CHAPTER V

MRS. GANDHI IN THE EIGHTIES: TOWARDS OPERATION BLUESTAR

AND THE END OF LEADERSHIP

Mrs. Gandhi’s final term as Prime Minister (1980-1984)

commenced with her remarkable victory in the seventh general

elections held in January 1980. This election and its outcome were to

mark the political decade of the eighties with far-reaching changes

and much turbulence. This term of Mrs. Gandhi’s prime ministership

was witness to a dramatic end to her political career in which all other

events were overshadowed by the Punjab crisis and its fallout. In this

chapter our main purpose is to understand Mrs. Gandhi’s handling of

the Punjab problem and what consequences it had for her leadership.

This chapter is discussed in four sections. The first section

briefly narrates the story of the Punjab problem. The second section

presents a summaiy of positions taken by some noted scholars on the

Punjab problem. The third section maps Mrs. Gandhi’s association

with the Punjab problem and looks at the events leading to Operation

Bluestar from a leadership perspective. The last section is a summing

up of the arguments of the preceding sections

A BRIEF STORY OF THE PUNJAB PROBLEM

What came to be defined as the Punjab problem in the ‘80s can

be traced to the late 1960’s with the formation of a separate Punjabi­

speaking state of Punjab. This new state of Punjab was created after a

246
prolonged agitation since 1955 by the Akali Dal, called the Punjabi-

suba movement. The long delay in conceding this demand was on

account of the nationalist objection to the Punjabi-suba. It was felt to

be a communal demand directly opposed to the conception of a

secular state.1 The Indian National Congress remained inflexible

towards the demand for a Punjabi-suba during Nehru’s lifetime. After

his death Lai Bahadur Shastri appointed a parliamentary committee

to deal with the problem. On the basis of the report submitted by the

committee, the AICC under the presidentship of Kamaraj passed a

resolution favouring the reorganization of Punjab on the basis of

language.2

The process of reorganization of Punjab which resulted in the

exclusion of several Punjabi-speaking areas from the predominantly

unilingual Punjabi-speaking state was to lead to tensions between the

newly created states of Haiyana and Punjab. In theory the new state

was Punjabi-speaking but in reality it was a Sikh-majority state. The

Akali Dal realized that since its appeal was limited to a particular

community, it could not hope to attain power all by itself, for mere

electoral victory could not guarantee territorial domination of a

regional party. Hence after the formation of the Punjabi suba, the

programmes and actions of the Akali Dal demonstrated that it was

1 Bonita Aleaz, Struggles of Indian Federalism (Calcutta: Punthi-Pustak, 1997), 138-139. Aleaz cites
Lok Sabha debates of August 1961 where the then Prime Minister Nehru, who was vehemently
opposed to the demand for a Punjabi-suba, voiced his apprehension that the way the demand had
evolved, it had taken a communal overtone and then on this count, other communities took objection to
it
2 K. Nayer, Minority Politics in Punjab (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), 52-53. Cited in
Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case Study of Punjab (Great Britain: Macmillan Press,
2000), 107.

247
keen to acquire and retain power as a moderate political party. Thus

on the eve of the fourth general elections in 1967 the Akali Dal faction

led by Sant Fateh Singh declared that the Akali Dal would continue to

protect the rights and privileges of the Sikhs. The party’s eagerness to

gain political power was evident from its willingness to enter into

coalitions with other parties like the Jana Sangh through pre-poll

alliances with a view to forming government. On March 8, 1967, a

united front government with Sant Fateh Singh’s Akali Dal nominee,

Gumaam Singh formed ministry. From this point onwards the two

Akali factions, that is, the one led by Sant Fateh Singh and the other

by Master Tara Singh clashed headlong over the question of aligning

with other parties and over chief ministership. In the course of the

struggle for dominance in the state, the Akali Dal (Sant group) made

an attempt to regain power by raising the demand for state autonomy

at Batala in 1968.3

Disaffections within the Akali Dal persisted because of the

continuance of some links between Punjab and Haiyana such as a

common governor, high court, electricity board, financial corporations

and housing corporations. Moreover the central government took over

Chandigarh and the Bhakra and Beas Dam Projects.4 The Akali Dal
had declared that it would work for the removal of the links with

Haiyana as well as for the inclusion of all Punjab-speaking areas

including Chandigarh in Punjab. After threats and counter-threats by

3 Bonita Aleaz, Struggles ofIndian Federalism, 143.

4 A. S. Narang, A Study in Democracy, Development and Distortion: Punjab Politics in National
Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1986X 62-63.

248
the Akali Dal during 1966-69, regarding the merger of the Punjabi-

speaMng areas along with Chandigarh into the Punjabi suba, in

January 1970 Mrs. Gandhi announced that Chandigarh would go to

Punjab.5 She had insisted that Punjab would have to surrender two

tehsils, Abohar and Fazilka to Haryana in addition to making a grant

of ten crore rupees for building a new capital.6 The final take-over of

Chandigarh and the transfer of Abohar-Fazilka territory were to take

place by 1975. It had appeared that while the Punjabis welcomed the

decision to hand over Chandigarh to Punjab, they were not prepared

to allow the transfer of Abohar and Fazilka to Haryana.7 These two

tehsils were Hindu-majority areas but were essentially Punjabi­

speaking areas. From this point of view the award went against the

spirit of Nehru’s stand on the alteration of state boundaries on a

religious basis. Hence the boundary dispute continued to be a source

of mutual distrust between the two states.

During 1971-72 the nature of unfolding political events, such as

the instability of non-Congress ministries, the struggle for power

within the Akali Dal and a general desire for reform within the Akali

ranks gave rise to the articulation of Sikh grievances and demands for

greater state autonomy. It was clear that the Akali Dal was quite

incapable of presenting a united front against the power of the

Congress and this became all the more obvious with the coming to

5 Within months of the Punjab Settlement, Sant Fateh Singh had started a fast unto death to force Mrs.
Gandhi to concede the city of Chandigarh to Punjab. He had to call off his fast without achieving his
aim. Then again in 1969, the Sant announced that he would sacrifice his life by burning himself to
death if Mrs. Gandhi did not award Chandigarh to Punjab.
6 Dalip Singh, Dynamics ofPunjab Politics (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1981), 39.
7 Ibid.

249
power of Zail Singh as Chief Minister of Punjab with a Congress

ministry in March 1972.8 The vulnerability of Sikh politics was

heightened when Zail Singh’s Congress government took over Akali

strongholds in Sikh affairs.9 It was this vulnerability that created the

background of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973. This was to

become the basis for the demands that the Akalis were to raise in the

agitation which ended with the Indian army storming the Golden

Temple in June 1984.

THE ANANDPUR SAHIB RESOLUTION

In 1972 it was felt in Shiromani Akali Dal circles that a “Policy

Programme” should be drawn up to state the objectives of the party

clearly. A sub-committee with Suijit Singh Bamala as Chairman

presented its report to the Akali Dal at its meeting held at Shri

Anandpur Sahib on October 16-17, 1973. This report which was

approved by the Akali Dal Working Committee in October 1973 came

to be known as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and it contained a

clear explanation of the Dal’s purposes and goals.10

The operative part of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution related to

the political goal of the Akali Dal which was defined as: the creation of

* Zail Singh came to power as head of the first Congress government in reorganised Punjab in March
1972. His tenure was the first one to last for five years till it was dissolved by the Janata government in
April 1977.
9 Zail Singh’s tenure was marked by unprecedented state-sponsored religiosity. Institutions, highways,
streets all received names from Sikh hagiography. His interest was in giving the state a uniquely Sikh
flavour. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle (New Delhi: Rupa, 2006),
64. Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage, 1991), 185.
10 The full text of the Basic Postulates of Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 is contained in the Draft
of the New Policy Programme of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar Shiromani Akali Dal, August 1,
1977).

250
a congenial environment in which the birth right of the Khalsa to rule

would become possible.11 In order to achieve this the boundaries of

the state had to be readjusted so that all the areas so far “deliberately

kept out” of Punjab such as Chandigarh and a few other areas

enumerated in the Resolution, could be included in it. Secondly, the

Dal envisioned a new federal set-up not only for reorganized Punjab,

but for all the states in the union. The Centre would be entitled to

legislate only on matters of defense, foreign relations, currency and

general communications. Moreover, not only would all the states enjoy

equal representation at the centre, but the states would be

represented in all the departments over which the centre exercised

legislation. Safeguards for all minorities, particularly the Sikhs, were

deemed as essential. The Akali Dal desired that Sikh representation in

the armed forces, which had always been high, could be retained and

since the kirpan was an integral part of their religious tenets, it

should be accepted as part of the Sikh soldiers’ uniform.12

There were two other sections, one outlining the economic policy

and programme and the other with regard to educational and cultural

matters.13

There are various interpretations of the Anandpur Sahib

Resolution. It is not our purpose here to get into a review of those

interpretations, but a couple of observations on the nature of the

Resolution would be in order. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, in an article entitled

11 Ibid, 20-22.
12 Ibid, 22.
13 Ibid, 23-30.

251
“A Resolution in Dispute” published in The Tribune, Chandigarh on

February 25, 1985 observed that the Resolution was a complete and

self-contained document that should be studied in full to realize its

real spirit and tenor and that there were may sections of the

Resolution that provided ample proof of the Akali Dal’s concern for the

entire country.14 A. C. Kapur commented that, “it cannot be denied

that the Anandpur Sahib Resolution clearly provides the ideological

basis for the demand for Khalistan, the land of the Khalsa.”15 Kapur

held that the Resolution accepted the Sikh community as a nation

and was committed to creating an environment in which national

sentiments and aspirations of the Sikh Panth would find full

expression, satisfaction and growth. Thus, according to Kapur, the

Resolution carried the seeds of separation, notwithstanding the

explanation given by moderate Akalis, including Harchand Singh

Longowal. It could not be equated with the demand for state

autonomy. Harkishan Singh Suijeet, the veteran Communist leader

felt that the Resolution embodied a potential demand for Khalistan.16

The Anandpur Sahib Resolution was recast, with greater

emphasis on federal restructuring, at the eighteenth All-India Akali

Conference held in Ludhiana on October 28-29,1978 where a set of

twelve resolutions were passed as modifications of the Akali stand as

M Cited in A. C. Kapur, The Punjab Crisis: An Analytical Study (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company,
1984), 194.
15 Ibid, 195.
16 Harkishan Singh Suijeet, Deepening Punjab Crisis: A Democratic Solution (New Delhi: Patriot
Publishers, 1992), 46-47.

252
adopted in 1973.17 The Ludhiana Resolutions did not refer to the

creation of an atmosphere where the “pre-eminence” of the Khalsa

could be maintained. There was much confusion about the marked

difference in the tone of the two resolutions passed in 1973 (the

original Anandpur Sahib Resolution) and in 1978 (the Ludhiana

Resolution). With explanations and counter explanations on the

nature of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, one point may be deduced

in retrospect -that the Akali leadership itself was quite unsure of the

impact the Anandpur Sahib Resolution would create once it was

authenticated by the party in 1977.

Nevertheless, from the Resolutions of 1973 and 1978, it was

possible to enumerate the main Akali grievances.18 They were the

demand for greater Punjab and the Punjabi-language, the demand for

codification of a separate personal law for Sikhs, abrogation of Article

25 of the Constitution, promulgation of an All-India Gurdwara Act,

holy city status for Amritsar; the installation of a high powered

transmitter at the Golden Temple for the relay of Gurbani and

permission to the Sikhs serving in the armed forces to wear kirpan.

One issue that was emotive as well as misunderstood was the issue of

water. The waters of three of united Punjab’s five rivers were allocated

to India in the post-partition Indus Water Agreement signed with

Pakistan. The rivers are the Sutlej, Ravi and Beas. Sikh farmers

regarded these waters as theirs by right. The issue was optimum

17 The full text of these twelve resolutions is contained in the Draft of the New Policy Programme of
the Shiromani Akali Dal, 6-15.
18 Ibid.

253
harnessing of existing water resources but to the Sikh farmers this

meant stealing his water and giving it to the new state of Haryana and

to the state of Rajasthan. Though there was no immediate shortage

Resolution 2 (d) of the Ludhiana Resolution stated that “arbitrary and

unjust award given by Mrs. Indira Gandhi during the Emergency on

the distribution of the Ravi-Beas waters should be revised on the

universally accepted norms and principles, thereby justice be done to

Punjab.”19

It must be remembered that the Janata government’s tenure

(1977-79) was replete with instances of non-Congress ministries

demanding more powers for the states. The Akali Dal’s demands were

supposed to be a reflection of this trend. With the reversal of power

equations and the reimposition of President’s Rule in Punjab in

February 1980, followed by the installation of the Congress (I) Darbara

Singh ministry in June 1980, the Akali Dal once again resorted to the

path of exclusivist politics.

Thus from the above discussion we may attempt to provide an

idea, in a nutshell, of the trajectory the crisis in Punjab had taken.

From the mid-sixties, after the creation of the Punjabi suba to the

early seventies, the problem in Punjab was non-specific in one

fundamental sense — it was more a demand for greater autonomy to

states, like in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal or Andhra Pradesh. The shift

in the character of the problem occurred from around the late 1970s

and early 1980s. Its specificity lay in the gradual merging of state

19 Ibid, 8.

254
autonomy demands with the aggravation of the crisis of Sikh identity

and the manifestation of these in the shape of a distorted nationality

consciousness based on chauvinistic communalism and extreme

sectarian violence, as will be evident in the analysis in a subsequent

section.

THE PUNJAB PROBLEM: SOME INTERPRETATIONS

Veiy few issues since the Emergency in India (1975-77) have

commanded so much attention and evoked such passionate reactions

as developments in Punjab during 1980-84, culminating in Operation

Bluestar in June 1984. These developments generated a plethora of

interpretations which were neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Broadly,

these interpretations could be divided into four general categories.

First, the role of Mrs. Gandhi’s leadership and the collapse of the

Congress party. There has been a tendency to hold Mrs. Gandhi

personally responsible for Punjab’s political turmoil. The second line

of interpretation tended to view Punjab’s civil disorder as essentially a

matter of federal politics, that is, as a centre-state conflict. A third line

sought to highlight the economic origins of the conflict. This category

would also include the Marxist interpretations of the Punjab problem.

The fourth kind of thinking obliquely tended to put the responsibility

on the Sikhs themselves.

Mrs. Gandhi’s role had been emphasized by writers who argued

that she deliberately created a “Punjab problem” in order to exploit it.

Her reluctance to resolve the Akali agitation, it was alleged, was part

255
of a calculated strategy to divide the Akalis into moderates and

extremists while cultivating sympathy amongst a predominantly

Hindu electorate with a view to winning the next national elections.20

They wrote, “In its essence, the Punjab problem became Mrs. Gandhi’s

war against the Akali party which had offered the stiffest resistance to

her during the Emergency and had collaborated with the Janata

regime. The Akali party was moreover threatening the Congress (I)

fortress of the Hindu belt, except in Maharashtra outside the belt, the

party had little following and no power. Punjab would lead to falling

dominoes. Since the Akalis could not be defeated electorally in Punjab

the thing to do was to split its support base from within.”21 Kothari

and Deshingkar maintained that the problem of Sikh identity,

however, was not the creation of Congress (I). The problem had an

independent existence and independent growth but argued that it was

Mrs. Gandhi’s style of politics in the post-Emergency period, which

deliberately let it grow and assume the menacing dimension that it did

during the 1980s. In a scathing indictment on Mrs. Gandhi’s post-

Emergency and post-Janata strategy, Kothari and Deshingkar pointed

out that it was to create seemingly acute crisis in one area after

another and then emerge as the saviour, as the leader to whom there

was no alternative. The attempt was to psychologically hijack the

country’s political process in the direction of heroic actions away from

20 Rajni Kothari and Giri Deshingkar, ‘Punjab: The Longer View’ in The Illustrated Weekly of
India (July 15,1984), 20-23.
21 Ibid, 21.

256
negotiating, power sharing and fair play which in turn meant the

abolition of politics itself.

Mark Tully and Satish Jacob have chronicled how Mrs.

Gandhi reneged on agreements with the Akalis showing Mrs. Gandhi

as an indecisive leader who repeatedly failed to negotiate a settlement

with the Akali leadership during her final tenure.22 Recounting the

breakdown of talks between Mrs. Gandhi and the Akalis in April 1982,

Tully and Jacob wrote, “The most obvious explanation for the change

in Mrs. Gandhi’s attitude is that politics came before statesmanship.

The following month (May 1982) elections to the state assemblies were

due in Haryana and in the Himalayan state of Himachal Pradesh,

which also borders on Punjab. Both states have sizeable populations

of Punjabi speaking Hindus who would certainly not have favoured

concessions to the party of the Sikhs.”23 So Tully and Jacob, like

Kothari and Deshingkar, singled out the primacy of electoral

considerations in Mrs. Gandhi’s scheme of politics. Throughout 1983

and 1984 Mrs. Gandhi’s attempts to arrive at acceptable solutions

proved elusive. Tully and Jacob noted that by May 1984 Mrs.

Gandhi’s own political predicament was clear. They wrote, “The people

of India were losing faith in her capacity to act. She was supposed to

have virtually admitted this in her broadcast to the nation, when she

said ‘Punjab is uppermost in all our minds. The whole country is

deeply concerned. The matter has been discussed and spoken about

22 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle (New Delhi: Rupa, 2006)
Particularly Chapters 6 and 7.
23 Ibid, 79.

257
time and again. Yet an impression has been assiduously created that

it has not been dealt with.”24

The second line of interpretation was a corollary to the first one

as it treated the Punjab problem as a political conflict, namely a

centre-state conflict, consequent upon Mrs. Gandhi’s over­

centralization of the Indian polity. The most notable observation in

this category came from Paul Brass. According to Brass, “Although the

Government of India did preside successfully over the satisfactory

resolution of complex and difficult linguistic, religious and other

minority conflicts, several others were left unresolved, of which some

became worse, and one “new” (but really old) problem cropped up.”25

The problems left unresolved concerned the status of minorities in the

linguistically reorganized states, Hindu-Muslim relations, migrant-

native conflicts in some parts of the country and the conclusion of the

reorganization of Punjab. Brass regarded the Punjab problem, in

effect, to be an old problem that had emerged in the late 1970s as a

part of the movement for increased regional autonomy. During 1982-

84 the old problem of Indian unity had reached a new period of crisis

particularly in the context of what Brass perceived to be changed

centre-state relations. Actually fundamental changes in centre-state

relations and in the general process by which power was aggregated in

India occurred during Mrs. Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister. Brass

reasoned that those changes occurred because for the first time the

24 Ibid, 143.
23 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Chapter 5.

258
dominant position of the Congress and the authority of its new leader,

Mrs. Gandhi, were challenged in 1967. In the process of consolidating

her power Mrs. Gandhi took several actions that led to significant

transformations in the character of centre-state relations. The overall

impact of such actions emitted a clear indication that the boundaries

between central and state politics had been obliterated, that state

politics no longer mattered in their own right. The autonomy of state

politics was no longer there. The complexity of the Punjab situation in

the 1980s, according to Brass, therefore was a function of the changes

that Mrs. Gandhi herself brought about such as centralization of

power, nationalisation of issues and increasing intervention in state

politics.26

Atul Kohli’s arguments about the nature of the Punjab problem

need to be located in his attempts to explore the causes of India’s

growing problems of govemability.27 Of the several factors identified by

Kohli in his study of contemporary political turmoil, one crucial factor

was the decay of the Congress party during the 1970s and 1980s. In

Kohli’s assessment, organisational decline within the Congress party

under Mrs. Gandhi contributed to the erosion of local authority. He

noted that Punjab’s complex and tragic civil disorder was rooted in the

political conflict between Mrs. Gandhi and the Akali Dal. In trying to

offer an explanation as to why it became such a vexed problem during

1980-84, Kohli wrote, “It is clear that Mrs. Gandhi’s narrow partisan

26 Ibid, 170-171.
27 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Govemability (U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 22-23.

259
concerns were important causal ingredients in Punjab’s tragic turmoil.

Many innocent lives would have been saved if Indira had put the

larger concern for the public good ahead of concern for her own and

Congress’s electoral fortunes. In retrospect, therefore, there is little

doubt that a more self-assured or more enlightened leader could have

put the evolving conflict in Punjab on a different track.”28 From the

above it is clear that Kohli singled out Mrs. Gandhi’s leadership which

placed ‘narrow partisan concerns,’ meaning electoral calculations,

before the greater concern for the public good, as being responsible for

the problem in Punjab. Such an analysis would seem to exonerate the

Akali leadership of any fault but Kohli did add that the transformation

of moderate Akali demands into militant terrorism pointed to the

failure of the moderate Akali leadership too.

Javeed Alam, a self-professed non-expert on Punjab, tried to

explore the genesis of the Punjab problem within the macro forces

that characterized Indian polity in general. He reasoned that the

known formulations for understanding regional movements in terms

of regional unevenness of modem economic development have been

inadequate in the case of Punjab primarily for two reasons.29 First, he

said, unlike in Andhra or Tamil Nadu earlier, or West Bengal, the

demand for state autonomy in Punjab had remained more or less

confined to one particular group - those Sikhs who supported the

Akalis. Hindus, in general, according to Alam, were either satisfied

2! Ibid, 362.
29 Jawed Alam, “Political Implications of Economic Conditions in Punjab” in Gopai Singh (Ed.),
Punjab Today (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1987), 77-97.

260
with way the things were or had been openly hostile to even the

secular demands raised by the Akalis. Secondly, the regional-cum-

state autonomy issue in Punjab was not due to Punjab lagging behind

in terms of regional development as such, or Punjab slipping behind

other states over time as was the case with West Bengal. Why then, a

region like Punjab or a community within it such as Sikhs, enjoying

an advantageous position, got in the forefront of raising such

demands? Alam sought to explain it in terms of the phenomenon of

centralization of political power in the 1970s. In his opinion, this had

the effect of stifling natural, vibrant processes of politics and eroding

democratic institutions and undermining institutionalized linkages,

e.g. political parties, between different layers of politics. Such forces,

he felt, were responsible for the aggravation of the Punjab crisis and

the rapid shift in its articulation towards violence and communalism.

As he wrote, “The initial bases of deflection in the mode of articulation

of the regional problem in Punjab have been the efforts of the

centralised state power in India to subvert the more democratic

tendencies and political movements in Punjab.”30

The spate of violence which engulfed the politics of entire

Punjab in the 80s testified to the failure of the administration to check

the deterioration of law and order and also underscored the

consequences of the central government’s adoption of a policy of drift.

This was the argument of Sucha Singh Gill and K. C. Singhal.31 They

30 Ibid, 79.
31 Sucha Singh Gill and K. C. Singhal, “The Punjab Problem: Its Historical Roots” in Economic and
Political Weekly (April 7,1984), 603-608.

261
held that what was essentially a historically necessary demand for

restructuring centre-state relations had been allowed to degenerate

into a divisive communal issue. Their contention was that the Punjab

problem had resulted from a combination of socio-economic and

political factors. They wrote, “.......along with the study of the

economic base, an analysis of the forces of super-structure in the

historical context is required. Most of the people writing on the Punjab

problem emphasise either one or the other aspect.” Gill and Singhal

made a plea for a thorough historical perspective of the socio­

economic structure and principal contradictions of Punjab society.

Only then was it possible to get to the root of the crisis. They noted

that attempts were being made to divide the people on communal

lines, thereby negating the achievements of democratic movements

and class-based secular organizations in Punjab.

Yet another line of thinking appeared sensitive to the issue of

socio-economic changes in hying to explain the origins of the conflict.

Such an argument pointed to growing economic differentiations

among the Sikhs especially in the aftermath of the Green Revolution.32

It was argued that it was the rural Jat Sikh landlords, particularly

from the Malwa region who controlled the Akali Dal and the SGPC.
The agitation led by the Akali Dal reflected a number of underlying

tensions: the Jat Sikhs’ feeling of receiving inadequate returns for

their farm output; the Akali leadership’s frustration at being out of

32 Gopal Singh, “Socio-Economic Bases of the Punjab Crisis” in Economic and Political Weekly
(January 7,1984X42-47.

262
power; the fear of both the Sikh fundamentalist and Akali leadership

of the Sikhs being pushed into a minority position within Punjab by

immigration of Hindu migrant labourers and emigration of Sikhs to

foreign countries; the conflict of interests between the Jat Sikh

landlords on the one hand and the Sikh agricultural labourers, the

scheduled and lower castes on the other, and the conflict of interests

between the Bhapa Sikhs and Hindus in the urban areas as well as

between the Hindu traders and the Jat Sikh peasants.33

An interesting insight on the Punjab problem is found in the

account by M. J. Akbar.34 He traced the roots of the problem to the

evolution of the Sikh’s identity crisis into a minority problem in its

own homeland that is Punjab indicating that the most interesting

phenomenon of the Sikh experience in independent India came in the

late 1960s. It was the impact of prosperity and the wealth generated

by the agricultural revolution that is the Green Revolution that

brought about dramatic changes. These changes, according to Akbar,

were to affect not only Sikh society but also Sikh politics where the

Akali Dal bungled in channelising grievances and charting out the

course of political action particularly after 1967. The Anandpur Sahib

Resolution of 1973, according to Akbar, was the embodiment of the

Akalis’ new programme. He wrote, “All strands of the inter-related

political-religious nexus were rewoven, but the foundation was built

on the same old fear. As the Akali President, Sant Harchand Singh

33 Ibid. Also H. K. Puri, “Akali Agitation: An Analysis of the Socio-Economic Basis of Protest” in
Economic and Political Weekly (January 22, 1983), 113-118.
34 M. J. Akbar, India: the Siege within: Challenges to a Nation’s Unity (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2003),
104-209.

263
Longowal said in an explanatory pamphlet, sent later to Members of

Parliament, the root cause was the genuine foreboding that, like

Buddhism and Jainism earlier, the Sikhs may also lose their identity

in the vast ocean of overwhelming Hindu majority.5,35

Akbar explained that towards the end of the 70s, a feeling had

begun to grow that since independence, minorities had been

pampered at the cost of the Hindu majority. The charge of

appeasement for electoral gain was brought particularly against the

Congress which had always sought the vote of the minorities. In

Akbar’s analysis, it was this perception that influenced Mrs. Gandhi’s

decision-making in the post-1980 spell.36 Mrs. Gandhi began to

believe that there was bound to be a “Hindu backlash” against any

further ‘pampering’ of the minorities. He concluded that, “Mrs. Gandhi

did not, therefore have a Punjab policy, she had a minority’s policy
which she extended to two minority states: Punjab and Jammu and

Kashmir.”37 So in Punjab, instead of cooperating with the Akalis to

isolate the Sikh extremists, Delhi wittingly or unwittingly fell prey to

the machinations of extremism and violence.

Deeply anguished at the events unfolding in Punjab,

Khushwant Singh, a respected Sikh historian and journalist, held the

Akali leadership responsible for the turmoil. He wrote, “I hold the

Akali leaders chiefly responsible for the Hindu-Sikh divide and the

sorry pass to which they have brought their community. They are a

35 Ibid, 178.
36 Ibid, 197-198.
37 iu:j

264
shortsighted, self-seeking group of men of limited political ability and

lack of foresight with a penchant for overplaying the game of

brinkmanship. They knew or should have known before they launched

their many agitations-Nahar Roko, Rasta Roko, Kaam Roko and the

Dharma Yuddha Morcha, that far from being discriminated against,

Sikhs enjoyed privileges far beyond those warranted by the proportion

of their population. They knew or should have known that the only

hope of regaining political power was through some sort of an alliance

with either the Congress or one of the opposition parties. Nevertheless

by their thoughtless actions they alienated the sympathies of both the

Congress and the opposition parties and by their intemperate

utterances made Sikhs’ loyalties to the country suspect in the eyes of

most Indians. It was the Akalis who reduced Sikhs, who were looked

upon as more than first class citizens of India, to be regarded as less

than third class. Two men who played most sinister roles in this

drama were Jhathedar G.S.Tohra, President of the SGPC and his rival

colleague, Jagdev Singh Talwandi.”38

Scholarly accounts in general have shied away from assigning

direct blame to the Sikhs, but this theme is important in providing

another dimension to understanding the Punjab problem. Kuldip

Nayar, an eminent journalist and political observer, had pointed out,

“the roots of the trouble (in Punjab) lie in the formation of the Punjabi

speaking state - the language of both the Hindus and the Sikhs of

38 Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Bluestar and After (New Delhi:
Vision Books, 1984), 12.

265
Punjab. This was despite the warning of the States Reorganisation

Commission, 1955; “The proposed state will solve neither the language

problem nor the communal problem and far from removing internal

tension, which exists between communal and not linguistic and

regional groups, it might further exacerbate the existing feelings.”39

Nayar had hoped that the creation of the Punjabi speaking state

would have encouraged the Akalis to instill confidence and faith

amongst the Hindus who were against it from the beginning and had

fears about being reduced to a minority in the new state. But the

Akalis had chosen to confine their activities to the Sikhs and did not

really make any effort to admit Hindus into their fold.

Finally, there are the Marxist interpretations which mainly

attempted to identify the interactions of three related issues: the

‘national question’, the impact of economic policies on the emergence

of social classes and the role of the Indian state.40 It was pointed out

that most Marxist accounts of the Punjab problem proceeded from the

process of nationality formation in India as an integral part of the

development of capitalism.41 In this regard, the assessments of the

Punjab crisis by the two communist parties could be relevant. In CPI’s

analysis, the Punjab crisis was the result of the economic

contradictions generated by the Green Revolution in the overall

39 Ibid, 8.
40 Gurharpal Singh, “Understanding die Punjab Problem* in Asian Survey (December, 1987),
1274-1275.
41 Ibid.

266
context of the growing crisis of the capitalist path in India.42 The CPI

believed that the deepening crisis of capitalism in India had brought a

lot of suffering to the common man. Increasing poverty and

unemployment generated social conflicts, which in turn had given rise

to regional disputes and communal clashes in many parts of the

country. The Punjab crisis fitted in the general pattern of the overall

crisis of the capitalist route in India, which was further aggravated by

the sharp power struggle between the Congress (I) and the Akali Dal

and secessionist propaganda.43 The CPM’s assessment of the political

crisis in Punjab identified the “selfish and anti-people policies” of the

Congress (I) government as responsible for the turmoil. It believed the

Congress had always perpetuated and exploited communal divisions

in the population of the state for its narrow partisan ends.44 This was

true of the manner in which the Punjabi-speaking state was formed.

Later on, the policy of drift adopted by Mrs. Gandhi towards the Akali

agitation was meant to serve the narrow sectarian interests of the

Congress.45

The variety of interpretations testifies to the fact that the Punjab

problem had been one of post-independent India’s most complex and

vexing problems. From the discussion in the preceding pages, we may

very briefly highlight the main themes in the arguments of the

different scholars.

42 Jasmail Singh Brar, “Punjab Situation Today: Position of Communist Parties” in Gopal Singh (EcL),
Punjab Today, 247.
*3 'jao

45 Harkishan Singh Suijeet, Deepening Punjab Crisis, 63-68.

267
 Mrs. Gandhi’s role in the Punjab problem and its subsequent

aggravation because of her political style has been one significant

theme. The other crucial theme has been the quality of centre-state

relations and its direction in the 1980s of which the Punjab problem

was a manifestation. The “identity crisis” theme was also a significant

angle of discussion for the causes and consequences of the Punjab

problem. The economic dimension of the issue in the light of the

effects of the Green Revolution and its impact on the power equations

of different classes in the Sikh community was yet another theme.

In the next section, we will attempt to understand Mrs. Gandhi’s

association with the Punjab problem and how she handled the

situation as Prime Minister and leader of the nation.

MRS. GANDHI AND THE PUNJAB PROBLEM

Mrs. Gandhi’s association with the Punjab issue dated back to

1966, when on becoming Prime Minister, she acceded to the creation

of a separate Punjabi-speaking state of Punjab that year, despite

strong reservations expressed earlier by Nehru during his prime

ministership.46 Hence this political decision of Mrs. Gandhi had

reflected a clear departure from her predecessors who had insisted on

46 The demand for a Punjabi-speaking state had been refused on grounds that here language was
dangerously allied with religion; that what was presented as “Punjabi suba” was in feet a “Sikh suba”, a
pretext for what could even become a separate nation of the Sikhs. See Ramachandra Guha, India after
Gandhi: the History ofthe World's Largest Democracy (India: Picador, 2007), 320-321.

268
preserving the old Punjab even though most other states had been

organized along linguistic lines.47

A Punjabi-suba was formed in November 1966 with 41 percent

of the area of former Punjab and 55 percent of the total population.

This struggle, as Paul Brass was to remark, “finally established an

undesirable nexus between the Punjab and the Sikh consciousness.”48

The reorganization of Punjab brought about far-reaching changes in

the demographic and political structure of the state. The reorganized

state, in which the Sikhs constituted a majority of more than 62

percent of population, opened for the Akali Dal an opportunity to

capture power.

But as we have pointed out in the first section of this chapter,

the creation of the Punjabi-speaking state of Punjab itself did not

bring about the desired peace, for the failure to complete the Punjabi-

suba settlement came to be an objective basis for the oft-repeated

claims of the Akalis that the Sikhs were discriminated against.49

Another significant cause for the Akali Dal’s disappointment was that

they realized they could not hope to be the natural party of power in

Punjab, for the Sikh vote was split, and as stated earlier, it could only

form government in coalition with other parties. So in order to

maintain their support bases while out of office, the Akalis were

47 Eleven linguistic states were created by the States Reorganisation Act (1955): They were Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Mysore, Orissa, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan, Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh. Bombay and Punjab were retained as bi-Iingual states at the time. In 1959, during Mrs.
Gandhi’s tenure as AICC President, Bombay was divided into two states-Maharashtra and Gujarat See
Chap n, Sec I of this dissertation.
48 Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North-India (New Delhi: Vikas, 1974), 433-434.
49 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 176.

269
reported to have revived the sense of Sikh grievances by resorting to

agitational politics.50

It would be relevant here to briefly recount the nature of Sikh

agitational politics vis-a-vis Mrs. Gandhi’s political agenda in the

1970s. The Punjab issue acquired a definitive dimension through the

adoption of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 which was

instrumental in articulating those Sikh demands that would

overwhelm the entire political process in India during the first half of

the 1980s.

The first few years of Mrs. Gandhi’s prime ministership during

the late 1960s was dominated by her efforts to consolidate her

position within the government and the Congress Party. As Bhagwan

D. Dua, a well known political commentator, had observed, “Mrs.

Gandhi became Prime Minister in the most difficult of circumstances.

Besides the general deterioration of the country’s economic situation

after the Indo-Pak war of 1965, she had to deal with the enormous

egos of the Congress bosses, who regarded her as no more that a ‘stop

gap’ prime minister.”51 During her struggle for the control over the

government and party during 1966-71, she had pledged to create a

strong central rule that would be free from the evils of bossism.52 The

new political process which Mrs. Gandhi created turned out to be

more highly centralised and personalised and less institutionalised

50 Such a view was expressed by Mark Tully and Satish Jacob in Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle,
43. Also Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis ofGovemability, 57-58.
51 Bhagwan D. Dua, “India: A Study in the Pathology of a Federal System,” in Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (November, 1981), 257-273.
52 Mrs. Gandhi brought about tile split in the Congress in November 1969 (Chapter II above) to usher
in a new era and the 1971 election (Chapter EH above) legitimised her promise. ’

270
than Nehru’s.53 In the process of consolidating her power, as has

been noted earlier, Mrs. Gandhi took several actions that led to

significant changes in the character of centre-state relations. These

included the delinking of parliamentary from assembly elections in

1971 and the establishment of a new pattern of selection of chief

ministers for most of the Congress-ruled states by the Prime Minister

herself in consultation with her personal advisors in New Delhi.54 Mrs.

Gandhi’s use of federal resources (particularly in the area of inter­

state boundary disputes, location of capital projects, allotment of

discretionary financial grants) in the way she did, she ruined the

support base of all those chief ministers who were not in line with her.

All this was done to get a foothold in state politics. Mrs. Gandhi’s

experience with the Syndicate seniors during 1966-69 had taught her

that to remain in power at the centre, one had to control the states.55

Hence after her victory in the 1971 polls she made control over the

states a critical factor in her strategy. Rather than the

institutionalization of party process there was an institutionalization

of the means of central intervention in state politics. At about the

53 According to Kochanek, such a political process was marked by there featees: first, it involved an
unprecedented centralization of power in the party and the government, with the Prime Minister at the top of the
decision-making pyramid; second. Mrs. Gandhi tried to modify the federal character of the party and the
government by strengthening their unitary tendencies and thereby reinforcing the centralization of power, and
third, she unsuccessfully tried to change the support base of the Congress from above by recruiting under­
represented sections of society, such as youth, women, minorities, backward tribes and castes and the poor into all
party organizations and into the Congress legislative parties. See Stanley A. Kochanek, “Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid:
The New Congress,” in Henry C. Hart (Ed.) Indira Gandhi’s India: A Political System Reappraised (Boulder
West View Press, 1976), 95.
54 Such incidents have been reported in innumerable case studies of state politics. One such study is by
Craig Baxter,’The Rise and Fall of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh’ in Myron Weiner and
John Osgoodfield (Eds.) Study in Electoral Politics in Indian States, Vol. 4, Party Systems and
Cleavages (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975), 113-138.
33 J.D. Sethi, India in Crisis (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975) 102. According to Sethi, after
her political supremacy was established, Mrs. Gandhi opted for the elimination of strongmen in the
states, and replaced them by nondescript nominees. This brought a temporary halt to the clashes
inherent in a power struggle but did not change the underlying relations.

271
same time, studies focusing on emergent nationalism in India

identified that the growth of powers of the centre was to a great extent

due to the inability or unwillingness of state leaders to take major

decisions by themselves.56
Moreover regional attempts to capture power were not

successful for the coalitions against the Congress were not really built

up as alternative centers of power - no ideological issues bound up

the coalitions together. Even after the Congress split of 1969 the

Congress monolith held sway over state politics to such an extent that

despite the emergence of regional power centers, or state political

parties, these had been with the tacit approval of the central power

bloc.

It was in this emerging political scenario that events in Punjab

took place and was not unique in the context of state politics in India.

The fourth general elections of 1967 witnessed the ascendance of

several regional parties to power. The emergence of the Akali Dal as an

important political force in Punjab in 1967 could be traced then to the

overall anti-Congress wave. The Akali Dal formed government in

reorganised Punjab with the Congress being forced into the opposition

for the first time since independence. The Akali Dal was riven with
factionalism and its term as a party in power in coalition with the

Jana Sangh and other non-Congress parties was characterized by

intra-party conflicts between different factions.

56 Harish K. Puri, “Centre-State Relations in India: A Review of Sarkaria Commission Report” in

Punjab Journal ofPolitics, Vol. 13, Nos. 1 and 2,1989,33-34. Also, Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction and
Party in Indian Politics, Vol. I (New Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1984). Horst Hartman, Political
Parties in India, (New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1977).

272
 When Mrs. Gandhi swept the Lok Sabha elections of 1971 the

Akali Dal was completely routed winning only 1 seat as against the

Congress’s 10. The Akali Dal-led government of Prakash Singh Badal

in Punjab was dissolved in June 1971 following intra-party

conspiracies. The victory of the Congress in the Punjab Assembly

elections in 1972 saw the Congress Party return to power and install a

majority government led by Giani Zail Singh. This development

presented a new challenge to the Akali Dal. According to Paul Brass,

there seemed to be two alternative courses before the Akali Dal then.

He said, “It can escalate Sikh demands even further and demand still

another kind of political unit, or it can once and for all adjust its

political goals to the realities of political life in the Punjabi-suba and

seek power by broadening its own social base and ethnic base or by

coalescing with other political groups.”S7 From 1973 the Akali Dal

chose the first alternative and accordingly adopted in October 1973

the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.58 By one reading the Anandpur Sahib

Resolution merely sought to make real the promise of states’

autonomy hinted at by the Constitution. But the Resolution was

amenable to more dangerous interpretations as we have indicated in

Section I of this chapter. Perhaps 1973 was not the best of time to

make these demands with Mrs. Gandhi riding high on the wave of a

war recently won (1971) and the centre made more powerful than ever

57 Paul Brass, Language, Religion and Polities in North India, 433-434.

58 The Anandpur Sahib Resolution has been discussed in Section I of this chapter.

273
before. Its powers were increased still further with the Emergency of

1975 when thousands of Akalis were imprisoned.

It must be emphasized in this connection that the five-year term

of the Congress government during 1972-77 was crucial for an

understanding of Mrs. Gandhi’s handling of the Punjab crisis in the

1980s. As noted, Mrs. Gandhi had made control over the states a

critical factor in her political strategy. The victory of the Congress in

the Punjab assembly elections in 1972 was Mrs. Gandhi’s opportunity

to control Punjab and Zail Singh’s tenure was consciously used to

enhance the party’s appeal among the Sikhs. The extent of state

sponsored religiosity that Zail Singh unleashed to wean away sections

of the Sikh population from the Akalis, who claimed to be their only

custodians has been recounted above. What was obvious was his

design to widen and legitimize the Congress base among the Sikhs.

The moderate Akalis found themselves on the defensive in the

religiously charged atmosphere in Punjab. The Emergency in 1975

saw the Akali Dal behind bars and its failure to become a party of

governance was alleged to have been engineered by the Congress.59

This period was witness to the growth of religious fundamentalism in

the state that would define and determine the path of agitational

politics in the 1980s. Though there are various interpretations

59 According to Paul Brass, Congress had penetrated the Akali Dal by dividing it and giving support to
dissident tactions within it The Congress had recruited its own leaders from Akali ranks, including
such prominent persons as P.S. Kairon, Swaran Singh, Zail Singh and others. See Paul R. Brass,
Ethnicity and Nationalism, 177. Also Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India, 104-105.

274
regarding this gradual turn in Sikh politics, some accounts,60 and

moderate Akalis believed this phenomenon emerged due to the

encouragement given by the Congress Chief Minister to obscure

religious teachers and religious rites in an effort to discredit the Akalis

and broaden the Congress base. But the most notable feature of the

Zail Singh period from the point of view of Punjab politics lay in what

was not done. In the words of Brass, “No efforts whatsoever were

made to undercut the Akali Dal by resolving in a way acceptable to

Punjab regional interests the major outstanding issues left unresolved

at the creation of the Punjabi suba in 1966, namely, the disposition of

the city of Chandigarh, and the tehsils of Abohar and Fazilka, and the

issue of distribution of Ravi-Beas river waters.”61

In the meantime the Emergency was lifted and fresh elections

were announced in March 1977. The Congress was defeated in a

historic election and the Akalis were swept back to power in the

Janata wave. In 1978 the Akalis recast the objectives of the Anandpur

Sahib Resolution (1973) with greater emphasis on federal

restructuring in Ludhiana in October 1978.62 But despite being a

partner in the government of Punjab between 1977-79, the Akalis did

60 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle, 57; Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and
Nationalism, 191; Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi, 559, and A. S. Narang, Punjab Politics in
National Perspective, 143.
61 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 186. Also Lok Sabha Debates, Second Session of Seventh
Lok Sabha, Vols.2-3,25.03.80.
62 The Anandpur Sahib Resolution as approved by the Akali Dal Working Committee was not placed
before the conference. Instead, twelve resolutions were adopted in die ‘light’ of the Anandpur Sahib
Resolution. The operative Resolution I was moved by G.S. Tohra and endorsed by Prakash Singh
BadaJL, die then Chief Minister of Punjab. The pro-Akali mass circulated Punjabi daily, Ajit, carried on
a series of articles “clarifying” that these resolutions gave the real meaning and content of the
Anandpur Sahib Resolution. See A. C. Kapur, The Punjab Crisis, 202-203. Also The Draft of the New
Policy Programme ofShiromani Akali Dal, 6.

275
nothing about implementing the Anandpur Sahib Resolution beyond

‘emphatically urging’ the Janata government at the centre, of which

they were also a part, to recast the constitutional structure of the

country on real and meaningful federation principles.63

With the collapse of the Janata experiment at the centre Mrs.

Gandhi was re-elected to power in 1980. She went to dismiss many of

the state governments controlled by the opposition. Punjab was one of

them; so when assembly elections were held in May 1980, the Akali

Dal was routed and lost power. In Mrs. Gandhi’s perception then the

Akalis had lost popular support and she had it. She decided to use

her position of advantage to launch a political offensive and

consolidate her position vis-a-vis the Akalis. Her attempts to keep the

Akalis out of power after 1980 and the Akalis repeated attempts to win

back Punjab constituted a normal political conflict. The power

struggle involving the centre and a regional party was not all that

unusual.64

What then caused the normal conflict to become such a violent

threat to the nation’s basic political fabric during the 1980s?

According to Balraj Puri, “The dismissal of the Akali-led government in

Punjab in 1980 can be held to be the immediate and direct cause of

the present phase of the crisis in the state. For it fully and finally

demonstrated that in normal times and under the prevalent system,

the Sikhs could not aspire for an effective share in political power

63 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle, 51.
64 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent, 354.

276
through the instrument of the Akali Dal. No heart-searching was done

to modify the instrument to meet the requirements of the system. The

Anandpur Sahib Resolution again seemed to provide the answer.”65

Two things were evident in the above statement. One, Mrs. Gandhi’s

act of dismissing the Akali government in Punjab in 1980 marked a

critical step in the ongoing crisis and two, the Anandpur Sahib

Resolution would be a basis for addressing the main issues in the

crisis. Dipankar Gupta, the noted sociologist, remarked that any

attempt to comprehend the problem of eontemporaiy Punjab would

have to begin by first accepting the reality that a new minority

consciousness had emerged.66 In which case neither the ethnicised

history of the community, such as the Sikhs, nor the mere existence

of a communal party like the Akali Dal could explain singly or jointly

the specificity of the new phenomenon. It was however in the light of

this new minority consciousness that the Anandpur Sahib Resolution

came to mean so much in the years following 1980. While conceding

that the problem of Sikh identity vis-a-vis minority consciousness was

not the creation of the Congress (I), distinguished political scientists,

Kothari and Deshingkar had attributed its deliberate growth to the

new political style that Mrs. Gandhi embodied post 1980.67 This new

political style, according to them, served one purpose: to decimate all

threats to the power of the ruling coterie and to project the Prime

65 Balraj Puri, “Understanding Punjab” in Economic and Political Weekly (July 21,1984), 1127.
66 Dipankar Gupta, “The Communalising of Punjab: 1980-1985”, in Economic and Political Weekly
(July 13, 1985), 1185-1190. Also LokSabha Debates, Vols. 21-23, Seventh Session of Seventh Lok
Sabha, 25.11.81. A pervasive restlessness in Punjab on account of this was noted.
67 Rajni Kothari and Giri Deshingkar, “Punjab: The Longer View”, 22.

277
Minister as the supreme.68 For Mrs. Gandhi the Punjab issue

remained a war against the Akali Dal which constituted the real

electoral threat in Punjab. Mrs. Gandhi had expressed sharp

disapproval of the Akalis for not raising its demands when it was

sharing power with the Janata at the centre and the state.69 She said,

“.... This problem (in Punjab) came up before me about two years

back. My government came into power in 1980. I should like to

remind you that the people who are today agitating and making

demands were in power in Punjab for three years earlier. During those

three years, they had two ministers of their own in the Central

Government and their allies were in power in the neighbouring states.

Thus during those three years they had all the opportunities to resolve

their problems and meet their own demands. However they did not

raise their voice then.”

Mrs. Gandhi also remembered that the Akalis had offered the

stiffest resistance to her during the Emergency and had shown that its

concerns were political and transcended Sikh interests. It had also

collaborated with the Janata regime in a bid to present itself as an

electoral alternative to the Congress but Mrs. Gandhi apparently

devised a strategy to divide the Akalis.70 Such a strategy did work with

the desired results. During the last four years after the Congress came

back to power, more and more of the Akali ranks moved over to

68 Ibid, 21.
69 Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi: January 1982-October 1984 (New Delhi:
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1986), 50.
70 Rajni Kothari and Giri Deshingkar, “Punjab: The Longa- View’, 21.

278
Bhindrawale’s camp and terrorism grew in the process as did the

communalization of Punjab politics.71

At this point two parallel factors were at play. The majority of

elected legislators in Punjab after the 1980 elections were Sikhs but

not Akalis. But by 1982 Sikh opinion had begun to give the Akali Dal,

what Dipankar Gupta called, “source credibility.”72 According to

Gupta, source credibility occurs “once an individual or an

organization wins absolute credibility on certain issues; thereafter that

individual or organization is deemed in the public eye as a source of

unimpeachable credibility such that its other pronouncements are

subscribed to without scrutiny.”73 In the light of the above, the

increasing ‘source credibility’ of the Akali Dal could be traced to two

factors. First, according to Gupta, was the apparent transparent

honesty of the Akali demands. Chandigarh, the Akali Dal had

demanded, should be given to Punjab as it was built as the capital of

Punjab at a site where the majority language was Punjabi. The Akalis

further urged that disputes over water and territory be handed over to

superior adjudicating bodies, and that the Dal would accept the

71 The Congress succeeded in sharpening the conflicts in the Akali Dal. In due course, the Talwandi
and the Sukhjinder Singh groups broke away from Akali Dal and spearheaded separate agitations
which were very militant and verged on extremism. The Dal Khalsa too indulged in violent activities.
On account of tremendous pressure from the militant and extremist groups subsequently the main Akali
Dal of Longowal was persuaded to fell in line with them. The extremism and the Akali Dal’s
compliance with it received impetus from the bias of economic planners in favour of the urban areas as
against the rural ones. In Punjab this rural discontent started taking a militant form under
Bhindranwale. The essence of the subsequent turmoil in Punjab was the conflict of economic interests
of two sections of the ruling bloc: the rich farmers and die big bourgeoisie leading to rural-urban
dichotomy. But it acquired the form of the Sikh struggle against die Indian state because the farmers in
Punjab were largely Sikhs. See A. S. Narang, Punjab Politics in National Perspective, 143.
72 Dipankar Gupta, “The Communalising of Punjab: 1980-1985,” 1187-1188.
73 Ibid, 1188.

279
decision of these bodies.74 In Gupta’s opinion, the second factor that

enhanced the Dal’s credibility was the fact that the Congress never

squarely faced these Akali demands. He said that the centre put off

any consideration of major issues by (i) calling the Anandpur Sahib

Resolution ‘secessionist’ (ii) by withdrawing from the Supreme Court

the case the Akalis had filed on water disputes in 1978 and (iii) by

linking Abohar and Fazilka with Chandigarh. The implication of this

last mentioned consideration was rather complex and the Congress (I)

could have responded to its position more openly. Though none of the

major issues raised by the Akali Dal could be described as ethnic or

communal, the Congress (I) insisted on communalizing these demands

by raising the bogey of Sikh separatism thereby undermining the

moderates in the Akali Dal. This also struck a responsive chord

among the Hindus who were increasingly becoming restive with the

forebodings of another impending partition.

This revealed a lack of political sense and direction on Mrs.

Gandhi’s part. By adopting an aggressive posture of mobilising and

consolidating her support base among Hindus in Punjab, she

displayed a sense of panic that was bred due to a feeling of political

uncertainty and insecurity. It was noted that a significant change

became visible in the 1980s in the Congress policy under Mrs.

Gandhi’s leadership.75 Instead of countering the charge of catering to

the minorities made by the fundamentalists, Mrs. Gandhi fell prey to

74 The Draft ofthe New Policy Programme of the Shiromani Akali Dal, 7-8.
75 Bonita Aleaz, “The Duality in the Sikh Identity and its Communal Repercussions” in Rakhahari
Chatteiji (Ed.) Religion, Politics and Communalism: The South Asian Experience (New Delhi: South
Asian Publishers, 1994), 99.

280
such allegations and came to believe that her pacific attitude towards

the minorities was the reason for her dwindling image. Sikh demands

and their aspirations to rule in Punjab became a test case for the new

minority policy associated with Hindu backlash.76 This was to mark

the beginning of a new kind of politics that would unfold during 1982-

84: that is, the ethnicisation of regional demands.77

With the proliferation of regional and secular movements, the

Congress (I) government of Mrs. Gandhi was faced with political

formations that were hostile to it. In the 1980s it was time for political

retribution and the Congress (1) retaliated ethnically. It ethnicised

secular issues in order to marginalize its opponents from the national

mainstream. The fact that the demarcation of state boundaries was

superimposed by linguistic and/or religious markers provided the

context for the regional political formations to lapse into the ethnic

slot the Congress (1) had created and the Akali Dal lacked the

foresight to blunder straight into it. Mrs. Gandhi’s policy of ethnicising

regional demands in Punjab was obviously aided by the fact that it

was the Akali Dal who was playing the main agitational role. Moreover

the Congress (I) was able to use a communalising catalyst in the

shape of Bhindranwale. Sikh fundamentalism gained salience with the

emergence of Bhindranwale.78The other phenomenon that had

emerged as a significant development in Congress politics in mid-70s

76 Such a view is also held by M. J. Akbar, India: the Siege Within, 197-198.
77 Dipankar Gupta, “The Communalising of Punjab: 1980-85’, 1189. Also Bonita Aleaz, ‘The Duality
in die Sikh Identity and its Communal Repercussions’ 100.
78 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi is Last Battle, Chapter 4. Also A. C. Kapur,
The Punjab Crisis, 242-247.

281
came to be reinforced in the 1980s in Punjab. Sethi called it

“systematic partisan mobilization” - where each faction within the

Congress party, while professing loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi, went about

strengthening itself without caring for the fate of the aggregate.79 The

Punjab problem was aggravated by the infighting of Congress factions

headed by Zail Singh on the one hand and Darbara Singh on the

other. The two were arch rivals in Punjab Congress politics but each

in his own way had demonstrated steadfast loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi

during her darkest days in the Janata period from 1977-1980.80 Both

remained with Mrs. Gandhi when the Congress split once again in

1978 in Punjab and elsewhere in the country. Consequently Mrs.

Gandhi rewarded both Zail Singh and Darbara Singh, with the former

being made Home Minister in the Government of India and the latter

the Chief Minister of Punjab. With this move Mrs. Gandhi had

ensured that she could exert direct control over Punjab and also

expect total allegiance of those whom she placed in charge. But

political and factional differences between the two soon surfaced.

When Darbara Singh became Chief Minister in 1980, he decided to

reverse Zail Singh’s policies and revert to what he perceived to be the

orthodox Congress policy of secularism. Darbara Singh, unlike Zail

Singh and most other Congress politicians, had never been a member

of the Akali Dal. He was bitterly opposed to any compromise with

communalism and adopted a hard-line policy on both Sikh and Hindu

79 J. D. Sethi, India in Crisis, 102.

80 Paul Brass, Ethnicity arid Nationalism, 186-187.

282
extremists.81 On the other hand, Zall Singh, during his tenure as

Punjab’s Chief Minister (1972-77), was known to have advocated a

politics of accommodation with religious communalism rather than

confrontation.82 The ongoing estrangement between these two

Congress leaders of Punjab and their fall out continued to plague

Congress policies in New Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi consulted Zail Singh,

who had by then been elevated to the home ministry, for advice in

handling the disintegrating political situation and failed to provide

support to Darbara Singh’s efforts to root out terrorists by arresting

Bhindmwale and other extremists, and clearing them out of the

Golden Temple Complex.83

The situation in Punjab required decisive action and united

leadership in Delhi and Chandigarh. But Mrs. Gandhi’s methods

proved acutely unsuitable to handle the matter. As Morris-Jones

remarked, “Chief Ministers of states, even if they are of one’s own

party, are not to be pushed around, for if they have emerged on top in
their area they must be men with a real support base. Mrs. Gandhi

sought to impose (on those states where her party won office)

nominees, whose prime qualification was loyalty to her, believing that

her approval should suffice to build support at state level. But not so;
one after another, the retainers failed and every local difficulty became

81 Mark Tally and Satisfa Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle, 65.
82 Pramod Kumar, Manmohan Sharma, Atul Sood and Ashwani Handa, Punjab Crisis: Context and
Trends (Chandigarh: CRRID, 1984), 63-72.
83 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle, 66-70

283
a central headache.”84 And this is what Punjab turned out to be

during 1982-84.

The internal politics of Akali Dal was riven with factionalism

and fragmentation, where the activities of Bhindranwale on the one

hand and the moderate leaders of the Akali Dal on the other, seemed

to be taking place under the cover of the ideal goal of communal

solidarity. Bhindranwale’s ascent in Punjab politics since 1978

confounded the already confused and complex political strife stalking

the state. From this time on Punjab became the scene of warfare

among heavily armed terrorist groups bent on decimating each other

for the glory and purity of the Sikh faith. At first, it must be reiterated

here, this conflict was primarily confined to the Sikhs. It was the

Sikhs who were killed and the issues concerned the solidarity of the

Sikh community and the purity of the faith of those who claimed to be

Sikhs.85 As has been extensively recorded in scholarly analysis of the

Punjab crisis,86 Congress initially saw this sectarian conflict among

Sikhs, which arose independently of party political calculations, as an

opportunity to divide the Akali Dal and to weaken its political control.

Mrs. Gandhi’s political agenda post-1980 of keeping the Akali

Dal out of power started going off the track when Bhindranwale fell

out with Congress in 1981. The Akalis, on the other hand, in trying to

84 W. H. Morris-Jones, “India: More Questions than Answers,” in Asian Survey (August, 1984),
813-814. Bhagwan D. Dua describes this phemenon as ‘patrimonialism’. See Bhagwan DDua,
“Federalism or Patrimonialism: The Making and Unmaking of Chief Ministers in India” in Asian
Survey (August, 1985), 793-804.
85 Sucha Singh Gill and K. C. SinghaL, “The Punjab Problem: Its Historical Roots,” 602-603.
86 Paul Brass, Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Atul Kohli, M. J. Akbar, Rajni Kothari and Giri
Deshingkar et. al.

284
understand their defeat in the 1980 assembly polls had begun

seriously thinking on what had gone wrong. In the words of Kuldip

Nayar, “They believed that their “secular image” during the coalition

with Janata had damaged their equation with the Sikhs, who thought

that ‘their own’ government did little for them. They came to the

conclusion that to get a better image, they must woo the Sikhs. They

must rely on the traditional stand of combining religion with

politics.”87 This soul-searching on the part of the Akali Dal was a

precursor to the changing nature of agitation and methods that the

party would adopt in the next couple of years. Initially the main effort

of the Akali Dal led by Longowal was devoted to maintaining its

political leadership of the Sikh community by pressing long-standing

demands through non-violent agitational movements. But

Bhindranwale’s emergence in Sikh politics had shown that the

moderate space had been usurped by violence and terrorism. Thus in

the midst of terrorist violence extending its grip over Punjab, the Akali

Dal, on July 26, 1981 had submitted a list of demands entitled “key

demands” to the central government. These were a scaled down

version of a set of forty-five demands drawn up earlier.88 So, the

Shiromani Akali Dal launched the “Pharma Yudh” morcha “for the
protection of the religious, economic and political rights of the Punjabi

17 Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy ofPunjab, 38.

88 Mentioned by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal in his Presidential Address delivered in die meeting
of the General House of the Shiromani Akali Dal on November 29, 1983, (Amritsar Shironiani Akali
Dal, 1983), 5.

285
as a whole as enshrined in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.”89 The

Akali Dal’s decision to launch such an agitation against the

government evoked Mrs. Gandhi’s response and she first met the Akali

Dal leaders in October 1981 and then again in November 1981 with

the “water issue” dominating both rounds. The talks were broken

temporarily. From April 1982 onwards the dialogue between Mrs.

Gandhi and the Akali leadership was a litany of postponements,

revised strategies, delays, betrayals and miscommunication. The

breakdown of talks in April 1982 was viewed as a watershed. Kuldip

Nayar wrote, “From that day onward, distance between the

government and the Akalis began to increase. And like a Greek

tragedy, both sides relentlessly slipped into a situation that spelt

disaster.”90

One immediate explanation for this change of attitude on Mrs.

Gandhi’s part was that politics came before statesmanship. Elections

to state assemblies in Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, two states

bordering Punjab, were to be held in May 1982. In Mrs. Gandhi’s

calculation the Congress in Punjab had a base among the Hindus and

they looked towards the centre for protection. After losing their homes

in Pakistan they feared disruption once again at the hands of the

Sikhs. The Akali demands had alienated them further and obviously

Mrs. Gandhi did not want to risk losing their support. Mrs. Gandhi

was moreover acutely conscious of the perception that minorities had

89 Ibid, 3. It is relevant to note here that what started out as a dharma yudh turned out to be a long
drawn out morcha in April 1982.
90 Kuldip Nayar and Khuswant Singh, Tragedy ofPunjab, 50.,

286
been pampered too long at the cost of the Hindu majority. With

elections round the comer, Mrs. Gandhi realized the need to develop a

new political strategy. The Akali Dal too at about the same time

reviewed its strategy. According to Akbar, the Akalis had three options

open to them.91 The first was to work closely with the extremists —

this was supposedly the view of the SGPC President, Gurcharan Singh

Tohra. On the other hand, the former chief minister, Prakash Singh

Badal continued his silent efforts to take the party gradually away

from the militant theocrats completely rejecting Bhindranwale and his

ilk. The President of the Akali Dal, Harchand Singh Longowal, tried to

steer a middle course, depending on the issue involved and the

political environment in which a decision had to be taken.

Nevertheless all the leaders agreed that the party would have to think

of a strategy if it was not to be totally isolated and decided a holy war’

in August 1982 to win realization of the demands listed in the

Anandpur Sahib Resolution.92 Following this, there was a marked

escalation of terrorist violence by Bhindranwale and his men which

created pressure on both the central government and the Akali Dal for

a face-saving conclusion of the Akali morcha.

Both Tully and Jacob, and Nayar and Singh have recounted the

manner in which the Akali Dal leaders were let down twice in

November 1982 at the behest of the intervention of the chief ministers

91 M. J. Akbar, India: the Siege Within, 195.

92 These have been mentioned above. In the light of these developments, the Punjab situation and the
rise in extremist activities came to dominate proceedings in the House. Lok Sabha Debates, Ninth
Session of Seventh Lok Sabha, Vols.29-31. 28.07.82 and 29.07.82.

287
of Haryana and Rajasthan.93 Moreover the impending Asian Games in

December 1982 was an event that completed the alienation of the

Sikhs.94 After the aborted talks of November 4, 1982, Sant Longowal

had announced that the next stage of agitation would involve

disruption of the Asian Games scheduled during November 19 to

December 4, 1982. The government countered this by stringent

security measures which left the Sikhs utterly humiliated.95 That is

why, on the failure of the talks in November 1982, the veteran CPI (M)

leader Harldshan Singh Surjeet wrote, “The responsibility for breaking

the talks does not lie with the Akalis; they had completely demarcated

themselves from the extremists and their slogans. The Akali

leadership has made it clear that it does not support the demand for

Khalistan; nor does it talk of the supremacy of the Sikhs. The policy of

drift followed by the government is no doubt leading to the

strengthening of the hands of extremists.”96

This became a turning point in the volatile Punjab situation. A

political vacuum was enveloping the state and the political process

was in complete disarray. The demand for Khalistan was revived and

found receptive ears. While the Akalis themselves did not demand

93 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle, Chapter 7. Kuldip Nayar and
Khuswant Singh, Tragecfy ofPunjab, 65-66.
94 Ibid.66.
9J The security arrangements introduced during the Asian Games included the proclamation on
November 11 of a temporary ban on large gatherings throughout the capital; a decree prohibiting the
carrying of lethal weapons and die erection of road blocks from mid-November. About 3000 Sikhs
were arrested under preventive detention orders and held until December 7, 1982 while order was
maintained in the Games by about 15,000 Indian Army troops supplementing police and paramilitary
security personnel. Those arrested included on November 23 Mr. Sukhjinder Singh, a former Education
Minister of Punjab and Leader since 1981 of the separatist Sikh League and Mr. Balwant Singh, a
former State Finance Minister. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events VoL
29, (London: Longman, 1983), 32442.
96 Harkishan Singh Suijeet, Deepening Punjab Crisis, 54-56.

288
secession, they maintained an enigmatic silence. They never preached

violence nor separatism but their inability to stand up to

Bhindranwale’s challenge, whatever be the explanation - amounted to

abdication of leadership at a crucial turning point in Sikh history.97

Akbar rightly noted that, “Whatever may have been their

contradictions, whatever their political ploys, they (the Akalis)

understood that this time around, there was a dangerous element to

the confrontation, over which they had no control: the violent, well

armed, well-financed secessionists who were not responsible to

majority Sikh opinion or to reason, were fanatic about their dream.”98

The consecutive failure of the Akali Dal and the central government

throughout 1983 exposed on the one hand the marginalisation of the

moderate Akali leadership and on the other, Mrs. Gandhi’s policy of

“Chanakyan realism.”99 Every time negotiations were to take place,

Mrs. Gandhi reversed her stand, not as an indication of indecisiveness

but for the fear of losing power.100 Gurharpal Singh, in his study of

the Punjab problem, emphasized this line of argument by describing it •

as a “strategy of hegemonic control.”101 He wrote, “Mrs. Gandhi was

bound by the compulsions of national politics and could not entertain

making concessions to Akalis that would have meant dismantling

hegemonic control, of surrendering to the discourse of “autonomy,” of

97 Balraj Puri, “Understanding Punjab,” 1128.

95 M. J. Akbar, India: The Siege Within, 197.
99 Aren Bose, “Diversities in our Politics” Seminar288 (August, 1983), 15-22. Also Interviews,
Kolkata, 08.04.06 and 06.09.06.
100 Henry C. Hart, “Political Leadership in India; Dimensions and Limits” in Atul Kohli (Ed.) India's
Democracy, 41. Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent, 362. Aran Kumar, “Wages of Past Sins,” in
Economic and Political Weekly (July 14,1984), 1076-1077. Also Interview, 03.08.06,
101 Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India, 100-110.

289
“separateness” and the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.”102 Mrs. Gandhi

felt, she could never make political concessions that would undermine

the position of the Congress in the vast north-Indian Hindi regions of

the country. According to Brass, it was not simply a case of concern

that a settlement favourable to the Akali Dal would help that party in

Punjab and harm the Congress in the neighbouring states of Haryana

and Rajasthan, but that the Hindu reaction in the latter two states

would spread to the big states of U.P., Bihar and Madhya Pradesh,

where widespread discontent over concessions to the Sikh minority

could threaten the Congress with defeat in the next parliamentary

elections.103

It is significant to note that Mrs. Gandhi during the negotiations

thought it prudent to concede the Akalis demands concerning minor

religious issues, while leaving unresolved the principal issues

concerning Chandigarh, the status of Abohar, Fazilka and of the

Punjabi-speaking areas left out of the Punjabi-suba and the

distribution of Ravi-Beas waters. All these issues were regional,

secular matters having nothing to do with secessionism. This decision,

on the part of Mrs. Gandhi, revealed a lack of foresight and political

sagacity. To preserve a secular, non-violent political process in Punjab

and in the long term interest of the government it was imperative that

Mrs. Gandhi showed a measure of political accommodation necessary

102 Ibid, 110.

103 Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 204. Moreover, the Congress (I) suffered electoral defeats in
the state assembly elections held in January 1983 in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and
Karnataka and this convinced Mrs. Gandhi of the feasibility of her position to keep the Hindu vote in
toe north in mind. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events Vol. 29, 32131.

290
for national integration. Some commentators attempted to explain

how legitimate and resolvable problems bundled into arguments about

federalism became submerged in the fundamentally irresolvable

demands and ideas associated with separatism and terrorism.104 In

Leafs analysis, what had happened in Punjab in the 1980s was the

progressive disenfranchisement of the middle ground of political

opinion, or the moderates in the political mainstream. Mrs. Gandhi’s

shortcomings of the early 1970s seemed to be relevant in the 1980s

too. The first method, according to Leaf, by which the moderates were

deprived of a political voice, was the use of President’s Rule to topple

state governments unfavourable to central policies. By insisting on a

state government that was loyal to her above all and measuring that

loyalty by lack of objections to her policies, Mrs. Gandhi necessarily

deprived those who favoured alternative policies, of the power to speak

through established government organs with a force appropriate to

their political strengths. The dismissal of the Akali government in

early 1980 was the beginning of the process. The second method of

disenfranchisement was unresponsiveness: the protracted

negotiations between the government and the Aklai Dal revealed

procrastination, partial concessions on minor issues and reluctance or

refusal to concede major Akali demands. Mrs. Gandhi never publicly

acknowledged them as serious or legitimate. The most common

response was to ignore them. The third method by which Mrs. Gandhi

disenfranchised the Punjab mainstream, in Leafs estimation, was the

104 Murray J. Leaf “The Punjab Crisis” in Asian Survey (May, 1985), 491-493.

291
most dangerous. In place of addressing the economic and political

issues, Mrs. Gandhi consistently described the Akali demands to the

West as ‘‘communal’’ and which advocated secessionism and

separatism.105 These combined processes of disenfranchisement

buttressed the frustrations and anger of the Sikhs who were aware of

the misrepresentation of their genuine concerns and in a way were

probably willing to tolerate the likes of Bhindranwale.

Mrs. Gandhi’s handling of the Punjab problem would be

incomplete without reference to two factors: one, the role of her “Think

Tank” - the group of top bureaucrats and ministers who were involved

in crisis management during 1980-84 and second, the role of the

national opposition. First the opposition: in January 1983, the

tripartite talks between the government, the opposition and the Akali

Dal were held at Mrs. Gandhi’s invitation, but these talks were

adjourned on February 20, 1983 inconclusively.106 The national

opposition on June 30, 1983 launched a conclave in New Delhi and

evolved a formula for a settlement of the territorial issues in Punjab

involving the integration of Chandigarh into the state, compensation

for Haiyana in the form of transfer of some other territories and

finance to build a new capital.107 But even this initiative did not find
favour with the government.108 Violence escalated in July 1983; there

105 Ibid, 493. In June 1983, U.S. Secretary' of State Mr. George Schultz, reaffirmed in talks with Mrs.
Gandhi in Delhi, the U.S. support for India’s territorial integrity and unity. See Keesing’s
Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events, Vol.29, 32443.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. It was reported on July 1, 1983 that Bhajan Lai, Chief Minister of Haryana, had said that it was
for Ihe central government to settle the issue and not for the opposition to put forward a formula.

292
was a general strike in August 1983 culminating in the imposition of

President’s rule in October 1983 in an attempt to deal with the threat

of increasing inter-communal violence arising from the agitation.

Among the opposition parties, the CPI at a meeting of its National

Council in New Delhi in September 1983 had overwhelmingly opposed

the idea of adopting a so-called soft-line towards Mrs. Gandhi’s

government. It was alleged that Mrs. Gandhi had written to Mr. Yuri

Andropov, the Soviet President and First Secretary of the Soviet

Communist Party, seeking his assistance in securing CPI support for

her government.109 Relations between the CPI and the Congress (I)

deteriorated further on September 22, 1983 when the CPI General

Secretary, C. Rajeswar Rao said at a press conference in New Delhi

that Mrs. Gandhi was trying to adopt a “soft-line” towards Hindu

communalism.110

The imposition of President’s Rule had failed to stem the tide of

escalating violence. One of the main reasons for the failure was that

neither the Punjab Governor, B.D. Pandey nor the advisors assigned

to him had a free hand in determining the appropriate course of

action.*111*All negotiations and decisions regarding the Punjab impasse

were taken by Mrs. Gandhi and her Think Tank on Punjab. It

comprised three of her most trusted bureaucrats namely, Cabinet

Secretary Krishnaswamy Rao Saheb, Principal Secretary P.C.

Alexander and Home Secretary MMK Wali. Mrs. Gandhi’s son Rajiv
109 Ibid, 32434.
110 Ibid.
111 The Times of India, New Delhi, January 23, 1984. Mark Tully and Saiish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs.
Gandhi’s Last Battle, Chapter 9.

293
Gandhi joined the Think Tank in January 1983. Tully and Jacob

remarked that the “irony was that there was not a single Sikh in the

Think Tank”112 The trio, that is the Prime Minister’s Secretary,

Cabinet Secretary and Home Secretary played a crucial role

throughout the talks. It prepared briefs, kept notes and gave

suggestions. They and the Prime Minister were the constant factors

throughout the negotiations; ministers were included in these on and

off. The trio contributed to the government’s policies and Mrs.

Gandhi’s arguments. Nayar and Singh noted that one main criticism

made was that it had too much power and too little responsibility.

Moreover, leaders of the opposition, the Akalis and even the Congress

(I) criticized the trio for not understanding or assessing the Punjab

problem properly.113 Mrs. Gandhi’s reliance on the bureaucracy to bail

her out of the crisis in Punjab was an instance of political naivety,

unbecoming of her experience and standing in Indian politics.

Countering a mass agitation politically was something that the

bureaucracy could not perform. Mrs. Gandhi found herself

resourceless in dealing with a problem of this magnitude for it

required the constitution of an alternative political discourse which

could communicate to people the political reality and their own

experience.

112 Kuldip Nayar and Khuswant Singh, The Tragedy ofPunjab, 68.
113 Ibid. Also Maiic Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle, 120.

294
1984: OPERATION BLUESTAR

The year opened somberly for India and Indira Gandhi. Amidst

forebodings of more trouble,114 the Prime Minister renewed her offer of

a negotiated solution of the Punjab problem, amidst reports of clashes

between supporters of Longowal and Bhindranwale inside the Golden

Temple.115 But between February and May 1984 no talks could be

held. The tripartite talks of February 14 featuring territorial disputes

between Punjab and Haryana were broken off the following day as a

further spate of violence erupted.116 The polarization of communal

extremism in Punjab had come full-circle. In Akbar’s words, “Fanatic

Hindu organizations were encouraged to teach the Sikhs a lesson: A

Hindu Frankenstein, who would not listen when Delhi eventually

began seeking peace, was encouraged: the Hindu Suraksha Samiti or

Hindu Safety Organisation led by Pawan Sharma rose to the defense

of the Hindus. The price which this Frankenstein extracted became

evident in February 1984, when after successful private negotiations,

the government was ready to sign a settlement with the Akalis at a

formal tripartite meeting which included the opposition parties. On

114 (a) The Akali Dal would decide on a new revolutionary action plan on January 17, 1984, which
would be the new phase of the 17 month old morcha, and would take effect after January 26, 1984, the
deadline the party had set for the centre to accept its demands. The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, January
11,1984.
(b) Akali’s decision to resort to mass civil disobedience. The Akali Dal President, Sant Longowal
warned that the centre was creating conditions for the Dal to announce a “parallel government” in
Punjab. The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, January 20-21, 1984.
(c) Opposition calls for a mass movement against centre for Mrs. Gandhi’s ruinous policies leading
to economic crisis. The Statesman, New Delhi, January 14,1984.
115 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events Vol 30,33221.
116 Ibid. Curfew was imposed in Amritsar and 5 other towns from February 14 to March 8 after violent
clashes between the Hindus and Sikhs following an attempt by some Hindu organizations to impose a
general strike to protest against what they saw as appeasement of the Sikhs by the central authorities. 4
policemen and 1 child were killed when Sikh militants opened fire from inside the Golden Temple
complex.

295
the very day of that meeting, the chance of peace was sabotaged by

the Samiti, which had become nervous about what the Akali-Congress

deal might mean for it. While the talks were in progress, the Samiti

indulged in day-long violence against Sikhs in Haryana, humiliating,

terrorizing, injuring and killing innocent isolated Sikhs. The talks

collapsed.”117With no abetment to the communal violence and reports

of fresh violence, Mrs. Gandhi resorted to measures that postponed

and put on hold further efforts at peaceful settlement. She empowered

the police and paramilitary with such measures that had been vested

in the security forces for the first time since independence - that of,

the power to arrest suspects and search for arms and explosives

without a warrant.118 She followed it up by declaring the whole of

Punjab a “dangerously disturbed area”119

During April-May 1984, terrorist activities continued unabated.

Citing “extreme difficulties” in curbing violence by terrorists, senior

government officers were supposed to have drawn parallels between

the Punjab situation and the Northern Ireland situation.120 Amidst

renewal of efforts by the government for fresh talks, the Akalis

threatened to launch a non-cooperation movement in Punjab from

June 3. The government viewed this threat with concern and it was

determined not to do anything that could be construed as

117 M. J. Akbar, India: the Siege Within, 198-199.

m The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, March 5,1984.
119 A spokesman of the Home Ministry said that under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the
security forces could now shoot to kill rioters and open fire to disperse illegal gatherings. Keesing's
Contemporary Archives, Vol. 30,33222.
120 The Statesman, New Delhi, April 13, 1984.

296
“appeasement” of the Akalis.121 The army was called out to assist the

civil authorities in Punjab in response to a demand from the Punjab

Governor, B. D. Pande, “in view of the escalating violence by terrorists

in Punjab.”122 Operation Bluestar had got underway to flush out

terrorists from the Golden Temple.

The army action to counter the terrorist mayhem was an

indication that there was no political process left in which talks about

peaceful settlement, dialogue and the like could make sense. It also

marked, as one political commentator said, the continuous erosion of

democratic constraints on political action.123 The Akali agitation and

government response were bitter reminders of this development.

CONCLUSION

What began as a demand for a restructuring of centre-state

relations ended up as one of the most serious crises to have overtaken

India since independence. For Mrs. Gandhi her main domestic

preoccupation during the last period in office was to maintain the

unity of India in the face of what she regarded as divisive regionalism.

Mrs. Gandhi viewed this ‘new’ regional assertiveness as being

disruptive and destructive of the union and it was this perception that

foreclosed the processes of political accommodation and political

bargaining necessary to address such issues.

121 The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, June 2,1984.

m The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, June 3, 1984.
123 Sham Lai, “The National Scene: Look Ahead in Anger,” in The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, May 12,
1984.

297
 Mrs. Gandhi initially perceived the Punjab problem as a political

one in which the Congress (I) and the Akali Dal were locked in a

normal battle of staying in power or out of it. In a strategy to challenge

the Akali government in power during 1977-80, the Congress (I) had

foisted and supported Bhindranwale and other religions extremists

groups.

Even if one were to concede that ruling powers encouraged and

manipulated communal, linguistic differences to keep the opposition

divided, then it was also true that able political leadership succeeded

in mobilising masses of different religions, linguistic entities around

an alternative ideology in the hope of a viable solution. Given Mrs.

Gandhi’s political experience, this was expected.

Grievances regarding distribution of river waters, territorial

disputes and economic problems affected the whole of Punjab.

Possibly a movement embracing Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims and other

communities for a solution of these problem at the initiative of the

central political leadership could have been the basis for political

bargaining in a democracy like India.

Mrs. Gandhi was probably sincere about India’s integrity as the

most important goal. As she herself said, “For me and for my party,

national unity and integrity are our supreme objectives and nothing
can be allowed to come in the way of that, neither elections nor

anything else. What was happening in Punjab was not simply a story

of cruelty or merciless violence against innocent people. It was a

concerted attempt by a combination of internal and external forces to

298
encourage divisive forces, and if possible to divide the country. This

was the challenge before us.”124

Yet her sincerity was punctuated by the failure to take a long

view, to trust her adversaries at least minimally, to go beyond a

strictly partisan view, playing with communal elements and by fear

and anxiety. Despite her professions of commitment to national

integrity as evident from the above speech, she did put a higher

premium on ensuring the longevity of Congress rule in Punjab.

The politics of democracy and nation-building rests on

tolerance: tolerance even of unreason, unreasonableness and

aggressiveness. This tolerance in turn rests on the capacity to place

oneself in the opponent’s position, view things from that perspective,

blame one for one’s own acts of omission and commission and to go

out of one’s way to accommodate the other. Mrs. Gandhi felt such a

posture would be misplaced in relation to the Akall demands, which

she ultimately dubbed as “secessionist.” This was contrary to the

requirements of not only democracy but also of mature political

leadership. Mrs. Gandhi’s handling of the Punjab problem was

indicative of her failure to manage ethnic conflict which was a

consequence of her own wrong doing in that she substituted the

politics of discourse with a virulent form of ideological assault.

124 Lok Sabha Debates, Fifteenth session of Seventh Lok Sabha, Vol. 49,25.07.84.

299