Report of the Attorney General onthe February 2 and 3, 1980 Riot at the Penitentiary of New Mexico PART II The Last Ten Years Conditions Leading to the Riot Conclusions and Recommendations Report Mandated By Section 9, Chapter 24, Laws of 1980 and Report of the Citizens Advisory Panel STATE OF NEW MEXICO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF BINGAMAN ATTORNEY GENERAL©1980, Offic ofthe Attorney General ofthe Stare, of New MexicoSTATE OF NEW MEXICO : Office of the Attorney General DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE P.O. Drawer 1508 someuy Sante Fe 3 AL evs01 September 25, 1980 TO: Governor Bruce King and Members of the New Mexico Legislature Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General Part Il —- Report of the Attorney General on the February 2-8, 1980, Riot at the Penitentiary of New Mexico Part I of our Report details prectices and policies at the New Mexico State Penitentiary over the past 10 years. In studying the past 10 years in detail, my staf’ discovered that there were certain factors whieh changed during this period and which made the riot more. likely to occur wher it did. The Legislature gave my office $100,000 to do this investigation, Part I and Part I. At the beginning of ‘the investigation, Governor Bruce ing and 1 decided that the public interest would best be served if a Citizens' Advisory Panel were appointed to oversee the process of our investigation as well as to. monitor the planning and rebuilding of Nev: Mexico's Corrections system. The Penel reviewed transcripts, the Process of our investigation, and Part I of our report. They have met Ul times. The Panel has heard from experts, officials, staff, inmates and citizens. They have toured many of the State's Correctional facilities, including several trips to the penitentiary. The nine members sre: R.B. Powell, Honorable Sem Montoya, Vera Cushman, Gordon Greaves, Betty Perkins, Archbishop Robert Sanchez, Roberto Samora, Adele King and Rev. Claude McDonald. Attached to this Report is their independent report and recommend- ations. The State owes a great debt to the members of the Citizens! Panel for the personal commitment each of them has made and for the contribution their report will make to the future of the New Mexico Corrections system. The procedures used for Pert Il of our Report are detailed in Appendix + Interviews with inmates were conducted anonymously, and are therefore available to the public on microfilm at the New Mexico State Archives. Appendix A also details the steps we have taken to insure the objectivity of the Report.Report of the Attorney General September 25, 1980 Page -2- ‘The following members of my staff deserve credit for the research and preparation of this Report: Manuel Aragon, David Brentlinger, Mark Colvin, Tess Monahan Fiddes, Reese Fullerton, Tim Orwig, Ken Richards, Carol Wantuchowiez and Jim Wilson. Special note is given to Mark Colvin for many of the insights into inmate behavior; Ben Crouch for his assistance in questionnaire development and for his insights when reviewing crafts of the Report and to Patrick Von Bargen for help in organizing and writing, and to Jerrie Herrera, a member of the Attorney General's Support Staff, for help in preparing the documents. We deliver Part I of our Report with the hope that by analyzing the past we have described the conditions that led up to the riot and have provided the Stete with a few lessons for the future. The Legislature mandated the Attorney General's Office to determine the causes of the riot and make recommendations. My office hes completed its investigation with this report. A final message which our investigation has made clear to me, my staff and the Citizens’ Panel: Prisons simply do not deal with the besic problems of crime in our society. Prison is a dehumanizing experience, and most persons come out the worse for being in. Nearly all criminals, even under the strictest sentencing practices will return to society. Even a well managed bureaucracy, necessary to run prisons, cannct change these basic truths that have become clear from the more than 300 interviews my staff has conducted. If New Mexico's heritage of rich and deep familial and community roots is to be realized, communities must play a part in housing, Ss resocializing and accepting persons who have violated the community's laws. If New Mexico does not dramatically change its philosophy and practices ebout how to deal with criminals, there will be more tragedies and the need for more reports by Grand Juries, by Citizens’ Panels, and by the Attorney Generel. Ultimately, there will be more bureaucracy, more waste of taxpayers’ money for architects and buildings, more crime and more human waste. jhTABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PROLOGUE: A HISTORY OF NEGLECT. . 1 INTRODUCTION. sees 4 CONSTANT FACTORS..........0644 8 INMATE LIVING CONDITIONS. “ tees 8 Food, Recreation, Visitation, and ServiceS...se..seeeeeeseeee 8 Overerowding... 8 SECURITY FAILURES... . 8 Understaffing.. 8 ‘Training... sees 9 Supervision of Security. seen 10 CHANGING FACTORS - THE LAST TEN YEARS.......... 12 MANAGING THE PRISON, 1970-75. 12 Management Policy . 2 Staff-Inmate Relations...... 2 Staff Disaffection and Inconsistencies. 13 MAINTAINING ORDER, 1970-75 “4 Programs ce teeeeeees 4 Informal Controls. 7 Punishment and Segregation. seseee 18 Summary of Maintaining Control in Early 1970s. sees 18 MANAGING THE PRISON, 1976-80... 20 Management Policy... . 20 Staff-Inmate Relations. sees 20 Staff Disaffection and Inconsistencies... aa‘Top Management Upheaval... MAINTAINING CONTROL, 1975-80. Information Gathering. Enmity Among Curtailment of Drugs.. Closing of Programs. Removal of Inmate Leaders Inmates. Punishment and Segregation....-.+sssseeeeeeeeeeee Lull in Disorder (1978-1979)... Growing Inmate Violence CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS....... 1. Establish an incentive-based inmate corrections policy and fund it... 2, Hire and hold accountable stable, professional management to implement that policy... EPILOGUE. ‘The Penitentiary Building... Security. Programs and Services...ss.+++ Inmates....+ Classi Inmate Disturbances.....+++ Guards... Administrative Turnover .< Corrections Department...... ‘Training....-- jeation. ss... 23 23 23 24 25, 26 268 27 28 28 33 33 35 39 40 40 40 41 al 42 42 42 43 43Other Activities. ae “4 Summary. 46 APPENDICES A. METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURES FOLLOWED IN THE INVESTIGATION A-1. 1, Inmate and Guard Questionnaires EXCERPTS FROM GRAND JURY REPORTS, 1971-1980. WARDENS AND GOVERNORS SINCE STATEHOOD. DEPARTMENT SECRETARIES, PENITENTIARY WARDENS AND DEPUTY WARDENS (1959-1980). POPULATION, AVERAGE AGE AND OFFENSES. EXAMPLES OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY RESIDENTS OF DORMITORY E-2. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS. CHART OF PROGRAMS 1970-1980.PROLOGUE: A HISTORY OF NEGLECT Throughout its history, the Penitentiary of New Mexico has suffered from neglect. The New Mexico prison has always waited at the end of the line for public money, and elected officials —— have turned their attention to the ugly problems of the penitentiary — only when the institution has erupted in violence and destruction. Lack of space, inadequate programs, and understaffing have all been part of the prison's tradition. (See Appendix B - Grand Jury Excerpts 1971-1980.) The first attempt, to build a penitentiary in the New Mexico Territory. was in 1854, when construction began on a stone building near the site of the federal courthouse in Santa Fe. The project was stopped in the spring of 1857 due to funding problems and strong opposition from residents in the area. Remnants of the building were later removed and the materials used in other publie buildings, ineluding the federal courthouse. In April 1884; the Territory contracted to construct "a centre building ‘and one cellhouse wing" in Santa Fe to confine convicted criminals. The Territorial Legislature appropriated $150,000 for the project, which was completed August 17, 1885. The new prison featured 104 cells, some of which were designed to house more than one inmate. From the beginning, the primary inmate activity at the Penitentiary of New Mexico was hard labor. A brick manufacturing Plant was built adjacent to the prison in 1893, and operated until the old institution was closed down in 1956. Although law makers and prison officials instituted the penitentiary work program primarily to make the penal system self-sufficient, some beneficial side effects of conviet labor soon became evident. "Hard labor is a positive kindness of the court," Warden H.C. Burnett said in 1888. "Inmates brood over their lot at all times, but never so much as when confined to their cells for lack of employment." Based on official disciplinary reports to the Territorial Legislature, isolation from the routine of work detail was used as punishment within the institution. Three years after the prison opened, it had an average daily Population of 124 inmates. The Penitentiary Annual Report of 1888 warned, ."The increase in life and long-term men threatens to severely test at any time the facilities for holding them." By 1897, the convict population had swollen to the point that large numbers of inmates had to be lodged in yard buildings. The same year, the Legislature appropriated $10,000 for construction of a second cellhouse wing, but work progressed slowly because convict laborers and prison-made bricks were being used to construct the Territorial capitol. By 1903, photographs showed the new south wing still unfinished, and construction was still underway as late as 1909. Recruiting, training, and retaining capable prison staff has becn difficult throughout the history of the penitentiary. Warden Burnett. observed in 1888, "Any competent officer or employee of thepenitentiary can do as well in some occupation fraught with fewer difficulties and less danger." By statehood, the problem was still evident. In 1912, Warden John B. MeManus urged the legislators to upgrade pay for guards. "The salaries of guards, cellhouse keepers and captains are totally inadequate when service expected of them is taken into account," McManus said. "They are the poorest paid lot in the service of the State, with longer hours and more trying work. I strongly urge the necessity of increased salaries... (Employees') efficiency will never be what it should until this is done. The 1912 Legislature also faced the old problem of overcrowding at the prison. Although the second cellhouse wing was in use by 1912, Warden McManus already needed yet a third cellhouse to allow single~ celling of inmates. “Every available cell in both cellhouses is now oceupied," MeManus reported. "A new cellhouse should be provided for at once, and it should be modern in every respect. One with @ capacity of 110 cells could be built complete, using prison labor, for the sum of $15,000." MeManus was still pleading for the expansion in 1916, when the prison had an average daily population of 427 in a space designed to accommodate 300. A pattern of crowding, leading to limited expansion, followed by more crowding continued at the old penitentiary through the 1920s, "30s, and '40s. By the early 1950s, the prison brimmed with violence, which erupted in a riot on June 15, 1953. Inmates in the maximum security wing overpowered guards and captured the institution and 21 officers, including Deputy Warden Ralph Tahash. State Police quickly isolated’ the. insurrection in the prison hospital, where. Tahash was being held by about 30 inmates, including the two major riot leaders. The deputy warden managed to distract his captors long enough to grab a .30-.30 carbine from a State Police officer posted outside the hospital. ‘Tahash promptly shot the two inmate leaders to death, and the State Police moved in to restore order. |The riot was the fourth major incident of violence at the prison in a’ year, and it prompted eries from the press and public for a new penitentiary. In a front page editorial "A New Pen--Now!" the Santa Fe New Mexican claimed, "Monday's riot could not have happened in a modern penitentiary. In all but archaic prisons like ours, trouble in one section can be isolated and snuffed out quickly before it spreads. ‘As long as the hideous physical conditions at the penitentiary exist, as long as men are required to live in degradation, we will have violence at the penitentiary." A 1953 Grand Jury inspected the prison shortly after the riot, and endorsed immediate construction, of a new institution. The new prison complex south of Santa Fe was completed in 1956, replacing what corrections officials admitted was an “inadequate, unsafe, ‘overcrowded end unsanitary" relic. For approximately $8 million, the state had bought whet Governor John Simms ranked as “among the most advanced correctional institutions in the world.” ‘The new building brought with it a new spirit ‘among corrections officials. Warden H.R. Swenson said in 1956, "The admonition of the -2court, ‘and him safely keep,’ shall be our first obligation.... We must establish a prison community with good living standards within a framework of control and discipline. Having performed these obligations, we elevate our sights and begin the task of human repair." Swenson spoke of using the "latest developments in the behavioral sciences" and claimed, "The barren, deteriorating routine of working, eating, milling around in the prison yard...have been supplanted by a program of specialized services and use of available community resources...these...provide an atmosphere in which classification and treatment have an opportunity to achieve their goals . In 1956, Warden Swenson faced the reeurring problem of upgrading the quality of his officers. "Of greatest importance...is the selection, ‘training and proper utilization of personnel.... ‘The old concept of the officer who is only a guard is giving way to the recognition that he is actually a supervisor, and, as such, has responsibilities requiring qualifications, training and compensation beyond those required for purely security work." New Mexico's convict population quickly filled the new prison, and, by 1958, the average daily inmate population was 905. By 1963, an average 1,272 inmates were housed in the penitentiary daily, and by 1975, operation of the "new" prison had. become, in the words of Corrections Secretary Michael Hanrahan, "a challenge to all concerned." "Much of the equipment has reached a point of disrepair," Hanrahan said in the 1975 annual report. "(The past year) reflects ‘a dramatic increase in population...(which) has required staff to assume added responsibilities beyond what can be safely required of them.” The following year, Warden Clyde Malley told the- Legislature, "Additional facilities are needed to alleviate the dangerously crowded living conditions." Malley said the department had studied the Possible placement of a medium security unit at Mountainair and in Albuquerque, and concluded, "The Mountainair location was too remote, (and) the Albuquerque proposal was dropped because of opposition from the local residents. Los Lunas appears to be an appropriate site." Construction of a medium security institution near the existing Los Lunas Honor Farm began in January, 1979, and-housing of inmates at the facility began in September, 1980. As had wardens before him, Malley repeated the need to improve corrections officers' professionalism, saying, “Penitentiary officials will work with the correctional staff to help all employees improve their skills in custody, classification and treatment of prisoners. This kind of training not only enhances security, but will enable the employee to achieve greater personal end professional satisfaction." Now the prison once again is the subject of attention. ‘The question is whether the 1980 riot will be just another episode in the history of neglect or an opportunity for meaningful, lasting reform. (See Appendix C for list of Wardens and Governors since statehood.)INTRODUCTION This report addresses the problems of operating a prison. A prison is more than just fences, walls, and bars. The choice of building a prison brings with it’ the responsibilities of managing a community of diverse human beings. The reality of a prison is complex, involving a world with its own code of conduct and rules of order, @ world of captive human beings, 97 percent of whom will return to society. An understanding of the world inside the Penitentiary of New Mexico requires an examination of the state corrections system, past and present. Such an examination is the purpose of this Report. Many of the findings of this Report challenge commonly-held notions about the nature of prisons, and go beyond the traditional debate of "treatment versus custody," or "rehabilitation versus punishment." The recent past has shown that attempts by New Mexico officials to establish and maintain control of the penitentiary have had the opposite effect, have in fact, contributed to a steady loss of control, culminating in a complete loss of control on the morning of February 2, 1980. To understand how a prison society can be controlled, one must understand the day-to-day, hour-to-hour workings of that society. The message from the words of persons who have lived in and administered the penitentiary, is simply, whether applied to the keepers or the kept, human beings function better when they have some self esteem and incentives in their lives. Through a study of the past ten years at the Penitentiary of New Mexico, this Report attempts to identify the elements and limitations of control, in the hopes that the lessons of the past will guide the State into the future. A study of the Penitentiary of New Mexico during the 1970s shows the prison curing a period of order followed by a period of relative disorder. By examining the conditions and practices at the prison that remained constant throughout the decade, es well as those conditions and practices that changed, one can better understand how the penitentiary reached the point of complete disorder--riot. The investigation revealed that significant security lapses, understaffing, inadequate training and poor living conditions plagued the penitentiary throughout the 1970s, indeed, throughout the prison's history (see Prologue). Since these factors remained relatively constant during periods of order and disorder, they alone do not adequately explain the increasing loss of control in the late 1970s. ‘The opportunity to riot has always existed at the penitentiary, and, to some extent, exists in all prisons. "The walls, the bars, the sallyports and all the impressive clanging hardware are deceptive in their promise of security," wrote veteran correctional administrator Paul Keve in Prison Life and Prison WorthThe ‘early 1970s was a: time of relative order at the Penitentiary of New Mexico, based on the low number of escapes and incidents ot violence, barometers of prison order There were only three Successful. over-the-fence -eseapes during the first five years of the 1970s, and an equal number of unsuccessful attempts. By comparison, there were 36 over-the-fence escapes'in the last half of the 1970s, and 18 unsuccessful attempts. Violence between inmates at the Penitentiary during the period of 1970-75, has been described by virtually ail those interviewed as “minimal.” "A person didn't have to sleep with a shank under his pillow," during the early part of the decade, ‘one inmate reported; "I would say there was a little more harmony" in the early "70s, he said; "You could walk a little more at ease." After 1975, however, "inmates started going wild," reported one convict. "People (were) getting killed and stabbed. “This place got worse {apathe, streets," he said. "Every day you got to look out for your life because you don't know when some dude might go behind you and stab you." Both inmates and staff. members reported a dramatic increase in the level of violence in the mid-to late 1970s. Order in the early '70s was: partly the result of a:series of formal and informal incentives which were used by the administrators to motivate inmates to accept and cooperate in the orderly operation of the institution. The period was also characterized by a single acministration with a unified purpose and corrections philosopiy. There was one corrections secretary and one warden from 1970-75. From 1876~'80, four wardens and four corrections secretaries administered the Corrections Department and the penitentiary. During the late '70s, many of the formal and informal incentives were removed by a new administration. The result was a forced reliance on coercion as the primary method of inmate control. True control of a prison exists only when inmates accept the order established by the administration. Control should not be Sorfused with containment of inmates who resist order. "Lloyd Patterson, @ 30-year veteran of the California corrections system who was hired to advise the New Mexico Corrections Department after the riot sai "We only stay in control of prisons to the degree that the prison population as a whole sees our administration ‘as fair, humane, somewhat reasonable, something they can understand. When Wwe reach the point where a large number of Prisoners see our administration as something other than that, then we have the potential for anything. I think most people who work in prisons understand that, although I think they lose sight and say, ‘Hey, we are in control. We got you guys..-and we've got all the gas and the sticks and guns that we need to control you.' That ain't true. You get that idea and you're in trouble."In the mid-"70s, the administrators of the Penitentiary of New Mexico got "that idea," and they were, indeed, in trouble. ‘The primary factor leading to the February, 1980 riot was the disruption of incentive controls over inmates. The removal of incentives undermined inmates’ self-interest in keeping order and disrupted the non-violent power sources of convict leaders. The study of the recent past also revealed that no clear policy or supervision guided the penitentiary, resulting in inconsistencies and a strained relationship between staff and inmates. Coercion and inconsistency created hostility in the penitentiary and gave inmates the motive, as well as the opportunity, to riot. The curtailment of most programs—formal ineentives--eliminated @ major source of non-violent convict power. Other actions, prompted by the administration's legitimate concern about drug trafficking in the penitentiary, disrupted the inmate economy and undermined informal incentives for inmates to "keep the lid on" in order to protect illegal rackets. The disruption of ineentives--formal and informal-— left a power vacuum in the inmate society. Without ‘avenues of constructive leadership and without sources of passive, albeit illegal, influence, power among inmates became based more and more on physical violence. A new group of violent inmates was thus given a self-interest in disturbing, rather than maintaining order. As the inmate society grew more violent, it fragmented into small self- protective cliques with no strong central leadership. An inmate's influence was enhanced by his reputation for violence. Placement in segregation enhanced an inmate's tough reputation. In addition, the arbitrary and excessive use of segregation soon exhausted its value as a disciplinary tool because inmates felt they had little to lose and much to gain by disobeying rules. The. need for an alternative coercive control fostered the practice of manipulating informants as a means of control. (See pp. 27, 30). ‘The abrupt change in:inmate society coincided with administrative and staff upheaval at the penitentiary. Governor Jerry Apodace removed the Secretary, Howard Leach, Warden Felix Rodriguez and top management staff in 1975. Ralph Aaron, a 30-year veteran of a federel maximum security prison, was made warden, but held the job only seven months. Aaron was replaced by his deputy, Clyde Malley, also a veteran of the federal system. Malley, like Aaron, attempted to tighten security at the prison by restricting programs and cracking down on drug trafficking and other convict rackets. Ironically, his efforts resulted in an inerease in escapes and violent incidents. Turnover among officers rose with the level of tension at the penitentiary. | During the early 1970s, turnover among guards was estimated to be between 30 percent and 40 percent, although actual statistics are not available. The rate of turnover rose from 44 percent in 1976, to 66 percent in 1977, 80 percent in 1978, and dropped to 76 percent in:1979.At about the same time as the change of wardens, the Corrections Department was being reorganized, and competing factions began to emerge. Confused signals and conflicting philosophies between the Corrections central office and the penitentiary resulted in a rapid shuffling of wardens and corrections secnetaries. (See Appendix D — Secretaries and Prison Wardens.) With corrections administration in a state of flux, by mid-1978 the day-to-day management of the Penitentiary fell to the veteran middle management at the prison. Without clear and consistent direction, shift captains and lieutenants were left to operate the institution in their own fashion. The result was inconsistent procedures and disciplinary practices which heightened the frustration of officers and inmates. Five events in late 1979 added to the turmoil at the Penitentiary. A lawsuit demanding improvements at the prison resulted in consent decrees which were sporadically implemented, adding to inmate frustration. A halt in transfers to satellite institutions cut off one of the last remaining incentives for orderly behavior. This halt increased the population at the prison by 200 inmates in the three months before the riot. The escape of ll inmates in December of 1979 provoked an increase in shakedown inspections which the inmates Perceived as harassment. During renovation of a cellblock, prison officials transferred violent inmates into a medium security dormitory. Early in the morning of February 2, 1980, some of these inmates started the riot in this dormitory. The takeover reflects several chenges in penitentiary life Curing the late 1970s. The presence of violent inmates in a medium Security dormitory reflects mismanagement. There was no clear inmate leadership’ during the riot; inmates were divided into small groups committing crimes, competing for control, or fighting to escape the mayhem. Finally, brutalized guards and murdered inmates reflect the inerease in violence as an inmate power base inside the penitentiary.CONSTANT FACTORS INMATE LIVING CONDITIONS Food, Recreation, Visitation, and Services. One factor might be that inmate living conditions contributed eritically to the riot. For years inmates have complained of poorly-prepared food and insufficient nutrition, inadequate medical, dental and psychological services, the lack of exereise and recreation and infrequent and non-private visitation opportunities. Certainly these conditions added to the inmate frustration that may have led to the riot. But each of these conditions, to the extent they affected inmates in February, 1980, had existed throughout the decade and in the 1960s as well. They have not changed over the years and therefore do not adequately explain why the riot occurred when it did and with such shocking violence. Overerowding. The institutional population changed from a low of 694 in 1972 to a high of 1272 in 1978. Inmate population rose steadily during 1972-79, dropped. briefly to 900 in 1979 after the opening of the Roswell Correctional Center, but climbed again to 1157 by the night of the riot. (See Appendix E for the ten year population figures.) ‘This dramatic increase of 200 inmates in the three months prior to the riot occurred because transfers to satellite facilities ceased. Overerowding undoubtedly added to the high level of tension at the penitentiary. A corollary problem of overcrowding was the failure to properly classify inmates. Maximum, medium and minimum security inmates were often housed in the same living unit. (See Appendix F for examples of the kinds of crimes committed by inmates in one dorm.) Although overcrowding existed and improper classification created obvious and unacceptable problems, they were not sufficient conditions by themselves, to. foster a riot. , During 1978 the prison was as overcrowded as it was the night of the riot. And in the early 1960s the institution reached a population level of over 1200 without any of the devastating consequences observed in the late 1970s. In addition, there was never adequate classification of inmates for housing or work assignment during the 19705. ‘Ténsion between races in the penitentiary also has not changed. Inmates say that new prisoners naturally gravitate towards their own ethnic groups. Cliques formed but no strong organizations were prominent in the penitentiary over the yea Additionally the riot itself was not triggered by racial conflict nor were the killings. Because of their small numbers and perceived need for safety, the blacks became the most cohesive ethnic group during the riot. SECURITY FAILURES . Understaffing. Prior to the riot there were many rumors that inmates were planning to take hostages. (For a detailed descriptionCf tle Tumors and the responses to the rumors see Part I, Attorney General's Report pp. 14-15.) When asked about the steps takecn to Engance security before the riot, one middle level administrator co {bg Penitentiary summed up what many others had said, "We didn't hace £00 quuch security because we didn’t have that many people. Were ve goddamn short on personnel it's ridiculous." ‘he inability of the prison management to recruit, train and retain an adequate number of correctional officers has constantly Posed a serious threat to seeurity at the penitentiary. Understaffing & not @ new problem at the Penitentiary of New Mexico. From lave Te eae the, Suard=to-inmate ratio remained at I:100. oversil svg Spproximately 3:00 per shift. Even prior to 1975, a formes Penitentiary official complained of constant understeffing. “A Safectional officer supervisor reported that priot to 1975" "Each staff member used to work between four and eight dormitories? ‘Thact Were often only two officers on the north side. We would come on grav fact, on the night of the riot, the the institution than'were on the regular graveyard shift at the prison prior to.1975 — a time when, in the words of one correcticnst supervisor, “Inmates could have ‘taken that institution any time they wanted to. Any time.” raining. | Proper training of staff and administrators could have Corrected Security lapses and reduced, to some extent, the effecte of understaffing. Classroom training for officers was initiates and reinitiated three times in recent -years. The 1979 Legislature's budget of $70,000 for training included money for 4 tretnere and office maintenance. The training program, supplemented by $40,000 of federal funds after July 1, 1979, was able to train only twenty penitentiary officers in the seven months before the rio Only one officer on duty at the penitentiary the night of the riot hea been trained under the new program. Zhe, formal training the prison condueted between 1976-'80 was pampered by understaffing. Classes were commonly only halfctell ses to cancellations caused by staffing needs. The penitentiary feministration often kept the best and most experienced officers “so the job and, consequently, out of class. When the trained sffieee renee’ 40, Guty» their new skills were not readily accepted or peinforced by the more experienced officers who had received ne former {raining. | Without the support of the veteran officers, the newly- pibined Suards found little opportunity to apply their training on the pepe inate effect was to negate the skills and techniques leamed re training. Officer training was even less formal in the period 1970-75, ine erison staff believed that the training was inadequate ood infrequent. On-the-job training was carried out only sporadically by line officers who were burdened with other important responsibilities, Indeed, most officers interviewed, including long-time veterans, cited informal instruction from fellow officers, not formal training as their main source of job skills. Training certainly had not worsened from 1976-80; if anything, corrections managers had tried to institute a more formal training program. But because that program trained few guards, the lack of training of correctional officers and supervisors remained constant between 1970-'80. One veteran officer told investigators that his best initial instruction on key and grill handling came from inmates. A new officer in May 1980, said he, too, had learned these job skills from inmates. Supervision of Security. The takeover on February 2, 1980 involved no elaborate planning or strategy on the part of inmates. The- takeover in Dormitory E-2 was hastily arranged and was successful because of the actions and inactions of penitentiary staff and officials. A series of security lapses which resulted from lax supervision of correctional officers and procedures gave inmates the chance to capture guards, move throughout the institution, and to gain complete control within 22 minutes. (A complete discussion of. these security lapses can be found on pages 27-30 of Part I of the Attorney General's Report.) These security lapses cannot be condoned and must be corrected. With the exception of the newly-installed glass windows in the control center, all of these lapses were common practices at the penitentiary years before the riot. Inmates and officers reported that unlocked unit doors and open corridor grills have been routine in prison operation for years, contrary to stated policy. One correctional officer wrote a memorandum in 1976, complaining of unlocked grills as a "common thing" in the institution; the officer was then criticized by his shift captain for complaining of the practice. A correctional officer supervisor with over ten years experience on the line reported that grills had been left open for so long, “it was practically a matter of standard operating procedure." Inmates and officers also confirmed that leaving dormitory doors open while. officers went inside to close down was a common practice. The lapse occurred with such predictable frequency’ that inmates in Dormitory E~2 relied on the door being open.the night of February 2, 1980. Security lapses are’ not unusual at the Penitentiary of New Mexico. An escape of 6 inmates in October, 1975 was publicly attributed to "a total breakdown in security procedure...supervision, count procedures and proper surveillance, since no one was aware of their absence." In 1976, another escape of 5 inmates was blamed by a PNM Board of Inquiry on “a laxity or breakdown in security and procedures." Warden Clyde Malley attributed a 1977 escape to "a complete breakdown of security, established procedures, misinformation, lack of responsible leadership and general chaos.” The warden added, "In 30 years in corrections, I have never witnessed such a total breakdown of basic prison practices." A Corrections Department inspection in 1978, reported, "It was very apparent that the » -1o-supervision is very lax, and in some of the housing units, next to non- existent. It was very obvious that the captains and lieutenants are not enforcing policies." An escape of Il inmates in December 1979, resulted in the dismissal of two tower guards for negligence. * Laxnes¢ in security which permitted escapes just as easily presented the opportunity for.a successful riot. The failure of prison management to effectively supervise security officers and procedures has been a constant factor for the past deeade. Even though the security lapses may have critically contributed to the disturbance easily growing into @ full scale riot, these security failures do not explain why the riot occurred in the first place. The same opportunity to riot created by lax security existed in 1978, 1975, and 1970. The prison management's lax security supervision does not provide an explanation for the occurrence of the riot for yet another reason. While opportunities to riot may be restricted to some extent, they ean hever be eliminated. Even with a full staff, inmates outnumber guards 40 to 1 or more, depending on the availability of staff during « shift. Inmates are not, and cannot be, constantly locked into ceils. They move to and from work assignments, meals, recreation, clothing exehange and visits. Even segregated inmates leave their cells for showers and exercise. Guards must enter cellblocks and dormitories in the normal course of their duties. Even minimal contact provides daily opportunities for the taking of hostages. Legal, moral and. financial restraints make it ‘impossible to build a prison that could completely eliminate the opportunities for inmates to riot. Certainly these opportunities must be reduced, but such a reduction cannot guarantee containment of inmates. | As one veteran correctional Supervisor told investigators, "There's never been anything holding an inmate back from rioting -- we'd have a riot today if the inmates wanted one." Wf the circumstances permitting a riot have always existed, what changed on February 2, 1980? And more importantly. what changes help explain why inmates tortured and killed each other? This murderous aspect of the riot is unique to the riot at the New Mexico Penitentiary. --CHANGING FACTORS - ‘THE LAST TEN YEARS MANAGING THE PRISON, 1970-75 Management Policy. The period from 1970 to 1975 was gharacterized by relative stability i, corrections Management. One Rretery of Corrections, Howard Leach and one Warden, Felix Fedriguez, operated the prison system for’ the enive period. They shared a philosophy of providing opportunities fon rehabilitation, and Sererceg gona! questions, the secretary and the Correctinee Commission deferred to the penitentiary warden's judgment « Staff-Inmate Relations. In the early 1970s, administrators were throu Ke the pulse of the prison and gather infameue informally {hteugh several avenues, including prison programe, Many inmates held poounistrative positions’ in these programs. “Convicts mye often let peeded Tacut members know when things were not right, or if something needed looking into. "If inmate administrators ic Programs spotted problems that could reflect on the education Program, (such as) Gistuptive behavior...they would let us know." a force staff member faid. Inmates protected the programs by alerting staff to potential trouble without naming specific inmates. Program staff members ferayed the information and their insights tenn warden on an informal basis. The program staff members were highly regarded by the Inmates reported that program staff members were easy to talk to guring the early "70s, and that "many of ‘thes would go to bat for inmates who had legitimate gripes." Warden with no prior agreement of special treatment, protection or inmeteg qltaybe (the warden) didn't go looking for information, but inmates felt ‘that they could give him a let oy information ’ that Wouldn't, get out where they would get into trouble," reported @ ieteran “correctional officer. Staff members seid were when these informants were ready for transfer or parole, theis role as informants pas Siven consideration. inmates and staff generally agree that information was not solicited or coerced from inmates’ in the early 1970s. Warden Rodriguez also met individually with inmates on a weekly basis to keep up with changes among. the inmates, and listen to Grievances. Prior to 1975, there was’an inmate council of elected Mest ientatives from each living unit. The council wee considered by most inmates as an ineffective body, whose benefit was primarily an epportunity for inmates to "let off steam.” In addition to providing carly warning of inmate problems and. potentich disturbances, the communication system allowed the administration to help control rumors -12-and explain policy. The warden's weekly meeting with inmates also Provided an avenue for explaining or, as an inmate put it, "getting the word from the Man." F "Staff Disaffection_and Inconsistencies. . The 1960s have been deseri y older conviets and correctional employees as a period of relative stability in guard and inmate relationships. The same warden managed the penitentiary from 1959-1966. Correctional officers and inmates from the period stated that both sides knew how to act toward each other. Correctional officers stated that during the period inmates responded to orders, didn’t talk back and generally stayed out of the officers' way. This relationship of "co-existence" began to change in 1968 and 1969 when a new warden, J.E. Baker, began to “open up the institution." Many restrictions on inmate movement were lifted, and disciplinary procedures were relaxed. Many programs were initiated. A former convict discussed the change during this period. "The rules changed, the hole, (maximum detention unit) was not in use, and when that began to happen you could see the officers lighten up. They had no vehicle for discipline. Maybe only 10 percent of their write-ups bore any fruit. After you write somebody up two or three times, he starts to laugh et you." This former convict also said that. this loosening of discipline and restrictions during the period created a rift between correctional officers and inmates and a feeling, confirmed by older correctional officers interviewed, that “inmates were spitting on the officers." Resentment emerged between officers and inmates during this period. Turnover rates for correctional officers rose during the 1968 69 period. ‘Those officers who remained felt that inmates could go over their heads administratively and reverse their decisions. When Warden Rodriguez took over in 1970, he attempted to tighten up the institution once again. But "Inmates were accustomed in the two years to that lax situation. It was difficult to come back and enforce the situation," observed one-staff member. The difficulty of returning to a more restricted environment was underscored by a 1971 inmate work strike. The incident was the first indication of a Possible breakdown in staff and inmate relations. Old correctional officers were asked in the late 1960s and early.1970s to be more than custodians, but they were never provided the training to meet the additional task of supervising a program-filled penitentiary. Despite the warden's efforts, the institution remained relatively loose in terms of inmate movement and discipline until late 1975. When the number of captain positions was inereased from one to four (and subsegently to. seven) in late 1971, a new factor was added to staff/insate relations. Under the one captain system inmates and guards report @ higher degree of consistency. One former convict stated, "There was a lot of consistency, it was damn negative but there's some stability in knowing where the hell you are." The 13+creation of new captain positions without adequate supervision and coordination by higher administrators opened the door for increasingly inconsistent management. The new captains expected to have the same Power and autonomy that the one captain had under the old system. ‘The result was a constantly fluctuating level of security and the beginning of inconsistent discipline that left both guards and inmates confused as to what was expected of them. MAINTAINING ORDER, 1970-'75 Programs. In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a wide range of programs and activities in the penitentiary. (See Appendix G for brief description of programs.) They included an associate of arts degree plan through the College of Santa Fe, which involved 213 inmates in 1971. Eastern New Mexico University sponsored Project NewGate, a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funded project, which offered counseling services, college preparatory courses, tutoring and financial assistance for inmates participating in education programs at the prison. An off-shoot of the College of Santa Fe and NewGate activities was a school release program which enabled up to 20 inmates nearing parole hearings to attend classes at the College of Santa Fe. There was also an IBM key punch program that involved up to 184 inmates. Other programs and activities consisted of community contact programs such as Outside Friends, Bible Study, Jay Cees, ‘Aleoholies Anonymous, Nareotics Anonymous, Toastmasters, Chess Club, Sex Offenders Counseling and a Pre-Release Program. On their own, inmates initiated Toys for Tots, Concerned Convicts for Children and other activities with charitable goals. Programs and activities during this period involved a majority of the inmates in some meaningful activity. Time spent developing skills, getting a high school diploma, college credits or a degree was perceived as worthwhile. Participation in counseling for drug, alcohol and sex-related offenses was also perceived by inmates as helping improve their lives and self-esteem. The clubs and charitable activities gave inmates constructive outlets for their interests and Provided the community some needed services. Many caseworkers and several correctional officers contributed unpaid overtime to oversee these activities. Conviets held administrative positions in the programs and organizations. Community contact programs were also run to a large extent by convicts. Many of these convicts had entered the prison with convictions of violent crimes. These convicts have been described by staff members as individuals who were respected in the inmate society because of their street reputation and institutional reputation for being "good" convicts. They brought this reputation with them to the administrative positions within the programs. Other inmates saw these convicts as spokesmen who could approach the administration. Inmates from the era report that these convicts engendered a supportive atmosphere for inmate : participation in Programs. Staff and inmates report a greater degree of "togetherness" -14-among inmates during this. :period because of their involvement in programs. Many inmates and staff members considered that the success of these programs was linked: to the conviets'-own self-interest. The programs gave inmate leaders a way of perpetuating a source of power and cclped in their own early release. The convicts’ ability to influence other inmates was directly linked to the benefit inmates derived from the programs. Inmate leaders carried considerable influence in helping other inmates get into programs. Many of the community contact programs required that any inmate desiring entrance into the program be sponsored by an inmate already in the program, erconvict leaders gave guidance to other inmates they saw as Geserving for entrance to the college program. They had some sway with staff members in their choices of new inmates entering cdueational programs. For instance, a conviet in the college progra, and also on the NewGate Selection Committee said, "The NewGate staff Would Usten to an honest evaluation by the convict on an inmate being selected." Former convicts indicated that the inmate administrators of the SCllege realized they had to give accurate evaluations; otherwise, the power to influence selections would be taken away by the administration. Selection to Project NewGate meant funding for school upon release and essentially guaranteed parole. jhe use of convicts in administrative positions opened the door for some abuses. Former convict staff members and prison administrators indicated thet some cheating on tests graded by inmates {0k place. Selection to college could also be manipulated by strong convicts not associated with the college program. Because the college maintained certain admissions ceilings, inmates sometimes paid tough convicts to force college inmates to withdraw from school, thus Providing an opening for themselves. Abuses seem to have become more Widespread only after the inmate leaders who helped initiate programe began to be paroled in 1974 and 1975. These inmate leaders were not replaced by new leaders who protected and appreciated their positions in programs as the former leaders had. Of key importance was the close connection between convicts associated with prison programs and orderly inmate behavior. A great geal of "self-policing" within the programs was reported by staff and inmates. A former inmate said that, "In the early 1970s, theec convicts were, for the most part, men in the college (program) and they did keep the lid on. In four or five years of my association with that place, 1 remember one or two fist fights and they were at the grill not in the educational area itself. That shows inmates yegpected the program." Generally, if an inmate was getting out of line in & program, he would be weeded out of the program by the conviets. 15~Staff and inmates gave similar reports of "self-policing" in the TEM Key punch program. ‘The computer project was sponcorcy by a staff camper and was operated by a convict with the assistance of other convicts. The responsibilities of work and production Schedules, job plasement, recruitment and the day-to-day supervision of the inmates in the program were carried out by eonviet administrators. The IBM "What inmates learned in the key punch program was that, if you keep allow on to eeether and police yourselves, the administration ash allow you to go forward with other programs." The stabilizing influence of inmate leaders spread beyond the programs into other areas of the institution. One veteran forrectional officer stated he knew for a fact that convines "used to tak {© the other inmates both in the classroom ang im their living units" and that this helped maintain order." think you have to have fo (der convict tell inmates what to do, how to come eroud vo as not with programs had some influence on other inmates and cs helped "keep the lid on." It started as a work strike in certain housing units and Sreipded into @ disturbance causing property damage. ‘The ieeldere was quelled by foree. Promised individual interviews wore then conducted to ascertain individual complaints. ine 1071 incident provided two specifie examples of convicts! influence in keeping order. Many inmates, ineluding those closely susegted with programs, refused to participate in’ the strane or fubsequent destruction. One former convict who held a state Position in Project NewGate was elected as a leader of the strike by inmates in Te Gormitory. The convict said he considered his pocitiny a Project NewGate, refused the leadership role and left the dormitory for work: Two or three other inmates who were associated with programs left with tims including one inmate described as "a pretty viokene person" whom Ang former eonviet had helped get into some programs.. Mii y hadn't had that key position at NewGate and if I hadn't hed ire optimism as sretta tect Participating in the program, I probably woulda gotten pretty deep into that riot." In @ cellblock at the other end of the penitentiary, @ small number of convicts involved in administering ‘the college program convineed the entire cellblock not to join in the disturbance," -16-don't know if we defused the incident, but we defused it in our celiblock," said one of the convicts. He associated the desire to keep the disturbance out of his unit with his position in the Programs. He also said that before getting involved in the Programs he would have very likely been one of the main instigators of such a disturbance. Informal Controls. During the early 1970s, convicts associated with running programs were not associated with dealing drugs or Tunning other rackets. In fact, some instances of reported "self- policing" involved removing inmate drug users from programs. The extent of drug trafficking during this period will never be known, but most persons interviewed who were in the penitentiary during the 1970- 78 period felt that drug use was on the upswing reaching a peak in 1975. (See Appendix E for figures on convictions for drug related crimes.) This trend was consistent with the national phenomenon on the streets and in other prisons. ‘There was a growth in the number of sub-groups that dealt in heroin and other illicit drugs during the early and mid-70s. Conduits for illegal drugs included visits, meat shipments from the Honor Farm, some staff members, and by 1975, school and work release. The 1975 Report by Attorney General Toney Anaya noted that inventories for pharmacy drugs were loose and checks on large scale pilfering of drugs were lacking. The report by Attorney General Toney Anaya states, "In the penitentiary hospital, inmate clerks are responsible for entering the administration of medication to inmates. If an inmate clerk was confiseating certain drugs, or working in conjunction with another inmate or employee, he could easily falsify the records to cover his illegal action." Whether this practice was actually taking place was never investigated. While inmate drug traffickers had a negative effect on the inmate society, the drugs had the side effect of providing order within the institution. When asked if there might be a connection between having a drug racket and wanting to keep things orderly to protect the racket, one former convict commented, "That's true. But you're not talking about controlling an institution, you're talking about whoever has the power in a small group controlling a group." When you have Several groups like this you have the effect you want, -an orderly prison. I was a gambler and in my area I saw to it everthing was tight so the poker game didn't get busted up. And I had some help with that, from a few other gamblers. The same thing would be true for whoever (sic) had a racket going." Other convicts indicated that groups controlling drug trafficking and other rackets would maintain order to "keep the heat off" their business. These conviets' desire to protect their businesses and power had the effect of maintaining order. According to staff members and inmates, control of inmates was also partially accomplished through legal drug prescriptions from the prison hospital. The extent of this practice is not known. However, -17-one staff member said that he saw many tranquilizers for inmates being Prescribed through the hospital and being hoarded by inmates. © sonegtional officer supervisor said, "Any time we had a. problem with an inmate in segregation, Cellblock 3, we'd call the hospital and he was given drugs. We gave out Darvons and Chloralhydrates.... ‘We had @ lot of zombies in that place. We had people that were so fee enous that were administered (from the hospital) that ‘they didn't KaoM that they were doing, or saying, or anything. ‘They were just real mellow." (See Appendix B, p. 1 for Grand Jury observation, ) A final source of power always available to inmates is physical violence. While fights did invariably oceur, inmates and stat? report inet yulolence during the early 1970s was relatively low, and rarely involved. an intent to kill. With the non-violent sources ef power associated with programs and drugs, violence was rarely needed ‘es on inmate power source in the early 70s. That the penitentiary wee serving the function of keeping the community safe and providing safety for inmates inside is reflected by the low number of escapes and attempted escapes and the minimal level of prison. vielense during the early '70s. Punishment and Segregation. During the early 1970s, the Face cenumber OF inmates in Cellblock 3, with a capacity of 86, fluctuated around $0. This figure includes disciplinary aces og Well as protection cases. It was as low as 13 in 1971. Segregation threaten GclY Used only for major violations whicn directly threatened the security of the institution or for inmates and threatened harm to other inmates or themselves. Prior to 1975, the Percentage of inmates in lockdown for disciplinary reasons or Protection was approximately § percent. Other punishments included the Joss of good time, of @ job assignment, program involvement, or a parole hearing. The great number of programs and other activitics automatically increased the number of punishments available sines less of program opportunities wes an effective deterrent to misbehavior, Summary of Maintaining Control_in Early 1970s. The relative stability in- Inmate behavioe Tied the early 70s was related to program incentives that gave individual inmates a self-interest in maintaining PrGerly behavior. These incentives also tended to eneourage inmate leaders to keep order. Some degree of control over these Programs as well as involvement in them provided inmate leaders with A Source of power. The inmates associated with: programs pulled the inmate society in a direction that was supportive of order. Informal Positive and negative incentives provided a range of incremental punishments through the loss of privileges and. the use ot segregation. Although there were few escapes or even attempted escapes, few incidents of violence between inmates and a relatively state stett Guring the period, the relative looseness and lack of training at this -18-time set the stage for later events. A former convict summed up the period, “Here's where 'who's in charge,’ the uniformed guards or the conviets, begins to breakdown.’ Things don't change overnight." He went on to describe the period through 1975 as the "calm before the storm." Hi9-MANAGING THE PRISON, 1976-'80 Management Policy. In 1975, the incentive control mechanisms and the ‘SabIIIty of the Inmate society began to be disrupted. In the autumn of that year, Warden Felix Rodriguez and the top level administrators were removed from the penitentiary. The new prison administration supported a philosophy that promoted tighter restrictions on inmates. ‘This philosophy was consistent with the new warden's long experience at a federal maximum security prison. The new warden, Ralph Aaron, expressed alarm at the loose procedures of the prison and stated that inmates would not. "run the prison." In June 1976, this warden was replaced by his hand picked deputy warden, Clyde Malley, who was also a veteran of the federal prison system. He shared the same basic concern that security was very poor. He further believed that a penitentiary should have limited activity involving contact with persons outside the penitentiary. These concerns were reinforced by the presence of drugs within the institution and by the perception that inmates had more authority than guards. Staff-Inmate Relations. The correctional officers' perception that inmates ran the Institution, and that correctional officers were not adequately listened to, existed until late 1975. This dissatisfaction among staff set the stage for an important change that occurred when Wardens Aaron and Malley arrived. One caseworker summed up the general feeling that when Aaron and Malley came in with the attitude, "We're gonna take control again because the institution has gone to hell and inmates are running it," they found a receptive audience in the correctional officers. Staff generally felt that Warden Malley gave them more support than any of the other wardens from 1970-80. To regain control of the penitentiary, Wardens Aaron and Malley reduced programs and tightened internal security through an accountability system to track inmates through their daily assignments and through a pass system to control inmate movement. Concertina wire was put up around the perimeter fence to prevent escapes. Ironically, from 1976 on the level of violence, the number of escapes, attempted escapes and staff turnover began to increase. During a June 1976 work strike, protesting the new restrictions and curtailed programs, relations between staff and inmates exploded into open confrontation. Inmates in certain dormitories where the strike was initiated refused to leave. Staff members and inmates report that guards then tear-gassed those dormitories. The inmates were removed, forced to strip and were escorted through the main corridor to the gym or to Cellblock 3 between two lines of correctional staff members armed with axe handles. Many inmates and some staff members described the scene as a gauntlet in which some steff members hit subdued inmates with the axe handles. Warden Malley denied that such a gauntlet occurred. -20-A number of correctional officers said that after the 1976 work strike, the staff showed inmates "who was in charge." Several staff members, who were perceived by the administration as being sympathetic with inmates, report that they were discouraged in their contacts with inmates and were encouraged to seek employment elsewhere. According to staff members, the administration encouraged an attitude that escalated the “we -and they" stand off between staff and inmates, According to staff members, a few correctional officers felt that this attitude gave them license to "openly harass inmates." Inmates reported an increase in what they perceived to be harassment after the 1976 period. Some of the harassment was blatant. Several staff members and inmates report that one lieutenant used to harass inmates in dormitories by calling them degrading names to their face and implicitly challenging them to retaliate. One inmate compared the practice to "baiting bears,” and one correctional officer feared that the incidents would provoke the inmates to take guards hostage. During the riot, inmates offered to give officials three hostages in exchange for this lieutenant. Many inmates recognized most harassment as a two-way street. Inmates would put pressure on some of the young guards to seare them} then older guards would turn around and put pressure on some of the inmates. An inmate said, "Really, the inmates, you know, they often brought it on themselves, but it started with the guards by the way they were treating them." One inmate pointed to immaturity in both inmates and some guards as a source of mutual harassment. ‘This mutual harassment which included name-calling and threats clearly escalated after the mid-1970s. The growth of this confrontational atmosphere through the late 1970s was described by one staff member as a "game matrix" in which guard and inmate frustrations fed on each other and created more hostility, frustration and the chance for confrontations. A staff member said that part of this confrontational "game matrix" allowed some inmates to build "tough" reputations by confronting guards. And similarly, it allowed a small number of guards to build a "tough" reputation by confronting inmates. Staff Disaffection and Inconsistencies. The frustration ‘of correctional officers and Inmates increased with the growing inconsistencies in procedures and discipline in the late 1970s. The most common example of harassment mentioned by inmates was inconsistent treatment by guards and supervisors. The incidents they cite illustrate the failure of supervisory control over shift Supervisors. Guards also complained about inconsistencies in the direttions they were receiving from their supervisors. The inconsistencies were related to the differences in procedures and discipline that each captain instituted on his shift. Attempts to standardize procedures from shift to shift were few and unsuccessful. The most vigorous attempt to standardize procedures and develop written policy was made in 1976 and 1977 under Wardens Aeron and Malley. Almost all policy statements and post orders were rewritten -21-during this period. These policies and orders were never successfully implemented. For example, Warden Aaron, noted for his strict ideas on security and discipline, held a meeting to discuss security. As the officers exited the meeting, Aaron recalls watching: as one captain walked down the corridor, casually sliding open and leaving open every grill that he passed through. As one guard put it, "Security depends on the supervisors not the warden. if (the supervisors) don't want to enforce it fully, what good does it do?’ The inconsistencies in supervision continued to intensify and reached a high level after Warden Malley left in 1978. Staff and inmates said that the next two wardens, Romero and Griffin, did not have sufficient experience at the penitentiary to exercise their full authority and role as wardens. Consequently, Deputy Warden Robert Montoya who came to the penitentiary under Warden Aaron had increasing authority in running the prison. ‘This apparently changed nothing. After 1978, shift captains were virtually unsupervised by the Superintendent of Correctional Security Manuel Koroneos and Deputy Warden Montoya. A correctional administrator observed that, "For 16 hours @ day and on weekends, the place was run by captains who made a lot of accommodations causing rampant inconsistencies." A correctional expert working at the penitentiary summed up the lack of consistent practices with the following observatior "At least half the time when I walked into the place in the morning...we were not flying the colors...Now you may not be able to relate that to basic security procedures, but I do. Something is done every day all ‘the time because it is supposed to be done." Most interviews with staff and inmates echoed the above observation, relating the failure to follow procedures to security, wake up time, meal time, housing and work assignments, rules and regulations, and to every aspect of daily life. This inability and failure to manage went unabated from 1978 to 1980. Enforcement of procedures and rules reportedly became even more inconsistent and more arbitrary. Inmates felt that petty harassment inereased. Inmates knew even less about how they should act toward the staff--what acts they would be punished for and what acts would be ignored. Their relations with the prison administration became so uncertain and unpredictable, they felt they could not depend on anything. Given this administrative disorder, inmates felt they had few incentives in their lives for orderly behavior. The inadequate, unclear and inconsistent direction given by management and captains also confused and frustrated the penitentiary guards. Harassment from some inmates and favoritism by some supervisors fueled the frustration, Without any career ladder. or clear hope for advancement, correctional officers had few -22-incentives to perform better on the job, when at the same time inmates had few incentives to maintain order. One devastating result of this was the rapid disintegration of a stable guard force. Correctional officer turnover rose from 44 percent in 1975 and 1976 to 66 percent in 1977, 80 percent in 1978 and 76 percent in 1979, among the highest in the nation. The second devastating result ‘was to accelerate the tension between correctional officers and inmates. Top Management _Upheaval Growing inconsistencies in the agement of the prison colclded with the general lack of direction in the department as a whole. The stable period of 1970-'75 ended with the arrival of the first of four successive wardens and four successive changes of the top administrator of the department. In 1978 the Corrections Department was reotganized into a full-fledged bureaucracy with separate divisions replete with assistants, deputies, and planners. The department had previously been a very small office, allowing the correctional facilities around the state to run themselves. The old department became the Corrections Division, and members of the former Governor's Couneil on Criminal Justice Planning became the core ‘for the two other divisions, Administrative and Technical Support. The three divisions began competing for power immediately, and have done so ever since. Few clear policy directives were ever successfully implemented from the central office. Failure to implement Standards and Goals of 1976 and the Master Plan of 1977 are but two examples of the Department's ineffectiveness. The lack of clear and consistent direction from the ‘central office only promoted the ineffectiveness and drift of the prison administration. Rather than abate the inadequate supervision, ineonsistent procedures, and demoralization of the guards, the central office exacerbated the disintegration of prison management. Consequently, untrained and unsupervised captains ruled their shifts as they wished. Inmates became more unsure of how officers would treat them and unsure of which rules would be enforced. In the end, management instability escalated the growing confrontation between correctional officers and inmates which culminated in the riot of February, 1980. MAINTAINING CONTROL, 1975~'80 Information Gathering. Already cut off from any sense of direction from the central office, the prison administration's elimination of many programs also cut off important communication links to the inmate population. In addition, the new administration stopped using the inmate council, eliminating another avenue of communication. "Treatment-oriented" staff members did not have the same credibility with the new administration as they did with the previous one and were not valued as information sources, though these staff members were more likely to be approached by inmates with information. Although a staff newsletter was established by the new administrators to inform inmates of new policies, the prison administration received little or no feedback from inmates about the effects of their policies. -23-‘The lack of communication became apparent during the June 14, 1976 work strike. First, the administration had no forewarning of the strike. Second, the administration made no attempt to discover the inmates’ frustrations which led to the strike. They interviewed 600 inmates for the purpose of identifying the strike leaders, rather than for the purpose of hearing complaints. ‘The 1976 strike coincided with the beginning of a new system of communication that inmates and staff members have labeled the "snitch game." The "sniteh game" has been described by staff members and inmates as directly soliciting information through threats and promises. Generally, inmates seeking protection had to inform before protection was given. The old communication patterns of Warden Rodriguez, who had been working at the penitentiary for over 20 years and who used program staff for information, were eliminated when he left. They were replaced with this more coercive form of communication whieh had two detrimental side effects. ‘The first detrimental side effect of direct solicitation of information through the "snitch game" was to diminish the reliability of information. Inmates report that writing @ "kite" on another inmate (a secret note passed to the prison staff) became more common. In fact, it was a convenient way to take revenge on another inmate because the disciplinary committee would use the kite, whether true or not, as "confidential information" against the targeted inmate. On other occasions, guards would threaten inmates with harassment or disciplinary actions if the inmates refused to provide information on other inmates' misconduct. To avoid these threats, some inmates would say anything, whether true or not. With such a system of information gathering, it was difficult to judge the reliability of information being received from inmates. Reliable information about potential escapes or disturbances was mixed in with totally unreliable information. With no means to distinguish the two, it became increasingly difficult for administrators to take appropriate action. Enmity Among Inmates. The second detrimental side effect of the "sniteh game” was to create suspicion and antagonism among inmates. "You can't even trust your old friends," was a sentiment voiced by several inmates. Inmate opinions of "snitehes" included this often- repeated characterization, "It's just like in a war. You're all on the same side. It's us (inmates) against them (guards). And it's the same mentality. If you cross to the other side, you're no more, no less than a traitor and a spy." In the late '70s correctional staff's increased use of the "snitch game" for information promoted enmity among inmates. In fact, some prison staff attempted to use the hatred which'the snitch game created in the inmate society as a means of controlling inmates. In order to coerce particular information from an inmate, some staff members threatened to tell other inmates that he was a snitch. The inmate would usually capitulate, knowing the consequences of wearing a "snitch jaeket . ~24-‘The consequences could be severe. First, snitches became more easily identifiable because a few guards were reckless or careless about protecting the identity of inmates who provided information. For example, inmates would see that an inmate had met with security staff and then other inmates identified by the informant would be rounded up the next day. Inmates also knew that the prison inereasingly used Celiblock 4 as a place to house and to protect "snitehes" after they were "used up." Second, inmates and staff attributed some of the increase in violence during the late '70s to the motivation for revenge against "snitches." This vengeful violence reached its horrible climax in the 1980 riot. Consider two examples of the violence which the “snitch game" prompted. An inmate walking down the corridor was called back by a captain. The captain told him that he was going to be put into segregation for not walking close enough to the wall unless he told the captain which inmates were using drugs in his dormitory. The captain said he'd pick up a list of names that night. The inmate refused to give the captain any names when he came around, but he saw another inmate hand the captain a list. By placing several inmates from that dormitory into disciplinary segregation the next day, the staff made it obvious who had actually provided the list. On the night of the riot, the first inmate survived unharmed; the supplier of the list had his throat cut; he survived. Another inmate was ordered to clean up some grease on the kitchen floor. He slipped and cut himself on a door as he fell. He was placed in disciplinary segregation for failing to abide by safety regulations. When he came out of segregation, staff accused him of having supplied ingredients for home brew to a dormitory. He denied this allegation’ and another inmate ‘was placed in segregation for the offense. But he was also placed in segregation for investigation. When he was released the next day fellow inmates suspected he had snitched on the other inmate. He, was stabbed to death during the riot. Curtailment of drugs. Correctional officers and inmates report that restriction Implemented by Warden Agron’ in visiting room procedures, closer scrutiny of meat shipments from the Honor Farm, closing of community contact programs, and closing of release programs helped curtail drug trafficking. As with attempts to curtail drugs in the early '70s, Warden Aaron felt that drug trafficking was probably at the same level when he left as when he arrived. But.as drug use on the streets decreased and curtailment efforts were continued by subsequent wardens the level of hard drugs decreased to a sporadic level throughout the remainder of the decade. Marijuana and inhalant use (paint thinner end glue) replaced the hard drugs and increased in the latter part of the decade. One result was that the subgroups based on more lucrative drug trafficking and rackets were broken up. In addition, controls on the hospital's pharmacy reduced illegal -25-trafficking or coverup from that source. The number of legal prescriptions for tranquilizers from the hospital were also substantially reduced. Closing of Programs. A sudden change in the policy towards programs was Initiated by Warden Aaron and continued by Warden Malley. (See Appendix H ~ Ten Year Chart of Programs.) All release programs and all but a very few of the community contact programs were closed. Furloughs were greatly restricted. Project NewGate, which had previously been federally funded, was neither lobbied for nor funded by the State Legislature when federal funding ended. School administrators, who previously were independently employed by outside organizations, were made direct employees of the prison. Convicts were removed from administrative positions in all programs as part of Warden Malley's attempt to wrest control of the institution away from inmates. The closing of many programs contributed to inmate idleness within the institution. By the night of the riot, 34 percent of inmates were officially on idle status. And at least 68 percent of the inmates had meaningful activity for no more than three hours a day. Removal of Inmate Leaders. The new administration identified convict leaders as being part of the educational programs. Leaders were removed from administrative positions within these programs. As security in the institution was generally tightened, inmates began to react negatively. During the June 14, 1976 work strike, the administration responded first by interviewing inmates from various cellblocks to identify the strike leaders. Inmates who refused to be interviewed were forced out of their units with tear gas. Warden Malley felt that most inmates were workers but were being intimidated by inmate leaders. So he ordered that every inmate in the institution be interviewed individually by top staff and each one be given a chance to declare for himself "without intimidation" if he were a striker or a worker. Alleged strike leaders were in many instances then placed three to .a cell, and many were retained in segregation for months and some for years. Other leaders were transferred to other states. After the interviews were completed, the administration allowed the workers to go back to work. The incident began. an era characterized by an increased use of segregation and heavier reliance by mid-level management upon solicited informants. For example, an inmate was punished with additional time in segregation for writing an affidavit in support of a federal civil rights complaint alleging that Deputy Warden Montoya had beaten an inmate during the strike. (The allegation was never proven.) Corrections officials voluntarily agreed to a permanent injunction forbidding the State from ever using segregation in this manner again. ~26-Punishment and Segregation. The loss of programs and other incentives meant that they could no longer be taken away as punishments, which resulted in increased use of administrative segregation after June, 1976. More inmates were going to segregation for infractions of a lesser degree. The distinctions between minor and major violations were not clear. Inmates reported that the guards threatened lockup for such offenses as walking down the wrong side of the corridor, lying on their bunks after reveille, disruptive conduct, verbal abuse against staff members, failing to follow a direct order, or taking crackers out of the kitchen. "They were locking people up for anything" was a typical comment by some staff and most inmates interviewed. A review of disciplinary reports over the last three years reveals a variety of acts which might result in a major or a minor report: Examples of major reports: "Inmate became abusive to the officer by saying 'Mind your own business} inmate called the officer a son-of- a-biteh because officer would not let him give another inmate a package of cool (sic) aid; killing an inmate; possession of sandwiches; assaulting another inmate.” Examples of minor reports: “Assaulting another inmate; inmate accidently injured his leg while running; inmate cut his finger and smashed it also while unloading trash in the dump site; (This third incident was technically considered failure to follow safety and sanitation regulations: ) In 1977, Celiblock 3 was used exclusively for disciplinary cases and Celiblock 4 was being used for protection cases. As prison staff began to rely increasingly on segregation as punishment for misbehavior, the percentage of inmates in segregation rose from approximately § percent in the early 1970s to over 20 percent by 1976, and through much of 1978. The two cellblocks remained overcrowded, often with double bunking and sometimes with triple bunking. Correctional officers reported more than 200 inmates in Cellblock 3 (which has a capacity of 86), which meant that triple bunking occurred between late 1976 and 1978. Cellblock 4 with a capacity of 90 was also double bunked at times during this period holding as many as 212 inmates in 1978. The loss of positive incentives associated with programs had already removed for most inmates several levels of rewards and punishments. For instance, the threat or actual loss of program participation was an available punishment for only a few,inmates. The Toss of all but a few programs and the incentives agsociated with programs left administrators with few tools to manipulate inmate self-interest. The increased use of segregation along with the reduction of positive incentives reduced the effectiveness of punishment for inmate control even further. According to one New Mexico corrections official, "When you use segregation as the only 272punishment for everything, your security is going to go down." Some inmates, in fact, stated that Cellblock 3 was not much of a punishment. ‘I'd rather final my number (complete my sentence) in Celiblock 3 than be out in population and get hassled.” Many inmates said Cellblock 3 was better than living in dormitories, which were becoming increasingly crowded, noisy and violent. Classification of an inmate by prison staff during this period was based on availability of bedspace. Consequently, violent, hardened convicts were mixed in dormitories with weaker inmates or inmates with non-violent records. Some inmates stated that going to Cellblock 3 was also a way of enhancing an image as a "tough con," an image that was becoming more desired during this period because there were few alternative sources of inmate power. Increases in escapes coincided directly with the loss of incentive control mechanisms. One inmate expressed this sentiment, "Why is someone willing to go over a fence right by a tower, risking his life knowing that they'll shoot him if they spot him? Why is he willing to do that? Because he's so frustrated with this place, doesn't see no way out, can't work towards his freedom, that he decides it's better to be shot, it's better to be killed than to remain here." Lull_in Disorder (1978-1979). There was a relative lull in escapes from mid-1978 through most of 1979. Between May 1978, and November 1979, there were four successful and two unsuccessful escapes over the fences. This relative lull in escapes coincides with the opening of the Roswell Correctional Center which provided a boost in programming for the correctional system. Roswell’s programs include community contact and community release. The chance of being transferred to Roswell and other satellite institutions became the major positive incentive for orderly inmate behavior for most of 1978 to November 1979 when transfers to the minimum facilities were halted. Growing Inmate Violence. Ultimately, the loss of incentive control mechanisms also had the effect of undermining old sources of convict power. A vacuum of power in the inmate society resulted from the disruption of non-violent power sourees in the mid-'70s. This vacuum of power was increasingly filled through violence. The violence found convenient targets in the growing number of snitehes. The "snitch game" forced inmates to become informants, and because inmates increasingly needed protection from more and more violence, they often had to pay the price of becoming snitches to transfer to the protection unit, Cellblock 4. Some inmates and staff also related the violence to the fact that when new inmates arrived, who were less sophisticated about the realities of prison life, they were more susceptible to being caught in con games. Often’ the new inmate quickly became obligated to other inmates for money or sexual favors. Once an inmate was caughtin such a dilemma, his choices were submission, seeking protection, or fighting. Most inmates stated that the best choice (without getting into deeper trouble) was to fight. Other inmates said that the best protection from becoming a victim of violence was to build a reputation as being violent "...s0 no one's going to mess with you.” An older convict stated, "Younger guys coming in were more afraid of what they were doing and so were more inclined to pick on somebody to show people that they were not afraid, while in turn they really were.” Inmates also reported a growth in distrust and suspicion between inmates in the late '70s. "They weren't together anymore the way they used to be," was the observation of one convict. The only resemblance of "togetherness" came out of a need for self-protection, and inmates banded together in small cliques for that reason. Inmate cliques were described by staff members as unstable and "in a great deal of flux." Several inmates stated that if an inmate was not part of a clique, "It was open season on that inmate." Membership in a clique was a matter of survival. It was during 1977 that many inmates pinpoint the growth of cliques whose leaders, according to one former inmate "didn't so much keep them in line as much as they kept them out of line." Leaders of the new inmate cliques were different from the old convict leaders in their manifested violence and in their motives. Staff and inmates report the appearance of a "new type" of young, aggressive and violent inmate starting around the mid-1970s. The appearance of this "new type" may, be related to the decline of old convict leaders who were powerful enough to keep young inmates in line in the early "20s. A Second reason for the perception that a new breed of inmate was causing disorder is that prison management was neither grooming new strong inmates as leaders nor were they creating any constructive leadership positions. It is not the case that this "new breed" of convict wes any more naturally prone to violence than the "old" convicts were. The old convict leaders were in the penitentiary for violent crimes, so it cannot be assumed that they were of a less violent nature. Actually this "new type" of inmate was usually convicted of @ less violent crime than his predecessor. In 1970, 45 percent of all crimes for which New Mexico prisoners were convicted were for violent crimes. By 1975 the figure had dropped to 37 percent, and by 1979 it was 33 percent. The difference in the "new" and “old” inmate seems more related to the change in the incentive control structure that formerly motivated convicts to participate in constructive courses of activity and into keeping the violence level down. The change in the inmate society promoted a struggle for power that began in 1976 and 1977. The struggle involved the decline of old leaders and the emergence of new inmates. A staff member described the change that he observed: "(Before 1975) I could just about -29-identify the different cliques and different powers. There was an inmate code where inmates respected boundaries. Then just before I left [in late 1977 there was a new wave of upstarts coming in. And these new upstarts had no respect for the inmate code." He said the balance of power within the inmate society was upset. "It was a combination of factors. The federal wardens had no respect for the inmate powers that be. They had no respect for their ways. ...so they started breaking things up left and right which created an imbalance.... Then the new breed. They were maybe first-timers to the penitentiary, but there was enough of them to be a force to be reckoned with. They started invading territory and using violence. you know, pulling out the lead pipes and getting it ‘on. All of a sudden this older convict that [has] never been challenged before begins to have to cop out some of his territory. I remember en old heavy, I mean he was a big heavy when I went in there. I saw his domain just diminish. They sliced it left and right. An old heavy, as a@ matter of fact, a number of the old heavies ended up in protection." The rise of the new violent cliques was closely associated by staff members with inmates who resided in Cellblock 5 and who "spent their career going between Cellblock 5 and (segregation) Cellblock 3." Several staff members identified these "hardcore" cliques as highly disruptive and unstable. Several stabbing incidents took place in Cellblock 5. Because the power of the inmates in these cliques was based primarily on violence, their motives and behavior were ineonsistent with maintaining order. With reputations for violence as the major source of power, these Cellblock 5 inmates now. had a self- interest in creating disturbances to enhance their power and reputations with other inmates. According to some interviewees, the killing of other inmates can often be attributed to a killers’ desire to make a name for himself in the prison population. The violent inmates involved in killing were associated by staff members with the Cellblock 5 cliques. In November 1979, some of these highly disruptive residents of Cellblock 5 were transferred to Dormitory E-2 beeause renovation had begun in Cellblock 5. Thé takeover on February 2, 1980, was initiated in Dormitory E-2. These factors were accelerated by. events in the months preceding the riot and set the stage for the total loss of control on February 2, 1980. Inmates report that the ACLU suit (Duran v. Apodaca), filed in late 1977, created expectations for rapid changes. These. xpectations created a "wait and see" attitude among inmates and gave inmate plaintiffs in the suit some influence over inmate behavior. The expected remedial actions did not materialize, creating frustration and a growing feeling among inmates that positive changes -30-would not take place. After the signing in the fall and winter of 1979 of partial consent decrees regarding such things as mail — privileges, visitation, and legal access, implementation was sporadic. ‘Delays in implementation of the new policies frustrated the expectations of inmates and caused additional mistrust in the months before the riot. Several inmates reported a growing impatience with legitimate avenues for change. One correctional officer overheard an inmate plaintiff in the suit tell his lawyer in late November 1979, that he didn't know how much longer he could "keep the heavies in line." Another incentive for inmate order had dissolved in the three months preceding the riot. In addition, halting transfers to satellites in October 1979, in reaction to a stabbing incident at Sierra Blanca nullified the remaining major incentive for inmate behavior during the three months before the riot. It also contributed to a 20 percent rise in the prison's population from 957 to 157:in the three months before the riot. The eseape of Il inmates on December 9, 1979, and the increase in shakedowns in reaction to the escapes, created an atmosphere of tightening up which most inmates equated to increased harassment. In reacting to complaints about the trouble with visibility from the control center, but ignoring the advice of correctional officers, prison management installed untested glass in the control center in mid-January. Several days later an inmate tapping on the glass thanked a correctional officer for "giving away the institution." The breakdown in communication between inmates and guards explains the failure to take appropriate responses to forewarnings about a possible hostage taking in Dormitory E~2. And finally, the transfer of hard core inmates from Cellblock 5 to Dormitory E-2 to accommodate renovation schedules created increased opportunity for a group of highly disruptive inmates to create a disturbance. The riot ‘itsélf reflected the “changing factors. Consider three specifie events during the riot. The initial takeover in Dormitory E-2 is connected to the changes in the inmate society which created a group of highly volatile, alienated inmates who perceived that they had little to lose by initiating the takeover. The placement of this group of inmates in a dormitory setting is a reflection of the mismanagement at the penitentiary emphasized by the priority given to renovation schedules over a concern for inmate safety and prison security. That the riot was characterized by disorganization and lack of leadership among inmates reflects the change in the inmate society. As power became based more on violence, groups fragmented. The inability of inmates during the riot to develop consistent spokesmen, and most importantly, to control other inmates during the riot, is @ reflection of the fragmentation of the inmate society. Finally, the killings and torture, become tragically comprehensible within the context of these factors. A reputation for ~31-violence was the growing source of inmate power. Considering that violence was the primary basis of power in the inmate society of the late 1970s, it is not surprising that inmates attacked and killed each other during the riot. The "snitch game" also helped to provide both the vengeful motive and the inmate targets of the violence in Cellblock 4. The mistrust and antagonism between inmates and guards which had grown so intense is reflected in the atrocities guards suffered at the hands of inmates. Because there were few inmates with constructive leadership positions within the inmate society before the riot, the violent inmates had no effective opposition during the riot. The riot exploded at the New Mexico State Penitentiary on February 2-3, 1980, with horror unparalleled in the history of American penal institutions. The riot and conditions leading up to it are not without explanation. This report has attempted to describe the 10 years leading up to the riot to give officials and citizens of New Mexico facts that they can use to insure that such a riot will never occur again. : 32CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The explanation of why the February, 1980 riot at the Penitentiary of New Mexico occurred when it did, and with such violence, is complex. Skill and perseverence will be needed to correct the problems covered by this study. In addition to the findings of this report, the Citizens' Advisory Panel has made comprehensive recommendations for action, as will the Corrections Department's Master Plan. Finally, the Legislative Interim Criminal Justice Study Committee will propose legislation in the coming months . But in the end, all the complexity and detail of this report and others, all the lessons to be learned and recommendations to be followed, will be to no avail if the State does not recognize key goals that the Chief Executive, with the support of the Legislature must act on and pursue. There are but two: 1, Establish end fund an incentive-based inmate corrections _ policy. = 2, Hire and hold accountable stable, professional management to implement that policy. The State must pursue these two fundamental requisites for a Corrections system as long as prisons exist. The following conclusions end recommendations offer the details necessary to implement the above recommended actions. 1, Establish_and fund an ineentive-based inmate corrections policy. ‘The effective control of inmates involves a certain degree of voluntary compliance that is largely gained by giving inmates a self- interest in maintaining orderly behavior. A degree of voluntary compliance is necessary for a safe prison environment, since staff is greatly outnumbered by inmates, and since most inmate activities take Place outside the surveillance of staff. This is a fact of life in every prison in America. Voluntary compliance is gained when inmates see: that it is in their interest to help maintain order. \ Controlling inmate self- interest is the key to controlling prisons. The manipulation of self-interest is more effective when the prison administration can use a wide range of rewards and punishments as the New Mexico prison had in the early "70s. The administration can then give inmates at each security level something to gain or lose depending on their behavior. A range of programs, housing and job assignments and other formal ineentives.are the tools of control. They can be given to inmates as rewards and taken away as punishment. To an inmate who has earned 33>@ program position, potential removal from a program is a greater deterrent to the inmate than the threat of lock-up. When program opportunities and other incentives were curtailed in the mid-'70s, the number of potential punishments, or control tools, was narrowed. A greater reliance on what can be the most severe legal punishment, segregation, emerged. | When segregation is indiseriminately used for ‘nearly every infraction, most inmates calculate that they have little to lose by being disorderly. As this attitude becomes pervasive among a significant and growing number of inmates, the effectiveness of control is undermined and disorder ensues.’ No clearer lesson can be derived from the New Mexico experience than this: Reliance on coercion is, in the long run, less effective for control than having a wide range of rewards end punishments. = For this reason, prison programs cannot be viewed as mere window dressing. When programs are used effectively, they are the integral component in a network of control. Programs and other formal incentives provide the range of rewards and punishments. They are tools for control that can be used to maintain inmate self-interest in orderly behavior. A corollary lesson to the control of inmates is the effect of informal incentives. Co-educational classes that allowed inmates to talk with members of the opposite sex proved to be an effective informal incentive for order in the early "70s. Inmates did not want to lose this privilege so they did not abuse it. Other informal incentives are clearly illegal, such as access to drugs. These incentives must be recognized for their effect and should be curtailed in a fashion that minimizes disorder. The supply of the drugs should be restricted as much es possible, and legal sanctions should be pursued where appropriate through prosecution. Second, the demand for Grugs or the operation of rackets should be curtailed through appropriate counseling and therapy. ‘The control of inmates is also complicated by an inmate society that includes a hierarchy of power among inmates. The inmate society has to be recognized as an important force that influences inmate behavior. The inmate society can be made to work for the administration in its attempts to maintain order. However, when the inmate society and its strong leaders are generally at odds with the administration, individual inmates are caught in @ dilemma of either following demands of other inmates or following opposing demands of the prison administration. This dilemma cannot be taken lightly because it involves life-and-death choices for inmates and guards. The dilemma can only be ameliorated by bringing strong, respected inmate leaders! self-interest into line with prison administration aims. Inmates generally want to do their time in a stable atmosphere; so prison officials have to provide leadership and incentives. This involvement of strong inmates was achieved in the early '70s and contributed to the relative calm during that periods -34-Overlooking the dynamics of inmate society, as was done from 1976- 1980, only causes the inmates ‘tobe at odds with the administration's aim of order. The inmate society is a product of the prison settin, A recognition of inmate power does not and should not mean a capitulation to that power. A recognition and understanding of the inmate society is the first step in-allowing prison administrators to mold that society toward a more: positive direction. Only then can real control be achieved. Effective implemention of the above described policies requires four essential elements. First, adequate funding and staff must be available for programs, housing assignments, and job assignments. More importantly, staff must be imaginative in developing incentives. Many seemingly small rewards such as the annual variety show, cost little or nothing, yet can be effective tools, if used imaginatively and with good judgment. Second, a comprehensive classification system must be used to evaluate changes in inmate behavior and effectively assign inmates to _ appropriate levels. of privileges, responsibi : 'reedom, based on — dehavi : Third, classification and program assignments must be fair, reasonable and consistent. Written guidelines must be specific, must be communicated and must be followed consistently by staff. Safeguards against arbitrary actions and personal vendettas must be established and maintained.- When the system es is even perceived as being arbitrary, it becomes unclear to inma of behavior is actually rewarded. The divergence between actual and written criteria creates inconsistent messages about behavior and undermines the effectiveness of control. A perception and demonstration of fairness is a significant incentive for compliance. Fourth, effective management requires the recruitment of persons who recognize dignity and worth in others. It also requires that all staff members be trained to carry out complex responsibilities. ‘They must understand that programs for inmates are not niceties, but are the very basis for keeping the prison safe for staff as well as inmates. If any of these four essential elements is missing, the operation of a prison becomes much more problematic. 2. Hire and hold accountable stable, professional management to implement that policy. ‘Throughout much of the last five years, personnel changeovers, political. maneuverings ‘and reorganizations within the Corrections Department constantly blurred lines of jurisdiction, authority and therefore accountability. The State had four corrections secretaries over five years, four wardens over four years, and some wardens were chosen who were at odds philosophically with their Department Secretaries. Competing camps within the Department prevented eny consolidation of management. The major consequence of these changes ~35-was that no clear and consistent correctional philosophy was Implemented. Bureaucrats, administrators and correctional officers were either constantly unclear of their guidelines or they often made up their own as they went along. Without clearly articulated policies and direction, management becomes ‘crisis-oriented. Corrections officials are unable to get beyond "putting out fires" largely created by their earlier reactions to crises. The influence of political pressure sets the stage for reactive management as edministratcrs become unsure if the next crisis will result in the rug being pulled out from under them. The events jn the months preceding the riot exemplify the deterioration of the Corrections Department toward an indecisive reactive style of management. The effect of this indecisive, reactive management is felt all the way down to the line staff and inmate levels of the department. Ironically, front-line personnel, who most directly put policy into action and who bear the brunt of inmate disorders, have been the most often overlooked in prison planning. For them the political reorganizations and revolving-door wardens did not alter the fact they had to go about the day-to-day business of supervising inmates. Yet their work had to be done with limited direction from their supervisors and insufficient resources to do their jobs. The resultant uncertainty, plus the changes in the inmate society, led to Jow morale and high turnover. .With limited confidence in, or support from their transient superiors, it is surprising that the prison operated as long as it did without more staff turnover or inmate Gisturbances. That front line correctional officers performed as well fas they did in such an environment is remarkable. Ultimately, the top managers of the corrections system and the Penitentiary of New Mexico must be held accountable for whet happens within the prison walls. In order to hold them accountable, the State inust hire @ truly professional Secretary of Corrections who wants to De and will be held accountable, is committed to the strategy of penitentiary management outlined in this report, end who is guaranteed Sufficient time to bring about effective management to the prison, without political interference. The new corrections secretary must play @ key role in selecting & new warden, and the new warden must share both the professional credentials and policy commitment of the secretary. Both managers must. have complete authority to hire middle~ level managers and security supervisors who are at once competent, imaginative and committed to a single, clear, and consistent policy. They must train mid-level managers, security supervisors, and correctional officers to maintain the professional skills required of their positions and to implement prison policies. ‘Above all, the corrections secretary, the warden and his deputies must send all prison staff clear, continuous and consistent messages -36-about penitentiary policies. Throughout their tenure, these managers must have authority to fire those staff members who are either unwilling or incompetent to implement those policies. Within this context the importance of communication between all levels of the department is critical. The late '70s was exemplified . by a failure to communicate throughout the corrections system. The most important commodity in: prison is information; it can make the environment safer and more predictable for both the keepers and the kept. Communication is thus of singular importance. When officials are able to keep communication open, they have the information critically necessary to control the penitentiary. This directly benefits inmates when dangerous disturbances are imminent. During the late '70s, communication became increasingly limited. Strained communication channels led many staff members to resort to the destructive "snitch game" to get information. This coercive and unreliable form of communication, together with the generally ineffective administration at the prison, largely caused the failure of officials to respond adequately to the forewarnings of the riot. Communication also is an important source for disseminating daily information and for explaining policies to both inmates and. line staff. The high turnover of staff is partly due to an inability of line staff to voice their complaints and ideas. Planning at the Department went on in a vacuum with little input from line staff who ultimately implement policies day in and day out. The effectiveness of policies is dependent on the commitment of staff who must implement them, Only through communication and direct input will such a cooperation be achieved. Data on barometers, such as level of incidents, escapes, violence, and segregation use, should be maintained and ‘monitored. Such information can be used as forewarnings of trends toward disorder. The inability to retrieve data in many areas for the preparation of this report’ underscores the need for keeping such data at the central office. While the 10-year ‘experience in New Mexico suggests that opportunities for a disturbance ereated by security failures do not adequately explain the riot, the factors related to opportunities are nonetheless critically important. Efforts to enhance security supervision, staffing and training must be funded, pursued and monitored. Decisions regarding renovations, satellite transfers, and watching and responding to barometers must’ be made with an eye on security considerations. Reliance on these security factors alone for control is a mistake, since they can only provide containment. But containment is sometimes all a prison administrator may have available to quell a disturbance. Finally, officials and citizens must understand both the need for immediate action to restore effective management at the -37-penitentiary and also the need for time to realize the consequences of good management . the need to restore the fundamental components of effective management to the penitentiary is urgent. |The state, can wait no Tages for new, permanent, professional top management. A new longer tions seeretary and a new warden are needed immediately- The prison must hire and train middle-managers to implement basic prisqement policies consistently, with special attention toward the managemenupervision of correctional officers. A full complement of cfrecttlonel officers is needed immediately, and they must snter & Sigorous training program which emphasizes both security and effective policies toward inmates. the corrections system must swiftly hire the staff to use St appropriate classification instrument, and immediately begin assigning appropriate inmates to the many medium and minimum security vacancies SPP eee system. A classification system must have e Taner of reilities. from maximum security imprisonment to community controlled treatment centers. The State may then place & pefton in the appropriate facility, based on the initial ovine oF the inmate's response to incarceration or treatment. This extended system provides responmaditional tools for discipline and minimizes the use of expensive maximum security prisons for offenders who can successfully Complete a sentence in cheaper, more localized program» Management complcNommunieate reasons to inmates for classification decisions. must commagement must slso begin now to use whatever resourses al eradable, including staff's imagination, to create | progiite to provide inmates with activity and with incentives for good behavior. qhere are two elements which must merk the relationship of the keepers and the kept at the penitentiary if that relationship is to be KecPethan constantly counterproductive or even dangerous The first metfnese elements is a set of rules or limitations clearly set forth to guide behavior. The second element is a means of maintaining the to. Futeem of the parties in that relationship- It is diffieult to selablish and maintain the balance between these two elements. It Cit take time. Programs must be allowed to prove themselves, whieh Will ReKGiowing a series of mistakes to take place without an vet meerHon that only worsens the problem. Expectations must be raised Recording to the results that the administration is willing and able aecorter. Patient but forthright steps toward: rebuilding must take place. A stable administrative environment thet allows such patient rebuilding is necessary~ The history of the penitentiary reveals periodic shifts in emphasis between custody and rehabilitation with ne clear philosophy emphatne proper balance. The stability and security which comes from eSnieving a reasonable balance is hard to translate into policy; it is aChost impossible when the prison is neglected on the one hand and becomes a political football on the other. ~38-| EPILOGUE Even before the last hostage was released on February 3, 1980, it was obvious to the political leaders, press, and public of the State that the riot created a monumental task of repair. ‘The penitentiary was a smoking, flooded wreck of a building, unfit to house more than half of its previous residents. At the least, the structure would have to be repaired; at most, a new prison would have to be built. ‘The needed repair ineluded more than just the walls and bars. As bruised and bloody guards walked or were carried out during the riot, the guards lucky enough to be outside the walls saw exactly what could have easily happened to anyone of them. A group of them gathered and refused to go back inside the destroyed prison. A list of grievances was written up, decrying the low pay that the guards received, the | understaffing, the lack of supervision and their poor training. After much coaxing, and discussion of their grievances with corrections officials and ‘several legislators they were convinced to return to work. Police were busy gathering evidence and testimony for the inevitable court cases for murder, rape, arson and kidnapping that had gone unchecked for 36 hours. The numbers of crimes overwhelmed them. Over 200 people were interviewed during the three weeks following the riot. Lawyers for the State considered court cases of another kind -- lawsuits by guards, inmates, and dead inmates’ relatives. Claims of millions of dollars were certainly to be brought against the State. The public was stunned. Many were outraged. To the people of New Mexico and elsewhere, the question was only ~~ what went wrong? ‘The local, national and’ international media picked up the riot. stories. ‘Local prison reform groups arrived at the penitentiary mid-way through that Ground Hog Day weekend. Inmates’ relatives and friends mobbed the front gate, anxious to find out what happened to . their people. Most had a long wait. For many, it was a week before they found out if a relative was alive. ‘The State Legislature, then in session, discussed all of these sudden realities, the rebuilding, the crimes, the guards and the lawsuits. With them came the questions: How much will it cost? What went wrong? How do we fix it? ‘The State, the Corrections Department and the penitentiary staff attempted to pick up the pieces and move on to repair the buildings, repair the people and repair the system in which such a catastrophe occurred. The State Legislature appropriated the money; money to rebuild the prison, prosecute crimes, conduct autopsies, house inmates out-of-state, train correctional officers, increase salaries, and investigate ‘what happened and why. Fifty million dollars - was allocated to build a new prison, should it be needed, -39-The Penitentiary Building. Easiest to gauge wes the progress of repal {he penitentiary itself. The smashed control center glass was immediately replaced by metal grillwork. | The inside of the les» ct eenter was completely funetioning by the end of August 1880 The sot eontrol grills on the southside, where the riot began were inoperable the night.of the riot. By August, 6-1/2 months after the riot, and almost a year after renovation had begun, they were finally In Working order. ‘Their operational effectiveness is still questioned by ‘correctional experts. The administrative offices, burned and By ached in. the riot, were completely renovated by early July Eikewise, the ransacked hospital was open for inmates by mid-August » Like certain equipment expected to be delivered in September. | The minus ive inventory of drugs on hand during the riot is now, stocked oxen a limited supply of single dose medication. Cellblocks 3, 4 and in’ ready for occupation in late May. Dormitories 42, Cl and Dt sowsin unused, pending a decision regarding the placement of maximum security and a forensic medicine unit. At this writing, both the kitchen and psychological units are nearly rebuilt; the Kitchen is due to resume full service by September reerehd the psychological unit is scheduled to open its doors around September 26, 1980. ‘The gymnasium was too badly burned to salvage. eerently, an out-building is being renovated to provide gym space, for CurventVareation. It is expected to be ready by November 1, 1980. J new gymnasium will be built, with completion planned for September fos: Fre gutted Protestant Chapel is scheduled to be rebuilt, by the 188). gate.” The visiting room, already in use, is scheduled to be Shlarged to provide a inore casual atmosphere. Inmates plan to build f nursery for the small children of visitors. The information booth 8 Nhe Gront of the institution remains unrepaired and unused: | Where possible, inmates have been used in repairing the damage of the riot, But security considerations limited this available resource. Security. Security has improved since the night of the riot, but correctional officers still report unsafe conditions. Supervisors are Couer orders not to be in one part of ‘the prison together at the same Lee” “Officers are strictly ordered to lock dormitory doors behind iMiwers entering the units. Double bunks have been removed from officers vith maximum number of bunks in any one dorm is 50. This Cohminates visibility problems present the night of the riot. Post Siders have been rewritten, some of which are circulated, others are Chuiting fine! epproval by the prison staff before being placed in Gach post. New key control procedures differ little from that before fhe Hot, but they have restricted the availability of keys. Solvents, ‘paint and blowtorehes are stored outside the security area. Suectvers feel that even longstanding habits of leaving corridor grills open are beginning to change- . Programs and Services. The riot caused the cancellation of some normal scheduled programs, due to destruction of physical plant or eemeceinistrative burden following the riot that left programs in é -40-position of least priority. The Prison Industries facilities, undamaged in the riot, were functioning two weeks following the riot when eleven inmates were accepted back for work (the pre-riot level was 150 inmates). This figure grew to 87 by April and 135 by September 1, 1980. The educational facilities were badly damaged in the riot. Those facilities have not yet been repaired, but nevertheless, the College of Santa Fe and Northern New Mexico Community College are beginning fall classes in several classrooms undamaged in the riot, and in three trailers acquired for that purpose. Visitation was limited to five minutes per inmate per week immediately following the riot. As inmates were rehoused and the visiting room was repaired, this time expanded until full visitation policies were resumed on April 9, 1980. New programs planned for the near future include a chapter of the Junior Chamber of Commerce, a Gavel Club sponsoring outside speakers, a Chess Club, and Conviets' Speakers Organization for Youth Awareness: Inmates. Inmates began returning from out-of-state prisons in May of 1980. As of August 29, 1980, 358 inmates remained in federal institutions, out-of-state penitentiaries and New Mexico county jails. Two hundred and fifty of these inmates have been classified and cleared for return, with priority given to minimum security inmates. The new facility at Los Lunas has room for 272 medium security inmates as soon as the final problems are resolved in opening’ that institution. ‘Thirty-five inmates will return to the penitentiary in several weeks making a final population of roughly 735 prisoners. Classification. A major obstacle to returning out-of-state inmates has been proper classification of inmates. Most inmate records were destroyed in the riot, making classification difficult. In addition, no formal mechanisms had been developed before the riot for classifying inmates. To resolve these problems, the Corrections Department created a new Intake and Classification Center (originally authorized but not funded in 1978) to standardize the classification process and reconstruct individual inmate files from probation and parole records and personal memory. Inmate files were fully reconstructed by August 20, 1980 and duplicate copies were kept at the penitentiary and at the central office of the Department of Corrections. By September 1, 1100 of the statewide roster of 1400 inmates had been classified. -4l-Inmate Disturbances. Inmates inside the penitentiary have initiated several disturbances since the riot. Fires and floods soi eet by inmates were common in the weeks after the riot. At least four inmates were hospitalized that same week due to injuries fonieted by other inmates. Two more inmates were beaten and stabbed by inmates on April 10, 1980. Five days later a food strike was Py oyor up with tear gas- A week after the first strike, April 21, 8 prowen swrike began that lasted two days and involved approximately second ston. The same month, @ PNM transfer stabbed another Now Mexico inmate in Arizona. On April 28, 1980 @ convicted rapist tscaped from. the penitentiary, the same day four PNW transfers ceca ed from the Curry County dail. Things cooled down until sumer, escapee PNM transfer was critically beaten in Oklahoma by other penitentiary transfers. The beating was reportedly inflicted on the penitentior helping @ guard during the riot. In August, an inmate inuide the penitentiary was stabbed for the same reason. On August 18, 1980, another disturbance took place in the maximum security Céliblock 3 in which four inmates and three guards were slightly {njured. | inmate charges of brutality by officers during the incident injured: substantiated. Frustrated by the ineident, one highly respected guard resigned. Guards, Frustration and resignation have run through the ranks of te guards. Fifty-six correctional officers have quit and four pre efired since the riot. These figures do not reflect the wavteon officers on duty the night of the riot who remain 00 thirteet ative leave. The main reasons offered for resignations were Safety, better paying jobs and the expense involved in commuting to the penitentiary. The majority gave little or no notice of their ths gnation. Interviews indicated that 80 percent of currently Employed officers would resign if offered a job with comparable pay cry vesponsibilities.. Officers complained of staff favoritism, lack ef supervision and lack of concern for their own safety. Administrative Turnover. ‘Twenty other penitentiary staff members have quit since the riot, including the warden, the director of nevGation, the chief classification officer, the director of fecreation, two psychologists, the Ubrarian, teachers» secretaries seeresierks. Deputy Warden Robert Montoya was transferred to the ane Gh office of the Corrections Department office after it was cCyealed that he struck en inmate two days after, the riot. Superintendent of Correctional Security Manuel Koroneos, the person in charge of prison security at the time of the riot, was ‘transferred to tre ee ntral office on April 24, 1980. Lt. Benito Gonzales, known ee tGreen Eyes” by inmates, who offered to exchange three hostages for hin during the riot, was transferred at the same time as Koroneos. ‘The new duties of Montoya, Koroneos and Gonzales are not clear one member of the Corrections’ Department remarked, "No one knows Ghat they're doing here. We don't know if they're being punished or weiraed. All we know is that they're sitting behind desks collecting hazardous duty pay.” ~42-‘The Department of Finance and Administration has confirmed that these three former penitentiary employees received hazardous duty pay until August 30, 1980. This pay is normally reserved for employees working only at the penitentiary. Corrections Department. The Corrections Department has been struggling to put itself in order since the riot. Without a corrections secretary and with little direction. at the time of the riot, the Department wes in a weak position to respond to the problems caused by the riot. Shortly afterwards, Adolf Saenz wes unanimously confirmed by the State Legislature as the Department's new Secretary. With little correctional background, Saenz directed a Department that continued. to be and grew more disorganized and demoralized. Staff complained of @ lack of support and direction from the new secretary. Empty positions were not filled; employees worked under acting directors and bureau chiefs. Work was duplicated or left undone. Following Saenz’ resignation by mutual agreement with the Governor, Belarmino Giron, the Governor's aide who had been monitoring the reconstruction of the prison became Acting Secretary. Corrections Department employees have reported that Giron has pulled the department together since his appointment. Positions in an acting status under Seenz were filled under Giron and individual job descriptions have been clarified. Some staff members continue to complain of @ lack of direction and coordinated effort. One high ranking employee said that despite Giron’s excellent administrative: ability, his acting status continues to cause the Department to operate on a “crisis to crisis basis.” Training. In the face of the many burdens of the last six months, the Department has managed to develop a training program drive with excellent potential and embryonic results. The Department was concerned over the lack of professionalism among the correctional officers and the record high turnover reducing their ranks. Forty-two correctional officers at the penitentiary have been trained since the riot under the old training program. To improve professionalism and security the Bureau of Education and Training designed a new training program that wes first used in June of 1980. The program is designed to exceed standards set by the American Correctional Association. So far, 47 correctional officers at Los Lunas have received this training and 18 supervisors, including 1 from the penitentiary. An additional 25 penitentiary guards received shortened versions of the session in August. ‘The Bureau then addressed the problem of retention. Despite the increase in starting pay from $703 to $1,000 a month provided by the legislature, guards were still leaving in record numbers. The Bureau is developing a career ladder for correctional officers to provide a -43-graduated scale of responsibilites, benefits and pay. Another prong of the attack on turnover is an intensified recruitment effort. An August Il, 1980 meeting of the corrections Master Plan Advisory Committee triggered a media blitz to speed up recruitment. The Committee urged that the hiring of correctional officers be accelerated through the personnel process. By September 4, 1980, the 34 vacancies at the time of the August Il meeting had been reduced to 12. This helped reduce the ratio of inmates to guards from 80 to 1 on the morning February 2, 1980 to 40 to 1 on Friday September 6, 1980. Despite an improved inmate-to-guard ratio, the penitentiary is hard pressed to release guards for training sessions. A class seheduled for August was cancelled when the penitentiary expleined that not enough officers could be spared from their duties. Department trainers reacted by standing at the penitentiary gates as guards ended their shifts and asked for anyone willing to be trained on his own free time. Twenty five guards volunteered and were trained under a shortened version of the full program. Other Activities. The Corrections Department has not been the only organization. involved in correcting practices at the penitentiary. Other organizations, public and private, have been involved in solving the problems of the penitentiary. A lawsuit filed years before the riot by the American Civil Liberties Union ageinst the state was finally concluded through a consent decree. Corrections officials were influential in getting the state to agree to a series of reforms, including population ceilings, uniform disciplinary procedures, basic services and personnel levels. Other corrective actions guaranteed by the consent decree included redefinition of all offenses; elimination of vague “catch all" offenses, such as, "disruptive conduct"; limitation of punishment; provision for 8 hours of meaningful daily activity for inmates and the implementation of a classification system that will insure proper program participation and housing assignments. The Attorney General's office was given a legislative mandate to investigate the events and causes of the February riot. The first report on the events of the riot was released on June 5, 1980. This Report is the second and final product of the investigation. It is a result of hundreds of interviews with Corrections Department employees and penitentiary inmates. The Citizens' Advisory Panel is a group of private individuals appointed by Governor King and the Attorney General to oversee the Attorney General's investigation. They have met II times since March to monitor the Attorney General's progress and formulate their own recommendations to the Corrections Department. The chaitman of the panel, Rey Powell, has been assisting Bill Giron in recruiting candidates for the position of Secretary of Corrections. He also sits ‘on the Corrections Master Plan Advisory Committee. The Department has succeeded’ in finding four quelified candidates as of early September, 1980. -44-In response to allegations by community prison reform groups of brutality and misconduct by penitentiary staff, Governor King asked that the Attorney General's Office investigate these allegations. One incident which was found to be factually supported resulted in the removal of Robert Montoya from his position as Deputy Werden. Other allegations have been found to be unsupported. Additional allegations are still being investigated. No charges have yet been filed against anyone accused of crimes committed during the riot. The District Attorney is considering indieting approximately 60 different individuals in connection with riot erimes. No civil suits filed against the state have been heard in Court. 508 notices of claim have been submitted to the state. Each claim may eventually evolve into a lawsuit but at this writing only eleven suits have been formally filed for damages totalling $6 million. State officials have predicated that figure will soon inerease to more than $20 million. State Representative George Fettinger's Interim Criminal Justice Study Committee -has been meeting for over a year to review the Corrections System. Since the riot their monthly meetings have served to identify problems facing the Corrections Department and guarantee that state funds are used properly in resolving them. The Committee will be instrumental in formulating legislation for the next legislative session. Their recommendations will include increasing Prison Industries pay, adding incentives for inmate participation by initiating programs, expanding the market available to Prison Industries products and engaging outside unions in training inmate laborers. In response to: suggestions by community prisons reform groups, Representative Fettingers' committee offered to consider legislation for alternatives to incarceration such as community correction programs, provided that communities offer plans to implement such Programs. Also under review is the state's determinate sentencing act. Corrections officials state that it negatively influences inmate behavior, by removing the ability to extend or reduce an inmate's sentence in response to destructive or constructive behavior. Parole officials have also commented that the law eliminates any behavioral control mechanism for those inmates nearing the end of their sentence. The Corrections Department has also been assisted by outside consultants in developing an updated Master Plan, scheduled for completion in December of 1980, The Master Plan is a well-detailed effort to identify long term (5 to 10 years) needs and goals for the Corrections Department. : -45-Summary. The penitentiary can be repaired and even a bureaucracy can be repaired. But the men who, day by day for year after year, have to look over their shoulder for the man with the knife, who lack enough opportunity to make decisions in their daily lives that they forget how to decide --these men cannot be repeired. They are forever broken by a system designed to correct them. Actions taken since the riot by the Corrections Department reflect that New Mexico has begun to attend to some long overdue problems. The cornerstone of a corrections system -- a classification system able to properly identify security levels, housing necessities and job capabilities of inmates has been implemented. ‘The first comprehensive Intake and Classification Center was proposed, authorized but not funded by the 1978 legislature because of bureaucratic malaise. In 1981 the State should finally get funding for this eritieal cornerstone. Significant progress hes been achieved to rectify the perennial problem of understaffing but if the training programs now on paper are not implemented and rigorously pursued and if basic working conditions do not improve, the unacceptably high turnover rate of correctional officers will certainly undo this achievement. Idleness among inmates is still pervasive although great effort is going into expanding education and prison industries program and reinitiating diverse programs aimed at the needs and interests of inmates. All of these steps will also be undone if the state does not commit itself to hire officials and train staff to participate in the operation of @ secure, active, and effective prison. The consent decree agreed to by New Mexico since the riot will, if monitored effectively, guarantee the implementation of many of the recommendations in this report. _ Persons running New Mexico's Corrections System and the penitentiary will have significant impact on staff and inmates, but the consent decree will insure that New Mexico will never again deviate so greatly from accepted standards of prison management. Finally, progress in rebuilding the prison since the riot will be illusory if @ new corrections secretery and a new warden are not in lace Soon and if the Department does not immediately begin to prepare inmates for their eventual release. ~46-APPENDIX A - METHODOLOGY PROCEDURES FOLLOWED IN THE INVESTIGATION In Section 9 of Chapter 24, Laws of 1980, the New Mexico Legislature appropriated to the Attorney General $100,000, "for the purpose of conducting @ study to determine the cause of the events at the State Penitentiary .on or about February 2-3, 1980, to investigate any claims the state may have against other persons and to recommend any necessary changes in the administration and facilities at the penitentiary." The Attorney General was directed to report his findings to the First Session of the Thirty-Fifth Legislature. Our initial decision was that the mandate to "determine the cause of the events" could not be accomplished without a clear picture of what had actually occurred. Our initial task, therefore, became the preparation of a detailed narrative of the riot, released on June 5, 1980, as Part I: The Penitentiary - The Riot - The Aftermath. The following persons have worked on Part-I of the investigation: Manny Aragon, David Brentlinger, Mark Colvin, Tess Monahan Fiddes, Reese Fullerton, Tim Orwig, Ken Richards, Carol Wantuchowiez and Jim Wilson. The coordinator of the investigation was Reese Fullerton. A Position paper on facilities was developed by Laban W. Wingert and released under separate cover. The writing of Part Il of the report was a combined effort of the staff. Particular credit for this work goes to Mark Colvin of the University of Colorado and Patrick Von Bargen of the Silverbridge Firm, Palo Alto, California, and to Ben M. Crouch, Ph.D., Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas. Special note is also given to Jerrie Herrera of the Attorney General's Support Staff for her assistance in the production of this report. Special note is made, too, of the staff assembled to transcribe the 302 interviews which were taken in the course of the investigation, including:: Amicus Secretarial Service and its staff; Betty Folmar, Beverly Smith, Delfinia Vigil, Carmen Quintana, Wendy Wilson. Transcription services were also provided by @ dedicated staff who logged over 1000 hours processing interviews: Patsy Cox, Mary Banks, Laura Gullette, Dinah Hesch, Barbara Lotz, Paula Sterman, Vicki Sewing, and Carol Tafoya. Special thanks goes to the coordinator of the Phase Il interview transcription, Martha Wood. Through interviews and the collection of other data, the riot investigation staff has attempted to examine the long-term factors associated with the riot of February 2 and 3, 1980. Structured interviews of prisoners, current and former prison and corrections -Al-staff es well es former inmates have been utilized in gathering fnformation about these factors. Specific research has also been iMiueted into areas of concer through the Department of Corrections sou the Penitentiary of New Mexico. The effort was hampered by the isk of offieial records. Historical data on certain areas, such as Inmate participation in programs and placement in segregation, has fuver been kept. (The Corrections Commission received reports as te the number of inmates in segregation, but these figures were not {etally aceurate. Only inmates who had been in segregation for over seventh were reported to the commission. These reports were not made @ permanent record and are not now available.) Many other, recores, 2 eeTGs disciplinary reports, were destroyed in the riot. However, sueneds which were available provided a source of substantiation for Tre data collected in the personal interviews which form the basis for our findings. Interviews during this part of the investigation were conducted with s7 inmates, 34 guards, 13 former inmates, 4 former guards and with at Corrections Depertment officials and officials associated with Che"Bopartment over the past 10 years. ‘The interviews were intensive, Ining two. to four hours and covering the 0-year Corrections, hitowy. ‘These interviews supplemented the 169 interviews conducted Guring. Phase I of the investigation. Inmates and correctional curlers were randomly selected for a cross-section of perspectives: Since e history of the last ten years had to be reconstructed, the saeetviews were eondueted with persons who hed long-term and short intervicsociation with the prison. Additional staff and inmates who erm ex part of the random selection were also interviewed. Their {etimony differed little from those randomly selected. Three inmates sesrie orrectional officers who were randomly selected refused to be interviewed. ‘All interviews with inmates and correctional officers were voluntary and anonymous. The names of the guards and inmates Nort vever mentioned during the tape-recorded session, nor do names of participants appeer on transcripts. ‘In| addition, inmates were Poquested not to mention the names of other inmates during the feaucniew .sinee the investigation did not concern specific individual criminal acts or misdeeds. Included in this Appendix are the two questionnaires used for inmates and correctional officers. The ex-convict questionnaire (not. ineluded here) wes tailored after the inmote questionnaire. Ger ent and former officials were asked individualized questions Govering specifie areas appropriate to the individual. eeee -A2-PHASE IL PRISONER QUESTIONNAIRE Interview Instruction: Have respondent read, or read for him, the Confidentiality Statement. Explain to him that to insure confidentiality we are asking him not to mention his name during the interview, nor the names of any other prisoners. Also explain that once tapes are transcribed, the tapes will be destroyed, so voice identification will not be possible. Explain the interview format to him. First, I'm going to ask you some general questions about your background. Then, Til ask you about your experiences with various prison programs and activities. Also to help us gain an understandin of the general conditions in the Penitentiary of New Mexico prior to the riot, I'm going to ask you questions about the prison staff and their activities, and questions about the types of groups among prisoners and their activities. Again, we do not want your name or the name of any other prisoners mentioned in this interview. We are interested in finding out about general conditions, not specific acts of any individual prisoners. This interview should take about 2 hours. We are going to cover every aspect of the prison we can. Then, test your tape recorder. When turning on the tape recorder, ‘the interviewer should say, "This is an interview with an anonymous prisoner from the Penitentiary of New Mexico." (Time, date, and place of interview are not important, so do not mention them.) QUESTIONS Follow the sequence of: questions as closely as possible, guiding respondent back to subject and format if he begins to stray. 1. Have you read or have you had explained to you the Attorney General's policy on confidentiality for this interview? Do you understand the confidentiality policy? b. Do you understand that you are not to mention your own name or the name of any other prisoners during this interview? 2. Have you previously been interviewed by anyone investigating the February riot? If so, by what agency? ~A3-BACKGROUND First, let's cover some general background questions: 3. What was the highest grade you completed in school before coming to prison? a. Have you completed a higher grade since being in prison? 4. What was your primary occupation before coming to prison? (Probe for ‘specific jobs) a. Have you learned any new job skills since entering prison? b. If yes, what are these skills? 5. On the outside, where have you lived most of your life? a. Have you lived mostly in cities, small towns or rural areas? b. Have you lived in New Mexico most of your life or in other states? 6. How long have you been at the Penitentiary of New Mexico? a. Is this current sentence your first time in the Penitentiary? b. How old were you when you first came to the penitentiary? PROGRAMS 7. Now I would like to get your opinion about different programs and activities that are: available at the penitentiary. I'm showing you a list of activities at the penitentiary. I want you take each activity and give it a rating from 0 to 5. Zero means you think the program is really bad and a 5 would mean the program is really good. A. So let's start with caseworkers. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate caseworkers or classification services on a seale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it that rating? Since you have been here, has this changed? Has it gotten better or worse? AdB. Now let's ‘do the same thing for the psychological services. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate psychological services on a scale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have been here, has this changed? Has it gotten better or worse? Now medical services. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate medical services on a scale of 0 to 5? Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have been here, has this changed? Has it gotten better or worse? Now educational services. Based on the last ‘six months, before the riot how would you rate the educational services on a scale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have been here, how have the educational services changed? Have they gotten better or worse? E. Now recreation programs. Again, based on the lest six months before the riot, how would you rate recreation programs on a scale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have been here, how have the recreation programs changed? Have you gotten better or worse? F. Now food services. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate food services on a scale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have been here, how have food services changed? Have they gotten better or worse? G. Now canteen services. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate canteen services on a scale of 0 to 5?a. Why would you give it that rating? b. Sine you have been here, how have canteen services changed? Have they gotten bette or worse? Now religious services. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate religious services on a seale of 0 to 5? (Are you rating the Catholic or Protestant or both?) a. Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have have been here have religious services changed? Have they gotten better or worse? Now visitation programs. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate the visitation program on & seale of 0 to 5? Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have been here has the visitation program changed? Has it gotten better or worse? Now outside activities like clubs where outsiders come into tho institutions and meet inmates. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate the outside programs on a scale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it that rating? b. Since you have been here, have outside programs changed? Have they gotten better or worse? Now prison industries: Besed.on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate prison industries on @ scale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it this rating? b. Have prison industries changed since you've been in prison? Have they gotten better or worse? Now work assignments. Based on the last six months before the riot, how would you rate the work assignment program on a scale of 0 to 5? a. Why would you give it this rating? b. Has the work assignments program changed since you were in prison? Has it gotten better or worse?M, 10. Before the riot, what program or work assignment were you in? a. Why would you give it this rating? b. Did it really keep you busy for your whole time during the assignment? Did you find yourself standing around quite a bit? Now I want you to give me your feeling about the quality of Programs generally under the last five wardens. Tell how available programs were and whether they helped inmates under a. Rodriguez (1975 and before); b. Aaron; ec. Malley; d. Romero; e. Griffin. Do you think programs help in rehabilitating inmates? Why or why not? Do you think programs provide incentives or motivation for inmates to keep good conduet in the penitentiary? Why or why not? Relations between Steff and Inmates Now I want to ask you some questions about the relationship between inmates and staff. nu. Now 12, First, deseribe for me the relationship between staff members and inmates during the six months before the riot. a. Has this relationship changed since you have been in prison? b. Describe what the relationship between staff and inmates was like under each of the last five wardens? a. Rodriguez (1975 and before) b. Aaron; ¢. Malley;-d. Romero; e. Griffin. I want to ask you about some specific areas. In the six months before the riot, how would you describe the level of trust between guards and inmates? @. Since you have been in prison has the, level of trust between guards and inmates changed? What about the level of contact between staff and inmates; has this changed since you have been in the prison? -AT-13. In the six months prior to the riot, were guards predictable in the way they acted; that is, did inmates know what to expect from guards? Since you have been here, has the behavior of guards been getting more consistent or less consistent or has it been about the same? In your opinion, what are the qualities that make a good correctional officer? 14, In the six months prior to the riot, was treatment of inmates by staff fair? a. Since you have been here, has treatment become more fair, less fair or has it stayed about the same? Have there been instances where staff members have harassed inmates? If yes, give me some examples of what you are talking about. @. Have you ever actually witnessed (not just heard about) a staff member(s) physically beating an inmate? On how many occasions? Describe the incidents. 15. T want to ask you some questions about disciplinary procedures. . First, do you think the rules that inmates must live by are fair and reasonable? a. Do you think most inmates agree with your opinion? b. Do you think inmates’ opinion about the reasonableness or fairness of rules has changed since you have been here? c. If it has changed, when did you first start noticing this change in opinion among inmates? B. In the six months before the riot, was the enforcement of rules consistent; that is did rule enforcement change from captain to captain or guard to guard? a. How has the consistency of rule enforcement changed sinee you have been in the prison, has it gotten more consistent or more inconsistent? ~A8C. What do inmates think of the Disciplinary Committee? a. Has the Disciplinary Committee changed in the way it operates since you have been here? D. 1 want you to describe for me the use of segregation, or Celiblock 3, and tell me how the use of segregation has changed under each of the last five wardens. Did the warden use segregation more or less than other wardens? a. Rodriguez; (1975 and before) b. Aaron; ce. Malley; d. Romero; e. Griffin. 16. Now I want to ask you some questions about how the administration uses informants (again I'm not asking you to name other inmates.) A. Can you describe for me how the informant system worked in the six months prior to the riot? a. Since you have been in the prison, has the informant system changed as far as you can tell? Describe the informant system under 1) Rodriguez, 2) Aaron, 3) Malley, 4) Romero, 5) Griffin. Are informants somehow “paid off" or "threatened" for information? Has this changed since you've been in the prison? Is it obvious who informants are? Has this changed since you have been in the prison? D. Since you have been in the prison, does there seem to have been an increase or decrease in the number of inmates needing protective custody? Why do you think it has increased or decreased? E. Tell me how most inmates view informants. 17. Now I want you to give me a comparison of, how much control each of the last five wardens had over the prison. ‘ell me for each warden, did he control the staff or did a group of middle-level administrators emerge as powerful? a. Rodriguez; (1975 and before) b. Aaron; ¢, Malley; d. Romero; e. Griffin. . -A9-18. Now I want you to give me a similar comparison of security deder each warden. By security I mean keeping people locked inand preventing free movement of inmates. For each warden was security loose or was it tight? a. Rodriguez; (1975 and before) b. Aaron; c. Malley; d- Romero; e. Griffin. Relations between Inmates. Now I want to ask you some questions about living with other inmates. 19. 20. a. 22, 23. 24. From your experience, what is it like living in @ dormitory as compared to living in a cellblock? When you first arrived at the penitentiary, how long did it take you to adjust to the place? a. How were you able to adjust or establish yourself in the prison? b. Who helped with your adjustment the most, staff or other inmates? How many inmates do you feel close to? a. Are you a part of a group or are you more of a loner? b. Are most of your friends in here (Black, Chicano, Anglo - use respondent's race)? ¢. Are most of your friends from your home town? In the six months before the riot, did inmates generally trust each other? Has the level of trust between inmates changed since you have been here? a Do you feel that recently a different type of inmate has been coming into prison? a. If yes, how are they different? b. Is the inmate code which says "do your own time” still respected among inmates? Let's say a new inmates comes in, another (give respondent's race Black, Chicano, White) from your home town. Now you have to teach him’ the ropes of how to survive in this prison. ~A-lO-25. 26. 2. 28. What would you tell him to look out for in terms of games other inmates-might run on him? What group of inmates should he hang with? What groups should he avoid? d. What other advice would you give him? Describe for me the relationship between racial groups in the penitentiary during the last six months before the riot. a. How has the relationship between races changed since you have been here? During the six months before the riot, were there inmates or groups of inmates (I don't want names) who sort of helped "keep the lid on," that is who were powerful enough to keep other inmates in line? Over the years, have you noticed if the same inmates or groups kept other inmates in line or have these changed? (If yes, they have changed,) when did you notice the change? who was warden then? What are the predominant inmate groups in the prison? a. Do they have names? (Suggest Aryan Brotherhood, Mexican Mafia, Black Muslims -- names that appear in newspapers.) b. Do these groups carry a lot of influence in the penitentiary? ¢. Which group is the strongest? Which of the groups is the weakest? d. Has the strength of these groups changed since you have been in the prison? If yes, when did you notice the change -- who was warden then? How did it change? e. Where do you see yourself as fitting in with these groups? Has the level of violence between inmates changed since you have been in prison? Has it become more violent or less violent? a. If it has changed, when did it start changing, under which warden? b. What types of inmates (not names) seem to be the victims of violence? ~AclI-29. 30. al. 32. What seemed to be some of the main reasons for violence? {racial tension, debts owed, gangs or cliques, sexual exploitation.) For the last five wardens, tell me if the level of drugs in the prison was high or low under: a. Rodriguez; (1975 and before) b. Aaron; c. Malley; d. Romero; e. Griffin. Since you have been here, was there a time that inmates who wanted drugs had a difficult time getting them? When was this? Who was the warden then? What types of drugs have been available in the prison? Hes this changed since you have been here? How have drugs entered the prison? What types of inmates (not names) seem to control drug trafficking? @. Has there been a group of inmates who control drug trafficking? b. Has control of drug trafficking changed to different groups sinee you've been in the prison? e. Are you aware of any competition between groups for control of drug trafficking? What other activities would you describe as "business activities" among prisoners before the riot? (i.e., buying protection, prostitution.) a. Were there groups who controlled these “business activities?" b. If yes, has control of other business activities changed since you have been in the prison? ¢. Was there much "green" cash in the institution? If yes, how did prisoners get cash? Did the level or amount of "green" cash seem to increase or decrease or fluctuate since you've been in the prison? In the eyes of the prisoners, what makes a good inmate? Before the riot, what was the time or activity during your cay when you felt the least tension or anxiety? a. When did you feel the most tension or anxiety? -Ad12-Now I want to ask you ‘some general questions to get your opinion about different issues raised by the riot. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39, 40. 41. What effect do you think the ACLU suit against the penitentiary had? - a. Do:you think the ACLU suit raised expectations about changes? b. If so, did these expectations contribute to the riot? What do you think has been the effet of the rapid turnover of wardens at the penitentiary? What do you think have been the effects of the new determinate sentencing act? (Flat time sentencing.) Do you think the death penalty had anything to do with the fact that the guards, hostages, were not killed? What do you’ think should be the purpose of the prison? a. What do you think the purpose of the prison actually is? What do you think caused the February riot? What recommendations, if any, do you have for changing the corrections system in New Mexico? How do you feel about the future? Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the prison system here in New Mexico? Is there anything else you would like to add before we end this interview? 1 am sorry this interview has been so long but there is a lot we need to learn about the prison. ‘Thank you for your cooperation. ACIPHASE I CORRECTIONAL OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE Interview Instructions Have respondent read or read for him the Confidentiality Statement. Explain to him that to insure confidentiality we are asking him not to mention his name during the interview. Also explain that once the tapes are transcribed, the tapes will be destroyed, so voice identification will not be possible. Explain the interview format to him: "First, I'm going to ask you some general questions about yourself and your background. then, Tl ask you about your experiences with various prison programs and activities. Also to help us gain an understanding of the general conditions in the Penitentiary of New Mexico prior to the riot, I'm going to ask you questions about the prison staff and their activities, and questions about the types of groups among prisoner and their activities. Again, we do not want your name mentioned in this interview. We are interested in finding out about general conditions, not about specific acts of any individuals. This interview should take about 2 hours. We are going to cover every aspect of the prison we can.” Then, test your tape recorder. When turning on the tape recorder, the interviewer should say, "This is an interview with an anonymous correctional officer from the Penitentiary of New Mexico." (Time, date, and place of interview are not important, so do not mention them.) QUESTIONS Follow the sequence of questions as closely as possible, guiding respondent back to subject and format if he begins to stray. 1, Have you read or have you had explained to you the Attorney General's policy on confidentiality for this interview? a. Do you understand the confidentiality policy? b. Do you understand that you are not to mention your own name during this interview? 2. Have you previously been interviewed by anyone investigating the February riot? If so, by what agency? ~Ald-First, let's cover some general background question: 3. Before getting into prison work, what was your primary occupation? 4. How old are you? 5. What was the last grade you completed in school? 6. How long have you worked as a correctional officer at PNM? 7. Are you still working at PNM? 8. Are you married? a. How many children do you have? How does being a correctional officer affect your family? 9. Where were you raised? Let's talk now about the time that you actually started working at the penitentiary. 10. When did you start working at the penitentiary? Ul. How did you happen to come and work at the penitentiary? Be specific. 12, Do you have relatives that work at the penitentiary? a. If yes, did they get you interested in correctional work? b. How many relatives do you have at the penitentiary? ¢. Where do they work at the penitentiary? 13, What kind of training did you receive as a correctional officer and when did you receive training? a. How would you evaluate the training in terms of preparing you, or any correctional officer, for what you have to do each day? b. What do you think is the most important thing to stress during training? + Were you encouraged by your supervisors to get training? ~AddS=14. Now after your formal training, once you were on the job, who gave you the most assistance in “learning the ropes. 15. Suppose you had to teach a new correctional officer who was a friend of yours wht he had to do on the job. a. What would you tell him to look out for in terms of inmates b. What would you tell him to look out for in terms of other staff members? ¢. What other advice would you give him? Now, I'd like to ask you about a number of aspects of your job. In each case, I want you to think first how it was in the months just before the riot. Then I want you to think back how it was under the last several wardens and tell me how things were under each warden or as best as you can. Let's start with the inmates. 16. Just before the riot, how would you describe relations or dealings between inmates and guards? Probes: a. Was there a lot of tension between inmates and guards? Did you and other officers feel in danger? b. Were guards supportive of inmates or did they try to help inmates? Did differences in ethnie groups between guards and inmates eause problems? Be specific. Describe for me what a new guard could expect from inmates in the months prior to the riot? Now consider how guards and inmates related to each other under the last five wardens. Describe the relations between inmates and guards under: Rodriguez; (1975 and before) Aaron; Malley; Romero; Griffin. 17. While we're on the subject of inmates, could you describe for me what inmate groups seem to be the strongest? Probes: a. Do these groups have names or are. they identifiable? ~Ac16-b. Was there much drug trafficking in the institution the months prior to the riot? ¢. What about drug trafficking in the past? Under which warden did it seem to be the highest? 4. Did any inmate groups seem to control drug trafficking? e. How have inmate groups changed since you were working at the prison? When did you start noticing this change? Who was the warden then? f. Did any new inmate groups seem to emerge as powerful in the recent past? When did you start noticing this change? Who was Warden then? g. Do individual inmtes seem to be different than they were in the past? If yes, how have they changed? h, What do you think makes a good inmate? Let's talk now about supervision of steff at the penitentiary. Again, think first about just prior to the riot. 18. Are you in a supervisory position at the penitentiary? 19. How would you evaluate the quality of supervision just prior to the riot? Probes: a. Why do you evaluate it that way? b. How much help do supervisors give to new men? ©. Were you and other officers always clear on what you were supposed to do on 2 daily basis? d. How ‘often did your supervisor talk to you on a daily basis? Under what circumstances did he talk to you? e. Do you feel that your supervisors kept you adequately informed about what was going on or doming down in the prison? f. In your daily activities (such as writing up disciplinary reports) did supervisors support officers or back them up? . sAIT=g- Tell me if there was much favoritism shown by supervisors. What was the basis of favoritism? h. Have you witnessed any incidents where employees were harassed by the administration? Be specific. i. Now think about what we have just discussed in terms of the quality of supervision and tell me about supervision under, the five wardens before the riot. How was supervision under: a) Rodriguez; (1975 and before) b) Aaron; ¢) Malley; d) Romero; e) Griffin? j. What do you think is the most important quality of a supervisor? Of a warden? Now think about relationship between fellow officers. 20. In the months just before the riot, how did line officers get along with each other? Probes: 2. a. There seemed to be a lot of young officers and a lot of older officers. Did this gap in age and experience cause any problems? b. Did ethnic differences between officers cause any problems? Do officers feel isolated from each other? Is there a feeling of being on a team in your shift? What about for the whole staff? 4. How do other officers treat a new man beginning work at the prison? e. Have the relations among line officers changed over the last few years? How were relations among officers under the following wardens (e.g., were officers isolated or did they feel part of a team: a) Rodriguez; b) Aaron; ¢) Malley; d) Romero; e) Griffin? There is a lot of turnover at the penitentiary especially for Correctional Officers T's. Why do you think turnover is so high? a. How was staff morale in the months before the riot? b. Did officers trust each other? If not, why not? ~A-18-22. 23. 24, 25. 26. c. How has staff morale changed? How was morale under: a) Rodriguez; b). Aeron; ¢) Malley; d) Romero; e) Griffin? If you could find a job with at least the same pay and benefits of a correctional officer, and which is equally demanding ,, would you leave the prison? Why or why not? What does an officer have to do to get a promotion at the penitentiary? a. Are officers encouraged to increase their formal education? b. Are promotions based on merit or training received? Did you notice any changes in security just prior to the riot? a. Was security tight or lax just prior to the riot? b. Were Security procedures consistent under each shift captain? How was security under each of the last five wardens? Was it tight or lax under (give examples, please a) Rodriguez; b) Aaron; c) Malley; d) Romero; e) Griffin? Did you notice any changes in discipline just prior to the riot? a. Was discipline strict or lax just prior to the riot? b. Was discipline consistent under each shift captain? e. Deseribe the discipline under each of the last five wardens in terms of both strictness and consistency: 2) Rodriguez; b) Aaron; ¢) Malley; d) Romero; e) Griffin? d. Are you aware of any incidents of harassment of inmates by staff? Specify. Have you witnessed any physical beatings of inmates by guards? Give specifies. Did you notice any difference in the use of informants just prior to the riot? a. Were inmates less likely to volunteer information just prior to the riot?2. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. b. Has trust ‘between correctional officers and inmates diminished over the years? ¢. Do some staff members solicit information from inmates through either promises or threats? If yes, has this inereased recently or has it been practiced at about the same level? How prevalent is this practice? d. Has "snitching" changed under the different wardens? How were informants handled under: a) Rodriguez; b) Aaron; ¢) Malley; d) Romero; e) Griffin? I want to focus now on programs. a. Do correctional officers generally support such programs as education, prison industries, or psychological services? Which programs do they support? Which programs do they not support? b. Do these programs help with rehabilitation? ¢. Do these programs provide incentives for inmates to keep good conduct? 4. How do correctional officers get along with program staff members? e. Describe the support for programs and the availability of programs under: a) Rodriguez; b) Aaron; c) Malley; d) Romero; e) Griffin? What do you think the purpose of the prison should be? a, What do you think the purpose of the prison actually is? How do you think the rapid turnover of wardens has affected the penitentiary? What effect do you think the ACLU suit against the penitentiary had? a. Do you think the ACLU suit raised expectations about changes? b. If so, did these expectations contribute to the riot? What do you think have been the effects of the new determinate sentencing act? Do you think the death penalty had anything to do with the fact that the guards, hostages, were not killed? ~A-20-33. What do you think caused the February riot? 34. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changing the corrections system in New Mexico? 35. Since the riot, do you feel more optimistic or do you feel pessimistic about making the prison system work? 36. Is there anything else you would like to add before we end this interview? I'm sorry this interview has been so long; but there is a lot we need to learn about the prison. Thank you for your cooperation. ~Ad-‘APPENDIX B EXCERPTS FROM GRAND JURY REPORTS, 1971-1980 7/21/tl: We were generally impressed with the academic ilities”and their programs of furthering the education of residents. We were equally impressed with the vocational training facilities. but felt that there was a need to make the facilities available to more residents. If it should be necessary to expand the number of trained personnel in the area of vocational rehabilitation, we would urge that funds be made available for this purpose. ...In connection with a full time resident psychiatrist we would urge one to be hired who is particularly trained in the areas of criminal Psychology, narcotics counselling and alcoholism and that money be made available for this purpose. We request the Court to forward the request for funds to the Legislative Finance Committee and to inform the Legislative Finance Committee of our recommendations. We would urge the use of outside volunteer personnel to aid in areas that are understaffed. We would recommend that the penitentiary staff take advantage of available federal funds for purposes of drug abuse rehabilitation . ‘The previous Grand Jury has recommended consideration of inmates with special dietary needs. Nothing has been done along this line. We suggest that consultation be utilized from the New Mexico Dietetic Association. Section 42-1-31.2 requires that physician examine all prisoners when received into the Penitentiary. Random selection of twelve (12) medical records did not reveal any documentation that such examination was performed by a physician. The admitting exam reports were all signed by Frank Stockham, Hospital Administrator, whose job description requires him to function at a sub-professional level. "In view of the statutory provision for examination by a physician, it appears that Mr. Stockham is performing in a capacity beyond his job description and beyond his educational preparation.. Prescription type medication administered both orally and by injection are piven to Inmates without the written authorization of @ ‘This _may in fact be in conflict with the New Mexico physician. Medical Practice Act and should be referred to the New Mexico Board of Examiners for further investigation. (Emphasis added.) 7/24/12: The college edueation program which is available to inmates should also be made available as a fringe benefit tor guards and_other_members of the Penitentiary staff. It is not consistent with the trend toward higher education of personnel in penal systems to educate prisoners beyond the level of educational achievement of the prison staff. (Emphasis added.) -B--12/8/12: ‘The Warden brought it to our attention that the beds usually provided lin Cellblock 3} were removed bocarte they were used tevpreak the commodes and lavoratories during the disturbance. Some of the commodes and lavoratories which had been broken were stuffed with rags to cover sewer pipes and to eliminate as much of the Ss eree "possible. In our opinion this is a health hazard- Food trays are presently distributed through openings at the bottom of the cell door. These areas were found to be very Besenitary. Openings should be relocated to about waist level for the passing of food trays. CELLBLOCK 3 - RECOMMENDATIONS: 1, That additional officers be assigned in an effort to prevent further disturbances. 9, That existing living conditions be improved immediately. ‘That a porter be assigned to CB 3. b. ‘That inmates be transferred to cells with the propel facilities (within CB3), until such time thet repairs are completed in {hg eslls that were damaged during the disturbance. ce. That the beds that were removed be returned immediately. 4, Inmates housed in this unit complained about insects. ‘That the existing contract with the exterminating company be reviewed and that this condition be corrected. the Grand Jury set through a complete hearing to obsetve the disciplinary proceedings. Below are some comments and recommendations concerning this committee. 1. That a listing be provided to the general population showing a list of infractions and the penalty that will be imposed for such an fifraction of the rules. At present the inmates ete ‘at the mercy of eircummittee which can end, does recommend “various penalties for one $ttense, which in our opinion were too sever Emphasis added.) 2, That the membership of the committee be compased of only two penitentiary employees and that | three members be nonpartisan Powitduals (probably to be appointed by the Corrections ‘Commission or the Governor.) 29/13: We toured the entire facility and found that it is generally in good condition and very, well maintained. However, Bertain passageways and stairways within the several cellblocks and Gormitory areas were not up to the cleanliness standards of the main fiiiways, Several broken windows stuffed with rags and other