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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. MA. EDELYN VENTURA

GARRY-GRANT GAVERIA
ERIC LOZADA
JONATHAN ELEAZAR MACLANG

GROSS IMMORALITY

 Immoral conduct is that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to

show indifference to the opinion of good and responsible members of the
community.
 Maintaining good moral character, in the lawyer’s professional and private life, is
important in the continued practice of law.

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal process.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which demands that “[a] lawyer shall
at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession”;
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the
Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

 A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
his clients. On these considerations, the court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor, thus proving
unworthy to continue as an officer of court.

 The act must not only be immoral; it must be grossly immoral as well to justify
suspension or disbarment.
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Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority. In the present case, the Court finds respondent administratively liable
for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct

But when is an act considered grossly immoral?

This is discussed in the case of Reyes v. Wong.

A.M. No. 547 January 29, 1975

EMERENCIANA V. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
FELIPE C. WONG, respondent.

RATIO: To be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must
be "grossly immoral" — "it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree".

FACTS:
Felipe C. Wong, duly admitted in 1962 to the Bar, is sought to be disbarred for grave
immorality by Emerenciana V. Reyes, alleging that:
Petitioner is a holder of the degree of Bachelor of Laws, where she and respondent
are classmates which they eventually became lovers. Sometime in 1960, petitioner was
requested to fill up and sign an application for marriage license upon the request of the
respondent and also filled up and signed a marriage contract.
Thereafter, petitioner was shown by respondent the marriage contract, dated
February 15, 1960, now allegedly signed by witnesses and the Honorable Arsenio Dizon as
the solemnizing minister; believing that petitioner was married to respondent, she went
with him in hotels and had carnal knowledge with him. They lived together in an apartment
in Manila, and eventually the petitioner gave birth to their child. After the respondent took
the bar examinations, he left for Mindoro to help a Cesar Climaco in his senatorial
campaign. In was then that petitioner thereafter received news from her cousin in
Zamboanga City that respondent had married someone else and petitioner found out from
the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Bacoor, Cavite, that their alleged marriage was not
registered.
Petitioner contends that she consented to live with respondent as husband and wife
because she was made to believe by respondent that she was legally married to him as she
was made to sign by respondent an application for a marriage license and afterwards a
marriage contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the respondent is grossly immoral to justify disbarment.

HELD:
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No. Petitioner's evidence disclosed that petitioner voluntarily yielded to the carnal
desire of respondent, with whom thereafter she freely lived as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage — an illegitimate cohabitation that stemmed from love and mutual
desire.
Also, in the compromise agreement embodied in the decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the two natural
children, Sheila Reyes Wong and Florinda (Thelma) Reyes Wong, and agreed to support
them. It was indeed a relationship that was devoid of deceit on the part of the respondent.
Furthermore, complainant was then in the fourth year in the School of Law, MLQ
University. In the first year of the law course, she already knew the requisites and
formalities of a valid marriage. Undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with
petitioner is immoral for lack of a valid marriage. But to be the basis of a disciplinary action,
the act must not merely be immoral; it must be "grossly immoral" — "it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree".
All told, because of petitioner's active and voluntary participation in her illicit
relationship with respondent, the latter's acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible.

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RATIO: Gross immorality is not limited to sexual acts. It is difficult to state with precision and
to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced
may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

FACTS:
This is for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto
M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
On December 2004, herein complainant sought the legal advice of the respondent
[Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours.
They met at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the
possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did
not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home
and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold her arm and kissed her on the
cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, she met respondent at Starbucks in Quezon City to finalize
the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a
ride, which he usually did every time they met. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately
after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost
restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold her face and kissed her lips while
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the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked succeeded in
resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage to go out of the car.
On the following day, respondent sent test messages to the complainant saying
sorry, asking for forgiveness and that next time he will behave.
In his defense, the respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to
the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to
discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which complainant was intending to file
against the owners of Queensway Travel and; that on both occasions, complainant rode
with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered
her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he
dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have
been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

ISSUE: Whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.

HELD:
No. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what
is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his
position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no
credit because the complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof
required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is
not synonymous with guilt.
Also, the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the
vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If
respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a
private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer
found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.When deciding
upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of
disciplinary proceedings are
to protect the public;
to foster public confidence in the Bar;
to preserve the integrity of the profession; and
to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.
Hence, based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that
this is respondent’s first offense, reprimand would suffice.
Case was DISMISSED but respondent is REPREMANDED.
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Adm. Case No. 1474 January 28, 2000

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER, respondent.

RATIO: Acquittal in a criminal is not determinative in an administrative case, where the

gross acts of the respondent is proved by the witnesses, the respondent may still be disbarred.

FACTS:
While complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the
complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.
As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife
let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When
she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with
him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes.
When he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on
the bed.She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and
other leg, preventing her from defending herself. Hence a complaint for rape was filed
against the respondent where respondent filed his answer denying the accusation as a
fabrication.
Consequently, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint
for disbarment against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.
The investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines where the Board of Governors issued a resolution
recommending that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year be meted on respondent.
However, in the criminal case for rape, the Court of First Instance acquitted
respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment proceedings should be dismissed due to his
acquittal in the criminal case.

HELD:
No. Such acquittal, is not determinative of the administrative case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the
complainant suffice to show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in
having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The
rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to
remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally."Good
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moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but
it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity.
Wherefore the respondent attorney is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

RATIO: Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
married woman, falls within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981,
106 SCRA 591).

FACTS:
Respondent Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation, and became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo presented to be a
widow, in which they had a child named John. Later, it was known Natividad’s marriage
was still subsisting.
Four days after the birth of John, Generoso married Preciosa (petitioner) and lived
for more than a year. Respondent took a vacation in Camarines Norte but he has never
returned.
Preciosa looked for him and discovered that he was living and cohabiting with
Natividad in Quezon City.
The housemaid, neighbors and several other persons known to Natividad and
Obusan testified and confirmed their relationship.
He answered that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa and he only goes to Quezon City to provide financial support to Jun-Jun. He also
denied the testimonies of the maid, the plumber and several other persons and contended
that he does not live together with Natividad.
He also contended that he only left the conjugal home for he cannot contain the
nagging of his wife and her interference with his professional obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Obusan should be disbarred.

HELD:
Yes. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of
grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a
former paramour, a married woman, falls within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community."
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Thus, a lawyer shall be disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another woman who had borne him a child.

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

RATIO: Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good
moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the
highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

FACTS:
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu),
alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said
university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times... under threat that she would fail
in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires.
Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain
Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
On July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of
complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special
defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made
against him.
As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge leveled against him is
in furtherance of complainant's “vow to wreck vengeance against respondent” by reason of
the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant
from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects.
It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the
hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence, both testimonial and
documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional
abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may
therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
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HELD:
It was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a
student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her
under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused. Complainant
submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for
sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if
she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects.
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

RATIO: The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client,
as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications
of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of
the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant
Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar,
with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the
complaint and praying that he be not disbarred.
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant
from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the
complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him,
he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she
completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11,
1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last
intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual
intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever
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they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract
marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because
we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my
common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the
complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted
to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him.
On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the investigators submitted a
report with the finding that:
1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he
was free from any criminal liability; and
2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a
married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and
3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take
the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman.
The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or
alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

ISSUE: Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the
adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Yes, it warrants for the disbarment of the respondent.
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law
for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even
though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing
on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
lawyer.

In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from
having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself
declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking
her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he
took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit
relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no
moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability.
He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
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An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or
what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the
fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him
a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered
then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168 April 21, 1999

LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna, respondent.

RATIO: Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases.
Only substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence. Given this requirement, the Court found that there was enough evidence
on record to sufficiently establish complainant's case against respondent.

FACTS:
Complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag prays to the Court that respondent Judge Paterno
H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to "gross immorality and grave misconduct
unbecoming of his profession." Her sworn statement details how respondent allegedly
molested her sexually.
Said sworn statement alleged among others that:
 Prior to July, 1994, her husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of
violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for
issuing checks amounting to approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were
dishonored when presented for payment.
 The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
presided by Judge Paterno Lustre.
 On December 16, 1994, Respondent, while he was giving her a copy of the
order, allegedly touched her shoulder, down to her breast.
 Judge Lustre kept cancelling hearings. By the way things were going,
complainant could sense that Judge Lustre was delaying the case, granting
postponement after postponement, despite objections from their lawyer. The
case was already dragging and nothing was happening. Plaintiffs were
running out of money and needed to have the case terminated right away in
order to get paid for the money the accused have swindled them. Because of
this dilemma, complainant decided to see Judge Lustre.
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 On March 6, 1995, complainant and respondent allegedly boarded his white

Toyota car, and while in the car, he kissed her on the lips and caressed her
breast. She was repulsed and disgusted but she could not do anything since
their cases were with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings.
 On March 13, 1995, respondent ushered complainant inside his, but she had
barely entered the room, when he kissed her on the lips and caressed her
body, particularly her breast. He exposed his penis and ordered her to
masturbate him. She could not do anything but obey.
 On June 15, 1995, complainant requested Judge Lustre to give them monthly
hearings, in July and August. He told her that he would oblige if she would
follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already touching her breast.
He exposed his penis and told her to perform "fellatio." She refused.
 On June 16, respondent allegedly brought complainant to Riverview Resort
and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba, Laguna. She could not refuse
because of the threat about their case. Inside the room at Riverview, he
undressed himself and ordered her to do the same. He ordered her to
perform "fellatio" on him and she obeyed.
 On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. Complainant was again ordered
to perform "fellatio" on him.
 On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M., respondent again kissed her and touched
her. She could not refuse for fear of retaliation.
Hence this complaint for the dismissal of respondent.
Apart from the letter and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court
photographs showing her and respondent together in various places. Five of these were
allegedly taken at the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt
issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two transcripts of phone conversations she
had with respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored on denial, alleging that he refused to accede to the
complainant’s and her common law husband’s demand to hastily decide the BP 22 case
before him; and the impossibility of the acts complained of due to his old age and sickness.
In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez, the executive judge who
investigated the matter, recommended dismissal of the complaint against respondent since
complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Judge Geraldez observed
that it was surprising why the complainant, no matter how desperate she may have been,
would submit to oral sex, and, why Jose Zafra, complainant’s husband allowed it.
The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The OCA, in its Memorandum dated
September 1, 1998, took a position directly opposite that of Judge Geraldez. The OCA noted
that there was an effort to gloss over a charge against respondent which the investigating
judge himself admitted to be serious. His investigative work and his subsequent report
reveal a perfunctory treatment and analysis of the submissions of the parties, particularly
the complainant herein, and an egregious misapplication of the law and jurisprudence. The
OCA found credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag, as her narration
bore the earmarks of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are so
finely etched by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or other similar fictive
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handiwork. It is an essential baring of rage, revulsion and disgust. The OCA recommended
that the case be formally docketed as an administrative complaint and that respondent be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and —
controlled corporations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Lustre is guilty of gross immorality and grave misconduct.

HELD:
The Court held that as a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in
deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided for
under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
Sec 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Given this requirement, the Court found that there was enough evidence on record
to sufficiently establish complainant's case against respondent.
The Court noted that respondent could not simply offer any plausible explanation
why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private room.
The Court agreed with the Court Administrator's assessment that respondent has
failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of members of the bench. He
grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety
not only in his public but in his private life as well. All to the grave prejudice of the
administration of justice, indeed.
The Court found respondent GUILTY of gross misconduct. As he has already retired
from the service and thus could no longer be dismissed nor suspended, the Court ordered
that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be deducted from his retirement
benefits. He was barred from any employment in all branches of the government including
government-owned and -controlled corporations.

G.R. No. L-225 September 30, 1959

ANITA CABRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO AGUSTIN Y GARCIA, respondent.

RATIO: The truth is that all along the respondent never intended to redeem
the complainant's honor. He had inveigled her into believing that they had
been married civilly to satisfy his carnal desir e. He himself admits that what
prompted him to effect and propose marriage to her was to satisfy such
desire. On the other hand, the complainant has not gone far in educational
attainment, having reached the first year of high school only, and does not
 13

have the slightest idea of a legal and valid marriage. Thus she fell an easy
prey of a man like the respondent, a lawyer who knows the intricacies of the
law and the way to extricate himself from the mess that he has brought
about.

FACTS:
Respondent Agustin courted the complainant Cabrera and thereafter
proposed marriage which was accepted by the complainant. The couple went
to Pasay City Hall to apply for a marriage license where they signed two
sheets of paper and a doctor took blood from them. After that t he respondent
told the complainant that they were already married, and the respondent took
the complainant to a hotel and successfully had carnal knowledge with her
with the assurance that they were already civilly married. The incident
happened several times. After passing the bar examination and during the
preparation of their church wedding, the respondent sent a letter that he is
withdrawing from their agreement to marry in church. Complainant knew
thereafter that they are not civilly married.
Complainant and respondent had a daughter. The respondent married
another woman after the incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the respondent in simulating a marriage

with complainant constitutes immorality.

HELD:
Yes, respondent’s act of making the comp lainant believe that they have
been married civilly to satisfy his carnal desires, knowing that complainant
lacks education and does not have any idea of what constitutes a valid
marriage constitutes immorality.
Respondent is disbarred form the practice of law and his name is
stricken out in the roll of attorney.

A.C. No. 377 April 29, 1966

CONCEPCION BOLIVAR, complainant,
vs.
ABELARDO SIMBOL Y MANUEL, respondent.

RATIO: The act of a lawyer in duping complainant based on a promise to marry

her is indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar.

FACTS:
This is a case for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Simbol based on
moral grounds. The Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
 14

Respondent promised that he would marry complainant. They lived

together as husband and wife, and bore a son named Eduardo Bolivar Simbol.
Complainant supported respondent in his law studies, giving him money to buy
his books and matriculation fees. Respondent became a lawyer, and complainant
continued to support him. All along, respondent fed complainant with assurances
that he would marry her. To ward off celebration of marriage respondent offered
varied excuses.
These avowals notwithstanding, respondent turned around and married
another. Adding insult to injury, he concealed the fact of his marriage and
continued to live with complainant for several more month s until the latter
discovered the bitter truth. Even then, respondent had the temerity to deny his
marriage and to appease complainant with the palaver that "the woman was not
his wife but the wife of his cousin".

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Simbol should be disbarred.

HELD:
The Court has inherent jurisdiction to suspend or disbar an attorney for
sufficient cause. On this point, the Solicitor General aptly observed.
Undoubtedly, respondent's actuations in making a dupe of
complainant, living on her bounty and al lowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his
studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money
from complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume
their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy, are
indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar. The fact that
complainant has withdrawn her complaint against respondent does not
wipe out the grievous offense he had committed, making complainant and
her child with him virtual outcasts of society. This, respondent should not
be allowed to do with impunity.
Respondent "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar". He is, indeed, guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

R espondent Abelardo Simbol y Manuel is suspended from the practice of

law for a period of five (5) years.

RESOLUTION

It can be said that the commission of gross immorality involving sexual impropriety
falls into two categories. The first involves sexual impropriety under burden of a legal
impediment to marry, wherein the act may constitute adultery, concubinage or bigamy, as
the case may be. The second involves sexual impropriety without legal impediment, such as
in the case of simulation of marriage or breach of promise to marry made by an attorney,
 15

wherein he takes advantage of his legal knowledge to induce the complainant to have
sexual relations with him.

In the first, the law punishes the erring attorney for harming the sanctity of
marriage and family relations. In the second, the law punishes the erring attorney for
taking advantage of his legal knowledge and authority to satisfy his carnal desire, to the
detriment of the good name of the legal profession.

It is submitted that attorneys must respect the sanctity of marriage, as protected by

law, and avoid any acts that would undermine the same. Likewise, attorneys must be
circumspect and exercise restraint in choosing who to love and desire, and in carrying out
such love and desire, to protect the public, the legal profession, and their hard-earned
license to practice law.

“Love is not a licen se for lust.”

People v. Ba utista, G.R. No. 140278, June 3, 2004