The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding

Research Paper No. 24

Chinese Migrants Versus Ordinary Zambians: Causes of Tension

and Possible Peace Pathways
By Emmanuel Matambo, Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar
January 2020

O
n October 4, 2018, Joseph Malanji, Zambia’s Foreign Minister, went in front of Parliament and assessed
relations with China in glowing terms. He had accompanied President Edgar Lungu to the 7th Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit in Beijing in early September.1 A month after the Foreign
Minister’s parliamentary presentation—ordinary Zambians in the Copperbelt Province demonstrated their own
view of China, diametrically opposed to the government one: They attacked and damaged five Chinese-owned
businesses.2 The trigger was allegations that China was about to grab and take ownership of several Zambian
state-owned enterprises through underhanded privatization or for debt default. Chinese entrepreneurs across
the Copperbelt fled the area. President Xi Jinping, “disappointed”3 by the events, dispatched a special envoy to
see President Lungu. In writing, the Chinese ambassador, Lie Jie, called the attacks xenophobia.

Still, Minister Malanji is not wrong. Zambia’s governments since independence have all been unanimous on one
issue: they value Beijing. The central reason is the 1,860 km-long Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) which was
built with a loan from China during 1970-1975. It gave resource-rich but landlocked Zambia access to the Indian
Ocean through Tanzania, Zambia’s ideological twin. TAZARA freed Lusaka from economic dependence on two

The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (SVNP) is a continent-wide network of African policy and
research organizations that works with the Wilson Center’s Africa Program to bring African knowledge and
perspectives to U.S., African, and international policy on peacebuilding in Africa. Established in 2011 and
supported by the generous financial support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the project provides avenues
for African researchers and practitioners to engage with and exchange analyses and perspectives with U.S., African,
and international policymakers in order to develop the most appropriate, cohesive, and inclusive policy frameworks
and approaches to achieving sustainable peace in Africa.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made
and views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and do not represent the views of the
Wilson Center or the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
For more information please visit https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-southern-voices-network-for-peacebuilding
 implacably hostile neighbors, Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. Both Salisbury and Pretoria were then
under white supremacist minority regimes that repressed the huge indigenous African majorities. Significantly,
Zambia and Tanzania approached China only after the West had been asked first and had refused.4 China was
handsomely rewarded. In 1971, Beijing, with overwhelming African support, defeated Taipei for a UN seat.5 A
recently disclosed recording, of then-governor Ronald Reagan, denotes how infuriated certain sections of the
United States were by China’s diplomatic victory. Reagan exploded into a race-laced tirade while pressurizing
fellow Californian, President Richard Nixon, to find ways to punish the “monkeys” (in reference to African
countries that supported China’s UN bid). This background explains why national-level Sino-Zambian concord
has been stable for more than 50 years.

However, recent sentiment among urban Zambians outside of government is quite another story. Their
attitude has emerged coincident with at least 4 factors: the late surge of Chinese migrants into Zambia; severe
inequality in Zambia even during a 10-year (2004-2014) economic boom; the recent economic precipitous
downturn; and perceived racist attitudes and abusive behavior of Chinese employers. Admittedly, coincidence
is not causality. But the problematic phenomenon this research focuses on exists and is serious, having
frequently boiled over into verbal and even physical violence. The current study is thus important as it outlines
possible solutions to the existing tension.

The first section introduces constructivism and track two diplomacy, the theoretical frameworks used for the
paper. The second section gives a background to Zambia-China relations. The third traces emerging trends in
Chinese migration to Zambia and the role of Zambia’s Patriotic Front (PF) in amplifying anti-Chinese sentiment.
The fourth section presents the economic dimension of subnational tension. The fifth section is a constructivist
analysis of the paper. Section six demonstrates and recommends how track two diplomacy could resolve the
said tension. The final section concludes the research.

Constructivism and Track Two Diplomacy

Constructivism
Constructivism argues that international relations are determined by the ideas and identities of the agents
involved. Friends and allies could forge a mutually empowering association that is unlikely among competitors
or foes. This paper uses the constructivist emphasis on social identities6 as determinants of the quality and
motive for international relations. It shows how constructing negative identities of China and its citizens has
bred hostility in Zambian citizens.

Track Two Diplomacy

Track two diplomacy “engages individuals and organizations from outside the government in the complex
task of conflict resolution.”7 Those involved “develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human
and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.”8 Both in democratic and authoritarian
states, leaders who take “risks for peace” without the consent of their constituents could forfeit their “political
base.”9 A national-level quixotic attitude towards China and the Chinese could prove costly for the Zambian
government. Resentment toward Chinese migrants in Zambia emanates from “a sense of victimhood felt in
varying degrees by the collectivity of the members in [an] identity group caused by a historical experience of
oppression, aggression or some other major experience.”10 For example, the proximity of a successful migrant
entrepreneur to the many citizens struggling to secure economic empowerment evokes fears of colonial
encroachment.

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 Zambia-China Relations: A Background
Official Zambia-China relations were established on October 29, 1964, five days after Zambia gained
independence. Whereas Taiwan’s relations with apartheid South Africa sullied its reputation in the Third World,
China’s avowed opposition to colonial and minority rule, such as was present in southern Africa at the time,
was an endearing characteristic that resonated with Zambia. China also provided more than USD$400 million
and sent Chinese workers11 to build the TAZARA which served as a lifeline for Zambia during the liberation
struggles.

In addition to compatible views on minority rule, Zambia and China had similar socialist-leaning economies
and views on democracy. Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s first president, described multiparty democracy as
“a beautiful anachronism—a pattern ideally suited to the genius of the British people but of limited value,
without drastic modifications, in Modern Africa.”12 Similarly, Zhang Weiwei defends China’s “hybrid model…that
combines selection with some kind of election” and argues that it “is probably better than the pure election
in the West.”13 These arguments obliquely support one-party systems. In 1973, Zambia became a one-party
state. However, in the 1980s Kaunda faced mounting pressure to reintroduce multiparty politics and abandon
socialism. Economic stagnation and an unsuccessful experimentation with Bretton Woods-imposed Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) contributed to the growing opposition.

In 1990, Frederick Chiluba, an erstwhile trade union leader, formed the Movement for Multiparty Democracy
(MMD) and led the pressure on Kaunda to foreswear one-party politics. Finally, in 1991, the Zambian
constitution was amended allowing for a return to multiparty politics.14 Chiluba defeated Kaunda at the 1991
polls and became Zambia’s second president. Chiluba went about privatizing Zambia’s economy, a move that
created space for foreign investment. It was under these circumstances, coupled with China’s “going out” policy
that augmented interaction between ordinary Zambians and Chinese migrants.15

Chinese Migration to Zambia and the Role of the Patriotic Front (PF) in
Inflaming Anti-Chinese Sentiment
Before 1991, Chinese citizens came to Zambia under the auspices of their government. The Chinese citizens
that worked on the TAZARA went back to China at the end of their duty.16 Thus, Zambia-China relations
were consigned to state actors. The recent increase in the number of Chinese entrepreneurs in Zambia is “an
unforeseen development of [China’s]…. ‘going out policy’. These migrants arrive in Africa through a number of
roots [sic] and often with no support from the Chinese state.”17 On the other hand, Andrew Malone argues that
“the strategy has been carefully devised by officials in Beijing, where one expert has estimated that China will
eventually need to send 300 million people to Africa to solve the problems of over-population and pollution.”18

Up to 2001, Zambian opposition parties campaigned on promises of fighting corruption—with which

the MMD was associated during Chiluba’s reign from 1991 to 2001. Levy Mwanawasa, Chiluba’s successor,
launched a “New Deal” government with “zero tolerance” to corruption.19 Thus, opposition parties trained their
focus on the preponderance of Chinese investment and migration. During this time, the PF, a key opposition
party led by Michael Sata, inflamed anti-Chinese sentiment especially during the 2006 general election,
including a claim that there were about 80,000 Chinese in Zambia.20 The predatory traits that were imputed to
China as an investor were projected on Chinese migrants. Li Baodong, China’s ambassador to Zambia at the
time, threatened that China would cut ties with Zambia if Michael Sata won the election.21 This was the first
time that China had openly gone against its its non-interference policy.22 Sata lost that election, and another
(by-election) in 2008 but won the 2011 general election. His victory bespoke “the first time in Africa [that] the
electorate…pronounced their opinion [on the Africa-China] relationship.”23 However, he did not stem the tide

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 of Chinese migration. An empirical study established that, of the 9,067 employment permits issued by the
Zambian government in 2012, 41 percent (3,722) went to Chinese citizens.24 A 2018 paper by Arran Elcoate,
claimed that “at least 100,000 Chinese are living in Zambia, some barely scraping by, others doing very well in
the less saturated Zambian economy.”25

The Role of Economics in the Conflict

Tension between Zambians and Chinese migrants has partly been caused by Zambia’s economic situation. In
2011, Zambia achieved the status of a middle-income country after an impressive economic growth trajectory
that “averaged 7.4 percent between 2004 and 2014, well above the average for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) of 5.7
percent.”26 Nonetheless, 58 percent of the population earn less than USD$1.90 a day, below SSA’s average of 41
percent.27 Furthermore, economic growth during this period benefited only a few urban citizens. This situation
is compounded by the decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 3.4 percent in 2017, to a projected 2
percent in 2019.28 These realities have had an impact on employment levels. While unemployment stands at
12.6 percent, youth unemployment is higher at 17.4 percent.29 The agricultural sector directly and indirectly
caters for about 50 percent of employment.30 Thus, unemployment is rife in urban areas where Chinese
entrepreneurs are concentrated.

Zambians with ambitions of venturing into small-scale businesses are hostile toward Chinese entrepreneurs
occupying that space.31 Chinese employers have also been criticized for their labor practices. While Zambians
welcome the employment opportunities, they have misgivings about Chinese nationals.

Placatory assurances from the government, such as those made by President Lungu that the allegations of
China seizing Zambian enterprises were “false, malicious and distorted reports that have been circulating,
which seek to malign Zambia’s mutually beneficial relationship with China,”32 did not forestall the 2018
destruction of China businesses referred to in the introduction during which more than 100 people
were arrested.33 While China as a state professes pursuit of mutual development, Chinese migrants, with
individual ambitions, present an ominous embodiment to their Zambian counterparts. The next section uses
constructivism to analyze this lower-level Sino-Zambian discord.

Analysis of Conflict: The Power of Identity Construction

Negative identities of China and its citizens have been constructed by opposition political parties, advocacy
groups, Western actors, the media, and the actual behavior of certain Chinese nationals and entities. While
in opposition, Zambia’s PF constructed an image of China as an “infester” rather than an investor.34 This
characterization gained the PF the most votes in Lusaka and the Copperbelt where China’s presence was
readily visible and felt. After the PF formed government in 2011, opposition parties assumed the vacated
anti-Chinese platform. Even erstwhile members of the PF government like Chishimba Kambwili and Harry
Kalaba have demonized China as a marauding invader and usurper of economic opportunities for Zambians.35

Media reportage and Western views have also contributed to constructing China’s identity in Zambia and
Africa in general. An example is Malone’s article cited above that describes Chinese migration to Africa as an
invasion planned by the Chinese government.36 In China’s Second Continent: How A Million Chinese are Building
a New Empire in Africa, Howard French predicts that, rather “than any carefully planned action by the Beijing
government to build state power and reinforce national prestige,”37 Chinese migrants are more likely to
establish a colonial-like structure in Africa.

Zambians that compete for subnational economic spaces with Chinese migrants relate with negative
constructions of China’s identity and interest. The conclusions drawn in this paper are similar to those

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 made by Esteban,38 though the latter’s research was conducted in Equatorial Guinea. While the political and
economic elite are sanguine about Africa’s close relations with China, opposition political parties and local
entrepreneurs are unnerved and uncomfortable with the growing numbers of Chinese nationals. The next
section recommends how track two diplomacy can help to resolve tension between ordinary Zambians and
their Chinese counterparts.

Recommendations for Solving Subnational Conflict: Applying Track Two

Diplomacy
Track two diplomacy involves three interdependent processes that could improve local-level Zambia-China
relations. “The first process consists of small, facilitated problem-solving workshops or seminars that bring
together leaders of conflicting groups or nations (or their representatives).”39 This process looks at conflict
at an interpersonal level and highlights shared challenges between adversaries. While there have been
concerns about the alleged racist and oppressive conduct of Chinese towards Zambians, there has also been
racist treatment of Chinese in Zambia, including the use of derogatory names such as “choncholi” and “ching
chong.”40

The second process entails humanization of the adversary’s identity and discourages the temptation to
highlight victimhood and perceive the other party as the sole aggressor or offender.41 Zambians are victims
of lack of employment and trickle-down effects of the country’s economic gains. However, foreign nationals
are often the object of frustration in such cases, as has happened in South Africa where xenophobic violence
is rife in areas with high unemployment. Thus, both Zambians and Chinese are victims of economic policies
and a shrunken economic space. Identifying this shared challenge creates prospects for cooperative economic
development—which is the third process.

“For groups and nations in conflict, cooperative economic activities offer the prospect for growth, the
enhancement of individual well-being, and a measure of stability for families and communities who have
suffered significant personal loss.”42 Zambia’s economic boom from 2004 to 2014, with minimal effect on
the majority of Zambians, coincided with increasing numbers of Chinese nationals in Zambia. These two
circumstances offer at least two solutions for economic progress. The first is to explore extra-governmental
means for economic empowerment. The second is enhancing cooperation between Zambians and Chinese
entrepreneurs. This process behooves the actors involved to be principal architects of each other’s identity and
interests, focusing on those that are mutually rewarding while excising those that are not. The process requires
candor and it is heartening that, unlike the government, ordinary citizens are not bound by the politically
correct or diplomatic appraisal of China and the Chinese.

Conclusion
To solve subnational tension, a two-pronged approach, involving simultaneous action from state and
lower-level actors, could be curative. While state actors are tasked with spearheading economic growth and
creating fertile conditions for entrepreneurship and employment, non-state actors could be engaging in track
two diplomacy in the manner outlined in the paper.

For a set of policy options and recommendations related to Zambia-China relations at the subnational level,
see the accompanying Africa Program Policy Brief No. 18 by Emmanuel Matambo.

Emmanuel Matambo was a Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar from August to November 2019. He
is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa.

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1. Joseph Malanji, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs: On his Excellency the President, Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu’s visits to China and the United States of
America,” (2018), http://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/7708.

2. Xinhua, “Zambian miners stage protest against inciteful opposition politicians,” November 15, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2018-11/15/c_137607705.htm.

3. “State House says it has received an official complaint from China over victimization of Chinese People,” Lusaka Times, November 19, 2018,
https://bit.ly/2MCqTty.

4. Wei Song, “Seeking new allies in Africa: China’s policy towards Africa during the cold war as reflected in the construction of the Tanzania–
Zambia railway,” Journal of Modern Chinese History 9, no. 1 (2015): 46-65.

5. Agness Ngoma Leslie, “Zambia and China: Workers’ Protest, Civil Society and the Role of Opposition Politics in Elevating State Engagement,”
African Studies Quarterly 16, no. 3-4 (2016): 89-106.

6. Richard Ned Lebow, A cultural theory of international relations (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

7. Joseph V. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case of Track Two Diplomacy” The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vol.
2, ed. Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Julius A. Dometrios (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 161-175.

8. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” 162.

9. Ibid, 163.

10. Joseph V. Montville, “The Psychological Roots of Ethnic and Sectarian Terrorism,” The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Concepts
and Theories, Vol. 1, ed. Vamik D. Volkan, Julius A. Demetrios, and Joseph V. Montville (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990).

11. Wei, “Seeking new allies in Africa: China’s policy towards Africa during the cold war as reflected in the construction of the Tanzania–Zambia
railway,” 46-65.

12. Kenneth Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa (London: Longmans Green, 1966), 106.

13. Zhang Weiwei, The China Wave: The Rise of a Civilizational State (Hackensack: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2011).

14. Commonwealth Secretariat, “Zambia General Elections 2011: Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group,” 2011, http://thecommonwealth.
org/sites/default/files/news-items/documents/ZambiaCOGFinalReport.pdf.

15. Guy Scott, Adventures in Zambian Politics: A Story in Black and White (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019).

16. Yoon Jung Park, “Chinese Migration in Africa,” South African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper no. 24 (2009).

17. Lidia Cabral, “South-South Relations in African Agriculture: Hybrid modalities of cooperation and development perspectives from Brazil and
China,” Routledge Handbook of South-South Relations, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Patricia Daley (London: Routledge, 2019), 226-236.

18. Andrew Malone, “How China’s taking over Africa and why the West should be VERY Worried,” Mail Online, July 18, 2008, https://www.dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-1036105/How-Chinas-taking-Africa-West-VERY-worried.html.

19. Walima T. Kalusa, “The Politics of the Corpse: President Levy Mwanawasa’s Death, Funeral and Political Contestation in Post-Colonial Zambia,”
Journal of Southern African Studies 43, no. 6 (2017): 1137-1155.

20. Hannah Postel, “Following the Money: Chinese Labor Migration to Zambia,” Migration Policy Institute, 2015, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/following-money-chinese-labor-migration-zambia.

21. Dominik Kopiński and Andrzej Polus, “Sino-Zambian relations: ‘An all-weather friendship ‘weathering the storm,” Journal of Contemporary
African Studies 29, no. 2 (2011): 181-192.

22. Ian Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

23. Grant Masterson, “What Sata’s victory means for Zambia,” SABC News, October 6, 2011, http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/
f87972004896bc9c8bef8f536442cdc5/What-Sata’s-victory-means-for-Zambia--20111006.

24. Postel, “Following the Money.”

25. Arran Elcoate, “Mines, Money, Mandarin: China in Zambia,” The Diplomat, October 5, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/mines-money-

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 mandarin-china-in-zambia/.

26. Gregory Smith, Fiona Davies, and Zivanemoyo Chinzara, “Beating the Slowdown in Zambia: Reducing Fiscal Vulnerabilities for
Economic Recovery,” World Bank Group: Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management, 2016.

27. The World Bank in Zambia, “Overview,” 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview.

28. International Monetary Fund, “2019 Article IV Consultation—press Release; Staff Report; and statement by the Executive Director
for Zambia,” 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/search#q=Zambia&sort=relevancy.

29. Zambia Central Statistical Office, “Zambia in Figures,” 2018.

30. Zambia Central Statistical Office, “Zambia in Figures,” 2018.

31. “Leave the selling of Chickens to Zambians and block the Chinese nationals—PAZ,” Lusaka Times, December 28, 2017, https://
www.lusakatimes.com/2017/12/28/leave-selling-chickens-zambians-block-chinese-nationals-paz/.

32. Lusaka Times, “Leave the selling of Chickens to Zambians and block the Chinese nationals—PAZ.”

33. Xinhua “Zambian miners stage protest against inciteful opposition politicians.”

34. Laura Spilsbury “Can Michael Sata tame the dragon and channel Chinese investment towards development for Zambians,” Journal
of Politics & International Studies 8 (2012): 238-278.

35. Oliver Chisenga, “Lungu wants to ‘eat’ with China …the man has no interest of this country at heart, says Kambwili,” The Mast,
September 17, 2018, https://www.themastonline.com/2018/09/17/lungu-wants-to-eat-with-china-the-man-has-no-interest-of-
this-country-at-heart-says-kambwili/.

36. T. Tu Huynh and Yoon Jung Park, “Reflections on the Role of Race in China-Africa Relations,” New Directions in Africa-China Studies,
ed. Chris Alden and Daniel Large (London: Routledge, 2019): 158-172.

37. Howard William French, China’s second continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2014).

38. Mario Esteban, “A Silent Invasion’ African Views on the Growing Chinese Presence in Africa: The Case of Equatorial Guinea,” African
and Asian Studies 9 (2010): 232-251.

39. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case of Track Two Diplomacy,” 163.

40. Barry Sautmanand Yan Hairong, “Bashing ‘the Chinese’: contextualizing Zambia’s Collum Coal Mine shooting.” Journal of
Contemporary China 23, no. 90 (2014): 1073-1092.

41. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” 163.

42. Ibid.

Cover Image: A Ugandan high school student learns Mandarin in school in Kampala, Uganda. Photo courtesy of Nicole Macheroux-
Denault via Shutterstock. https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/kampala-uganda-09-29-2019-ugandan-1530622109.

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