Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/23/2020 06:19 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by J. Lara,Deputy Clerk

1 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN (State Bar No. 150477)
2 wforman@scheperkim.com
DAVID C. SCHEPER (State Bar No. 120174)
3 dscheper@scheperkim.com
MARGARET E. DAYTON (State Bar No. 274353)
4 pdayton@scheperkim.com
800 W. Sixth Street, 18th Floor
5 Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 613-4655
6 Facsimile: (213) 613-4656

7 Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology

International
8

9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

11

12 VALERIE HANEY, CASE NO. 19STCV21210

Assigned for All Purposes to:
13 Plaintiff, Hon. Richard J. Burdge, Jr., Dept. 37

14 v. DEFENDANT CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL’S
15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION;
16 TECHNOLOGY CENTER, and DAVID MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
MISCAVIGE; and DOES 1-25, AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
17
Defendants. [Filed Concurrently with: Objections to
18 Plaintiff’s Evidence Submitted in Opposition to
Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration;
19 Supplemental Declaration of Lynn R. Farny;
Supplemental Declaration of Gary S. Soter;
20 and Proof of Service]

21 Dept.: 37
Date: January 30, 2020
22 Time: 8:30 a.m.

23 RESERVATION NO. 523728976924

24

25

26

27

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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2
I.  INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................6 
3
II.  REBUTTAL FACTS..............................................................................................................6 
4
III.  ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................7 
5
A.  Validity and Arbitrability Must Be Determined by the Arbitrators. ..........................7 
6
B.  The First Amendment Protects CSI’s Right to Require Religious
7 Arbitration. .................................................................................................................9 
8 1.  Plaintiff’s “Neutral Law” Argument Is A Strawman. ....................................9 
9 2.  The Ministerial Exception Applies. .............................................................10 
10 C.  The Agreements Are Not Unconscionable...............................................................11 
11 D.  Plaintiff Has Not Proven Undue Influence, Coercion, or Duress. ...........................13 
12 E.  Section 1281.2(c) Does Not Apply. .........................................................................15 
13 F.  The Court Should Deny the Request to Conduct Discovery. ...................................15 
14 IV.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................15 
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
2

3 Federal Cases 

4 Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693 (1986) ...................................................................................................................... 9
5

6 Brennan v. Opus Bank,

796 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2015) ....................................................................................................... 8
7
Employment Div. v. Smith,
8 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ................................................................................................................ 9, 11
9 Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.,
No. 8:13-cv-220, 2018 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2018) ........................................... 10, 12
10
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Srvc. Org., Inc.,
11
No. 8:13-cv-220, 2015 WL 10844160 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) ............................................. 12
12
Gen. Conf. of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical Methodist Church,
13 807 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2011) ....................................................................................... 12

14 Gillette v. U.S.,
401 U.S. 437 (1971) .................................................................................................................... 11
15
Headley v. Church of Scientology Int.,
16
687 F. 3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................................. 13, 14
17
Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l.,
18 No. 09-3986-DSF, 2010 WL 3157064 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) ............................................... 10

19 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,

586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 524 (Jan. 8, 2019) ................................................................................ 8, 9
20
Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n,
21 565 U.S. 171 (2012) .............................................................................................................. 10, 11
22
Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Bd of Equalization,
23 493 U.S. 378 (1990) ...................................................................................................................... 9

24 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,

485 U.S. 439 (1988) ...................................................................................................................... 9
25
McClure v. Salvation Army,
26 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) ....................................................................................................... 11
27 McDonald v. City of Chicago,

28 561 U.S. 742 (2010) ...................................................................................................................... 9

3
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1 (1990) .......................................................................................................................... 9
2
NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Secs., LLC,
3 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................................ 8
4
Puri v. Khalsa,
5 844 F. 3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................... 11

6 Rent-a-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson,

561 U.S. 63 (2010) ........................................................................................................................ 8
7
Reynolds v. U.S.,
8 98 U.S. 145 (1879) ...................................................................................................................... 11
9 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,

10 426 U.S. 696 (1976) .................................................................................................................... 10

11 U.S. v. Fishman,
743 F.Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1990) .............................................................................................. 14
12
U.S. v. Lee,
13 455 U.S. 252 (1982) ...................................................................................................................... 9
14 Watson v. Jones,

15 80 U.S. 679 (1871) ................................................................................................................ 10, 12

16 Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference,

377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) ..................................................................................................... 10
17
State Cases 
18
Balling v. Finch,
19 203 Cal. App. 2d 413 (1962) ....................................................................................................... 13
20 Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet,

21 124 Cal. App. 4th 1159 (2004) .............................................................................................. 11, 12

22 Goldstein v. Enoch,
248 Cal. App. 2d 891 (1967) ....................................................................................................... 13
23
Higgins v. Maher,
24 210 Cal. App. 3d 1168 (1989) ..................................................................................................... 11
25 Katz v. Superior Court,
73 Cal. App. 3d 952 (1973) ......................................................................................................... 14
26

27 Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass’n,

506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)................................................................................... 14
28

4
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Molecular Analytical Sys. v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc.,
186 Cal. App. 4th 696 (2010) ........................................................................................................ 7
2
Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist.,
3 246 Cal. App. 2d 123 (1966) ....................................................................................................... 13
4
Robinson v. City of Manteca,
5 78 Cal. App. 4th 452 (2000) ........................................................................................................ 13

6 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,

131 Cal. App. 4th 417 (2005) ...................................................................................................... 10
7
Rowe v. Exline,
8 153 Cal. App. 4th 1276 (2007) .................................................................................................... 15
9 Skrbina v. Fleming Cos.,

10 45 Cal. App. 4th 1353 (1996) ...................................................................................................... 14

11 Tarpy v. Cty. of San Diego,

110 Cal. App. 4th 267 (2003) ...................................................................................................... 13
12
Warren-Guthrie v. Health Net,
13 84 Cal. App. 4th 804 (2000) .......................................................................................................... 8
14 State Statutes 

15
CCP Section 1281.2(c) .................................................................................................................... 15
16
CCP Section 1281.4 ........................................................................................................................ 15
17
Civ. Code § 1568 ............................................................................................................................. 13
18
Civ. Code § 1575(1) .................................................................................................................. 13, 14
19

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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 Plaintiff’s Opposition shows that when she has neither the facts nor the law on her side, she

3 reaches for the gun. She concedes the applicability of the substantive provisions of Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which requires that the arbitrators decide the arbitrability and validity of
4
her agreements with CSI. She does not dispute that she is a minister of CSI, meaning that this Court
5
cannot adjudicate the terms of her relationship with CSI. She has no response to the long history of
6
courts enforcing religious arbitration, including the same provisions involved here. Faced with her
7 repeated commitments to arbitrate disputes with CSI, and her cashing a $4,500 check to reaffirm

8 those commitments, she now says she was forced to sign her Departure Agreement while a man

9 with a gun stood by. This claim is contradicted by her previous accounts of this meeting and the
transcript of the meeting.
10
Plaintiff’s gun ploy is not even her most brazen argument. She claims that CCP Section
11
1281.2 warrants denial of CSI’s motion because the other appearing defendant, RTC, has not moved
12
to arbitrate. But RTC has filed and served a motion to arbitrate. Indeed, over a week ago, Plaintiff’s
13 counsel signed a stipulation that RTC has filed a motion to arbitrate, that its motion significantly

14 overlaps with CSI’s, and that CSI’s motion should be heard at the same time as RTC’s motion.

15 Plaintiff has shown she will say anything to defeat CSI’s motion. But one thing she does not
1
16 deny is that she signed the Departure Agreement (Ex. 2) and Church Agreements (Exs. 7-11). The
agreements establish the terms of her ministerial relationship with CSI and must be honored.
17
II. REBUTTAL FACTS
18
Plaintiff now states that when she signed her Departure Agreement with CSI’s General
19 Counsel (Gary Soter), “a man armed with a gun” was also in the room. (Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 14.) Her

20 attorneys then transform the allegation into “men with guns hovering over her.” (Opp. at 11:1-2.)

21 Plaintiff’s past statements show that the allegation of “a man armed with a gun” in the room is a

22 new invention. She does not mention it in her account of her meeting with Mr. Soter in her initial
complaint (Compl. ¶ 99) or in her Amended Complaint (FAC ¶ 65). She filed a State Bar complaint
23
asserting that Mr. Soter told her that he was her lawyer during their meeting, but did not mention
24
her now crucial (but false) allegation that Mr. Soter brought an armed man to the meeting. (Supp.
25

26 1
Exs. 1 through 3 are to the Declaration of Gary S. Soter and Exs. 4 through 11 are to the
Declaration of Lynn R. Farny, filed with CSI’s Motion. Ex. 12 and Ex. 13 are to the Supplemental
27
Declaration of Gary S. Soter (“Supp. Soter Dec.”), and Ex. 14 is to the Supplemental Declaration
28 of Lynn R. Farny (“Supp. Farny Dec.”) all filed with this Reply.
6
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Soter Dec. ¶ 9, Ex. 12.)2 When she described the meeting on an anti-Scientology tv show, she said

2 nothing about the gun, though she otherwise attacked the Church. (Supp. Farny Dec. ¶ 4, Ex. 14.)
As to the content of that meeting, Plaintiff swears under oath that she did “not know the
3
contents of any of the documents I signed” and “signed any document that was given to me.” (Pl.’s
4
Dec. ¶ 14.) But at the meeting she affirmed that she had read the Departure Agreement, understood
5
it, and asked questions about it. (Ex. 1 at p. 4.) She “expressed concerns” about the Agreement and
6 asked for and received revisions that she then initialed. (Ex. 1 at pp. 9, 21; Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 2.H. 9.E.)

7 Finally, Plaintiff makes vague allegations about “brainwashing” from the age of 6 and being
8 restrained by unnamed people at “Gold Base.” (Pl.’s Dec. ¶¶ 5, 9, 12.) But she admits that she began
working for CSI after she was 26 years old, and her agreements with CSI date from after she turned
9
30. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11; Exs. 2, 7-11.) Plaintiff fails to challenge the statements in the Declaration of
10
Catherine Fraser submitted with CSI’s Motion. Ms. Fraser states that when Plaintiff lived at Gold
11
Base she travelled with the location shoot teams all over Southern California (¶ 23), “she had a car
12 for much of the time, a phone and would at times be totally on her own” (¶ 24), was in a loving

13 marriage (¶ 25), served as host for social affairs with the non-Scientology community (¶ 28), and

14 vacationed to Oregon, Florida, and Nevada – returning each time to her life in the Sea Org (¶ 29).

15 III. ARGUMENT
A. Validity and Arbitrability Must Be Determined by the Arbitrators.
16
Plaintiff concedes that she signed Exhibits 7 through 11 (the “Church Agreements”) and
17
Exhibit 2, the Departure Agreement, so CSI has met its burden of proving the existence of the
18 agreements to arbitrate. Molecular Analytical Sys. v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th

19 696, 710 (2010) (party seeking arbitration satisfies burden by “submitting a copy of the [arbitration

20 agreement] as an exhibit. . . . [T]he court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s
existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.”).
21
Plaintiff raises challenges to the validity of the agreements as a whole. (Opp. at 6:4-12; 9:14-
22
15; 10:2-11; 10:19-28; 11:4-12:4.) But Plaintiff has not challenged provisions that delegate all
23
questions concerning arbitration to the arbitrators. For instance, in her Departure Agreement,
24 Plaintiff made clear that civil courts were to have no role in resolving disputes subject to arbitration.

25 (Ex. 2, ¶ 8.A at pp. 10-11 & ¶ 8.D at p. 12.)3 The Opposition never addresses any provision of the

26
2
The State Bar rejected her complaint after receiving the transcript of the meeting. (Ex. 13.)
27 3
The Departure Agreement: “I . . . agree that I cannot and will not sue in civil courts or seek a
28 jury trial in connection with any such dispute” and “My intention in making the foregoing
7
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Departure Agreement or other similar provisions of the Church Agreements that vest the arbitrators
4
2 with power to resolve all disputes subject to arbitration, and divests power from the civil courts.
Plaintiff’s failure to challenge the removal of the question of arbitrability from civil court
3
jurisdiction means that the arbitrators must consider her defenses of unconscionability, undue
4
influence, and coercion. In Rent-a-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010) (RTC Mot.
5
at 12),5 the Court held that where a party challenges an entire arbitration agreement as invalid, but
6 does not challenge the delegation of arbitrability, the arbitrator, not the court, is to determine

7 challenges to validity. (“Accordingly, unless [Plaintiff] challenged the delegation provision

8 specifically, we must treat it as valid under § 2 [of the FAA], and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4
of the FAA], leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator.”)6
9
Plaintiff also challenges the scope of one of the arbitration clauses in one of the Church
10
Agreements (a 2010 Religious Services Agreement, Exhibit 7 – paraphrased at Opp. 12-13, and
11
quoted at CSI Mot. 15:22-28), and argues that the scope of claims to be arbitrated in that agreement
12 is overbroad. But when the parties agree the arbitrators are to determine all questions relating to the

13 matters to be arbitrated, questions of the scope of arbitration also must be determined by the

14 arbitrators in such cases. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct.

15 524, 530 (Jan. 8, 2019) (“If a valid agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the arbitrability
issue to an arbitrator, a court may not decide the arbitrability issue.”) (RTC Mot. at 12.) Plaintiff’s
16
agreement that her disputes concerning her Sea Org service be resolved “solely by Scientology
17
ecclesiastical authorities” and “not by a secular court of law” (fn. 3 supra) means that arbitrability
18 has been delegated to the arbitrators.7 Also, the authority cited (Opp. at 12-13) regarding scope is

19

20 promises is to resolve any problem or dispute I may have concerning my experiences as a member
of the Sea Org or as a voluntary religious worker for the Church or any Scientology Entity . . . solely
21 by Scientology ecclesiastical authorities applying the principles of the Scientology system of
Ethics and Justice and not by a secular court of law.” (Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 8.A., 8.D. (emphases added).)
22 4 See also, e.g., Ex. 11,¶ 3; Ex. 10, ¶ 7 at p. 6; Ex. 9, ¶ 5 at pp. 4-5; Ex. 8 at p. 3; Ex. 7, ¶ 6.a.

23 5 Arguments about validity and scope were raised at pages 12-13 of RTC’s Motion, which CSI
joined. (CSI Mot. at 3:1-4.) Plaintiff did not respond to those arguments. The failure to oppose the
24 arguments concedes them. Warren-Guthrie v. Health Net, 84 Cal. App. 4th 804, 817 (2000).
6
25 Plaintiff does not challenge that the substantive provisions of the FAA apply. (Opp. at 4:15-16;
13, n.1 (arguing that procedural aspects of the California Arbitration Act (CAA) apply.) Therefore,
26 “[t]he court is to make th[e] [arbitrability] determination by applying the federal substantive law of
arbitrability.” Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015).
27 7 NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Secs., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1031 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]here a

28 broad arbitration clause expressly commits all disputes to arbitration, . . . all disputes necessarily
includes disputes as to arbitrability.”).
8
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 questionable after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2019 Henry Schein holding that where all disputes

2 subject to arbitration are reserved for the arbitrators, courts cannot adjudicate scope. Finally,
Plaintiff’s argument about the unlimited scope of one agreement ignores CSI’s showing that
3
subsequent agreements, including the Departure Agreement, cover the exact subject matter of her
4
claims in this action. (See CSI Mot. at 16:3-22, 13:1-3; Departure Agreement (executed 2017), Ex.
5
2, ¶¶ 8.A, 8.B, 8.C. & 8.D at pp. 10-12 (agreeing to arbitrate disputes, including future disputes,
6 “concerning [her] experiences as a member of the Sea Org or as a voluntary religious worker for the

7 Church or any Scientology Entity. . . ”); Pledge of Religious Commitment (executed 2013), Ex. 11,

8 ¶ 2 (agreeing to arbitrate “any dispute I may have concerning my service as a CSI staff member.”).)

9 B. The First Amendment Protects CSI’s Right to Require Religious Arbitration.

1. Plaintiff’s “Neutral Law” Argument Is A Strawman.
10
Even if the Court decides it may address the questions of validity and arbitrability, the First
11 Amendment prohibits the Court from using the unconscionability doctrine to abrogate terms of

12 Plaintiff’s agreements. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, CSI is not using the First Amendment as a

13 “refuge for criminal or tortious behavior” by claiming exemption from neutral laws of general

14 applicability. CSI is simply trying to enforce terms of arbitration agreements. None of Plaintiff’s
“neutral law” authority (Opp. at 7) concerns religious arbitration or the ministerial exception, or
15
matters of internal church governance. The cases cited involve churches or parishioners challenging
16
government conduct by claiming exemptions to laws of neutral application.8 The rationale of this
17
authority is that churches cannot use the Free Exercise clause to dictate to the Government how it
18 administers neutral laws. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (Opp. at 7) (“the Free

19 Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal

20 affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.”)
Plaintiff’s “neutral law” analysis ignores the robust authority cited by CSI that is the mirror
21
image of Bowen, and prohibits the Government from interfering in church internal affairs. From
22

23 8
Examples of the Supreme Court authority relied on by the Opposition at p. 7: Employment Div. v.
24 Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (State may criminalize general use of peyote, even though used by some
in religious ceremonies); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (Defendant could not use religion
25 as a defense to failing to pay Social Security taxes); Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Bd of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 380 (1990) (State could impose sales tax on sale of religious materials);
26 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (Government permitted
to harvest timber in portion of National Forest traditionally used for religious purposes). Other
27 authority cited does not concern religion at all. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
28 (municipal ordinance regarding firearm possession); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990) (defamation suit by wrestling coach).
9
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729-31 (1871) forward, the Supreme Court has held that civil courts

2 may not exercise supervision over how a church constitutes itself: “All who unite themselves [to a
church]. . . did so upon the condition of continuing or not as they and their churches might determine
3
and, they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical power and cannot now invoke the supervisory power
4
of the civil tribunals.” See also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724
5
(1976) (CSI Mot. at 18, ignored by Plaintiff) (“Constitutional concepts of due process, involving
6 secular notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are . . . hardly relevant to such

7 matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.”) Given this precedent, courts routinely enforce religious

8 arbitration agreements that are a condition for membership in a church. This is so even where terms
of those agreements–such as reliance on scripture in determining outcome–would never be
9
permitted under civil laws of “neutral application.” See Section III.C., infra. Scientology’s religious
10
arbitration agreements with its parishioners–which use the same procedures at issue here–have been
11
enforced. Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220, 2018 WL
12 3439638 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2018) (“Garcia II”) (CSI Mot. at 23). Plaintiff ignores this authority.

13 2. The Ministerial Exception Applies.

14 If Plaintiff were “just” a parishioner, like the Garcia plaintiffs, there would be no question

15 that Watson and its progeny require the Court to refrain from interfering with Plaintiff’s agreements.
But Plaintiff was more than a parishioner. She does not dispute she was a minister. Nor could she.
16
Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l, No. 09-3986-DSF, 2010 WL 3157064, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
17
5, 2010) (Sea Org member serving in film production unit qualifies as minister). Therefore, the
18 Court cannot dictate to CSI as to her “salar[y], assignments, working conditions and termination of

19 employment.” Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 4th

20 417, 433 (2005) (“A minister’s working conditions . . . are part of the minister’s employment

21 relationship with the church.”) (quoting Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099,
1101 (9th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original); CSI Mot. at 19. Her Church Agreements embody the
22
terms of retention, assignment, and conditions of work, and her Departure Agreement concerns her
23
termination. Religious arbitration is part of those terms. (See, e.g., Ex. 2 at pp. 10-12; Ex. 10 at pp.
24
2-5.) To strike out those terms would deprive CSI of its constitutional right to have “control over
25 the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.” Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Employment

26 Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 192 (2012).

27 Plaintiff attacks the ministerial exception by claiming it does not exist: “The Supreme Court
of the United States and the lower courts have consistently held religious organizations may not use
28
10
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 the First Amendment doctrine of the ministerial exception to avoid liability under civil law.” (Opp.

2 at 8:1-3.) This sweeping statement is wrong (Hosanna-Tabor denied employment claims due to the
ministerial exception) and the cases Plaintiff cited for it do not support it.9
3
Plaintiff also tries to limit the ministerial exception by arguing that it only exempts churches
4
from employment discrimination laws. (Opp. at 8:26-27.) This is not true. See, e.g., Higgins v.
5
Maher, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1168 (1989) (applying ministerial exception to bar claims for defamation
6 and intentional infliction of emotional distress). The argument misses the point about why Hosanna-

7 Tabor and other cases recognize the exception. Churches must be permitted to choose who they

8 want as ministers, establish whatever qualifications they want (irrespective of employment laws),
and set the terms of that relationship. “The relationship between an organized church and its
9
ministers is its lifeblood. . . . Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as
10
of prime ecclesiastical concern.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
11
Plaintiff, in seeking to set aside her agreements, is asking the Court to deprive CSI of its right to set
12 the conditions for its ministers’ service–exactly what the Supreme Court has said courts cannot do.

13 C. The Agreements Are Not Unconscionable.

14 Based on all of the foregoing, the Court should not consider the unconscionability
arguments. But even so, Plaintiff’s argument that the unconscionability analysis in Armendariz
15
applies to religious arbitration agreements between a church and its minister is wrong. (CSI Mot. at
16
17-23; RTC Mot. at 15-21.) Plaintiff does not cite to a single case addressing religious arbitration
17
with ministers and does not address any of CSI’s authority pertaining to such internal religious
18 arbitration. (CSI Mot. at 23, n.5, collecting cases). Many courts have ordered religious arbitration

19 under faith-based procedures similar to provisions that Plaintiff asserts are “unconscionable,” as

20 shown in the Motion and below.

Plaintiff must show both substantive and procedural unconscionability. Crippen v. Central
21
Valley RV Outlet, 124 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1165 (2004). With regard to substantive
22
unconscionability, Plaintiff chiefly10 complains about the requirement that the arbitrator be a
23

24 9
None of the Supreme Court cases cited at Opposition 8:1-4 concern the ministerial exception or
25 even liability under civil law. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (criminalization of peyote);
Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S. 437, 440 (1971) (conscientious objector challenging conviction for failing
26 to report for draft); Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879) (bigamist challenging conviction on
religious grounds). Plaintiff also cites Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F. 3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017), which
27 held that the defendants did not qualify as ministers on the facts pled.
10
28 Plaintiff also argues that the agreements require Plaintiff to “give[] up the right to sue the
11
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Scientologist in good standing, claiming this “ensur[es] that Plaintiff never receives a fair outcome.”

2 (Opp. at 6:15-19.) Plaintiff cites no authority holding that the term is unconscionable, and courts
routinely enforce arbitration agreements providing that the arbitrators are members of a certain faith.
3
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Srvc. Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220, 2015 WL 10844160, at *9
4
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) (“Garcia I”) (compelling religious arbitration before Scientologists in
5
good standing); see also CSI Mot. at 23 n.5 (collecting authorities). Courts also reject arguments of
6 unsubstantiated, ex ante arbitrator bias. “The Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled that [under]

7 the FAA . . . courts should not presume, absent concrete proof to the contrary, that arbitration

8 systems will be unfair or biased.” See, e.g., Gen. Conf. of Evangelical Methodist Church v.
Evangelical Methodist Church, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294-95, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2011); RTC Motion
9
at 20 (collecting authorities). And there is no basis for Plaintiff’s “concern” of bias. In Garcia II,
10
former Scientology parishioners prevailed on part of their claims in an arbitration before a panel of
11
Scientologists and were awarded $18,495.36. 2018 WL 3439638, at *2.
12 Plaintiff also fails to show procedural unconscionability. First, Plaintiff claims the
13 agreements are “contracts of adhesion” because they are “standardized agreements” that Plaintiff

14 could not–and did not–negotiate. (Opp. at 6:4-8.) This is not true, but it does not matter. The First

15 Amendment protects a church’s right to impose non-negotiable terms for joining it. See Watson, 80
U.S. at 729-31; RTC Mot. at 16-18. Furthermore, “there is no general rule that a form contract used
16
by a party for many transactions is procedurally unconscionable.” Crippen, 124 Cal. App. 4th at
17
1165. Here, Plaintiff read the Departure Agreement so carefully that she proposed a revision, which
18 was accepted, (Soter Dec. ¶ 10, Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 2.H., 9.E.); and as to the Church Agreements, she presents

19 only conclusory statements regarding their execution, (Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 7). Plaintiff falsely claims the

20 terms of the agreements were “hidden in prolix” (Opp. at 6:8-9.), but, the arbitration provisions are

21 in separate paragraphs, in the same size font, and on Exhibit 9, in all capital letters and bold font.
(See, e.g., Ex. 7 at ¶ 6; Ex. 9 at ¶ 5; Ex. 11 at ¶¶ 2-3.) Moreover, Plaintiff signed multiple agreements
22
to arbitrate. She can hardly claim “surprise.” (Id.) Next, Plaintiff claims that she did not have enough
23
time to read the agreements. This is false. Plaintiff read and understood the Departure Agreement
24
and her prior agreements. In her exit interview, Plaintiff referred to a term in her prior agreements
25 (signed while in the Sea Org), the right of CSI to review her communications, and negotiated its

26 modification. (Soter Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 1 at p. 21, Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 2.H, 9.E.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that

27

28 Defendants . . . ‘in a secular court of law’” and contains a release of claims. (Opp. at 6:12-15.)
Releases of claims, and agreements not to sue in court, are standard contractual terms.
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 1 she cannot “pay for arbitration,” (Pl. Dec. ¶ 18), but Scientology religious dispute procedure is free.

2 D. Plaintiff Has Not Proven Undue Influence, Coercion, or Duress.

These defenses concern the circumstances under which Plaintiff signed the agreements. To
3
prove “undue influence,” Plaintiff must prove two elements, (1) “undue susceptibility in the servient
4
person” and (2) “excessive pressure by the dominating person.” Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist.,
5 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 131 (1966). To prove coercion, Plaintiff must show that CSI “intentionally

6 exerted an unlawful pressure on [her] to deprive [her] of contractual volition and induce [her] to act

7 to [her] own detriment,” Goldstein v. Enoch, 248 Cal. App. 2d 891, 894–95 (1967), and that “but

8 for” those actions she would not have consented to the agreement, Civ. Code § 1568.
With regard to the Church Agreements, the circumstances in which the agreements were
9
executed is the crucial inquiry to determine if duress or undue influence are proven. Balling v.
10
Finch, 203 Cal. App. 2d 413, 419 (1962) (the alleged unlawful pressure must be specifically in
11 connection with the execution of the contract at issue.) Plaintiff’s conclusory description that she

12 was “rushed” to sign the documents in the presence of unnamed “high-ranking Scientology official”

13 provides no evidence of the circumstances of execution. (Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 7.) This does not prove

14 “excessive pressure” for undue influence because, at most, this description satisfies one of Odorizzi
factors, Factor (3) “demand that the business be finished at once.” (Opp. at 10:11-18). To show
15
“excessive pressure” Plaintiff must prove several of the Odorizzi factors. See Robinson v. City of
16
Manteca, 78 Cal. App. 4th 452, 457-58 (2000).11 This also does not prove duress/coercion because
17
the conduct is not unlawful. Tarpy v. Cty. of San Diego, 110 Cal. App. 4th 267, 279 (2003).
18 Because she cannot show unlawful conduct, Plaintiff relies upon the circumstances of
19 service in the Sea Org generally, rather than anything that occurred in the execution of the Church

20 Agreements, to show duress. (Opp. at 11:2-12:5.) Plaintiff falsely claims duress is present because
of “brainwashing” and that she was “verbally, physically, and psychologically restricted from
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leaving the Gold Base.” First, “brainwashing” is just Plaintiff’s pejorative for religious belief and is
22

23 11
Plaintiff also fails to prove the first element of undue influence, improper use of a relationship of
24 confidence and authority to the advantage of the dominant party. Civ. Code § 1575(1). Plaintiff
agreed that she would serve in the Sea Org under certain conditions, and in turn received from CSI
25 religious services and food, clothing, lodging, medical and dental care, transport, and a weekly
allowance. (See, e.g., Ex. 10 at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff has not shown any “unfair advantage” to CSI from the
26 agreements, as required for the first element of undue influence. The conditions Plaintiff agreed to
are common to Sea Org members. Headley v. Church of Scientology Int., 687 F. 3d 1173, 1175,
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1180 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing “demanding, ascetic life” of Sea Org members, and holding that
28 circumstances of Sea Org life did not support claim under Trafficking Victims Protection Act.)
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 1 not recognized as a scientific concept or a basis for a civil lawsuit. U.S. v. Fishman, 743 F.Supp.
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2 713, 717-719 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Second, her allegations of “unlawful confinement” are impossibly
vague (what does “psychologically restricted” mean? Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 9). She notably does not allege
3
that she was restrained when she signed any of the agreements, or that she was threatened with
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restraint if she refused. Third, Plaintiff concedes her “restraint” argument. She fails to contest at all
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the Fraser Declaration submitted with CSI’s Motion. Ms. Fraser states that when Plaintiff lived at
6 Gold Base Plaintiff “would go out with the location shoot teams” and “traveled all over Southern

7 California” (¶ 23), “she had a car for much of the time, a phone, and would at times be out totally

8 on her own” (¶ 24), was in a loving marriage (¶ 25), served as host for events with the non-
Scientology community (¶ 28), and vacationed in Oregon, Florida, and Nevada–returning each time
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to her life in the Sea Org (¶ 29). Fourth, Plaintiff says she feared “she would risk losing her religion,
10
her home, her family, and her only source of food and shelter,” but her fear of forfeiting the benefits
11
of a contract is not duress. Skrbina v. Fleming Cos., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1353, 1367 (1996). Finally,
12 Plaintiff’s fear that she would “risk losing her religion” if she did not sign is not actionable. Headley,

13 687 F. 3d at 1180 (“A church is entitled to stop associating with someone who abandons it.”)

14 As to the Departure Agreement, Plaintiff renegotiated the terms of the agreement, and asked

15 questions about its provisions. Section III.C., supra. She also claims there was a man with a gun,
(Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 14) when she signed the Departure Agreement. This claim is false. Section II, supra.
16
But the Court need not weigh this false evidence because Plaintiff never claims that she signed the
17
Departure Agreement out of threats of violence. Rather, she states, “I just wanted it to be over and
18 get out of there.” (Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 14) Disgust, hatred, whatever she was feeling, does not amount to

19 evidence of acts of coercion or undue influence. Particularly with regard to undue influence, Plaintiff

20 cannot show the element of relationship of confidence. Civ. Code § 1575(1). When she signed her

21 Departure Agreement, Plaintiff states that she was making “false confessions” and “provid[ing] false

22
12
Under the First Amendment, lifestyle constraints in a religious context such as the Sea Org are
23 beyond judicial scrutiny. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 972 (1973) (First

24 Amendment prohibits conservatorship order sought by parents of adult members of Unification

Church contending that the Church had subjected them to “coercive persuasion” through methods
25 such as “food deprivation; sleep deprivation; isolation; the use of fear tactics; the use of guilt
feelings; and indoctrination”); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass’n, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176-78 (N.Y. App.
26 Div. 1986) (dismissing lawsuit for emotional distress allegedly arising from “fasting, chanting,
physical exercises, cloistered living, confessions, lectures, and a highly structured work and study
27 schedule,” because such conduct “constitutes common and accepted religious proselytizing

28 practices,” that are “neither extreme nor outrageous [and are] not considered by our society to be
beyond all possible bounds of decency”).
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 1 testimonials.” (Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 13.) She admits that there was no relationship of confidence.

2 E. Section 1281.2(c) Does Not Apply.

Plaintiff falsely claims that CSI “is the only one of the three defendants that is seeking to
3
compel arbitration,” and “[n]one of the other two defendants contend . . . Plaintiff has any obligation
4
to arbitrate.” (Opp. at 13:12-15.) These are not true. RTC filed a motion to compel arbitration on
5 December 20, 2019. On January 9, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel signed a joint stipulation stating that

6 “on December 20, 2019, RTC filed its Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration.” (1/13/2020 Stip.)

7 That stipulation recited that the contents of the RTC and CSI Motions “overlap[ped],” showing that

8 Plaintiff’s counsel had read the RTC Motion. Mr. Miscavige has not been served or appeared.
Plaintiff also wrongly claims, “The agreements . . . state that the agreements apply only to
9
Defendant ‘Church of Scientology, International. . . .” (Opp. at 13.) This is false. The Departure
10
Agreement dispute resolution procedure applies to any dispute concerning her experiences in the
11 “Sea Org or with any Scientology Entity,” regardless of the parties. (Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 8.A, 5.D.) The

12 Departure Agreement defines “Scientology Entity” to include RTC. (Id. ¶ 5.D.) The Departure

13 Agreement “specifically includes Chairman of the Board of the Religious Technology Center, Mr.

14 David Miscavige” as a beneficiary of the Agreement. (Id.) The Departure Agreement affirms prior
agreements that apply to “the Church [CSI], any other Scientology Church, any other organization
15
that espouses, presents, propagates or practices the Scientology religion, or any person employed
16
by any such entity.” (See, e.g., Ex. 7 at ¶ 6.d.; see also Ex. 9 at ¶ 5; Ex. 2 at ¶ 2.H. (reaffirming prior
17
agreements).) Because all of the Defendants may enforce the arbitration agreements, Section
18 1281.2(c) does not apply. Rowe v. Exline, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1290 (2007) (a nonsignatory who

19 may enforce an arbitration provision is not a “third party” within the meaning of Section 1281.2(c).)

20 F. The Court Should Deny the Request to Conduct Discovery.

CSI has filed its motion for a mandatory stay under CCP Section 1281.4. Plaintiff has not
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made a showing for why the mandatory stay should not obtain. She has not identified any discovery
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she needs to challenge any of the assertions in the motion to arbitrate or to support any of her claims.
23 The request for discovery should be denied. If the Court is inclined to credit any of Plaintiff’s

24 statements about guns or other fantastical statements in considering the motion to arbitrate, CSI asks

25 that it be able to examine Plaintiff and present witnesses on any such issue.

26 IV. CONCLUSION
CSI respectfully requests the Court stay this case and order Plaintiff to pursue her claims
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through Scientology’s internal Ethics, Justice and binding religious arbitration procedures.
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 1 DATED: January 23, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
WILLIAM H. FORMAN
2 DAVID C. SCHEPER
3 MARGARET E. DAYTON

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By: /s/ William H. Forman
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William H. Forman
7 Attorneys for Defendant, Church of Scientology
International
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