Necessito v.

Paras

G.R. No. L-10605, 30 June 1958, 104 Phil 75

FACTS:

In 1954, Severina Garces and her one- year old son, Precillano Necesito boarded Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
(PRBL) in Pangasinan.

After passing a wooden bridge, the front wheels of the truck suddenly swerved to the right such that the driver
lost control, and after wrecking the bridge’s wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water
was breast deep.

The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was injured, suffering abrasions and
fracture of the left femur. Consequently, their money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were lost.

Later, two actions for damages and attorney’s fees totalling over P85,000 having been filed in the CFI of Tarlac
against the carrier. However, the latter pleaded that the accident was due to “engine or mechanical trouble”
independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the driver Bandonell. It was found out that the accident
was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle.

After trial, the court, holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous event, dismissed the action.

Plaintiffs appealed directly to the SC in view of the amount in controversy. Thus, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle.

RULING:

Yes.

The court ruled that the proximate cause of the accident was the reduced strength of the steering knuckle of the
vehicle caused by defects in casting it.

Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.

It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers’ safety. His liability rests upon negligence, his failure
to exercise the “utmost” degree of diligence that the law requires, and by Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of
a passenger’s death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the
duty of prudence required.

In American jurisprudence, where the carrier is held to the same degree of diligence as under the new Civil Code,
the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of equipment is thus expressed: “The preponderance of authority is
in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from
a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been
discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent
upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests.

For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier,
as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of the
manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability”

The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier
in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having, no privity whatever with
the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier
usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his passengers, should
nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable.

If the carrier has contracted with someone else the passenger does not usually know who that person is, and in no
case has he any share in the selection. The liability of the manufacturer must depend on the terms of the contract
between him and the carrier, of which the passenger has no knowledge, and over which he can have no control,
while the carrier can introduce what stipulations and take what securities he may think proper.

For injury resulting to the carrier himself by the manufacturer’s want of care, the carrier has a remedy against the
manufacturer; but the passenger has no remedy against the manufacturer for damage arising from a mere breach
of contract with the carrier.

The carrier, in consideration of certain well-known and highly valuable rights granted to it by the public,
undertakes certain duties toward the public, among them being to provide itself with suitable and safe cars and
vehicles in which to carry the traveling public. There is no such duty on the manufacturer of the cars. There is no
reciprocal legal relation between him and the public in this respect.

The manufacturer should be deemed the agent of the carrier as respects its duty to select the material out of which
its cars and locomotive are built, as well as in inspecting each step of their construction.

In this case, however, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering knuckle in question was
a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either the
manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to
standard, or that it had no hidden flaws that would impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware
of the critical importance of the knuckle’s resistance; that its failure or breakage would result in loss of balance
and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon the passengers.

No argument is required to establish that a visual inspection could not directly determine whether the resistance
of this critically important part was not impaired. Nor has it been shown that the weakening of the knuckle was
impossible to detect by any known test; on the contrary, there is testimony that it could be detected.

The court is thus satisfied that the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier’s
agents did not measure up to the required legal standard of “utmost diligence of very cautious persons” — “as far
as human care and foresight can provide”, and therefore that the knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a
fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.
G.R. No. L-30056
MARCELO AGCAOILI, Plaintiff-appellee,
VS.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Defendant-appellant

Article 1191. Power to Rescind Contracts

August 30, 1988

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The appellant Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) approved the application of appellee
Agcaoili for the purchase of house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka Marikina, Rizal, with the
condition that Agcaoili should occupy the said house and lot within three days from receipt of notice otherwise
the application shall be automatically disapproved and will be awarded to another applicant. Agcaoili tried to
fulfil the condition but could not because the house was uninhabitable. The fixtures, ceilings, and even utilities
were inexistent. The appellee refused to pay the remaining instalments and fees until GSIS made the house
inhabitable but to no avail. GSIS opted to cancel the award and demand Agcaoili to vacate the premises. Agcaoili
sued GSIS in the Court of First Instance of Manila for specific performance with damages and obtained a
favourable judgement. Hence this petition for appeal by GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether or not Agcaoili is entitled to specific performance with damages

CONCLUSION:
Yes, Agcaoili is entitled to specific performance with damages. There was a perfected contract of sale
upon the purchase of the plaintiff. It was then the duty of GSIS as seller to deliver the thing sold in a condition
suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer. The house contemplated was one that could be occupied for purpose of
residence in reasonable comfort and convenience. The records show that the plaintiff tried to fulfil the condition
but found the house uninhabitable and could not stay any longer.
In reciprocal obligations, a party incurs delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a
proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. The defendant did not fulfill its obligation to deliver the house
in a habitable state, therefore, it cannot invoke the plaintiff’s suspension of payment as a cause to cancel the
contract between them.
AGCAOILI VS. GSIS
No. L-30056, August 30, 1988
FACTS:

The appellant Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) approved the application of the appellee
Marcelo Agcaoili for the purchase of the house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal,
but said application was subject to the condition that the latter should forthwith occupy the house. Agcaoili lost
no time in occupying the house but he could not stay in it and had to leave the very next day because the house
was nothing more than a shell, in such a state that civilized occupation was not possible: ceiling, stairs, double
walling, lighting facilities, water connection, bathroom, toilet kitchen, drainage, were inexistent. Agcaoili did
however asked a homeless friend, a certain Villanueva, to stay in the premises as some sort of watchman, pending
the completion of the construction of the house. He thereafter complained to the GSIS but to no avail.
Subsequently, the GSIS asked Agcaoili to pay the monthly amortizations of P35.56 and other fees. He paid the
first monthly amortizations and incidental fees, but refused to make further payments until and unless the GSIS
completed the housing unit. Thereafter, GSIS cancelled the award and required Agcaoili to vacate the premise.
The house and lot was consequently awarded to another applicant. Agcaoili reacted by instituting suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for specific performance and damages. The judgment was rendered in favor of
Agcaoili. GSIS then appealed from that judgment.
ISSUE:

Was the cancellation by GSIS of the award in favor of petitioner Agcaoili just and proper?
RULING:

No. It was the duty of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment
by the buyer for the purpose contemplated. There would be no sense to require the awardee to immediately occupy
and live in a shell of a house, structure consisting only of four walls with openings, and a roof. GSIS had an
obligation to deliver to Agcaoili a reasonably habitable dwelling in return for his undertaking to pay the stipulated
price. Since GSIS did not fulfill that obligation, and was not willing to put the house in habitable state, it cannot
invoke Agcaoili’s suspension of payment of amortizations as cause to cancel the contract between them. It is
axiomatic that “In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him.”
Agcaoili v. GSIS
G.R. No. L-30056 August 30, 1988
[Narvasa, J.:]
Facts: Petitioner was awarded the house by GSIS on the condition that he should reside on it immediately. As
the house is uninhabitable, petitioner vacated the area after 1 day and refused to pay further installments until
respondent make it habitable. Respondent cancelled the award.
Issue: W/n the petitioner incurred delay in fulfilling his obligations
HELD: In reciprocal obligations, a party incurs delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a
proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Respondent did not fulfill its obligation to deliver the house in
a habitable state, therefore, it cannot invoke the petitioner’s suspension of payment as a cause to cancel the
contract between them. There was a perfected contract of sale, it was then the duty of GSIS as seller to deliver
the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer and for the purpose contemplated. The house
contemplated was one that could be occupied for purpose of residence in reasonable comfort and convenience.
Lao Lim vs. CA
G.R. No. 87047, October 31, 1990

FACTS:
Private respondent entered into a contract of lease with petitioner for a period of three (3) years, that is,
from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired, private respondent refused to vacate the premises, hence,
petitioner filed an ejectment suit against the former in the City Court of Manila. The case was terminated by a
judicially compromise agreement. On 1985 Dy, informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to 1988, Lim
did not agree to the renewal. Another ejectment suit was filed by Lim against Dy due to the failure to vacate the
premises.
The RTC dismissed the case then later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons:
(1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as
long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition, and therefore beyond the ambit of art
1308 of the NCC; and
(2) the compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as
long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?

RULING:
No, the stipulation in the compromise agreement is not valid. The statement “for as long as the defendant
needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases” is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the
effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee.
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010

Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused for violation
of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.

The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan
used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003.
The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule
5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time
before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture
on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground
for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
Angeles v. Calasanz
G.R. No. L-42283, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 323

FACTS:
Ursula and Tomas Calasanz sold a piece of land to Buenaventura Angeles and Teofila Juani covered by a
contract to sell. Angeles paid a down payment upon the execution of the contract and started paying the balance
in monthly installments for nine years with only a few remaining installments left to pay. Although Calasanz
accepted late payments before, Angeles was now five months late. Calasanz demanded payment of past due
accounts, but did not receive any. Eventually, Calansanz canceled the said contract and Angeles asked for
reconsideration, but was denied.
A provision in the contract to sell gave Calasanz the right to cancel the contract and consider the amounts
paid as rent for the property. However, the lower court ruled that the contract was not validly canceled and ordered
Calasanz to execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Angeles.

ISSUE:
Was the contract to sell validly canceled?

RULING:
No. The act of a party in treating a contract as canceled or resolved on account of infractions by the other
must be made known to the other and is always provisional, being ever subject to scrutiny and review by the
proper court. If the other party denies that rescission is justified, it is free to bring the matter to court. Then, should
the court decide that the resolution of the contract was not warranted, the responsible party will be sentenced to
damages; in the contrary case, the resolution will be affirmed and indemnity awarded to the party prejudiced.

The right to rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations is not absolute. The general
rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial
and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. The question of
whether a breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances.

The breach of the contract alleged by Calasanz is so slight considering that Angeles had already paid
monthly installments for almost nine years. In only a short time, the entire obligation would have been paid.

To mitigate the unilateral act of Calasanz in cancelling the contract, Article 1234 of the Civil Code
provides that: If the obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor may recover as though
there had been a strict and complete fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.
Ayson-Simon v. Adamos
G.R. No. L-39378, August 28, 1984, 131 SCRA 439

FACTS:
On December 13, 1943, Nicolas Adamos and Vicente Feria, defendants-appellants herein, purchased two
lots forming part of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City. The successors-in-interest of the latter filed Civil Case No.
174 in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City for annulment of the sale and the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title, which had been issued to defendants-appellants by virtue of the disputed sale. On December
18, 1963, the Court rendered a Decision annulling the sale, cancelling TCT 69475, and authorizing the issuance
of a new title in favor of Porciuncula’s successors-in-interest. The said judgment was affirmed by the Appellate
Court and had attained finality.
In the meantime during the pendency of the above mentioned case, defendants-appellants sold to Generosa
Ayson Simon the lots in question. Due to the failure of defendants appellants to comply with their commitment
to have the subdivision plan of the lots approved and to deliver to deliver the titles and possession to Generosa,
the latter filed suit for specific performance. As a result of the sale of the lot to said defendants appellants being
null and void, there is impossibity that they can comply with their commitment to Generosa, the latter then seek
the rescission of the contract plus damages.
The defendants-appellants contend that Generosa’s action had prescribed, considering that she had only
four years from May 29, 1946 to rescind the transaction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action to rescind the obligation has prescribed.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that according to Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that an injured party
may also seek rescission if the fulfillment should have become impossible. The cause of action to claim rescission
arises when the fulfillment of the obligation became impossible when the court declared that the sale was null
and void. The Generosa cannot be assailed on the ground that she slept on her rights.
Borromeo v. CA
G.R. No. 133643, 6 June 2002
FACTS:

Villamor was the distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller and the plaintiff Borromeo being
Villamor’s friend and former classmate borrow a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his property as a
security because of his obligation to Mr. Miller. Miller then filed a civil action against Villamor and attached his
properties including the mortgaged property to the plaintiff. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant to settle his
obligation, but the defendant however offered to execute a document promising the plaintiff to pay his debt even
after the lapse of 10 years. Defendant then signed a promissory note to pay his debt and with 12% interest per
annum. Despite repeated demands from plaintiff, defendant still failed to settle his debt.
Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution of the
document as there was no property registered in defendant’s name, who furthermore assured him that he could
collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war, plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants
failed to settle his account, — hence the present complaint for collection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in their interpretation.

RULING:
It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the literal sense of the
words employed is to be followed, such is not the case where they “appear to be contrary to the evident intention
of the contracting parties,” which “intention shall prevail. However, the above decision, had occasion to reiterate,
under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based
upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering
therefrom, except in cases where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention of the parties,
is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it
would also occasion.’ The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely
because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies,
although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or necessary
implication declares the entire contract void.
Makati Dev’t Corp. v. Empire Insurance Co.

G.R. No. L-21780, 30 June 1967

FACTS:

On March 31, 1959, the Makati Development Corporation sold to Rodolfo P. Andal a lot. A so-called “special
condition” contained in the deed of sale provides that “the VENDEE/S shall commence the construction and
complete at least 50% of his/her/their/its residence on the property within two (2) years to the satisfaction of the
VENDOR and, in the event of his/her/their/its failure to do so will be forfeited in favor of the VENDOR by the
mere fact of failure of the VENDEE/S to comply with this special condition.” To ensure faithful compliance with
this “condition,” Andal gave a surety bond the sum of P12,000 in case Andal failed to comply with his obligation
under the deed of sale.

Andal did not build his house; instead, he sold the lot to Juan Carlos. As neither Andal nor Juan Carlos built a
house on the lot within the stipulated period, the Makati Development Corporation, sent a notice of claim to the
Empire Insurance Co. advising it of Andal’s failure to comply with his undertaking. Demand for the payment was
refused, whereupon the Makati Development Corporation filed a complaint against the Empire Insurance Co. to
recover on the bond in the full amount, plus attorney’s fees. In due time, the Empire Insurance Co. filed its answer
with a third-party complaint against Andal.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Andal is entitled to pay the surety bond of Php12,000 as a penal sanction.

RULING:
No. The so-called “special condition” in the deed of sale is, in reality, an obligation1 — to build a house at least
50 percent of which must be finished within two years. It was to secure the performance of this obligation that a
penal clause was inserted. Here the trial court found that Juan Carlos had finished more than 50 percent of his
house or barely a month after the expiration of the stipulated period. There was, therefore, a partial performance
of the obligation within the meaning and intendment of article 1229. The penal clause, in this case, was inserted
not to indemnify the Makati Development Corporation for any damage it might suffer as a result of a breach of
the contract but rather compel performance of the so-called “special condition” and thus encourage home building
among lot owners in the Urdaneta Village.

Considering that a house had been built shortly after the period stipulated, the substantial, if tardy, performance
of the obligation, having in view the purpose of the penal clause, fully justified the trial court in reducing the
penalty.

The stipulation, in this case, to commence the construction and complete at least 50 percent of the vendee’s house
within two years cannot be construed as imposing a strictly personal obligation on Andal. To adopt such a
construction would be to limit Andal’s right to dispose of the lot. There is nothing in the deed of sale restricting
Andal’s right to sell the lot at least within the two-year period and we think it plain that a reading of such a
limitation on one of the rights of ownership must rest on more explicit language in the contract. It cannot be left
to mere inference.
Culaba v CA
G.R. No. 125862 April 15, 2004
Art. 1240 – Payment shall be made to person in whose favor obligation has been constituted.

Facts:
· The spouses Francisco and Demetria Culaba were the owners and proprietors of the Culaba Store and
were engaged in the sale and distribution of San Miguel Corporation’s (SMC) beer products.
· SMC sold beer products on credit to the Culaba.
· The Culaba spouses made a partial payment.
· They failed to pay despite repeated demands. Hence, SMC filed an action for collection of a sum of
money against them.
· In their defense, Culaba claimed that they had already paid the SMC in full on four separate occasions to
an SMC supervisor who issued genuine SMC liquidation receipts.
· But SMC countered that the issued LR were part of the lost booklet receipts as evidenced by publisher’s
affidavit that SMC duly warned the public about it through the Notice of Loss.

Issue:
WoN the payments that the petitioners claimed they made were the payments that discharged their obligation to
the respondent.

Held:
No, the Court holds that the payments claimed by the Culaba are not the payments that extinguishes an
obligation pursuant to Article 1240 of the Civil Code.
Under the said law, payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor-in-interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
In this case, the payments were purportedly made to a "supervisor" of the private respondent, who was clad in an
SMC uniform and drove an SMC van. He appeared to be authorized to accept payments. Unfortunately, Culaba
did not ascertain the identity and authority of the said supervisor, nor did he ask to be shown any identification to
prove that the latter was, indeed, an SMC supervisor. The petitioners relied solely on the man’s representation
that he was collecting payments for SMC. Thus, the payments the petitioners claimed they made were not the
payments that discharged their obligation to the private respondent.
Hence, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Antonio Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, Lasal Development Corp.
G.R. No. 80201, November 20, 1990
PONENTE: Cruz, J.

FACTS:
Western Minolco Corporation (WMC) obtained from Philippine Investments Systems Organization
(PISO) two loans of P2,500,000 and P1,000,000 for which it issued promissory notes. Antonio Garcia and Ernest
Kahn executed a surety agreement for the P2.5 million loan. WMC failed to pay after repeated demands. A
memorandum of agreement was entered into by WMC and its creditors in which promissory notes were to be
issued by NDC, fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the Philippine government, in payment of WMC’s
obligation. Also, the parties to the original loans agreed to an extension of the original period of payment and the
compounding of the interest on the principal loans.

Lasal Development Corporation, PISO’s assignee of the credit, sued Garcia. He claims that the issuance
of the new promissory notes which extended the period of payment and provided for the compounding of the
interest operated as a novation of the contract, therefore releasing him from his obligation as surety.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a novation of the contract.

HELD:
No. An obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated in a new instrument by changing the term of
payment and adding other obligations not incompatible with the old one. It is not proper to consider an obligation
novated as in the case at bar by the mere granting of extension of payment which did not even alter its essence.
To sustain novation necessitates that the same be so declared in unequivocal terms or that there is complete and
substantial incompatibility between the two obligations.
Conception v. Sta. Ana
GR No. L-2277, December 29, 1950

FACTS:

Perpetua Conception sold her three parcels of land to Paciencia during her lifetime. When Perpetua died, Monico,
the only surviving legitimate brother of the former filed an Action to Annul the Sale. According to the complaint,
the deceased, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff sold and conveyed them to
the latter, for false and fictitious consideration. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
Monico added that as an heir of Perpetua, he can bring the action to annul the contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Perpetua has transmitted to the plaintiff any right in order that he can bring an action herein.

RULING:

None. As the deceased had no forced heir, she was free to dispose of all her properties as absolute owner thereof,
without further limitation than those established by law, and the right to dispose of a thing involves the right to
give or to convey it to another without any consideration. The only limitation established by law on her right to
convey said properties to the defendant without any consideration is, that she could not dispose of or transfer her
property to another in fraud of her creditors.

Also, the court ruled, using the words of Maneas, that forced heir has the right to institute an action for rescission.
The reason is that the right to the legitime is similar to a creditor of a creditor. Plaintiff, being the brother of
the deceased is not among those enumerated in the Civil Code as forced heir of the decedent.

The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.