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2 HAZOP Hazards and Operability Analysis
HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Based on early account by Elliott & Owen (1968)
Hazop studies are carried out by an experienced, multidisciplanary team, who review all physical
aspects of a process (lines, equipment, instrumentation) to discover potential hazards and
operability problems using a check list approach.
The basis for a HAZOP is a critical examination of information found in a word model, a process
flowsheet, a plant layout, equipment specification or a P&ID, (Piping and Instrument Drawing).
The principals of examination include: See tabs D1 to D3 for examples of computer forms.
1 Intention
2 Deviation
3 Causes
4 Consequences
(a) hazards
(b) operating difficulties
5 Safeguards
6 Recommendations / Actions
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3 Early HAZOP studies used the following set of Guide Words to systematically review the process:
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4 Some Common HAZOP Analysis Process Parameters
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5 Prepare for the review
Attitude
Preparation Meeting Leadership
HAZOP
Review By Documentation Follow-up
Team
Table
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6 HAZOP analysis method flow diagram
Select a process
section or
operating step
6 con't
List possible Assess acceptability
causes of of risk based on
deviation consequences
Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation
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7 Potential HAZOP Pitfalls
An Ethylene plant has 100 P&IDs, 625 equip't items. 625 items
Consider 5 variables, Pressure, Temperature, Flow
Composition and Function. 5 variables
Consider 6 Guidewords, None, More of, Less of
Part of, More than and Other than. 6 guide words
Questions to be answered = 18750 questions d = axbxc
Consider 5 minutes per question = 5 min./question
Time for ethylene plant HAZOP study = 93750 minutes
4 hour, 240 minutes sessions per day = 250 minutes/day
No. working of days = 375 days
Days per week = 5 days/week
No. of weeks to complete HAZOP for plant = 75 weeks
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8 Common Mistakes
3 Taking unwarranted credit for safeguards See example on page 9 - one page down
10 Wrong technique for system being reviewed (See spreadsheet titled Fig 5.3)
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9 HAZOP Example See page 8 - item No. 3
To Compressor Inlet
LAH
FV Teams tend to quickly identify alarms, shut-downs
1 and controls, and claim them for safeguards.
ysis (Mini-QRA)
t & Owen (1968)
odel, a process
ent Drawing).
computer forms.
view the process:
dditional to A
o design direction
Repeat for all
process sections
Develop action
Assess acceptability
of risk based on
consequences
a
c
d = axbxc
e
f = dxe
g
h=f/g
I
j=h/I
e 9 - one page down
larms, shut-downs
r safeguards.
Table 1 Example Standard Set Of Generic Deviations For Process Section Types
Source Lessons Learned From HAZOPS Reviews of FCCUs by P.E. McCluer et al, Hydrocarbon Processing, Aug 1992, p-140-C
Tank or Heat
ID No. Deviation Column Vessel Line Exchanger Pump Compressor
1 High Flow X
2 High Level X X
3 High Interface X
4 High Pressure X X X X
5 High Temperature X X X X
6 High Concentration X X X
7 Low / No Flow X X
8 Low Level X X
9 Low Interface X
10 Low Pressure X X X X
11 Low Temperature X X X X
12 Low Concentration X X X
13 Reverse / Misdirected Flow X X
14 Tube Leak X
15 Tube Rupture X
16 Leak X X X X X X
17 Rupture X X X X X X
More Flow
Less Flow
More Pressure
Less Pressure
More Level
Less Level
Part of, wrong concentration
As well as, contaminants
other than, wrong material
More Reaction
Less Reaction
No Reaction
More Mixing
Less Mixing
More Corrosion
More Erosion
Sampling
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Dev'ns
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D1
Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 °F for the startup period.
Possible Causes
1 FV-1 Wide open
2
3
Consequences
1 High level in KO pot with liquid carry-over to compressor with serious damage to rotor. Potential hydrocarbons relea
2
3
Safeguards
1 High level alarm LAH-1
2
3
Recommendation / Actions Respib
1 Consider limiting flow orifice, auto SD trip on High-High level, smart check valve. 1
2 2
3 3
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D1
2-Jun-97
1
startup period.
By Date
JB 1-Jan-99
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D2
Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 °F for the startup period.
0
0
Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions Respib
1 1
2 2
3 3
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D2
2-Jun-97
2
0
0
0
e startup period.
By Date
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D3
Intention
Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions Respib
1 1
2 2
3 3
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D3
By Date
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Chk List
1 Changes In Quantity a High Flow 1 Pump racing, delivery vessel pressure lost, Loss of automatic
suction pressurized, scale dislodged, leak in control
heat exchanger
b Low Flow 2 Pump failure, scaling of delivery, presence of Operator error
foreign body, poor suction condition,
cavitation, leak in heat exchanger, drain
leak, valve jammed
c No Flow 3 Pump failure, delivery vessel Failure of joint, pipe,
overpressurized, gas blockage, presence of valve, trap, bursting
foreign body, scale, sediment, suction vessel disc, relief valve.
empty.
d Reverse Flow 4 Pump failure, pump reversed, delivery
vessel over pressurized, poor isolation, gas
locking, surging, back siphoning.
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