Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III v.

Civil Registrar-General

Facts:

A petition was filed by Filipino lawyer Jesus Falcis before the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
The high court was asked about the constitutionality of the provision of the Family Code of the
Philippines defining marriage as "between a man and a woman".

On March 2018, the Supreme Court of the Philippines approved the scheduling of a same-sex
marriage petition that seeks to invalidate Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code.

During the second week of June 2018, the Supreme Court announced that they will hear
arguments in a case seeking the invalidation of the Family Code's provisions prohibiting same-
sex marriage.

On June 19, 2018, oral arguments commenced with the following arguments made.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) under Jose Calida argued against the case. The second
session of arguments took place on June 26, 2018.

Supreme Court justices queried Falcis on what injury was inflicted on him due to the
implementation of the Family Code but it was learned during the oral arguments that Falcis was
a single man did not apply for a marriage for himself which meant he was never denied one.
Falcis was told that his concern should have been raised in a lower court, particularly a regional
trial court first.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition is properly the subject of the exercise of the Supreme Court's power
of judicial review, whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are
cognates of the right to life and liberty, whether or not the limitation of civil marriage to
opposite-sex couples is a valid exercise of police power, whether or not limiting civil marriages
to opposite-sex couples violates the Equal Protection Clause, whether or not denying same-sex
couples the right to marry amounts to a denial of their right to life and/or liberty without due
process of law, whether or not sex-based conceptions of marriage violate religious freedom,
whether or not a determination that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are unconstitutional
must necessarily carry with it the conclusion that Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code
(i.e.: homosexuality and lesbianism as grounds for annulment and legal separation) are also
unconstitutional, and whether or not the parties are entitled to the reliefs prayed for.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on September 3, 2019 for "lack of standing" and for
"failing to raise an actual, justiciable controversy." and stated that it could only base a decision
on actual facts and "real adversarial presentations" noting that Falcis cannot claim injury since he
is not seeking marriage for himself or has presented an actual case. The high court however
added that the 1987 Constitution in "plain text" imposes no restriction on same-sex
marriage. The Supreme Court suggested in its ruling that Congress should address the issue.

The petitioners were also cited for indirect contempt with the high court reasoning that "[t]o
forget [the bare rudiments of court procedure and decorum] – or worse, to purport to know them,
but really, only to exploit them by way of propaganda – and then, to jump headlong into the
taxing endeavor of constitutional litigation is a contemptuous betrayal of the high standards of
the legal profession."

Falcis described the decision as a "temporary setback" and has already considered the fact that
oral arguments were held regarding his case as a victory "for the opportunity to educate the
public" about the issue of same sex marriage in the country.

James Imbong, et al. vs. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,

Facts:
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its
decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that
the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law

Issue: WON RH Law violates the right to health

Ruling:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15,
Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system
and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the
country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation,
self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No.
5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they
are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law
and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation
of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in
place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe
are made available to the public

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out
by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness
or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the
FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds
that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various
kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded
herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of
Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory.
There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.

“The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public
or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to
his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion”
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.”

Obergefell, et al vs. Hodges

SC-USA No. 14-556 Decided: June 26, 2015

FACTS:

The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased. The
respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in question. The petitioners claim that
respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their
marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.

Issue:

(1) whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex;
(2) whether the fourteenth amendment requires a state to recognize the same-sex marriage licensed and
performed in a state which does not grant that right.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.
S. 438, 453; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–486. Courts must exercise reasoned
judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them
its respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections
and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. THE RIGHT TO MARRY
IS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution
apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

1. The right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.

2. The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals.

3. The right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights
of childrearing, procreation, and education.

4. Marriage is a keystone of the nation’s social order.

The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound
way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are
not always co- extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. Indeed,
recognizing that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has invoked equal
protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex- based inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 460–461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and equality, see, e.g., M. L.
B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 120–121.

The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of the
legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This dynamic also applies to same-
sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts
of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits
afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long
history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing harm, serving to
disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians. Pp. 18–22.

The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived
of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.

(2) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same- sex marriages validly performed out of
State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character. Pp. 27–28.

People of the Philippines vs. Echegaray

FACTS: Right against cruel and unusual punishment

Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The
crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act No. 7659, commonly known
as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of
death.

In appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law as being severe and excessive,
cruel and unusual in violation of the constitution. He invokes the ruling in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US
Supreme Court categorically ruled that death penalty is cruel and degrading. He also argues that death is an excessive
and cruel punishment for a crime of rape because there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes the ruling in Coker vs.
Georgia which said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it should not involve the taking of human life. In
rape, life is not over for the victim. Death penalty should only be imposed where the crime was murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and unusual punishment.

HELD: NO. The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In the US case of Kemmler, it was held that
punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It implies there something inhuman, barbarous,
something more than the extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it involves public humiliation. The severity is not
sufficient, but must be disproportionate to the crime committed. Excessiveness is measured by 1) seriousness of the
crime, 2) policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of the accused.

The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much the death penalty itself, but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures
by which the death penalty was imposed by the jury. It was nullified because the discretion in which the statute vested
in trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards.

With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia, the SC held that this case has no bearing on Philippine experience and
culture. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty
in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a
person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial
injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of
individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so.

RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are heinous crimes – crimes punished with death are those that are grievous,
odious, and hateful by reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those that are repugnant and outrageous
to common standards of norms and decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. They also include
crimes which are despicable because life is callously taken, or the victim is treated as an animal or dehumanized.

Roe v. Wade
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on
behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing
all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for
the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the
statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District
Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she
was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain
a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that
the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her
pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its
penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?

Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from
statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion
performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable
offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it
destroyed a quick fetus.

Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that
the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument
has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion
procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern
medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first
trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat
negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.

For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in
ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the
mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where
necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the
potential life of the unborn child.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

Brief Fact Summary. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a “persistent
vegetative state.” After it became clear that Cruzan would not improve, her parents requested that the
hospital terminate the life-support procedures the hospital was providing. The hospital and subsequently
the State court refused to comply.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A State may condition the exercise of a patient’s right to terminate life-sustaining
treatment on a showing of clear and convincing evidence of the desire of the patient to exercise such a right.

Facts. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a “persistent vegetative state.” In
order to feed her and to facilitate her recovery, surgeons implanted into her a gastronomy feeding and
hydration tube. After it become apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance for recovery, Petitioners,
Cruzan’s parents, asked hospital employees to terminate the life support procedures. The State hospital
employees refused to honor this request without court approval. After trial, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme
Court refused to order termination of the life-support, because clear and convincing evidence was not
produced to show that Cruzan herself would have chosen to refuse treatment.

Issue(s).
Did Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that would require the hospital to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment?

Did Missouri’s procedural requirement for clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person’s desire
to terminate life support before it is terminated violate the Constitution?

Held. No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed.

Prior decisions support the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. But incompetent persons do not enjoy the
same rights, because they cannot make voluntary and informed decisions.

The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be exercised, must be done for
such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouri’s interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid
State interest. The Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse life-saving
treatment. Missouri may legitimately safeguard these personal decisions by imposing heightened
evidentiary requirements. Moreover, even when available, family members will not always act in the best
interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against such abuses.
 BOLOS V. BOLOS

634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits,
the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent
Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.

The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with
the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also
prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations
to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring
the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did
not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February
14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such
that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if
the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14,
1980, years before its effectivity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD:

No, it does not.

RATIO:

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to
subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration.

Aglipay vs. Ruiz

Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose –
for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’