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TIE" a $$ Borrower: MWS, Call #: 105 $933a Location: LincPk Stacks Journal Title: international studies in philosophy = Studi internazionali di flosofia Billing Category: LVIS Max Cost: 0.00 Volume: 19 Issue: 3 Month/Year: 1987-09-01 Pages: 43.53 Shipping Address: Missoun Western State University Article Author: State University of New York at Binghamton Hearnes Center 4525 Downs Dr St. Joseph, MO 64507 & Article Title: Terr Taylor Piatonic ideas, 3 Aesthetic Experience, and the Resolution of © Schopenhauer(u2019)s (u201C}Great Z Contraciction{u2010) 2 = a 2 ILL Number: {MEA Odyssey: 2 5 Zz 5 3 3 a 9 a Notice: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S, Code) PLATONIC IDEAS, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, AND ‘THE RESOLUTION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S “GREAT CONTRADICTION” TERRI GRAVES TAYLOR Look around you, says Schopenhauer. Look at the guppies who devour their young and the gal gnat larvae who feast on their mothers. The underlying nature ‘of the world is Will. Iris endless striving. Ifyou doubt it, reflect on yourselves: all of you sre unhappy because you want what you do not have and when you finally get our heart's desire, you find your moment of triumph empty because cone desire has given way to another. Our glands rule us. Our desires devour us, We are prisoners to our wills, predestined for lives of misery. However, sometimes, when we look ata painting or listen to a symphony, wwe get so caught up in the experience that we forget ourselves. Enraptured, wwe are momentarily freed from our willsand thus from our suffering. And because the intellec is unchained from the wil, it can grasp reality without the wills distorting influence. Yes, in aesthetic experience we contemplate the Platonic forms (Or do we? According to Richard Taylor, itis in Schopenhauer’ account ‘of aesthetic experience, thatthe “great contradiction” in his philosophy emerges.' And David Hamlyn agrees though he prefers to call it a “paradox” rather than, « contradiction.? Indeed, among the commentaries on Schopenhauer available in English, the standard interpretation seems to be that if Schopenhauer is to be consistent he must ether forfeit his claim for the primacy of Will or admit he's mistaken about aesthetic experience." Let me pause here and quote Taylor because he gives pethaps the clearest formulation of the problem: Schopenhauer. ght tht one can gin eles form sesing only by freeing hist ‘ior he bondage io hs will whereupon all raving and wing cease, and one then views ‘exstencecontemplavely and sees... [but scoring Schopeahavers principles, ‘tas sill upcleae- what could pombe at upon the wilt produce ths diminution of fs fore, sce Schopenhauer climeehoughout his philosophy that he wl the ony ching {hat ever does act and thar never ated upon. «Ie was ental for him to deny com pletely the pom that a man could emancipate himself fom his will by the ase of feast And yeritidifcult re how Schopenhauer conception difersignificandy ffom this one. Had he simply denied the pomiby of any tlete from wing, aad x ‘cepted the fealism tha this imps, his philosophy woul have remained edie cone tent and pesimisde throughout * “4 ‘TERRI GRAVES TAYLOR Taylor is I think, wrong—at least, that is what I hope to show by the end of this paper. My strategy is to give a “new” reading to Schopenhauer, that i, 1 fiesh exposition of his metaphysics which dissolves both Taylor's contradic: tion and Hamlyn’ paradox. It is to that task we now rurn. The presupposition of Schopenhauer’s metaphysis is Kant’s phenomena— noumena distinction. However, there is a significant difference berween ‘Schopenhauer and Kant: Kant says chat we can never know anything about ‘the nature of the noumena. In contrast, Schopenhauer maintains that our dou ble knowledge of ourselves as body (phenomenon) and as will gives usa key to the inner nature of the rest of realty. Thus he reasons: “If... the material ‘world isto be something more than our mere representation, we must say that besides being the representation, ...it is what we find immediately in ourselves as will His argument is by disjunctive syllogism: either solipsism is true and ‘my body is the only phenomenon backed by noumenon or every other phenomenon is linked to will the same way my body is. He rules out solipsism 45 unthinkable and so concludes that the Kantian thinginislf is Will? Not only does Schopenhauer claim thar the willis the noumenon, he main- tains we can know things about Will that is, what its nature is. Kant would have objected strenuously. He taught that by the very definition of noumena ‘we know that it eannot be made subject to the forms and categories of our understanding. And having thus discovered the limits of pure reason, Kant drew an epistemological conchusion: we have to remain agnostic about what the narure of noumena is. t immediately follows from this chat we cannot say with theoretic certainty whether or not a punicular category. like causation, has a correlate in the noumenal realm.* But tha is exactly what Schopenhauer claims he ean doz on the basis of Kant’s observations about our epistemological limitations, he draws a conclusion about metaphysics, about the nature of noumenal real- ty. He claims tha it is not just shat ie cannot apply the Kantian categories to rnoumena, but rather that sey do not apply? The noumenon is undifferentiated and timeless. There are no thingsin-themselves (plural; there is only Will. But if there is only one Will, then what is the status of one's individual will? As we shall se, both Taylor and Hamlyn assume that i is identical with the noumenal Will. Such a position is understandable since Schopenhauer argi- ‘ment chat the nournenal is Will was based solely on one's immediate awareness of oneself as will. However he later explains: [Now if hs thing nelf.. which at sch ie never an object since al objec i ts mere sppeatance of phenomenon, and not telat be thought of bjeively, thea we mart botow is name and concep om an objec, fom someting i some way objecrely ven. snd therfore from one of is phenomena. But in ordt to serve at» poi of expagaon {his can be oa other than the mos complete of al i phenomens: Le the mow di the most developed, the most direc enlightened by koowledge but this peciely man's “a {cis obvious from this that individual wills are phenomena. Given that, we have ‘SCHOPENHAUER'S “GREAT CONTRADICTION" 45 ‘wo options for understanding his argument for the identification of noumena ‘with will. The first is that he means it to be an argument by analogy; i.e, my ‘will : my body s:noumena : phenomena. However, this option is the les likely since he stresses that the identification of will with noumena is not the result of an inference but of immediate knowledge." The second and more likely posi- tion is this: the individual will of a human being is a phenomenal representa- tion of the noumenal Will. However because humans have selFconsciousness, they are aware that chcie phenomenal wills are somehow backed by a noumenal Will. In fact, this is how Schopenhauer handles the question of free will” Because our individual will are phenomenal, they are determined, and because wwe sense that we are linked to the noumenal Will, we believe we are free. The phenomenal status of individual wills will become clearer once we understand the role the Platonic forms play in the nourenal Will's manifesta- sion. In fact, although the standard interpretations seem to treat the Platonic forms as an embarrassing addition to Schopenhauer’s system, they seem to be the key to understanding his metaphysics. Part of the impetus for introducing them seems to have been not only to cxplain aesthetic experience but to block reductive materialism. Weiting slight- ly earlier than Schopenhauer, Lamarck had suggested that life was “merely the effect of warmth and electricity." Schopenhauer countered him by claiming that each natural kind was a representation ofa Plantonic form. Unfortunately, his only jusification is the explanatory adequacy of his metaphysical scheme. Going back to that metaphysical scheme, we might ask what the difference is between the thing-iniselfand the Platonic forms. The answer i that Platonic forms are knowable— notin ordinary tates of consciousness, but knowable none the les. Moreover, they are phenomenal representations of the Will, and here Schopenhauer is using “phenomenal” not in the Kantian sense but strictly as the antonym to “noumcnal." Standing outside space and time, they are the frst stage of its objectification. In fac, Schopenhauer goes on to explain that they are “simple acts ofthe Will” while individual things are “manifestations of these ‘acts in space, time, and multiplcity.”"* The Ideas mediate between the Will ‘and the individual sensible things much in the way Plato sai the Forms mediated between the Form of the Good and particulars." It might be helpful here 0 invoke an illustration Schopenhauer suggests: the relationship between the Will ‘and the Ideas is analogous to that between an individual character and his ac- tions. For example, each of my actions equally expresses my character, and ‘there is, moreover, a certain identity between them inasmuch as they are all ‘my actions. So also each Platonic Idea equally manifests the Will and thereby shares an identity. Furthermore, no one can fully understand a particular ac- tion of mine unless he knows my character, and he cannot truly know my character unless he is familiar with all of my aetions."? So my actions have to be considered collectively as an objectification of my character, Similarly, all of the Platonic Ideas collectively considered are a manifestation of the Will. 46 TERRI GRAVES TAYLOR In any case—this is a crucial point—although the Willis equally “present” in each of the Platonic Ideas, it is not equally intelligible. Consequently, ‘Schopenhauer assigns each Idea a separate rank and proceeds to talk about “grades of objectification” of the Will; the higher grades or ranks being those through which knowledge of the Will is more easily gained.’ Moreover, “these grades are related to individual chings as their eternal forms or procorypes."!” As might bbe expected, Schopenhauer’ ordering of grades superficially resembles the Neo- Platonis's Scala Pefeciomis at the bottom are inanimate things, then plants, then brute animals, and finally man. Describing the different grades, Schopenhauer ‘explains that in electrical and chemical forces, the Will reveals itself as blind sriving whereas in plants and bruce animals, i is visible as response to stimuli Similarly, in higher animals, it takes the form of actions from motives or in- stincts, while in humans it manifests itself in the shape of a conscious will guid- ed by reason. We should note in passing that this is another indication that individual wills are phenomenal representations of the one Will. However, this description ofthe hierarchy raises a question: we know that the Medievals bas- ‘ed theirs on ontological distinctions (humans had more being than dogs), but ‘what does Schopenhauer base his on? On his account, what makes one grade higher chan another? There are two possible answers. The firs is that he also uses an ontological distinction in the sense that the higher grades are objective- ly better representations of the Will. That is, while each Idea is as fully Will as the nent, the higher grades express the Will more clearly. To go back to the analogy of human actions, none of my actions is more fully mine than any of, the others, but nonetheless, some are more telling. From them you can more ‘easily grasp what my character or inner nature is. It could be that that is just the kind of distinction that Schopenhauer is making berween his grades of the ‘Will's manifestation: in other words, although each of the Ideas isan expression ‘of the Will, some of them are more revelatory than others~they are in themselves ‘more faithful representations of the Will. However, if this answer were correct, ‘we would expect Schopenhauer's scale to be reversed. The Will, after al, is not guided by intelligence. Surely itis more closely represented by the blind striv- ing of the forces of nature than by the intentional actions of men. So since Schopenhauer insists thar humans are higher grade objectificarions than magnetic fields, we must reject this first answer, The second possiblity is that the difference is not ontological but cpistemological. That is, itis not that the higher grades actually ate better oF ‘more faithful expressions of Will, but rather that they are more easily recogniz- ced as being expressions of the Will Willis more transparently “objectfied" for the knowing-subject. In other words, the Will is as much in a man as a rock, but because of our own experience of willing i s easier for us to identify men with Will. Inthe case of the rock the relationship to the Will is obscured: we hhave a hard time understanding that the inner nature of things on the bottom of the scale is Will. Indeed, according to Schopenhauer, “Only by comparison ‘SCHOPENHAUER’S “GREAT CONTRADICTION 47 with that which goes on in me if my body performs an action when I am in fluenced by a motive ... [can I] understand what is their inner nature [ie their identity with Will"! The reason, then, that humans are on the top ofthe scale is that the self-consciousness that intelligence gives them enables them to im- mediately realize that their inner nature is Will. So on this account the hierar- chical ordering represents two things: (1) Ix represents a progressive movement of the Will o consciousness of itself as Will, because each successive grade comes closer to achieving selfconsciousness; and, because of this (2) it corresponds to how easy it is for a human knower to recognize the phenomena by analogy with himself as Will, Now that we have briefly sketched the relationship berween the Will and the Ideas, we need to consider the relationship between the Ideas and particular things. Here Schopenhauer takes an Artistotelian turn: a particular thing is the union of form and marter.!! Bare marter has no properties—unless you count its existence. Because we never encounter bare matter, Schopenhauer asserts that itis « condition of perceptual experience just like Kans space and tim thar is, if bare matter did not exist perceptual experience would be impossible, Indeed Schopenhauer maintains that matter is “the third pure form” and is as dependent on our intellect as space and time are. This may sound strange to speak of matter as a form of consciousness but Schopenhauer says Kant made a similar claim when he asserved that causality was a category.” Afterall, says Schopenhauer, matter is just the objectification of causality.” Mater unites the cence fight of time wih the rigid immobility of apace: therefor ‘she permanent substance ofthe changing accidents. Caaalty determines hit change for ‘very place # everytime and thereby combines time and space and cones the whole saree of matter" Briefly put, che law of causality states, “every change has it cause in another ‘change which immediately precedes it And the law of causality is immanent im the world because “it belongs to the mere form of our understanding. like the whole of the objective worl.” So the law of causality, oF mater, is just the flipside of the form of causality. We call it the law of causality when we consider the world as Will's objectification and call tthe form of causality when ‘we speak of the world as our representation But back to the problem of the relation of the Ideas to particular things: Schopenhauer points out that in principle each Idea could have an infinite ‘number of copies or representations butin actuality there is only afnite amount of matter. So the Ideas fight over the matter like dogs over a bone. Frederick Copleston, in his commentary. puzzled over the question of how the will, that ccernal striving, could manifest itself objectively in the Platonic Ideas.” The answer is that it’s not the Ideas alone but the Ideas in their state of perpetual strife which manifest the Will. Indeed Schopenhauer says that this continual 4s ‘TERRI GRAVES TAYLOR conflict among the Ideas as they each clamor for possession of matter is, in fet, “that variance with itself which is essential to the Will He goes on to argue that because matter does change its form there must be a rule that governs the instantiation of Form in matter; otherwise, once & form gained possession of matte, it would never relinquish it." On the basis ofthis transcendental argument alone, he argues tha this rule isthe law of causal ty. Moreover the way it operates is this: whenever two forms are fighting over the same bit of matter. the matter goes to the one which will allow the greater ‘manifestation of the Wil ‘The natural question is what justifies his giving more content to the law of causality than he does to the form of causality ifthe two sre identical? In particular, what is the bass for his claim that the law of causality guarantees the higher manifestation of the Will? Schopenhauer docs not give a direct answe infact, he claims you cannot answer questions about why the law of causality functions as it does since it falls outside the province of the principle of suff- cient reason.” However, he does give two hints: the first is thatthe phenomenal world has to evince a teleology because all the particular things it includes are collectively a manifestation of the one Will; that is, because the will or thing- iniself is a unified totality, the phenomenal world as its representation is ‘eleologically structured." The law of causality is the mechanism of this struc- turing, The law of causality operates as it does because the Will itself i always striving ater higher and higher objectification. In fact, itis striving to become conscious of itself as Will Now Schopenhauer’s aim in introducing this account was to counter Lamarck by providing the basis for a non-reductionis theory of evolution. ¥ In fact, itis essential to dissolving Taylor's “contradiction” chat we understand that evolution isthe struggle by which the Willis made more and more visible through the objecifcaion of ever higher grades. Humans are higher grade objectfica- tions than animals because humans alone have wills guided by reason. That is, only humans have intellects chat enable them to be conscious of themselves as willing. However, their intellect emerged in their struggle for survival; that is, in the conflict of leas for objectification in matter. Consequenty, the intellect is simply “a means of supporting the individual and the species just like any organ of the body." Its value as a means of recognizing the world as the ‘manifestation ofthe wills in ordinary humans incidental. In them, its “proper” fanction is to enable the will to achieve its ends. Itis subservient tothe individual will. ‘As a result of its subordination to the individual’ will, intellect distorts knowledge. tt sees only what pertains to the interests of the individual's will and suppresses the rest”? But sense data not only get adulterated by motives and desires, they are filtered through a Kanciamlike grid of consciousness com- prised of space, ime, and causality. Thus o gain knowledge of the Platonic ‘SCHOPENHAUER’S "GREAT CONTRADICTION" o forms one must both bypass the grid and emancipate the intellect from the demands of the wil Now, ths is exactly what Schopenhauer says happens in aesthetic contempla- tion although he never explains how the individual shakes the Kantian-like grid.” ‘With respect to emancipating the intellect, he insists that che individual cannot affect this emancipation by willing because itis precisely from willing that he is being liberated. It is the spontaneous result of receiving strong perceptual stimulus so that the brain becomes overly excited and in this excited state is strong enough to overthrow the will! Phenomenologically, the individual loses all sense of himself; he forgets his own goals and interests. His consciousness is completely filled with the perception. In Schopenhauer’ terms he has lost his individuality and become the Pure Subject of Knowledge contemplating the Platonic Forms.*? And because he has been freed from his will, he not only enjoys the pleasure induced by the presence of the perception but he also ex- periences inner peace because of the absence of the will’ demands.*” In most human beings this is only a temporary state but there are some who can remain in this state for long periods* We call such people “geniuses.” And being a genius is a necessary condition for being a true artist, poet, or philosopher, because in these professions one not only has to gain a vision of the Platonic forms but sustain the vision long enough to produce a work which ‘communicates it Now what I want to suggest is that the genius isthe next step in “evolu tion’; that is, the law of causality insures that when certain antecedent condi- tions are met, the intellect will riumph over the individual will. Afterall, the ‘Will qua noumenon strives for its highest objectification, the union of the pure subject of knowledge with the Platonic Forms.* Just as humans are higher ob- jectificatons of the Will than animals; geniuses are higher than humans. So the emergence of aesthetic geniuses, indeed even the obtainment of aesthetic ex- perience by ordinary human beings, is not something contrary to the rest of, Schopenhauer's philosophy but actually the natural consequence of i. In case this isn't clear let me briefly recap my reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s argument: (1) The opposition of will and intellect emerged from the struggle between Ideas for matter. (2) In a genius the will and the intellect ae similarly fighting against each other” (3) Such struggles are not resolved by the action of either pary but by the law of causality which insures that the result willbe a fuller revelation of the Will (4) Moreover, iis its connection ‘with the individual will thax keeps the intellect from having as its objects the Platonic Ideas.” (5) And the highest manifestation of the Will occurs when an incellect contemplates the Ideas. (6) This is what happens in the case of an artistic genius engaged in aesthetic contemplation. ‘With this understanding of Schopenhauer in hand, let us turn back to con- sider Taylor's and Hamlyn’s objections. First Taylor: his supposed contradic- tion resulted from his assuming that the individual, noc the law of causality, 50. ‘TERRI GRAVES TAYLOR liberates the intellect from its will, and from his confusing individual wills with Will qua noumenon. But as we saw early in the paper, Schopenhauer holds thar the individual will is a phenomenal representation of the noumenal Will, and these cwo terms are not interchangeable. So on this point at least, Schopenhauer is consistent itis by the triumph of intellect over individual will under the guidance of the law of causality that Will manifests itself. Now for Hamlyn: he asserts chat in aesthetic experience the Will denies itself. This ‘Hamlyn complains, is paradoxical, but he has made the same mistake as Taylor: he has identified the individual will with the noumenal Will. What actually hhappens is that the noumenal Will striving for a higher objectification of itself denies the phenomenal will of the individual. ‘Thus Schopenhauer is vindicated. As we have seen, the charge of incon- sistency brought against him by the standard interpretation arises from a misunderstanding of his metaphysics. And by providing a fresh exposition that focuses on the role of the Plantonic ideas we have shown that his account of aesthetic experience is not anomalous but rather is in accord with the rest of his philosophy. In conclusion, I would like to mention a question that arises from my inter pretation of Schopenhauer: is Schopenhauer really a pessimist? True, the Will, qua noumens, is purposeless,' but, in its phenomenal representation itis seek- ing ever higher manifestations. Doesn't this teleology imply a theodicy: dividual lives might be miserable, but by golly we're suffering for a higher good? I think Schopenhauer would probably respond by saying that although the Will, is striving for higher manifestations, itis always striving. Any ciumph is tem- porary. Victory always ends in defeat. No matter how magnificent the aesthetic ‘experience, it will end abruptly. Your stomach will grow/ or the phone will ring and in that moment your will will subdue your intellect. Once again you will be prisoner to its demands. As Schopenhauer says, “The will mus live on itself, since nothing exists beside it and it is a hungry will? 1 Richard Taylor “Schopenhauer, A Cal Hina of Waar Ppl, DJ. O'Conner, London, The Fre Pres of Glenco, 196, p. 579. Nowe that both Hazy and Taylor wert that 1 parallel problem arses rom Schopeahaues ethics. However, the problems are 30 sar that tolls the one wil be to solve theater 2D. W. Hemlya, Sdupnteur, London: Rouuedge & Kegan Pal, 1980, p 110 3 In addon to Hamlyn and Taylor, ee Frederick Coplenon, Plnpbr of Pasion, 2nd ‘cd. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1975; and Pack Gardiner, Sdeepnioe,Bakimore, Peni Books, 1965 ‘SCHOPENHAUERSS “GREAT CONTRADICTION" a anything determinate whatever about these pore being ofthe underandig, ...“Inimanvel Kant, ‘Prlegomens Any Future Mapa, Paul Carus revised by James W. lingo. in Clans of Waser Poop ed. by Sever M. Cahn lnanepol, Hacer Publahing Company 1977 . 798 {6 Anbu Schopenhauer, The Worl Wil amd Repracnaon (WWR)F. FJ. Payne w., Col rad: The Falcons Wing Pres, 1958; reprinted. New Vork Dover Publeations, le. 1966, Value 1. Book Hl, Section 1p. 105 1 Tid, Book M, Section 21 pia, 1 This comes out in hs daction ofthe reasonableness of pontulating the freedom ofthe wis "Now, the noon of being tha has fee wilt che notion ofa catia noumenon and th ‘his nation involes no contraction we ae alteady assed by the fact tha, nusauch a the com cep of cause hat arisen wholly fom pure understanding, and basis jective rely sured ly the Dedction, a tc moreover in origin independent on any renble condion, i thettore, ‘ot revi to phenomena (oles we wanted to make a definite tneorei se of, but can be plied equally things that are obec ofthe pore understanding” Immanuel Kent, “Cricl Ex ‘ination of Practical Reston,” Thoma Kiogsll Abboet ria Kant Crag of Praca! Reston, Shed. London, Longmans, Green and Co, Lid, 1909, p. 143-6, See also: Iman Kant, Ci of Pre Reson, Max Mueller we, London, 1081, A 255-60. 9 Amur Schopenhauer, Te Worf ar Willan ta (WWW, R.B. Haldane and}. Kemp te London, Kegan Paul Teach, Trabaer & Co, La. 1896, Volume 1, Book 2, Section 24, p 15S. spd Secon 26, p74 Schopenkauer, WWR, Volume 1, Book Il Secon 22, p. 110. Se als Seton 2. p. i the fact ovedooked that the individual the penon, & not will a hing inal, but ns i phenomenon ofthe wil 1 Bi, Section 22, p11 12 Ma, Section 23, p. 118 15 Schopenhauer, WT, Volume 1, Book 2, Section 27, p 185 14 a, Rook H, Section 28, p. 202 1 Md, Book Il, Sesion 32, p. 226 16 thi, Book I, Secton 28, p. 208. 17 Bid, p. 205. 18 Bid, Section 24,» 19 tid, p. 169. 20 Mid, Secdon 27. pp. 195-58 21 hd, Seon 24, p. 163 2 ‘TERRI GRAVES TAYLOR 22 Using Thomisic language, Schopeshauer writes, “we unin of form and matter, or of ‘scotia and exstemia. ivr the concrete which i ahway partly thus the thing" (Volume 2, 25). And ina more explicit pase, be sys, “he forma substan of Artal denotes excly ‘what Leal he rae ofthe objeiation of wil in the ding” (Vale 1, Bok 2 Secon 27, p. 186 25 Ud, Volume 2. p58 24 Did, p 208 25 Ud, 9. 225. 26 Id, p 218. 27 Bie, p26. 26 Ibid, Volume 1, Book 2, Section 26, p. 175 29 Frederick Copleton, “Aras Eacape: The Parc cape Ar” in Ani A Ctl An- egy, George Dickie and Richard J. Sclarani cds, New York St. Martin's Pres, 1977, p. 140, “The essay comsined in chat volume orgally appeared ax chapter five of Frederick Copletn, Stupentoer Pspier of Pei, 2nd ed, New Vork, Barnes & Noble Books, 1975 30 Schopenhauer, WWL Volume I, Book 2, Section 27. ps 191 51 Bid, Section 26. p. 174 52 Tad, p. 177, Seton 24, p. 158 55 Bid, p. 16041 54 Td, Seeson 27, p18 55 Did, pp. 18546 56 Taylor. p. 199. 37 Schopenhauer, WIN, Volume 3, Supplement tthe Third Book, Section XXX p. 139 58 Td, Volume 3. Appeadie p. 47. Unlike Kant, Schopenbauer argues that perception procedes coneprion; he concludes. therefore requze tha we sould eject leven of the categories Ed ony retain that of exualty.” 59 Id, Voluee 1, Book Il, Secon 34, p 251. See alto Arthur Schopenhauer, “The Metaphysics of Fine Ar in Emoto Abr Sbponbier, Bley Sanders, New York, A. L- Bure Company, no date given, p. 200 40 Schopenhauer, "Supplement to the Third Book” WWI, Volume 3, Section XXX. p. 126 [Note shat is is ocder ato wiling that are imponnble, not second order ac ike going tothe 1 SCHOPENHAUER'S “GREAT CONTRADICTION 3B 42 Did, Volume 1, Book 3, Section 54, p. 252 43 Bi, Secon 38, 9.259 44 Wid, Secon 37, p 252. 5 46 Tid, Volume 3, p14. See abo Volume 1, Book 3, Section 34, p. 280-54 47 Schopentavet doesnot my this expicidy but in several places give evidence that chis isthe ae He sys thatthe il "oppores el w any activity ofthe ftelles (Volume 3p. 148 Silly, heel we thatthe eeson forthe biefnes of aexhetic experiences that if eh intlct saceeds ina coup dat, he wil racer into re-eablsh i sovereignty Ul, 147) 48 Tid, Volume 2, Book 2, Sexton 27, 9. 189, 49 ad, Volume 5, p. 122 $0 Ted, Volume 2, Book 3, Section 14, p. 252 51 Ted, Volume 1, Book 2, Seen 29, p. 215 52 Tht, Book 2, Secon 27, p. 192. 1 would ike to expres my deep appreciation to Profesor John Arwel fr his encouragement and for his comments on an eater version of this pape.

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