1. In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. Conflict of Laws, pp.

Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas,
EUGENIO EUSEBIO vs. AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN
EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing,
according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda,
Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said
petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter
was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be
dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated
March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence,
the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28,
1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p.
220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had
been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down
to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have
manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who
took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to
the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased (had)
decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee
did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent,
Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on
his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court
held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from
the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This
conclusion is untenable.lawphil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an
not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice was given and followed in
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It
estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at
is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp.
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C.
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San
Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit
2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City, was
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had
conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the
always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well
decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B"
as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr.
residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a
Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on
notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract
October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention,
Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to
in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter,
Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days
the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio
prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy
took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent
of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein
remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes
appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the
before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo
deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that
mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2)
occasion and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were
days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive
false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the
heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he
decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter,
never stayed or even slept in said house at España Extention.
shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was,
San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the as regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.
presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence
of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in
is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement
evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason
of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under
therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during the
the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another
hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:
domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are
essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently (Minor,
 Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the
records for whatever action oppositors may want to take later on because
until now the personality of the oppositors has not been established whether
or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass
upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of
this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed.
(P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in
evidence before appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case,
referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said
hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate
children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it
seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your client; you are
leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased
was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-
examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will
sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should
inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the
decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish
such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the question of
venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing
procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances
surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on
the one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce
evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court,
on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the
appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing,
in the lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only
to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.).
During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the
relation between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto,
the court said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the
jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I
will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p.
7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my
stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2,
for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they
maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially
made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that
appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their
right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly.
Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true,
entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged
residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits
1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue
under consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?"
In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November
4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio".
Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to
Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order
dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on
November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed
Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein),
moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present
case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This
motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above
Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said
order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent.
Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive
jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to
cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not
possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by
law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which
jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of
the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who
have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their
respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of
said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction — and,
hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts —
but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules
of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which
deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance
of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in
two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in
which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and
we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955).
Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been
improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding
proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority,
therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having
been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants'
opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is
dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
In the matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. Eugenio Eusebio,
petitioner and appellee, vs. Amanda Eusebio, Virginia Eusebio, Juan Eusebio, et
al., oppositors and appellants.
December 28, 1956 | Concepcion
Facts: Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged
that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s
siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are
illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon
the ground that venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’ objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A
Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him,
resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer
to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his son’s
residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a
place merely for one own’s health” even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never
again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy
years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct
evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City
indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented
to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed
of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga,
as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres when he was married
in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his
residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of
choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no
change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI
of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must
be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the
same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.
Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not
changed by presence in a place for one’s own health.
2. VIRGINA FULE VS CA
FACTS: Virginia G. Fule filed a petition for letters of administration, alleging Amado G.
Garcia died intestate, leaving real estate and personal properties. She moved ex
parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar
granted the motion. Preciosa B. Garcia filed an MR contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction,
since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all
persons interested, and as the surviving spouse of Amado, she should be preferred in
the appointment of a special administratrix in lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix
after due hearing, alleging that Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado and thus has
adverse interest against the estate and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
administratrix and as officer of the court.
Judge Malvar denied the MR. Preciosa moved for reconsideration insofar as they
sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of
action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of
checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. During the hearing, Preciosa presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
death his residence was in Quezon City. Fule testified that Amado was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death. The CA rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Malvar for lack of jurisdiction. Denied of their motion for
reconsideration Fule elevated the matter on appeal by certiorari to the SC. Before
Fule could receive the decision of the CA, Preciosa had already filed a petition for
letters of administration before the CFI of Quezon City, with a motion for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Ericta granted the motion
and appointed Preciosa as special administratrix.
ISSUES:
1. What the word “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of
Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, means.
2. Who should be appointed as special administratrix of the subject estate?
RULING:
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed
by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.”
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual
residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,”
like, the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. The term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia,
which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B.
Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased’s residence certificate for
1973 obtained three months before his death; and certificates of titles covering parcels
of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia’s last
place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative
that the venue for Fule’s petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the
CFI of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to
improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: “When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived.” Preciosa did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the CFI of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
residence of the decedent.
2. Preciosa B. Garcia’s challenge to Virginia G. Fule’s appointment as special
administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that “(w)hen there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the
probate court. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he
is married to Preciosa B. Garcia.
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
The petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule were denied.
3. ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO,
CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO,
CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution
promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors'
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2)
minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all
residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of
the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent
Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first
instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late
senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu
at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and
Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for
hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and
interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and
modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be
heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a
third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for
the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for
the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the
notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the
petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic
petition for the issuance of letters of administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu
petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first
instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving
widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special
Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order
holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of
that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought
by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they
challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction
of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for
appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive
jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said
respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss,
giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate
proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that the residence of the late
senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon
City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition
and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his
death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March
1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the
aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors
do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he
died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will
should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in
the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be
entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of
the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death
was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and
Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will
shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly
stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon
City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice
and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two
residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he
himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the
center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before
this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this
court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of
all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's
said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a
second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate
of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but
notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City
court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court
noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and
motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his
benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the
testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the
hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of
the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to
the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and
Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the
said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence
certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating
that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed
by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted
to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and
voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed
petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the
testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to
probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent
Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from
proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate
proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is
that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is
that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of
(1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or
not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate
was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-
7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of
the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another
court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964,
Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated
 that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready
for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court
to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge
was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only
to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend
on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing
the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and
the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from
proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending
before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions
heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and
connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore
issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court
of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court
erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it
to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the
decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This
issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed
with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon
City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be
the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order
of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition
or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without
any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to
dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue,
to proceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having
been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First
Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the
other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the
very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different
courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule
specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule
provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate
is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was
lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases
the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view
because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case
has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province
where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who
also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse
decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of
the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we
consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have
arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to
be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of
justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio &
Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act
No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in
the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as
defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
(Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of
First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place
of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section
600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus,
the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the
new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the
estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of
equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is
first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order
to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's
last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his
conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and
that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition
and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion
to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action
on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on
the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if
the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely
decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be
shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon
City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the
Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties
whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where
he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The
Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of
the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the
latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the
decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule
73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the
decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu
court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule
of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu
court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said
Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City
court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the
appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the
decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance
with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over
intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the
Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem
to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for
probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending
Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila
Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had
no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from
doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner
knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila
Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it
was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
 Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and
for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that
date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator
with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five
months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now
to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila
Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly
had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where
the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will
duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the
first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile
therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of
said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record"
could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to
the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown
that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late
senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held
in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court
is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of
First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that
the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring
both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be
submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance,
particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the
Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu,
besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter
requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and
controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July
27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with
the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the
residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon
which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon
City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts — at the
behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was
the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue,
the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical
ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable
and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual
residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined
Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have
not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if
the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its
contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of
waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken
into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a
will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate
proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in
such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-
requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even
against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is
conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was
not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,)
in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a
writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's
appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where
the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action
admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance
therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice
Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and
annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings
before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require
comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the
decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate,
then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a
rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly
assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the
detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at
naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be
converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice
regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the
decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the
right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were
certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy
and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the
applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent
Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's
time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within
fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964)
timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is
admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would
be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and
submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by
asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding — when
under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of
record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the
decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be
executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and
a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require
her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the
Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the
probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73,
section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her
husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered and
liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed
decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue
of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took
cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and
consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and
petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to
Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal
estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance
of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a
week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's
last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss)
showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had
died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or
prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the
probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free
(pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the
decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will
to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary
disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1
lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of
May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix
thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order
of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic
action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory
authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the
case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City
court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the
Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent
(with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate
of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix
without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions
taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to
annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court
should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the
Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record,
Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts
FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow
and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage,
residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that
the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife,
filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she
was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon
shall have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were
denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to
CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs: Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in
pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence
of probate over intestate proceedings
HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction: Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would
affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.
4. EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on
March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his
six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left
real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less;
that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued
an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home
to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo
to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and
the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code. On April 21, 1994,
Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of
said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent
and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was
without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
26 27
Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the disqualification of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce
in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The
foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x
x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals. On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion
to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant
to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
– Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence
is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings
in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve
election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at
his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced
by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated
by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when
the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61 In the recent case
of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code
and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them." x x x x
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid
v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
x x x x In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and
an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on
March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The
second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying
the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition
for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
Held: Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied
by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code. The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
5. OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,, v. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the
Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right
to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were
consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues
raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo
de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in
the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A
copy of the will2 was annexed to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61
issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12
September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo
de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated
04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on
the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on
motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand
and was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers
to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he
executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is
of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or
fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his own free and
voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in
signing it.
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in
his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5")
at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City;
said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses,
namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty.
Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria
C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the
presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the
said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L.
Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures
were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address
at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as
sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and personal, approximately
valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as
executor and to serve as such without a bond.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established
the material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having
been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution
of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it
executed under duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing
and executed in the language known and understood by the testator duly subscribed
thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the
Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that
the instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the
allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED
and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming
that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr.,
he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise
alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration
in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch
61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was
granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of
his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his
intervention.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand,
private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to
Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an
order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss
estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set
aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that
he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came
to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still
pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testators estate; that
private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that
petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of
RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on
August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the
Court of Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the
denial of petitioners motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the
records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending
case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The
order reads:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this
case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before this
Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no related
case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this
Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76
of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP.
PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become
final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the
hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter
involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her
motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No.
M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August
1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed
under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule
76 of the Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be approved
by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos appeared firm
in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the
petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were
commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the
latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case
"to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue
hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate
proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch
(Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite
the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is
but one court.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court
Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los
Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial
court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February
26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that
petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost
jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired
jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private)
respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a
right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by
the respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition
for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65
knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of the
decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61.
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did
not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing
the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he argues that the
proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs,
devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
respondents petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited
to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so
much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of
such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate
of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of
wills.10cräläwvirtualibräry
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the
will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the
allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the
allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary
for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the
testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his
will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been
explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the
testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few
cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the
courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his
death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will
does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected
at once. The probate during the testators life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest
upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions
that may remain for the courts to decide after the testators death will refer to the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the
testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or
undue influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily
mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new
will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a
chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testators
death would be in order.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will
pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling
of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -Nex old
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings
of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease
upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire
estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that
the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latters death.
In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the
probate court.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73,
1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement
of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was
held:13cräläwvirtualibräry
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
"so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement
of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended
to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is
one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the
court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply
directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised.
There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the
person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once
raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to
the parties.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro
Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The
different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. 14cräläwvirtualibräry
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for
probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the
same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after
his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:15cräläwvirtualibräry
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth
Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only
one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And
when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that
Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the
administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both
for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different
branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not
involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be
vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any
branch or judge of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next
of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling
that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-
Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy.
Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all
his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His
interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.18
first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the
records show, not supported by evidence.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testators will.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will,
and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
respondents opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named
and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as
an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the
executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the
testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19
probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.16cräläwvirtualibräry
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural
Rule 79, 1 provides:
that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted
to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
- Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters
testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond
them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such
may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. 20 None of these
grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the
circumstances is present in this case.
will annexed.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be
filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner,
such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which
contingent.17cräläwvirtualibräry
are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the
other.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered
an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr.
who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus,
De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the
Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private
respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing
authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the
testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition
terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons
named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the
latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 Octavio Maloles II vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133359, January 31, 2000
FACTS: On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati
City, filed a petition for probate of his will 1 in the Regional Trial Court. He alleged that
he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee
the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were
in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only
child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole
full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he
was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent
RULING: No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as the nearest next of kin
and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. Even if
petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an “heir”
of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of
the Civil Code provides:
“One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of
it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.”
“One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.”
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s —
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased.
Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the
Court to respect the desires of the testator. Only if the appointed executor is
incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons
to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.
6. DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in
Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of
donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties
mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July
27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the
Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9,
1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula,
and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all
surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente,
Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and
Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in
accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among
the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was
alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed
an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of
partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased
Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960,
respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was
presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain
legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was
contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili
belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena
Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs
of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the
donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the
donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil
action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of
donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties,
aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that
since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner
of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued
an order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical
nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered
under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits
donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second
category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in
relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same
order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file
another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between
the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased
Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of
the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new
trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum
that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal
heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of
Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the
donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion
for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners
filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that
the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to
adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to
title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings," 1 except
where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the
question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. 2 However, we
have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional
to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so
submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the
consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be
taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided
interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to
adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein
involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes,
or to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in
the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to
pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and
void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its
decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an
action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there
can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case
of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro
Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction
to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the
procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of
practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly
speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject
matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person
regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been
recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an
administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue
among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the
estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. 3 Thereafter, distribution is made of
the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The
proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to
bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end,
and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the
ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of
the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all
matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as
no interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of
certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or
to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine
the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties
to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her
death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and
who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected.
It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but
the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that
is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being
asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the
widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of
ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the
contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition
claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition
and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be
deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly,
the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of
partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character
of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents".
In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed
lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners
themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well
within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto,
they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction
of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection
are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the
court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. 6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of
ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not
only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of
her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried
properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute
estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at
the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge
works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because
of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such
deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been
executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the
same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.
7. ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the
September 24, 20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which dismissed, after trial, their
complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims
of the parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary
evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose
Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua
Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition and Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who
died intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their
rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan
in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name
of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir
of Estate of Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land.
TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and in its
stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on
March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to
Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer
by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before
the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint15 against respondent for
annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate
of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the
deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that
she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of
Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT
in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered
to cancel the TCT in respondent’s name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners’) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order
chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is
valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the
legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, 17 after giving an account of
the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary
evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case
for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative
heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of
jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.x x x
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth,
pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent.
Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent,
was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a
right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c),
Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong
(ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter, it is "to
enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having
been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’
cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to
sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial
court’s ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Court’s
following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity,
is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v.
Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that
of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cariño to
be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño,
whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both
named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee Cariño) both of whom he
married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages
with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two
marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased
Cariño was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages
was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main
issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case
is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two
contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, — both
now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the
parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x.
Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly
ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action,
whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that
purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law
prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a
declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding
brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x21 (Emphasis in the
original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,22 thus affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to
have erred when
I.. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state
a cause of action.
II.. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the
existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and
the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative
to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the
questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the
prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence
adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a
quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the
determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the
determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged
by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows courts to pass on the
determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is
necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s
ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a
special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case
for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her
name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein
petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of the two lots mentioned
therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two
lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and
Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual
respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of
titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein
petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it—except the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays—that
they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of
property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . 27
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an
improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court of
Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of
a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for
issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on
January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who
are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911;
that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa
Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the
decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on
Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a
civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator
Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their
complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations
made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents
in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it
rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the
plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir
is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were
married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al.,
found "substantially correct" the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that,
among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity
of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does
not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner
intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other documentary
evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove
the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their]
alleged status . . . as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have
declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent,
for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed
before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as
sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother.
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father,
moved to reconsider the court’s order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the
decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the
ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed
a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the
RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other
issues, "whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil
action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the
same court," this Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court
should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal
court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are
still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva]
had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to
proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice," and declared
her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the
therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was
approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-
adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the
case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project
of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive
father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition.
She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive
father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’ agreement
to suspend action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate estate proceedings
for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil
case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on
the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she
acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she
was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in
her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that
there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial
court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of
the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate
proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as Juanita’s share under the project of
partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson,
supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent
the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a
proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-
opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court
or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs.
Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the
civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it "involves no
longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had
been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to
have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask
for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in
order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a
property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir
to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court.36 Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. 37
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate
court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate
of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances
of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just
to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome
to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to
reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name
petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
HELD:
pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is
valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal
heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings.

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.Let the records of the case be
REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on
the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.No costs.SO ORDERED.
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. v. LEONILA
PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel
de la Puerta and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner.
Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate
of Portugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case,
to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason
to still subject Portugal‘s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues
it defined during pre-trial.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver
of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the
deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of
land in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran
executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person”
adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in
her name.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City
a complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of
the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to
the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was
dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal
Jr.‘s status amd right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court,
and lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
RTC‘s dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:
 8. FERDINAND R. MARCOS II vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and
HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again assailed as
precipitate and unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored requisites of due process
of law. Specifically, the petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363, where the said court held:
In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax
assessments and estate tax assessment, are already final and
(u)nappealable-and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy
resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and
separate from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and
Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the pendency of any
other tax remedies instituted by the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition for certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and
Injunction.
No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the settlement of his estate,
and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are still unresolved, the latter issue
being now before this Court for resolution. Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos
II, the eldest son of the decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary
remedy of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the
estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on
probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 10279 in
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to —
I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February
22, 1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue;
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;
III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection
Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the real properties covered by
Notices of Sale.
After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision 2 on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for estate
and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the deceased President
Marcos have already become final and unappealable, and may thus be enforced by
the summary remedy of levying upon the properties of the late President, as was done
by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Restraining Order and Injunction. No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the appellate court's
decision, assigning the following as errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
SUMMARY TAX REMEDIES RESORTED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT
ARE NOT AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE
SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE LATE
PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO THE CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE
PROCEEDING PRECISELY PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM
PART OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF
THE PROBATE COURT TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER COURTS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY
DECIDING THAT SINCE THE TAX ASSESSMENTS OF PETITIONER AND
HIS PARENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE,
THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF THE GROUNDS
CITED IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER,
PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL
MANNER AND METHOD IN WHICH TAX COLLECTION IS SOUGHT TO
BE ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER AND DE
GUZMAN. THUS, RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY
CONSIDERED THE MERITS OF THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE
PETITION:
(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property were issued beyond the
period provided in the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68.
(2) [a] The numerous pending court cases questioning the late
President's ownership or interests in several properties (both
personal and real) make the total value of his estate, and the
consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact pecuniary
determination at this time. Thus, respondents' assessment of the
estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and Sale are
premature, confiscatory and oppressive.
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's compulsory heirs, was
never notified, much less served with copies of the Notices of
Levy, contrary to the mandate of Section 213 of the NIRC. As
such, petitioner was never given an opportunity to contest the
Notices in violation of his right to due process of law.
C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE PETITION,
RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD
NO POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PETITIONER.
SECTION 219 OF THE NIRC NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS POSSESS
 THE POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO
RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER'S AND DE GUZMAN'S
ARBITRARY METHOD OF COLLECTING THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY
ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF LEVY.
The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby adopted:
On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA.
On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct
investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the late
president, as well as that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said audit
team concluded its investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The
investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the
death of the decedent, an estate tax returns [sic], as well as several income
tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986, — all in violation of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
before the Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations of Sections 82, 83 and
84 (has penalized under Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section 252 — a
& b) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and
filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the late president, the Income
Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the
Income Tax Returns of petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II for the
years 1982 to 1985.
On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency estate tax
assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the estate of the late president
Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos); (2) Deficiency
income tax assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and Deficiency income tax
assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the Spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40
representing deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and 1986); (3)
Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to FAC-1-85-91-
002463 (against petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II in the amounts of
P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60 Pesos
representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to 1985).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the deficiency
estate and income tax assessments were all personally and constructively
served on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos
(through her caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at No. 204
Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "D" and "E" of the Petition). Likewise,
copies of the deficiency tax assessments issued against petitioner Ferdinand
"Bongbong" Marcos II were also personally and constructively served upon
him (through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last known address
at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes
"J" and "J-1" of the Petition). Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices were
served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos c/o petitioner, at his office,
House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Quezon City. Moreover, a
notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized representative
or counsel), to a conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean
Antonio Coronel — but to no avail.
The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs.
Marcos and the other heirs of the late president, within 30 days from service of
said assessments.
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of
levy on real property against certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses —
to satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses
Marcos.
On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued for
the purpose of satisfying the deficiency income taxes.
On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were
again issued. The foregoing tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to
Sections 205 and 213 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata (counsel
of herein petitioner) calling the attention of the BIR and requesting that they be
duly notified of any action taken by the BIR affecting the interest of their client
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II, as well as the interest of the late president
— copies of the aforesaid notices were, served on April 7, 1993 and on June
10, 1993, upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of record,
"De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office".
Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby of
the City Hall of Tacloban City. The public auction for the sale of the eleven (11)
parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no bidder, the lots
were declared forfeited in favor of the government.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement of tax
laws and the collection of taxes, is of paramount importance for the sustenance of
government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and should be collected
without unnecessary hindrance. However, such collection should be made in
accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government
itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the
authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be achieved. 3
Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said tax
obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject of the Court's
inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of properties
of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void for disregarding the
established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due upon the estate of the
deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos 4 is specifically cited to bolster the
argument that "the ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness
against the estate of a deceased, person, as in an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the
claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the
administrator to pay the amount therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and
cannot be effected through any other means.
Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded from denying
a request by the government for the immediate payment of taxes, and should order
the payment of the same only within the period fixed by the probate court for the
payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this regard, petitioner cites the case
of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil
502), where it was held that:
The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Collector of
Internal Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon by the petitioner-appellant is
good authority on the proposition that the court having control over the
administration proceedings has jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented
by the government for taxes due and to order the administrator to pay the
tax should it find that the assessment was proper, and that the tax was
legal, due and collectible. And the rule laid down in that case must be
understood in relation to the case of Collector of Customs
vs. Haygood, supra., as to the procedure to be followed in a given case by
the government to effectuate the collection of the tax. Categorically stated,
where during the pendency of judicial administration over the estate of a
deceased person a claim for taxes is presented by the government, the
court has the authority to order payment by the administrator; but, in the
same way that it has authority to order payment or satisfaction, it also has
the negative authority to deny the same. While there are cases where courts
are required to perform certain duties mandatory and ministerial in
character, the function of the court in a case of the present character is not
one of them; and here, the court cannot be an organism endowed with
latitude of judgment in one direction, and converted into a mere mechanical
contrivance in another direction.
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect internal
revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate proceedings over the
estate of the deceased does not preclude the assessment and collection, through
summary remedies, of estate taxes over the same. According to the respondent,
claims for payment of estate and income taxes due and assessed after the death of
the decedent need not be presented in the form of a claim against the estate. These
can and should be paid immediately. The probate court is not the government agency
to decide whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-
settled is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and limited jurisdiction.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited
jurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling thing.
The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with
indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very parties invoking its
authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court
to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before
final adjudication; 5 to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; 6 the recognition of
a natural child; 7 the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the
decedent; 8 the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; 9 and to pass upon
the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. 10
The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying upon, and sale of
real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies, without the cognition and
authority of the court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the deceased.
The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as follows:
Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does not directly
involve the administration of a decedent's estate, although it may be viewed
as an incident to the complete settlement of an estate, and, under some
statutes, it is made the duty of the probate court to make the amount of the
inheritance tax a part of the final decree of distribution of the estate. It is not
against the property of decedent, nor is it a claim against the estate as such,
but it is against the interest or property right which the heir, legatee,
devisee, etc., has in the property formerly held by decedent. Further, under
some statutes, it has been held that it is not a suit or controversy between
the parties, nor is it an adversary proceeding between the state and the
person who owes the tax on the inheritance. However, under other statutes
it has been held that the hearing and determination of the cash value of the
assets and the determination of the tax are adversary proceedings. The
proceeding has been held to be necessarily a proceeding in rem. 11
In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax, is executive
in character, as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue Code attests to this:
Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau. — The powers and duties of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue shall comprehend the assessment and
collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the
enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith,
including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the
Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts. Said Bureau shall also give
effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by
this Code or other laws.
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez 12 that the court recognized the liberal treatment of
claims for taxes charged against the estate of the decedent. Such taxes, we said,
were exempted from the application of the statute of non-claims, and this is justified by
the necessity of government funding, immortalized in the maxim that taxes are the
lifeblood of the government. Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae — taxes are the sinews
of the state.
Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after
administration is opened, need not be submitted to the committee on claims
in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of its control over
the administrator, the court may direct the payment of such taxes upon
motion showing that the taxes have been assessed against the estate.
Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings extends so
far, even to allowing the enforcement of tax obligations against the heirs of the
decedent, even after distribution of the estate's properties.
Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the
deceased, can be collected from the heirs even after the distribution of the
properties of the decedent. They are exempted from the application of the
 statute of non-claims. The heirs shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their
share in the inheritance. 13
Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question.
One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the
amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another
remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon
all property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income
tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an
heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate. (Commissioner
of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in probate, or
as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the
collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in
proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late
President, on the ground that it was required to seek first the probate court's sanction.
There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the
necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for
estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court
which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's
estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the estate, unless it is
shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes
have been paid. This provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the
probate court which approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the estate taxes,
this should have been pursued through the proper administrative and judicial avenues
provided for by law.
Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. — When the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be
assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to be
prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to
respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall
issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for
reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be prescribed
by implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the assessment;
otherwise, the assessment shall become final and unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or
corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision;
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (As
inserted by P.D. 1773)
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required for the
filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never questioned the assessments
served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and prompting the BIR to
collect the said taxes by levying upon the properties left by President Marcos.
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have been
validly undertaken by the Government, collection thereof may have been done in
violation of the law. Thus, the manner and method in which the latter is enforced may
be questioned separately, and irrespective of the finality of the former, because the
Government does not have the unbridled discretion to enforce collection without
regard to the clear provision of law." 14
Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68,
implementing Sections 318 and 324 of the old tax code (Republic Act 5203), the BIR's
Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued beyond the allowed period, and
are therefore null and void:
. . . the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes O to NN of Annex C of
this Petition) in satisfaction of said assessments were still issued by
respondents well beyond the period mandated in Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 38-68. These Notices of Levy were issued only on 22 February
1993 and 20 May 1993 when at least seventeen (17) months had already
lapsed from the last service of tax assessment on 12 September 1991. As
no notices of distraint of personal property were first issued by respondents,
the latter should have complied with Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
38-68 and issued these Notices of Levy not earlier than three (3) months
nor later than six (6) months from 12 September 1991. In accordance with
the Circular, respondents only had until 12 March 1992 (the last day of the
sixth month) within which to issue these Notices of Levy. The Notices of
Levy, having been issued beyond the period allowed by law, are thus void
and of no effect. 15
We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within the
prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the present Tax Code.
The deficiency tax assessment, having already become final, executory, and
demandable, the same can now be collected through the summary remedy of distraint
or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.
The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the assessment and
collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of the NIRC, which pertinently
provides:
Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and
collection of taxes. — (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with
intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or
a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without
assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the
falsity, fraud, or omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has
become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken
cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.xxx xxx
xxx
(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of
limitation above prescribed, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a
proceeding in court within three years following the assessment of the
tax.xxx xxx xxx
The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to contest or
appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's cause, as under the
above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed at
any time within ten years after the omission, and any tax so assessed may be
collected by levy upon real property within three years following the assessment of the
tax. Since the estate tax assessment had become final and unappealable by the
petitioner's default as regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is
now no reason why the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any
objection against the assessment should have been pursued following the avenue
paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue
taxes.
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases questioning the late
president's ownership or interests in several properties (both real and personal) make
the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact
pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents' assessment of the estate tax
and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and sale are premature and oppressive." He
points out the pendency of Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and 0141,
which were filed by the government to question the ownership and interests of the late
President in real and personal properties located within and outside the Philippines.
Petitioner, however, omits to allege whether the properties levied upon by the BIR in
the collection of estate taxes upon the decedent's estate were among those involved
in the said cases pending in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to
how these cases are relevant to the matter at issue. The mere fact that the decedent
has pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not affect the enforcement of tax
assessments over the properties indubitably included in his estate.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's total
assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating that this amount deviates from the
findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per its resolution of 20
September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the uncertainty on the part of the
Government as to the total value of the estate of the late President.
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the assessment of estate
tax which had already become final and unappealable.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked to
determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, 16 whose determinations and assessments are presumed correct and made
in good faith. 17 The taxpayer has the duty of proving otherwise. In the absence of
proof of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an assessment will not
be disturbed. Even an assessment based on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful
where it does not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden
of proof is upon the complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is
erroneous. Failure to present proof of error in the assessment will justify the judicial
affirmance of said assessment. 18 In this instance, petitioner has not pointed out one
single provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit Team which gave rise to the
questioned assessment, which bears a trace of falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's attack
on the assessment bears mainly on the alleged improbable and unconscionable
amount of the taxes charged. But mere rhetoric cannot supply the basis for the charge
of impropriety of the assessments made.
Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised, considering
the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described earlier, and cannot be
raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext of grave abuse of discretion.
The course of action taken by the petitioner reflects his disregard or even repugnance
of the established institutions for governance in the scheme of a well-ordered society.
The subject tax assessments having become final, executory and enforceable, the
same can no longer be contested by means of a disguised protest. In the
main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or remedy. 19 This
judicial policy becomes more pronounced in view of the absence of sufficient attack
against the actuations of government.
On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the petitioner, we
find the respondent appellate court's pronouncements sound and resilient to
petitioner's attacks.
Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) — both alleging/claiming lack of notice — We find,
after considering the facts and circumstances, as well as evidences, that there
was sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments, levy and sale,
sent to herein petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos as well as to his mother
Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to the
caretaker of Mrs. Marcos at the latter's last known address, on August 26, 1991
and September 12, 1991, as well as the notices of assessment personally given
to the caretaker of petitioner also at his last known address on September 12,
1991 — the subsequent notices given thereafter could no longer be ignored as
they were sent at a time when petitioner was already here in the Philippines, and
at a place where said notices would surely be called to petitioner's attention, and
received by responsible persons of sufficient age and discretion.
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs.
Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan
Pambansa, Q.C. (Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210,
Comment/Memorandum of OSG). Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated October
8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to a conference relative to her tax liabilities, was
furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos — Dean Antonio Coronel (Annex "B", p.
211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were also served upon Mrs. Imelda
Marcos, the petitioner and their counsel "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello,
Guevarra and Serapio Law Office", on April 7, 1993 and June 10, 1993. Despite
all of these Notices, petitioner never lifted a finger to protest the assessments,
(upon which the Levy and sale of properties were based), nor appealed the same
to the Court of Tax Appeals.
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother) and
it appearing that petitioner continuously ignored said Notices despite several
opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals, — the tax assessments subject of this case, upon which the levy
and sale of properties were based, could no longer be contested (directly or
indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari. 20
Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must be nullified
for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the petitioner. As a
mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has an interest in the subject
estate, and notices of levy upon its properties should have been served upon him.
We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the delinquent estate
tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent, and not necessarily, and
exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased. In the same vein, in the matter of
income tax delinquency of the late president and his spouse, petitioner is not the
taxpayer liable. Thus, it follows that service of notices of levy in satisfaction of these
tax delinquencies upon the petitioner is not required by law, as under Section 213 of
the NIRC, which pertinently states:xxx xxx xxx
. . . Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a description of the
property upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the levy
shall be mailed to or served upon the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the property is located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if he be
absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in
respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the
property in question.xxx xxx xxx
Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate
or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the
same can be enforced and collected.
The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are already final
and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy resorted
to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from the other tax
remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not affected or
precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by the government.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants of distraint
and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7, 1993, and June
10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his office at the Batasang
Pambansa. 21 We cannot therefore, countenance petitioner's insistence that he was
denied due process. Where there was an opportunity to raise objections to
government action, and such opportunity was disregarded, for no justifiable reason,
the party claiming oppression then becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of
government. He who comes to court must come with clean hands. Otherwise, he not
only taints his name, but ridicules the very structure of established authority. IN VIEW
WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present petition. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. SO
ORDERED.

MARCOS II vs. CA GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997

General Rule: The approval of the court sitting in probate is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes. In case of failure to file a return, the tax
may be assessed at anytime within 10 years after the omission.

FACTS:
Ferdinand Marcos II sought for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals to grant
CIR's petition to levy the properties of the late Pres. Marcos to cover the payment of his
tax delinquencies during the period of his exile in the US. The Marcos family was
assessed by the BIR after it failed to file estate tax returns.

However the assessment were not protested administratively by Mrs. Marcos and the
heirs of the late president so that they became final and unappealable after the period
for filing of opposition has prescribed. Marcos contends that the properties could not be
levied to cover the tax dues because they are still pending probate with the court, and
settlement of tax deficiencies could not be had, unless there is an order by the probate
court or until the probate proceedings are terminated.

Petitioner also pointed out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68, the BIR's
Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties were issued beyond the allowed period, and
are therefore null and void.

ISSUE: Are the contentions of Marcos II correct?

HELD:

No, his contentions are incorrect. The Supreme Court held that, from the foregoing, it
is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement
tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate
taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the
levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground
that it was required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the

9. PURITA ALIPIO v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse
for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether
such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse. s virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
Respondent Romeo Jaring 1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito,
Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on
September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining
period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido
and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two
installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second installment falling due
on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only
satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due
demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their obligation, so that, on October 13,
1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the
said amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the
alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants
fail to pay the balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband,
Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988. 2 She based her action on Rule
3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that
now Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied,
and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action
was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself
a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit
together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in
his exclusion from the case. 3
The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in
default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner
and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of P50,600.00
plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision 4 rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate
court dismissed her appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be
dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court, does
not apply where there are other defendants against whom the action should be
maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of action
against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action
for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the corresponding action is,
unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
x x x
However the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant. Manuel Co was also named
defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore. the order appealed from is erroneous
insofar as it dismissed the case against Co. (Emphasis added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories
to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by
claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has totally extinguished their
obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the
obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the
debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and
severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her
husband’s; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the
claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the
decedent’s estate. (Agcaoili v. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97). 5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, 1998. 6 Hence
this petition based on the following assignment of errors:c
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING
CLIMACO V. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER
WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING
DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT
AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A
MONEY CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING
IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. V. DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE
BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT JARING.
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a
decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable
against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in
the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner’s husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before
private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October 13, 1989. This
case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals with dismissals of
collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case
and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim
in the proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate. As already noted, Rule 3,
§20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The issue to be resolved
is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file this case against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease
contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the
Alipios’ obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is
liable for —
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases
where she may legally bind the partnership. 8
When petitioner’s husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved
9 and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings
in accordance with Rule 73, 52 which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved
by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
As held in Calma v. Tañedo, 10 after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint
for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be
brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the
proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for
this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving
spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having
jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. 11 Indeed, the surviving spouse
is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership
property is void. 12
The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura v. Militante.
13 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended complaint for a sum of
money based on an obligation allegedly contracted by her and her late husband. The
defendant, who had earlier moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the
amended complaint on the ground that the death of her husband terminated their
conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff’s claim, which was chargeable against the
partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The
trial court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in
this case, that since the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her
husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection suit against her.
On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that —
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of
either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the
recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any
judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to
be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there
is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the
conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent cannot be said to have no
remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for
letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after
thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request
that administration be granted to some other person. 14chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling, namely, Climaco
u Siy Uy 15 and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David, 16 are based on different sets of facts.
In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for
malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal
partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely
resulted in the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant
Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally executed
an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection suit filed against the
wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses’
liability was solidary, the surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary
action for the enforcement of the entire obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of
gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment.
17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into
by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true,
the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary
but rather merely joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit
against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner’s husband or, if none has been
commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters of administration 18
or for the allowance of will, 19 depending on whether petitioner’s husband died intestate
or testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside from
petitioner’s lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of the
Alipios’ conjugal property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be
paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction
over the settlement of the decedent’s estate and not to any other court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private
respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of P50,600.00 without
specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection
with this, Art. 1207, of the Civil Code provides:c
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each
one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the
nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the
wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be
only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each
debt being considered distinct from one another.
Private Respondent does not cite provision of law which provides that when there are
two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter’s obligation to pay the rent is
solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased
property after the expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor,
they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis
of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors. 21 In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the
sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the
sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent in
his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the sublease expired on
September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more
than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent
portion of the contract involved in this case reads: 22
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three
(3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS, including all the improvements, prawns, milkfishes,
crabs and related species thereon as well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and
accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in
the following manner, to wit:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,600.00) Pesos to be paid on
June 30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel
and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the
unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each couple is liable
to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel
are ordered to pay the amount of P25,300.00, the attorney’s fees in the amount of
P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The complaint against petitioner is dismissed
without prejudice to the filing of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the
settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses
in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of P25,300.00. SO ORDERED.
10. CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and
ANSELMO MANGULABNAN vs. BERNARDO PATULANDONG
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision dated
June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, "In re: Petition for the Probate of the Codicil
(Will) of Rufina Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Anselmo Mangulabnan v. Carolina G.
Camaya, Ferdinand Camaya and Edgardo Camaya."
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein
she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan
(Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will reads:
IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang loob,
ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, may sapat na gulang,
kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, at anak
ng aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa aking APO na si ANSELMO ay aking
ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa aking pagkamatay, ang mga sumusunod
kong pagaari:
LOT NO. TITLE NO. KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA
288-A NT-47089 Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2
3348-A 100629 Poblacion (2) p. 2
3349-B 100630 Poblacion (3) p. 2
The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein, was in
the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was docketed as Sp.
Pro. No. 128.
By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted paragraph
five of her will in this wise:
UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No. NT-47089, na
aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa
Pangkat IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING HABILIN (Testamento), ay ipinasiya
kong ipagkaloob at ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA,
GUILLERMA at JUAN nagaapellidong PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si
ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sa magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi
bawat isa sa kanila.
IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng aking
HULING HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na muli.
x x x3 On May 14, 1988, the testatrix died.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title to
Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in view of the codicil
which modified the testator’s will.
Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the Regional
Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552 (the partition
case).
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, 4 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to
deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089.
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds that the
partition is without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in accordance with the
Rules of Court, [P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited by the plaintiff:
"After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he
make a new will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if he should die before
he had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the
testator’s death would be in order."
The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in question
should be protected meaning to say that the tenants should not be ejected.
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a
petition5 for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 218.
On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order6 setting the petition for
hearing and ordering the publication of said order.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan
caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-
2157507 was issued in his name.
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of
Sale dated February 19, 1991.8 TCT No. NT-215750 was thus cancelled and TCT No.
NT-2164469 was issued in the name of the Camayas.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision10 in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting the
codicil to probate and disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan
dated February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in
favor of the intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed
Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-
216446 under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the above-
named intervenors as NULL and VOID and of no force and effect; and,
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of
Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the
corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino,
married to Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing at San Lorenzo,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of legal age,
Filipino, widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia
R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and residing at San
Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan
with full personal circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5)
each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of Rufina Reyes dated June 27,
1973.11
The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and
Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said decision but it was
denied by Order12 of February 28,1996.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan (hereinafter
referred to as petitioners) raised the following errors:
1. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE
FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE RULES, THE LAW, AND THE
AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY WILL
BUT HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE SAME BY PARTITION IN A CIVIL CASE
WHERE THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS FINALITY AND
THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A QUESTIONABLE
CODICIL.
3. THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE
REACHED (sic) OF THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE
OPPOSITOR VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE
INTERVENORS-VENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF
SALE AS INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.13
By Decision14 of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.
Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following issues:
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null
and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the
deed of sale; and
2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of
the codicil.
As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate court has
no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale and titles of
petitioners;15 and that the probate court can only resolve the following issues:
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will
and testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of
identity[;]
Petitioners’ first argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was
not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision
was "without prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil." The rights of the
prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the
codicil.

2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners’ titles,
formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas’ claim
execution[; and] that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the
transfer was lawful. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of capacity. 16 The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757
affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, 17 this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court, to wit:
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null and void
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued on February 7, 1991 by the
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan, the February
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the intervenors - herein
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya, and Transfer Certificate of Title
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
No. NT-216446 issued on March 18, 1991 in favor of the petitioners Camayas, and 2)
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
the order for the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate of
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Linsangan, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the
xxx
extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil are SET ASIDE, without
prejudice to respondent and his co-heirs’ ventilation of their right in an appropriate
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of action. SO ORDERED.
third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the
name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of
the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their
possession and ownership of the property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared
the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of
depriving them possession and ownership of the property.

Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:

SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law,

petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.

As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in
effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed by
law;18 and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the
legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.19
 11. EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard
AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING- on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate
PACIOLES vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s
leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing a fertile ground for estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such
reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as
dispute over the estate of their loved one.
the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion13 praying,
petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of
among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2)
Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997
partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment
in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17,
of attorney’s fees.
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s
motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles;
and his motion for reconsideration. Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet
no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
The facts are undisputed.
paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated hearing be scheduled.
value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits
amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes
her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court ratiocinated as
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for follows:
the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be
issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the
"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared
compulsory heirs.
heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a
hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint
specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of partnership venture.’"
"paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be
issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated
special administratrix.6
May 7, 1996.

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to
direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he,
annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution
being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator
dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the
under the law.7
estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve
respondent’s claim of ownership.
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because
she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the
"would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity
challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of
of business partners."8
discretion.

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her
The Appellate Court ruled:
son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and
discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership against
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of
the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a
administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of
collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed
upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative
to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is
being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not
tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:
"I. RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE
COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II. RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE
INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE
AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE
COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT
CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND
BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate
court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be
part of the decedent’s estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale
for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. 16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such
situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate
court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction
of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is
misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the
intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is
merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate
court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory
prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended
Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October
5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor,
however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and
reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of
the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead
of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low
valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of
Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator,
is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his
possession or knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding
therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact
that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioner’s inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a
ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted
something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her
claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita
Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the
subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be
implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the
propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns
the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the
deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in
the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the
intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of oppositor’s
(respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the
oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means
that she has a "material and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should
be given her day in court." The intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards
resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk
of Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a
proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita’s estate.
Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of
petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals
her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions,
that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present
estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
testimony, thus:
of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of
an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the "Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese tradition and
court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that: culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a
token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the
undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
statement?
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
probate court cannot do so."22
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the
other half was given to Emmanuel.
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her
adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate. Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional A: Yes, sir.
or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still respondent’s claim cannot
prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s
inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered
the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement in Bolisay vs. the amount.x x x x x x
Alcid23 relevant, thus:
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set
aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, A: Yes, sir.
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you,
Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late husband?
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title A: If I only knew that this will happen…
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself
is in the persons named in the title. x x x" A: Wala po."24

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree,"
proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks,
investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests and
participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various
motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties
be partitioned or what should be done with these properties? According to you
earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a
50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in
Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte
and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o
hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin x x x x x x
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay
Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in
petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any document to prove
her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to
improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is
composed of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not
strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare
that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter most of
her properties to be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized
early on that if the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then
Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such
properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two
minor children.28
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or
deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be
rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be
part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
12. ANA JOYCE S. REYES vs. HON. CESAR M. SOTERO
This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May 14, 2005
denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the Court of Appeals
annulled and set aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204
but refrained from dismissing the petition for letters of administration and settlement of
estate on the ground that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by
the decedent, Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising
before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and
raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who
died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L.
Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine
Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities
of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which
were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of
the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate,
upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to
the legal heirs.1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband, Serafin Delos
Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the petition should be
dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she
was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She further
asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as administrator of Lising’s estate because of
her "antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs
have questioned the decedent’s title to a piece of real property which forms a large
part of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition3 attaching
thereto the Certification4 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac
stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was
adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in
Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-
Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on
December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner’s adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos
Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 436 indicating that the
adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the
dispositive portion of the adoption decree was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption and
therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares that henceforth, the child
Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all
legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge petitioner
Lising.7 with falsification of public documents per resolution dated January 5, 2001. 23 Petitioner
thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Serafin Delos Santos, On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the appointment of a
death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter", Ana Joyce special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty.
Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the branch clerk
of court was disqualified from taking on the task of special administrator, and that Atty.
Saguyod was appointed without being required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence to
that the petition should be dismissed because she is the sole heir of the
prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on petitioner’s
decedent.25 However, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on
opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to
November 5, 2001.26
Oppositor’s Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered the parties to submit
memoranda thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.12 On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the
findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint against
petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for review before the Department of
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the
Justice (DOJ).
Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No.
53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in
1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the
(OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioner’s natural mother supposedly RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to the
connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted the basement of
Delos Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a Lising’s residence into a billiard hall without authority of the special administrator.28
weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special
proceedings.
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the
dispositive part of which reads:
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of
hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No.
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting
53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed15 SP No. 53457 for
business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent. The Special
failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession of the listed personal
Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000.17
and real properties of the decedent and those that may be found to be owned or
registered in the name of the same. SO ORDERED.29
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying that
the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that the petition be
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied
dismissed.18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion19 filed by petitioner on
by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a resolution
October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her opposition.
dismissing respondent Chichioco’s petition for review in the criminal case. 30

On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition stating that
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and
due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also informed the RTC that
November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions
they have filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the adoption decree and
jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the decedent’s
Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.
property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the latter’s death.
Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring an inventory of the decedent’s estate.
resolution of petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the outcome of
the criminal case filed against the latter. In the meantime, the parties were enjoined
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the
from dissipating or disposing any or all of the properties included in the estate of Elena
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the
Lising without order from this Court.
former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption and she consequently
remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special need for the appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
Administrator22 before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true determination
and appraisal of the decedent’s universal estate. It was prayed therein that the Branch
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of
Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed special administrator as he was
the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused
"an experienced and able person in the management of properties" and is "honest,
his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as special administrator. Citing
impartial, competent and acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."
Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate court reasoned that such act could engender
a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s
estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and
inventory and could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s
properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the
dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate as
res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the
trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according
to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree
render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15,
2005,34 hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO
IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE
39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE
MERITS.36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal
adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before
the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from the local civil
registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of
Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree
was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were
issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers.
These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties
that said public officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document 38 required by
law to be entered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all
other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil
registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 39 As such, the
certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details
of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications
suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities"
will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in
a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree.
The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent’s estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly,
respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in
order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a
categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is
void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should
be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the
decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her
standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid,
respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate. For this reason, we
agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x
x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as
such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate
succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil
Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case -
considered valid. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude
respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives
of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary
purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec.
Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement relative to the
presumed validity of petitioner’s adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the
petitioner’s opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters of
administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case.
The same has in fact been submitted for resolution before the RTC more than six
years ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The parties have
likewise amply ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective
pleadings filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let
the RTC resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of
Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it.42 This is in keeping with the
avowed purpose of the rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since
the grounds for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and
there is no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should
be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s second
assigned error. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings
No. 204 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
(Special Proceedings – Adoption)
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was
the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and
personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S.
Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the

certification of her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption
decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification
issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac.

Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have
been cast on Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain
“badges of fraud.”

The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon
the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
Santos spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree
render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”

Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities.

Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than
those which she had already presented before the trial court.

An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public

records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court
which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty

by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the
certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details
of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications
suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities”
will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
 13. MARIA CALMA, as administratrix of the testamentary proceedings of
Fausta Macasaquit vs. ESPERANZA TAÑEDO, assisted by her husband
Felipe Mamaual, and BARTOLOME QUIZON, Deputy Sheriff of Tarlac
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property
described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also indebted to
Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable against the conjugal property, in the sums of P948.34
and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum. On October 10, 1933,
Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria
Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the commencement of the
corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the said
daughter, Maria Calma, was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the
deceased.
While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending,
Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for
the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac
rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment,
despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the property described in the
complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this
action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the
complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole
and absolute owner thereof. lawphi1.net
The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.
The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted in
accordance with Act No. 3176 reading:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the
provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and
partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally
capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of
proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in
order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale
shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this
Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities
shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the
vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section 685 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Interpreting the scope of Act No. 3176, this court, in the
case of Caragay vs. Urquiza (53 Phil., 72), said that the amendment introduced by this
Act consists in authorizing the institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the
liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership. It should be
understood that these remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that
they cannot be availed of at he same time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic
situation would result if conjugal property were administered, liquidated and distributed
at the same time in a testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary action for liquidation
and partition of property. Consequently, the testamentary proceedings of Fausta
Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal
property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be made in these
proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.
Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the case of Cruz
vs. De Jesus (52 Phil., 870) said that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the
administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted
to that end if there be any debts to be paid. This doctrine has been confirmed in the
other case of Ona vs. De Gala (58 Phil., 881).
From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio
Calma for the payment of the sums of P948.34 and P247, which wee debts
chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio Calma. legal
administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta Macasaquit was living, had ceased
and passed to the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in the testamentary
proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable
against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio
Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim
for this amount had to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.
Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure relative to the administration and liquidation of properties of deceased
persons, it should be filed before the committee on claims in said testamentary
proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the corresponding Court of
First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix.
On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included among the
inventoried properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit
because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it should, under Act No. 3176,
be included among the properties of the testamentary proceedings.
We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal
property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against
him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the
committee on claims.
Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made by
the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the
collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and
said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.
The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
So ordered.
 14. PAZ Y. OCAMPO vs. CONRADO POTENCIANO, VICTOR POTENCIANO
This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals.
From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes of this
appeal, it appears that on February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco,
executed a deed purporting to convey to his relative, Conrado Potenciano, and the
latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,5000,
a town a lot with a house as strong materials standing thereon. On that same day,
Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that, for an annual rental of
P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price, the
vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption
period.
The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the poblacion
of Biñan, Laguna, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, worth between 20 and
25 pesos. Though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to
him and his wife as conjugal property.
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to another
year," but several extensions were granted, with the vendor paying part of the principal
in addition to interests. The last extension granted was for year from February 3, 1937,
and the period having elapsed without the repurchase having been made, Potenciano,
on January 24, 1939, filed with the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the
consolidation of title, on the strength which the register of deeds issued transfer
certificate of title no. 18056 in the name of Potenciano and his wife. This, however, did
not close the avenue for settlement, for on February 28, 1939, with Edilberto Ocampo
and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase
the property for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon for the same period of time
at annual rental of P300 which, as may again be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of
the purchase price. On or about February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise the
option by tendering to Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000 an amount
sufficient to cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected,
deposited the money in court and brought an action in her own name and as judicial
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to accept
it and to have the title to the property reinstated in her name and that of her husband.
Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-
complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father to plaintiff on
February 28, 1939, was null and void as to the share of their deceased mother Rufina
Reyes in the property in litigation, which share passed to them by right of inheritance,
and that as to their father's share in the same property they, the intervenors, were
exercising the right of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in
common, for which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the
fifth day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint. To meet these
allegations, plaintiff amended her complaint by including the intervenors as defendants
and alleging, in effect, that the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a
mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the rental contract thrown in to cover the
stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that the option agreement for the repurchase of the
property within five years from February 28, 1939, and for the payment of rental for
that period in an amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was
also meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the tender
of payment was valid, the same having been made within the extended period. The
Court of First Instance, after trial, upheld these allegations and gave judgment in favor
of the children of Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter
after her death.
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a somewhat
different view and rendered judgment declaring:
(a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and Conrado
Potenciano was one of mortgage, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum;
(b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and E-1)
were validly executed by defendant Conrado Potenciano and binding upon the
property in litigation;
(c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of one-half
of the same from their deceased mother Rufina Reyes;
(d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption
(retracto legal) of the other half of the property belonging to their father Conrado
Potenciano;
(e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in
litigation within the time she had to do so;
(f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made with the
Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in payment of the property in
question, was in accordance with the law and relieved the heirs of the spouses
Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said purchase price;
(g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer the title of the property in litigation to the
heirs of the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco; and
(h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title
No. 18056 (Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate of title for
said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco,
upon payment by appellees of the corresponding fees and the registration in his
office of the deed of conveyance mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
This judgment that is now before us for review.
First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not disputed that
the pacto de retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Conrado Potenciano
and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with
simulated rental for interest. Such being the case, the lenders had no right, through
the unilateral declaration of one or both them, to consolidate title in themselves over
the property given as security. The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in this
case was, therefore, null and void.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded,
through novation, by the option agreement for the repurchase of the property
mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this war error because Potenciano
had no authority to enter into that agreement after the death of his wife. To this
contention we have to agree. The Court of Appeals erred in supposing that the
surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate.
As pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view
are now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the
marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs.
But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176 (approved on November 24,
1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs
must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324).

Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option
agreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of time for the payment
of the mortgagee debt, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction had
between them was that of loan with security, or equitable mortgage, though as is usual
in these cases, it was given the form of sale with right to repurchase.

It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment
and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said contract of loan with security
was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal currency (Haw Pia vs. China
Banking Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229), the tender and consignation must be
held to produce their legal effect, which is that of relieving the debtor from liability. (Art.
1176, Civil Code; Limkako vs. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.)

Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants
Victor Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and that the Court of Appeals erred in not
declaring them owners of the property in question, they having inherited one-half of it
from their mother and acquired the other half from their father in the exercise of their
right of legal redemption as co-owners. As ownership in the property never passed to
their parents, these appellants acquired nothing.

Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be entered,
declaring the obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby held to be mere
contract of loan with security or equitable mortgage, already discharged, and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 and to
issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the
spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco upon payment of the corresponding fees.
With costs against the appellants.