ARTICLE IX. the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.
In
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Sec 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity.
BRILLANTES v YORAC
G.R. No. 93867
December 18, 1990
FACTS
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chairman
Hilario B. Davide.
The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in issue in this
case. What is the power of the President of the Philippines to make the challenged
designation in view of the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent
constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution
that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that
the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence
ISSUE
W/N the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the
COMELEC.
RULING
YES. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under
the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most
likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In
any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.
CAYETANO V. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991
FACTS
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked as a as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator.
ISSUE
W/N Monsod is qualified as the COMELEC Chairman
RULING
YES. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties
that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases
of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard
of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct
of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
GALIDO V COMELEC
G.R. 95346
January 18, 1991
FACTS
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections
for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Petitioner
was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. On 25 January 1988, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election
protest before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Through its First Division, the COMELEC reversed the trial court's decision and declared
private respondent the duly-elected mayor. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
by the COMELEC in its en banc resolution of 20 September 1990 which affirmed the decision
of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct
containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. In
the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC found
that fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after the name Galido are
clearly marked ballots.
Undaunted, petitioner filed on 6 October 1990 the present petition for certiorari and injunction
with prayer for a restraining order (G.R. No. 95346) which contains the same allegations and
legal issues contained in G.R. No. 95135. On 11 October 1990, we issued the temporary
restraining order prayed for by petitioner and required respondents to file comment on the
petition.
ISSUE
W/N a COMELEC decision may be brought to this court by a petition for certiorari by the
aggrieved party (the herein petitioner)
RULING
YES. Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this
petition, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
PEOPLE V DELGADO
G.R. 93419-32
September 18, 1990
FACTS
The COMELEC received a report - complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City for
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Cebu, Atty. Manuel Olsen to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
case. After the investigation Oyson recommended a filling of an information against each of
the private respondents for the violations on the OEC. COMELEC en banc resolved to file the
information.
Private respondents filed for motions for reconsideration and the suspension of a warrant of
arrest with respondent court on the ground that there was no preliminary investigation that
was conducted. The respondent court then issued an order to directing COMELEC to
reinvestigate the said case through Regional Election Director of the Region VII. The court
denied the COMELEC prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion
for reinvestigation alleging therein that only the SC may review the decisions, orders, rulings,
and resolutions of the COMELEC. Whereby the trial court upheld its jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
ISSUE
W/N RTC has the authority to review action of the COMELEC in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses filed in court.
HELD
YES. According to section 2 Art IX - C of the Constitution and section 52 Article 7 of the OEB,
that the COMELEC is vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to
conduct authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election
offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Therefore, when the
COMELEC, through its duly authorized officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and files an information in the proper court, with a prima facie finding of a
probable cause, the said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. All dispositions of
said case must be then subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court.
PEOPLE V INTING
GR NO: 88919
July 25, 1990
FACTS
Mr.s Barba filed a letter - complaint against OIC mayor Dominadaro Regalado of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her in the office of the Municipal
Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from
COMELEC as may be required by law. Atty Lituanas found a prima facie case upon
conducting a preliminary investigation on the complaint. A criminal case was filed with the
respondent trial court for the violation of the Omnibus Election Code against the OIC - Mayor
and subsequently issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. Before the accused could
be arrested, the trial court set aside its order of arrest on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not
authorized to determine the probable cause pursuant to section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Atty Lituanas failed to comply with the order. The trial court later on quashed the
information and the motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
W/N the preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving
election offenses have to be coursed through the provincial prosecutor, before the RTC may
take cognizance of the investigation
HELD
YES. The 1987 Constitution empowers the comelec to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the judge determine probable
cause and for filing an information in court. This is an exclusive power with COMELEC and it
is obvious that the constitution intended in bestowing this power to the COMELEC to insure
the free orderly and honest conduct of elections. The failure of this would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right
and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would
thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. The trial
court therefore misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed.
PEOPLE V TANODBAYAN
G.R. L-62075
April 19, 1857
FACTS
Petitioners were members of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the
January 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the Bureau of Domestic
Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a candidate and later elected mayor of the
same election. Respondent Esteban Mangasar an independent candidate for vice - mayor of
the same municipality sent a letter to President Marcos charging the petitioners with violation
of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting
centers during the election. COMELEC then conducted a formal investigation and submitted
its report recommending to the COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. Mangaser formally
withdrew his charges with the COMELEC stating intention to refile it with TanodBayan.
COMELEC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Assistant Provincial fiscal started a preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser
with Tanodbayan against the same parties and the same charges that were previously
dismissed by the COMELEC. The Castillejos moved for the dismissal which was subsequently
denied. TanodBayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct preliminary investigations and
prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC officials in relations to their offence. Another MR
was denied, which therefore brings this petition of certiorari and preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person
HELD
YES. COMLEC has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person. It is the nature of the offense, not the personality of the offender
that matters. The grant to the COMELEC of the power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute
election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutions intendment in
bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make
a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. T To
divest the COMELEC of the authority of this power would thus seriously impair the its
effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. The 1978 Constitution reveals the
clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in
relation to his official duties or not. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction
over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC.
TAN V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 112093
October 4, 1994
FACTS
Antonio Tan, petitioner was designated by COMELEC as Vice - Chairman of the city of Board
of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11 May 1992 synchronized national and local elections
conformably. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to
represent the Second district of Davao in the House of Representatives. Senforiano Alterado,
one of the private respondents and a candidate, filed a case questioning the validity of the
proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the City Board of Canvassers of unlawful,
erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass. Meanwhile, the electoral protest of private
respondent Alterado was dismissed by the HRET. The criminal complaint for falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of the Anti - Graft and corrupt practices act before the office
of the ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part
of the respondents.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC has committed a grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in
continuing to take action of the administrative case.
HELD:
NO. The COMELEC’s authority under section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the constitution is virutally
all encompassing when it comes to election matters. It should be stressed that the
administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the
COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as
a city prosecture. The COMELEC’s mandate includes its authority to excercise direct and
immediate supervision and control over national and local officials and or employeesm,
including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the
government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. The law
also provided that upon COMELEC’s recommendation, the corresponding proper authority
shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the ofcier, or employee
who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply
with instructions, orders, decisions or ruling of the COMELEC.
REYES V RTC
G.R. NO. 108886
May 5, 1995
FACTS
Reyes and Comia were candidates for members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Municipal
Board Of Canvassers proclaimed Reyes as the eighth winning candidate. Comia then filed an
election protest before the trial court alleging that a vital mistake was committed by the BOC in
the computation of the total votes he garnered. Municipal BOC admitted in its answer that it
had made a mistake in the counting of votes of Comia. Thus, the trial court rendered its
decision annulling the proclamation of Reyes and declared Comia as the eight winning
candidate. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC but COMELEC dismissed
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed
period.
ISSUE
W/N the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion by assuming jurisdiction over the
election contest filed by respondents despite the fact that the case was filed more than ten
days after petitioner's proclamation.
RULING
NO. A motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretations of the
constitutional and statutory provision in light of the facts of the case. Decisions, orders, and
rulings of the COMELEC “may be brought to the SC on certiorari the constitution in its article
IX means the special civil action of certiorari under rule 65. Petitioner's failure to file a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC is fatal to his present actions
KILOSBAYAN V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 128054
October 16, 1997
FACTS
The Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI) was
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock, non - profit
foundation with private respondents herein as incorporators. In order to implement its various
sports, health and cultural activities, The PYHSDFI President entered in to a MOA with DILG -
NCR Regional Director for the purpose of allocating an amount from the government’s
countrywide development fund to finance its various programs. The advice of allotment
allocating the amount of 70 million pesos was signed and released by the Sec of the
Department of Budget and management. The petitioner Kilosbayan wrote the COMELEC to
inform them of two election offenses committed in relation to the release of the CDF funds.
The COMELEC of two election offenses committed in relation to the release of the CDF funds.
The COMELEC of referred the letter complaint to its law dept. For comment and or
recommendation. After the investigation, the COMELEC law department found that there was
insufficient ground to hold that the respondents had committed the acts complained of and
that the allegations in the complaint were plain conjectures, speculations and based on
hearsay evidence. It was recommended that the complaint of Kilosbayan against all
respondents be dismissed. Adopting the findings and conclusions of the law department, the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a minute resolution dismissing the charges against all the
respondents, all on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Its MR
and Supplemental MR having been denied by the COMELEC en banc, petitioner Kilosbayan
has before the SC ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Kilosbayan’s letter -
complaint against the respondents.
HELD
NO. They did not commit any act constituting to the grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Kilosbayan’s letter complaint against herein respondents, the former having failed to prove its
cause against the latter. The COMELEC is the “Public prosecutor with the exclusive authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable
under the OEC before the court. This constitutional statutory mandate under Article IX Section
2 for COMELEC mandates them to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election
laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation in cases
involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the
Judge determine, in the course of the preliminary inquiry, w/n a warrant of arrest should be
issued.
BUAC V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 155855
26 January 2004
FACTS
Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista filed a petition questioning COMELEC’s resolution
stating that it has no jurisdiction over plebiscite controversies. The COMELEC contends that
the rules and regulations it has only covers election protests. The quasi-judicial jurisdiction of
the Commission extends to section 2(2), Article IX of the constitution, which does not include
controversies over plebiscite results; and even if the petition to annul plebiscite results is akin
to an election protest. It is the RTC that has jurisdiction over election protests involving
municipal officials, and the COMELEC has only appellate jurisdiction in said cases.
ISSUE
W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite and
the annulment of its results.
HELD
Yes. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of plebiscites.
One must first look at the nature of the case. Such controversy could not be attended by the
judiciary because it is not w/in its jurisdiction to settle such type of controversy. It does not fit
the usage of judicial power. If the RTC would be given jurisdiction over such case, there would
be a confusion regarding the settlement of justice. The Judiciary, based on Section 2(2) Article
IX, has jurisdiction only on elections, returns, and qualifications of elected officials.
LDP V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 161265
24 February, 2004
FACTS
Before the May 2004 elections, LDP has been divided because of a struggle of authority
between Party Chair Edgardo Angara and Party Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both
having endorsed two different sets of candidates under the same party, Laban Demokratikong
Pilipino.
The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The commission in its resolution, has recognized
the factions creating two sub - parties, namely the Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing
ISSUE
W/N the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets of sub
party's, LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.
HELD
YES. To resolve the issue the COMELEC need only resolve such questions as may be
necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers. The party chairman and Chief Executive
officer of the party’s functions include, “To represent the party in all external affairs and
concerns, sign documents for and on its behalf, and call the meetings and be the presiding
officer of the National Congress and national Executive Council. The Sec Gen on the other
hand assists the Party Chairman in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Party. The
Sec Gen’s authority to sign documents therefore is only a delegated power which originally
pertains to the Party Chairman. The COMELEC invokes the constitutional policy towards a
free and open party system. This policy, however, envisions a system that shall evolve
according to the free choice of the people, not one molded and whittled by the COMELEC.
When the constitution speaks of a multi party system, it does not contemplate the COMELEC
splitting parties into two.
MANANZALA V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 176211
May 8, 2007
FACTS
Petitioner Ibarra Manzala and respondent were mayoralty candidates in Magdiwang,
Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed respondent as the elected municipal mayor with 2579 votes as
compared to Manzala who only got 2566.
Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC seeking recount in the 10 precincts of
Magdiwang on the grounds of fraud, serious irregularities, and willful violation of the OEC and
other pertinent COMELEC rules allegedly committed by the voters and the Chairman and
members of the Board of Election Inspectors during the election.
RTC court rendered judgment in favor of Manzala and subsequently, petitioner moved for the
execution of decision pending appeal which the trial court granted. Then, the COMELEC
issued a resolution which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It found that
respondent obtained 2560 and petitioner 2543. Petitioner then files an MR which was denied
by the COMELEC En Banc which further affirmed the earlier decision.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC has the appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, modify, or even reverse and
set aside the decision of the RTC.
HELD
YES. Decisions, final orders, or ruling of the COMELEC contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executor and not appealable. In the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi judicial powers, the constitution also provides under section 2(2) of
Article IX - C that the COMELEC has quasi judicial power to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials, decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or
rulings of the COMELEC contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final executory, and not appealable. Section 3 thereof states the administrative powers of the
COMELEC either en banc or in two divisions to promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including proclamation controversies. All cases shall be
heard and decided in division provided that MRs of decisions shall be decided en banc. The
COMELEC clearly exercises appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, modify, or even reverse
and set aside the decision of the former and substitute it with its own. Constitution also
mandates COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon MR, by the
COMELEC en banc.
AGGABAO V COMELEC
G.R NO. 163756
January 26, 2005
FACTS
Petitioner Goergidi B. Aggabao and private respondent Anthony Miranda are rival
congressional candidates for the 4th district of Isabela during the May 10, 2004 elections.
During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of
Cordon and San Agustin, Private respondent moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the
COCV on the grounds that it was tampered with, prepared under duress, and differed from the
other authentic copies and contained manifest errors. Petitioner objected to this arguing that
the grounds raised by Miranda are proper only for pre-proclamation controversy, which is not
allowed in elections for member of the House of Representative. On May 22, Provincial Board
of Canvassers (PBC) excluded from canvass the contested COCVs. Based on the results,
Miranda garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Congressman. On appeal
with the COMELEC, petitioner asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard
Miranda’s petition for exclusion. On June 9, 2004, COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No.
7233 directing the proclamation of the remaining winning candidates for the province of
Isabela. On July 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as duly elected Congressman of the 4th
district of Isabela. Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed present petition assailing of
Resolution 7233. He claimed that the COMELEC in banc acted without jurisdiction when it
ordered Miranda’s proclamation considering that the Second Division has not yet resolved the
appeal. In Miranda’s comment, he mored for the dismissal of the petition considering that the
issue raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
RULING
NO. The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election
relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such, petitioner’s recourse would have been to file
and electoral protest before the HRET.
ATIENZA V COMELEC
GR NO: 188920
February 16, 2010
FACTS
On July 5, 2005, respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon) as president of the Liberal Party (LP,)
announced his party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. However, Petittioner Jose L. Atienza jr. (Atienza), LP chairmain, and a
number of party members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the
announcement without consulting his party. On March 2, 2006, petitioner Atienza hosted a
party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when
convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s rulign body vacant and
elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon filed a petition with
COMELEC to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s
electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council
(NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP
constitution, party’s officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on
November 30, 2007. On October 13, 2006, COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting
Drilon’s petitioner. It annulled the Marc 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new
election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the
others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with
the Salonga constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not
been properly ratified, Drilon’s term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position
of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected. Both sided of the
dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007, The court
held, through the majority, that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership
dispute.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction over the intra-leadership dispute.
RULING
NO. Membership issues of the validity of invalidity of the expulsion of Atienza and the other
members were purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an
internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any
and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct
their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in the
disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions. The court ruled in Kalaw v. COMELEC that the COMELEC’s powers and functions
under Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of
the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.
CAPALLA V COMELEC
G.R NO. 201112
June 13, 2012
FACTS
Pursuant to its authority to use and Automated Election System (AES) under Republic Act No.
8436 as amended by RA No. 9369 or the Automation Law and in accordance with RA 9184,
otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, COMELEC posted and
published an invitation to apply for eligibility and to bid for the 2010 poll automation project
(the project). On June 9, 2009, the COMELEC issued Resolution no. 8608 awarding the
contract for the project to respondent Smartmatic-TIM. On July 10, 2009, COMELEC and
Smartmatic-TIM entered in to a contract for the provision of an automated election system for
May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections (AES Contract). The Contract
between the two parties was on of lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods
listed in the contract. In said contract, COMELEC was given until December 31, 2010 within
which to exercise the option. In a letter dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM though its
chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the option period on the remaining
81,280 PCOS machines until March 31, 2011. The COMELEC did not exercise the option
within the extended period. Several extensions were given for the COMEELC to exercise the
OTP until its final extension on March 31, 2012. On March 29, 2012, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 9377 resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to
exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorized Chairman Brillantes to sign for and
on behalf of the COMELEC the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP under the AES
contract. On March 30, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution 9378 resolving to approve the
Deed of Sale between COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS
machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections. Petitioners come before the court
claiming that the issuances of the COMELEC, as well as the transactions entered into are
illegal and unconstitutional.
ISSUE
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed resolutions and in executing the assailed
Extension agreement and deed.
RULING
NO. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are
given the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise
the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the
contract is still effective. As the COMELEC is confronted with time and budget constraints,
and in view of the COMELEC’s mandate to ensure free, honest and credible elections, the
acceptance of the extension of the option period, the exercise of the option, the execution of
the deed of sale are the more prudent choices available to the COMELEC for a successful
2013 automated elections.
DUMARPA V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 192249
April 2, 2013
FACTS
Petitioner Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st district of Lanao del Sur for the
May 10, 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in 7 municipalities,
including three municipalities which are situated within the 1st Congressional district of
Province of Lanao del Sur. The special elections was originally scheduled for May 29, 2010.
On May 25 2010, COMELEC issued resolution No. 8946, resetting the special elections to
June 3, 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued herein assailed resolution which provided,
among others, the constitution of Special Board of Election (SBEI) in section 4 and clustering
of Precincts in Section 12. Dumarpa filed a motion for reconsideration concerning only
sections 4 and 12 as it may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. COMELEC did
not act on Dumarpa’s motion. A day before the scheduled special elections, Dumarpa filed
instant petition alleging that both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts and constitution of
SBEIs would affect Municipality of Masiu and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat if
its implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court. At the time
of the filing of present petition, Dumarpa was leading by a slim margin over his opponent in
the canvassed votes for the areas which are part of the 1st congressional Distrcit of Lanao del
Sur where there was no failure of elections. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters the issues raised by the petitioner are mooted by the holding of the special elections
as scheduled on June 3, 2010. The OSG maintains that COMELEC resolution No 8965 is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution 8965.
RULING
NO. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8965 in the exercise of its plenary powers in the
conduct of elections enshrined in the constitution. It brooks no argument that the COMELEC’s
broad power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, carries with it all necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. As stated in Sumulong v. COMELEC: “There are no ready-made formulas for
solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve
the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the
conduct of elections, we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the commission on
elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.”
ZARATE V COMELEC
GR NO: 129096
November 19, 1999
FACTS
During the 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections, private respondent Lallave Jr. won over
petitioner Zarate by a single vote. The tallied votes were 46-45. The barangay Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Lallave Jr. as the duly elected SK Chairman. On May 16, 1996,
petitioner lodged his election protest before the Minicipal Trial Court of Malasiqui, Pangasinan
stating that three or more votes that read “JL” should have been marked void. Petitioner
further asserted that the votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate
with the name or nickname “JL.” On September 9, 1996, The Municipal Trial Court rendered a
decision annulling and setting aside proclamation of private respondent. On the other hand, of
the petitioner’s 45 votes, one was invalidated. Petitioner was therefore declared the winner
with 44 votes against the 39 of Lallave. Respondent appealed to the COMELEC theorizing
that the invalidated ballots with the initials “JL” should have been credited in his favor
considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate intended to be voted for.
On the other hand, petitioner maintained that the trial court of origin was correct in invalidating
the said ballots in question pursuant to paragraph 14, section 211 of the Omnibus Election
Code. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC was not convinced. It did not uphold the
findings and conclusion of the Municipal Trial Court. On April 24, 1997, The COMELEC en
banc came out with its assailed resolution annulling and setting aside the decision a quo and
declaring private respondent as the duly elected SK Chairman. Petitioner filed present petition
claiming that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
RULING
YES. The COMELEC acted with grave abused when it heard the case as COMELEC en banc
without first referring it to any of its division. Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the
Constitution provides that “The COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of elections cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration or decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.” It is clear from this provision that election cases that include pre-proclamation
controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission. The commission en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at first instance.
LOKIN JR. V COMELEC
GR NO: 193808
June 26, 2012
FACTS
Respondent CIBAC (Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption) party-list is a multi-sectoral party
registered under RA 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System act. On November 20,
2009, Two different entities both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a
“Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May
10, 2010 Elections.” A Pia B. Darla, claiming to be the party’s acting secretary-general, signed
the first manifestation. On the same day, another manifestation was submitted by herein
respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the party’s vice-president and
secretary-general. On January 15, 2010, COMELEC issued resolution No. 87447 fiving due
course to CIBAC’s manifestation, without prejudice the determination which of the two factions
of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two manifestations of
intent to participate is the official representative of the said party-list coalition/sectoral
organization. On January 19, 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the
COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Jose. On March
26, 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second certificate of nomination with petitioners Luis Lokin
and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification as “acting
secretary-general” of CIBAC. Respondents filed with COMELEC a “petition to expunged from
the records and/or for disqualification,” seeking to nullify the certificate filed by Derla.
Respondents claim that the nomination of petitioners was unauthorized and that Derla had
misrepresented herself as “acting secretary-general” when she was not even a member of
CIBAC. Respondents also contend that the certificate of nomination and other documents she
submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid. In the resolution dated July 5,
2010, the COMELEC first division granted the petition and ordered the certificate filed by
Derla to be expunged and declared that respondents’ faction as the true nominees of CIBAC.
Petitioners now seek recourse in the present petition filed with this court.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination
of party-list representative
RULING
YES. Even as petitioners insisted on the purely-intra corporate nature of the conflict between
“CIBAC foundation” and the CIBAC Sectoral Party, they submitted their certificate of
Nomination and Manifestation of the Intent to participate in the party-list elections. Precisely,
petitioners were seeking the COMELEC’s approval of their eligibility to participate in the
upcoming party-list elections. In effect, they invoke its authority under the Party-List system
act. Contrary to their stance that the present dispute stemmed form an intra-corporate matter,
their submissions even recognize the COMELEC’s constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. More specifically, as on of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC is also tasked to
“register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, mist present their platform or program of government.” In the
2010 case of Atienza v. COMELEC, it was expressly settled that the COMELEC possessed
the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionality
mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. Contrary to petitioners’
stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC First division and the
COMELEC en banc. The tribunal correctly found Pia Derla’s alleged authority as “acting
secretary-general” was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence.
Petitioners did not submit an documentary evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let
alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its Certification of Nomination.
DAYAO V COMELEC
G.R. NO: 193643
January 29, 2013
FACTS
Individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while
petitioner Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. FPII is an association comprised of entities
engaged in various industries in the country. Private respondent LPG Marketers Association,
Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG
and energy sector who have banded together in order to pursue their common objective of
providing quality, safe and reasonably priced gas and oil products. On May 21, 2009, LPGMA
sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation with COMELEC through
petition for registration as sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the May 10,
2010 elections. LPGMA claimed that it has special interest in the LPG industry and other allied
concerns. It averred that one of its programs is the promotion of fair trade practices and
prevention of re-entry of cartels and monopolies. LPGMA’s petition was approved by
COMELEC in its resolution dated January 5, 2010. After four months, individual petitioners
lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a
party-list organization. In the said complaint, it stated that LPGMA in essence does not
represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers, and
members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers
and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail market. FPII also
alleged that LPGMA is a mere lobby group that espouses their own interests before the
Congress and the Department of Energy. In response, LPGMA countered that section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution does not requite that party-list representatives must be members
of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred that the
ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of RA No 7941 and
that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for
registration. In the first assailed resolution dated August 5, 2010, the COMELEC dismissed
the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not
among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of RA 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a
belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with
finality on January 5, 2010. The ruling was reiterated in the COMELEC resolution dated
September 6, 2010 denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Instead of opposing
said registration or intervening therein after having been constructively notified thereof by its
publication, petitioners waited almost four months before filing the instant complaint.
COMELEC has previously ruled on the issue after a thorough evaluation. The first division of
the Commission as concluded that LPGMA truly represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. With respect to the said conclusion, absent any circumstance
subsequent to the promulgation of the mentioned resolution which would call for the
cancellation of registration of LPGMA, the same can no longer be disturbed by the
COMELEC. Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC, petitioners come before
the court assailing the COMELEC resolutions dated August 5, 2010 and September 6, 2010.
ISSUE
Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the action of
complainants.
RULING
NO. An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the
filing of a complainant for cancellation. Section 6 of RA 7941 lays down the grounds and
procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation. According to this, the COMELEC may
motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national. Regional, or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the grounds provided for in said RA. For the COMELEC to validly exercise
its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes two
conditions: that due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned, and that
any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in section 6 is present.
ALCANTARA V COMELEC
GR NO: 203646
April 16, 2013
FACTS
Sometime between January and April 2003, Alcantara, et al., along with their fellow law
teachers, organized a party named advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School
Teachers and Allied Workers. The Party has a constitution and by-laws (CBL) and a principal
office at the same location as Atty Alcantara’s office. On May 14, 2004, the party name was
amended and changed to Abakada Guro Party list. The change was duly approved by the
COMELEC. In the May 2007 elections, where ABAKADA participated and won a seat,
Jonathan de la Cruz (de la Cruz), its first nominee, became the party’s sole representative in
Congress. In a May 5, 2009 letter, addressed to COMELEC, De la Cruz tendered his
“irrevocable” resignation effective December 31, 2009. Despite the supposed effectively of his
resignation however, De la Cruz refused to vacate his seat, prompting Alcantara et al to file a
petition for quo warranto with the Supreme Court. Petition was subsequently dismissed for
being moot and academic. In several occasions between October and December 2009, De la
Cruz requested Alcantara to convene the supreme assembly since no supreme assembly has
been held since 2004 and according to ABAKADA’s CBL, a supreme assembly meeting
should be held atleast once every three years. In his letter response, Alcantara explained that
the supreme Assembly cannot be held because many of the members live in the province and
the party lacked funds. Alcantara also said that the supreme assembly can be held the next
year, as may be determined by the National Executive Board. On December 15, 2009, an All
Leaders Assembly was convened. Alcantara failed to attend but sent Noel Tiampong to
attend. The convening of a Supreme Assembly was proposed as well as the agenda of
amending the ABAKADA CBL, the election of new officers, and the discussion of other
election related matters. A letter dated January 23, 2010 notified thee party’s chapters and
members that the party would hold its first supreme assembly on February 6, 2010. As
scheduled, respondents proceeded to hold the Supreme Assembly which resulted to the
approval and ratification of the revised ABAKADA CBL, the ouster of Alcantara et. Al from
their positions, the expulsion of the petitioners from the party and the election of de la Cruz
and Albano as new president and secretary general. This prompted the petitioners to file a
petition with the COMELEC to declare the February 6, 2010 meeting void and to restrain the
respondents from falsely representing themselves as duly elected officers of ABAKADA. The
COMELEC second division dismissed the petition. It ruled that the holding of an assembly
was long overdue and that under Alcantara’s leadership, no supreme assembly took place.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the ruling, mainly questioning the COMELEC
second division’s failure to address the issue of validity of the Supreme Assembly.
ISSUE
W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Alcantara’s
affidavit and affirmed Alcantara’s ousting from ABAKADA
RULING
NO. Under the constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties. As part
of its power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of an election, the
COMELEC possesses the power to register national, regional and sectoral parties or
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system of the elections. It is the party-list
group’s registration under the party-list system that confers juridical personality on the party-
list group for election related purposes. As a juridical entity, a party-list group can only validly
act through it duly authorized representatives. In the exercise of its power to register parties,
the COMELEC necessarily possesses the power to pass upon the question of who among the
legitimate officers of the party-list group, are entitled to exercise the rights and privileges
granted to a party-list group under the law.
ARROYO V DOJ
GR NO: 199082
September 18, 2012
FACTS
On August 15, 2011, the COMELEC and DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. According to section to of the joint order, the
committee shall conduct necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence
gathered and the charges recommended by the fact-finding team. Resolution finding probable
cause for election offenses that are defined and penalized under the Omnibus Election Code
and other election laws shall be approved by the COMELEC in accordance with COMELEC
rules of procedure. The Fact-finding committee on the other had was created for the purpose
of gathering real, documentary and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the
preliminary investigation to be conducted by the joint committee. In its initial report dated
October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotobato and Maguindanao
were perpetrated. The Fact-Finding team recommended that petitioners GMA and Abalos for
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for manipulating election result in
Maguindanao. On November 16, 2011, the Joint committee promulgated a joint resolution
which was later endorsed to the COMELEC. On November 18, 2011m after conducting a
special session, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution approving and adopting the joint
resolution. On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an urgent omnibus
motion ad cautelam with leave to allow the joint committee to resolve the motion for
reconsideration filed by GMA to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a hold departure
order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She likewise filed with the
COMELEC a motion to vacate ad cautelam praying that its resolution be vacated for being null
and void. The RTC issued a warrant of her arrest which was duly served. GMA thereafter filed
a motion for bail which was granted.
ISSUE
1. W/N Joint Order No. 001-2011 is constitutional
2. W/N COMELEC had the jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary
investigation jointly with the DOJ
RULING
YES. Section 2, Article IX-C of the constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the
COMELEC. Paragraph 6 thereof vests in the COMELEC the power to “file, upon verified
complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” The grant to the
COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the COMELEC to
effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The failure
of the COMELEC to exercise this could result in the frustration of the true will of the people
and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.
Under section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg 881, the power to conduct preliminary investigation
is vested exclusively with the COMELEC. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government. The deputation of the Provincial and City prosecutors is necessitated by the
need for prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of
the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The text and intent
of the constitutional provision granting the COMELEC the authority to investigate and
prosecute election offenses is to give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers
for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The COMELEC should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created. COMELEC
Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding team.
Should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s independence but as a
means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election
offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre- proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
BAYTAN V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 153945
February 4, 2003
FACTS
Petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly
elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio (Ignacio for brevity), in Barangay 18, Zone II of
Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.
When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked
unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to study the
precinct map of Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated within the
jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and
registered anew.
Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter dated August 21, 1997 to former COMELEC Assistant
Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a copy thereof to COMELEC Registrar
Francisco Trias. In this letter, petitioners requested for advice on how to cancel their previous
registration.
The Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners Voters Registration Records
to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo (Ravanzo for brevity), for
evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually,
the Law Department endorsed the case to Ravanzo for resolution.
Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. In an
en banc meeting held on November 09, 2000, the COMELEC in its Minute Resolution No. 00-
2281 affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The
COMELEC en banc denied the motion.
ISSUE
W/N the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of lack of intent and substantial
compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration.
RULING
NO. The COMELEC also pointed out that since double registration is malum
prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential.
Neither did the COMELEC consider petitioners letter dated August 22, 1997 as an application
to cancel their previous registration. The COMELEC explained that this letter was sent after
their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had
already reported their act of double registration to a higher official.
BALINDONG v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 153991-92
October 16, 2003
FACTS
Anwar Balindong (Anwar), a candidate for Mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, seeks to set
aside the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) to immediately reconvene, totally exclude from canvass the election return for a certain
precinct and count eighty-eight (88) votes in the election return for another precinct, not in
favor of Anwar but another mayoralty candidate by the name of Amir-Oden Balindong.
The MBC convened with all parties represented by their lawyers and/or authorized
representative, so it stated. Before the start of the canvassing, the lawyers of the candidates
and political parties who were present agreed that all election returns should be opened and
appreciated immediately so that they could determine the genuineness and authenticity
thereof.
During the canvassing on the same day, Aklima, through his representative, Bassit Balindong
(Bassit), filed an objection to the inclusion of the election return for Precinct 127A/128A due to
fraud and irregularity in the conduct of election, being voted upon by those who are not
registered thereof (sic) and violence, threat and intimidation against watchers of our (their)
party and the registered voters thereof. Bassit also objected to the inclusion of the election
return for Precinct 18A for being voted upon by non-registered person (sic) and non existent
Barangay, all the registered voters are non-existent
Anwar argued that since Aklima failed to object to the inclusion of the returns for Precincts
80A and 47A/48A at the MBC, much less appeal the MBC ruling to the COMELEC, which
failure was fatal according to him, the COMELEC could no longer exclude the returns.
Anwar filed the present petition. He faults the COMELEC for having acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, firstly, in taking cognizance of the
consolidated cases in the first instance without referring them to either one of its divisions, in
violation of the Constitution; and secondly, in taking action on the returns for Precincts 80A
and 47A/48A although Aklima did not object to their inclusion for canvass at the MBC level,
thereby violating Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), aggravated at that by its selective or
disparate treatment of the two (2) returns.
ISSUES
1. W/N the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies at
the first instance;
2. W/N the COMELEC had authority to pass upon the validity of the two (2) election
returns which were not objected to before the canvassing board
RULING
NO. The Commission en banc does not have jurisdiction in the first instance, whether original
or appellate, over election cases, pre-proclamation controversies and incidents thereof. When
such disputes are filed before or elevated to the Commission, they have to be heard and
adjudicated first at the division level.
The 1987 Constitution, in Section 3, Article IX-C thereof, has established the two-tiered
organizational and functional structure of the COMELEC. The provision requires that election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, should be heard and decided first at the
division level. It reads, thus:
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
NO. An order directing the COMELEC to assign the consolidated cases to either one of its
divisions for further proceedings is unmistakably in order. This makes it relevant still, despite
the earlier pronouncement herein that the assailed COMELEC Resolution is void, to discuss
the remaining issues for they relate to the proper treatment which should be accorded to the
questioned returns at the COMELEC division level and the appropriate course of action which
should be taken at the canvassing board level or at the BEI, if need be.
Under R.A. No. 7166, matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the OEC in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns shall be brought in the first instance before the board of canvassers only.
CAYETANO v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 193846
April 12, 2011
FACTS
In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and private
respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was
proclaimed the winner thereof on May 12, 2010, receiving a total of Ninety-Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty-Five (95,865) votes as against the Ninety-Three Thousand Four Hundred
Forty-Five (93,445) votes received by private respondent.
Private respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC. Private
respondents protest listed election frauds and irregularities allegedly committed by petitioner,
which translated to the latters ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the whole, private
respondent claims that he is the actual winner of the mayoralty elections in Taguig City.
Thereafter, on August 31, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Preliminary Conference Order relative to the denial of her affirmative defenses. Private
respondent filed a Comment and Opposition thereto. Consequently, the COMELEC issued the
second assailed Order dated September 7, 2010, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE
W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and
content.
RULING
NO. Not unexpectedly, private respondent refutes the allegations of petitioner and raises the
procedural infirmity in the instant petition, i.e., the power of this Court to review decisions of
the COMELEC under Section 3,[4] Article IX-C of the Constitution, pursuant to the leading
case of Repol v. COMELEC.[5] Private respondent likewise counters that the petition fails to
demonstrate grave abuse of discretion.
JALOSJOS V COMELEC
G.R. No. 205033
June 18, 2013
FACTS
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled
“People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos,”3 convicting petitioner by final judgment of
two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
Petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous
conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City.
The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution, resolving “to CANCEL and DENY
due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga
City in the 2013 National and Local Elections” due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as
well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUES
W/N the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process.
RULING
NO. It is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it
issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or
resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty
to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of absolute
disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction.
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
and equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.
SANIDAD v. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
1990
FACTS
RA 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act For The Cordillera Administrative
Region” was enacted into law, pursuant to said law, Baguio City and the Cordilleras
(Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, and Kalinga – Apayao) shall take
part in a plebiscite for the ratification of the Organic Act.
Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the “Overview” of the Baguio Midland
Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of the Section 19 of the COMELEC Resolution which prohibited columnists,
commentators or announcers to campaign for or against plebiscite issues. Petitioner states
that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution
As a columnist, his column contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue
or subject about which he writes and that the provision in the Resolution constitutes a prior
restraint on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes
subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a penal provision
If media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted
to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate
information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue. The SC issued a TRO
enjoining COMELEC from enforcing and implementing the provision and required COMELEC
to comment
COMELEC’s argument:
The questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation
of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite
periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines.
· Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views
and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his
views or campaign for or against the act through the COMELEC space and airtime
ISSUE
W/N media practitioners fall under COMELEC regulation during plebiscite periods?
RULING
NO. COMELEC has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of
R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of COMELEC
Resolution 2167.
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the COMELEC
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or
other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates are ensured.
The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may
favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or
television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence
from his work during the campaign period
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be
construed to mean that the COMELEC has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates.
In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the
electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Anent respondent COMELEC's argument that Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167
does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the COMELEC
space and/or COMELEC radio/television time, the same is not meritorious.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was
advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement.
 The Court held that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's
freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of
the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite
should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may
be exercised.
COMELEC spaces and COMELEC radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do
not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 133486
28 January 2000
FACTS
ABS-CBN has prepared a project to conduct a radio-TV coverage of the elections, along with
the creation of exit surveys for the President and Vice-President. COMELEC approved the
issuance of a restraining order to prevent ABS-CBN or any other group from erecting exit polls
for the 1998 elections. COMELEC argued that such a project might conflict with the official
COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of NAMFREL. COMELEC further
argued that the sanctity of the ballots will be indirectly violated by the exit polls and it would
result in conditioning the minds of the people and cause confusion as to who are the winners
and losers in the election, which would result in violence and anarchy. According to
COMELEC, the goal of the issuance was to simply maintain clean and free elections.
Petitioner argued that COMELC gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the
petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of speech as mandated by Art III of the Constitution.
ISSUE
W/N the COMELEC, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls
RULING
NO. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals for the
purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly
selected voters whom they have voted. The results are announced to the public to give an
advance overview of how the electorate voted. By doing so, COMELEC has violated the
constitutional right of petitioner to freedom of expression. The Court has always ruled in favor
of freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption.
In order to justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be
clearly shown. In addition, when conflicted between freedom of the electorate to know and
actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, the court shall lean in favor of
freedom.
Although the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote and the duty
to secure the secrecy of the ballot, the responsibility of ensuring orderly voting DOES NOT
outweigh the restriction of the people’s freedom of speech.
COMELEC’s argument that the exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion is untenable.
1. The survey result is not meant to replace the official COMELEC count.
2. Rather, it is merely an opinion of the polling group as to who the general public has
PROBABLY voted for.
3. There is no showing that the exit polls will cause chaos in voting centers
4. Prohibiting the erection of the exit polls would prevent the collection of exit poll
data and valuable information, which would deprive the electorate, candidates, and
researchers of studies on the impact of current events and of election day and other
factors on voters’ choices.
Conclusively, the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic
abridgment of the constitutionality guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate.
SWS v COMELEC
G.R. NO. 147571
5 May 2001
FACTS
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics,
demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
publishes the Manila Standard. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing Sec 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before
an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the
other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the
elections on May 14, 2001. They argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in Sec 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as
necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that:
1. The prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period
proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated
surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply;
2. It narrowly tailored to meet the “evils” sought to be prevented; and
 3. The impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited
both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days
before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results
but only require timeliness.
ISSUE
W/N the COMELEC can exercise their supervisory power pursuant to Art IX-C sec 4 to
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media communication
pursuant to Sec 5.4 of the Fair Election act?
RULING
NO. Sec 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by
prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed
periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days
before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.
The grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Sec 4 is limited to ensuring “equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply” as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities for “public information campaigns and forums
among candidates.” Pursuant to Art IX-C Sec 4, the technical effect is seen to be that no
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority
on the part of COMELEC. The Court applied the O’Brien test to determine the constitutional
validity of the assailed Sec 5.4 of the Fair Elections Act to distinguish content-based
regulations from content-neutral regulations.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O’Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest “not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.” By prohibiting the publication of election survey results
because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election,
Sec 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers.
To summarize then, Sec 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
BANKERS ASSOCIATION v. COMELEC (c, 26 November 2013)
G.R. NO. 206794
26 November 2013
FACTS
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of COMELEC’s Resolution No. 9688 “In the Matter of
Implementing a Money Ban to Deter and Prevent Vote-Buying in Connection with the May 13,
2013 National and Local Election (Money Ban Resolution), which would in effect prohibit the
withdrawal of cash exceeding 100,000 pesos. Further, all withdrawals exceeding 500,000
pesos would be presumed to be a “suspicious transaction” Under the said ban, COMELEC
requires the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government to
strictly implement the Money Ban resolution. Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued the
Money Ban resolution without jurisdiction because pursuant Art IX-C Sec 4, they may only
supervise and regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits and it does not
extend to Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which is not a holder of any special privilege from the
government. Petitioners further argue that since the BSP and the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) are not law enforcement agencies, unlike the NBI and the PNP, they may not
be deputized.
COMELEC on the other hand argues the Sec 4, Art IX-C provides COMELEC the power to
regulate covers banks and other financial entities, since these entities operate under an
“authority” granted by the BSP, which in essence, is the same nature as “grants, special
privilege, or concessions.” The Money Ban Resolution is a reasonable measure that is not
unduly oppressive on individuals. It merely limits transactions involving cash, but does not
affect other NON-CASH transactions (credit cards, checks, etc)
ISSUE
W/N the Money Ban Resolution should be struck down as unconstitutional
RULING
NO. The Court dismissed the petitions for being moot and academic because the Money Ban
was only effective for a specific and limited time from May 8 to 13. Further, the Court already
issued a Status Quo Ante Order on May 10, making the Money Ban Resolution not in force
during the critical period of the election. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
or controversies and seeing that the issue is already moot and academic, the Court sees no
reason to grant the petition.
The Court rationalized that it is premature to assume that a similar Money Ban Resolution
would be issued in succeeding elections considering that COMELEC did not issue a similar
resolution during the October Barangay elections. The Court considers it significant that the
BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address the
COMELEC’s concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need
for any formal COMELEC resolution if and when the need arises. The Court also stated that
the Congress has the plenary authority, through its lawmaking powers, to address the
circumstances and evils the Money Ban Resolution sought to address. Hence, Congress can
very well act to consider the required measures for future elections, thus rendering
unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed Money Ban Resolution.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC
FACTS
On Feb 21 2013, Bishop Vicente Navarra, representing the Diocese, posted two 6’ by 10’
tarps within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. The first
read IBASURA RH Law and the second contentious one, headed by “Conscience Vote”, lists
candidates as either Pro-RH (Team Patay) or Anti-RH (Team Buhay).
On Feb 22 2013, Atty Mavil Majarucon, the Election Officer of Bacolod, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials within 3 days to Navarra since COMELEC Res 9615 provides
the size requirement of 2’ by 3’, the tarps being oversized. Navarro asked for a definite ruling
by COMELEC Law Department before the tarp be taken down. The Law Dept. issued a letter
on Feb 27 giving notice to immediately remove the tarps else COMELEC will be constrained
to file an election offense against them. Fearing imminent persecution for free speech, Ps filed
this case for prohibition & certiorari with application for preliminary injunction & TRO.
ISSUE
Does COMELEC have legal basis to regulate expression made by private citizens pursuant to
Art IX-C Sec 4?
RULING
NO. Art IX-C only grants COMELEC the authority to regulate expressions made by candidates
and political parties and NOT by private citizens. Art IX-C Sec 4 only allows for the regulation
of franchises or permits for transportation and public utilities and all grants and concessions
granted by the government. Furthermore, Sec 2 (7) of the same article states that COMELEC
shall recommend to Congress ways to minimize election spending, which based on the
enumerated acts seems to ONLY AFFECT CANDIDATES. Also, the Fair Election Act Sec 9
only mentions “parties” and “candidates”
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, COMELEC prevented journalists from covering plebiscite issues on
the day before and on plebiscite day; SC held that was an invalid curtailment of freedom of
expression since media practitioners are neither franchise holders nor candidates. Private
speech amounts to election paraphernalia when what is regulated is declarative speech that,
taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only, that can still
be regulated as “election paraphernalia”. The regulation should be provided by law,
reasonable, and narrowly tailored. But this isn’t the situation here. Even bishops have a
secular existence. Every act can be motivated by moral, ethical and religious considerations.
On its face, the tarp conveys no religious doctrine of the Catholic Church, and the mere
coincidence of the Church’s position and the opinion of the tarp cannot by itself bring the
expression within the ambit of religious speech.
1-UTAK v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 206020
14 April 2015
FACTS
Upon the promulgation of Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing the
Fair Elections Act, which prohibited forms of election propaganda specifically on public utility
vehicles such as buses, jeepney, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles and in their
respective terminals. Violation thereof would result in revocation of public utility franchise and
owners will be liable for an election offense. Petitioners sought for clarification on the
aforementioned resolution and explained that the prohibition provided in the resolution
impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.Petitioners requested COMELEC to allow private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to post election campaign on their vehicles and transport terminals. However, the
request was denied by COMELEC. They argue that assuming that substantial public interest
exists, it still would not be enough to prohibit the petitioner from placing electoral propaganda
on their respective vehicles and terminals as such curtailment of the right to free speech is
much greater than is necessary to achieve the desired governmental purpose.
According to COMELEC since petitioners do in fact possess a franchise and/or certificate of
public convenience and operates as a public utility (as recommended by Commissioner
Christian Lim), then pursuant to Sec 4 of Art IX-C, petitioners will be placed directly under the
supervision and regulation of the COMELEC for the duration of the election period. Further,
COMELEC argues that Resolution 9615 is a valid content-neutral regulation and does not
impinge on the constitutional right to freedom of speech. Hence, it is a valid exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power to regulate pursuant to Art IX-C Sec 4. COMELEC adds that
the regulation simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity, time and space for all
candidates, considering the mass audience that terminals hold who have “no choice but to be
subjected to the blare of political propaganda.”
ISSUE
W/N Resolution No. 9615, specifically the prohibition on the posting of any election campaign
or propaganda material, inter alia, in PUVs and public transport terminals are valid regulations
RULING
YES. The assailed administrative regulations run counter to the Constitution and even if it
purports to advance a legitimate governmental interest, it may not be permitted to run afoul
over the cherished rights of the people enshrined in the Constitution.
Section 7(g) items 5 and 6, in relation to Sec 7(f) of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringes on
the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. The penalty of revocation of the
public utility franchise and the liability of an election offense constitutes a prior restraint on the
right to free expression of the owners of the PUVs and transport terminals.
A content-neutral regulation is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards. The requisites
are as follows
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the government
2. It furthers an important or substantial government interest
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Applying the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation, Resolution No. 9615 are not
within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under sec 4, Art IX-C. Pursuant
to Sec 4, Art IX-C, COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and
regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to
the franchise or permit to operate the same.
A restriction on the franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is necessarily a
limitation on the ownership, but a limitation on the rights of ownership over PUV is not
necessarily a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate the same.
In sum, the assailed section of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are
content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC
issue and are not necessary to further the objective ensuring equal time, space and
opportunity to the candidates.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
GMA Network v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 205357
September 2, 2014
FACTS
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued
Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime
limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per
station.”7 For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the interpretation of said
candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements
from a “per station” basis, to a “total aggregate” basis.
Petitioners posit that Section 9 (a) of the assailed Resolution provides for a very restrictive
aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for a proper computation of “aggregate total”
airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby defeating the intent and purpose
of R.A. No. 9006.
Petitioners contend that Section 9 (a), which imposes a notice requirement, is vague and
infringes on the constitutionally protected freedom of speech, of the press and of expression,
and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern
ISSUE
W/N the Resolutions No. 9615 and 9631, amending the earlier Resolution, are
unconstitutional and issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction
RULING
YES. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous
COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements. This
essentially consists in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of
broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done on a per station basis.
Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that there was effected a drastic reduction of the
allowable minutes within which candidates and political parties would be able to campaign
through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the power of the COMELEC
to do or not. The Court holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
CAGAS V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 194139
January 20, 2012
FACTS
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of
Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local
elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the
canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the
winner
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and
resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest.
The COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed orders denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner
Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated
to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC;19 that the rules of
the COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions constituting the
electoral frauds, anomalies and election irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon
which the cause of action was based; and that Pea v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal did not apply because, firstly, Pea had totally different factual antecedents than this
case, and, secondly, the omission of material facts from Peas protest prevented the protestee
(Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being apprised of the issues that he must meet and made it
eventually impossible for the HRET to determine which ballot boxes had to be collected.
The COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order,20 denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law.
ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the protest for
insufficiency in form and content
RULING
NO. The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC
Section 8. Political parties, or organizations orA coalitions registered under the party-
list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall
be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.
Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls,
shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be
released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission.
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
Mison v. COA
187 SCRA 445
1990
FACTS
In a Customs Case, the Commissioner of Customs rendered a decision declaring illegal the
seizure by elements of the Philippine Navy of the M/V “Hyojin Maru” a vessel of Japanese
registry, and ordered the release of the vessel and its cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On
and Cheung I. Return of the cargo as thus ordered was effected pursuant to a directive of the
Secretary of Finance dated February 5, 1970. Release of the vessel, however, was never
effected; it sank while yet in the custody of the Bureau of Customs, and requests by the
Bureau to the Philippine Navy and the CADA to refloat or salvage the ship could not be
complied with for lack of funds. Chan Chiu On and Cheung I then filed a claim with the
Commission of Audit for the payment of the value of the vessel. Acting thereon “(b)y authority
of the Acting Chairman,” Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office of the
COA, denied the claim
Another letter signed by Acting COA Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, was also sent to
claimants’ counsel, Atty. Juan David, enclosing a copy of Decision Atty. David moved for
reconsideration which was denied by Acting COA Chairman Tantuico on the ground that it had
been filed beyond the reglementary period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the
subject Decision which, in consequence, had “already become final and executory.
Mr. David replied that said Decision—rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service Office
of the COA, and “not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less xx the Commission on Audit”—was
void because the matter could validly be acted upon only by “the Commission on Audit duly
constituted, by the appointment and qualification of its Chairman and two Commissioners,” “as
specifically provided by Section 2, Article XIID of the (1973) Constitution.”

Commissioner Tantuico wrote back on August 24, 1978 informing Mr. David that “this
Commission finds no cogent reason that would justify a reversal of its stand on the matter”
Atty. David filed for reconsideration again reiterating the lack of authority and requesting that
“the same be submitted for resolution by the Commission on Audit, after the appointment of
the two (2) commissioners thereof as required by Section 2, Article XIID of the Constitution.”
On November 17, 1986, the Commission on Audit having been fully constituted with the
appointment of the Chairman and two (2) members, Mr. David wrote still another letter to it,
drawing attention once again to his clients’ claim for payment. In a 4th Indorsement dated
June 22, 1987 addressed “to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs,” Chairman Eufemio C.
Domingo, acting “FOR THE COMMISSION,” reconsidered the decision of Acting
Commissioner of Audit Tantuico. He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal custody of
the Bureau of Customs, which “should have preeminently taken adequate measures to
preserve” it but did not; hence, he declared that “this Commission will interpose no objection”
to the instant claim, subject to the usual auditing and accounting requirements.”
Petitioner Mison sought clarification in 2 letters, which was answered by a response letter
signed by the full complement of 3 members of the COA Said COA Decision No. 992 pointed
out that the earlier decision, No. 77142, was “open to question and cannot be recognized by
the present Commission” because signed merely by the then Manager of the Technical
Service Office,” who evidently “was not acting for the Commission but only for the then Acting
Chairman.” It therefore held that the 4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 should be “deemed
for all legal intents and purposes as the final decision on the matter x x.” This letter— Decision
No. 992—was received by the Bureau of Customs on June 22, 1989. Petitioner filed petition
for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions No. 992 and 1053, pursuant to Section 7, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
W/N the “Espiritu Decision” is valid
RULING
NO. The “Espiritu decision” was void ab initio. As manager of the COA Technical Service
Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power whatever to render and promulgate a decision of
or for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone, had not that power. As clearly set
out in the Constitution then in force, the power was lodged in the Commission on Audit,
“composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners.”
It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which then as now, had the jurisdiction to
“(d)ecide any case brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
resolution,” subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari. The adoption or ratification
of the Espiritu decision by the Acting COA Chairman was inconsequential. Ratification cannot
validate an act void ab initio because done absolutely without authority. The act has to be
done anew by the person or entity duly endowed with authority to do so.
No proper ratification or validation could have been effected by the Acting Chairman since he
was not the Commission, and he himself had no power to decide any case brought before the
Commission, that power, to repeat, being lodged only in the Commission itself, as a collegial
body. The proposition advocated in this connection that Chairman Domingo may no longer
question the validity of the “Espiritu Decision” because in assailing it, he had referred to it as
“a decision of the Commission on Audit and not merely of its then Acting Chairman,” is so
patently unmeritorious as to deserve scant consideration.
Petitioner argues to sanction the foregoing principle would result in the invalidation of
“hundreds of decisions and orders signed by or signed by authority of the Acting Chairman
Tantuico (alone),” considering that there was an appreciable interval during which only an
Acting Chairman had been designated and no other Commissioner had been appointed or
was otherwise acting as such. The Court reiterates that the Espiritu Decision was not merely
“technically invalid,” as the petitioner describes it. It was substantively void ab initio, because
rendered without jurisdiction. It had an essential inherent defect that could not be cured or
waived
Funa v. COA
GR 192791
24 April 2012
FACTS
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N.
Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7)
years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. His term started on February 2, 2001 to end on
February 2, 2008.
Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years
starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following the retirement of Carague on
February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14,
2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of
the COA. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment
papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011. Villar argued that his appointment as COA Chairman meant he got a fresh
7 year term from 2008 or his chairmanship will end in Feb 2, 2015.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office
upon the appointment of his replacement. Villar vacated his position when to make way for
Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) as COA Chairman.
ISSUE
W/N Villar’s appointment as COA chairman, while having served for 4 years of 7-year term as
COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitation imposed under Sec 1. (2), Art IX-D.
RULING
NO. Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D). does not directly prevent a member of the Commission from
taking over the role of Chairman as long as the total term of the person is 7 years. Hence
upgrading can only happen when the Chairman resigns, dies, impeached or was not able to
finish the term. When the Chairman retires, an incumbent cannot be promoted to Chairman
because it will upset the rotational scheme of the members of the commission wherein every
two years a new Commissioner comes in to serve a full term of 7 years. This rotation was
meant to preserve the independence of the Commission, since the President will not be able
to dominate the membership of the Commission. If an incumbent Commissioner is allowed to
take over a Chairmanship position for the remainder of the term, his/her replacement will also
finish the term at the same.
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a
fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by
the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability
or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a
full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to
any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years
is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term
of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal
by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)
means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position
or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in
the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
HENCE, The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office
as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-
audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government- owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre- audit, as
are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve
the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.
DIGCONG V GUINGONA
G.R. No. 76044
June 28, 1988
FACTS
Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong was the former Acting Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI
of the Bureau of Treasury in IloIlo City. On three occasions during his tenure, he contracted
the services of Rameses Layson, a private carpenter and electrician, on an “emergency labor
basis” or on “pakyao” basis for the renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury
Office in IloIlo City. He was subsequently hired as a casual employee in the Bureau in order to
remove the hiring of a private carpenter and electrician.
When Atty. Dingcong retired, the Resident Auditor disallowed the amount of Php6,754, which
were from the labor contracts with Layson. This reduced the daily rate of Layson from Php40
to Php18. Atty. Dingcong appealed to the Chairman of COA the said disallowance. However,
the COA Chair affirmed the disallowance since it is “excessive and disadvantageous to the
government” but increased Layson’s daily rate to Php25. This resulted to the total
disallowance of Php4,276.
ISSUE
1. W/N the disallowance is within the power of the COA
2. W/N COA ruled correctly in determining the amount of Php4,276 as the total
disallowance to Atty. Dingcong
RULING
YES. Among the powers that is vested to COA thru the Constitution is the duty, to examine,
audit and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the expenditures or uses of funds ... owned ... by,
or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. The
Court further clarified the duties of COA which includes the following:
- authority extends to the accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties
received or held by them in an accountable capacity
- In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal
responsibility that rests directly with the head of the government agency has
been properly and effectively discharged
- whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources. It is
also empowered to review and evaluate contracts
- after an audit, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose
account has been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances
found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the
settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or suspensions
NO. The Court ruled that the “pakyao” labor contract is not disadvantageous to the
government since it was entered into only after the public bidding upon which Layson
submitted the lowest price. Subsequently, Layson was hired as a casual in the Bureau of
Treasury Office in order to eliminate the hiring of a carpernter and an electrician. This was
viewed by the Court as a cost-cutting measure by Atty. Dingcong.
DANVILLE MARITIME, INC. V COA
G.R. No. 85285
July 28, 1989
FACTS
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) passed a resolution that authorized the sale through
public bidding its 14-year-old turbine tanker due to old age and high maintenance costs.
Danville Maritime, Inc. won the bidding being the sole bidder.
The Commission on Audit (COA) issued a memorandum which notified the disposal
committee that managed the bidding that (1) the proposed contract of sale must first be
submitted to COA for review and (2) the public bidding suffered from deficiency of lack of
competition since there was only one bidder. The PNOC president requested for the formal
approval of COA of the sale of the subject vessel in favor of Danville Maritime, Inc. Before
receiving the response from COA, PNOC received a notice from Fearnly Finans, offering to
buy the vessel for a price atleast US$1 million higher than the bid of Danville Maritime.
However, this offer was rejected by PNOC.
COA issued its reply to the letter of petition of the PNOC and directed PNOC to reconduct a
public rebidding, in light of the fact that there is another interested buyer and that it a bidding
must have atleast two competing bidders. The following day, PNOC had ordered a rebidding
for the sale of the vessel.
ISSUE
W/N committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was a failure of bidding
when only one bid was submitted and subsequently ordered a rebidding.
RULING
NO. The Court ruled that COA has the power to interpret “public bidding” and what constitutes
a failure of public bidding. The Constitution vests the power to COA to have “exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and properties.”
In light of such power, the Court ruled that COA correctly determined what is the applicable
law in the absence of a clear definition of a failure of public bidding. In this case, COA used
the definition under the implementing rules of P.D. 1594 which governs infrastructure projects
to be applicable in the disposition of government assets. It is provided under P.D. 1594 that
competitive requires that there be at least two bidders who shall compete with each other on
an equal footing for winning the award. In the case at bar, there was only one qualified bidder,
which clearly shows the failure of bidding in light of the definition under the governing law as
determined by COA.
RAMOS V AQUINO
G.R. No. L-28594
June 30, 1971
FACTS
Petitioner Edilberto Ramos filed an action for certiorari and prohibition in the lower court
against the Fiscal of Rizal, respondent Benjamin Aquino. The action seeks to prevent Aquino
from conducting a preliminary investigation of the alleged commission of malversation through
falsification of public, official and commercial documents of Romeo Espino, the Commanding
General of Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio.
Ramos contends that under the Constitution, the Auditor General is vested with the power to
bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property
which in his opinion are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant”. Ramos’ main
argument is that the Auditor General is required to determine whether criminal responsibility
exists during the course of his audit or examination of accounts.
ISSUE
W/N the Auditor General has the power to determine whether criminal responsibility is present
on the basis of his audit or examination of accounts
RULING
NO. The Constitution is clear in providing for the mandate to the Auditor General. It is limited
to the examination and audit of accounts of the agencies and instrumentalities of the
government, in order to serve as the checking mechanism of the Constitution. The main
responsibility of the Auditor General is to check that no department or agency of the
government exceeds the statutory limits of the appropriations to which it is entitled. The Court
clarified in this case that the enforcement of criminal statutes is not within the purview of the
power granted to the Auditor General since this is a power exercised by the Fiscal or
Prosecutors’ office.
MAMARIL V DOMINGO
G.R. No. 100284
Date: October 13, 1993
FACTS
Petitioner Narciso Mamaril was a former evaluator/computer of the Land Transportation Office
(LTO) at its San Pablo City Branch. In the performance of his duties, he committed errors in
evaluation and computation which resulted to the under collection of registration, license, and
other miscellaneous fees and penalties. Mamaril availed of the Early Retirement Program.
Upon his retirement, the COA released a decision which held that Php44,515.90 must be
withheld from petitioner’s terminal leave pay.
Petitioner contends that he cannot be held liable on the audit disallowances because he is not
an accountable officer since his work as purely clerical and that he did not possess any
money or property which he is now asked to pay.
ISSUE
W/N Narciso Mamaril should be held liable for the disallowances in his terminal leave pay
RULING
YES. The Court ruled that the power of the Commission on Audit as provided in Sec. 2 (2)
which provides that the COA has "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article
to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the technique and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, . . ." does not limit
state audit to auditing the accountable officers and the settlement of accounts. It also includes
accounting functions and the adoption in the audited agencies of internal controls in order to
ensure that the correct fees and penalties due the government are collected. The evaluation
and computation of fees and penalties that were done by petitioner are part of the function of
COA in examining and auditing revenue accounts since fees and penalties are considered as
a revenue accounts.
Due to the repeated mistakes and errors of petitioner, COA has the authority to order the
withholding of the payment of any money due a person determined to be liable for
disallowances, suspensions, and other deficiencies in the accounts audited. The Court further
ruled that the role of petitioner as evaluator/computer constitutes an indispensable part of the
process of assessment and collection of fees. As such, petitioner is liable for the
disallowances in his terminal leave pay until such time that the private parties concerned
would pay their deficiencies and penalties.
SAMBELI V PROVINCE OF ISABELA
G.R. No. 92279
June 18, 1992
FACTS
Petitioner entered into an agreement with the Province of Isabela for the purchase of
wheelbarrows, shovels, and radio communication equipment. The initial payment of 50% or
Php190,388.20 was allowed by the Commission on Audit. Another delivery of the batch of
equipment was made and the payment for such was given by the Province of Isabela which
constitutes another 50% amounting to Php190,200. The total amount already paid by the
Province of Isabela is equivalent to 50% of the total price of all the equipment.
The Price Evaluation Division of the COA Technical Service advised the provincial auditor that
there is an overprice in the total amount to be paid. The findings show that there is an
overpayment of Php195,893.10 made by the province to the petitioner. COA advised the
Province of Isabela to withhold the payment and apply for a refund for the overpayment.
Petitioner contends that the contract of sale has already been perfected and that the order of
COA to withholding the payment would constitute an impairment of contract.
ISSUE
W/N COA has the power to enjoin the Province of Isabela to withhold the payment to
petitioner.
RULING
YES. The Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property
should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. The
disallowance made by the COA is in line with the said policy considering that there is a clear
overpayment and overpricing of materials to be paid by the Province of Isabela.
OSMENA V COA
G.R. No. 98355
FACTS
The City of Cebu decided to construct a modern abattoir in 1985. The City Treasurer certified
to the availability of funds amounting to Php5,419,180. After the successful bidding, H. Franco
Construction Company was awarded the contract, with the total project cost at Php8,368,920.
To supply the deficit for the funds, the City of Cebu in its contract with HFFCI, provided that
Php6,276,690 will be allocated in the budget for the next calendar year.
Sen. John H. Osmeña, officer-in-charge of the City of Cebu, ordered the suspension of the
project and review of the contract by the COA. HFCCI was unable to collect the value of the
amount of the work already accomplished.
The Mayor Tomas Osmeña of the city of Cebu entered into a compromise agreement with
HFFCI, duly approved by the court, to serve as the final settlement to HFFCI in the amount of
Php1,500,000. However, the contract between the City of Cebu and HFFCI was declared null
and void by the Commission on Audit. Mayor Tomas Osmeña argues that the COA cannot
invalidate the contract between the City of Cebu and HFFCI since it was already executed and
fulfilled.
ISSUE
W/N COA has the authority to declare a contract entered into by the City of Cebu as null and
void
RULING
YES. The COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to revenue and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned
of held in trust by, or pertaining to, the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities. COA based its decision to annul the contract between the City of Cebu and
HFFCI on P.D 1445 or the Auditing Code of the Philippines. It provides that there shall be no
contract involving expenditure of public funds shall be entered until there is an appropriation
therefore.
The Court ruled that the compromise agreement cannot be valid, even if it was approved by
the Court since the constitutional mandate given to COA cannot be invalidated by a decision
of a lower court.
BUSTAMANTE V COA
G.R. No. 103309
November 27, 1992
FACTS
Benito M. Bustamante is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power Corporation. He
was issued a government vehicle by the virtue of his position. Also, pursuant to NPC Board
Resolution, Bustamante is entitled to claim transportation allowance in addition to his use of
government vehicle. However, the regional auditor transmitted a letter to Bustamante which
disallowed the transportation allowance.
ISSUE
W/N the regional auditor committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disallowing the transportation allowance granted by the NPC to petitioner.
RULING
NO. The Commission on Audit, pursuant to the power granted to it by the Constitution
specifically their power to “promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including
those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or
uses of funds and property” promulgated COA Circular No. 75-6 which regulated the use of
government motor vehicles, aircrafts and watercrafts. It is provided in the said circular that an
official who has been furnished a motor vehicle shall not be issued a motor transportation
allowance.
It is on this ground that the COA disallowed the transportation allowance that was granted to
Bustamante given the fact that he has already been furnished with a motor vehicle by the
NPC.
OROCIO V COA
G.R. No. 75959
August 31, 1992
FACTS
An accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
Due to this, two people were injured. One of which is a contractual janitor that was employed
by OPLGS, the NPC’s janitorial contractor. His hospitalization expenses were initially paid for
by NPC, but later reimbursed itself by deducting the total amount from OPLGS’s billings to
NPC.
This was acted upon by the NPC and eventually allowed the refund of the hospitalization
expenses to the contractor, OPLGS. However, this refund by the contractor is revoked and
reversed by the Comission on Audit on the ground that there is no employer-employee
relationship that exists between NPC and OLGS, hence, the NPC is not answerable for the
hospitalization expenses.
Petitioner filed before the Court a motion to reconsider its position that NPC should be allowed
to collect from OPLGS, while COA maintains that such disallowance it made is valid.
ISSUE
W/N he legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for the disbursement in question,
preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in post-audit such disbursement
RULING
NO. The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the audit power of the COA. The
constitution vests to COA the authority to prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable use of government funds or properties. The Court
highlighted the power of the COA to be an independent watcher of the Government.
In the present case, the COA shall not be barred by the opinion of the legal counsel of any
agency or instrumentality.
Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
CALTEX PHILIPPINES V COA
GR 92585
8 May 1992
FACTS
This is a petition erroneously brought under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court questioning the
authority of the Commission on Audit (COA) in disallowing petitioner's claims for
reimbursement from the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and seeking the reversal of said
Commission's decision denying its claims for recovery of financing charges from the Fund and
reimbursement of under recovery arising from sales to the National Power Corporation, Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) and Marcopper Mining
Corporation (MAR-COPPER), preventing it from exercising the right to offset its remittances
against its reimbursement vis-a-vis the OPSF and disallowing its claims which are still pending
resolution before the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) and the Department of Finance (DOF).
The COA can neither ignore these issuances nor formulate its own interpretation of the laws in
the light of the determination of executive agencies. The determination by the Department of
Finance and the OEA that financing charges are recoverable from the OPSF is entitled to
great weight and consideration. The function of the COA, particularly in the matter of allowing
or disallowing certain expenditures, is limited to the promulgation of accounting and auditing
rules for, among others, the disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
Denial of petitioner's claim for reimbursement would be inequitable. Additionally, COA's claim
that petitioner is gaining, instead of losing, from the extension of credit, is belatedly raised and
not supported by expert analysis.
ISSUES
W/N the COA has discretionary power to disapprove irregular or unnecessary government
expenditures.
RULING
YES. As to the power of the COA, which must first be resolved in view of its primacy, We find
the theory of petitioner that such does not extend to the disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government
funds and properties, but only to the promulgation of accounting and auditing rules for, among
others, such disallowance to be untenable in the light of the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and related laws.
There can be no doubt, however, that the audit power of the Auditor General under the 1935
Constitution and the Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution authorized them to
disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Our present Constitution
retains that same power and authority, further strengthened by the definition of the COA's
general jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and
Administrative Code of 1987. Pursuant to its power to promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures or uses of funds, the COA promulgated on 29 March 1977 COA Circular No. 77-
55. Since the COA is responsible for the enforcement of the rules and regulations, it goes
without saying that failure to comply with them is a ground for disapproving the payment of the
proposed expenditure.
POLLOSO V GANGAN
GR NO 140563
Date: July 14, 2000
FACTS
In 1994, the National Power Corporation (NPC), represented by its President Dr. Francisco L.
Viray entered into a service contract with Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre. Under said contract,
Satorre was to perform the services for the Leyte-Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection
Projects of the NPC.
The contract provided that in consideration for services rendered, Satorre would receive a
monthly salary P21,749.00 plus representation and transportation allowance of P5,300.
On 12 January 1995, Unit Auditor Alexander A. Tan, NPC-VRC, Cebu City issued Notice of
Disallowance No. 95-0001-135-94 for the payment of the services rendered by Atty. Satorre
for the period covering March to December 1995 in the total amount of P283,763.39.
ISSUES
W/N the prohibition under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986 and Sec. 212 of the
government accounting and auditing manual imposed on government agencies from hiring
private lawyers “to handle their legal cases” apply to a lawyer hired by virtue of a service
contract but who actually handle purely right-of-way matters (excluding handling of court
cases).
RULING
NO. In the main, petitioner posits that the phrase "handling of legal cases" should be
construed to mean as conduct of cases or handling of court cases or litigation and not to other
legal matters, such as legal documentation, negotiations, counseling or right of way matters.
To test the accuracy of such an interpretation, an examination of the subject COA Circular is
in order:
SUBJECT: Inhibition against employment by government agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, of private lawyers to handle their legal
cases.
It has come to the attention of this Commission that notwithstanding restrictions or prohibitions
on the matter under existing laws, certain government agencies, instrumentalities, and
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, notably government banking and financing
institutions, persist in hiring or employing private lawyers or law practitioners to render legal
services for them and/or to handle their legal cases in consideration of fixed retainer fees, at
times in unreasonable amounts, paid from public funds. In keeping with the retrenchment
policy of the present administration, this Commission frowns upon such a practice.
Accordingly, it is hereby directed that, henceforth, the payment out of public funds of retainer
fees to private law practitioners who are so hired or employed without the prior written
conformity and acquiescence of the Office of the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the written concurrence of the
Commission on Audit shall be disallowed in audit and the same shall be a personal liability of
the officials concerned.
What can be gleaned from a reading of the above circular is that government agencies and
instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to render legal services or
handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the payment to private lawyers unless
prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the
Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel.
It bears repeating that the purpose of the circular is to curtail the unauthorized and
unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the
government. This is in line with the Commission on Audits constitutional mandate to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. Having determined the intent of the
law, this Court has the imperative duty to give it effect even if the policy goes beyond the letter
or words of the statute.
Hence, as the hiring of Atty. Satorre was clearly done without the prior conformity and
acquiescence of the Office of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as
well as the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit, the payment of fees to Atty.
Satorre was correctly disallowed in audit by the COA. On February 18, 1987, the Board of
Directors of the DBP approved the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as the DBP's private
external auditor for calendar year 1986 as required by Central Bank Circular No. 1124 and the
World Bank. The DBP Board of Directors placed a ceiling on the amount of reimbursable out-
of-pocket expenses that could be charged by the private auditor.
DBP V COA
GR NO 88435
January 16, 2002
FACTS
On February 18, 1987, the Board of Directors of the DBP approved the hiring of Joaquin
Cunanan & Co. as the DBP's private external auditor for calendar year 1986 as required by
Central Bank Circular No. 1124 and the World Bank. The DBP Board of Directors placed a
ceiling on the amount of reimbursable out-of-pocket expenses that could be charged by the
private auditor.
However, a change in the leadership of the COA suddenly reversed the course of events. On
April 27, 1987, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo, wrote the Central Bank Governor
protesting the Central Bank's issuance of Circular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon
the COA's constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies.
On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing
firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA
resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose
services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.
ISSUES
W/N the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
government banks to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any
circumstance.
RULING
NO. The resolution of the primordial issue of whether the COA has the sole and exclusive
power to examine and audit government banks involves an interpretation of Section 2, Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the
COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority
to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow
unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's
findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as
government agencies and officials are concerned. The superiority or preponderance of the
COA audit over private audit can be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission.
The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors
who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials, however, remain bound by
the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or second
paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or
reversed by the courts.
The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non-exclusive,
cannot be taken away from the COA. The mere fact that private auditors may audit
government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same
government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and
conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit
poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA
audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point
to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine
and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need
to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA
audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the
government borrows money from abroad.
PARRENO V COA
GR NO 162224
Date: June 7, 2007
FACTS
Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years.
On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd
Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to
three years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to
P13,680.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001,
the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential
Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD
1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied
the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.
ISSUES
Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended.
RULING
YES. Petitioner filed his money claim before the COA. A money claim is a demand for
payment of a sum of money, reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due
from or owing to a government agency. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1445, money claims against the government shall be filed before the
COA.
The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the
power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this
Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioners money claim essentially involved the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the restoration of his pension even
without ruling on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. The COA ruled
on the matter in its 13 January 2004 Resolution, thus:
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that this Commission assumed
jurisdiction over the instant case, claimant’s entitlement to the retirement
benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily be severed or
stopped upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship as prescribed in Section
27, P.D. No. 1638, as amended by P.D. No. 1650.
The COA effectively denied petitioners claim because of the loss of his Filipino citizenship.The
COA further ruled that even if it assumed jurisdiction over the claim, petitioner’s entitlement to
the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of
his Filipino citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
BLUE BAR COCONUT PHIL B TANTUICO
GR NO L- 47051
July 29, 1998
FACTS
Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit initiated a
special audit of coconut end-user companies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to
their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the subsidies they had
received. As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to
the petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman, the Administrator,
and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization
Fund, in various letters to them (Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and N of petition) to collect the short
levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies
should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.
The petitioners contend that the respondents, COA Acting Chairman Francisco Tantuico, Jr.,
and PCA Auditor have absolutely no jurisdiction to—
1. Assess the CCSF levy against petitioners and to make them personally liable for the
payment thereof;
2. Cause the witholding of the payments of petitioner's subsidy reimbursement claims;
3. Set-off petitioners' subsidy reimbursement payments against alleged CCSF levy
remittance shortages;
4. Institute a retention scheme of subsidy reimbursement claims which adversely affect
even companies not subject to levy;
5. Audit private corporations like petitioners;
6. Deny to the petitioners, in effect, their constitutional right to appeal to the Supreme
Court an adverse decision of the Commission on Audit. (p. 41, Rollo)
The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them. They contend that they
are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or
controlled corporations. This argument has no merit.
ISSUES
W/N the Commission on Audit can audit the coconut end-user companies, which include
herein petitioners.
RULING
YES. They can audit the coconut end-use companies. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the
Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d) such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the
Government which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity." The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule
that private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or
audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.
In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown through the laying down of concrete factual
foundations that the respondents' questioned acts were done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
VERSOZA V CARAGUE
GR NO 157838
February 7, 2012
FACTS
On two separate occasions in December 1992, the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
purchased from Tetra Corporation (Tetra) a total of forty-six (46) units of computer equipment
and peripherals in the total amount of P2,285,279.00. Tetra was chosen from among three
qualified bidders (Tetra, Microcircuits and Columbia). In the technical evaluation of the units to
be supplied by the qualified bidders, CDA engaged the services of the Development Academy
of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC). The bidding was conducted in
accordance with the Approved Guidelines and Procedures of Public Bidding for Information
Technology (IT) Resources and Memorandum Order No. 237 issued by the Office of the
President. Petitioner who was then the Executive Director of the CDA approved the purchase.
On May 18, 1993, the Resident Auditor sought the assistance of the Technical Services Office
(TSO), COA in the determination of the reasonableness of the prices of the purchased
computers. In its reply-letter dated October 18, 1993, the TSO found that the purchased
computers were overpriced/excessive by a total of P881,819.00. It was noted that (1) no
volume discount was given by the supplier, considering the number of units sold; (2) as early
as 1992, there were so much supply of computers in the market so that the prices of
computers were relatively low already; and (3) when CDA first offered to buy computers, of
the three qualified bidders, Microcircuits offered the lowest bid of P1,123,315.00 while Tetra
offered the highest bid of P1,269,630.00. The Resident Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance
No. 93-0016-101 dated November 17, 1993, for the amount of P881,819.00.
ISSUES
W/N COA acted within its jurisdiction when it disallowed in audit the amount representing the
overprice in the payment by CDA for the purchased computer units and peripherals.
RULING
YES. Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. It is
only upon a clear showing that the COA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that this Court will set aside its
decisions or final orders. We find no such arbitrariness or grave abuse on the part of the COA
when it disallowed in audit the amount representing the overprice in the payment by CDA for
the purchased computer units and peripherals, its findings are well-supported by the evidence
on record.
With respect to the liability of petitioner, we likewise affirm the COAs ruling that he is
personally and solidarily liable for the disallowed amount. The doctrine of separate personality
of a corporation finds no application because CDA is not a private entity but a government
agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of
Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily
established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the DAP-TEC to modify
the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading
system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened.
The continued serviceability of the purchased computers is not a factor in the determination of
whether the price paid by the government was unreasonable or excessive. The damage or
injury caused to the government refers primarily to the amount exceeding the allowable
variance in the price paid for the item purchased under a transaction which is not the most
advantageous to the government. In this case, it was clearly shown that CDA could have
purchased the same quality computers with similar technical specifications at much lower cost
and the result of technical evaluation was manipulated to favor one bidder, for which the COA
found the petitioner to be directly responsible.
BSP V COA
GR NO 177131
Date: June 7, 2011
FACTS
This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011 on August 19, 1999 (the COA
Resolution), with the subject Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines. In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP
was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines
v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as
constituted under its charter, was a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of
Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution; and that the BSP is appropriately regarded as a
government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code. The COA Resolution also
cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D).
COA argues that Republic Act No. 7278 did not change the character of the BSP as a
government-owned or controlled corporation and government instrumentality.
The COA claims that the only reason why the BSP employees fell within the scope of the Civil
Service Commission even before the 1987 Constitution was the fact that it was a government-
owned or controlled corporation; that as an attached agency of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), the BSP is an agency of the government; and that the BSP is a
chartered institution under Section 1(12) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
embraced under the term government instrumentality.
The COA concludes that being a government agency, the funds and property owned or held
by the BSP are subject to the audit authority of the COA pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX
(D) of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUES
W/N the COA has jurisdiction over the BSP
RULING
YES. After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the
applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation
and its funds are subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled An
Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to
Define its Powers and Purposes created the BSP as a public corporation to serve the
following public interest or purpose:
Regarding the COAs jurisdiction over the BSP, Section 8 of its amended charter
allows the BSP to receive contributions or donations from the government.
The sources of funds to maintain the BSP were identified before the House
Committee on Government Enterprises while the bill was being deliberated.
Historically, therefore, the BSP had been subjected to government audit in so far as
public funds had been infused thereto. However, this practice should not preclude
the exercise of the audit jurisdiction of COA.
Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a
government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to
the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the
provisions of the BSP Charter.
POI V AUDITOR GENERAL
GR NO L - 3659
April 30, 1954
FACTS
On October 3, 1947, the petitioner herein, Philippine Operations, Inc., entered into a barter
agreement with the Bureau of Prisons whereby it agreed to deliver to the Bureau a sawmill,
complete, with a diesel fuel engine, a stop saw edge and log turner, etc., and two LCMs in
good turning condition, in exchange for 350,000 board feet of sawed lumber.
When around a year later, it became evident that it was not feasible for the Bureau of Prisons
to deliver the lumber, obviously due to the delay in the installation, the petitioner herein
proposed to obtain surplus properties from the Surplus Property Commission in lieu of the
lumber so as to finally liquidate the obligation contracted by the Bureau of Prison. It turned
out, however, that no equipment could be found in the various Surplus Property Commission
depots which could be of service to the petitioner herein, so it proposed that the corporation
be credited with the amount of P70,000 and be allowed to bid and negotiate in future surplus
offerings up to that amount.
On June 20, 1949, the attorney for the petitioner filed a claim with the Auditor General. On
August 26, 1949, the Director of Prisons offered to deliver the first installment of sawed lumber
after 30 days. This offer was rejected by the petitioner on the ground that the offer to deliver
the lumber came too late, and it demanded that cash payment of P70,000 be paid to it, plus
P35,000 for damages suffered.
The above considerations regarding the existence of issues with regard to petitioner's claim
for P105,000 are set forth in view of the defense set up by the Bureau of Prisons that the
Auditor General has no jurisdiction over petitioner's claim, and that the same is not authorized
under Commonwealth Act No. 327.
The respondents contend that Commonwealth Act No. 327, which imposes upon the Auditor
General the duty of acting upon and deciding "all cases involving the settlement of accounts
or claims other than those of accountable officers," does not authorize or empower the Auditor
General to pass upon the petitioner's claim for P105,000, because the term "claims", used in
the said Act can refer to no other that liquidated claims, as held in the case of Compañia
General de Tabacos vs. French and Unson, 39 Phil. 34. In reply the petitioner argues that
under Commonwealth Act No. 3038, Sections 1 and 2, the Auditor General has been granted
the additional power upon "any moneyed claim involving arising from contract express or
implied, which could serve as basis for civil action between private parties," and that even
granting that the Auditor General has jurisdiction only over liquidated claims, the claim has for
P70,000 is a liquidated claim because it has been accepted by the parties as such.
ISSUE
W/N the Auditor General has jurisdiction or power to take cognizance of claims for
unliquidated damages.
RULING
NO. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that Act No. 3083 authorizes the auditor to take
the cognizance of unliquidated claims. We find nothing in the context from which this
contention can be inferred. The term used is moneyed claims, which has a well-defined
concept under the Jones law as above indicated.
There are other fundamental reasons why Act No. 3083 could not have contemplated
unliquidated claims, or cases where the liability of the Government or its non-liability is in
issue. In these cases the most important questions to be determined are judicial in nature,
involving the examination of evidence and the use of judicial discretion. To assume that the
legislature granted this jurisdiction to an administrative officer like the Auditor General is not
warranted, because it would amount to an illegal act, as a delegation of judicial power to an
executive officer. If the power were interpreted as having been granted to the Auditor General
to pass upon the rights of private persons, without the judicial process established by the
Constitution and the laws, private parties would be deprived of their property without due
process of law.
For these very obvious reasons, therefore, Act No., 3083 may not be interpreted to grant
jurisdiction to the Auditor General to determine and decide cases involving unliquidated
damages.
Having come to the conclusion that under the Jones law and the laws in force up to the time of
the adoption of the Constitution the Auditor General has no jurisdiction or power to take
cognizance of claims for unliquidated damages, we now come to the questions as to whether
under the provisions of the Constitution and the laws enacted thereafter by Congress, such
power may not be considered as having been lodged in the Auditor General. An examination
of the provisions of the Constitution fails to disclose any power vested in or granted to the
Auditor General to consider claims. All that is vested in the Auditor General is the settlement
of accounts. "Accounts," because of the absence of any reasons to the contrary, must be
deemed to have the same meaning as accounts under the laws in force before the approval of
the Constitution. The Constitution does not grant the Auditor General the right to consider
claims. After the promulgation of the Constitution, the power was granted under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 327. We have examined this law, and we find nothing therein to
show that the term "moneyed claims," the jurisdiction over which is granted the Auditor
General, should not be interpreted in the same sense that it was understood prior to the
adoption of the Constitution.
ICNA V REPUBLIC
GR NO: L-26532
July 10, 1967
FACTS
This case originated in a shipment from Hamburg, Germany of 288 bundles of axle shafts for
trucks, consigned to Yu Brothers Trading Company in Quezon City. The Bureau of Customs
delivered only 227 bundles of which 6 were empty. The consignee claimed P1,543.58 for the
loss from the Bureau of Customs and the Insurance Company of North America. The insurer
paid the consignee but filed a suit against the Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of
Customs and was granted recovery for the said amount by the City Court of Manila. During
the pre-trial conference, the parties limited the issues to defendants’ immunity from suit and
the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
ISSUE
Whether the Bureau of Customs is immune from suit
RULING
YES. Bureau of Customs is immune from suit. The Court of First Instance dismissed the case
on the ground that the Bureau of Customs being an agency of the national government, the
suit against it is a suit against the Republic which is immune from suit without its consent. In a
similar case, Mobil Philippines Exploration v Customs Arrastre Service & Bureau of Customs,
the Court held that the Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national
government in its operation of the arrastre service, is immune from suit.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT V REPUBLIC
GR NO: 178193
January 24, 2012
FACTS
In 1971, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8
thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the
PhP0.55 levy of which the copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts,
PhP0.02 was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut
producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA, now PCA) as having
the largest membership.
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential
decrees ("P.Ds.") purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the
collection and use of the coconut levy fund. While coming generally from impositions on the
first sale of copra, the coconut levy fund came under various names, the different
establishing laws and the stated ostensible purpose for the exaction explaining the differing
denominations. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was PCA.
Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered
in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.
Towards achieving the policy thus declared, P.D. No. 755, under its Section 2, authorized
PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit
the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the
bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. The same section also
decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or
fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government within the contemplation of
P.D. No. 711.
The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by P.D. No. 1468 (Revised
Coconut Industry Code), read:
Section 5. Exemption. — The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all disbursements as herein
authorized, shall not be construed ...as special and/or fiduciary funds,or as part of the general
funds of the national government within the contemplation of PD 711; . . . the intention being
that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the
coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their private capacities.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various
projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments. 25 Of particular relevance
to this case was their use to acquire the First United Bank (FUB),later renamed UCPB,and the
acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF companies, of a large block of SMC shares
The following were some of the issuances on the coco levy, its collection and utilization,
how the proceeds of the levy will be managed and by whom, and the purpose it was
supposed to serve:
1. P.D. No. 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and
declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, 21 to be utilized to
subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible
oil.
2. P.D. No. 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance
the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
ISSUE
W/N the two PDs undermine the jurisdiction of COA
RULING
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468 violate Article IX
(D) (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for State audit.
154 As an independent supreme State auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by
any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, "[n]o law shall be
passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or
any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit." 155
Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it
is clear that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds.
Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares
purchased using the said funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of
private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public
funds of the government, and consequently renders them impervious to the COA audit
jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its
constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its constitutional independence.
The conversion of these special public funds into private funds by allowing private individuals
to own them in their private capacities is something else. It effectively deprives the COA of its
constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle such accounts. The conversion of the said
shares purchased using special public funds into pure and exclusive private ownership has
taken, or will completely take away the said funds from the boundaries with which the COA
has jurisdiction.
DE LA LLANA V COA
GR NO: 180989
February 7, 2012
FACTS
On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of
government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. It affirmed the state policy
that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in accordance
with law and regulations and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper
disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of
government. It also emphasized that the responsibility to ensure faithful adherence to the
policy rested directly with the chief or head of the government agency concerned. The circular
was also designed to further facilitate or expedite government transactions without impairing
their integrity.
The COA issued Circular No 86-257, which reinstated the pre-audit of selected government
transactions following the occurrence of grave irregularities in the government’s financial
transactions which were uncovered after the change in administration due to the Feb 1986
Revolution. When the political system normalized and the government operations were
stabilized, COA lifted pre-audit of government transactions of national government agencies
and GOCCs through Circular No 89-299. This mandated the installation, implementation and
monitoring of an adequate internal control system which would be the direct responsibility of
the government agency head. It also provided that the pre-audit activities retained by COA as
therein outlined shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the implementation or prosecution of
projects and the payment of claims. COA was then to focus its efforts on the post-audit of
financial accounts and transactions, as well as on the assessment and evaluation of the
adequacy and effectivity of the agency's fiscal control process.
The COA later issued Circular No. 94-006 on 17 February 1994 and Circular No. 95-006 on
18 May 1995. Both circulars clarified and expanded the total lifting of pre-audit activities on all
financial transactions of NGAs, GOCCs, and LGUs. It also issued COA Circular No. 89-299,
as amended by Circular No. 89-299A, which in Section 3.2 provides that whenever the
internal control system of the government agency is inadequate, the Commission may
reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control measures.
3 May 2006, petitioner dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an
internal pre-audit service. On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner, informing him of the
prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299. The 18 July 2006 reply of the COA further emphasized
the required observance of Administrative Order No. 278 dated 8 June 1992, which directed
the strengthening of internal control systems of government offices through the installation of
an internal audit service.
Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the pre-audit duty on the part
of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional
mandate (Sec 2 Art IX-D). He also claims that because of the lack of pre-audit, serious
irregularities in government transactions have been committed.
ISSUE
W/N the petitioner is entitled to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
RULING
The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad
powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenues and expenditures and the use of
public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination; to establish the techniques and methods for the review; and to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations.. Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of
COA includes the duty to conduct pre-audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial
transactions before their consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following
conditions are present: (1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or
other specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose; (3) the
proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended balance of
appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the
expenditure; and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly
supported by authentic underlying evidence.
Petitioner's allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is
nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government
transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated
for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the
internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may
adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. With
this being said, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel
the COA to perform. COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination.
RALLOS V CITY OF CEBU
GR NO: 202651
August 28, 2013
FACTS
At the root of the controversy are Lots 485-D and 485-E of the Banilad Estate, Sambag I,
Cebu City, which were expropriated to be used as a public road in 1963. The Heirs of Fr.
Rallos alleged that the City of Cebu occupied the lots in bad faith sans the authority of the
former's predecessors-in-interest, who were the registered owners of the subject parcels of
land.
Heirs of Fr. Complaint for Forfeiture of Improvements or Payment of Fair Market Value with
Moral and Exemplary Damages against the City of Cebu.||| In its Answer filed on October 6,
1997, the City of Cebu contended that the subject parcels of land are road lots and are not
residential in character.|||On January 14, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision, which found the
City of Cebu liable to pay the Heirs of Fr. Rallos just compensation in the amount still to be
determined by a board of three commissioners, one each to be designated by the contending
parties and the court.
Contending parties both moved for MR. The City of Cebu argued that the reckoning period for
the computation of just compensation should be at least not later than 1963 when the said lots
were initially occupied. On the other hand, the Heirs of Fr. Rallos insisted that the amount of
just compensation payable by the City of Cebu should be increased from Php7,500.00 to
Php12,500.00 per sq m, the latter being the fair market value of the subject lots. They also
prayed for the award of damages in the amount of Php16,186,520.00, which was allegedly the
value of the loss of usage of the properties involved from 1963 to 1997 as computed by Atty.
Fidel Kwan, the commissioner appointed by the RTC. RTC increased the amount of just
compensation payable to the Heirs of Fr. Rallos from Php7,500.00 to Php9,500.00 per sq m.
The CA opined that the RTC erred in holding that the reckoning point for the determination of
the amount of just compensation should be from 1997, the time the complaint for just
compensation was filed by the Heirs of Fr. Rallos. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CA still
dismissed on procedural grounds the appeal filed by the City of Cebu. The Heirs of Fr. Rallos
thereafter filed before the RTC a Motion for Execution relative to the Decision rendered on
July 24, 2001. They claimed that in 2001, the City of Cebu paid them Php34,905,000.00, but
there remained a balance of Php46,546,920.00 left to be paid, computed as of September 2,
2008. On its part, the City of Cebu admitted still owing the Heirs of Fr. Rallos but only in the
amount of Php16,893,162.08. RTC issued a writ of execution in favor of the Heirs of Fr.
Rallos.
The RTC, however, set aside the demand letter served upon the City of Cebu by Sheriff
Bellones and interpreted the directives of the writ of execution issued on December 4, 2008
as:
[T]he entire amount of Php44,213,000.00 shall be subjected to a
12% interest per annum to start 40 days from the date the decision
on July 24, 2001 [was rendered] until the amount of
Php34,905,000.00 was partially paid by the City of Cebu. After the
payment by the City of Cebu of a partial amount, the balance shall
again be subjected to 12% interest until the same shall have been
fully paid.
The Heirs of Fr. Rallos assailed the abovementioned order on the ground that it effectively
modified the final and executory Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. The CA granted the
petition after finding that the two assailed orders effectively modified the final and executory
disposition made by the RTC on March 21, 2002. The CA likewise ruled that the case calls for
the application of Article 2212 of the New Civil Code, hence, it directed the City of Cebu to pay
interest at the rate of 12% per annum upon the interest due, to be computed from the date of
the filing of the complaint until full satisfaction of the obligation.
Meanwhile, in response to Mayor Rama's query, the Commission on Audit's (COA) Regional
Director Delfin P. Aguilar wrote the former a letter dated October 27, 2011 opining that:
Under Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 issued by the Supreme Court, it was clearly stated
that the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction of state liability must be pursued in
accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Presidential Decree No. 1445,
otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, wherein it is provided
that all money claims against the government must first be filed with the [COA]. . . . . we are of
the view that the issuance of the writ of execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment
against the City of Cebu may be considered beyond the powers of the court. On the other
hand, Section 1, Rule VIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA provides that a
money judgment is considered as a money claim which is within the original jurisdiction of the
Commission Proper (CP) of the COA and which shall be filed directly with the Commission
Secretary . . .
In praying for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, the City of Cebu stressed that it had already
paid the Heirs of Fr. Rallos Php56,196,369.42 for a 4,654 sq m property or at a price of
Php12,074.85 per sq m. Further, the procedures prescribed in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1445, this Court's Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 10-2000 and Rule VIII of the
COA's Revised Rules of Procedure were not yet complied with, hence, public funds cannot be
released notwithstanding the rendition of the decisions and issuance of the orders by the RTC
relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. CA granted the City of Cebu’s application for TRO.
ISSUE
W/N the City of Cebu, Mayor Rama, the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang
Panlunsod and the lawyers from the Office of the City Attorney committed several acts of
indirect contempt all geared towards preventing the execution of final and executory
judgments rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 179662 and 194111.
RULING
Petitioners assail that respondents did so by (a) with the CA of a Petition for Annulment of
Final Decision/s and Order/s again on the basis of the Convenio, which was already
presented and considered in the proceedings before the RTC, and despite the finality of the
decisions and orders rendered or issued relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388; and (b) of
several motions before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-20388 for the purpose of preventing or
delaying the execution of decisions and orders which had already attained finality. (Lacks
merit)
Lucena avers that the respondents willfully and maliciously defy the execution of final and
executory decisions and orders rendered or issued relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388.
Such averment is untenable.
The respondents allege and Lucena does not refute, that the City of Cebu had already paid
the Heirs of Fr. Rallos Php56,196,369.42 for a 4,654 sq m property or at a price of
Php12,074.85 per sq m. The controversy remains and the parties resort to all legal
maneuverings because the Heirs of Fr. Rallos obdurately insist that they are still entitled to
collect from the City of Cebu a balance of Php133,469,962.55.
An appropriation ordinance should be passed prior to the disbursement of public funds
"Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts
ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not,
and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a
seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that
the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction
thereof” Based on considerations of public policy, government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments rendered by the courts
and disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law
Despite the rendition of a final and executory judgment validating a money claim against an
agency or instrumentality of the Government, its filing with the COA is a sine qua non
condition before payment can be effected.
Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445 states that the COA has jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle
all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. Section 4, Rule X provides that any case brought
to the COA shall be decided within 60 days from the date it is submitted for decision or
resolution. Section 1, Rule XII allows the aggrieved party to file a petition for certiorari before
this Court to assail any decision, order or resolution of the COA within 30 days from receipt of
a copy thereof.
Without compliance by Lucena and the Heirs of Fr. Rallos with the provisions of P.D. No. 1445
and the COA's Revised Rules of Procedure, their lamentations that the respondents are
unjustly refusing the execution of the decisions and orders in Civil Case No. CEB-20388 do
not hold any water.
OCAMPO V COA
GR NO: 188716
June 10, 2013
FACTS
On 1 March 1996, Ocampo retired from the National Electrification Administration under
Commonwealth Act No. 186 3 as amended, by Republic Act No. 1616, 4 after more than
seventeen (17) years of service. Ocampo availed of the lump sum payment with a net gratuity
of P358,917.01.
Three days thereafter, on 4 March 1996, under Letter of Appointment dated 16 February
1996, Ocampo assumed office as Board Member of the ERB. On 30 June 1998, upon
expiration of her term, Ocampo retired under Executive Order No. 172, "Creating the Energy
Regulatory Board" in relation to Republic Act No. 1568, "An Act to Provide Life Pension to the
Auditor General and the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections." Ocampo
availed of the five year lump sum benefit and the corresponding monthly pension to be paid
out for the remainder of her life. This first gratuity lump sum payment based on sixty (60)
months or five (5) years advance salary was immediately received by Ocampo after her
retirement. Likewise, Ocampo began to receive her monthly pension.
On 25 August 1998, Ocampo was again appointed, this time as Chairman of ERB with a term
of four (4) years. On 15 August 2001, the ERB was abolished and replaced by the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC) as a consequence of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9136,
the Electric Reform Act of 2001. For the second time, Ocampo sought retirement under
Executive Order No. 172. Ocampo's claim was endorsed by the then Chairperson of the ERC,
Fe C. Barin (Chairperson Barin), to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Upon
release by the DBM of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and the corresponding
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA), Chairperson Barin approved the payment thereof to
Ocampo.
However, on post-audit of the transaction with Ocampo as payee, State Auditor IV, Nelda R.
Monterde (Auditor Monterde), issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No. 2002-002-101 dated 10
July 2002: (1) suspending payment of the amount of P1,452,613.71 covering Ocampo's
second retirement gratuity computed on a pro-rata basis equivalent to only two years, eleven
months, and twenty days; and (2) requiring submission by the ERC of "legal basis for [the
payment of] retirement gratuity twice under the same law (EO 172)."
The above provision of law is integral to the matter on hand since RA 1568 merely extends to
the Auditor General and the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections the
retirement benefits granted under RA 910. EO 172, on the other hand, explicitly provides that
the Chairman and Members of the Board shall be entitled to the same retirement benefits
given to the Chairman and Members of the COMELEC. Having claimed retirement benefits
under EO 172 twice, . . . Ms. Ocampo, therefore, would in all certainty be receiving double
pension for the remainder of [her life]. The most practical solution that would not run counter
to the prohibition against double pension is to deduct the amount of lump sum and monthly
pensions already received on the first retirement under EO 172 from the gratuity claimed on
the second retirement under the same law.
EO 172 sets forth the condition when the Chairman and the Members of the Board of the ERB
shall be entitled to retirement benefits provided under RA 3595. For clarity, the condition is
"upon completion of their terms or upon becoming eligible for retirement under existing laws."
A quick review of the circumstances herein obtaining would show that . . . Ms. Ocampo had
met such condition when [her] term [was] completed upon the abolition of ERB.
Section 1 of RA 3595 is clear as to the extent of the gratuity: lump sum of salary for one year,
not exceeding five years, for every year of service plus the life pension. In the attached
pertinent documents, it is shown that [Ocampo was] granted retirement gratuity in the amount
of . . . P1,472,155.43
On motion for reconsideration of Ocampo, the COA LAO-N issued ND No. 2003-021 dated 3
September 2003 affirming NS No. 2002-001-101 disallowing Ocampo's receipt of a second
retirement gratuity under Executive Order No. 172. In its Decision No. 2009-038 dated 1 June
2009, COA denied Ocampo's motion for reconsideration and affirmed the disallowance of the
amount of P1,449,450.48 and of the double monthly for Ocampo.
ISSUE
WN Ocampo is entitled to a second lump sum retirement gratuity as ERB Chairperson under
Executive Order No. 172, given that she had already received in full, as admitted by Ocampo
herself, a five year lump sum retirement gratuity as ERB Board Member.
RULING
In affirming ND No. 2003-021 dated 3 September 2003, the COA ruled that: (1) the phrase
"for every year of service" limits the payment of the lump sum to the employee's length of
service and does not automatically entitle an employee to a lump sum gratuity of five years;
(2) Ocampo is not entitled to two (2) lump sum benefit of five years for each term as it would
run counter to the "common-sense principle" laid down in jurisprudence; (3) payment to
Ocampo of two retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172 for both her retirements,
albeit under different positions and offices, is unconstitutional as it violates the provision
against additional or double compensation; and (4) ultimately, Ocampo should have received
only a pro-rated amount on her retirement gratuity based on her two years and four months as
ERB Board Member, and two years, eleven months and twenty days as ERB Chairperson.|||
While COA's decisions did not state whether Ocampo, for her first retirement gratuity,
received the maximum lump sum benefit of five years which an employee may receive,
Ocampo asseverated in her Reply, and the records of this case categorically show that for her
retirement as ERB Board Member, she received the maximum lump sum benefit of five years
although her actual creditable service for that position and period is less than five (5) years,
i.e., two years and four months. This has already been paid to, and received by Ocampo, and
has never been the subject of any audit or disallowance by the COA prior to Ocampo's claim
for a second retirement benefit as ERB Chairperson.
First. We disagree with Ocampo that COA should not have audited the first retirement benefit
paid to Ocampo as ERB Board Member. COA's plenary authority, consisting of pre and post
audit, is enshrined in the Constitution, and as oft observed in jurisprudence. COA validly
looked into the government expenditure relating to the first retirement benefit paid to Ocampo
because she now claims payment of a second retirement benefit under the same law. Part of
the scope of the COA's power, authority and duty is to "promulgate accounting and auditing
rules, and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government
funds and properties.”
Second. Before examining the correctness of the COA audit, however, it is imperative to
ascertain first, in view of the circumstances herein obtaining, as to how much Ocampo is
entitled to receive as retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172 in relation to Republic
Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595.
In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two (2) sets of retirement benefits for one and the same
creditable period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of her two
(2) retirements from the ERB. In other words, each set of retirement benefits claimed by
Ocampo is based on distinct creditable periods i.e., one for her term as member of the ERB
and another for her term as chairman of the same agency.||| What Ocampo is merely
claiming, therefore, is that she is entitled to two (2) sets of retirement benefits for her two (2)
retirements from the ERB under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. Hence, in order to
resolve her claim, what is only required is an interpretation of Republic Act No. 1568, as
amended.
Republic Act No. 1568 as amended does not justify payment of more than one gratuity and
annuity as a consequence of several retirements from the same agency.

SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM V CA
GR NO: 174788
April 11, 2013
FACTS
Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) filed a Petition for Prohibition with
the CA dated 18 July 2005 against petitioner Special Audit Team (SAT) of the Commission on
Audit (COA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction, and a writ of prohibition. GSIS also submitted manifestation
and Motion detailing urgency of restraining SAT which was granted.
COA created the SAT under Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order No. 2004-093, which
was issued by COA Assistant Commissioner and General Counsel Raquel R. Ramirez-
Habitan. Tasked to conduct a special audit of specific GSIS transactions, the SAT had the
avowed purpose of conducting a special audit of those transactions for the years 2000 to
2004. Accordingly, the SAT immediately initiated a conference with GSIS management and
requested copies of pertinent auditable documents, which the latter initially agreed to furnish.
However, due to the objection of GSIS to the actions of SAT during the conference, the
request went unheeded. This prompted the latter to issue a subpoena duces tecum. In
response to the subpoena, the GSIS, through its President and General Manager Winston F.
Garcia, replied that while it did recognize the authority of COA to constitute a team to conduct
a special audit, that team should not be the SAT, whose members were biased, partial, and
hostile.
Through a subsequent letter of Atty. Claro B. Flores and Atty. Nelo B. Gellaco, the GSIS
alleged that the SAT's creation was not supported by COA Resolution 2002-005, which was
without force and effect. The reasoning of both lawyers was based on the theory that the 1987
Constitution did not give COA the power to reorganize itself. Allegedly, the commission only
had the power to define the scope of its audit and examination, as well as to promulgate rules
concerning pleading and practice. Thereafter, several GSIS officials sent COA Chairperson
Carague a letter emphasizing that the special audit should be conducted by another team and
detailing how the SAT, as then constituted, prejudged the legality of several key projects of
the GSIS while merely relying on hearsay and inapplicable legal standards.
In its Petition, the SAT claimed that due to the continued refusal of GSIS to cooperate, the
team was constrained to employ "alternative audit procedures" by gathering documents from
the Office of the Auditor of GSIS, the House of Representatives, and others.
ISSUE
W/N the SAT was validly constituted
RULING
As previously discussed, the COA has "the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charter[.] . . .” The Constitution grants the COA the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, and establish the techniques and
methods therefor. Pursuant to this authority, COA Memorandum No. 2002-053 was
promulgated, giving the General Counsel the authority to deputize a special audit team
The validity of the SAT, therefore, cannot be contested on the grounds claimed by GSIS. If
ever it has a cause for complaint, it should refer to the conduct of the audit, and not to the
validity of the auditing body. And since the COA itself provides for the procedure to contest
such audit, the Court must not interfere.
DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ V COA
GR NO: 199114
July 16, 2013
FACTS
Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA's Employment Services Regulation Division
(ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing)
ordered his dismissal from service as he was found to have bribed a certain Madoline
Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the amount of P6,200.00 in order to expedite the
issuance of her overseas employment certificate. Aside from the foregoing administrative
proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was instituted against Labrador in view of the
same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated a
Decision, convicting him of the aforementioned crime. The Court denied Labrador's motion for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial and prayer for
referral to the Court En Banc, resulting in the January 26, 2000 Resolution's entry of
judgment.
Eventually, upon favorable recommendation of the Parole and Probation Office, the SB, in a
Resolution dated September 28, 2001, granted Labrador's application for probation and
likewise cancelled the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.
Thereafter, at the end of Labrador's probation period, a Probation Officer's Final Report dated
November 4, 2003 was issued, recommending that his probation be terminated and that he be
discharged from its legal effects. The SB, however, withheld its approval and, instead, issued
a Resolution dated March 2, 2004 (March 2, 2004 Resolution), stating that Labrador's
application for probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal from his
judgment of conviction, in violation of Section 4 of the Probation Law. On March 9, 2004,
Dimapilis-Baldoz received a copy of the said resolution and thereupon issued a Notice/Order
of Separation dated March 11, 2004 (Separation Order), relieving Labrador of his duties.
lmost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV, Crescencia L. Escurel,
issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2005-011 dated February 7, 2005 (COA Audit
Memo) which contained her audit observations on the various expenditures of the POEA
pertaining to the payment of salaries and benefits to Labrador for the period covering August
31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. The pertinent portions of the COA Audit Memo read as follows:
 The accounts Government Equity and Salaries and Wages-Regular,
Additional Compensation, Representation and Transportation
Allowances and Other Personnel Benefits are overstated by
P1,626,956.05, P57,143.03, P3,000.00, P16,050.00 and P11,800.00,
respectively due to payment of salaries and wages, additional
compensation, allowances and other benefits to an official from August
31, 1999 to March 15, 2004, contrary to the Sandiganbayan Decision
dated August 31, 1999.
Based on these observations, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance 27 (Notice of
Disallowance) on January 18, 2006, finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees,
personally liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador in the amount
of P1,740,124.08, paid through various checks issued from August 1999 to March 15, 2004.
Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of the Notice of Disallowance, asserting that the
POEA should not be held liable for the refund of the foregoing amount since Labrador's
employment was fully and promptly terminated upon receipt of the SB's March 2, 2004
Resolution.
ISSUE
W/N grave abuse of discretion attended the COA’s disallowance in this case.
RULING
It is fundamental that the COA has the authority to rule on the legality of the disbursement of
government funds. This finds force in Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. It has been pronounced that the COA's exercise of its general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent
in our form of government. Furthermore, it has also been declared that the COA is endowed
with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds
Pursuant to its mandate, the COA disallowed the disbursements pertaining to the personnel
benefits paid to Labrador, reasoning that the latter should have stopped reporting for work as
early as June 28, 2000 when the denial of his appeal from the SB's August 31, 1999 Decision
rendered his conviction for the crime of direct bribery final and executory, notwithstanding the
grant of his application for probation. While Dimapilis-Baldoz takes no exception to the COA's
authority to disallow any illegal disbursements, she argues that its disallowance of the subject
amounts pertaining to Labrador's salaries and benefits should have been reckoned only from
March 2, 2004, which is the time the SB set aside its initial resolution granting Labrador's
application for probation and directing the latter to finally serve the penalties imposed against
him, more significantly, his temporary special disqualification from public office. Neither of
these positions adopts a proper perspective toward the attendant facts of the case.
Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of the disallowance is the undisputed
fact that, pursuant to an order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing, Labrador had
already been made to suffer the administrative penalty of dismissal from service on May 2,
1997, which was long before the SB convicted him of direct bribery on August 31, 1999 and
this is immediate and executory. Highlighted here is the immediate effect of administrative
sanctions upon final order by the department secretary or head of agency. Hence, based on
these authorities, then Labor Secretary Quisumbing's order of dismissal in this case should
have also been executed immediately upon its issuance on May 2, 1997. In this accord,
Labrador should not have been allowed to report for work from such date, much less receive
any salary or benefit accruing from his previous post.
As correctly argued by the COA, the grant of probation does not justify a public employee's
retention in the government service. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot
justify his retention in the government service. He may seek to re-enter government service,
but only after he has shown that he is fit to serve once again.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COA in fixing the reckoning point of the
period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are bereft of any showing that it had any
knowledge of Labrador's prior dismissal on May 2, 1997.||| Verily, public funds are the
property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent
dissipation and waste. As such, the COA must correct its previous issuances in this case in
order to reflect the actual date of Labrador's dismissal which would also be the proper
reckoning point of the period of disallowance.
It is well to stress that neither will it do justice to hold Dimapilis-Baldoz personally liable simply
because she possessed the final authority for the disbursements and had direct supervision
over her subordinates. Case law exhorts that although a public officer is the final approving
authority and the employees who processed the transaction were directly under his
supervision, personal liability does not automatically attach to him but only upon those directly
responsible for the unlawful expenditures. As Dimapilis-Baldoz's direct responsibility therefor
had not been demonstrated, in addition to her good faith as above-discussed, there is no
cogent factual or legal basis to hold her personally liable. In this respect, the Court finds that
the COA gravely abused its discretion.
Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
VELOSO V COA
GR NO: 193677
September 6, 2011
FACTS
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An
Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local
Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same
Position. Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of some former
councilors.
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive
terms, subject to the availability of funds as certified by the City Treasurer.
On August 8, 2005, Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina), Supervising Auditor of the City of
Manila, issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-100(05)07(05) with the
following observations. (1) Initial payment of monetary reward as part of Exemplary Public
Service Award (EPSA) amounting to P9,923,257.00 to former councilors of the City
Government of Manila who have been elected for three consecutive terms to the same
position as authorized by City Ordinance No. 8040 is without legal basis (2) The amount
granted as monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to double compensation (3) The
appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA ordinance was classified as
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal Services contrary to Section
7, Volume III of the Manual on the New Government Accounting System (NGAS) for local
government units and COA Circular No. 2004-008 dated September 20, 2004 which provide
the updated description of accounts under the NGAS.
Former councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance. In its Decision No. 2007-
171 dated November 29, 2007, the LAO-Local decided in favor of the movants. Citing Article
170 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, the
LAO-Local held that the monetary reward given to the former councilors can be one of gratuity
and, therefore, cannot be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. Giving
importance to the principle of local autonomy, the LAO-local upheld the power of local
government units (LGUs) to grant allowances. More importantly, it emphasized that the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not disapprove the appropriation for the
EPSA of the City which indicate that the same is valid.
The COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the term
"compensation." Though it recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs, it emphasized the
limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL
does not authorize the grant of such monetary reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence
of a specific law passed by Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward
or gratuity to the former councilors.
ISSUES
1. W/N the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government
funds
2. W/N the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance
covering the EPSA of former three-term councilors
RULING
Under the 1935 Constitution, the Auditor General could not correct irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant expenditures of public funds, but could only bring the matter to the
attention of the proper administrative officer. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA
is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply
with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of these funds.
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers
over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public
funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's,
property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the COA to disapprove
payments which it finds excessive and disadvantageous to the Government; to determine
the meaning of "public bidding" and when there is failure in the bidding; to disallow
expenditures which it finds unnecessary according to its rules even if disallowance will
mean discontinuance of foreign aid; to disallow a contract even after it has been executed
and goods have been delivered. Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are
still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
In this case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the
assailed decisions as will be discussed below. In the exercise of the above power, the City
Council of Manila enacted on December 7, 2000 Ordinance No. 8040, but the same was
deemed approved on August 23, 2002. The ordinance authorized the conferment of the EPSA
to the former three-term councilors and, as part of the award, the qualified city officials were to
be given "retirement and gratuity pay remuneration." We believe that the award is a "gratuity"
which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of pecuniary value bestowed without claim or
demand, or without consideration. However,the power is not without limitations.
Moreover, the IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional provision that "no elective or
appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government." Section 325 of the law limit the total appropriations for personal services of a
local government unit to not more than 45% of its total annual income from regular sources
realized in the next preceding fiscal year.
While it may be true that the above appropriation did not exceed the budgetary limitation set
by RA 7160, we find that the COA is correct in sustaining ND No. 06-010-100-05. There is
nothing wrong with the local government granting additional benefits to the officials and
employees. The laws even encourage the granting of incentive benefits aimed at improving
the services of these employees. Considering, however, that the payment of these benefits
constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene the law on disbursement of
public funds.
Undoubtedly, the above computation of the awardees' reward is excessive and tantamount to
double and additional compensation. This cannot be justified by the mere fact that the
awardees have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Neither can
it be justified that the reward is given as a gratuity at the end of the last term of the qualified
elective official.

COA's assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious
exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA adheres to
the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and
that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such finds and
property should be prevented. However, in line with existing jurisprudence, we need not
require the refund of the disallowed amount because all the parties acted in good faith. In this
case, the questioned disbursement was made pursuant to an ordinance enacted as early as
December 7, 2000 although deemed approved only on August 22, 2002. The city officials
disbursed the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in the honest belief that the amounts
given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident
that they richly deserve such reward.

Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the
time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit,
and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It
shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.