Corinthian Gardens v. Sps.

Tanjangco
FACTS:
Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco own Lots 68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon
City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. On the other hand, Frank and
Teresita Cuaso own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos' lots. Before the Cuasos constructed their
house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios conducted all
the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before,
during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order
to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of
Corinthian.

Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz Construction Co.,
Inc. build their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos' Lot 69 by 87 square meters. No amicable
settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the
perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC asuit against
the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.** The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its
failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to
undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted
Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in
making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian
exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the
Tanjangcos.

Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damagesthat they
might incur as a result of such construction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Corinthian Garden’s Association is liable for negligence, in approving the building plan and
whether or not it acted in good faith in doing so.

HELD:YES, Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its
approval of the Cuasos' building plans was only limited to a so-called "table inspection and not actual site
measurement. Corinthian's failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter wall into
Tanjangcos' property - despite the inspection conducted - constitutes negligence and, at the very least,
contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

Heirs of Completo v. Albayda

Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, 527th Base
Security Squadron, 520th Airbase, Philippine Air Force, located at Villamor Air Base (VAB), Pasay City.
Petitioner Redentor Completo (Completo), now represented by his heirs, was the taxi driver of a Toyota
Corolla, bearing Plate No. PYD-128, owned and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad (Abiad). Albayda and
Completo figured in an accident along the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, VAB. Albayda filed a complaint
for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
1333.

While Albayda was on his way to the office to report for duty, riding a bicycle along 11th Street, the taxi driven
by Completo bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the
Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However, he was immediately transferred to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC) on V. Luna Road, Quezon City, because there was a
fracture in his left knee and there was no orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH. From August 27, 1997 until
February 11, 1998, he was confined therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23, 1998 until
March 22, 1998.

Albayda alleged that the proximate cause of the incident which necessitated his stay in the hospital for
approximately seven (7) months was the negligence of Completo who, at the time of the accident, was in the
employ of Abiad. The pain he suffered required him to undergo medical physiotherapy for a number of years
to regain normality of his left knee joint.

In his answer to the amended complaint, Completo alleged that, on August 27, 1997, he was carefully driving
the taxicab along 8th Street, VAB, when suddenly he heard a strange sound from the rear right side of the
taxicab. When he stopped to investigate, he found Albayda lying on the road and holding his left leg. He
immediately rendered assistance and brought Albayda to PAFGH for emergency treatment. The deep
indentation on the rear right door of the taxicab was caused by the impact of Albayda’s body that hit the
taxicab after he had lost control of the bicycle; while the slight indentation on the right front door of the
taxicab was caused by the impact of the bike that hit the taxicab after Albayda let go of its handles when he
had lost control of it.

ISSUES:
(1) whether Completo was the one who caused the collision
(2) whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family

HELD:
(1) YES. It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by
Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the serious physical injuries sustained
by Albayda. Completo did not slow down even when he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets of VAB. It was also proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached the
intersection ahead of Completo.

The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the
highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a motorist than a bicyclist in
discharging his duty of care to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile has over
the bicycle.

At the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet per second, while a car
traveling at only twenty-five miles per hour covers almost thirty-seven feet per second, and split-
second action may be insufficient to avoid an accident. It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a
greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa. Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable
care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more
care is required from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist.44 Simply stated,
the physical advantages that the motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more dangerous to the
bicyclist than vice versa.

(2) YES. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises
that the employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the
part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of
negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the employer.

The trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda
at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as
driver, and his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-
delict is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary
and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil liability of
the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a
trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.

The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required under the law. Abiad’s
evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving
testimony of Abiad was insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the
selection and supervision of his driver.

SPS. PACIS v. MORALES

FACTS:
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in a shooting
incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent is the
owner of the gun store.
Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation taking up BS
Computer Science, died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun
Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned
and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.

With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes Matibag and Jason Herbolario. They were sales
agents of the defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers of the gun store.

The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for
repair.

The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with Serial No. SN-H34194 (Exhibit "Q"), was left by
defendant Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.

Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the regular
caretaker of the gun store was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales agents Matibag and
Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and defendant Morales were away. Jarnague entrusted to
Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store which included the key to the drawer where the
fatal gun was kept.

It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the
table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked
Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the
bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.

ISSUE: WoN Morales was negligent.

HELD: YES. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a
person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled
the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing
and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer,
otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent
any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored
unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use.
With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are
defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly
negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it
was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action
is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the
gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original
composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him
from liability in this case.

TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY

FACTS:
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system
in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within
the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the
son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude
and training in mechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed
the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was
not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest
which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.
The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after
leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across
the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from
its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These
caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two
long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in
the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After
some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they
could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge,
they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy
Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an
electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel
looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that
it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a
lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie,
who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to
run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck
in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to
the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.

ISSUES:
1. WoN Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.
2. WoN the elements of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable.

HELD:
1. No. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and
impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the
public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses
the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as
does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of
premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children
are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child
has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner
owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent
the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are
accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is
at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions
 the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or
unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if
the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a
stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the
children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or
occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.

This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a
right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their
parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to
put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is acquired and held
under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights and interests of the
community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very
tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we
lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein
they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of
accident to the child the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to
deprive it a right to recover in such cases — a point which we neither discuss nor decide.

2. No. But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries
incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the
negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause
of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the
negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting
open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion
and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to
earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record
discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the
explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by
him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the
application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor
can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when
he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which
might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the
resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might
be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It
would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held
civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC. v. PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORP.
FACTS:
The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; and at the time of the incident with which we are here
concerned, H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City of Manila. At the same time the
plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in
the Philippine Islands. In January, 1925, Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on the
Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in
the cost of running the boat. He therefore made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors,
and was told by Mc Kellar, of said company, that he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors
Corporations, which had its office on Ongpin Street, in the City of Manila. Cranston accordingly repaired to the
office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and had a conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to
do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work.

The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business as an automobile agency, but, under
its charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate,
buy and sell the same and the equipment therof. Quest, as general manager, had full charge of the
corporations in all its branches.

As a result of the aforesaid interview, Quest, in company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay at
anchor in the Pasig River, and the work of effecting the change in the engine was begun and conducted under
the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. In this work Quest had
the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place
themselves under Quest's directions.

Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing necessary to
accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor, and a Zenith carburetor was chosen as the one
most adapted to the purpose. After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a
fuel, supplied from the tank already in use. The result of this experiment was satisfactory. The next problem
was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. For
this purpose a temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from
the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing,
which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. Owing to this fact the
fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that
already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the
gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. The purpose of this arrangement was to enable the operator to start the
engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new
fuel supply. lawphil.net

In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the
carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the
carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter
and said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear.

After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made the boat was taken out into the bay for a trial
run at about 5 p.m. or a little later, on the evening of January 30,1925. The first part of the course was covered
without any untoward development, other than he fact that the engine stopped a few times, owing no doubt
to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial Quest remained outside of the engine
compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the
two elements would give best results in the engine.

As the boat was coming in from this run, at about 7:30 p.m. and when passing near Cavite, the engine
stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been
done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a
back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and
instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the
crew were unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and their
escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck,
when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court
found, was P10,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not Quest was negligent.

HELD: YES. A study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable to the
negligence and lack of skill of Quest. The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at
too great an elevation from the carburetor, with the result that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic
pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was no
doubt the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the
external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was
quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by. Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would
not be followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor
had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have
taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too
advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held
liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which
he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles
and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this
reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not
convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of
work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances (risks) to cause him to take
greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would
have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our
opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was
in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or lack of skill.
The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame.