the front page prepared by Pablo Amorsolo, a
member of the New Leaders' Association, and had about 800
copies mimeographed and distributed. The pamphlet was
supposed to be the official organ or OUR PEOPLE'S OWN
GUERRILLA (O. P. O. G.), and gave the reader thereof to
understand that the Articles therein were written by Filipino
guerrillas. It severely and bitterly attacked and censured Japan,
America, the new Republic under President Laurel, the
Makapilis and even Alvero himself. The attack against America
and the guerrillas contain among other things the following:
In 1941 to 1942, our youth were sacrificed on Bataan. The
young soldiers of our Country, thinking that they were fighting for
freedom in their stand against Japan, sacrificed their young
lives. But really for what? That America may have time to
prepare in Australia. (Liberty, Exhibit T, p. 1.)chanrobles virtual
law library
We had been in the past the dupes of imperialistic peoples, and
now we refuse to continue to be their dupes. As Lincoln said,
you can fool some of the people all of the time, all of the people
some of the time, but not all of the people all of the time. (Id., p.
2.)chanrobles virtual law library
The people of this country are now divided into three:
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Second - America's hirelings, consisting of so-called guerrillas
who are only awaiting America's return for their soldier's pay,
people who sell their country for paltriness! (Id., p. 5.)
AMERICA AS LIBERATORchanrobles virtual law library
Forty-six years ago, America came to the Philippines as her
liberator. Because of this role, because of America's promises to
the Philippines, the Filipinos under Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo fought
the Spaniards until the latter were cornered in
Intramuros.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
With Spain down - America, the liberator, changed her attitude
and she assumed the role of conqueror. Through a mock Treaty
of Paris where the small Philippines was sacrificed to pacify
America on the one hand and to white-wash the name of Spain
on the other, the Philippines was literally "sold down the
river".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Now, America asks the Filipinos to have faith on her. This time
she comes again as the liberator. This time she is asking the
Filipinos to fight Japan. She is asking the Filipinos to suffer, to
starve, to die as did the young men in the wilderness of Bataan.
(Id., p. 6.)
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
The O. P. O. G. warns the people: Do not be fooled by
promises! Remember Dewey! (Id., p. 6.)
He does not even spare Pio Duran, Benigno Ramos, and
Artemio Ricarte as may be gleaned from the following:
And now we ask: Who are the few being favored?chanrobles
virtual law library
First in the list, though not the Tayog, is the TANDIS of the
GANAPS - Se�or Don Excelentisimo Benigno Ramos,
newspaperman, poet, pseudo-Tagalist, pseudo-patriot, expert
politician and first-class HEEL. He will sell the Philippines to the
Japanese for "a mess of pottage". He utilizes his Ganaps to
fawn with the Japanese. PATRIOTS! WATCH THIS
MAN!chanrobles virtual law library
Second in the list, the Taguyod, - Vice Minister Pio Duran,
lawyer, politician, assemblyman and eel. He is so squeamish he
can circulate among Japanese as also among Filipinos. He is
loved by pro-Japanese like Benigno Ramos and loved by
Filipinos like Laurel. Not only this, he plays poker with guerrilla
chieftains like Recto and Alunan, and manages to be acceptable
even to diehards like Osias and Roxas. PATRIOTS! WATCH
THIS MAN!chanrobles virtual law library
Third in the list, the Tayog, - General Artemio Ricarte, an
innocent tool because of his age, an unfortunate patriot.
Whereas Ramos is a heel and Duran is an eel, the old man
Ricarte sadly does not know an eel. Because of his dreams of
grandeur, he is used by Ramos and Duran for their ends.
PATRIOTS! WATCH THIS MAN! (Id., p. 11.)
As to the Puppet Republic under Laurel he has the following to
say:
Time and again, President Jose "Pula-Puti" Laurel has delivered
high-sounding speeches about the need of the Republic of the
support of all patriotic Filipinos. He passionately asks the people
to rally under the flag of the Republic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The Flag is all right! The idea of the Republic is also good! But
the men who administer the Republic are mainly racketeers!
They have done everything to fatten their selves!chanrobles
virtual law library
But what have they done for the People? What can the Republic
claim that the Republic has done for the people? (Id., p. 7.)
As for himself (Alvero), the pamphlet LIBERTY prepared by
himself, has the following:
Aurelio Alvero, politician, lawyer, professor, poet, writer,
historian, linguist, youth leader and Cassanova, is not the head
of the "NEW LEADERS
ASSOCIATION".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
He preaches patriotism ... "Nationalism above all else" is his cry.
To prove this, he distributes coconuts at cost to the public ... he
even pushes push-carts ... and is willing, according to reports,
even to sweep the streets of Manila to prove his
patriotism.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Of all patriots, pseudo-patriots and professional patriots, he has
a most different approach. He blah-blahs in Tagalog in spite of
his English and Spanish Education. He even signs his name in
ancient Tagalog writing. He claims interest in the Tagalog
language, Tagalog arts, Tagalog culture and Tagalog history. He
goes to the extreme of changing our beloved Philippines to
TAGALA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Of course, all that is very nice ... but it is too, too nice... Perhaps
Aurelio Alvero, the eternal "Young man", in spite of his
"impotence", has learned everything from his mentor Pio Duran,
and is fast developing the technique of the EEL!chanrobles
virtual law library
What Young Man Alvero is up to, we really do not know. But we
are suspicious ... very suspicious. ... We knew him in the past for
his Young Philippines game and also for his Kalturop
tricks.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But Young Man Alvero should stop playing games ... it is high
time he outgrew the nursery. ... This is not peace time; but WAR
TIMES!chanrobles virtual law library
SO WE SAY: YOUNG MAN, BEWARE! (Id., p. 12.)
Now, as regards Japan and the Japanese Armed Forces the
same pamphlet LIBERTY among other things contains the
following:
On the other hand, now Japan wants us to fight avowedly for our
independence against America. But really for what? To save
Japan proper from being the battlefield of this war. (Liberty, p.
2.)
JAPAN AS THE LIBERATORchanrobles virtual law library
What has Japan done to the Philippines in the last three years
that she was here?chanrobles virtual law library
NOTHING for the Philippines; EVERYTHING for
Japan!chanrobles virtual law library
Japan won prestige for her Flag and added wealth to Japan by
buying out economic and industrial strength with bond paper
money!chanrobles virtual law library
In exchange, Japan gave the Philippines untold sufferings. The
present critical almost starvation conditions were caused by
20
Japan's acts to control the free life of the people. These acts,
abetted by the Puppet Republic, are killing the Philippines inch
by inch.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is not to be denied that Japan granted the Philippines
independence, but only paper independence! The Philippines, it
is true, gained one thing, the recognition of the world to her right
to be free. Up to this point, Japan gets a merit, but her
interference in the affairs of the Republic score more demerits
that easily drown out the lone merit that she has!chanrobles
virtual law library
Instances? There are plenty. Japan with the aid of the Puppet
Republic deprives the Filipinos of their homes. Japan with the
aid of the Puppet Republic deprives the Filipinos of their food,
rice particularly. Japan with the aid of the Puppet Republic
compels the Filipinos to render service for military purposes. (Id.,
p. 4.)
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
The people of this country are now divided into three:chanrobles
virtual law library
First - Japan's stooges consisting of government parasites,
Makapili's traitors, newspaper quislings, buy-and-sell-their-
country people! (Id., p. 5.)
At first it is hard to understand how the appellant could have
dared and taken the risk to publish the said pamphlet LIBERTY
under the very nose of the Japanese Armed Forces, especially
the Military Police. One phrase, sentence or paragraph of the
article against Japan as above reproduced would have been
sufficient pass or ticket to the garrison and torture chambers of
the Japanese Military Police or to Fort Santiago. The only
reasonable explanation for this immunity of the appellant to
arrest and torture by the Japanese is that he made the
publication with the knowledge and consent of the Japanese.
This may be gathered from an entry in his diary (Exhibit ZZ) on
November 19, 1944, at 3:30 p.m. as follows:
Before we parted, Director General Yoshida took me to his room
to discuss important secret matters. He wanted me to organize
an organization. I suggested that the O. P. O. G. was the
answer. I explained to him my concept of the coup to fortify out
state: on the left hand, the O. P. O. G. doing the destructive
work; on the right hand, (the N. L. A. New Leaders' Association)
doing the constructive work; and on the center, the League of
Patriotic Filipinos (MAKAPILI) making a frontal attack. He saw
my point and we parted in agreement.(Inclusion and Emphasis
supplied.)
Considering all the circumstances surrounding this case of the
OUR PEOPLE'S OWN GUERRILLA (O. P. O. G.) and the
pamphlet LIBERTY supposed to be its official organ prepared
and published by the appellant, there would appear to be reason
and logic in the opinion and finding of the People's Court that the
act of Alvero was a mere act of deceit and pretense, calculated
and designed to sow confusion and dissension in the ranks of
the guerrillas and to persuade them not to fight with and help the
American Forces of Liberation. We quote with favor that part of
the People's Court decision on this point as follows:

De esto se infiere que la O. P. O. G. fue, creada para servir al
Japon y que el enemigo estaba al tanto del
plan..chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Era, pues, pura enganifa la censura del acusado contra el Japon
y su ejercito, contra los Makapilis y contra si mismo. Con que
objetose preparo el Exhibito T? America estaba viniendo
entonces y no habia tiempo que perder. Criticando y
censurando al Japon y al Japonofilo Alvero, criticando y
censurando a los fanaticos Makapilisy a la Republica de Laurel,
presentandose como guerrillero, se captala simpatia y la
confianze de la genuina guerrilla y el folleto serialeido con el
animo propicio y benevolo. Nadie hubiera hecho casoentonces
de las predicas pro-japonesas del acusado, pero con el
disfrazde guerrillero y apelando al patriotismo y al filipinismo,
podria seducira algunos y sembrar la division y la confusion en
el seno mismo de la guerrilla. "Divide y venceras." Muy
insidiosamente decia enel articulo, "American as Liberator"
(Exhibit T, pag. 6):chanrobles virtual law library
Under such impending possibilities, the O. P. O. G. counsels the
People to refuse to be the instruments of any of the contending
nations, but asks the Filipinos to get arms from both sides so
that we may be in a position to make a bid for our Freedom in
the only honorable way: Fight for it against
all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The O. P. O. G. warns the People: Do not be fooled by
promises. Remember Dewey!'.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Nuestro pueblo y su guerrilla iban contra el Japon, y peleaban
por America. El aconsejar entoces "to refuse to be the
instruments of any of the contending nations" no significa otra
cosa mas que no sean instrumentos de America, que se
nieguen a pelear con los americanos. (Decision of trial court, pp.
35-36.)
PETITION FOR DISMISSAL
Now, for a little digression. Considering the motion for dismissal
of the cultural, political and economic counts of the information,
filed by appellant and agreed to by the Solicitor General, based
on Amnesty Proclamation No. 51, of January 28, 1948, we have
to give due course to said proclamation and accord its benefits
to those invoking them like the appellant herein. The Amnesty
on economic collaboration may include the trading and business
activities of Alvero in connection with his ASA TRADING. One
may contend that the economic collaboration contemplated by
the Amnesty Proclamation was trading with the enemy in
general - buying from and selling to it, whether said business
dealings indirectly benefited and aided the enemy. In the case of
appellant, it has been proven that he dealt mainly in war
materials which he bought from his agents and sold almost
invariably and exclusively to the Japanese Army and Navy,
especially for their transportation facilities. We all know that one
of the vital things that Japan lacked in the prosecution of the war
was motor transportation. She confiscated almost all the motor
vehicles she found in the Philippines, used some of them here
and the rest she dismantled, shipping the engines and other
important parts to Japan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Some one has said, perhaps with some exaggeration that the
lowly and ubiquitous jeep now flooding and crowding our streets
and highways won the war for America and her allies. The
statement may not have been seriously made, and may not be
wholly true, but at least it conveys the idea of the vital
importance of transportation facilities in war. It requires no
stretch of the imagination to see that the automobile spare parts
sold by the appellant to the enemy materially aided said enemy
in the war in the servicing and maintenance of its war motor
vehicles, at least here, if not in Japan proper, so that defendant
may in a sense be regarded as having given aid to the enemy.
However, inasmuch as the Amnesty Proclamation speaks in
general terms and makes no distinction as to the kind and
nature of the economic collaboration rendered, we are not
prepared to make such distinction in this case, and giving
appellant the benefit of the doubt, we are willing to apply as we
hereby apply the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation to him
and consider as dismissed the counts in the information relative
to economic collaboration, particularly his commercial activities
through his ASA TRADING.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
As regards cultural and political collaboration, that portion of the
Amnesty Proclamation may also be held to extend to and cover
his congratulations given to President Laurel for his declaration
of war or state of war against the United States of America and
Great Britain, his offer of services in any capacity and even to
his contribution of P10,000 intended according to his letter, for
national defense although according to his letter to Pio Duran, to
"add to the strength of our war efforts." Equally included in this
political collaboration in his membership in the KALIBAPI, even if
his participation in that organization was not as a mere
indifferent or involuntary member as was the case with many
Filipinos, but as an active member and important official who did
all within his power and capacity to propagate the idea of the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and slander and
ridicule America and deprecate and assail its institutions and
work in these Islands. Also coming under political collaboration
to be covered by the Amnesty Proclamation is the appellant's
organization of and activities with the New Leaders' Association,
even when the objectives of said association as conceived and
prepared by him, included collaboration with the various
Japanese organization, pacification efforts, and collaboration
with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the safe-guarding
of its public works and communication facilities, this, under a
liberal interpretation and application of the Amnesty
Proclamation. Besides, in this respect there is no concrete
evidence that the appellant through the members of the New
Leaders' Association actually helped in the pacification
campaign of the Japanese Armed Forces or helped in guarding
their transportation facilities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant's interview with a Japanese named Kobayashi
under count No. 19, will also be included in political
collaboration, to be covered by the Amnesty Proclamation. So is
his interview with guerrilla leader Leonardo Garcia as described
in his diary, under count No. 10.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
21
Appellant's preparation of the resolution congratulating the
Kamikaze Special Attack Squadron and its presentation to the
Navy officials, may equally be classed under political
collaboration and as coming within the scope of the Amnesty
Proclamation. The air unit of said Navy must have appreciated
and been encouraged by said resolution and found comfort in
the thought and knowledge that an association composed of
young, intelligent, active and more or less influential Filipinos,
were, at least in spirit, on their side, and applauded their war
efforts and achievements. This might be regarded as
psychological aid and comfort. But by taking a liberal view of the
case, we can as we do hereby regard it as included in the
Amnesty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Acting upon this petition for dismissal, above referred to, we
hereby grant the same and consider dismissed those counts of
the information referring to economic and political collaboration
as above enumerated and discussed. Now whether by reason of
the application and extension of the Amnesty Proclamation to
appellant's acts of economic and political collaboration his acts
of adherence alone and proof thereof have also been wiped out,
or whether they may still be considered in connection with the
acts of military collaboration, quaere. Anyway, there is no need
of so considering them for there is more than sufficient proof of
adherence in the other counts.
ADHERENCEchanrobles virtual law library
As to the other acts of appellant showing his adherence to the
enemy we find from the evidence, as was also found by the
People's Court that he used to speak by radio over the Radio
Broadcasting Station, the PIAM, then controlled by the enemy.
On one occasion about the middle of January, 1945, when the
American Forces had already landed in Lingayen, the appellant
in a radio talk, hailed and praised as heroes "the Makapilis
fighting side by side with the Japanese in the beaches of
Pangasinan" and he urged the Filipinos to emulate and follow
their example. This may well be considered in connection with
his membership in the MAKAPILI, and not covered by the
Amnesty Proclamation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
As proof of the esteem and regard in which the appellant was
held by the Japanese during the occupation, and as
compensation or reward for his services and collaboration, he
was issued special passes by the Japanese Manila Garrison
Commanding Officer Hashimoto. In connection with the
propaganda of the Japanese Army, he had a special car and two
Japanese bodyguards, one of whom told him that he
volunteered to be a bodyguard to defend appellant's life as he
considered appellant vital not only to his country's future but also
to the Co-Prosperity Sphere.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
According to Rosendo Aterrado, the appellant proposed to
Yoshida the installation of a secret radio broadcasting station in
his (appellant's) house as propaganda to win the confidence of
the people by exposing the abuses of the guerillas as well as the
Japanese soldiers. According to witness Socorro Laguio, in
January, 1945, the defendant, carrying a revolver in his hand
accompanied by three Japanese civilians also armed, searched

her house for rice, telling her that if she had plenty of rice it can
be taken away from her because according to him the rice was
exclusively for the use of the Japanese Army. Alvero at the time
wore short pants and blue denim shirt, evidently, the uniform of
the Bisig Bakal �g Tagala.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Let us now consider the assignment of errors made by the
appellant. Of the forty-two errors assigned we shall only discuss
and pass upon the important ones, and those necessary for the
determination of this case. Error No. 1 sets up to the theory of
suspended sovereignty. Error No. 2 asserts that the treason law
being political in character was equally suspended during the
enemy occupation, and Error No. 3 is based on the contention
that due to the change in government from the Commonwealth
to Republic of the Philippines, treason against the former is not
now punishable. These same theories had already been
advanced in previous treason cases. They have been overruled
and rejected by this Court in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (G.R.
No. L-409, 44 Off. Gaz., 1176 1 ) and reaffirmed in the case of
People vs. Carlos (44 Off. Gaz., 4281 2 ). We therefore see no
necessity in discussing and determining this point or points
again.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the 4th error assigned, the appellant claims that the
People'sCourt erred in considering adherence as constituting by
itself treason and of treating it as an independent charge. The
defendant labors under a misapprehension. In its decision the
People's Court grouped the counts under three main
classifications, namely: economic, political, and military.
Adherence was never considered as a count or included in any
of those three groups. It was merely added in the latter part of
the decision, not as a separate count but to show the treasonous
intent which impelled and characterized his overt acts of
treason.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under error No. 25 appellant claims that the People's Court
erred in finding him as one of the organizers of the Makapili and
that he voluntarily joined it, and in not holding that he was
compelled to sign the Articles of Association and the by-laws of
the same, and that on this point the two-witness rule was not
complied with. We find that the trial court did not commit the
alleged error. The testimony of Jose I. Baluyot as well as the
testimony of the accused himself during the trial and during the
hearing of his petition for bail, and the entries in his diary show
that the accused was present at the meeting of organization,
acted as secretary of the same, took very active part in its
deliberations, presented five of the seven motions as shown by
his own minutes of the first meeting, voluntarily signed the
Articles of Association and the By-laws of the association,
occupied an important department of the association, looked up
the rooms which were to be the headquarters of the
organization, instructed the members of the New Leaders'
Association of which he was a co-founder and an important
official to be present at the inauguration of the Makapili, helped
in making the chair arrangements and the work of ushering in
said inauguration and felt enthusiasm in translating the speech
of General Yamashita into Tagalog and exaltation over the
power and true of his own voice while making the
translation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Appellant also urges that the People's Court erred in holding that
the Bisig Bakal �g Tagala was organized for treasonous
activities or that it engaged in such treasonous activities. The
very objectives of the Bisig Bakal �g Tagala, its organization
into a military unit with arms, uniforms, and military discipline, its
activities in taking over and guarding the barracks and
installations and equipment left by the Japanese Army in the
City of Manila and the offer made by the appellant of this
Bisigbakal organization to help in the maintenance of peace and
order which at the time included the suppression of the activities
of the guerrillas which was then regarded as subversive by the
Japanese, abundantly show that this organization which the
appellant helped to found and to organize, was of a military
character intended to and actually used to help the Japanese
Armed Forces in their work of maintaining peace and order,
suppressing the resistance movement and defending the City of
Manila against the American Liberation Forces and their guerilla
colleagues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
According to Rosendo Aterrado, on January 1, 1945, the
appellant announced a meeting of the New Leaders' Association
that afternoon at the Heacock building and at the meeting, he
urged the members to join the Bisig Bakal �g Tagala because it
was the wish of the Japanese Commander of the Manila
Defense Corps that it help in the maintenance of the peace and
order. Aterrado declined to join the Bisig Bakal �g Tagala on
the ground that he was unable to carry a gun and because he
did not like the prospect of shooting his own people; that in his
opinion the best way to maintain peace and order was to get
food from the Japanese Army and distribute it among the people
so that they may not participate in the fight between the
Japanese and the Americans. Because of this attitude and
stand, Aterrado was summoned to a mock court martial presided
over by Alvero, with Yoshida at his right side, and without any
trial Aterrado was summarily and dishonorably
discharged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Under his 32d assigned error, appellant maintains that the
People's Court erred in finding and holding that his desire and
efforts to maintain peace and order constituted treason and in
support thereof, he cites article 297 of the United States Rules of
Land Warfare as regards the right of a military occupant to
demand and enforce from the inhibitants of occupied territory
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of its
forces, and for the maintenance of law and order, citing
Birkhimer on Military Government and Martial Law. It is to be
borne in mind however, that according to international law
(Hague Conventions of 1907, Art. 43), the duty to maintain
peace and order is imposed upon the military occupant and not
upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory. In the present
case, the appellant through his Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala not only
offered to assist but actually assisted in the maintenance of
peace and order through his military organization. In so doing,
his purpose according to himself was to relieve the Japanese
Armed Forces of the necessity of detailing and assigning a
portion of their forces for the maintenance of peace and order,
so that they could concentrate on defending the City of Manila
against those trying to enter it, who we all know were none other
than the American Forces and their guerilla colleagues.
22
Furthermore, as already stated, the maintenance of peace and
order at that time meant the suppression of the guerillas who
were regarded as subversive elements because they were killing
Japanese soldiers and spies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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Under error No. 33 regarding the meeting at the City Hall in
January, 1945, he maintains that the trial court erred in holding
that meeting was for a treasonous purpose or that the
utterances made therein by him constituted treason. Through
the testimony of Leon Guinto, then Mayor of Manila, he claims
that nothing was said in that meeting about the defense of
Manila nor the suppression of guerrilla activities, and that he
(appellant) merely complained against the confiscation of
foodstuffs. Examining other portions of the testimony of witness
Leon Guinto, however, it will be found that previous to that
meeting the appellant accompanied by two Japanese civilians
had already done to his office offering the services of his New
Leaders' Association to help distribute cloth to the people and to
maintain peace and order, and that Mayor Guinto had answered
him that he already had an adequate system for the distribution
of cloth, but that he (Guinto) had accepted the offer as to the
maintenance of peace and order. Furthermore, Guinto admitted
that at the meeting at the City Hall, representatives of the
Japanese Army and Navy and Military Police were present. It is
therefore more reasonable to accept the testimonies of De la
Fuente, Quintos, and Lugtu, who were also present at that
meeting who said that the appellant spoke on and urged the
intensification of the maintenance of peace and order and the
urgency of uniting all peace organizations for a more effective
decimation or suppression of the subversive elements which
were the guerrillas.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In further support of his claim, appellant also pointed to the
testimony of Gerardo Cabo Chan to show that at that meeting he
only complained of the abuses of the Japanese sentries and
soldiers. It should be remembered however, that at that time
Leon Guinto was a treason indictee, and that consequently, he
may not be regarded as an absolutely impartial witness; and as
to Gerardo Cabo Chan, his father named Justo Cabo Chan was
also present at that meeting, representing the Chinese
Community and that his presence and participation in that
meeting was one of the charges brought against him when he
was arrested by the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) for
collaborating with the enemy. Naturally, witness Gerardo Cabo
Chan could not well be expected as a witness to give or attach
any treasonous color or intent to that meeting for it may
prejudice the case of his own father as a treason suspect or
indictee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The 34th assigned error concerns count No. 11 which charges
that the appellant with intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy and to counteract the activities of the guerillas and other
pro-American elements, proposed to Director General Yoshida
of the New Leaders' Association the organization of a military
body to be known as the O.P.O.G. (Our People's Own Guerilla).
The People's Court found the defendant guilty on this count
mainly on his admission as to his preparation and publication of
the pamphlet LIBERTY (Exhibit T) supposed official organ of the
O.P.O.G., and his diary (Exhibit ZZ) as well as the testimony of
Rosendo Aterrado as to the statements made by Alvero when

he gave him a copy of the pamphlet. This admission by the
appellant may not be considered as the confession in open court
contemplated by the law on treason as a basis for conviction. It
is therefore believed that the requirement of the law as to the
sufficiency of evidence to convict has not been filled;
consequently, we uphold this assignment of error and we rule
that the People's Court erred in convicting appellant on count
No. 11. However, the evidence submitted on this count is
sufficient to prove adherence of the appellant to the
enemy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the 38th assigned error, appellant maintains that the trial
court erred in considering as evidence against him a number of
pages of stenographic notes allegedly of his diary and ignored
his two real diaries. From what we can gather from the record,
appellant's theory seems to be kept two diaries, one for the
public eye and consumption, including the Japanese, which
diary did not reflect his will and true sentiments; neither did it
record correctly the events therein narrated, so that even if
examined by the Japanese he would not be molested, much
less, accused of being anti-Japanese, and that this diary was
Exhibit ZZ; and that there was another, real diary in his
handwriting for his private files, so that his private life would not
be exposed to the public view. But this supposed real diary was
never presented by him in court. If it were true as intimated by
him that it was included among the papers seized by the CIC
(Counter Intelligence Corps), then he should have proved in
court the existence of said alleged real diary; that it was in the
possession of the prosecution who refused to present it in
evidence and thereby have the benefit of the legal presumption
that evidence will fully suppressed by the prosecution will be
adverse to it if produced. On the other hand, Exhibit ZZ could
not possibly be the fake and false diary he claims, supposedly
intended for public consumption and to mislead the public
particularly the Japanese because it contains entries regarding
his private life, his relations with the opposite sex, and
statements not exactly pleasing to the Japanese such as that his
brother Jesus Alvero was pro-American and wanted to join the
guerillas. There is therefore every reason to believe and to find
that Exhibit ZZ is his real diary, and that the sentiments and
events therein noted and narrated were entered in good faith
and were more or less a faithful record of what he felt and what
had occured at the time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In this connection and inasmuch as this diary (Exhibit ZZ) has
been continually referred to and quoted not only by the People's
Court but also by this tribunal, it is deemed advisable to say a
few words on its admissibility and competence. Exhibit ZZ was
duly identified by Patricia Fermin, one of the secretaries of the
appellant to whom it was dictated by him and who (Patricia) later
transcribed it. It was offered and admitted in evidence without
objection. As a rule, diaries are inadmissible because they are
self-serving in nature, unless they have the nature of books of
account (51 L. R. A. [N.S], 813-815); but it has also been held
that an entry in a diary being in the nature of a declaration, if it
was against interest when made, is admissible.(Muller vs.
Mclean, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 64, cited in Ann. Cas. 1916C, p.
718.)chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit X and KK, alleged diaries dictated to Romana Bautista,
another secretary, are a little different. Exhibit X was objected to
by the defense on the ground that it was among the papers
illegally seized from appellant's house; and Exhibit KK was
objected on the ground that its authenticity was not properly
established although in the course of the hearing of the
appellant's petition for bail he admitted the correctness of his
material statements in Exhibit X. However, inasmuch as
Romana Bautista who took down and transcribed Exhibits X and
KK refused to identify them during the trial, it is doubtful whether
their authenticity has been duly proven. Consequently, they are
not admissible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Under 42d and last assigned error appellant claims that the
People's Court erred in disregarding and not considering as
evidence of his intention and his explanation of his activities, the
tangible and valuable services which he rendered to Filipinos,
friends and strangers alike. He maintains that in aid of the
resistance movement, among other things he offered all his
money and all that he could earn for the unification of the
guerrillas and he cites the testimonies of Col. Centenera and
Major Ross. It appears, however, that his proposition to
Centenera on the basis of which he made the offer of aid was
set up a guerilla organization armed and supplied by the
Japanese to overthrow the Laurel government or Republic and
set himself (Alvero) in power, which government was to be later
recognized by the Japanese. This proposition was rejected by
Centenera and Ross and several days later, they were being
sought by the Japanese Military Police. As to his alleged offer of
a radio transmitter, P30,000 in cash, radio shortwave, foods,
medicines, rifles, etc. to the resistance movement, it was
testified to only by his own brother Jesus Alvero for whose
natural bias, allowance should be made; and Col. Barrrion of the
resistance movement to whom they were allegedly delivered
was never presented in court to corroborate and fortify this
claim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant's having saved the life of Buenejeres Cascante a
guerrilla, who was caught and was being investigated by the
Japanese, bears explanation. At that time, the guerrillas were
gaining the upperhand. In fact, the Americans and their guerrilla
colleagues were nearing Manila. It was but natural that the
appellant should do something for the guerrillas to gain their
good-will and be in their good graces, for his own safety later on.
What happened was that Cascante was taken to the appellant
and the latter told the Japanese the prisoner was his man,
whereupon Cascante was released. If at all, the incident shows
the great influence the appellant had with the enemy,
undoubtedly, for services rendered to them. And, as to his
assistance to the City population by distributing food at prices
lower than the black market and in some cases giving them free,
as we have already stated earlier, the distribution was part of the
propaganda for his New Leader's Association, and later of his
Bisigbakal. What is more, in making such distribution we said
that he had some ulterior motive, as revealed by his trying,
during such distribution of commodities at the Legarda
Elementary School Building, to persuade the population to resist
the Americans and guerrilla forces that were coming to the City
of Manila to liberate it. Moreover, the performance of righteous
actions, no matter how meritorious they may be is not a
justifying or exempting, not even a mitigating circumstance in the
commission of a wrong. Even service as a guerrilla does not
exempt one from criminal responsibility for treason (People vs.
23
Victoria, 44 Off. Gaz., 2230 3 People vs. Garcia 46, Off. Gaz.,
2497 4 .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The last portion of appellant's brief, particularly the conclusion,
which he himself prepared and signed, begins with a paragraph
which reads thus:
The decision appealed from tried to point the accused-appellant
as an all-out traitor, a monster devoid of any good or noble traits.
The judge who wrote it, caught in the post-war hysteria of his
time, dipped his pen in the bloody wave of bias and hatreds of
that collaborator-bathing era and shutting his eyes to the truth,
produced a masterpiece of distortion equal only to the mind that
conceived it. So colored with prejudice was the point of view of
the judge, that he saw even in such good acts of the accused-
appellant as distributing food to the people, he saw even in such
good acts the taints of treason. No small shred of evidence
capable of misinterpretation escaped his genius in conjuring the
horrible picture of treason which he wanted portrayed.
In conscience and in justice to Judge Jose S. Bautista who
penned the decision appealed from, we can not allow this
personal attack to pass unnoticed or uncensured. Said invective
is uncalled for, unwarranted as it is unfair. We have liberally
quoted with favor portions of the decision appealed from thereby
showing our conformity with and approval of said decision,
learned and well written. We can well appreciate and imagine
the position of the appellant and his natural reaction to a
judgment of conviction but being a highly intelligent and
educated man and a lawyer at that, he should have been more
discreet and have had more self-control and not allowed himself
to be dominated and carried away by his feelings and expressed
them in such a passionate, ruthless and unfair manner,
especially in brief filed before this
Tribunal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is hard to imagine a Filipino so completely sold on the
Japanese, their way of life, their ideals and their institutions, a
Filipino so utterly won over to the enemy, as Alvero. The entries
in his diaries make mention of his countless Japanese friends in
high officialdom, not only among the Japanese civilian entities
attached to or collaborating with the Japanese Armed Forces,
but also in the Army and the Navy itself. His diary records almost
daily conferences, interviews, dinners, luncheons, rides, etc.
with such Japanese officials. Some of his conferences and
parleys were by himself described as
secret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
To fully understand the pro-Japanese leanings, sentiments and
adherence of the appellant to Japan, which later took the form of
overt acts of treason, it may be stated that far back in 1939, he
went to Japan to attend the Japanese sponsored International
Asiatic Anti-Communistic Convention in Tokyo where he made
known his friendship with Japan through his poem
"TOMADACHI TO NARO" meaning "let us be friends", punished
in the Japan Times on October 30, 1939 (Exhibit OO). This
gesture met with a flattering reception from the Japanese,
particularly the press. Complimentary and favorable comment
and editorials were written as shown by defendant's own
clippings from these Japanese newspapers (Exhibits OO to OO-
16). On his return from the conference the appellant published a
pamphlet entitled "WHO ARE THE FRIENDS OF THE

PHILIPPINES?" After answering that question he concludes
thus:
Were there more neighbors like Japan, were there more guests
like the Japanese, there would be no need of territorial barriers
and divisions of nations and race, but in the contrary, there
would be a universal union of men fighting towards the greatest
ambition of the world, the happiness of humanity. (Exhibit 00-2,
p. 118, rec.)
Evidence of appellant's adherence to the enemy to be gathered
not only from his overt acts of treason but from many other acts
during the occupation as testified to by his own countrymen and
from the entries in his own diary, is abundant and overwhelming.
Judge Dizon, one of the three Judges of the People's Court who
signed the decision of conviction, in his concurring opinion has
the following to say on the adherence of the appellant:
La Adhesion del Acusado al Enemigochanrobles virtual law
library
La ponencia apunta con acierto diferentes actos del acusado
que no dejan duda alguna en cuanto a su adhesion a la causa
del Japon dirimida y resuelta por las armas en la segunda
guerra mundial. Su actividad febril e inusitada en el escenario
de la vida publica durante la ocupacion de nuestro pais por el
invasor - cuando la mayoria de los de su sangre o se unian
abiertamente al movimiento deresistencia activa o procuraban
pasar desapercibidos y ponerse almargen de los sucesos,
huyendo de toda actividad que, directa oremotamente pudiera
demostrar simpatia por el enemigo o constituir ayuda material,
moral o espiritual a sus esfuerzos de guerra - constituye, en mi
opinion, la prueba mas categorica y fehaciente de su adhesion a
la causa del Japon. En realidad, si nos fuera dable exprimir, los
autos, cual se hace con una jugosa fruta, el liquido que
destilarian seria no la adhesion inocente e irreflexiva del
automata sino la adhesion consciente, deliberada y resuelta de
un hombre sano y libre; el acusado que habia puesto al servicio
del Azotede su pais todo el idealismo y vigo de su sangre joven,
dignos, ciertamente, de mejor causa.
Regarding this same adherence, had appellant confined himself
within the realm of mere adherence - disloyal state of mind and
treasonous thoughts, intentions, and sympathies, however great
may have been the disappointment, disapproval, and even
hatred of his countrymen for such disloyalty to them and to their
country, the law and prosecuting officials could not have taken
action against him. Adherence alone is not indictable. In a free
and democratic country like the Philippines, there is freedom of
thought and free and unhampered discussion and expression of
sentiment. But when he translated such treasonous sympathies
and intentions into overt acts of treason such as joining the
Makapili, establishing his military organization Bisig Bakal Ng
Tagala and offering its services to take charge of the
maintenance of peace and order, which included the
suppression of the guerrillas, so that the Japanese could
concentrate their forces in defending the City of Manila by
fighting against the American and guerrilla forces trying to enter
and liberate it, then he (appellant) breached as it were the walls
of allegiance and loyalty which the treason law has erected to
surround and protect the security and integrity of the nation, and
he may then be held criminally liable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
In several cases already decided by this Court we have
convicted persons of treason for mere membership in the
Makapili organization, on the theory that one joining such
military body organized to actively help the Japanese Armed
Forces was "placing himself at the enemy's call to fight side by
side with him when the opportune time came altho an
opportunity never presented itself, because such membership by
its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort." (People vs.
Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300 5 People vs. Alitagtag, 45 Off. Gaz.,
715 6 . Here, the appellant not only joined the Makapili as a
member but greatly helped organize and later inaugurate it. He
was assigned the high and important post of colonel in it. Later,
in a radio speech he hailed as heroes to be emulated the
Makapilis who, side by side with the Japanese, were fighting the
American landing forces in Lingayen. That appellant Alvero is
guilty of the charge of treason, is
clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In conclusion we find the appellant guilty of treason. Although
we agree to the prison sentence of reclusion perpetua meted out
by the People's Court, all the members of this high Tribunal
taking part believe that the fine should be increased. We hereby
increase it from P10,000 to P20,000. With this modification as to
the sentence and as to those portions of the decision of the
People's Court discussed and ruled upon by us, the said
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
ARTICLE 122 – PIRACY
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O.
CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG,
and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained
in docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together
with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of
A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo
vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600
barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with
a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of
Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain
Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and
Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio
Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco.
The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and
Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber
handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant
Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black
paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions
24
of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the
vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee,"
with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to
sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio
messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the
disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and
secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the
vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The
pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March
14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991
where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and
anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's
shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao"
to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride".
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of
"Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an
interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed
on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area
and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan,
Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991,
the members of the crew were released in three batches with
the stern warning not to report the incident to government
authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991,
otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from
the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco,
who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to
Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their
respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-
appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were
brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the
members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members
were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The
incident was also reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation where the officers and members of the crew
executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified
information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance,
accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were
arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the

latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade
arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and
Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas
City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN,
VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN
DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed
as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10,
1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and
armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded
with petroleum products, together with the complement and crew
members, employing violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to
Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter
returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the
aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before
Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon
ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola,
notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to
where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of
denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any
cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their
story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were
conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto
Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board,
approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the
three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the
work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a
month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that
period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going
experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel,
prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied
having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to
Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21,
1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen
days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted
to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of
employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge,
averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He
testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan
Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia,
obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed
the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two
years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine
Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged
in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker
lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It
owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized
by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in
the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime
Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone
operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil
for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the
company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul
Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations
Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board
"Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March
27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching
Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel
oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated
by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and
quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul
Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed
toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T
Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of
"Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure,
Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port
clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list.
Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list
submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The
General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried
11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T
Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-
side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired.
Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be
Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full
name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the
tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The
surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby"
signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed
the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at
25
Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the
quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer
of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride."
The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This
time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks,
including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T
Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on
March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that
he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo
operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for
the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines
to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the
details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as
contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to
arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted
at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under
the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN
OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself,
also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving.
Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-
appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused
Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio
Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of
Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San
Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the
said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory
death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution,
the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco
are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong
San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are
hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer
return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit,
jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the
amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests
thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until
the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong
San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex
Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the
accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation,
all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in
the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus
interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused

Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be
deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their
detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City
Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that
they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the
rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National
Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of
accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and
Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio
Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to
adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being
represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby
depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due
process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas
entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in
the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial
court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the
Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and
examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio,
Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were
forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to
read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of
counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their
constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in
finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege
that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22
and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these
accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the
alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in
effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court
erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that
Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T
Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the
subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in
finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified
piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of
Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the
trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence
on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in
convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-
appellants do not prove any participation on his part in the
commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues
that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and
that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged
under the information with qualified piracy as principal under
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was
convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For
the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been
committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows:
(1) what are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a
non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2)
what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of
counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court
err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime
of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the
crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can
accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he
was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed
by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation
(Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991,
stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they
were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-
appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a
categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were
apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed
the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents
when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present
and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment
26
(Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that
"[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article
6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule
115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions
imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown
that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and
properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas.
An examination of the record will show that he knew the
technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a
valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the
trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide
lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights
has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997];
Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during
custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436
[1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which
is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial
investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may
waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even

adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in
writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-
called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid.
In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even
shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated
Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree
doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388
[1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is
also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the
uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants,
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible
and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded
as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject
confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound
deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits
"U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and
Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime
charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J.
Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of
witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said
Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T
Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and
brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew
of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about
sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its
cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo
was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for
the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29,
and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than
one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of
the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did
see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the
operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin
Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas
executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and
identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense,
the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact,
boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and
remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination,
which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-
appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard
evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in
the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
[1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by
three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while
said accused-appellants were conversing with one another
along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas,
to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored
off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work
as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without
even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing
their destination or the details of their voyage, without the
personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such
evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human
experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that
Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion
"had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and
venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5)
cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the
alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that
on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite,
sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and
inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated
by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997])
considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult
to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it
was physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan,
Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise
unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates
aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a
testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have
an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of
witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is
telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need
not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact
part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when
conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which
27
may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a
whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the
ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off
Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was
to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the
shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring
them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of
the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the
attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his
task in view of an objective common to all other accused-
appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants
to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the
younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain
Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping
Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their
residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from
each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on
the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were
neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-
appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by
affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its
cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989.
Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime
while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no
longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and
penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential
Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised
Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No.
532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters.
He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word
"any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree
No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532
shall only apply to offenders who are members of the
complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic
Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members
of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence,
excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high
seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon
any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel
or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.

(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1,
1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high
seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or,
not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean
and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or
the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of
the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as
pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high
seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is
no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no
ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the
coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the
law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as
amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the
crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state
that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo
was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack
and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and
its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the
same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the
Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied
with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage
and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278
SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as
an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
even though he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence
showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the
attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he
induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-
appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided
or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the
disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or
abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person
who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or
highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information
about the movement of police or other peace officers of the
government, or acquires or receives property taken by such
pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit
therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be
considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be
punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless
the contrary is proven.
28
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence
that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the
liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v.
Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is
always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v.
Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125
SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any
person who does any of the acts provided in said section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the
legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates
and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the
pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its
transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited
therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine
Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even
tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum
products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in
falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that
the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port
Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other
provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992,
pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration
(Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and
utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services
personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by
Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong
not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could
have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and
this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in
Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T
Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court
showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the
disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on
March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the
"Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the
crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port
authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General
Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off
port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely
stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10
o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board,
and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and
that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo;
that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio
Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the
helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit
"11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the
"Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong
was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the

"Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH",
Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any
receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue
one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its
arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the
evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to
falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of
cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it
acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil.
The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as
discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-
appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised
the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following
the orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the
illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny
knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he
himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have
avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the very
suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed
to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase
order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he
never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and
documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even
verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the
first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that
the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the
dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not
ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted
with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any
receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was
a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also
be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or
roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1,
the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold
for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong
should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right
mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and
money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if
it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of
falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong
was well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was
purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was
"merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is
justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by
a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the
means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful
(Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably,
the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is
a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law.
Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated
vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said
order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration
authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to
consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself,
and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and
articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must
have realized the nature and the implications of the order of
Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to
follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of
the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason,
he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants
justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS
the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y
MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y
Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece
Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter
Power were charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi,
which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the
vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi,
and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-
named accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime
Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez
y Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power
being crew members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel
of Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another and armed with bladed weapons
and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14,
one (1) garand and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent
of gain and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons,
did then and there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take,
steal and carry away against the consent of the owners thereof,
the equipments and other persona) properties belonging to the
crew members and passengers of the said M/V Noria 767,
consisting of cash money amounting to Three Million Five
Hundred Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos
(P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of passengers and crew
amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts and
instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in
the total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY
SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,687,300.00) Philippine Currency; that by reason of and on
the occasion of the said piracy and for the purpose of enabling
the abovenamed accused to take, steal and carry away the
properties abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to
their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill and with evident premeditation,
treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage
of superior strength, use personal violence upon the persons of
Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos
Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi
29
Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael
Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam,
Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop
Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid
Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil
Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola
Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil,
Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon them
multiple gunshot wounds which caused their instantaneous
death and likewise causing physical injuries upon the persons of
Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji
Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could
have produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of said
accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of
superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and
Rico Lopez, assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charge, were convicted on March 5, 1982 and sentenced each
"to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of
not guilty. However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it with
that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime
charged and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer
the extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities
of the four defendants because "there was a separate civil
action for breach of contract and damages filed with the same
trial court in Civil Case No. N-85 against the several defendants,
including the four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on
automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the
evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the
name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de
Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the
following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon.
In the evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On
board the vessel were several traders and crew members. Two
or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles
from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of
the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and,
after awhile, he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor
launch to hide and on his way through the engine room, he saw
appellant Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario

Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards
Que's companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's
house to handle the steering wheel. He was substituted by
Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other crew
members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and
the dead bodies of Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and
Vicente America. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed with
a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions
from the motor launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying
down among the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter
Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming
down the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred Canizares
and Guilbert Que were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When
he tried to move, he realized that he was also hit on the right
side of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till
daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the
commotion from one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open
the door but it could not be opened. After awhile, the door
opened and he saw a gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid
behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came
and fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men
crawled and they took cover in the bodega of copra. While in
hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and Peter
Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman
persuaded him to come out otherwise something worse would
happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to direct his
men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel
reached an island where the four appellants were able to secure
pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the
pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which were full of money.
Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while
Peter Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with
them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of
ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel
M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on
September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies, all
victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul
Naran Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico
Canizares, Masihul Bandahala, Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan,
Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario
Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death
penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred
de Lara, Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2)
in giving weight to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce
y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I
to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in
holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is
guilty of the crime of piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a denial; and, (5) in
holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00
which was his personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants,
namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100,
and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law,
amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took
effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon
conviction by competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical
injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. If rape, murder or no homocide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or
when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a
vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the
crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is
mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no
error in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a
mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties.—In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to
be devoid of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement
(Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities and another
statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of
Investigation of Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-
11") was offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same was
not objected to by the defense, aside from the fact that Peter
Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of said
declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that
correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of
Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat,
you have signed that statement, is that correct?
30
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the
authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-
61069), which We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence
shows that his participation in the commission of the offense
was positively testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil
Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another
witness, passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him
(Peter Ponce) armed with an M-14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet,
Jr. who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon
indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton
disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and
killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in
one pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in
conspiracy with the three other defendants. After his arrest,
Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his
participation as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to
"I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the
Malaysian authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau
of Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila
where they executed their respective statements after Rico
Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and
P1,700.00, respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one
Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities also turned over to
the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and
answers pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are
informing you that you are under investigation here in
connection with the robbery committed on the M/V Noria last
August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant Engineer. You
have a right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any of our
questions here. You have the right to be represented by counsel
of your choice in this investigation. Should you decide to be
represented by a lawyer but cannot afford one we will provide a
lawyer for you free. Should you decide to give a sworn
statement, the same shall be voluntary and free from force or
intimidation or promise of reward or leniency and anything that
you saw here maybe used for or against you in any court in the
Philippines. Now do you understand an these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow
to signify that you so understand all your rights as above stated
and that you do not need the services of a lawyer?

A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants,
(Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are
with each other as each admits his participation and those of the
other co-accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy
existed among them. The conduct of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the
crime is a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in
the commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is
responsible for the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque
buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and
Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque
brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of
history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a
tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of
all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a
horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch
possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the
boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat
eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.
After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang
and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch
boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too
horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat,
with the exception of the two young women, were again placed
on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge,
although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and
Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested
and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the
crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio
for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor
of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial
judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the
two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the
offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been
robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and
to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court
by the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however,
certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the
crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible
depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done
animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in
the lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court
of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are
in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in
the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all
so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this
court for decision for the first time is whether or not the
provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are
still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as
follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or
the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to
cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of
another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first
paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of
cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from
cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing
upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or
by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred
31
and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs
one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against
chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without
means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as
all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be
understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this
code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the
Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as
such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the
United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from
another State to the United States are well-known. The political
law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The
municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution,
the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and
institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to
the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed
to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of
the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago,
Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application
to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of
May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he
said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and
supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of
the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,
such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide
for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things,
until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to
be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette,
Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal
Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine
Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of
the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the
provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to
Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is
the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been
disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar
in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of
the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the
Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas,
the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress
shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in
putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned
for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S.
Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy
rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in
the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal
Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be
that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by
the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression
"citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case
of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the
word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning,
which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and
civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal
Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with the United States, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to
cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of
another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished
with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the
crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force
in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the
Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least
two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as
authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy
was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving
themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine
as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should
be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the
one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating
the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal
Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three
aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed
which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also
be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering,
therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset
by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the
horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the
defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the
women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr.
Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance
with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant
Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place
as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang
and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly
and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924
rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias
"Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise
known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for
having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a
bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by
means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene
Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the
seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to
their damage and prejudice. [1]
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused
Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias
"Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to
reclusion perpetua. [2] Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan
appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court
erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only
constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
32
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and
Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away
from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat
caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the
accused Emiliano Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the
Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan
struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan
Jr. to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the
pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him
to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a
tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to
ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other
pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its
passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene
reminded Catantan that they were now off-course but Catantan
told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the
engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat.
Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not
allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went
farther out into the open sea the engine stalled again. This time
Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were
set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a
tres cantos [4] held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat.
Catantan asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him
that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was
new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to
approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say
anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the
"new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito
to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito
tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and
harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You
choose between the two, or I will kill you." [5] Juanito, obviously
terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other
pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its
outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so
he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the
sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied
his brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their
boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed them
safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack
upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or
part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings
of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders
shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter

provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the
same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of
passengers and cargo from one place to another through
Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels
or boats used in fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be
committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of
a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or
seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or
intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when
they were already on board that they used force to compel the
Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists
that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking
possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter
of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the
brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave
the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims,
he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as
well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy.
While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled
to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat.
The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the
appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and
enlightening -
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the
seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual
that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived
and the passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how
many were riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded
your pumpboat, how did they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the
pumpboat (underscoring supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your
pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us
(underscoring supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say
anything to you?
xxxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring
supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the
pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion
of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these
persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. [6]
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one
of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing
vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As
Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them
and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at
them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to
"dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his
face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after
which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to
Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The
sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four passengers,
all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that
they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other
pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn
revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the
issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the
33
case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the
decree -
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that
lawless elements are still committing acts of depredations upon
the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby
disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of
livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural
elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to
bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen
that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their
livelihood would be to deprive them of their very subsistence,
and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532
are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people." Had it not been for the
chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil
brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering
outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open
sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of
depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which
they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is,
Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their
pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to
another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair.
Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas
so they were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils
reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat
was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the
crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan
and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation
the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in
Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO
CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under
PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN
and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court
of First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente,
imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE
SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW
JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder
and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to
the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is.,
Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the
above named accused, being strangers and without lawful
authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their
superior strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding
and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the
use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon
things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire
their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo
de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de
Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of
Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and
take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches,
stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings
amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine
Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime
herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims
were at their mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the
water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them
which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman;
thus the accused have performed all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with
Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it
by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is, said
Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid
himself, and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to
said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death.
(Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only
Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p.
8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this
Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy
with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and
penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532,
and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of
Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or
ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are members
of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so called
compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of
error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND
JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods
at the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-
3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de
Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de
Guzman received goods from his store consisting of mosquito
nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total value
of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received
under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-
named persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said
goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for themselves.
However these people neither paid the value of the goods to
Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15,
1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group
was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions
were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo
de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were
brought by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-
18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that
caused the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together
with his friends who were also travelling merchants like him,
were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the
goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they
brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37,
tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a
pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the
house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together
with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They
were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the
group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their
goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth
P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house.
However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon
inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him,
Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman
went to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were
able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They
returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with
them (p. 47, tsn).
34
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-
Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They
used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time
armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram
and Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15
meters away from the place where the group was selling its
goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group
talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could
not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the
members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared
to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh
positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine.
On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another
pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from
their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the
engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from
the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn).
There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were
armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the
same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at
Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram
threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island,
Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their
money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter
Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to
undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman,
Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was
good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo
Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de
Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from
the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring
his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove
where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw
the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and
Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and
brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he
received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S.
Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68,
tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his
companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He
pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before
they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he
took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas
at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72,
tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano
Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed:
'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C,
prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo
de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding
death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138;
140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is
the credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de
Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh

and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were
also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how
they testified assigned credibility to the former and an
examination of the record does not reveal any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or
the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a
reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the
following claims of the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily
robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the
occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say
that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and
his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before
they had sold all their goods would be premature. However,
robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after they had
sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from
prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to
the PC. The record does not support this assertion. For as the
prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention
that the witness presented by the defense are all from Pilas
Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be members
of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were
ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why
the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily
Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the
attention of the PC or Police but to an army detachment. The
Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in
locating the army soldiers with whom the report was made?
(Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of
the defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de
Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused
testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and
nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far
presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert
the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as
qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The
point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the
role taken by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by
the accused immediately after the commission of the offense.
Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency
in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or
believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor
Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report
and placed the accused under detention for investigation."
(Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the
deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife
of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de
Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their
husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram.
The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli
Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the
former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven
conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is
sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the following facts appear
to have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July
14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both
accused were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at
Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and
overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized
their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom
the two accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the
dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the
two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the
captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion
peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and
undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not
molested. These concerted actions on their part prove
conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime
(People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130).
The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the scheming
and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of
them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759).
(Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was
killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen
because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason
to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he
died in a manner different from his companions. The incident
took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the
case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing.
But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not
material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape,
murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion
of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature
of the injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked
wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to
hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.)
The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de
Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were
armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed
with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord
with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following
modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty
imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the
appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the
deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 124 – ARBITRARY DETENTION
G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003
BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
35
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,[1] as well as its
Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
following Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram,
Samar, as well as a number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with unidentified persons,
who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES,
who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo
Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR
Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them
to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby
restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine
(9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group
(RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to
the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence
gathering and forest protection operations in line with the
governments campaign against illegal logging. The team was
composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo
Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker
Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team leader. The
team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1
Rufo Capoquian.[3]
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at
2:00 p.m., where they saw two yacht-like boats being
constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials,
the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael
Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the time,
the team left Brgy. Bagacay.[4]
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted
two more boats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-
Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them
to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante
disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met
Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante
returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the
request of Mayor Astorga.[5]
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and
SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain
the purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard
twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed,

Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di
ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo
makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter. (I
can make you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can
box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a
misencounter?)[6] Mayor Astorga then ordered someone to
fetch reinforcements, and forty-five (45) minutes later, or
between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men,
some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed
with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the
team, guns pointed at the team members.[7] At this, Simon tried
to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission.[8] He
then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was
going to contact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform
them of the teams whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga
forcibly grabbed Simons radio, saying, Maupay nga waray kamo
radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri
kamo maka aro hin bulig. (Its better if you have no radio so that
your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you
cannot ask for help).[9] Mayor Astorga again slapped the right
shoulder of Simon, adding, Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw
pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo puwede ha akon. (If you
are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will
not tolerate it here.)[10] Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to
allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that
they would not be allowed to go home and that they would
instead be brought to Daram.[11] Mayor Astorga then addressed
the team, saying, Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga
dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida
ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon. (If you really
want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you
confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will
surrender mine.)[12] Simon then tried to reiterate his request for
permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor
Astorga, who angrily said, Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on
ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya. (You cannot
go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have
many things to discuss there.)[13]
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they
would be served dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor
Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted
between 7:00-8:00 p.m.[14] After dinner, Militante, Maniscan
and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house,
but not to leave the barangay.[15] On the other hand, SPO3
Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the
team was finally allowed to leave.[16]
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention
against Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the
above-quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000,
wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.[17] At the
trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint Affidavit.[18]
However, the presentation of Simons testimony was not
completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward
to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR
RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.[19]
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision,
disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT
guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correctional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11,
2001[21] which was denied by the Sandiganabayan in a
Resolution dated September 28, 2001.[22] A Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 24, 2001[23] was also filed, and
this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002.[24]
Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a
sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty
of Arbitrary Detention as defined and penalized under Article
124 of the Revised Penal Code, based on mere speculations,
surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining
witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitioners
innocence of the crime charged.[25]
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the
required quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused,[26] especially in light of the fact that the private
complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.[27]
Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is
there any competent evidence that could sufficiently establish
the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons of the
team members.[28] Furthermore, he claims that the mere
presence of armed men at the scene does not qualify as
competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they would feel
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.[29]
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or
employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person.[30] The
elements of the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.[31]
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed
herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed.
Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender
is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of
petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On
the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his
instinct for self-preservation and the feeling that he was being
36
singled out.[32] The detention was thus without legal grounds,
thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team
was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,[33] which involved the illegal
detention of a child, we found the accused-appellant therein
guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that
any physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However,
because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned
not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had
returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could
not leave because of his fear to violate such instruction.[34]
In the case of People v. Cortez,[35] we held that, in establishing
the intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary
that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her
freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended
party in said case was found outside talking to the owner of the
house where she had been taken. She explained that she did
not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers
would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. We
ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers
knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that
their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight.
Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people
immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as
by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of
actual force or violence.[36]
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention
is that the curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any
physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of
the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the
victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in
accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is,
for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident.
Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were
not allowed by petitioner to go home.[37] This refusal was
quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen
reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the
complainants and the witnesses.[38] Given such circumstances,
we give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was not
safe to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.[39] It was not just the
presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these
gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear
was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the
extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and
witnesses against their will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the
private complainants, suffice it to say that the principles
governing the use of such instruments in the adjudication of
other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare,
it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole

consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given
by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge. Here,
there are no such circumstances.[40] Indeed, the belated claims
made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations
that the incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that
the team acceded to Mayor Astorgas orders out of respect, are
belied by petitioners own admissions to the contrary.[41] The
Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainants is
evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in
the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of
the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the case.
This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs,
which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our
sincerity and improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs
Executive and other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR
programs and project can be effectively implemented through
the support of the local officials for the betterment of the
residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are
much dependent on government support.[42]
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the
evidence, pointing out that the Sandiganbayans reliance on the
testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that
SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the
case.[43] He also makes much of the fact that prosecution
witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly not exactly privy to, and
knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein
accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from
their alleged confrontation, until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob
in the early morning of 2 September 1997.[44]
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings
are conclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[45] Nothing in
the case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed,
the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the
rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively
supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary
Detention. Furthermore, Mayor Astorgas claim that SPO1
Capoquian was not exactly privy to what transpired between
Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian
testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk
to petitioner.[46] He heard all of Mayor Astorgas threatening
remarks.[47] He was with Simon when they were encircled by
the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14
rifles.[48] In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the
circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at
the hands of Mayor Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact
prevented from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had
simply decided to while away the time and take advantage of the
purported hospitality of the accused.[49] On the contrary, SPO3
Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply
whiling away the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga
and their departure early the following morning.[50] SPO1
Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did not use
the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their
departure early the following morning to enjoy the place and
that, given a choice, they would have gone home.[51]
Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge, because the ponente of the assailed decision
acted both as magistrate and advocate when he propounded
very extensive clarificatory questions on the witnesses. Surely,
the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a
trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order
to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be
assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions were asked
during the trial.[52]
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention.
Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that, where
the detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall be
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum
term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which has a
range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice
Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he
decried the impunity enjoyed by public officials in committing
arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the intensification of
efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention
committed by government officers form part of our statute books
even before the advent of American sovereignty in our country.
Those provisions were already in effect during the Spanish
regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued
in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese
regime they were not repealed. The same provisions continue in
the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic of the
Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often
heard of violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that
prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact
that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same
government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high
time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and
that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold shrugging
of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or
illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124
and 125 of the Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce
to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as
depicted in this case. The responsible officials should be
prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified
violation of their fundamental rights.[53]
37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
AARON FLORES @ RONITO, SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA
@ SULPING and EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA,
accused-appellants.
Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th
Infantry Brigade detailed at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros
Occidental, and three (3) members of the local Citizen Armed
Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision,
namely, Aaron Flores alias Ronito, Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega
alias Sulping and Edgar Villeran y Magbanua, were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention. The Information charged as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the
Municipality of Ilog, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with high powered firearms conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, kidnap, detain and keep under guard one
SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella
(sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring
the latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and
against his will, without proper authority thereof, thereby
depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then up to the
present.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
All the four accused pleaded Not Guilty when arraigned. Trial
ensued and, based on the testimonial evidence presented, the
trial court found the following antecedent facts to be undisputed.
On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam,
was drinking beer at the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located
at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental. Sgt. Wennie
Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran were
at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused
at their table. Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left
the store and walked towards the direction of the military
detachment headquarters. After the accused left the store with
Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by
rapid firing coming from the direction of the detachment
headquarters.[2] That was the last time Samson Sayam was

seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayams mother and
relatives, he has not been found.
It was the prosecutions contention that on that fateful evening,
all four accused hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and
thereafter detain him at the detachment headquarters. They
allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the prosecution avers, to
this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All the
accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts
charged.
The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy among
the four accused. More specifically, the prosecution failed to
show an apparent common design by and among the accused
to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the
trial court proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of the
four accused based on the degree of their participation in the
commission of the offense charged.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence that
Samson Sayam was seen being forcibly dragged out of the store
and pulled towards the direction of the detachment headquarters
by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran.
Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since
then, the trial court held that the three accused were responsible
for the formers disappearance.
As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the
store ahead of the three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing
to do with the disappearance of Samson Sayam. Notably, none
of the prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically
mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in
bringing Samson Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike
his co-accused who are natives of the place of the incident,
Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment
Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-
motive was attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise, the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson Golez, on the one
hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict
as to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While
Golez stated that he was armed with an Armalite rifle,[3]
Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a short
firearm.[4]
More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt.
Tampioc as one of the perpetrators of the crime was doubtful,
because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson Golez knew
Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992,[5] the
original complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Ilog Candoni, dated October 21, 1992, which was based on the
affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit, did not mention Wennie
Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said affidavits merely
mentioned an unidentified member of the 7th IB, Philippine
Army, assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment. At the time of the
execution of the affidavits, the witnesses could have known that
Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he was the
commander of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and
emphatic manner in which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired
belief in the trial courts mind.[6]
On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed
judgment, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
accused Aaron Flores, Edgar Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and there being no
proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to pay him
jointly and severally, or, in the alternative, his heirs the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs of this suit.
The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and
the convicted accused ordered confined pending appeal if they
so file an appeal, in accordance with Administrative Circular No.
2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-
appellant Sulpecio Silpao raised the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT SULPECIO SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER
ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE
WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR
HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER
1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAMS
DISAPPEARANCE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar
Villeran interposed a joint appeal based on the sole error that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS AARON FLORES AND EDGAR VILLERAN
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced
before the trial court, we find that accused-appellants should be
acquitted of the offense charged against them.
The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The elements of the
offense are:
38
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public
officer.[8]
Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted
of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since
the first element of the said crime is that the offender must be a
private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants were
members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was
committed.
The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264
for the purpose of complementing the operations of the regular
force formations in a locality.[9] It was composed of civilian
volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their
localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As
such, they were provided with weapons, and given the authority
to detain or order detention of individuals.[10]
The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and
convicting accused-appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention for the reason that the appellants are not private
individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor General
submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can
only be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and
penalized in Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. The
prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other elements of
Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed
against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of
said crime.
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or
employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person.[11]
Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the
question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the
evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson
Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.
As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,[12] it was held that
in the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention, it is essential that
there is actual confinement or restriction of the person of the
offended party. The deprivation of liberty must be proved,[13]
just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty must also be established by indubitable proof.[14]1 In the
more recent case of People v. Fajardo,[15] this Court reiterated
the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be uncontroverted

proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as
actual confinement or restriction.
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an
enclosure, or in any manner detaining and depriving him of his
liberty.[16] A careful review of the records of the instant case
shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was
detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution
witnesses testified that accused-appellants were seen walking
with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the detachment
headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually
confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam
has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with
accused-appellants does not prove that he was detained and
deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that
Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-
appellants forced him to go with them when they left the store of
Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the detachment headquarters.
We assayed the testimonies of the prosecutions main witnesses,
namely, Carlito Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito
Manlangits testimony was offered to prove that Samson Sayam
was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter tried his best
to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito
testified to was that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street
alone from the store of a certain Moleng; that the four accused,
who were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his residence
certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam
and brought him to the detachment headquarters; and that he
went home after he saw Samson Sayam talking to the
accused.[17]
It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangits testimony failed to
prove the stated purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was
taken forcibly to the detachment headquarters. To be sure, the
witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled, dragged,
or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say
that Samson Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no
relevant testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam tried his
best to free himself from the clutches of accused-appellants. For
if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not
conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson
Sayam being apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free
himself, it cannot be logically explained why Carlito Manlangit
just went home,[18] instead of doing anything to help Samson
Sayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the
incident to the authorities.[19] More telling is the absence of
testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being taken to
the detachment headquarters against his will, that he was
protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help,
considering that there were other people within hearing and
seeing distance. Most damaging is Carlito Manlangits statement
that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment
headquarters with any or all of the accused.[20] In fine, Carlito
Manlangits testimony failed to prove that Samson Sayam was
arbitrarily detained or deprived of his liberty.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction.
According to him, he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay
Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At
around six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed
by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw
the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go
home because he had to show his residence certificate and
barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry
Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda
Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of
Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam
stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified
that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the
detachment headquarters.[21]
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the
elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Neither does it
support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for
they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see
any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam.
He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected
the residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson
Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay
evidence,[22] which has no probative value.[23] In summary,
Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accused-
appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez,
who identified the four accused as the persons with Samson
Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry Cabrillos. He also
stated that following a heated argument, the accused and
Samson Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of
the detachment headquarters. He said that the accused were
holding and pulling Samson Sayam towards the road. Ten
minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed by
rapid firing.[24]
On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his
earlier statement that the accused and Samson Sayam were
engaged in a heated argument. Rather, he said he did not hear
them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although Nelson
Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the
accused were dragging him, he did not do anything to help
Samson Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.[25]
Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golezs
testimony. First of all, he was unsure of his assertion that there
was an argument. The mere fact that Samson Sayam was being
dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary
detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was
completely deprived of his liberty such that he could not free
himself from the grip of the accused, if he was indeed being held
against his will. The incident transpired in a public place, where
there were people milling about, many of whom were his friends.
It is puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out for help.
Nobody bothered to report the incident, if indeed it happened, to
the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to
corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez.
The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He
wavered on material points, even as the prosecution failed to
substantiate by direct or corroborative evidence the bare
testimony of Nelson Golez.
It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the
accused may be convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Although the findings of fact made by
39
trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if there are
substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the
results of the case in favor of the accused, such facts should be
taken into account by the appellate court.[26] And where it
appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation of the
evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the
trial court may be reversed.[27]
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing
the testimonial evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and
materiality, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution
grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the fact of
detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly
established by credible evidence. There was no showing that
Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his freedom, or
prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was
no proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-
appellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It
is necessary that there must be a purposeful or knowing action
by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force,
because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal
or arbitrary detention.[28]
The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even
though circumstantial, sufficiently establishes the guilt of the
accused-appellants. It cites the following circumstances:
1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening,
accused-appellants, together with their companions Sergeant
Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with
Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were
having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a
heated argument.
2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by
accused-appellants by holding and pulling him towards the road.
From another angle, another prosecution witness saw accused-
appellants on the road arresting Samson.
3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of
the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.
4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the
direction of the detachment followed by rapid firing.
5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard
from.[29]
As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances
were not established by clear and convincing evidence. And
even if these acts were proven to be true, the combination of all
these circumstances would still not be able to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality of
these circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbroken
chain pointing to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused-appellants are guilty, and
inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent.[30] Thus:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[31]
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven
circumstances which in complete sequence leads to no other
logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused.[32] It is
admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-
appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that
there was a heated argument among them, and that the
accused-appellants held and pulled Samson Sayam to the road
and brought him towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant
testimony.
Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that
night have no relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be
concluded that the gunshots came from the direction of the
detachment headquarters. The witnesses who testified that they
heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the
center of the barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself
was also some distance from the barangay. At night, especially
in the rural areas when all is quiet, loud sounds such as
gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every
direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with
certainty, point to the exact location where the gunshots would
be coming from. That would otherwise be attributing expertise
on such matters to the prosecution witnesses.
That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again
cannot be the basis for the trial court to render judgment
convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has no bearing in
this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime of
arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one relevant
circumstance was proved, i.e., that accused-appellants were the
last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However, said
circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously
abducted him, then arbitrarily detained him.[33]
Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson
Sayam was a result of accused-appellants alleged criminal acts
and intentions is insufficient to convict them. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence.[34] An
uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient
for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt.[35]
The prosecution was not able to prove a possible motive why
accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In
sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the
conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces
of circumstantial evidence do not fulfill the test of moral certainty
that is sufficient to support a judgment or conviction, the Court
must acquit the accused.[36]
In the recent case of People v. Comesario,[37]3 we had
occasion to rule that:
Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on
circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial
evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one
circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that
can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to
the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it
is where the evidence is purely circumstantial that there should
be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule
that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the
defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty of guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of
strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only
if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved. In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial
evidence relied on by the prosecution and the trial court to
support a conviction have failed to overcome the constitutional
precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants.
Among other grounds, not only is there a lot of room for
reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt, there is a virtual dearth
of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been
committed.
There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense,
for the prosecution bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably
prove that a crime had been committed by accused-
appellants.[38] It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish
its case with that degree of proof which leads to no other
conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits for it
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.[39] Clearly, the prosecution in this
case has failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has often and
consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to
convict an innocent one.[40]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED. Unless being held
or detained for some lawful reason, accused-appellants are
ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of Prisons is
DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice,
of the date and time when accused-appellants are released
pursuant to this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
GR Nos. L-6033-35, Sep 30, 1954
PEOPLE v. LORETO A. OLIVA
This is an appeal in three separate criminal cases tried and
decided by the Court of First Instance of Cagayan.
40
In Case No. 1091-a (now G.R.No. L-6033), for the murder of
Fernando Pablo, the accused Cecilio Rol was acquitted, while
the res of his co-accused - Loreto Oliva, Jose C. Villanueva,
Adriano Quinsay, and Daniel Ulsano - were convicted of the
crime, qualified by abuse of superior strength, and aggravated
by the circumstance of having taken advantage of their public
position as municipal policemen, offset by the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the
one committed; and sentenced to suffer each reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Fernando Pablo in the sum of P6,000 without
subsidary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay 1/5 of
the costs. From this judgment, the four convicted accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to
us for decision, considering that all the appellants have been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In Cases Nos. 1092-A and 1093-A for arbitrary detention of
Eliseo and Sofronio Arreola, with physical injuries (now
G.R.No.L-6034 and 6035), accused Angel C. Adap, Alfonso
Martinez, Restituto Fronda, Joel Macataig, and Marcelo
guillermo were acquitted; while the other defendants Loreto A.
Oliva, Jose C. Villanueva, Daniel Ulsano, and Adriano Quinsay
were found guilty as charged, and all of them were sentenced in
each of the two cases to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from
4 months of arresto mayor as minimum to years and 4 months of
prision correccional as maximum; to pay jointly and severally to
Elisea Arreola the sum of P75,00 in Case No. 1092-A and to
Sofronio Arreola the sum of P50.00 in Case No. 1093-A, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but not exceeding
1/3 of the principal penalty; and to pay in each of said cases
1/10 of the costs. From this judgment, the defendants likewise
appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter again certified
the case to us, for decision together with the appeal in the
murder case, upon the ground that the three cases arose out of
the same acts and occasion.
During the pendency of these cases in this Court, appellant
Adriano Quinsay moved to withdraw his appeal in all three
cases, which motion was granted. This decision therefore
involves only the appeals of Loreto A. Oliva, Jose C. Villanueva,
and Daniel Ulsano
Upon a careful review of the records, we find the following facts
to be undisputed:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 3, 1951 a
police patrol composed of ten members of the police force of
Aparri, Cagayan composed of Sgt. Jose C. Villanueva, and
Policemen Daniel Ulsano, Alfonso Martinez, Joel Macatiag,
Marcelo Guillermo, and Angel Adap, at the command of
Lieutenant Loreto A. Oliva, headed for barrio Bakiling, Aparri, to
investigate the reported murder or suspicious death of one
Remegio Marcos. The investigation in Bakiling lasted up to
about 4 o'clock in the afternoon; and when the partol was about
to return to the poblacion, it was met by a truck of the Panifual
Saw Mill, from which one Anacleto Abarriao (alias "Big Boy")
alighted and complained to the police that on the previous day,
at the cockpit of Binalan, Aparri, he had trouble with and was
maltreated by the brothers Eliseo and Sofronio Arreola and their
relative Fernando Pablo, all of Fugu, Ballesteros. Wherefore, the
patrol rode on the Sawmill truck and proceeded to Fugu. Upon

arrival, Lt. Oliva instructed his men to summon Elisep Arreol,
Sofronio Arreola, and Fernando Pablo, for the purpose of
settling their trouble with Abarriao. Policemen Ulsano, Macatiag,
and Guillermo picked up Eliseo from his house and Sofronio
from the ricefield where he was plowing; while Mariano Dancel
fetched Fernando Pablo. The three men, who were interested in
having their dispute with Abrriao settled, voluntarily went with the
police, and when brought before Lt. Oliva were asked be the
latter to board the truck and come with the police to Aparri so
that they could save the expense of the fare in going to town the
following day. At Nagsirucan, the patrol picked up three other
persons, who were suspected of being responsible for the death
of Remgio Marcos. After crossing the Cagayan River at
Camalaniugan ferry, the party boarded a Sambrano passenger
bus. Upon reaching the town of Aparri, the bus stopped at the
Sambrano garage. Lt. Oliva ordered his men to proceed on foot
to the municipal building with the Arreola brothers, Fernando
Pablo, and the three murder suspects, while he stayed behind to
settle a controversy with the Sambrano inspector.
As to what transpired later in the municipal building, the
evidence for the prosecution and of the defense are at variance.
After contrasting and weighing the same, we find no error in the
lower Court's having taken as proved beyond reasonable doubt
that, after arriving at the municipal building, the policemen under
the direction of sergeant Villanueva separated Fernando Pablo
and the two Arreolas from the suspects of the killing of Remegio
Marcos, and then proceeded to maltreat systematically the first
three. Sergeant Villanueva slapped and boxed Fernando Pablo
first, saying "You rascal, we almost got into trouble because of
you"; then assaulted Eliseo Arreola in the same way, and after
him, his brother Sofronio. As soon as Villanueva had finished
with one suspect, policemen Ulsano and Quinsay took turns in
taking up the maltreatment of the detainees. The worst beating
was administered to Fernando Pablo who do not only received
fist blows, but was repeatedly hit in the abdominal region with
the rifle butts until he fell prostate; and when lying thus, Pablo's
tormentors tried to make him stand up with blows and kicks, and
finally sought to bring him back to consciousness by pouring
water on his face.
At this juncture, Lieutenant Oliva came un asking what happend,
to which Ulsano replied "Zarzuela, sir", meaning that Pablo was
merely feigning injury. Oliva reprimanded the men, instructed
them to desist from further maltreatment and led Pablo's
companions, the Arreola brothers, outside the room, telling them
to report to him if somebody would again maltreat them, and
advised them to sleep in the municipal building because it was
already late. Oliva then ordered Pablo placed inside one of the
jail cells, with other prisoners. The latter noticed that Pablo was
already dead and called the guard, Rol, to the cell. Finding the
prisoners' statement to be correct, Rol informed Lt. Oliva of
Pablo's death, and the two went to the house of Dr. Ricardo
Alvarado, President of the 4th Sanitary Division, woke him up,
and informed him of the death of Fernando Pablo in the
municipal jail. At about 12:00 p.m. of September 3 and 1:00 a.m.
of the next day, Dr. Alvarado came with the policemen to the
municipal building, and as he could not perform an examination
of Pablo's body because it was dark in the cell, he merely
removed the dead man's outer garments. The next morning, at
about 8:00 o'clock, Dr. Alvarado conducted an autopsy of
Pablo's remains, and the result of his post-mortem examination
is stated as follows:
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have this day performed an autopsy on
the person of FERNANDO PABLO, single, resident of Fugu,
Balesteros, Cagayan, and found the following:
1.Externally - Ecchymoses around the pelvis and loin below the
umbilicus.
2.Internally - On opening the the abdomen below the sternum at
the line of the linea alba down to the pelvis and on reaching the
peritoneum was found blood serum and hupermia.On reaching
the inner part of the abdomen, blood serum and dark clotted
blood was found along the sides of the intestines and omentum.
The intestines itself were found to be clean and light pale, but
the omentum was mostly hyperemic and congested blood forum
thru out the greater and lesser omentum. The spleen was well
exposed and found that the tail was ecchymotic. Much dark
blood was found inside the abdomen of about 2 or 3 liters. The
gall bladder was full and light greenish in color. The urinary
bladder was found to have been emptied with a tear wound,
showing that the urine was extravasated into the abdomen.
I further certify that the cause of death was internal hemorrhage.
(Sgd) RICARDO G. ALVARADO
President 4th Sanitary Division"
(Exh. A, p.3, Rec. Case No.1091-A)
In the morning of September 4, Sgt. Villanueva took the Arreola
brothers to the place where they had their breakfast. He asked
them to sign an affidavit to the effect that Pablo fell from the
truck and that he was a Huk, but the brothers refused it was not
true. In the afternoon, Villanueva ordered the brothers to guard
the remains of Fernando Pablo. They stood guard up to the
afternoon of September 5, when they helped bury Pablo's
remains. After the burial, Sgt. Villanueva still did not permit the
Arreola brothers to go home, saying that they must wait for Lt.
Oliva. the Arreolas were actually released only in the afternoon
of September 6. The morning after their release, they went to
the Ballesteros Emergency Hospital, where they were treated by
Dr. Emilio A. Alonso for the injuries inflicted upon them by the
policemen Villanueva, Quinsay and Ulsano. According to the
medical certificates Exhs. H and J (p.69, Rec Case 1092-A; and
p.60, Case 1093-A), Dr. Alonso found on the person of Eliseo
Arreola a contusion on the right lower costal region with marked
ecchymosis, which took 20 days to heal, and contusions on the
right and left arms (dorsal), side, which healed in 10 days; while
on the person of Sofronio Arreola, he found swellings on the left
arm, right hand, and chest, and also swellings with ecchymosis
on the forearm; which lesions healed in 10 days' treatment. Dr.
Alonzo charged and received from the brothers P25.00 for
medicine used, without collecting from them any professional
fees because they were poor.
The maltreatment of the deceased Pablo and of the Arreola
brothers by appellants Ulsano and Villanueva, (and by the
accused Quinsay who has abandoned his appeal), was amply
41
attested in court not only by Sofronio and Eliseo Arreola and by
Eusebio Caculita, a detainee who had been lodged in the prison
cells of the municipal building some time before the arrival of
Pablo and the Arreolas, but also by the testimonies of doctors
Alvarado and Alonzo. Upon the other hand, the attempt of these
appellants to attribute Pablo's death to injuries inflicted by "Big
Boy" Abarriao the day previous, is belied by the seriousness of
the injuries, as disclosed by the autopsy. Were the defense
version truthful, the internal hemorrhage and the rupture of the
urinary bladder would have caused Pablo to expire the next day,
even before reaching the municipal building in the evening of
September 3. At least, he would have arrived at Aparri in a
condition that would have caused the police to immediately call
for a physician or take Pablo to the hospital instead of the jail.
Certainly he would not have been able to walk a hundred meters
from the Sambrano bus station to the municipal building.
The same reason militate against the alternative defense that
Fernando Pablo's death was due to a fall inside the truck where
he rode with the policemen when the speeding vehicle at one
time was suddenly braked to a stop to avoid hitting a carabao.
Such a fall could not have inflicted such extensive injuries as the
autopsy has revealed.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the conviction of
Lieutenant Loreto oliva of either murder or arbitrary detention is
entirely without support. Sofronio and Eliseo Arreola, as
prosecution witnesses, testified that Oliva arrived only after
Pablo had been tortured by Sgt. Villanueva and policemen
Ulsano and Quinsay, and already lay dying on the floor of the
police quarters. The Arreolas also asserted that Oliva inquired
what happened and angrily upbraided his men for the
maltreatment of Pablo (t.s.n. pp. 66 and 112), a clear indication
that the torture was done without his knowledge. Eusebio
Cacilitan, testifying for the prosecution stated that Oliva had
taken one of the Arreolas out of the police department for a
separate investigation and arrived only to order some one to
revive Pablo by pouring water on his face he lay sprawling on
the floor (t.s.n. pp. 34-36). Oliva therefore took no hand in the
death of Pablo, and there is no proof that he ordered or
conspired with his men to torture the deceased of that he had
any knowledge of it nor opportunity to stop the maltreatment one
time. There is no support for the trial Court's finding that Oliva
made the maltreatment possible, or that Oliva arrested the
offended parties out of complaisance for "Big Boy" Abrriao.
Neither can appellant Oliva be held responsible for the Arreolas'
detention until September 6, since Eliseo Arreola himself
testified that he and his companions voluntarily went to Aparri
with the patrol and that after the death of Pablo, Lt. Oliva
permitted the Arreola brothers to sleep in the hall of the
municipal building.
"A * * * When Milo Tan asked me, I told him that Lt. Oliva
released us the previous night and asked whether we had any
place wherein to sleep and we told him that we would sleep in
the house of Milo Tan and that because it was already late, we
slept in the municipal hall."(t.s.n. p. 3)
The extrajudicial statements of Olivia's co-accused are not
competent proof against him, not being made in his presence.

They are not even admissible in rebuttal because Olivia
presented no evidence in his behalf.
The records of the case are thus clear that those really
responsible for the death of Fernando Pablo were Sergeant
Villanueva and policemen Ulsano and Quinsay. Likewise,
despite in his denials, it is abundantly proved that it was the
sergeant, Villanueva, who detained the Arreola Brothers and
forbade them from leaving the municipal building until Pablo was
buried, unsuccessfully attempting in the meantime have them
subscribed to an affidavit that Pablo's death was due to
accidental injuries, and that the deceased was a Huk. The
sergeant would not allow the Arreolas to go home on the 4th of
September, when Pablo's relatives arrived, notwithstanding the
orders of Lieutenant Oliva, so that the Arreolas were in fact
arbitrarily detained by him from the 4th to the 6th of September,
when they were finally allowed to depart and tend to their
injuries. While the brothers were occasionally permitted to leave
the municipal building and eat at the house of one Milo ta, the
complainants were evidently too terrorized to take advantage of
these occasional sallies and meekly returned to custody even
docilely stood guard over the remains of Pablo until it was
buried. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief.
" * * *. It clearly appears from this testimony that it was Sergeant
Villanueva who continuously kept them under guard the remains
of Fernando Pablo and to help prepare his coffin, by telling them
to come back to the municipal building after taking their meals
outside, and making sure that they came back by conducting
them, and by telling them not to go until after the burial of the
remains of Pablo (pp. 67, 70, 105, 106, 123, 124, 382, 390,
t.s.n.) (Brief of Appellee, p. 25)
The cooperation of appellant Daniel Ulsano toward this arbitrary
detention is not satisfactorily shown. The probabilities are that,
as a disciplined subordinate, he left everything to his superior,
Sergeant Villanueva, and anyway he could not presume to
overrule the latter's orders. For this reason, we are not inclined
to hold him responsible for this charge. But the record is clear
that he must stand equally responsible with the sergeant for the
murder of Fernando Pablo, in whose maltreatment this accused
actively participated together with his co-accused Quinsay and
Villanueva, as well as for the physical injuries inflicted upon the
brothers Arreola.
There being no clear evidence that the maltreatment inflicted on
the offended parties was for the purpose of extorting
confessions or information, Art. 235 of the Revised Penal Code
does not aplly.
Wherefore, the conviction of appellants Jose Villanueva and
Daniel Ulsano in case No. 1091-A of the Court of First Instance
of Cagayan (G.R. No. L-6033) for the murder of Fernando Pablo
(with aggravating circumstance of public position utilized by the
offender offset by the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
doing as the one inflicted) is hereby affirmed. Loreto Oliva is,
however, acquitted of this charge, with costs de oficio.
In the other two cases (Nos. 1092-A and 1093-A of the Court
below, L-6034 and 6035 of this Court),the conviction and
sentence of appellant Jose A. Villanueva, for arbitrary detention
complexed with physical injuries, is likewise affirmed. But
appellant Loreto A. Oliva is acquitted therefrom, with costs de
oficio. Appellant Daniel Ulsano is likewise acquitted from this
charge and, instead, conviected only of less serious physical
injuries, aggravated by the circumstance of having taken
advantage of public position (U.S. vs. Yumul, 34 Phil. 169; U.S.
vs. Cerdena, 51 Phil. 393), and sentenced to six (6) months of
arresto mayor.
The civil liabilities imposed by the trial Court shall be understood
as imposed only upon appellants Jose Villanueva and Daniel
Ulsano, in solidum with the accused Adriano Quinsay, who
abandoned his appeal.
Costs in this instance shall be taxed against appellants Jose
Villanueva and Adrian Quinsay. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan,
directed to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the
latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the
body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement",
anchoring the relief prayed for on certain allegations in the
petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state
penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and
supervisory control of the respondent Director of Prisons, is
illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed
upon said petitioner for the crime of evasion of service of
sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal
Code, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his
person and of the offense with which he was charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition,
was confined in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal,
serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was
commuted to twenty (20) years by the President of the
Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the military
barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated
at Makati, Rizal, under the custody of the Stockade Officer of the
said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still
serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from
his confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City of Manila.
Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before
the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner
was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced
accordingly with the imposable penalty prescribed by law, on
August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the
petition, and on the basis thereof, we shall proceed to discuss
the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the
decision sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime
of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental
or constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose
the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by
habeas corpus.
42
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the
Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to try and
decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner,
for the offense with which he was charged — evasion of service
of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality of province where the offense was committed
or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing
offenses because some acts material and essential to the crime
occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the
rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the
essential ingredients of the crime took place has — jurisdiction
to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados
como hechos independientes en sentido natural, el principio del
resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha de
aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares
donde se produzca uno de pesos plurales resultados.2
There are, however, crimes which although all the
elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a
single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense
committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing.
Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation3 and
abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second
class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where
the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one
place to another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is
published or circulated from one province to another. 6 To this
latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service
of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the
service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and
thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to
another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a
continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and
operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It
may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped
from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service
of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime,
and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he
may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be
invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c]
thereof, one of the instances when a person may be arrested
without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. 7
Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on
the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the
continuous act of committing a crime — evading the service of
his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL,
FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG.
GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in
the above-entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration of the
Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following
dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except
that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for
petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins
with the statement that the decision did not rule — as many
misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid
ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision
merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations
obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th
outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with
shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no
longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is
Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the
Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum,
maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of
the questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying on
the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of
Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated
the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and
Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions
made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and
their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
subversive documents found in their possession at the time of
arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be
deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules
of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and
effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4
Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that
if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit
released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention
petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision
dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests
without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the
arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the
detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with
law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer
or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a
warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by
law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the
grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be
conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando
Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said
that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural)
was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was
arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an
outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for
subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia
vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA
which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized
government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
43
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he
was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had
shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural
had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and
then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing
offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery,
murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base
which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness
and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere
suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the
CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as
supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be
said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural
falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt
without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just
committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who
committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted,
refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge
of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests
without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the
other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February
1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which
was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a
gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the
wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the
day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio,

Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4,
South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers,
to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being
treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed
reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and
supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that
an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts
supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in
Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including
Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records
as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St.
Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of
this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded
man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting
officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact,
it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of
the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the
attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with
the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable
sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled
with acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest,
the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering
that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official
duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is
therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was
made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after
Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information charging double
murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
(Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed
under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the
arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the
crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in
G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-
82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-
84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without
warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to
search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit
unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their
persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which
justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a),
Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without
warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners,
thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these
petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the
custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases
are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received
information imparted by a former NPA about the operations of
the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house
occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this
information, the said house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was
conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted
he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms,
ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and
he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the
house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988,
and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel
group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a
consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his
possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17
that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found
subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted
then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when
they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the
evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the
latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them.
19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without
warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the
head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a
search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest
without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in
the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled
the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2)
safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other
by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the
44
names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents
or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances
surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that
the information they had received was true and the persons to
be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain
crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search
of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse
was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he
was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession
were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third:
at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they
admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the
CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were
positively identified by their former comrades in the organization
as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the
corresponding informations were filed in court against said
arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of
Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in
the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house,
do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during
and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural,
Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent
an can say that it would have been better for the military agents
not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have
been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in
order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial
authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and
secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the
nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without
warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted
in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule
113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are
indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were
arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to
conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what
the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if
the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and
acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers
can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for

damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other
administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was
arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of
certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and
Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27
(Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press
conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22
November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was
arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing
offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in
the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception
and regard the language as falling within free speech
guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost
the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that
he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the
charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of
the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the
time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the
scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the
Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had before
arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the
peace officers did not appear. Because of this development, the
defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings
to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No.
88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond
cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the
morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a
group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil
Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and
he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning
(28 December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno,
without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988,
while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section
5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that
the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably
one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to
be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were
alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent
possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in
upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several
facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without
warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil
Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II
was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.
The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail
but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10
January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his
co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial
court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January
1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian,
Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30
January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of
the respondents by reason of an information filed against him
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad
taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the
motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably
because of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and
Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were
filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances.
They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule
113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since
been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-
G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the
contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial
admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30
that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of
Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession
during her arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the
arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well
45
as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as
revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that
truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their
arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e.
that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission
of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other
hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of
the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of
persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for
habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and
Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no
compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and
liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor
from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus
proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into — and all other
appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of
the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5
of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are
not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released;
but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be
made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to
the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the
least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion
of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is
absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the
suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned
arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a
long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and
good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the
basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is
that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision
dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141121. July 17, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. REYNALDO
LOZADA y SALOPESA, alias ROY, GERALDINE BELLEZA y
MAYAGMA, alias MAYMAY, RONNIE SANCHEZ, at large,
REY ANDALES, at large, appellants.
On the early morning of 14 October 1998, the lifeless body of
Rosita Sy was found inside her car along a remote hacienda
road in Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City. The post mortem
examination showed that Rosita Sy had died at approximately

eleven oclock on the evening of 13 December 1998 caused by
cardio-respiratory arrest, shock, hemorrhage, severe, internal
lacerated liver, right lobe and ruptured heart due to a single stab
wound inflicted on the right side of her body just below the ribs.
Her bag, containing at least P4,000.00 cash and her ring worth
P2,000.00, was missing. The police apprehended Reynaldo
Lozada and Geraldine Belleza who, together with Ronnie
Sanchez and Rey Andales (at large), were charged with the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 50, in an
Amended Information that read:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses
REYNALDO LOZADA y SALOPESA @ ROY, GERALDINE
BELLEZA y MAYAGMA @ MAYMAY, RONNIE SANCHEZ and
REY ANDALES of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
Under Art. 294 (1) of the RTC, as amended, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 13th day of October, 1998, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually acting in concert, with intent of gain and by means
of force and intimidation against the person of Rosita Sy y Son,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob
and carry away with them one (1) tissue holder (black wallet)
containing the sum of P4,000.00, Philippine Currency, two (2)
lipsticks and one (1) ring worth P1,500.00 belonging to the said
Rosita Sy, to her damage and prejudice in the aforementioned
amount; that by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery,
the herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the
purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away the said
amount and other personal belongings of the said offended
party, the herein accused with intent to kill, with treachery,
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and making
use of nocturnity, being then armed with knives and by use of a
motor vehicle, craft was employed by the accused by
deliberately pretending to bump the car of Rosita Sy in the
commission of the crime and to ensure their escape, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack,
stab and use personal violence upon the person of Rosita Sy y
Son, thereby inflicting upon her the following:
Wound, stab, 2 cm long, 12 inches deep at the right lateral
aspect of the hypochondrium along anterior axillary line directed
upward diagonally medically lacerating the right lobe of the liver
and rupturing the heart.
Cause of death:
Cardio-respiratory arrest, shock hemorrhage, severe, internal
lacerated liver, right lobe and ruptured heart due to a stab
wound.
which would directly cause the death of Rosita Sy y Son, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.
Act contrary to law.[1]
Lozada and Belleza, on 02 December 1998, entered a plea of
not guilty to the accusation.
The evidence for the prosecution hinges much on the testimony
of Reynaldo Diaz who recounted the events of 11 and 13
October 1998.
On 11 October 1998, at about eight-thirty in the evening,
Reynaldo Diaz, a trisikad driver, went to a coffee shop in front of
Rizal Theater, along Luzuriaga Street, Bacolod Central Market,
Bacolod City. He saw his old acquaintance Ronnie Sanchez. He
and Sanchez, a taxi driver, talked for a while and in the course
of their conversation, Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob
Rosita Sy, the owner of Wilrose Drugstore, later that evening.
Out of curiosity, Diaz asked Sanchez how he would accomplish
the scheme and who would help him carry it out. Sanchez
replied that they should first wait for some friends who would be
coming over to finalize the whole thing. Sanchez then asked
Diaz if he would be interested to join the group. Diaz responded
in the affirmative.
After a little while, Geraldine Belleza arrived, driving a white Kia
Pride taxicab. Soon, Rey Andales also arrived. The two were
introduced to Diaz. Later, Lozada came in at the coffee shop.
Diaz immediately recognized him because he was also a trisikad
driver. Sanchez approached Lozada and invited him to join in.
Lozada agreed. Sanchez then discussed the plan to the group.
He told them that Rosita Sy would normally leave Wilrose
Drugstore around ten-thirty to eleven oclock in the evening
carrying with her a substantial sum of money. The group would
wait for her on board the white Kia Pride taxi and then tail her.
The moment she would reach Lopues East, the group would
bump her vehicle, drive past her and stop a few distance away
from the car. Once Rosita Sy would have alighted from her car
to check the damage, Sanchez was to kill her to ensure the
groups anonymity. Appellants Lozada and Belleza agreed. The
latter volunteered to drive the taxicab that would be used to
perpetrate the crime.
When he realized that Rosita Sy would not only be robbed but
also killed as well, Diaz changed his mind about joining the
group. Without expressing this intention to the group he excused
himself by saying that he would have to get a weapon.
Purposely, he delayed his return. After an hour, he saw the
group still in the coffee shop. He was informed that they failed to
catch up with Rosita Sy because they had to wait for Diaz. The
malefactors decided to instead pursue the plan on 13 October
1998 since it was again Bellezas turn to drive the taxicab to be
used. On the night of 13 October 1998, Diaz deliberately stayed
away from the designated meeting place. The following day, he
heard over the radio that the lifeless body of the owner of
Wilrose Drugstore was found in a remote hacienda road in
Barangay Estefania. Immediately, he informed Bert Grajo, the
owner of the house where he was staying about the plan
hatched by Lozada, Belleza, Sanchez and Andales.
Bert Grajo testified that, upon hearing the Diaz story, he went to
see team leader SPO4 Esperidion Estana of Police Station IV.
At that time, however, SPO4 Estana was already at the crime
scene investigating the incident. Grajo then proceeded to
Wilrose Drugstore to speak with the family of Rosita Sy. Not
having been able to talk to them, he just left word with one of the
employees. The latter promptly called Police Station IV and told
them about the message relayed by Grajo.
46
SPO4 Estana narrated that he asked Grajo to bring Diaz to the
police station. At the station, Diaz informed SPO4 Estana of the
names and addresses of the alleged conspirators. Forthwith,
SPO4 Estana organized a team that would effect the arrest of
the assailants. The team, together with Diaz and Grajo,
proceeded to the residence of Lozada who, upon seeing the
police, tried to flee but SPO1 Jose Pahayupan was quick to
collar him. SPO1 Pahayupan recovered from Lozada a black
purse containing two (2) lipsticks, one (1) wallet with money, and
a pawnshop receipt for the pledge of a ring later recognized to
belong to the victim. The purse and wallet were identified to be
those of the victim by the latters daughter. SPO2 Johnny
Herboso testified that at the police station, Lozada confessed to
him his participation in the robbery. Lozada gave the names and
addresses of Belleza, Sanchez and Andales.
On 15 October 1998, appellant Belleza was apprehended by
members of the City Director Squad. He was turned over to
Police Station IV. Belleza admitted before SPO4 Estana that he
was the one who drove the white Kia Pride taxicab when they
robbed and killed Rosita Sy. He named appellant Lozada,
Andales, and Sanchez as his cohorts in committing the crime.
He led the police to the place where he hid the keys and bag of
Rosita Sy.
Lucia Caballero testified (at rebuttal) that she was the owner of
the Kia Pride Taxi driven by Belleza. She confirmed that it was
Belleza who was the assigned driver of the taxicab on 13
October 1998. The following day, Belleza returned the taxicab,
reporting to its owner that the left front light of the vehicle had
been hit and damaged by an insane person.
The defense was one of denial coupled with alibi.
Reynaldo Lozada claimed that at around six oclock on the
afternoon of 13 October 1998, he was at home cooking supper.
He did not report for work that day because it was his rest day.
He slept at about nine oclock in the evening. When he woke up
the following day, he was not feeling well so he decided not to
go to work as well. At five oclock in the afternoon, two policemen
arrived at his house and, without any warrant, arrested and
subsequently searched him. Nothing was found in his
possession except his belt with a buckle knife. In jail, he met for
the first time his co-accused Belleza. He was maltreated by the
police and, out of fear, he admitted his participation in the crime.
Geraldine Belleza, for his part, maintained that on the evening of
13 October 1998, he was on duty as a barangay tanod, roving
with the purok president of Greensville Subdivision, the areas of
Estefania, Greensville I and Camingawan proper. In the morning
of the following day, he went to Talisay to gather sea crabs and
thereafter spent the rest of the day with his wife and children. On
15 October 1998, his uncle Walter Nepomuceno, a member of
the Talisay police, informed him that the authorities in Bacolod
City were looking for him about the Rosita Sy rob-slay. Since he
had nothing to do with the crime, he willingly submitted himself
for investigation. He denied knowing his co-accused and
surrendering a ladys bag and a bunch of keys to the police.
After trial, the court a quo found Reynaldo Lozada and Geraldine
Belleza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime with which

they were charged and sentenced each of them to suffer the
extreme penalty of death.
In this review, appellant Reynaldo Lozada would want the Court
to hold that the trial court erred in not finding his warrantless
arrest to be unlawful, in not declaring as unconstitutional the
search conducted on his person and as being thus inadmissible
in evidence the items seized from him, in allowing the use of his
alleged extra-judicial confession against him, and in finding him
guilty of the crime charged. Appellant Geraldine Belleza
submitted the lone argument that the trial court had erred in
convicting him on the mere basis of circumstantial evidence.
It remained undisputed that there was no warrant issued for the
arrest of the appellants. The trial court, nonetheless, ruled that
the arrests were lawful because they were based on probable
cause and the police had to immediately act to prevent the likely
flight of appellants. It was a valid warrantless arrest, according to
the Solicitor General, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[2]
The applicable rule at the time of the arrest of appellants is
Section 5(b), Rule 113, of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides that a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x (b) when an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Personal knowledge, the Court has explained, should be based
on probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion.[3] The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when the suspicion on the probable guilt of the
person to be arrested is based on facts or circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create a probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested.[4]
In People vs. Tonog, Jr.,[5] the Court upheld a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 133, of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure because the arresting officer, in effecting the
arrest of (the) accused x x x, had knowledge of facts gathered
by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating
that (the accused) was one of the perpetrators. In the instant
case, the police officers, on the basis of the facts gathered in the
course of their investigation, including the disclosure made by
Reynaldo Diaz on how the plan to commit the offense was
hatched, also had sufficient and reasonable grounds of
suspicion that appellants were probably guilty of the crime
charged.
But even on the assumption that the police erred in not securing
warrants for the capture of appellants, the latter could no longer
impugn the validity of their arrest. Any objection against an
arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused should be made at or
before the arraignment; otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.[6] Appellants entered their plea of not guilty to the crime
of robbery with homicide and thereafter participated in the trial
without questioning the legality of their arrest. The search
conducted on appellant Lozada, being an incident to the arrest,
should also be upheld. Belleza, on the other hand, waived his
right against a warrantless search when he himself voluntarily
disclosed where he hid the keys and the bag of Rosita Sy and
where, true enough, the items were recovered.
The extra-judicial confessions made by appellants Lozada and
Belleza, however, are inadmissible in evidence. The supposed
confessions have merely been recounted on the witness stand
by the investigating officers. Republic Act No. 7438[7] requires
an extra-judicial confession made by the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation to be in writing and
signed by such person; otherwise, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence.[8]
While there may be no eyewitnesses to a crime, conviction could
still be reached on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided
a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[9]
The circumstantial evidence introduced at the trial included a)
the testimony of Reynaldo Diaz detailing the plan of the group
composed of appellants and two other accused (at large) to rob
and kill the victim and how it was to be carried out; b) the
discovery of the body of Rosita Sy, apparently the victim of foul
play, at the place where it was expected to be; c) the victims
belongings - her purse, Iipsticks, wallet, and a pawnshop receipt
for the victims ring - were found in the possession of appellant
Lozada; d) the victims black bag and bunch of keys were
retrieved by the police in the place disclosed by appellant
Belleza; e) the testimony of the owner of the taxicab that
appellant Belleza was, on the day the crime occurred, indeed
the assigned driver of the vehicle used by appellants in
perpetrating the offense; and f) the taxicab was returned by
Belleza with a damaged front headlight giving a lame excuse on
how it was damaged.
The circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
the reasonable conclusion that the trial court could not have
erred in finding appellants to have been the responsible culprits.
The recovery of the loot from appellants at the time of their
arrest moreover gives rise to the legal presumption of guilt. The
absence of an explanation on how appellants have come into
the possession of the personal effects of the victim gives rise to
reasonable presumption that they, too, could have been the
authors of the crime.[10]
Mere denial and alibi, not only are weak defenses, but also
cannot prevail over credible evidence particularly when, on their
face, they do not demonstrate the physical impossibility of an
accuseds presence at the place and time of the commission of
the offense.[11]
The taking with animo lucrandi of personal property belonging to
another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons
or using force upon things constitutes robbery, and the complex
crime of robbery with homicide arises when by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, someone is killed.[12] All these
elements have satisfactorily been shown by the prosecution.
Conspiracy, aptly alleged in the amended information, has
attended the commission of the crime. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of the felony and decide to commit it.[13] The
prosecution has narrated in detail how the appellants and their
47
co-accused have agreed to a common design to rob and kill the
victim. The subsequent discovery of the lifeless body of the
victim and the recovery by the police of the victims belongings in
the possession of the appellants would later confirm the
execution of plan to rob and kill the victim. Where conspiracy is
shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each
accused becomes secondary and the act of one may be imputed
to all the conspirators.[14] In the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, it is not necessary to identify who among
the conspirators have inflicted the stab wound on the victim.[15]
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
use of motor vehicle have both been alleged and proved. Where
conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant
deliberations and selection of method, time and means of
executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can
be considered[16] for then its own elements, i.e., 1) the time
when the offenders determined to commit the crime; 2) an act
manifestly indicating that the offenders clung to their
determination; and 3) a lapse of time between the determination
and the execution sufficient to allow the offenders to reflect upon
the consequences of the act,[17] themselves would have
thereby become evident. The use of a motor vehicle is
aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to
facilitate escape.[18] Appellants, indeed, have made use of a
taxicab to tail the victim in her car, bump her vehicle, drive past
her and eventually rob and kill her.
Under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, any person guilty of robbery with
homicide shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Since the crime has been committed with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and use of motor
vehicle, the death penalty has correctly been imposed upon
appellants.
The P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court to the
heirs of the victim should be increased to P75,000.00
considering that the crime was committed under circumstances
that justify the imposition of the death penalty.[19] The award of
P200,000.00 moral damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00, in
keeping with prevailing jurisprudence.[20] Apart from the actual
damages in the amount of P87,303.70, duly supported by
receipts,[21] the heirs of the victim should also be entitled to
P25,000.00 exemplary damages in view of the presence of
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.[22]
Three justices of the Court have continued to maintain their
adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs.
Echegaray[23] that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless,
they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law
is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding
appellants Reynaldo Lozada and Geraldine Belleza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the death
penalty is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that they are
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 civil indemnity,

P87,303.70 actual damages, P50,000.00 moral damages, and
P25,000.00 exemplary damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the
records of this case, be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur
convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos
sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense
charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to
General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to
Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm
subject of this case was not used in the circumstances as
embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to reclusion
perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory
penalties, as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this
case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise,
the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized
are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime
of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion in an
information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with intent
to possess and without the necessary license, permit or
authority issued by the proper government agencies, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess,
carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm was issued to and used by the
accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of
operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's
Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines through lawless and violent means, of which the
accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the
accused in the performance of his subversive tasks such as the
recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection of
contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision
of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo
Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an intelligent information
obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos,
Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at
about 9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary
Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused
Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one
(1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his
contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14,
1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of
PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by
Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May
13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest
accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30
P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM
where through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the
team was able to locate accused, who was plowing his field.
(TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team
and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his firearm, as reported by
Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said
firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro
Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a
place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.
(TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and
dug the grounds, after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber
.38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the
team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock
pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his
house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon
grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook
colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the
prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including
the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng
Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo,
Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31,
1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and another pamphlet Asdang
Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and April
48
1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D"
for the prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its
recovery, readily admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly
team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army,
responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to
NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the
late Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya
Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing-October
14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a
former NPA convert was presented, who declared that on March
7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del
Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions
Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his
house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair.
Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their purpose was to ask
rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their
companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their
group otherwise, he and his family will be killed. He was also
warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities.
Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a
seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation,
accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber revolver
which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters
away from accused, which make him easily Identified said
firearm, as that marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN,
pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok,
accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and
Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the
seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben
Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias
Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very
distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to
assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to
overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if
they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and
documents, then finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious.
Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as
Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages
75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and
Oscar Gomez, who likewise expounded their own opinions
about the NPA. It was also announced in said seminar that a
certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing-
January 4, 1983)

On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to
Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove
that on May 19, 1982, he administered the subscription of th
extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as
Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his
confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that accused was not
represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog,
whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused
in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession
from English to Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of
question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of
Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having
understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained
to him his constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel
and right to answer any question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the
presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the
presence of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but
were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for
the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the
subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and
explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos,
Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the lists
of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the
name of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included
among the lists of persons who applied for the licensing of the
firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its
case and offered its exhibits, which were all admitted in
evidence, despite objection interposed by counsel for accused,
which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case
against him is stated in the decision as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot
recognize, brought him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del
Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date.
At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated
by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing
a civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he
was detained with respect to the subject firearm, which the
investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its
ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him
unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity,
crying and with emotional attachment, described in detail how he
was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again
confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and
when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he
was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical
agony. Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth
with pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only
blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and over his private
parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The
process of beating, mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly
done in similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted
only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and
physical ordeal he was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly
refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be
salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain and
agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but
accused was made to sign his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for
the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the
certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148,
Hearing-June 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him,
accused, by way of explanation and commentary in details, and
going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged
extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those questions
involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation
of his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating
pain he was subjected by an investigator, who, unfortunately he
cannot Identify and was able to obtain his admission of the
subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive
activities, and also to support his denial to the truth of his alleged
extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those
questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said
Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the
above-questions embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in
the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such
NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true
because on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the
persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did
she meet the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages
118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez,
and that she was personally charged with subversion in the
Office of the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary,
Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed without
reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio
Arellano, was likewise charged for subversion filed in the
Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, but was likewise
49
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-
examination, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him,
Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador
qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he was not
personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can
personally attest to his good character and reputation, as a law
abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and farmer
thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot
of arrests made by the authorities in his barrio involving
subversive activities but they were released and were not
formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath
of allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in
relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his
wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and who testified that the
subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and
one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will
leave it behind, temporarily for them to claim it later. They were
the ones who buried it. She said, her husband, the accused, was
not in their house at that time and that she did not inform him
about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the
authorities, for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24,
November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the
recovery of the firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still
Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally
rested his case in support of accused's through counsel
manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or
in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel
for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following
assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
(SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT
VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO
GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his
house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and

documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and
valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged
meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities
went to the house of Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting
him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the
accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army
(NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant
with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61,
November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to
his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in
Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so
important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In
that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in
the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630
[1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work
(Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly
characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a
'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home
and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the
long reach of government is no legs than to value human dignity,
and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant
without any warrant as falling under one of the instances when
arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113,
Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as
follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he
has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest
of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities received an urgent report
of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his
arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit
of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the
firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an
incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12,
which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense
must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo
v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever
knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in
its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok.
The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was
he committing any act which could be described as subversive.
He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most
basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do
so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
50
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may
still be considered lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of
reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by
Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in
fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The
fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The
test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of
Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to
suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still
fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the
arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the
moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned
tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with
which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail
to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining
a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is
no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused
was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no
showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the
verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to
subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion
for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the
need to go through the process of securing a search warrant
and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of
the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest
being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired
afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere
incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that
consent was given by the accused to be searched simply
because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin,
65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the
entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed
out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V.
Locsin (supra)

xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in
the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or
an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is evident from the
records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were
not armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when
you went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed
him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you
surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan
interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of
his rights under the constitution considering that he was
purposely under arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was
buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged
subversive documents were obtained in violation of the
accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged
subversive documents, the prosecution presented the two
arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted
ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where
it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused himself
who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged
subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused
was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership
of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive
documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination
under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in
violation of this right is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently,
the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions
made by the appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the
accused as inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the
appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical
terror, violence, and third degree measures may not have been
supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the
"provocative presumption" that indeed torture and physical
violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right
to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. The
lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel,
Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath
to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have
no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the
51
time of the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial
statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged
subversive documents inadmissible in evidence against the
accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the
charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of
Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict
Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial court
found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However,
we are not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial
court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People vs..
Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to
question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to
great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was
able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is
not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of
convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial
court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is
analogous to that found in People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98
1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony,
and the issue hinges on how much credence can be accorded to
him. The first consideration is that said testimony stands
uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on
the mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He
knew his fate depended upon how much he cooperated with the
authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident
campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony
We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be
considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally
uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the
military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he
cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be
charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83,
January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an
interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free
from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even
fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the
alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father
,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74,
January 4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar

Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in
furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in
subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other
witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v.
Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after stressing that accusation is
not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it
was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.'
(Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven,
64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs.
Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v.
Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513;
People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115
SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs.
Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in
Davao del Sur where there appears to be a well-organized plan
to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and
replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The
open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted
in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized
all over the country and abroad. Even as we reiterate the need
for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in
their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security,
we must also remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21
SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists,
the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with an the means
at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever
action is taken must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion.
A cavalier attitude towards constitutional liberties and
protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities
instead of containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the
crime with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver,
caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the
alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in
accordance with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 125 – DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED
PERSONS
G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, vs. HON.
ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of
the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS.
JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO,
SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO,
PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA,
SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL,
respondents.
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of
the Office of the Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable
cause made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we
reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies
absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,[1] contend
precisely that the public respondents herein officers of the Office
of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing
the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private
respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police
stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings[2] of the parties, the following
facts appear to be indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday
and the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections[3]), petitioners
were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers
for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of
.38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation of
Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not
more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of
sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with
ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the
Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police
Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police
officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas
52
Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday
and election day), petitioners were brought to the residence of
Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur,
before whom a Joint-Affidavit against them was subscribed and
sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting
officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutors
Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the
Joint-Affidavit was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001,
petitioner Soria was released upon the order of Prosecutor
Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while
petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained
at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Sorias
detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours
had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner
Bista was brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where
the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending.
Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release
was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in
connection with petitioner Bistas arrest for alleged illegal
possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day
(15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was
filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon,
informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition
and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were
filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of
bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He
was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation
of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents.
11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the
Office of the Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint
Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit;
and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for
reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second
assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next

preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground
and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the
cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner
Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by
correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute
that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested
are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without
criminal complaints or information having been filed with the
proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper
application of the 12-18-36 periods. With respect specifically to
the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is
alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing
Article 125[4] as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days
in the computation of the periods prescribed within which public
officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial
authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory
construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempts at interpretation.[5] Public respondents, on the other
hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[6] and Sayo
v. Chief of Police of Manila[7] and on commentaries[8] of jurists
to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and election days
are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in
Article 125,[9] hence, the arresting officers delivered petitioners
well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect
specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing
of the information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify
his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m.
of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on
law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor
within the period fixed by law, the arresting officer must release
the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125.[10]
Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting
officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper
judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military,[11] and People v. Acosta.[12]
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it
is evident that public respondents did not abuse their discretion
in dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against
private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned
which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.[13]
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to
herein public respondents. Their disposition of petitioners
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was
properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public
respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint
of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and
jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not
be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law
for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of
warrantless arrests, it being a no-office day. (Medina vs. Orosco,
125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the
complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already
been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30
p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor
Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak
of.[14]
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[15] that
. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to
deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or
thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not
released. From the time of petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m.
on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the
information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75
hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a
Sunday; November 8 was declared an official holiday; and
November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these
three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look
for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search
for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court
to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the
uncertainty of locating those officers and employees could very
well compound the fiscals difficulties. These are considerations
sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina
was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very
first office day following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila[16] --
53
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability
of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material
possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time
the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after
the information has already been filed in Court, public
respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the
respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because
the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law
for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his
arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a
standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was
only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to
post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however,
he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal
case requiring his continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article
125, RPC and COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with
the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes G and I, Complaint-
Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention
only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes J and K, Complaint-Affidavit).
Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the
proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer
is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic)
seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-
hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of
the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of
the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order,
then rests upon the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54
O.G. 4739).[17]
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military,[18] wherein we ordained that
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied
considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of
the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the
court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself
acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release
when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting
bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been
duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We
agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the
complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in
said Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion,
we have no choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans
determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the
investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman
absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on
constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are
mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of
the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure
and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is
in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case.
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so
that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as
a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman,
using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the
Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In
much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if
they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May
2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint
Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25
March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-01-1472. June 26, 2003
ADRIANO V. ALBIOR, complainant, vs. DONATO A.
AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, respondent.
Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe[1], Talibon, Bohol,
is charged by Adriano Albior, of usurpation of judicial function
and negligence in the performance of official duties. According
to complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions when he
issued the order for the detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son
of complainant. Further, complainant alleged that respondent
committed negligence when he failed to inform Acting Presiding
Judge Avelino N. Puracan of that court regarding the filing of
cases that necessitated issuance of the detention order.
The antecedent facts of this administrative matter are as follows:
On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape[2] were filed
against Edilberto Albior before the MCTC, Branch 4 in Talibon-
Getafe, Talibon, Bohol. As clerk of court of the said court,
respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints which were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9144 and 9145. The following
day, respondent issued a detention order[3] to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) in San Jose, Talibon, Bohol,
for the commitment of the accused Edilberto Albior. On January
27, 1999, the BJMP duly issued a receipt of detainee[4] for the
person of the accused.
According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior
preliminary investigation and without a warrant of arrest. Neither
was there any record in the Police Blotter of the accuseds
apprehension, or of his surrender. Nor was there proof that he
signed a waiver for his detention. Whats more, the respondent
failed to inform Acting Municipal Judge Avelino Puracan
regarding the filing of the complaints for rape before his sala.[5]
On February 23, 1999, counsel for the accused then filed an
urgent motion to release the accused.[6] Two days later,
respondent issued a subpoena, directing the accused to submit
counter-affidavits for the preliminary investigation of the charges
of rape. But no further action was taken by the court. Accused
through counsel filed a second motion[7] on March 1, 1999.
Again, the motion was not acted upon.
Having no other recourse to regain his liberty, the accused filed
a petition for habeas corpus on March 15, 1999, with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 52. During the habeas
corpus proceedings,[8] the respondent testified that this was not
the first time he issued a detention order without a warrant of
arrest. He testified that he has done this action many times
already[9] in the past, upon the request of the Chief of Police of
the Philippine National Police in Talibon. He reasoned out that it
was in the best interest of the detainees to be transferred from
the PNP jail to the BJMP because the former did not have meal
provisions for detainees.
After due hearing, the RTC Judge Zeta V. Villamayor issued an
order[10] on March 25, 1999, finding that the accused was being
illegally restrained of his liberty and ordering his immediate
release from confinement. On the same day, the MCTC
conducted a preliminary examination of the prosecutions
witnesses and issued an Omnibus Order[11] confirming the
arrest of the accused.
On April 12, 1999, counsel for the accused filed a motion for
reinvestigation[12] with the Department of Justice, assailing the
validity of the Omnibus Order. He maintained that no warrant of
arrest was ever issued against his client and as such, no
confirmation of such arrest may be undertaken.
On June 2, 1999, the father of the accused, herein complainant
Adriano Albior, filed a letter-complaint[13] with the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas. Complainant charged respondent
of usurpation of judicial functions and negligence in the
performance of duties, in connection with the detention of his
son, Edilberto Albior.
In a resolution dated June 3, 1999,[14] the Deputy Ombudsman
referred the letter-complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. On May 8, 2000, the
Ombudsman issued a resolution[15] dismissing the criminal
complaint for usurpation of judicial function as defined under
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code.[16] However, he
recommended the filing of an information with the proper court
for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.[17]
Acting on the letter-complaint, the OCA required respondent to
file a comment to the complaint. Respondent filed his counter-
54
affidavit.[18] Respondent claims that he issued the detention
order only after the PNP Chief and PNP Trial Officer of Talibon
repeatedly requested him to do so. The respondent asserts that
it was out of honest conviction that he was only helping the
accused and his relatives. He was merely sparing them the
trouble of having to bring meals to the accused, as the municipal
jail where the latter was detained did not serve food to its
prisoners.
Respondent also appended the affidavit[19] of Police Senior
Inspector Lecarion P. Torrefiel, the PNP Chief of Police of
Talibon. In it the Police Chief stated that he personally requested
the respondent to immediately issue a detention order in order to
transfer the accused to the BJMP jail, where he is ensured of
three square meals a day. The Chief explained that the
municipality did not have a budget for meals of detainees at the
PNP jail, hence, it is alleged that respondents action was
intended purely for humanitarian reasons. Nothing is said,
however, why the local government unit allows this inhumane
practice. The Chief of Police himself appears blissfully ignorant
of the human rights aspects of the matter for which his
command could be held accountable.
On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report.[20] It found
respondents defense unconvincing and held him administratively
liable for issuing the said detention order prior to a preliminary
investigation conducted by a judge and before a warrant of
arrest was issued against the accused. It recommended that the
case be re-docketed as an administrative matter and that a fine
in the amount of P3,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a
warning that the commission of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
We then required the parties to manifest if they were willing to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings
filed.[21] The respondent subsequently manifested his
conformity.[22]
The main issue for our resolution is whether the respondent
should be held administratively liable for the issuance of a
detention order resulting in the actual detention of the accused
under the abovementioned circumstances.
The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not
empowered to issue the questioned detention order. The duties
of a clerk of court in the absence of the judge are defined under
Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the
judge. - In the absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all
the duties of the judge in receiving applications, petitions,
inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices
that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may
also, when directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts
of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers,
and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the
estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships,
or receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts,
and evidence to the judge, together with his findings in relation
to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and
include the same in his report.

Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to
issue an order of detention, as such function is purely judicial. In
fact, we already had occasion to rule that a clerk of court, unlike
a judicial authority, has no power to order the commitment of a
person charged with a penal offense.[23]
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that
where a judge is not available, the arresting officer is duty-bound
to release a detained person, if the maximum hours for detention
provided under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code had
already expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an
offense under the Code, to wit:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next
preceding articles shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground
and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to
help the accused and his relatives. But as an officer of the court,
he should be aware that by issuing such detention order, he
trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused.
Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the
accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due
process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful
detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the
appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on
March 25, 1999.
Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious
violation committed by the respondent. Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution mandates:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. (Underscoring ours)
Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank,
should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility.[24]
Their conduct at all times must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum, but above all else must be in
accordance with the Constitution and the law. A clerk of court,
such as herein respondent, is a ranking and essential officer in
the judicial system. His office is the hub of activities. He
performs delicate administrative functions essential to the
prompt and proper administration of justice.[25]
Respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in
the dispensation of justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold
the fundamental law of the land. His defense that he is not a
lawyer or law graduate and so is excusably ignorant of the legal
implications of his detention order, deserves scant
consideration. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith, especially a clerk of court who ought to
know better than an ordinary layman.
This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act
which tends to undermine the faith and trust of the people in the
judiciary.[26] The Court cannot countenance any act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norms of public accountability and
diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.[27]
The respondents issuance of the detention order not only
deprived the accused of liberty, it also considerably diminished
the peoples faith in the judiciary. For the very officer of the court
on whom they depended to safeguard their human and
constitutional rights was also the one who violated these rights.
Respondent should be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a
ranking officer in the judicial system, to ensure that basic rights
are protected.
In conclusion, we agree with the findings of the OCA that
respondent is liable as charged administratively. But we
disagree with its recommendation that respondent be merely
meted out the penalty of a fine. We cannot treat lightly the
actions of the respondent for he has admitted doing them
repeatedly, in fact many times in the past. The implication of his
action as an official of the court is not only disturbing but
shocking, for it involves no less than a violation of the
constitutional right to liberty. We hold that respondents
unauthorized issuance of the detention order and his failure to
inform the Presiding Judge about said order constitute not
merely gross neglect of duty but outright grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a violation of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross
negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the
service, the misconduct must be serious, important, weighty,
momentous and not trifling. It must also have direct relation to,
and connected with the performance of official duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure
to discharge the duties of the office.[28] Because of the order for
the arrest of the accused and resultant confinement in police
custody, the respondent unduly usurped the judicial prerogative
of the judge, and such usurpation is equivalent to grave
misconduct.[29]
In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave
misconduct for issuing a Release Order without the knowledge
and signature of the Presiding Judge concerned.[30] In another,
we ruled that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
warranting dismissal from the service when he issued a warrant
of arrest without any order coming from the court that caused
the accused to be illegally confined for three (3) days.[31] In
both cases we held that though the respondents might have
been moved by compassion and might have acted in good faith,
the respondents actuations could not be condoned, for the
committed acts constituted a serious infringement of, and
encroachment upon, judicial authority.
In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency,
especially in light of the fact that respondent herein admitted he
issued detention orders countless times in the past. In
55
accordance with precedents and Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999,[32] the
appropriate penalty to be imposed on respondent is dismissal
from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II,
MCTC, Branch 4 at Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol, is hereby
found administratively liable for issuing the assailed detention
order without lawful authority, as well as failing to inform the
Presiding Judge of that court regarding such order, thus
committing GRAVE MISCONDUCT in the discharge of official
functions. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
FORFEITURE of all benefits and privileges, except earned leave
credits if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the
government including government owned and controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF
MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners
with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a
policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April
2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the
fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for
habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners
were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed against them an information with the proper
courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there
was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in
Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting
in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have
not until now an official information as to the action taken by the
office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao
against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action
taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this
case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved
herein for the information and guidance in the future of the
officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in
order to decide whether or not the petitioners are being illegally
restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of
manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the
penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the
above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution

guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of
Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion
that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean
the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial
power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a
person charged with having committed a public offense, that is,
"the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken
from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force of these
Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial
officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a
charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the
judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There
was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the
judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper
investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of
the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers,
who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204,
which complements said section 202, of the same Code
provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and
medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons:
1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the
provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to
release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner
formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds
upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old
Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not
be construed as having been modified by the mere omission of
said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides
that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated,
and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and
the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional precept
no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge
after examination of the complainant and his witness. And the
judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public
officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or
judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment
or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial
of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of
commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than six
hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the
Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of an officer after
arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for
legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the
time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person
arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may
deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which
reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to
the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information
filed against him. He shall also informed of the substance of the
testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he
desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor,
he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses
need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be
taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and
4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the provision of
said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue
of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario
sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the
person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the City
of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant
of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person
surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested
without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40
Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159,
promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The
investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the
preliminary investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule
108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses
cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are
entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for
the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the
defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First
Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants,
in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of
the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain
sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent
a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with
offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not
entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper
preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of both
the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace
from the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors
who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of
the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6,
Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary
investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2,
Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding
paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the
commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is
not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of
Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or
conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must
be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or
through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for
the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing
56
with the proper court the necessary information against the
accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and
obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the
accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted
bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should, as
abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the
person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to
try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17,
Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if
the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or
make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace
court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to
the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the
provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with
the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or
person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take
the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make
the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the
corresponding information within the time prescribed by section
125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a
warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the
accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the
investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them
to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making
the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available,
and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the
person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city
fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having
committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the
information on the strength of the testimony or evidence
presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested
for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code,
without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and
filing afterwards the proper information against him with the
court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of
course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an
officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well
as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the
time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to
make the investigation and file in time the necessary
information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the
detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period
longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by
a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after
due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information
or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the
latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any
process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person
without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any
other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law.
What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a

complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice
of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not,
to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that
there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the
accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even
though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement
as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the
detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have
acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the
matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of
article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the
office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact
that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said
policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we
hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their
liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now
detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of
justice. So ordered.
ARTICLE 127 – EXPULSION
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as
remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus
submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with
in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the
cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront
of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if
we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the
courts, as an independent power of such a government, were
constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit
a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be
set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these
proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other
departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor
of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill
repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the
city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25,
1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the
district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of
Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers;
with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a
guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the
police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that
awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to
collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to
depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly
given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests
were received on board the steamers by a representative of the
Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers.
The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29.
The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero
Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes who had been
expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these
women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-
treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the
disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of
the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine
relations with men, others went to work in different capacities,
others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly
portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor
and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the
relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through
stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women
who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same
questions concerned them all, the application will be considered
as including them. The application set forth the salient facts,
which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were
illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made
returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the
respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts
relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the
writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not
proper parties, because the action should have been begun in
the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao
and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the
women under their custody or control, and because their
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of
Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the
fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open
court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of
the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without
their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of
November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the
court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their
liberty, on December 2, 1918.
57
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to
Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for
petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the
Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in
the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose
behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had
been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts,
were notified by the police and the secret service to appear
before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when
pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the
Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao
and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between
the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in
Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women
were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to
return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it
was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court
because the women had never been under his control, because
they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they
had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo
answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under
his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey
the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10,
1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the
respondents had not complied with the original order to the
satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and
therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann,
Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women
should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge
of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the
right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other
legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further
stated that the question of whether the respondents were in
contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the
order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a
number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and
of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk
of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity.
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented
before the Court the women who had returned to the city
through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought
to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by
their returns, once again recounted the facts and further
endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the
habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents,
through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in
bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-
one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they
desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee,
renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had
already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all
efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel
for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit
memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando

Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the
city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that
the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck
from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for
granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will
now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one
hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and
then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity
to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions
unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women
left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown
by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the
constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of
the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and
practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the
question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief
of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons
from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine
Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in
conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can
order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the
Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section
733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for
the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any
person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the
return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been
convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House
of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes.
Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person
in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or
order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or
regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city
of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a
sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly
authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change
his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of
domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional
system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not
even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the
United States, who has often been said to exercise more power
than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative,
either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the
executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of
delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at
their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives,
render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents
and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to
themselves such power, then any other official can do the same.
And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would
have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be
sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to
another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same
club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that
— "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of
his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him
nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer
to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111,
1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the
more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196,
220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high
tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails,
as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins
[1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in
issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said
in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the
courts should permit a government of men or a government of
laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official
oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the
aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest
with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was
never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such
situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in
force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by
regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who
58
shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or
by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines
who shall compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not
less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the
proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has
violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and
press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have
defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the
act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To
quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be
referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to
an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his
liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a
crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the
guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process
of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to
set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents
have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this
instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in
parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a
assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not
restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of
police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that
perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel.
The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The
way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It
was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons
in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for
personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to
grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained
of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked
for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been
made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good
practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest

judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast
rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine
Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable
before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that
the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the
women had any means by which to advance their plea before
that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners
with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their
attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved
parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown
that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its
purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior
court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would
have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more
difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the
parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of
the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city
limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be
perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The
forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that
city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited
them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings,
they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when
and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to
Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his
right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense
would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and
place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold
his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and
that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his
power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong
that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if
the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with
the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief
of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not
be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing
her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in
the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty
has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus
be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been
presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it
may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal
any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are
however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of
Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within
the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child
under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to
be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of
Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy,
justices. On the question presented the court was equally
divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held
that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom
concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since
the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent
on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will
hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view,
only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice
Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this
court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid
before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums
of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna
Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its
many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on
the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he
will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits
and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that
great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the
life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed
here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay,
that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not
doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . .
. does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are
confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems
to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our
jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of
king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ
from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but
to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
59
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of
procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon,
not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the
former except through the latter. The officer or person who
serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner
free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to
release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon
the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be
resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and
imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if
any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those
which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not
important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of
process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled
to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not
increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the
state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important
question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am
aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as
authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57
Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the
subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's
Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her
husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge
at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the
child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before
the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to
another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it
was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in
contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M.
R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued
on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the
body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts
of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with
the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command
to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless
some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction
of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having
lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the
issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to
produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence
of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he
without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in
argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior
period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some
time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is
not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The
question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the
writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its
commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305.
See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12

Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo,
Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A
habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the
circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons,
with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ,
stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in
the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed
beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of
habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and
out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had
removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply
for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be
evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce
the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to
produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of
the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be
otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards
ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the
negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged
in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last
day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C.,
622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883],
111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of
the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate
bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent
complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the
writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not,
whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as
purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton
Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the
persons named in the writ before the court on December 2,
1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply
with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city
of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a
telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the
response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram
of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to
return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being
brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three
optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the
bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They
did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the
writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance;
and they did not present writings that waived the right to be
present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contended with their life
in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the
signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary
diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty,
could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be
found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number
either returned at their own expense or were produced at the
second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made,
would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to
jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The,
authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all
tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must
be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said:
"We thought that, having brought about that state of things by
his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said
that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that
he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he
must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go
after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the
matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an
absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore
at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to
see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it
desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate
their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents
appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a
better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards
were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in
rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation
to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a
critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a
substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be
influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy
incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in
Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any
particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be
made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a
substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection
remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of
court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez,
and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz,
Fiscal of the city of Manila.
60
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order
to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to
produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer
a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge
the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him
either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the
body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when
he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of
the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson
[1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial
regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the
respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has
flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only
followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of
public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is
nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero
Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The
city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more
than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city
government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court,
his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of
attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and
done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was
primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered
the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for
the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the
head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate
the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo
Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to
suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were
unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the
court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for
disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and
in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of
the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible
to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially
with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt
of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this
merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the
correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first
mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity
may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal
fine will at once command such respect without being unduly
oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of
habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be
in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme
Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100).
The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the
record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January
25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents.
So ordered.
ARTICLE 128 – VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
G.R. No. L-6800 November 16, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALERIANO DE LOS REYES and GABRIELA ESGUERRA,
defendants-appellants.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, the Hon. Charles S. Lobingier presiding, convicting
each of the appellants of a violation of section 31 of Act No.
1761 and sentencing each of them to six month's imprisonment
and to pay the costs of the action.
It appears that a few days prior to the 5th of November, 1910,
the appellant Gabriela Esguerra, who lived in San Miguel de
Mayumo, being a friend of the family of the other appellant,
Valeriano de los Reyes, came to visit him and his wife at their
home in the city of Manila; that on the said 5th day of November,
and while Gabriela was still there, certain revenue officials went
to the house of the accused Valeriano to search for opium; that
having arrived there they were refused admission to the house
by Valeriano upon the ground that they were not authorized to
search his premises, they having no search warrant authorizing
them to do so; that, after a few moments' conversation, and
upon their assertion that they were officers of the law, while not
consenting, he offered no physical resistance to their entry, and
the search for the drug began; that while some of the officers
were in the house prosecuting the search therein, others were
on the outside watching to see that no one left the house; that
during the progress of the search in the front part of the house
one of the officers outside saw the accused Gabriela throw a
package from the window of the kitchen into the grass behind
the house; that upon recovering the package it was found to
contained a considerable quantity of morphine.
It is concede in this case that at the time the drug was
discovered the defendant Valeriano was in the front part of the
house, while the accused Gabriela was in a room in the rear
used as a kitchen; that there is no direct evidence of any kind
showing that the accused Valeriano had any knowledge
whatever of the fact that the accused Gabriela had possession
of the drug. It is substantially admitted by the court in its opinion
convicting Valeriano that the only evidence relative to his
knowledge that the opium was in his house is derived from the
fact that he refused permission to the officials to search his
premises, the inference being drawn from such refusal that the
accused had knowledge of the fact that the contraband drug was
located in his house, otherwise he would have offered no
objection to the search. The trial court says:
Counsel for the defense does not deny that if the Government's
evidence is accepted as true the opium in question was in the
woman's possession, but he denies that it was in the man's also.
But under the law his "knowingly having on his premises any
opium" (Act No. 1761, sec. 31). The man admitted (p. 18) on the
stand that the house was his; and that he knew that the opium
was there seems clear from the fact the he endeavored to
prevent the search of the premises.
This is all that the trial court has to say with reference to the
evidence which supports the conviction of the accused
Valeriano. We do not believe that this is sufficient. The accused
Gabriela was only a visitor in the house of Valeriano. She had
been there but a short time. At the time of the search the
morphine was found exclusively in her possession and under
her control. It nowhere appears that any member of the family of
Valeriano had the slightest knowledge of its existence. It was
only when the accused herself was about to be searched that
she relinquished possession and control of the drug in an effort
to protect herself against the consequences of the search.
Rather than indicate that anyone else had knowledge of her
possession of the drug, the proofs seem to suggest that it was
her effort to keep knowledge of such possession from every
other person, including Valeriano and his family.
The fact that Valeriano refused the officers permission to search
his house for opium can not be taken against him. No public
official or other person in any country where that portion of the
Constitution of the United States against searches and seizures
or similar provisions is in force, has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of
search or seizure without first being provided with the proper
search warrant for the purpose, obtained in the manner provided
by law. (Sec. 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; secs. 95,
96, 97, and 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.) Judge
Cooley, in his constitutional Limitations, sixth edition, says at
page 364 and following pages:
Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of the
person is that maxim of the common law which secures to the
citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the
government, and protection in person, property, and papers
against even process of the law, except in a few specified cases.
The maxim that "every man's house is his castle," is made a part
of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of
high value to the citizen.
If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for
these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find it in the
abuse of executive agents into the houses and among the
private papers of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of
political offenses either committed or designed. . . . .
The history of this controversy should be read in connection with
that in America immediately previous to the American
Revolution, in regard to writs of assistance issued by the courts
to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to
search suspected places for smuggled goods, and which of his
pronounced "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of
law, that ever was found in an English law book;" since they
61
placed "the liberty of every men in the hands of every petty
officer." All these matters are now a long way in the past; but it
has not been deemed unwise to repeat in the State
constitutions, as well as in the Constitution of the United States,
the principles already settled in the common law upon this vital
point in civil liberty.
For the service of criminal process, the houses of private parties
are subject to be broken and entered under circumstances
which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need
not be enumerated here. And there are also cases where
search-warrants are allowed to be issued, under which an officer
may be protected in the like action. But as search-warrants are a
species of process exceedingly arbitrary in character, and which
ought not to be resorted to except for every urgent and
satisfactorily reasons, the rules of law which pertain to them are
of more than ordinary strictness; and if the party acting under
them expects legal protection, it is essential that these rules be
carefully observed.
xxx xxx xxx
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence
of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of an offense
actually committed. Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's
privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him,
except in a few special cases where that which is the subject of
the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the
complainant has an interest in it for in its destruction. Those
special cases are familiar, and well understood in the law.
Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for
stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into
the country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of
gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors
kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept
for sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and
dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety. A
statute which should permit the breaking and entering a man's
house, and the examination of books and papers with a view to
discover the evidence of crime, might possibly not be void on
constitutional grounds in some other cases; but the power of the
legislature to auhorize a resort to this process is one which can
properly be exercised only in extreme cases, and it is better
often times that crimes should go unpunished than that the
citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks
broken open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed to
prying curiosity, and to the misconstruction of ignorant and
suspicious persons, and all this under the direction of a mere
ministerial officer, who brings with him such assistants as he
pleases, and who will select them more often with reference to
physical strength and courage than to their sensitive regard to
the rights and feelings of others. To incline against the
enactment of such laws is to incline to the side of safety. In
principle they are objectionable; in the mode of execution they
are necessarily odious; and they tend to invite abuse and to
cover the commission of crime. We think it would generally be
safe for the legislature to regard all those searches and seizures
"unreasonable" which have hitherto been unknown to the law,
and on that account to abstrain from authorizing them, leaving
parties and the public to the accustomed remedies.

We have said that if the officer follows the command of his
warrant, he is protected; and this is so even when the complaint
proves to have been unfounded. But if he exceed the commands
by searching in places not described therein, or by seizing
persons or articles not commanded, he is not protected by the
warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases where he
assumes to act without process. Obeying strictly the command
of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner doors, and his
justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which
he is to make search.
In other cases than those to which we have referred, and subject
to the general police power of the State, the law favors the
complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his own
premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that he
may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by his
servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of the
intruder, if that seem essential to the defense.
Judge Cooley in a note quotes the eloquent passage from
Chatham's speech on General Warrants as follows (p. 364):
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind
may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter;
but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
In the case of McClurg vs. Brenton (123 Iowa, 368), the court,
speaking of the right of an officer to enter a private house to
search for stolen goods, said:
The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home, however
mean or humble, free from arbitrary invasion and search, has for
centuries been protected with the most solicitous care by every
court in the England-speaking world, from Magna Charta down
to the present, and is embodied in every bill of rights defining the
limits of governmental power in our republic.
The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low
degree, gives him no more right than is possessed by the
ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home
and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for the
evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that
purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever its
source, will supply the place of such warrant. At the closed door
of the home, be it palace or hovel, even blood-hounds must wait
till the law, by authoritative process, bids it open. Even with a
warrant, the law of this state forbids a search in the nighttime,
save upon a showing therefor, and upon special authority
expressed in the writ. (Code, sec. 5555.) A right thus carefully
guarded by the statute as well as by the common law is not to
be lightly disregarded.
In the case of Bailey vs. Ragatz (50 Wis., 554), the court said:
It is very questionable whether the defendant would, by virtue of
his office as policeman, be justified in demanding an entrance
into the plaintiff's house in the nighttime, and after the family had
retired, even though the boy he claims he was looking for had
been there. Having no warrant or authority for his arrest, we
think he would not have been justified in going further than
making a proper inquiry upon the subject, and requesting, in
proper manner, to be permitted to enter the house to make
search. He was not in a position to demand an entrance. And as
there is evidence tending to prove that the defendant demanded
an entrance into the house, and that he entered against the will
of the plaintiff, the court was not justified in saying, as a matter
of law, that the defendant lawfully entered the house of the
plaintiff.
Article 205 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands reads as
follows:
The penalties of suspension in its minimum and medium
degrees and a fine of not less than 325 and not more than 3,250
pesetas shall be imposed upon the following persons:
1. Any public officer, other than a judicial officer, who, in the
absence of the authority referred to in article 200 shall enter the
dwelling of a Spaniard or a foreigner without his consent.
2. Any public officer, other than a judicial officer, who, without
authority of law or of some general regulation in force in the
Philippine Islands, shall search the papers and effects in the
dwelling of a Spaniard or of a foreigner, unless the owner shall
have given his consent thereto.
If the papers and good searched are not restored to their owner
immediately thereafter, the penalty shall be that next higher in
degree.
If the offense penalized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article be
committed in the nighttime, the penalty shall be suspension in its
medium and maximum degrees and a fine of not less than 625
and not more than 6,250 pesetas; Provided, however, That in
cases falling within the second subdivision of paragraph two the
penalty shall be that next higher in degree than the penalties
designated in said paragraphs one and two.
Commenting on this article, Viada, in his Treatise on the
Spanish Penal Code, says (vol. 2, p. 130, etc):
Article 5 of the constitution of 1869 provided that no one should
enter the domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner residing in
Spain without his consent except in urgent cases of fire, flood, or
some other similar danger, or in case of unlawful aggression
proceeding from within, or for the purpose of rendering
assistance to a person calling for help. Outside of these cases
the entrance into the domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner
could only be authorized by a competent judge and it could only
be effected in the daytime. However, when an offender was
caught in flagrante delicto and was pursued by the authorities or
their agents and he took refuge in his own domicile, the
authorities or their agents could enter the premises for the sole
purpose of arresting him; and if he should seek refuge in the
domicile of another, it was necessary to first make a demand
upon the occupant of the house.
That inviolability of the domicile, as provided in the aforesaid
article of the constitution, is what paragraph 1 of the said article
came to protect by means of its penal sanction.
62
The constitution of 1876, now in force, provided, in regard to the
inviolability of the domicile, only that: "No one shall enter the
domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner residing in Spain without
his consent, except in the cases and in the manner expressly
provided by law."
We find the same principle quoted ad pedem literate in article
545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure now in force, article 550
of which has in part modified the provisions of the constitution of
1869 upon the subject by providing that the judge or tribunal
taking cognizance of the cause may decree the entrance into
and search of any closed building or place, or any part thereof,
constituting the domicile of any Spaniard or foreigner residing in
Spain, either during the day or the nighttime, if the urgency of
the case should so require, in the cases enumerated in article
546, that is to say, when there is reason to believe that either the
offender of the instrument of the crime, books papers, or any
other things which may serve as a clue to the discovery of the
crime, might be found therein; but this, provided the interested
party consents thereto as stated in article 6 of the constitution;
or, in the absence of his consent, by virtue of an order of the
court which must be immediately served upon the party affected
thereby, within the twenty-four hours at most after the issuance
of such order. The order shall set out the grounds thereof and
the judge must expressly state therein the particular building or
place to be entered or search and whether the entrance and
search is to be made during the day or the nighttime, and the
name of the officer or official who shall execute the order. (Art.
558 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.) It should be also borne
in mind that according to article 553 of the said code, police
officials may now, on their own authority and, therefore, without
the necessity of a special order of the court, make any search
and, hence, enter any inhabited place when a warrant has been
issued for the arrest of any person and his capture is sought;
and also when a person is caught in flagrante delicto, or when
an offender who is closely pursued by the agents of the
authorities, should seek to conceal himself, or seek refuge, in a
private house. In all these cases the entrance of a public official
into the domicile of another no longer constitutes the crime
penalized in paragraph 1 of this section. (2 Viada, Penal Code,
pp. 130-132.)
Groizard in his work on the Penal Code of Spain, commenting
on articles 215, 217 thereof, says:
In the early history of most peoples we find beliefs and traditions
which bear witness to the ancient respect for man's home.
We should not be surprised at this, for religion, under which
primitive families were constituted, gathered under the same
roof all of the members thereof to worship their protecting gods,
at the same time, with the same prayers, and in accordance with
the same rites. Eneas, when he abandoned Troy, did not save
from the conflagration and take with him the gods of the city, but
its Lares and Penates. The Hebrews themselves, a happy
exception in ancient history, the only worshippers of the true
God, the creator of heaven and earth, invoked him by the names
of God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob.
The house of man was the first house of God: the home the
primitive altar. Family worship preceded public worship; the
sanctity of the home preceded that of the temple.

In Rome the home of the citizen was a safe refuge, a sacred
asylum. Its inviolability was at once proclaimed, both by the
jurists and by the laws. Cicero exclaimed: "Quid est sanctius,
quid omni religione munitius quam uni-uscujusque civium
domus? Hoc perfugium est ita sanctum omnibus, ut inde abripi
neminem fas sit." Any acts of violence which resulted in an
invasion thereof were anathematized and were likened to similar
acts committed against the person. The right to bring persons
before tribunals and magistrates, however expeditious, absolute
and securely protected by the laws, did not prevail over the
inviolability of the domicile. "De domo sua nemo extrahi debet,"
says with eloquent laconism one of the ancient laws. Another
law provided that: "Plerique putaverunt nullum de domo sua in
jus vocari licere, quia domus tutiissimum cuique refugium at que
receptaculum sit, eumque qui inde in jus vocaret vim inferre
videri."
During the earliest ceturies of the middle ages, the religious
sentiment, which was so greatly encouraged and revived by the
church, placed the temples and cloisters beyond the possibility
of any violent attacks. But the security of the domicile, as well as
personal security, sought its own defense in the only effective
protection of the citizen's rights existing during those turbulent
times, to wit force. The home was converted into a castle, the
fields bristled with fortresses, and the towns were surrounded by
walls. The sentiment of individual liberty which, with the
barbarians, made its noisy entrance in history, impressed every
one most strongly with the right which he had, by himself, and
with the assistance of his relatives and friends to protect the
entrance to his domicile, meeting force with force, and opposing
to the unjust violence of aggression the just violence of
resistance.
When monarchy triumphed over the more real than apparent
anarchy wherein all of the elements which were to serve later as
the foundation of the great modern nations were purified through
struggle, the protection of the person and the domicile were
placed in the hands of the king as the representative of all social
forces. "In the name of the king," shouted the magistrates and
their agents when pursuing an alleged offender in order to arrest
him, and it was only by invoking the name of the king that the
doors of a private house could be opened whenever they had to
perform any functions or acts therein in the discharged of their
duties.
What religion did among primitive peoples, and individual
sentiment in the middle ages and the royal authority in despotic
governments, in defense of the domicile, should be
accomplished through the laws in those countries governed by a
constitution.
Unfortunately the political disturbances which have agitated
almost all those countries which have passed from a regime of
absolutism to liberty, and particularly our country, Spain, have
been the cause of the inviolability of the domicile having been
very little respected in practice.
Some progress, however, has been made in the right direction.
Victory seems assured in the field of legislation. All that is
necessary is that it take root in the customs of the people. —
The English subject says with pride, "My home is my castle."
Would to God that the Spaniard could rightfully say the same
thing!
The constitution of 1869 proclaimed the following principles as to
the domicile:
No one shall enter the domicile of a Spaniard, or of a foreigner
residing in Spain, without his consent, except in the urgent
cases of conflagration, flood, or some other similar danger, or in
case of unlawful aggression proceeding from within, or in order
to render assistance to someone calling for such assistance.
Except in these cases, the entrance into the domicile of a
Spaniard or of a foreigner residing in Spain, and the searching of
his papers and effects, can only be decreed by a competent
judge, and must be done in the daytime.
The search for papers and effects shall always be made in the
presence of the interested party, or of some member of his
family, and, in the absence of either, of two witnesses, residents
of the same town.
However, when a offender is caught in flagrante delicto and is
pursued by the authorities or their agents, and he should seek
refuge in his own domicile, said authorities or their agents may
enter therein for the sole purpose of arresting him. If he should
seek refuge in the domicile of another, it will be necessary to first
inform the occupant of the premises.
It is the purpose of the three sections which precede these
commentaries to protect these rights by penal sanction.
The first thing to be ascertained is whether they have been
repealed, either in whole or in part, by the constitution of 1876.
The constitution provides: No one shall enter the domicile of a
Spaniard, or of foreigner residing in Spain, without his consent,
except in the cases and in the manner expressly provided by
law.
The search for papers and effects shall always take place in the
presence of the interested party, or of some member of his
family, and, in the absence of either, of two witnesses, residents
of the same town.
The difference between these two fundamental laws is that the
former announces the principle and determines the rights which
are a consequence thereof, whereas the latter merely
announces the principle, leaving the matter of its application to
be provided for in subsequent legislation.
The logical deduction from this is that the sections of the code
still preserve their full force and vigor, either because the
constitution contains no provision in conflict therewith, or
because they, being a integral part of the law, have to be
enforced until they are repealed, in conformity with the
constitution itself, which declares that no one can enter the
domicile of a Spaniard, or of a foreigner residing in Spain,
without his consent, except in the cases and in the manner
expressly prescribed by law.
63
To distinguish them and to avoid any confusion as to whether
the entrance constitutes a mere abuse or an act performed by
the authorities in the discharge of their duties, the first thing to
be taken into consideration is whether or not constitutional
guaranties have been suspended. If they have, the inviolability
of the domicile disappears and, therefore, the official who,
without the consent of the occupant of the house, enters the
same in the discharge of his duties commits no crime.
In this delicate matter, we must also distinguish authorities from
authorities. The administrative authorities and their agents, when
the provisions of the constitution are in full force and operation,
can, without any responsibility whatsoever, enter the domicile of
another only in the urgent cases of conflagration, flood, or
similar danger, or in case of unlawful aggression proceeding
from within the premises, or for the purpose of rendering
assistance to a person calling for help, or in the pursuit of an
offender who, having been caught in flagrante delicto, should
seek refuge in his own domicile, for the sole purpose of his
arrest.
Judicial authorities, however, have only one prohibition, to wit,
that they can only act in the daytime, but even this does not
apply to the cases of alarming urgency above enumerated.
The code has endeavored to avoid, if not in whole at least in
part, in a very ingenious manner, without detriment whatsoever
to the constitutional provision, the great inconvenience which in
the prosecution of crimes and the punishment of criminals may
result from the absolute prohibition imposed upon judicial
authorities to enter in the nighttime the domicile of a citizen,
without the latter's consent. The method adopted by the code
has been to judicial authorities the necessary permission to
enter his premises in the nighttime for the purpose of arresting
an offender shall be considered an accessory after the fact in
relation to the crime committed.
In other respects, the penalties provided by the code are
adequate for the abuses which are sought to be corrected. The
administrative official who, in the daytime, invades the domicile
of a person, is punished with suspension in its minimum and
medium degrees and a fine of from 125 to 1,250 pesetas. If the
invasion takes place in the nighttime, and greater alarm is
thereby created, the suspension is increased to the medium and
maximum degrees and the fine to from 250 to 2,500 pesetas.
The judicial authority who shall commit the same act shall be
punished with suspension in the minimum and medium degrees
and by a fine of from 125 to 1,250 pesetas. (Groizard, vol. 3,
Commentaries on the Spanish Penal Code, pp. 327-331.)
In Alcubilla (Dissionario de la Administracion Española, pp. 454-
456), the following appears:
Article 7 of the constitution of 1845, which corresponds to article
6 of the constitution now in force, provided, among other thins,
that the domicile of a Spaniard could not be entered except in
the cases and in the manner provided by law, thus announcing
in a most solemn manner the principle that a man's home is his
kingdom, as an eminent jurist very eloquently puts it, or,
according to another jurist, the inviolable asylum of the citizen
and of his family, the veil which covers the acts which outside of

the home should not be published and the wall which separates
one family from another and from the city.
What a lofty conception! That within the limits of his home man
be in certain sense emancipated from the rest of the community;
that in his own house each father of a family is the chief to whom
all should render the highest respect and consideration, which is
not due even to the authorities themselves; that without any
bolts on both in their persons and in their secrets. That is what
the law contemplated when it inserted in the constitution that
guaranty which we have mentioned. It commands that only in
the cases and in the manner expressly provided by law can the
domicile of a Spaniard or of a foreigner be entered without his
consent; and hence the reason why the Penal code provides a
penalty for the citizen who enters the home of another against
the will of the occupant, and the public official or judge who,
taking advantage of his official position, enters the house of any
person except in the cases and in the manner provided by law.
But, what cases are those, we may be asked, in which the
authorities may invade the home of a citizen by entering the
same against his will? What formalities are necessary in order to
do so? Let us see.
Very limited are the cases in which the law authorizes an
entrance into the domicile of a citizen and then only on account
of the serious consequences which would follow if it were made
absolutely inviolable. Far from accomplishing the result which,
by this guaranty, the legislature contemplated, property,
personal security, public order, and all other rights which are the
subject of the penal laws, would, on the contrary, remain
unprotected. The criminal would seek refuge in his own house,
and, shielding himself with the inviolability of his domicile, would
laugh and sneer at the rights of the citizen, and would with
impunity challenge the whole community, which would be
absolutely helpless and at the mercy of the wrongdoer.
The home, therefore, can not be guaranteed as a shelter of
crime and bad faith, and, for that reason, with the formalities
hereinafter enumerated, the public authorities may enter the
house of any citizen in the following cases:
1. To arrest any person against whom a warrant of arrest has
been issued.
2. To capture the person of any known criminal, either because
of his having been caught in flagrante delicto, or because there
is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty, although no
warrant for his arrest has been actually issued.
3. To prevent the consummation of a crime the commission of
which is being planned of the same or has already commenced.
4. To search for and seize the effects of the crime or the
evidence of the commission of the same and of the identity of
the guilty parties.
5. To detect and seize all contraband articles which are the
subject of state monopolies.
6. For the purpose of attaching property.
Outside of these cases we do not know of any case in which the
entrance of the authorities into the domicile of a private
individual, which constitutes the forcible entry of the same, may
be justified, and when the entrance is at all authorized it must be
upon some notoriously known facts, a mere pretext, which the
penal law punishes, not being sufficient. And in all cases an
order of the court setting out the reasons therefor is necessary.
(See art. 8 of the constitution.) And the judge shall expressly
state in his order the particular building or place to be searched
and whether the search shall take place in the daytime, and the
authority or official who is to conduct the same; complying in
addition thereto with the other formalities which the law, and
particularly the Code of Criminal Procedure, provides so as to
prevent abuses or to restrict them as much as possible.
As a general rule, it may be stated that, in order to enter a house
for any purpose whatever, whether to inspect the same, to arrest
a person, or to attach property, it is necessary to first obtain the
consent of the occupant of the same, as provided in article 6 of
the constitution, and, in his absence, an order of the court will be
required for the preliminary inquiry in each case, upon notice to
the person affected thereby, either immediately or at the most
within the twenty-four hours after the issuance of said order.
The order need not be in the nature of a command to enter the
house, but a warrant of arrest or writ of attachment will be
sufficient. In other cases, however, the order must be specific,
as, for instance, where the house is to be searched for the
purpose of finding the effects of the crime or evidence of its
commission. In this latter case the order of the court must be
very plain and it should describe the premises to be searched in
order to avoid any unnecessary inquiries into the family secrets
of the occupants, which the law requires should be absolutely
respected, provided they do not affect the interests of the public
at large.
When the entrance is not made personally by the judge, he must
issue a writ in due form, for the inferior officials of the court can
not proceeded to perform such delicate functions without said
requisite. (Note 9, Title 30, Book 4, Novisima Recopilacion.)
In the execution of an act so delicate as the search or inspection
of a private house, in addition to the requisites hereinbefore set
out, the first thing to be done is to make demand upon the
occupant to voluntarily consent to the same.
This demand must be made with much prudence, as though the
official was performing a very painful and unavoidable duty, and
not with the arrogance which irritates and reveals an arbitrary
and abusive exercise of such functions.
The occupant of a house has a perfect right to demand that the
authorities explain to him the reason for and the object of the
search to be made therein; he has a right to present for the
consideration of the authorities the reasons which he may have
for objecting to the search as a whole or for requesting that the
same be restricted to the necessities of the case; and if his
objections should be entirely disregarded, he has the right to
immediately protest against the search and to require the same
be made a matter of record. He has the right to be present
during the search of his house and to respectfully request the
authorities that the persons assisting the latter should enter in an
64
open manner and undisguised, so as to prevent any abuse
which might otherwise result; and that in making the search they
avoid any unnecessary inspections and that all necessary
precautions be taken so as to avoid injuring his reputation. A
public official would create a bad impression in regard to his
authority if he should refuse to grant such just and due
demands, his conduct being always taken into consideration for
the purpose of determining the degree of any abuse in
substance or form committed by him, and which the penal law
would not allow to go unpunished. (See art. 299, above cited.)
Here we should explain the differences which have always
existed and which must necessarily exist between the forcible
entry of a private house and that of a public building, the
residences of ambassadors, barracks, royal palaces, the senate
and congress, churches, ships, etc.; but this as well as other
important matters are settled by the provisions of articles 41 to
52, inclusive, of the royal decree of June 20, 1852, relating to
proceedings in matters of contraband and similar frauds, in the
regulations of the Civil guard Corps of August 2, 1852, articles
36, 43, and 44, articles 170 to 172, inclusive, of the Internal
Revenue Regulations of the 21st of June, 1889, articles 495 to
523, inclusive, of the Code of Military Justice, and articles 545 to
588, inclusive, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provide
what buildings or places shall be public as regards entrance into
the same, the requisites for entering royal palaces and building
occupied by the legislative bodies the residences of consuls,
foreign ships, etc.lawphil.net
In the case of United States vs. Macaspac (9 Phil. Rep., 207), it
appears that:
On the morning of April 19, 1906, Atanacio Macaspac, lieutenant
of the barrio, made his appearance at the gate of the yard of
Apolonia Ico's house, situate in the barrio of San Antonio, town
of Lubao, Pampanga, and stated that he intended to enter the
house and search it. The landlady objected to such search, in
the presence of one Luis and Maria de la Cruz, who were also
there on that occasion, and three times repeated her objections,
alleging as her reasons therefor the absence of her husband
from the house. But in spite of her opposition to such search and
that offered in support thereof by her said companions, the
defendant, not being provided with and showing no order of
court, insisted upon entering the said dwelling under a threat
that he would procure a search warrant; thereupon he entered
and proceeded to search the house and inspect some jars and
baskets therein contained. The said inmates were not aware of
what was being searched for, and the defendant was
accompanied at the time by one Pedro Manalandin, Moning
Sambat, Tolome Devera.
The facts as above described, and which have been clearly
proved in the present cause, and which have been clearly
proved in the present cause, constitute the crime of forcible
entry of a dwelling committed by the defendant in his official
capacity as lieutenant of the barrio, as defined and penalized by
article 205, No. 1, of the Penal Code, which provides as follows:
The following shall incur the penalties of suspension in its
minimum and medium degrees and a fine of from 325 to 3,250
pesetas:

1. The public official who, not being a judicial authority nor
empowered in the manner prescribed in article 200, shall enter
the domicile of a Spaniard or foreigner without his consent.
(See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, written as vacation
judge, published in Volume V of the Official Gazette, p. 955. 1)
The discussion of the question in hand is so full and clear in the
quotations above made that it is unnecessary to extend it
further. In deciding this case we do not consider or pass upon
the searches of private premises and seizures of books and
papers which are made under the authority or claim of authority
of the revenue laws of the United States in cases where goods
have illegally evaded the payment of duties, customs or internal
revenue, levied by the Government. With respect to such cases
the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have laid
down a doctrine by itself to which we now merely refer. Nor is
there anything herein in conflict with the decision in the case of
United States vs. Vallejo (11 Phil. Rep., 193), in which the court
said:
The defense rests upon points of law: First. That within his own
house a man's person is sacred and he may conduct himself as
he pleases. The inviolability of a dwelling has been well
explained in United States vs. Arceo (3 Phil. Rep., 381), but
while it may be true in general that "a man's house is his castle,"
it is equally true that he may not use that castle as a citadel for
aggression against his neighbors, nor can he within its walls
create such disorder as to affect their peace. It is clear from the
testimony that in this case the behavior of the defendant
amounted to more than private misconduct and constituted a
public annoyance and a breach of the peace of the
neighborhood.
Manifestly this case rests upon different facts from those in the
case at bar.
The only evidence against the defendant Valeriano being an
inference drawn from the exercise of a legal right, we declare
the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. We
accordingly reverse the judgment below as to him and acquit
him of the charge embraced in the information.
As to the accused Gabriela Esguerra, we have no doubt of her
guilt. The evidence clearly demonstrates her possession of the
morphine and her attempt to rid herself of its possession before
discovery by the officers. We have carefully examined the
evidence in the case and, notwithstanding the able arguments of
her counsel, we are convinced that she is guilty. It is the
unanimous opinion of the court however, that the penalty
imposed is to severe. We accordingly modify the judgment
against her by reducing the penalty from six months'
imprisonment to a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment as
provided by law in case of nonpayment. Judgment is hereby
entered in conformity herewith, with one-half of the costs of this
appeal against the accused Gabriela Esguerra and one-half de
oficio. So ordered.
ARTICLE 129 – SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY
OBTAINED
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J.
BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-
Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the
margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors
— several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of
which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and
void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court —
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5)
the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed
of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases
already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys
seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
65
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the
contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event,
the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution
dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but,
the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents
and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into
two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have
no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of
a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right
to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed,
it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of
papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it
affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully
seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were
invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the
rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of
the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful,
could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose
property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the
benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was
with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States
(C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question
of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful
search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . .

. (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d.
786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution
of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining
herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)
important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the
search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the
answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether
said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants
are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In
this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect
to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in
this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would
happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules
of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised
Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application
for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described
— as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches
and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position
was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal
should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable
has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure,
and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
66
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is
true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court
had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and,
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in
subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp
vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional
documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led
by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee
against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal
Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties,
so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time
that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable
to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal
officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible

of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it
was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion
doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also
insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason
of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but
in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year
the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the
incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which
the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its
Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable
at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement
is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary
in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the
letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no
reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in
power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the
majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing
their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the
party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege
that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and
Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included
among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P.
Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal
belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they
have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of
federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their
alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned
records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended
petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words,
said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in
said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion
for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain
either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with
the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of
said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents
of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein
expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not
deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best
to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases
in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado
case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for
the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that
the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned
residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby,
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
67
pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI
SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.,
respondents.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the
validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982
by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which
the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal
Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate
General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute
or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized
as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were
required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on
June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while
opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case
until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and
academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the
ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having
previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the

validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3
But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of
this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan
dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this
Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the
words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C.
Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of
the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of
laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said
search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or
after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for
the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer,
p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on
June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners'
premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If
they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was
because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events
of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in
this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of
persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a
letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet
asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V.
Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential
Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that
the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally
decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to
our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise
them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial
efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the
presumption that they had abandoned their right to the
possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of
laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the
seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents
lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact
that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners
to nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to
conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be considered
moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during
the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed
been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to
search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the
execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address
on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping
and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under
P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the
same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error.
Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued
because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent
judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the
same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be
searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since
it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which
executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have
arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent
than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7
Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in
mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been
68
held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on
whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that
the judge who issued the warrant intended the building
described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file
to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search
warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-
petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the
personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal
property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of
the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact,
under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in
whose possession it may be at the time of the search and
seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed
has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the
articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real
properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under
Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered
immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where
this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of
the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed.

This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent
judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence
Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and
Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application
for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned
documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause
for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in
his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense
of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars
as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause,
said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to
have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable
cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence
gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the
premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-
described were used and are continuously being used for
subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the
objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6
Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched,
the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency
established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the
articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink,
photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of
the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books,
and other publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of
the subversive organization known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of
the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA
892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV
969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV
427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which
authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas,"
was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have
been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant
which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could
be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
69
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was
held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a
notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between
the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of
the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent
both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business
and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We
Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where
a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing
machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person,
natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it
was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied
the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors
for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing
presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We
Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of
the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign

Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983
of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President
Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In
this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a]
and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982
are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 9951. December 3, 1914.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A. A. ADDISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant A. A. Addison, having been condemned to pay a
fine of P100, to indemnify the injured party in the sum of P500,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the
payment of the costs of the cause, for a violation of the
provisions of section 106 of General Orders No. 58, appealed to
this court.
On the 23d of December, 1912, the appellant subscribed and
swore to an affidavit wherein he stated that on or about the 20th
of that month at 8.30 a. m. he saw various bottles containing
compounds of opium in an aparador situated in the upstairs sala
of the house of John McStay in Lucena, Tayabas. On the same
day the Court of First Instance issued a search warrant, based
upon that affidavit, directing the sheriff to search the house of
McStay and seize the opium. In compliance with this warrant the
sheriff proceeded immediately to search the house, but found
nothing of a contraband nature, and so reported to the court.
Subsequent thereto, and on the 3d day of January, 1913, John
McStay filed a sworn complaint (denuncia), charging the
appellant with the "crime of malicious prosecution" and alleging
that the appellant did, on the 23d day of December, 1912,
willfully and maliciously, with the sole intent and purpose of
gratifying his personal resentment against the complainant,
procure and obtain, without any probable cause whatever, a
search warrant "of the person, residence, and place of business
of the undersigned, by signing and swearing before the
Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge of the Court of First Instance,
certain malicious, false, and defamatory statements, known to
be false and defamatory by said accused." On the 11th of April,
1913, the provincial fiscal filed a formal complaint against the
appellant charging him with the same crime and setting forth the
same allegations as in the complainant’s denuncia. After trial,
the judgment above stated was duly entered.
For the purpose of showing that the search warrant was
procured "maliciously and without probable cause," the
prosecution presented seven witnesses, who testified
substantially as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Juan Merchan, clerk of the court, and Agapito Villasenor, sheriff,
testified only in reference to the filing of the affidavit upon which
the search warrant was based, the issuing of the warrant, and
the search of the complainant’s premises.
John McStay, the complainant, testified that for some time prior
to the 23d of December, 1912, he was running a hotel and
canteen in Lucena, Tayabas; that the appellant lived in his hotel
from the 28th of September until the 23d of December; that on
the 23d of December the appellant left his hotel on account of
certain disturbances which occurred therein on the previous
night; that these disturbances were caused by three of four
guests, and disturbed the appellant’s sleep; that on the following
day the appellant had a quarrel with one of these guests; that at
the time he left he was angry and stated that he desired to leave
the hotel and would arrange his account on the following day;
that when he (the witness) bought the hotel he also bought the
beds and the aparadores; and that he and the appellant were
friends, never having had any trouble. As to the damages
suffered by the complainant on account of the search of his
premises, he stated that some persons did not know whether he
was guilty or not, and, therefore, stayed away from his hotel
during those days, resulting in damaging him in the sum of
P500.
James R. Gittings testified that he was one of the persons who
were making the noise in the hotel on the night of the 22d, while
the appellant was sleeping upstairs; that the appellant called
their attention to these disturbances and asked them to stop so
that he could sleep; and that on the following day he and the
appellant had a quarrel.
Thomas Hoey, an internal-revenue agent, testified that he
accompanied the sheriff at the time the complainant’s hotel was
searched; and that he induced the appellant to present the
affidavit upon which the search warrant was based, after the
appellant had stated to him that opium could be found in
McStay’s possession.
Guy B. Shiller, principal of the Lucena High School, testified that
he had a conversation with the appellant and Hoey at the
government building, and that he heard Hoey ask the appellant if
the latter would make an affidavit for the purpose of securing the
search warrant, and the appellant answered that he would.
Jose Nieva, an employee in the Bureau of Agriculture, stated
that he was acquainted with Benigna Robles, a witness for the
defendant; that on the 24th of December he returned to Lucena
from Manila, and that when the train stopped at Calamba about
10 a. m., he saw Benigna Robles in the train.
The defense presented four witnesses; Joseph Rosemblatt,
Charles R. Duffin, Benigna Robles, and the Appellant.
Rosemblatt testified that he lived in Lucena up until some time in
the month of August, 1912; that at that time a Mr. Salmon owned
the canteen and hotel which was searched by the sheriff; that he
was in an automobile accident when one of the passengers had
his arm dislocated and, upon returning to Lucena after the
accident, they went to the drug store to get some opium liniment;
that the pharmacist refused to sell them this medicine without a
doctor’s prescription; that the following day he went to the
70
canteen, which was located in the hotel, and was then informed
by a Mr. Henson that the canteen had some 25 bottles of
various kinds of medicines; that these bottles were shown him in
an aparador; and that on taking hold of one of the bottles he
discovered that it contained an opium mixture.
Duffin, who was a mechanical engineer at that time, stated that
he knew the canteen owner, at the time the search warrant was
issued, to be McStay; that when he first knew the hotel it was
owned by one Henson; that at the time he left Lucena McStay
was negotiating for the purchase of that hotel; that he saw in this
hotel on various occasions opium in an aparador; and that this
aparador was upstairs.
Benigna Robles testified that she was a dancing girl in McStay’s
saloon in December, 1912; that two days before Christmas she
saw Hoey and McStay talking together in the hotel and heard
Hoey use the word "Addison;" that after Hoey and McStay
terminated their conversation, Henson entered the room upstairs
and took out of the aparador some bottles and put them in his
pocket; and that that same afternoon the search was made.
Section 106 of General Orders No. 58 reads: "Any person who
shall procure a search warrant maliciously and without probable
cause, and any officer who shall unlawfully exceed his authority
or use unnecessary severity in executing the same, shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a
fine of not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by both such fine
and imprisonment."cralaw virtua1aw library
This section requires that both malice and absence of probable
cause must exist concurrently in order to justify a conviction. If
the appellant’s act in making the affidavit was malicious and
unfounded, but there was probable cause for such act, he must
be acquitted. "In a legal sense," says Greenleaf (vol. 2, sec. 453,
16th Ed.) , "any unlawful act done willfully and purposely to the
injury of another, is, as against that person, malicious." Malice
cannot be inferred from the fact that no opium was found in the
house of the complainant by the sheriff.
"Probable cause may be defined as such reasons, supported by
facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the
belief that his action, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are
legally just and proper." (Burton v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 33
Minn., 189.)
Addison lived in McStay’s hotel from September 28 to December
23, when he left on account of certain disturbances in the hotel
on the night of the 22d. McStay took no part in these
disturbances. He and Addison were, according to his own
testimony, friends. But it is said that the fact that Addison in
effect charged McStay with the commission of a serious crime is
inconsistent with the latter’s testimony to the effect that they
were friends. McStay said that they were friends, and he is the
person who claims to have been injured. Again, Addison was
induced by the internal-revenue agent to make the affidavit. In
so doing he was carrying out his obligation as an "informer," and
as such informer he had reasonable cause to believe that he
would be rewarded therefor in accordance with certain
provisions of the Opium Law.

Rosemblatt testified that he saw opium in the aparador before
McStay bought the hotel. Duffin testified to the same effect and,
also, that at the time he saw the opium McStay was negotiating
for the purchase of the hotel. Benigna Robles said that she saw
opium in the hotel two days before Christmas. She also testified
in effect that McStay was notified of the issuance of a search
warrant and caused the opium to be removed. The prosecution
attempted to show that this witness was not in Lucena on the
23d of December, and for this purpose presented Jose Nieva,
who testified that on his return to Lucena on the 24th he saw
Benigna in the train at Calamba. It does not appear that Benigna
could not have come to Manila on the afternoon or night of the
23d, or even on the morning of the 24th. We must, therefore,
conclude that there was an absence of malice on the part of the
defendant in making the affidavit and that there existed probable
cause for making the affidavit.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is
reversed and the defendant acquitted, with costs de officio.
ARTICLE 131 – PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION AND
DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS
ARTICLE 133 – OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance
of Laguna by virtue of a writ of mandamus issued by this court in
G.R. No. 45780. The facts are the following: In the justice of the
peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna,
a complaint was filed of the following tenor:
The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in
the parish and municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna,
upon being duly sworn, charges Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro
Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against
religion committed as follows:
That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this
municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid accused, while
holding the funeral of one who in life was called Antonio
Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of religious sect known
as the "Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through the
chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, which
churchyard belongs to the said Church, which churchyard
belongs to the said Church and is devoted to the religious
worship thereof, against the opposition of the undersigned
complainant who, through force and threats of physical violence
by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass
through the said churchyard. An act committed in grave
profanation of the place, in open disregard of the religious
feelings of the Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES
Parish Priest
71
Complainant religious feelings of the Catholics of the municipality in which the
act complained of took place. We believe that such ground of
(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.) the motion is indefensible. As the fiscal was discussing the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny
The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary any of them, but must admit them, although hypothetically, as
investigation. Before the case was remanded to the Court of they are alleged. The motion raises a question of law, not one of
First Instance of Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is
statement regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question
have full knowledge of the facts and of the witnesses who could of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of
testify thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the court, the the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is
fiscal, instead of filing the corresponding information, put in the possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who
following motion for dismissal: profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the
feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take
The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the
Church of Lumban, Laguna. The said priest charges the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised
accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the
threats, the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts
pass through the churchyard of the Church. Apparently, the should be conclusively established, the court may find the
offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion,
belonged to the Church of Christ. or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code,
as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No.
The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the 58.
accused does not constitute the offense complained of
considering the spirit of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to
At most they might be chargeable with having threatened the comply with his duty under the law, without pronouncement as to
parish priest, or with having passed through a private property the costs. So ordered.
without the consent of the owner. Justice Albert, commenting on
the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously
offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person
ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious
dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious
ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object of
veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage
through the churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral
of one who in life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither
offends nor ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong
to the Roman Catholic Church.
Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August
31, 1937, dismissed the case, reserving, however, to the fiscal
the right to file another information for the crime found to have
been committed by the accused.
From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied
but thereafter given due course by the court by virtue of an order
of this court.
The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by
the fiscal. This officer questions the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint, but omits an essential part thereof, to
wit, that the churchyard belongs to the church, and is devoted to
the religious services of said church, and it is through this
churchyard that the accused, over the objection of the parish
priest and through force and intimidation, caused to pass the
funeral of one under the rites of the religious sect known as the
Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not omitted this essential part,
he would not have come to the conclusion that the acts
complained of do not constitute the crime defined and penalized
by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the
unlawful act committed by the accused had offended the