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1. Clarin v.

Rulova, 127 SCRA 512


COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-30786. February 20, 1984.]

Complaint filed: Respondent Rulona filed a complaint for specific performance and recovery
of improvements

Grounds: The petitioner and his wife violated the terms of the agreement of sale "by returning
by their own volition and without the consent of plaintiff, the amount of P1,100.00 in six postal
money orders, covering the downpayment of P1,000.00 and first installment of P100.00."

Allegation (Respondent): The respondent alleged that the petitioner sold ten hectares of his
share of the disputed lot to him for P2,500.00. The conditions of the sale were that a
downpayment of P1,000.00 was to be made and then the balance of P1,500.00 was to be paid
in monthly installment of P100.00. The respondent delivered to the petitioner a downpayment
of P800.00 and on the first week of June the amount of P200.00 was also delivered thereby
completing the downpayment of P1,000.00.

On the first week of August, another delivery was made by the respondent in the
amount of P100.00 as payment for the first installment. Respondent further alleged that despite
repeated demands to let the sale continue and for the petitioner to take back the six postal
money orders, the latter refused to comply.

Allegation (Petitioner): While it is true that he had a projected contract of sale of a portion
of land with the respondent, such was subject to the following conditions: (1) that the contract
would be realized only if his co-heirs would give their consent to the sale of a specific portion of
their common inheritance from the late Aniceto Clarin before partition of the said common
property and (2) that should his co-heirs refuse to give their consent, the projected contract
would be discontinued or would not be realized.

Petitioner further contended that the respondent knew fully well the above terms and
accepted them as conditions precedent to the perfection or consummation of the contract; that
respondent delivered the amount of P1,000.00 as earnest money, subject to the above
conditions and that the amount was returned by the petitioner upon his learning definitely that
his co-heirs and co-owners refused to give their consent to the projected sale.

Earlier Rulings: The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent on the ground
that the contract of sale is a pure sale of a portion of Lot No. 20, containing an area of ten
hectares for the sum of P2,500.00, and that the sale is not subject to any condition nor is it
vitiated by any flaw. The trial court also ruled that the fact that petitioner returned the sum of
P1,100.00 paid by the respondent indicated an intention to rescind the contract. The court
stated, however, that rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code can be authorized by the
court only if either party violates his obligation. Since there had been no violation, the court
ruled that the petitioner could not rescind the contract. Lastly, the court held that although as
co-owner the petitioner could not dispose of a specific portion of the land, nevertheless, his
share was bound by the effect of the sale.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the trial court and added
”Suffice it to state that a contract to be binding upon the contracting parties need not be
notarized. Neither should it specify the manner of payment of the consideration nor should it
specify the manner of payment of the consideration nor should it contain the proper heading.”

Issue: Whether the contract of sale had been perfected.

Held: Yes. While it is true that the documents (2) are, in themselves, not contracts of sale,
they are, however, clear evidence that a contract of sale was perfected between the petitioner
and the respondent and that such contract had already been partially fulfilled and executed. A
contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price. Such contract is binding in whatever form it may
have been entered into.

Construing the evidences submitted, it can be seen that the petitioner agreed to sell and
the respondent agreed to buy a definite object, that is, ten hectares of land which is part and
parcel of Lot 20 PLD No. 4, owned in common by the petitioner and his sisters although the
boundaries of the ten hectares would be delineated at a later date. The parties also agreed on a
definite price which is P2,500.00. Further, it shows that the petitioner has received from the
respondent as initial payment, the amount of P800.00. Hence, it cannot be denied that there
was a perfected contract of sale between the parties and that such contract was already
partially executed when the petitioner received the initial payment of P800.00.

The latter’s acceptance of the payment clearly showed his consent to the contract
thereby precluding him from rejecting its binding effect. With the contract being partially
executed, the same is no longer covered by the requirements of the Statute of Frauds in order
to be enforceable. Therefore, with the contract being valid and enforceable, the petitioner
cannot avoid his obligation by interposing that Exhibit A is not a public document. On the
contrary, under Article 1357 of the Civil Code, the petitioner can even be compelled by the
respondent to execute a public document to embody their valid and enforceable contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
2. Coronel v. CA, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996

Complaint filed: (Root) Complaint for specific performance to compel herein petitioners
(except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of land
with its improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the
parties sometime in January 1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00.


Allegation (Respondent):

Allegation (Petitioner

Earlier Rulings:



3. Valencia v. Cabanting, A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543, April 26, 1991
4. Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702, may 29, 1973
5. Director of Lands v. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096, February 27, 1979
6. Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No 133-J, Mary 31, 1982
7. Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, G.R. No. L-57499, June 22, 1984
8. Medina v. CIR, G.R. No. L-15113, January 28, 1961



[G.R. No. L-15113. January 28, 1961.]

Complaint filed: Petition to review a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals upholding a tax
assessment of the Collector of Internal Revenue except with respect to the imposition of so-
called compromise penalties, which were set aside.

Grounds: November 30, 1963, petitioner protested the earlier assessment of respondent;
however, respondent Collector insisted on his demand. On July 9, 1954, petitioner filed a
petition for reconsideration, revealing for the first time the existence of an alleged premarital
agreement of complete separation of properties between him and his wife, and contending that
the assessment for the years 1946 to 1952 had already prescribed.
Allegation (Respondent): On the thesis that the sales made by petitioner to his wife were
null and void pursuant to the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(formerly, Art. 1458, Civil Code 1889), the Collector considered the sales made by Mrs. Medina
as the petitioner’s original sales taxable under Section 186 of the National Internal Revenue
Code and, therefore, imposed a tax assessment on petitioner, calling for the payment of
P4,653.54 as deficiency sales taxes and surcharges from 1949 to 1952.

Allegation (Petitioner): Petitioner argues that the prohibition to sell expressed under Article
1490 of the Civil Code has no application to the sales made by said petitioner to his wife,
because said transactions are contemplated and allowed by the provisions of Articles 7 and 10
of the Code of Commerce.

Earlier Rulings: Unhappy with the assessment of the collector, the petitioner appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals, which the Conference Staff of the Bureau of Internal Revenue eliminated
the 50% fraud penalty and held that the taxes assessed against him before 1948 had already
prescribed. Based on these findings, the Collector issued a modified assessment, demanding the
payment of only P3,325.68.

The court’s decision was based on two main findings, namely, (a) that there was no pre-marital
agreement of absolute separation of property between the Medina spouses; and (b) assuming
that there was such an agreement, the sales in question made by petitioner to his wife were
fictitious, simulated, and not bona fide.

Unhappy with the two findings, petitioner again requested for reconsideration, but respondent
Collector, in his letter of April 4, 1955, denied the same.

The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the sales of logs to his wife could not be considered as the original taxable

Held: No, the primary reason why the sales of logs to his wife could not be considered as the
original taxable sales was because of the express prohibition found in Article 1490 of the Civil
Code of sales between spouses married under a community system.

Contracts violative of the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code are null and void (Uy Sui
Pin v. Cantollas, 70 Phil. 55; Uy Coque v. Sioca, 45 Phil. 43). Being void transactions, the sales
made by the petitioner to his wife were correctly disregarded by the Collector in his tax
assessments that considered as the taxable sales those made by the wife through the spouses’
common agent, Mariano Osorio. In upholding that stand, the Court below committed no error.
9. Goyena v. Tambunting, G.r. No. L-956, November 18, 1902
10. Beaumont v. Prieto, G.R. No. L-8988, March 30, 1916
11. Vda. De Espiritu v. CFI of Cavite, 47 SCRA 354
12. Pacific Commercial Co. v. De la Rama, 62 Phil 380
13. Nonato v. IAC, 140 SCRA 255
14. Layug v. IAC, 67 SCRA 627
15. Camacho v. CA, G.R. No. 127520, February 9, 2007