ORANGE PART SPECPRO

2.Garcia- Quiazon v Belen

FACTS: Eliseo died intestate, Elise filed a Petition for Letters of Administration and
claimed that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, wife of the decedent,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual
and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City
and directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the residence of the decedent as indicated in the death certificate
should be taken into account for purposes of determining the venue for the
probate of the will.
2. Whether or not the natural child of the decedent may be appointed as an
administrator.

HELD:
1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

The word “resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,

meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s

residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to
the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985,
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.

2. Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be

filed by an interested person

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the

estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the
estate as distributees.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to
Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of
the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
 the findings of the Court of Appeals.

11.Aranas v Mercado

FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate. Thelma filed a petition for the appointment
of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio indicating

that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties".

Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory. The RTC issued an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be
included. Teresita sought the reconsideration of the order on the ground that one of the
real properties affected had already been sold to Mervir Realty.

The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration stating that there was no cogent reason
for the reconsideration, and that the movants' agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC
the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.

The CA partly granted the petition for certiorari. The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had
properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new
inventory of properties was interlocutory, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had
transferred the ownership to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale had been
notarized

ISSUES: Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain
properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either
transferred by sale

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of
the RTC.

Every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased, which has come into his possession or
knowledge. The usage of the word all demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory.

Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties
appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of
their being in the possession of another person or entity.

The RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator.

Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir
Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the
inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se
guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed.

20. Abad v Biazon

FACTS: Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura
B. Abad. When the petition was called for hearing, nobody entered an opposition and
Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Leonardo Biason filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition. Biason
alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and opposed the appointment of Abad as
Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in
Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Pangasinan.

Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously

granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties. RTC denied
Abad’s petition and appointed Biason as Maura’s guardian. Abad filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing decision but the RTC denied the same.
On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Thus, Abad filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the SC.

Pending the resolution of the instant petition, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion,
informing this Court that Biason died. She averred that Biason’s death rendered moot
and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be
dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the appointed guardian terminate the guardianship
and renders all issues assailing his appointment moot.

HELD:

Yes. With Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with
resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of
guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of
Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been
dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else
for that matter, any substantial relief.

29. In re: Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim

FACTS: Monina Lim (Petitioner) married Primo Lim and they were childless. Minor
children, whose parents were unknown were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia
Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child on their own, Petitioner and Lim registered the
child to make it appear that they were the parents of the children.

Unfortunately, her husband died. Later on, Petitioner married Angel Olario, an American
citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus,
Petitioner filed petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the Trial Court. At
the time of the filing of the petition, both Michelle and Michael were already of age.

Michelle and Michael, as well as Olario, Petitioner’s new husband executed an Affidavit
of Consent.
RTC, however, dismissed the petitions on the ground that petitioner should have filed
the petition jointly with her new husband as she has already remarried citing Sec. 7(c) of
Art. III RA 8552 and Art. 185 of FC.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt?

HELD:

No. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, Petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband. The petitions must be denied. The law is explicit on requiring Husband and
wife SHALL jointly adopt.

The use of the word “shall” means that the joint adoption by the husband and wife is
mandatory.

38. Tujan-Militante v Cada Despera

FACTS: Raquel fled before the RTC-Caloocan a verifed petition for writ of habeas
corpus directing petitioner Hazelina to produce before the court respondent's biological
daughter, minor Criselda, and to return to her the custody over the child which was
granted by the court. But, despite diligent efforts and several attempts, the Sheriff was
unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of
the writ.

Meanwhile, petitioner fled a petition for guardianship over the person of Criselda before
the RTC-Quezon City but was dismissed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus
petition before RTC-Caloocan. Thereafter, respondent fled a criminal case for
kidnapping against petitioner and her counsel.

Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the
RTC-Caloocan, which was granted. The Alias writ was served upon petitioner at the
Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City during the preliminary
investigation of the kidnapping case.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has 0urisdiction over the habeas corpus
petition fled by respondent.
2. Whether the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was
served a copy is enforceable.
3. Whether or not RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the
person of Criselda.

HELD:

1. Yes, the RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
fled with the Family Court. However, the petition may be fled with the regular
court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided,
however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon
as its presiding judge returns to duty. The petition may also be fled with the
appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.

2. Yes. The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable
in the judicial region where they belong. In the case at bar, respondent fled the
petition before the Family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-
Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in
the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.

3. As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served,

suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a
habeas corpus petition. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a
role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by
service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.

47. Fujiki v Marinay

FACTS:
Marinay contracted two marriages, first with Petitioner Fujiki and second with Maekara.
The first marriage ended without being legally annulled due to Fujiki’s parents who does
not favor the marriage. The second marriage ended due to an alleged physical abuse
committed by Maekara against Marinay. Fujiki and Marinay met again in Japan and
reestablished their relationship.

In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan, which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The RTC motu proprio dismissed of the petition on the following grounds: (1) that a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry) may not be done to recognize a foreign judgment which
is effect collaterally attacks the validity of or to nullify marriages; and (2) that under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:
1. The answer is in the affirmative. A recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life
which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,
which the State has an interest in recording.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an

action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,
which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign
law.

2. The answer in the affirmative. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.
For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry
on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of
an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage.
56. Caram v Segui

FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had an amorous relationship with
Marcelino Gicano Constantino III and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child
without the benefit of marriage.

During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home
for Children in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing
situation for having a second illegitimate son.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical
expenses.

On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of
Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

ISSUE: Whether or not writ of Amparo is the proper remedy available to the Petitioner.

HELD: No. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from
her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is
not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or
a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.