January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report dated November 30,
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1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings
had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel
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received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to
the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, and all
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parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act
6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes
of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall
be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and
contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations
of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It
will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on
pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do

so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
and publish information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent
legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the
Filipino lawyer; and
 (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of
the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the
nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association
and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as
an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and
just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated
Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues
in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial
support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the

Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member
that might result from his required payment of annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.
 A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for
which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free
speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us
to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in
the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at
this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an
official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge
by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No
less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of
the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and
politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved
the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission
in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor
of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are
non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. All
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these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced
in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions
in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed
to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of
Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since
1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent
in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74
per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No.
972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill
to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in
an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM

NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one

hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half
or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking
the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned
whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972
total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 196

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555 968 284

TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be
favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal
finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question
may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's
Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as
humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David
stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public
knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles,
but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar
background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established
here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day,
54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated,
the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to
us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of
New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
 the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office.
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been
exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find
in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court
of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution
of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors,
the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the
latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for
that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense
with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the
age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this
 extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the
bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to
Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and
principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked
or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in
the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment
providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)
 Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of
the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10
Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach
to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted
to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity
and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments
of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at
law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the
 legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express
constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications
of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course
of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel
courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an
attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely

true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43,
119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to
confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there
be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority
over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One
is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish
and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to
the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power
of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
 admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19
How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court
the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair.
The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible
to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been
so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter
of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-
651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines
 rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at
the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as
is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this
Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the
power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court,
but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place
of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service
of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to
admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up
any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a
good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty
of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary
to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and
exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to
 the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts
of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon
motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and
now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in
mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to
the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16
and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed
to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in
the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession
of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
 duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he
offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given
him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if
he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from
the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued
by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned
date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled
"An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,
in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists
in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall
comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in
said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every
diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state,
whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student
of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of
law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral
character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two
years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the
rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it
is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and
establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,

prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
 attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal
Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad
Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve
as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is
limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with,
and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation
to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began
the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in
study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899,
and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must
be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted
by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of
being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
 alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered
as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to
every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their
prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of
his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172,
76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It
is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact
in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This
Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W.
179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as

follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences,
as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
 discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate
on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent
in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has
been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then
the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by
years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations
prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an
equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar
of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained
only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in
1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by
the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years
were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done —
cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly
not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been
done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law.
Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the
cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954
and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said
candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what
the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The
grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing
laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The
system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was
abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article
is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of
the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these
810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this
Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to
render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.
 RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our
beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved,
and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force
and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.
After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.

Number of candidates 206

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12

73'S 6

72'S 6

Number of candidates who passed 85

Number of candidates who failed 121

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18

Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62

Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74

Passing grade (per cent) 72

November, 1946

Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.

Number of candidates 481

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---

 Minutes of March 31, 1947)

Number of candidates who passed 249

Number of candidates who failed 228

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43

Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20

Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80

Passing grade (per cent) 72

(By resolution of the Court).

October, 1947

Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Members.

Number of candidates 749

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per 1

cent

69 per cent 40
 68 per cent 2

Number of candidates who passed 409

Number of candidates who failed 340

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972

Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59

Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41

Passing grade (per cent) 69

(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.

August, 1948

Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis

P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.

Number of candidates 899

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64

71's 29

70's 35

Number of candidates who passed 490

Number of candidates who failed 409

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11

Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40

Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60

Passing grade (per cent) 70

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1949

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo,

Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 55

(74's)

Number of candidates who passed 686

Number of candidates who failed 532

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164

Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28

Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72

Passing grade (per cent) 74

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1950

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A.
Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.

Number of candidates 1,316

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38

 (The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and
authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).

Number of candidates who passed 432

Number of candidates who failed 894

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26

Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14

Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86

Passing grade (per cent) 75

August, 1951

Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Members.

Number of candidates 2,068

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 112

(74's)

Number of candidates who passed 1,189

Number of candidates who failed 879

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196

Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49

Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51

Passing grade (per cent) 75

August, 1952

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.

Number of candidates 2,738

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 163

(74's)

Number of candidates who passed 1,705

Number of candidates who failed 1,033

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426

Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27

 Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73

Passing grade (per cent) 75

August, 1953

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.

Number of candidates 2,555

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 100

(74's)

Number of candidates who passed 1,570

Number of candidates who failed 986

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284

Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04

Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96

Passing grade (per cent) 75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without
invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

. Av.

MRD- Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4

1.

MRD- Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45

2.

MRD- Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85

3.

1948

MRD- Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9

4.

MRD- Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95

5.

MRD- Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65

6.

1949

7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8

MRD- Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
8.

9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8

10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05

11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2

12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95

13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15

14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65

15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95

16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70

17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3

18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6

19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35

20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5

21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5

 22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85

23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55

24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9

25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8

26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4

27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95

28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4

29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65

V.

MRD- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4

30.

31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15

32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1

33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75

34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8

35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95

36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95

37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7

38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15

39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85

40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6

41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8

42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7

43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65

44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9

45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85

46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6

47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45

48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65

49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70

50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3

51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3

52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15

53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75

54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15

55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4

56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75

57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71

58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7

59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55

60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95

61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95

 62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71

63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95

64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55

65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15

1948

66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9

67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1

68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6

69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5

70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6

71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75

72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25

73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1

74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05

75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6

76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55

77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55

78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9

79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75

80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35

81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85

82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71

83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8

84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9

85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5

86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3

87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25

88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25

 89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85

90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65

91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4

92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4

93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65

94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7

95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85

96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6

97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6

1950

MRD- Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4

98.

99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2

100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9

101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3

 MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
102.

103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15

MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25

104.

105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8

1951

106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7

107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4

108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25

109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35

MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6

110.

111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05

112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1

 113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85

114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8

MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25

115.

116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2

MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25

117.

MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2

118.

119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25

MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95

120.

121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75

122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25

123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4

124. Cacacho, Emilio V.

125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65

MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
126.

127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70

128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55

129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15

130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65

MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1

131.

MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85

132.

133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95

134. Cabangbang, Santiago 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2

B.

135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65

136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05

137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85

MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
138.

139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6

MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25

140.

141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75

142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35

143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1

144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9

145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55

146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5

147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6

MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35

148.

149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9

150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7

MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
151.

152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5

153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05

154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95

155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55

156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55

157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75

158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75

159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35

160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15

MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75

161.

MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3

162.

163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65

 164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05

MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15

165.

166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1

MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95

167.

MRD- Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75

168.

169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05

170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2

MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1

171.

172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5

MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75

173.

174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5

MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95

175.
 176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95

177. Ramos-Balmori, 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2

Manuela

178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3

MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70

179.

MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35

180.

181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9

MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15

182.

183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65

184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2

185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35

186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85

187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73

188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5

 189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73

190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7

191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1

192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3

193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35

194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7

195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75

MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V.
196.

197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6

198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05

199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1

200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2

201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25

202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45

1952

203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7

MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95

204.

MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7

205.

MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7

206.

MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9

207.

208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2

209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9

MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65

210.

211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85

212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8

MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
213.

214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55

215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4

216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65

217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.

MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75

218.

219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7

Felicidad

MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4

220.

MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3

221.

MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75

222.

223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7

224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7

 225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8

MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2

226.

MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95

227.

228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85

229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3

MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73

230.

231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65

232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5

MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95

233.

MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7

234.

235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2

236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25

237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75

 238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65

MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85

239.

MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15

240.

MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95

241.

MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85

242. O.

MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85

243.

MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45

244.

MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75

245.

MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05

246.

247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75

248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15

 249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9

MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2

250.

MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5

251.

MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3

252.

253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85

254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6

MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85

255.

256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7

MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8

257.

258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8

259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95

 260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71

261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65

262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2

MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15

263.

MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9

264.

MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65

265.

MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25

266.

267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8

268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65

MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15

269.

270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2

271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35

272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75

 273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6

274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1

275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65

MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85

276. B.

277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1

278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45

MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7

279.

MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95

280.

MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4

281.

282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45

283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35

284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8

MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
285.

MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5

286.

287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25

MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65

288.

289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65

MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25

290.

291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8

MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65

292.

MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9

293.

MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35

294.
MRP- Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
295.

296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05

MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9

297.

298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65

299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95

300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72

301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4

MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2

302.

MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65

303.

304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1

305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7

MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05

306.

MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9

 307.

308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5

309. Evangelista, Felicidad 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15

P.

310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85

311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75

312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2

MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25

313.

MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73

314.

MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05

315.

MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35

316.

MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55

317.

318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9

MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
319.

320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75

321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95

322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15

323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05

324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85

MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85

325.

326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4

327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15

328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55

329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95

330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25

MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8

331.
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
332.

333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5

334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9

335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85

MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35

336.

MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05

337.

MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3

338.

339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75

340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6

MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9

341.

342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75

343. Guzman, Salvador T. 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75

de
 344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65

345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9

346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6

1952

347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7

348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55

349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72

MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8

350.

MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8

351.

MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85

352.

353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75

MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05

354.

355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4

MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
356.

357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5

358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55

359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73

360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4

361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73

362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2

363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4

MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95

364.

MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5

365.

366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05

367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85

MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3

368.
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
369.

370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3

371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1

372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9

373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75

MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9

374.

MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95

375.

MRP- Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2

376.

MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3

377.

378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35

MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9

379.

MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8

380.
 381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95

MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1

382. D.

MRP- Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15

383.

384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9

385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73

MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15

386. L.

387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75

388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15

MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15

389.

MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05

390.

391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9

MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15

392.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
393.

394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35

MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65

395.

396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7

397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9

398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85

MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8

399.

MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45

400.

401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45

402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1

MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95

403.

404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95

MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6

 405.

406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65

407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3

408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95

E.

MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25

409.

MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45

410.

MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65

411.

412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85

MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55

413.

414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65

MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9

415.

MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2

416.
 417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4

418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25

419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2

MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15

420.

421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55

422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15

MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8

423.

424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05

425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9

MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55

426.

MRP- Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85

427.

428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55

429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65

MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
430.

MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25

431.

MRP- Ramos-Balmori, 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45

432. Manuela

MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4

433.

MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9

434.

435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35

436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85

437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7

438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9

439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35

MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65

440.

441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7

 442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2

MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6

443. A.

MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7

444.

445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25

Arellano

446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9

447. Rosario, Adelaida R. 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15

del

448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1

MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95

449.

450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6

451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1

452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6

MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95

453. M.
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
454.

455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8

456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25

MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7

457.

MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75

458.

MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8

459.

MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3

460.

461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1

MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5

462.

463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35

464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7

465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9

MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
466.

467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85

MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95

468.

MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72

469.

470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65

471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15

MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45

472.

MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4

473.

474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3

MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55

475.

MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8

476.
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
477.

478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8

MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6

479.

480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7

481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71

MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55

482.

483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7

484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85

485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8

MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85

486.

487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05

MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65

488.

489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05

MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
490.

MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2

491.

MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95

492.

493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75

MRP- Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15

494.

495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65

496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85

MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1

497.

MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65

498.

499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95

500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3

 501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in
previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.

1. Amao, Sulpicio M.

1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5

1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4

2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.

1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9

1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75

1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7

3. Blanco, Jose B.

MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95

4. Condeno, Mateo

1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3

1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85

5. Ducusin, Agapito B.

MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65

1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1

6. Garcia, Manuel N.

MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25

1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3

7. Luna, Lucito A.

1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55

1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
 8. Maraña, Arsenio s.

1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35

1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9

9. Montano, Manuel M.

1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8

1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4

1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65

10. Peña, Jesus S.

1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2

1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4

1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4

11. Placido, Sr., Isidro

1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8

12. Rementizo, Filemon S.

1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65

1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05

1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7

13. Amao, Sulpicio M.

1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35

1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9

14. Rodulfa, Juan T.

1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75

1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1

15. Sanchez, Juan J.

1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68

1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8

16. Santos, Constantino

1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65

1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4

17. Santos, Salvador H.

1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85

1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1

1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70

18. Sevilla, Macario C.

MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1

MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68

1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
 MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3

1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented
motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A
list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those
who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc Int. Pol Crim. Rem. Leg Gen.

. . . Av.

1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8

3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4

4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7

5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4

6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25

7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95

8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
 9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7

10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95

11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35

12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05

13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73

14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35

15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95

16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2

17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1

18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6

19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8

20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9

21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65

22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71

23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6

24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1

25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7

26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35

27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9

28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45

29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85

30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75

31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1

32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75

33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35

34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95

35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75

36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73

37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7

38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66

39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4

40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05

41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85

42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55

43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7

44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75

45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6

46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2

47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1

48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65

49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6

50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5

51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85

52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1

53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55

54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9

55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15

56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc Int. Pol Crim. Rem. Leg Gen.

. . . Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8

3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9

4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35

5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2

6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05

 7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
Concepcion

8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4

9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8

10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35

11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3

12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25

13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71

14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6

15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05

16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3

17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75

18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45

19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65

 20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6

21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6

22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2

23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9

24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9

25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4

26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70

27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2

29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in
the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74
per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those
who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the
Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession.
The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16
immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in
which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into
account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be
required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled

to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any
other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with
a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that
if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort
of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one
or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last
required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no
grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to
be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.

xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In
other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination
since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-
admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general
average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more
but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion,
when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be
its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in
any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that
required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered
and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The
present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs
counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect
says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because
 he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be
admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another
important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group
of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950
bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to
grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by
2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No.
371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO
AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
 and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court
has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it
is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination,
73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be
restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below
50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last
world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted,
considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the
established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable
difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such
precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court,
without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates
who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still
enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a
class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
 dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.
(Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which
must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a
class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only
a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does
not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils
with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide
margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77
L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972
(many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine
admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from
the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate
amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the
discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of
applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to
determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a
general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion
judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades
lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the
Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should
those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower
passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per
cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration,
19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a
general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of
1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all
candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15,
1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the
Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and
this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set
by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946.
This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar
to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the
provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the
study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the
publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division
among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second
bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it
within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72
per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the
1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any
subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent
examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act
No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate
petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon
the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the
resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members
of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar
examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice
of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution
which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
 Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court
and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations
held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the
Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first
place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable
cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which
the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the
Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the
word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases,
do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the
second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process
and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment,
does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due
process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to
correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be
that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No.
972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the
legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly
suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the
facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by
the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances
of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has
not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the
other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates
who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been
admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under
previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were
from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing
the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed,
when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of
69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or
more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14
of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948,
said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing
the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This
Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has
consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public
was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we
are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of
office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public
interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be
more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression
of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not
do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only
hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in
its entirety.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine
admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from
the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate
amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the
discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of
applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to
determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a
general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion
judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades
lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the
Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should
those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower
passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per
cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration,
19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a
general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of
1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all
candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15,
1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the
Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and
this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set
by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946.
This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar
to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the
provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the
study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the
publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division
among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second
bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it
within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72
per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the
1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any
subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent
examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act
No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate
petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon
the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the
resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members
of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar
examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice
of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution
which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court
and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations
held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the
Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first
place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable
cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which
the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the
Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the
word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases,
do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the
second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process
and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment,
does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due
process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to
correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be
that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No.
972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the
legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly
suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the
facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by
the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances
of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has
not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the
other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates
who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been
admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under
previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were
from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing
the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed,
when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of
69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or
more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14
of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948,
said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing
the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This
Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has
consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public
was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we
are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of
office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public
interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be
more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression
of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not
do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only
hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in
its entirety.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
 MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado

de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain
a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
 After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator
of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
 preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position
of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office.
My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he
had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. To "practice" law, or any profession for
1

that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,

repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
 preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8
citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my
view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice
on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be
deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged
in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied
the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman
and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in
the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official
leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of
persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-
finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice
law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and

affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt —

Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines
 c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who
has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life.
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but
also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of
any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract
or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must
be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or
counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where
he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered:
"I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-
estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

 ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear
and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons
are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but
the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in
facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of
an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.;
as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do
not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was
our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such
high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that
office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position
of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office.
My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he
had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. To "practice" law, or any profession for
1

that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,

repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
 available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8
citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my
view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice
on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be
deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged
in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied
the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman
and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in
the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official
leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of
persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-
finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice
law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and

affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt —

Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines
 c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who
has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life.
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but
also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of
any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract
or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must
be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or
counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where
he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered:
"I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-
estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

 ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear
and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons
are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but
the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in
facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of
an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.;
as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do
not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was
our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such
high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that
office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13
May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and "the matter of signing in
the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten." 9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of
law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this
Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took
him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to
come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere
to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While 1âwphi1

the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this
privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of
the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his
acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. 25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to
the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed
to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of
law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice
of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.,
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave) (On official leave)

ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 176278 June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors by
legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’ role in the appointment
of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’ confirmation of nominees. 1 However, for lack
of a case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness, 2 we dismiss
the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question
raised, novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United
Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign
Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in
March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section
23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute
rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks
discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question
petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents)
argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question
respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial
interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal
disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition,
contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender
for the office in question.
On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated retirement
age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as
respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit.
We have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of
"transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution. 5 Three factors are relevant in our
determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues
raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters.
Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement
of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a
"clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of
personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to
leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial
and personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law. 1avvphi1

The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’
contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are
claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide
received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the
funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total expenditures contained in the
annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office
under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to
draw salary,8 negating petitioner’s claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds." 9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." 10 Certainly,
preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the
proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice