DeLima vs Guerrero
Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant,
Issues:
Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from
compliance with the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts considering that the petition should first
be filed with the Court of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion
to Quash the Information before the trial court
renders the instant petition premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the
present petition, violated the rule against
forum shopping given the pendency of the
Motion to Quash the Information before the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in
Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for
Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the
preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ Panel.
Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the
violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in
the assailed Information.
B. Whether or not the respondent gravely
abused her discretion in finding probable
cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against
petitioner.
C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status
Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant
petition is resolved or until the trial court rules
on the Motion to Quash.
Ruling
It is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima
did not sign the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of
Merit in front of the notary public. Such clear
breach of notarial protocol is highly
censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the 2004
petitioner De Lima in this case, to sign the
instrument or document in the presence of the
notary De Lima failed to sign the Verification
and Certification against Forum Shopping in
the presence of the notary, she has likewise
failed to properly swear under oath the
contents thereof, thereby rendering false and
null the jurat and invalidating the Verification
and Certification against Forum Shopping.
Without the presence of the notary upon the
signing of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance
that the petitioner swore under oath that the
allegations in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, and not
merely speculative.
PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF
COURTS
the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important
component of the orderly administration of
justice and not imposed merely for whimsical
and arbitrary reasons. well-defined exceptions
to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed
when any of the following grounds are present:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are
raised that must be addressed immediately; (2)
when the case involves transcendental
importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4)
when the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by this Court; (5) when time is
of the essence; ( 6) when the subject of review
involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7)
when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when
the petition includes questions that may affect
public welfare, public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice; (9) when the
order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy. Unfortunately, none of
these exceptions were sufficiently established
in the present petition so as to convince this
court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy
of courts. This Court cannot thus allow a
precedent allowing public officers assailing the
finding of probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants to be brought directly to this
Court, bypassing the appellate court, without
any compelling reason.
THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE
Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and
prohibiting respondent judge from conducting
further proceedings until and unless the
Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;
Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the
parties to the status prior to the issuance of the
Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated
February 23, 201 7, thereby recall inf both
processes and restoring petitioner to her
liberty and freedom
In the palpable absence of a ruling on the
Motion to Quash -- which puts the jurisdiction
of the lower court in issue -- there is no
controversy for this Court to resolve; there is
simply no final judgment or order of the lower
court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm. As per the block letter provision of the
Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a definitive
ruling on mere suppositions.
[T]he relation between the crime and the
office contemplated by the Constitution is, in
our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall
into the intent of the Constitution, the relation
has to be such that, in the legal sense, the
offense cannot exist without the office. In
other words, the office must be a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the statute,
such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of
the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder.
The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or
public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator, being a public
functionary took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty
is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere
to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises
not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

G.R. No. L-4922 September 24, 1951
128096, January 20, 1999

SEPTEMBER 12, 2018

MANUEL MONTILLA, as Provincial Fiscal of
FACTS:
Ilocos Sur, and FAUSTINO S. TOBIA, petitioners,

vs.
On 18 May 1995, 11 members of the Kuratong
HON. ZOILO HILARIO, as District Judge of the
Baleleng gang, were killed along
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and HON.
Commonwealth Ave., QC by the Anti-Bank
FLORO CRISOLOGO, respondents
Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)
headed by Chief Supt. Jewel Canson of PNP.
One of the components of ABRITG is the
In Montilla v. Hilario,32 this Court described Presidential Anti-Crime Commission-Task
the "offense committed in relation to the
office" as:
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Supt. Panfilo Lacson.
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes told the media that
what happened was a summary execution (or
a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG.
Omb. Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
investigators headed by the Deputy Omb. for
Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to
investigate the incident. This panel found that
the incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
Omb. Francisco Villa recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against 26
respondents, including Lacson.
Lacson was among those charged as principal
in information for murder before the
Sandiganbayan. All the accused filed separate
motions questioning its jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred
to the QC RTC which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under RA 7975 (An Act to
Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending
for that Purpose PD 1606, as Amended), as
none of the principal accused has the rank of
PNP Chief Supt. or higher (Lacson is NOT a PNP
Chief Supt.)
The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for
a reconsideration. While it is pending, RA 8249
(An Act Further Defining thr Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose PD
1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes) was enacted to law
which deletes the word “principal” from the
phrase “principal accused”. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan takes cognizance again of the
case.
Lacson now questions the constitutionality of
Secs. 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 because the
provisions are: (a) introduced by the Congress
in bad faith, (b) ex post facto legislation and (c)
misleading as to the law’s title. The OSG asserts
otherwise.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 8249 is constitutional.
(YES)
2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. (NO)
HELD:
1. RA 8249 is constitutional.
The Court mainly stresses that the provisions
are CONSTITUTIONAL because: (a) there is
presumption of validity of laws and no showing
that the Congress pinpointed solely the
petitioners which would amount to a violation
of the Constitution’s Equal Protection clause,
(b) using the doctrine in Calder v. Bull, the
same is not an ex post facto legislation and
lastly, (c) law’s title is comprehensive enough
to fit in the one-title-one-subject provision of
the Constitution.
2. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
It’s QC RTC that has jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of a court is defined by the
Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary
rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information,and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.
The multiple murder charge falls under Section
4(b) of R.A. 8249, which requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
An offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it (the offense) is
‘intimately connected’ with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.
While the information states that Lacson, et al
committed the crime of murder in relation to
their public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of
the victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does NOT indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody.
While there is the allegation in the amended
information that the said accessories
committed the offense “in relation to office as
officers and members of the (PNP),” the Court
do not see the intimate connection between
the offense charged and the accused’s official
functions. That phrase is merely a conclusion
between of law, not a factual averment that
would show the close intimacy between the
offense charged and the discharge of the
accused’s official duties.
What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused’s official duties and
the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office.
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
GR No. 136806, 2000-08-22
Facts:
On December 1, 1995, the Office of the
Ombudsman, acting through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, filed an information[3]
with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Eduardo A. Alarilla with the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 of the
Revised Penal Code. On the same day, a second
information[4] was filed charging petitioner of
having violated section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019. These informations were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070,
respectively.
the trial of Criminal Case No. 23069 proceeded.
On May 19, 1998, after the prosecution had
completed the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence[15] on
the ground that the prosecution had failed to
prove that he had... committed the crime
charged in the information and that the act
complained of took place while he was
performing his official functions.
In a resolution[16] dated July 28, 1998, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's demurrer
to evidence.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
December 17, 1998 resolution
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING
PETITIONER'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
Ruling:
petitioner claims that the elements
constituting the crime of grave threats have
not been proven. He insists that the
prosecution had not established that his act of
pointing a gun at complainant Simeon Legaspi,
assuming that it had actually... occurred,
constituted grave threats.[27] However, quite
to the contrary, the Sandiganbayan found that
the prosecution's evidence, standing
unrebutted by any opposing evidence,
sufficiently established the crime charged.
The resolution of a demurrer to evidence
should be left to the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. A lower court's order of denial shall
not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts
will not review the prosecution's evidence and
precipitately decide whether or not such...
evidence has established the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless
accused has established that such judicial
discretion has been gravely abused, thereby
amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[29] Mere allegations of such
abuse will... not suffice. For the special civil
action of certiorari to lie, it is crucial that
…there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very
antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance
with centuries of both civil law and common
law traditions. To warrant the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged...
lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of
discretion must be so gross or grave, as when
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility, or the abuse must be so
patent as to amount to an evasion of positive...
duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law.
When there is no showing of such grave abuse,
certiorari is not the proper remedy.[31] Rather,
the appropriate recourse from an order
denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court
to proceed with the trial, after which the
accused may file an... appeal from the
judgment of the lower court rendered after
such trial.[32] In the present case, we are not
prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has
gravely abused its discretion when it denied
petitioner's demurrer to evidence. Public
respondent found... that the prosecution's
evidence satisfactorily established the
elements of the crime charged.
Correspondingly, there is nothing in the
records of this case nor in the pleadings of
petitioner that would show otherwise.
Principles:
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES, GR No.
102342, 1992-07-03
Facts:
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for
commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in
the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May
11, 1990
The referral-complaint of the police was
received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.[2]
The corresponding information was filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information
on the ground that the crime had prescribed,
but the motion was denied.
the petitioner first argues that the charge
against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and
regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city
ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the
penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged does not exceed six months
imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom. x x x"
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution
of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information filed directly in court without need
of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation:
Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided,
further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding
complaint shall be signed and sworn to before
the fiscal by... the offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended,
entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following
rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and... punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special
acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal
Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Issues:
the applicable law specifying the prescriptive
period for violations of municipal ordinances.
Ruling:
That section meaningfully begins with the
phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which
plainly signifies that the section does not apply
to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing
in... the last paragraph obviously refers to the
cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances,
it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by... that
rule... the Court feels that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the
special law. And if there be a conflict between
Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules... on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights"... the
instant case is for violation of a municipal
ordinance, for which the penalty cannot
exceed six months,[8] and is thus covered by
the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of
the necessary judicial proceedings until its too
late.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period
for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on
May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance
with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.
It was not interrupted by the filing... of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a
judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding
that could have interrupted the period was the
filing of the information with the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done...
only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim (G.R. No.
168662)
Date: June 9, 2016Author: jaicdn
0 Comments
Facts:
Petitioner Sanrio Company, a Japanese
corporation, is the copyright owner of various
animated characters sold locally by its
exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated,
which allowed local entities to manufacture
petitioner’s products. A search warrant was
issued against respondent Lim alleged to be
selling imitations of petitioner’s products.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for
copyright infringement with the Task-Force on
Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the
DOJ. Respondent asserted that he obtained his
merchandise from petitioner’s authorized
manufacturers. The complaint was dismissed.
CA affirmed and further held that the offense
had already prescribed.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the action had prescribed.
(2) Whether or not there is copyright
infringement.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the
prescriptive period for violation of special laws
starts on the day such offense was committed
and is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings against respondent (i.e., the
accused). Petitioner in this instance filed its
complaint-affidavit 1 year, 10 months and 4
days after the NBI searched respondent’s
premises and seized Sanrio merchandise
therefrom. Although no information was
immediately filed in court, respondent’s
alleged violation had not yet prescribed. In the
recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,
we affirmed that the filing of the complaint for
purposes of preliminary investigation
interrupts the period of prescription of
criminal responsibility. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the prosecution of the alleged
violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner’s
timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before
the TAPP.
(2) NO. To be criminally liable for violation of
Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following
requisites must be present:
possession of the infringing copy and
knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an
infringement of the genuine article.
The prosecutors in this case consistently found
that no probable cause existed against
respondent for violation of the IPC. The TAPP
found that: Evidence on record would show
that respondent bought his merchandise from
legitimate sources. While it appears that some
of the items seized during the search are not
among those products which [GGI] authorized
these establishments to produce, the fact
remains that respondent bought these from
the abovecited legitimate sources. At this
juncture, it bears stressing that respondent
relied on the representations of these
manufacturers and distributors that the items
they sold were genuine. As such, it is not
incumbent upon respondent to verify from
these sources what items [GGI] only
authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as
respondent is concerned, the items in his
possession are not infringing copies of the
original [petitioner’s] products.
4. PHILIPPINE RABIT VS PEOPLE FACTS: On July
27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y
Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to
six (6) years, and to pay damages to the heirs,
hospital bill, to La Union Electric Company as
the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van
and to the owner of the jeepney. The court
further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of
the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for
the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the
judgment against accused had become final
and executory. Admittedly, accused had
jumped bail and remained atlarge. It is worth
mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of
appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for
accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court. We affirmed the
denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of
accused. The appellate court further held that
to allow an employer to dispute independently
the civil liability fixed in the criminal case
against the accused-employee would be to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since
the notice of appeal filed by the accused had
already been dismissed by the CA, then the
judgment of conviction and the award of civil
liability became final and executory. Included
in the civil liability of the accused was the
employers subsidiary liability. ISSUE: Whether
or not an employer, who dutifully participated
in the defense of its accused-employee, may
appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused HELD: Appeal by
the Accused Who Jumps Bail The accused
cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless
they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of
the court or are otherwise arrested within 15
days from notice of the judgment against
them.[15] While at large, they cannot seek
relief from the court, as they are deemed to
have waived the appeal. The accused-
employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is
deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory Civil Liability
Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
Only the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action. What is deemed
instituted in every criminal prosecution is the
civil liability arising from the crime or delict per
se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts
or quasi-contracts. Petitioner argues that, as
an employer, it is considered a party to the
criminal case and is conclusively bound by the
outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner
must be accorded the right to pursue the case
to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. To allow
employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by
a competent court.
People v. Posada
Facts:
Accused-appellants Roger Posada and Emily
Posada were convicted by the RTC Branch 43,
Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No. 3490
for selling 12 pieces of transparent sealed
plastic sachet, containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of
0.4578 grams, in violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165.
Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in
Criminal Case No. 3489 for possession of one
piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue
of a crystalline substance (allegedly shabu), a
piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small
scissors, and 15 pieces of used lighter all of
which are intended to be used for smoking or
introducing dangerous drugs into the body of a
person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165.
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-
appellants filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision dated June
17, 2010, affirmed the RTC Decision as to the
accused-appellants' conviction in Criminal
Case No. 3490 but acquitted Roger in Criminal
Case No. 3489 on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred
in convicting the accused-appellants
notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to
establish the chain of custody and integrity of
the alleged seized illegal items.
II. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in convicting the accused-appelants despite
the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
On the first factual issue, the Court found that
the records of the case and the testimonies of
witnesses belie the accused-appellants'
contention.
Based on the records, the buy-bust operation,
the arrest of the accused-appellants and the
confiscation of the illegal items happened at
around 12 noon of August 3, 2005. PO1 Area
received from Emily one sachet of shabu and
after PO1 Area introduced himself and
arrested Emily, 12 more sachets of shabu were
found in the possession of Emily. The said 12
sachets of shabu were inside a coin purse, with
a bundle of money. PO1 Area prepared on the
same day an RPS in the presence of Asuncion,
Kagawad Sarmiento and Vargas. On August 4,
2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory
examination of a piece of small size heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing
white crystalline substance marked with initial
R; 12 pieces of small size heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets, containing white
crystalline substance with sub-markings R-1 to
R-12; and one small size crumpled aluminum
foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of
P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated
August 4, 2005 was received by PO2 Abanio
and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz on the same date.
Nothing in it would show that P/CI Tria
submitted the alleged illegal drugs beyond the
24-hour reglementary period. In fact, even the
Laboratory Examination Request dated August
4, 2005 does not indicate violation of Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165. Clearly, from the
foregoing, the accused-appellants failed to
adduce any evidence to prove their
contention. The age-old but familiar rule that
he who alleges must prove his allegation
applies in this case. The accused-appellants'
failure to show evidence that the police
officers did not comply with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 gives us no other recourse but to
respect the findings of trial court and of the CA.
CA is correct in giving credence to the
testimonies of the police officers as regards the
timely submission of the subject illegal drugs
since they are presumed to have regularly
performed their duties, unless there is
evidence suggesting ill-motive on the part of
the police officers. In this case, the accused-
appellants failed to contradict the
presumption. What goes against the accused-
appellants is the fact that they have not
offered any evidence of ill-motive against the
police officers. Emily even admitted that she
did not know PO1 Area, the poseur-buyer.
Considering that there was no existing
relationship between the police officers and
the accused-appellants, the former could not
be accused of improper motive to falsely
testify against the accused-appellants. In
People v. Dumangay, the Court upheld the
findings of the lower court on the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official
duties because there was no proof of ill-
motive. Therein, the accused-appellants self-
serving and uncorroborated defenses did not
prevail over the trial court's findings on the
credibility of witnesses. The same may be said
in the present case.
On the second factual issue, the Court found
the accused-appellants' claim not supported
by evidence.
A review of the defense-quoted testimony of
PSI Clemen would show that accused-
appellants received one piece of small size
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with
marking R, 12 pieces small size heat-sealed
marked as R-1 to R-12 and one small size
crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic
sachet totaling to 15 items. PSI Clemen's
testimony tallies with the Laboratory
Examination Request of P/CI Tria.
Evidence shows no discrepancy as to the
number of plastic sachets recovered from the
accused-appellants and those submitted to
forensic chemist PSI Clemen.
The prosecution has established the chain of
custody and integrity of the seized illegal
items.
After PO1 Area arrested Emily and confiscated
the 13 sachets of shabu (one bought by PO1
Area from Emily and 12 found in Emily's coin
purse after she received the same from her
husband Roger), P/CI Tria took pictures of the
incident using his cellphone while the official
photographer was also taking pictures. Then
PO1 Area prepared an RPS, which Asuncion,
Sarmiento and Vargas witnessed. Meanwhile,
SPO1 Aldave, seizing officer went inside the
house of the accused-appellants, prepared and
signed an RPS after the raiding team found a
piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet
containing residue of white crystalline
substance, one small pair of green scissors
beside the bed inside a room, 15 pieces of used
lighters, and two pieces of P50.00 bill and one
piece of P100.00 bill. Asuncion, Arcilla and
Gonzales witnessed the preparation and
signing of the said RPS. Thereafter, on August
4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory
examination of a piece of small size heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing
white crystalline substance; 12 pieces of small
size heat sealed transparent plastic sachets,
containing white crystalline; and one small size
crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic
sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory
examination dated August 4, 2005 was
received by a certain PO2 Abanio and P/Insp.
Sta. Cruz. Subsequently, witness PSI Clemen,
the forensic expert, received personally from
PO2 Abanio the above-mentioned marked
pieces of evidence. She then immediately
conducted a laboratory examination, yielding a
result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets, the
one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
with marking R and the one aluminum foil strip
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In open court, the above-mentioned pieces of
evidence were identified and marked.
From the foregoing, the prosecution, without
an iota of doubt, has established the chain of
custody and integrity of the seized illegal
items. The Supreme Court in People v.
Sanchez, clearly discussed how chain of
custody should be proven, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to
present, not only the corpus delicti, but the
testimonies of the people involved in each link
in the chain of custody.
The prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants
sold 12 sachets of shabu, but it has proven the
accused-appellants' guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of possession of the same number of
shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165.
There was a discrepancy in the Information for
Criminal Case No. 3490. In the said
information, the accused-appellants were
charged for selling 12 pieces of transparent
sealed plastic sachet of shabu. However, based
on the evidence which the prosecution
adduced, Emily sold to PO1 Area one sachet of
shabu, which was worth P250.00. Then, after
she handed the one sachet of shabu to the
poseur-buyer, Emily received additional 12
sachets of shabu from her husband Roger and
when PO1 Area informed the couple of the
buy-bust, Emily had in her possession the 12
sachets of shabu. Subsequently, the
confiscated sachets of shabu were marked.
The one sold to PO1 Area was marked with R,
while the 12 sachets of shabu Roger handed to
Emily before their arrest were marked as R-1 to
R-12.
The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather
than separately charging Emily for the sale of
the one sachet of shabu and charging both
Emily and Roger for possession of the 12
sachets of shabu, the public prosecutor
lumped the charges together to sale of 12
sachets of shabu. This is wrong. The
Information is defective for charging the
accused-appellants of selling 12 sachets of
shabu when, in fact, they should have been
charged of selling one sachet of shabu and
possessing 12 sachets of shabu. From the
evidence adduced, Emily and Roger never sold
the 12 sachets of shabu. They possessed them.
Thus, they should have not been convicted for
selling the 12 sachets of shabu. However, this
was exactly what was done both by the trial
court and the CA. Without basis in fact, they
convicted the couple for selling the 12 sachets
of shabu.
Indeed, it must be pointed out that the
prosecution filed a defective Information. An
Information is fatally defective when it is clear
that it does not really charge an offense or
when an essential element of the crime has not
been sufficiently alleged. In the instant case,
while the prosecution was able to allege the
identity of the buyer and the seller, it failed to
particularly allege or identify in the
Information the subject matter of the sale or
the corpus delicti. We must remember that
one of the essential elements to convict a
person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify
with certainty the corpus delicti. Here, the
prosecution took the liberty to lump together
two sets of corpora delicti when it should have
separated the two in two different
informations. To allow the prosecution to do
this is to deprive the accused-appellants of
their right to be informed, not only of the
nature of the offense being charged, but of the
essential element of the offense charged; and
in this case, the very corpus delicti of the crime.
Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the
complaint or information, the court has no
other recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the accused. Here, since there exists
ambiguity as to the identity of corpus delicti,
an essential element of the offense charged, it
follows that such ambiguity must be resolved
in favor of the accused-appellants. Thus, from
the foregoing discussion, we have no other
choice but to acquit the accused-appellants of
sale of 12 sachets of shabu.
Truly, both the trial court and the CA were
wrong in convicting the couple for selling 12
sachets of shabu because the prosecution
failed to show that the husband and wife had
indeed sold the 12 sachets of shabu. Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165 provides:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos ([P]500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
([P]10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of
the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as
a broker in any of such transactions.
More, jurisprudence holds that the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
can only be successful when the following
elements are established, namely:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and consideration of the sale; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefore.
To our minds, while there was indeed a
transaction between Emily and PO1 Area, the
prosecution failed to show that the subject
matter of the sale to PO1 Area was the 12
sachets of shabu. Based on the testimony of
PO1 Area, the 12 sachets of shabu were the
sachets of shabu which Roger handed to his
wife Emily and were not sold, but which PO1
Area found in her possession after the latter
identified himself as a police officer.
In People v. Paloma, the Court acquitted the
accused for the prosecution's failure to prove
the crime of illegal sale of drugs, and we have
set the standard in proving the same, to wit:
Under the "objective" test set by the Court in
People v. Doria, the prosecution must clearly
and adequately show the details of the
purported sale, namely, the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the
offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration, and, finally, the accused's
delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer,
whether the latter be the informant alone or
the police officer. This proof is essential to
ensure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit the offense.
In the instant case, PO1 Area's testimony
showed no evidence that the transaction as to
the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu ever
happened. Rather, PO1 Area adequately
testified on the fact that accused-appellant
Roger handed the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily
who kept them in a coin purse. And after PO1
Area identified himself as a police operative,
he found the 12 sachets of shabu in Emily's
possession. From the foregoing, while the
prosecution was able to prove the sale of one
sachet of shabu, it is patently clear that it never
established with moral certainty all the
elements of illegal sale of the 12 sachets
ofshabu. And failure to show that indeed there
was sale means failure to prove the guilt of the
accused for illegal sale of drugs, because what
matters in the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is to show proof that the sale
actually happened, coupled with the
presentation in court of corpus delicti. Here,
the prosecution failed to prove the existence
of the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu and also
to prove that the 12 sachets of shabu
presented in court were truly the subject
matter of the sale between the accused-
appellants and PO1 Area.
Notwithstanding the above-discussion, we
convict both Roger and Emily of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs despite the fact
that they were charged for the sale of illegal
drugs, because possession is necessarily
included in sale of illegal drugs.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall
be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily
includes possession of the same, the accused-
appellants should be convicted of possession.
We have consistently ruled that possession of
prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed in
the sale thereof. Then Associate Justice
Artemio Panganiban logically and clearly
explained the rationale behind this ruling, to
wit:
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of
marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof,
except where the seller is further apprehended
in possession of another quantity of the
prohibited drugs not covered by or included in
the sale and which are probably intended for
some future dealings or use by the seller.
Possession is a necessary element in a
prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
It is indispensable that the prohibited drug
subject of the sale be identified and presented
in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale
could not be established without a showing
that the accused possessed, sold and delivered
a prohibited drug clearly indicates that
possession is an element of the former. The
same rule is applicable in cases of delivery of
prohibited drugs and giving them away to
another.
For prosecution of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs to prosper, the following
essential elements must be proven, namely:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object that is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possess the said drug.
Emily and Roger were found in possession of
12 sachets of shabu.
In United States v. Juan, the Court have
clarified the meaning of the words having
possession of. The Court said that the said
phrase included constructive possession, that
is, the relation between the owner of the drug
and the drug itself when the owner is not in
actual physical possession, but when it is still
under his control and management and
subject to his disposition. In other words, in
that case, we recognized the fact that a person
remains to be in possession of the prohibited
drugs although he may not have or may have
lost physical possession of the same.
sloppy work and failure to file airtight cases. If
only the prosecution properly files the
Information and prosecutes the same with
precision, guilty drug pushers would be
punished to the extent allowed under the law,
as in this case.

The ruling in Juan applies to the present case.

Admittedly, the 12 sachets of shabu were
found in the possession of Emily. But PO1 Area
saw Roger hand the same 12 sachets of shabu
to Emily. While Roger had lost physical
possession of the said 12 sachets of shabu, he
had constructive possession of the same
because they remain to be under his control
and management. In the Juan case, Lee See
gave the physical possession of the opium to
Cabinico while Chan Guy Juan had not yet
received the same opium from Lee See, but
both were held guilty of illegal possession of
opium. Thus, we can liken the instant case to
that of Juan because while Roger had lost
physical possession of the 12 sachets of shabu
to Emily, he maintained constructive
possession of the same.

Convicting both Emily and Roger of possession

of illegal drugs deprives their children of
parents. But if the Court have to take care of
our children and the family where each of us
belongs, the Court are obligated to put in jail
all those, including fathers and mothers, who
peddle illegal drugs.

The Court emphasized the need for the public

prosecutor to properly evaluate all the pieces
of evidence and file the proper information to
serve the ends of justice. The public prosecutor
must exert all efforts so as not to deny the
People a remedy against those who sell
prohibited drugs to the detriment of the
community and its children. Many drug cases
are dismissed because of the prosecutor's