On “Bullshit Jobs”

By Chris Wright

Referring to cultural Marxism, especially the Frankfurt School, Noam Chomsky once said, “I don’t
find that kind of work very illuminating… The ideas that seem useful also seem pretty simple, and
I don’t understand what all the verbiage is for.” While I think there’s much of value in the so-
called Western Marxist tradition—for instance, I’m partial to Georg Lukács (more so than to
Adorno and others in the Frankfurt School)—I have to admit I strongly sympathize with Chomsky.
But his criticism generalizes, and is even truer in other areas: since well before the mid-twentieth
century, a large amount of work in the humanities has been prone to unnecessary and sometimes
incomprehensible verbiage. Later this tendency came to be associated with postmodernism, for it
was most pronounced in the writings of such luminaries as Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva, Deleuze, and
Foucault, as well as their hordes of epigones. By the end of the twentieth century, a vast field of
“Theory” had reached maturity, encompassing much of philosophy, anthropology, psychoanalysis,
and literary, film, and cultural studies.

As an anthropologist, David Graeber works in this broadly conceived “interpretive” tradition (I

call it that because it consists essentially of endless cultural and social “interpretations” or
“theories,” often playful and highly verbose conceptual exercises). He has an advantage over many
of his peers in that, while not a particularly great writer, he can at least write clearly and informally
enough to be widely read. Presumably this lucidity helps account for his fame—as do, more
importantly, his heterodox ideas, his ability to capture a cultural mood even in the titles of his
books (Debt, The Utopia of Rules, Bullshit Jobs), and his impressive productivity. Perhaps he’s
too productive: while reading his latest book, I couldn’t help thinking it would have packed a
greater punch if he had shortened it by a third. It meanders and meanders, repeats and repeats, and,
well, I didn’t understand what all the verbiage was for.

The full title of his book is Bullshit Jobs: A Theory. I wasn’t able to find the “theory,” unless it be
that bullshit jobs do in fact exist. And Graeber marshals abundant evidence to test and confirm that
theory. The most entertaining, and probably the most valuable, parts of the book are the many
testimonies he presents from poor souls who spend their lives in a bullshit job, which is to say a
job they think shouldn’t exist because it contributes nothing to the world. The numbers of people
who believe this are incredibly high. One poll in the United Kingdom found that only 50 percent
of people with full-time jobs were sure their job made a meaningful contribution to the world,
while 37 percent were sure theirs didn’t. A poll in Holland put the latter number at 40 percent.
Even jobs that aren’t bullshit, like nurses and professors, are being increasingly bullshitized, as
paperwork, meetings, and other administrative duties crowd out more meaningful tasks like taking
care of patients and teaching. (Nurses reported to Graeber that as much as 80 percent of their time
is now taken up with meetings, filling out forms, and the like.) Considering these facts, as well as
the existence of many second-order bullshit jobs (jobs done in support of those directly engaged
in bullshit), Graeber estimates that well over half of all work being done in society could be
eliminated without making any real difference.

What sorts of jobs are we talking about? Not most lower-tier jobs: not street cleaners, bus drivers,
repairmen, restaurant workers, store clerks, gardeners, construction workers, etc. These people
make a contribution to the world. Graeber suggests a rough five-fold classification of bullshit jobs.
First are flunkies: jobs that exist “only or primarily to make someone else look or feel important.”
This includes doormen, many receptionists (those who have hardly anything to do and find the job
oppressively dull), some HR assistants, and the like. Second are “goons,” jobs that have an
aggressive element but “exist only because other people employ them.” For instance, most
lobbyists, PR specialists, telemarketers, corporate lawyers (“I contribute nothing to the world and
am utterly miserable all of the time,” one said), and national armed forces, which exist only
because other countries have armies. “If no one had an army, armies would not be needed.” As for
PR specialists, one of them probably spoke for many when he opined that every person who works
in or for the entire advertising industry simply “manufactur[es] demand and then exaggerat[es] the
usefulness of the products sold to fix it.” He concluded, “If we’re at the point where in order to
sell products, you have to first of all trick people into thinking they need them, then I think you’d
be hard-pressed to argue that these jobs aren’t bullshit.”

Third is the category of “duct tapers,” people whose jobs exist only because of a glitch in the
organization, “who are there to solve a problem that ought not to exist.” Often this includes
underlings who have to fix mistakes made by incompetent superiors. Or do nothing but deal with
customers irate because something went wrong. Fourth are “box tickers,” who allow an
organization to be able to claim it’s doing something it actually isn’t doing. One testimony is from
a guy who was Senior Quality and Performance Officer in a local council in the United Kingdom;
most of what he did involved ticking boxes, “pretending things are great to senior managers, and
generally ‘feeding the beast’ with meaningless numbers that give the illusion of control. None of
which helps the citizens of that council in the slightest.”

The fifth category is taskmasters, people who do nothing but assign work to others, create bullshit
tasks for others to do, or supervise bullshit. Middle management frequently falls under this
category, as when managers oversee workers who could perform just as well, or sometimes better,
without oversight. “I just got promoted to this job,” one manager says, “and I spend a lot of my
time looking around and wondering what I’m supposed to be doing.” That’s a common complaint:
being forced to supervise people who don’t need supervision. (Readers of Harry Braverman’s
classic Labor and Monopoly Capital won’t find this complaint surprising at all.) Frequently
positions with the word ‘strategic’ in their names—Strategic Dean, Vice President of Strategic
Development, Strategic Officer—are bullshit. “All I could do,” one such person said, “was come
up with a new strategy that was in effect a re-spin of already agreed-upon strategies.” But these
people are given their own staff, which they have to try to find work for.

Graeber’s classification system is somewhat interesting, though, as he acknowledges, it leaves out

a lot. One huge area of bullshit it leaves out he doesn’t mention at all: bullshit academic research.
Surely the large majority of academic research makes essentially no contribution to the world,
except to pad CVs and advance careers. Endless conferences, “calls for papers” sent out for yet
another conference, thousands upon thousands of scholarly articles published every year most of
which are read by hardly anyone (more often simply glanced over). Much of the writing isn’t only
irrelevant and uninteresting, superficial and unchallenging, but even perverse: again, one thinks of
postmodernist obscurantism, relativism, and idealism. In the case of postmodernism and, more
generally, the idealism (and centrism) of bourgeois scholarship and journalism, the bullshit serves
an obvious purpose for the establishment: it distracts from structures of class and power, obscures
understanding of how society works, and does nothing to advance left-wing dissent. (I discuss
these matters here.)

Graeber devotes a couple of chapters to what it’s like to work in a bullshit job and why people so
often report themselves miserable. According to bourgeois psychological theories, after all, it
might seem that some of these jobs are great. You hardly have to work, you have barely any real
responsibilities, you can spend hours playing computer games or surfing the web. You can (in
many cases) be almost as lazy as, supposedly, you want to be just by virtue of being human. But
of course humans are not, in fact, lazy by nature, creatures who have to be driven to work, as
bourgeois ideologies proclaim. They want to work, but on creative and enjoyable tasks. Their
fundamental desire is not to slack off but to have a meaningful life, full of purpose, creativity,
exploration, and love, a life of contributions to the world. To work in an utterly pointless job,
therefore, day in and day out, month after month, can be maddening, soul-killing torture. It seems
that the respect and prestige these people might be accorded can make it even worse, heightening
their sense of being frauds or parasites.

Many of the testimonies Graeber has compiled are both sad and hilarious. Most are too long to
quote here, but I’ll quote one, from a security guard:

I worked as a museum guard for a major global security company in a museum

where one exhibition room was left unused more or less permanently. My job was
to guard that empty room, ensuring no museum guests touched the…well, nothing
in the room, and ensure nobody set any fires. To keep my mind sharp and attention
undivided, I was forbidden any form of mental stimulation, like books, phones, etc.

Since nobody was ever there, in practice I sat still and twiddled my thumbs for
seven and a half hours, waiting for the fire alarm to sound. If it did, I was to calmly
stand up and walk out. That was it.

One might think of this guard’s job as a literal realization of the metaphorical meaning of thousands
of positions filled by tens of millions of people. The colossal waste of human potential is beyond
comprehension.

The natural question, aside from how to change this terrible collective situation, is how all these
worthless jobs started proliferating in the first place. Why aren’t we all working fifteen-hour
weeks? If we got rid of the pointless jobs and the pointless aspects of the real jobs, the resulting
work could easily be taken care of by our working fifteen- or twenty-hour weeks. In fact, back in
1930 John Maynard Keynes predicted that in a hundred years the problem of scarcity would have
been solved, and the major problem of the age would be to find ways to prevent ourselves from
going insane with boredom. So what happened?

This is a complicated historical question that gets to the heart of how capitalism has evolved over
the last century, so it isn’t to Graeber’s discredit that he doesn’t fully answer it. He first dispatches
two answers conservatives give: that the world has become so complicated we need all these jobs,
and they aren’t really as pointless as they seem; and that even if there are bullshit jobs, it’s only
because government regulations have led to a growing number of useless bureaucrats. These
answers are on the intellectual level of most conservatism, and Graeber refutes them with ease.
With one piece of evidence. He points out that between 1985 and 2005 the proportion of
administrators and their staff in American universities shot up even though the number of teachers
per students remained largely constant. Teaching and writing certainly haven’t become so
complicated they suddenly need far more administrators and staffers—so why the bullshitization
of universities? It isn’t because of the big bad government either, since the number of
administrators at private institutions has increased at more than twice the rate it did at public ones.
So there goes the “libertarian” notion of government wastefulness. “In fact,” Graeber comments,
“the only reasonable interpretation of these numbers is precisely the opposite: public universities
are ultimately answerable to the public, and hence, under constant political pressure to cut costs
and not engage in wasteful expenditures.”

Graeber’s own answer is that capitalism has changed its character since the days when it somewhat
approximated conditions of perfect competition. When capitalism was mainly about producing
things competitively, the argument that free-market enthusiasts give against the notion that
corporations would ever hire unnecessary workers to do bullshit jobs made sense: maximizing
profits meant paying the least number of workers the least amount possible. To hire a large number
of redundant workers would be absurd. But, as Graeber argues, the logic of the economy has
changed in the last forty years, with the rise of financial capitalism and the FIRE sector (including
insurance and real estate). The main object now is not to produce goods competitively but to
distribute large sums of money, to distribute the proceeds from enormous amounts of debt, to
create money (by giving loans) and then move it around in very complex ways while extracting
fees with every transaction. “The results often leave bank employees feeling that the entire
enterprise is…pointless.”

So, “when a profit-seeking enterprise is in the business of distributing a very large sum of money,
the most profitable thing for it to do is to be as inefficient as possible.” It can then find pretexts to
take more cuts, even acting against the interests of its clients, and using its profits to hire more
people and grow bigger. There seems, indeed, to be a tendency inherent in large bureaucracies,
whether corporate or political, to expand, to suck up more resources as an end in itself. Graeber
gives a name to the “new” dynamic that has emerged in capitalism: managerial feudalism. It’s
supposed to be analogous to the creation of hierarchies of nobles and officials in medieval Europe
through a process of devolution called “sub-infeudation,” in which a king would grant land to a
duke, who would use the resources from that land to support a huge retinue of courtiers and vassals,
many of whom would be granted their own plots of land that could support their own retinues, and
so on down to local knights and lords of the manor.

“The rise of managerial feudalism has produced a similar infatuation with hierarchy for its own
sake.” Managers manage other managers, each with their own staff; various levels of managers
market things to one another, especially in “creative industries” like publishing, the visual arts,
and film and television. It’s particularly bad in the latter industry, where there are untold numbers
of producers, sub-producers, executive producers, consultants, etc., “all in constant search for
something, anything, to actually do.” But even in more traditional manufacturing industries, white-
collar workers are hired seemingly for the sake of having more white-collar workers. Graeber uses
the example of the Elephant Tea factory outside Marseilles, France. Years ago it was bought up
by Unilever, which pretty much left its old organizational structure intact. Meanwhile the workers,
on their own initiative, managed to speed up production by more than 50 percent, markedly
increasing profits. So what did Unilever do? Rather than hiring more workers or buying new
machinery to expand operations, it hired a bunch of white-collar bureaucrats to wander around
trying to think of something to do. “They’d be walking up and down the catwalks every day,” an
older worker said, “staring at us, scribbling notes while we worked. Then they’d have meetings
and discuss it and write reports. But they still couldn’t figure out any real excuse for their
existence.” Finally they just suggested that the company shut down the whole plant and move
operations to Poland—whereupon the workers took over the factory and kicked their employers
out.

Even when corporate executives are presented with ways to automate tasks that white-collar
employees are doing by hand, they often resist. One testimony was from a guy who was hired by
a large bank to do risk management, which meant he was able to have a panoramic view of the
bank’s internal processes and suggest fixes for incoherencies, vulnerabilities, and redundancies.
He concluded that, conservatively, 80 percent of the bank’s 60,000 employees were unnecessary,
because their jobs either could be performed by a program or were in support of “some bullshit
process” to begin with. But when he presented executives with programs that would solve
inefficiencies, he always faced severe hostility. Not a single one of his recommendations was ever
adopted. “Because in every case,” he said, “fixing these problems would have resulted in people
losing their jobs, as those jobs served no purpose other than giving the executive they reported to
a sense of power.” In case after case that Graeber reports, it was clear that the higher-ups prided
themselves on their bloated staffs.

The notion of managerial feudalism is evocative, and Graeber is clearly onto something with his
suggestion that “there seems to be an intrinsic connection between the financialization of the
economy, the blossoming of information industries, and the proliferation of bullshit jobs.” What
exactly that connection is, though, is hard to tease out. The precise mechanisms are hard to tease
out. His “iron law of liberalism,” formulated in Utopia of Rules, is also apropos: “any market
reform, any government initiative intended to reduce red tape and promote market forces will have
the ultimate effect of increasing the total number of regulations, the total amount of paperwork,
and the total number of bureaucrats the government employs.” Such reforms have been abundant
in the neoliberal era, and they have certainly contributed to the explosion of bureaucracy, in both
the private and public sectors.

But Graeber neglects to mention the more deep-rooted forces that have made bullshitization a
steadily growing phenomenon since at least the time of Frederick Winslow Taylor. Ever since
management began to take control of production away from workers, to centralize knowledge in
its own ranks and reduce the worker to mere appendage of the machine—but an appendage that
has to be closely monitored and supervised—whole layers of unnecessary bureaucracy have
existed. Much of the bureaucracy has existed only to control and monitor the direct producers, to
strip power from them and keep it in the hands of capitalists or their agents. In other words, its
purpose has been largely political, not directly economic or “efficiency”-related.

At the same time, it became ever more necessary to control markets and the public mind, through
political and advertising propaganda. Hence the rise of the public relations industry from around
the time of World War I. And hence whole new layers of massive bureaucracy, which have
continued to expand for a hundred years. Meanwhile, government bureaucracies expanded
exponentially in order to improve society’s “legibility” to the state and administer it for the benefit
of capital. Corporate capital and the state constantly strengthened their ties, effectively
intertwining, collecting practically infinite amounts of data on the population for the usual
purposes of surveillance, control, and profit-making; and the processing of such data inevitably
was used to justify further growth of bureaucracies, even beyond what was strictly necessary. All
this was happening long before the neoliberal era, though it attained new heights of wastefulness
under the impact of “deregulation,” privatization, financialization, globalization, and the
information economy.

It’s significant, too, that the proliferation of bullshit jobs is itself a form of population control, of
keeping people subordinate in hierarchical structures, socialized into submission, atomized and
alienated from one another. African-American men are kept under control by being locked up in
prisons, while whites are funneled into pointless jobs where they can be supervised and
indoctrinated. The system hasn’t been consciously designed for this purpose, but the reason it’s
able to expand is that it serves the interests of power-structures.

So is there any way out of our bullshit society? Can it be reformed so that half the work being done
is no longer pointless? Graeber doesn’t focus on this question, since his book is supposed to be
about diagnosing the problem rather than proposing solutions, but he does suggest that Universal
Basic Income would help. Unlike many reforms that social movements are proposing, UBI would
likely reduce the size and intrusiveness of government, not increase it. If everyone automatically
received, say, $25,000 or more a year, huge and intrusive sections of government could simply be
shut down (even if social welfare programs continued or expanded). Millions of bureaucrats would
lose their jobs, but they would also receive an annual income allowing them to pursue other
projects that interested them.

“A full Basic Income would eliminate the compulsion to work, by offering a reasonable standard
of living to all, and then either leaving it up to each individual to decide whether they wished to
pursue further wealth, by doing a paying job or selling something, or whether they wished to do
something else with their time.” Bosses might start treating their employees better, since it would
be a less frightening prospect for them to quit, and conditions in crappy low-paying jobs would
have to improve in order to attract workers. Many pointless jobs would cease to exist, since few
people would want them. The social changes would be so radical and far-reaching it’s impossible
to fully anticipate them.

Graeber doesn’t delve into the technicalities of UBI, but he’s right it’s a proposal worth seriously
thinking about. It could be a step on the road to even more radical changes.

All in all, Bullshit Jobs is a good book that’s worth reading, despite its irritating prolixity and
meandering structure. It usefully highlights and names a major social malady that afflicts tens of
millions of people but that few talk about, except in informal conversations among their fellow
sufferers. We should all be talking about the meaningless-jobs crisis and proposing solutions that
will end the rampant spiritual misery it has caused. UBI, if designed well, could be a huge step in
the right direction. But ultimately, I don’t see any thoroughgoing cure except an end to capitalism
itself, which is to say a (necessarily protracted) revolution that finally establishes the old socialist
ideal of economic democracy. Democracy is the only real cure for all of humanity’s current
ailments.