PAL v. NLRC G.R. No.

85985 August 13, 1993

Facts: PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees
and was immediately implemented, and some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary
measures embodied therein.

The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). PALEA contended that PAL, by its unilateral implementation of the Code,
was guilty of unfair labor practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and Article 253 of the
Labor Code. PA LEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers; that being
penal in nature the Code must conform with the requirements of sufficient publication, and that the
Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the rights of the employees.

It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of
the Code with PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code be reinstated and their cases subjected
to further hearing; and that PAL be declared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay
damages

PAL asserted its prerogative as an employer to prescibe rules and regulations regarding employees'
conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that by implementing the Code, it had
not violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor Code. Assailing the
complaint as unsupported by evidence, PAL maintained that Article 253 of the Labor Code cited by
PALEA reffered to the requirements for negotiating a CBA which was inapplicable as indeed the current
CBA had been negotiated.

Issue: W/N the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the
employer and the employees.

Ruling: Petitioner's assertion that it needed the implementation of a new Code of Discipline considering
the nature of its business cannot be overemphasized. In fact, i ts being a local monopoly in the business
demands the most stringent of measures to attain safe travel for its patrons. Nonetheless, whatever
disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly implemented in the absence of full cooperation of
the employees. Such cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are restive on account, of their
being left out in the determination of cardinal and fundamental matters affecting their employment.
 ANTONIO CARAG VS NLRC ET. AL.

G.R NO. 147590, APRIL 2, 2007

FACTS:

National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and Mariveles Apparel Corporation Labor Union
(MACLU), on behalf of all of MAC’s rank and file employees, filed a complaint against MAC for illegal
dismissal brought about by its illegal closure of business. They included in their complaint Mariveles
Apparel Corporation’s Chairman of the Board Antonio Carag in order to be solidarily liable for the illegal
dismissal and illegal closure of business. According to the Labor Union of MAC, the Corporation suddenly
closed its business without following the notice as laid down in the Labor Law of the Philippines. The Labor
Arbiter decided in favor of the Labor Union and held that Antonio Carag being the owner of the
corporation be solidarily liable for the payment of separation pay and backwages of the rank and file
employees. Antonio Carag questioned the decision of the Labor Arbiter and alleged that the Corporation
and its officers have separate and distinct personality and the latter cannot be held liable solidarily in
cases of payment of damages.

Issue:

Whether or not Antonio Carag be held solidarily liable for the payment of the illegally dismissed
employees.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the rule is that a director is not personally liable for the debts of the
corporation, which has a separate legal personality of its own. Section 31 of the Corporation Code lays
down the exceptions to the rule, as follows:

Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who

wilfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict
with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally
for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders
or members and other persons.

xxxx
Section 31 makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he wilfully and knowingly votes for or
assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also makes a director personally liable
if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation.

Complainants did not allege in their complaint that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or
assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC. Complainants did not present any evidence showing that
Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC. Neither did
Arbiter Ortiguerra make any finding to this effect in her Decision.

For a wrongdoing to make a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, the
wrongdoing approved or assented to by the director must be a patently unlawful act. Mere failure to
comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure or dismissal of employees does not
amount to a patently unlawful act. Patently unlawful acts are those declared unlawful by law which
imposes penalties for commission of such unlawful acts. There must be a law declaring the act unlawful
and penalizing the act.

Wherefore, Antonio Carag is not liable to the debt of the Corporation as to the illegally dismissed
employees of MAC.
G.R. No. 113856 September 7, 1998
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM MANUFACTURING UNITED WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (SMTFM-
UWP), its officers and members, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JOSE G. DE VERA and TOP FORM MANUFACTURING PHIL.,
INC., respondents.

FACTS
- Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing — United Workers of the Philippines (SM) was the certified
collective bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form Manufacturing
Philippines, Inc.
- Employer Top Form Manufacturing (TFM) refused to grant across-the-board increases to its employees in implementing Wage
Order No. 01 (granting an increase of P17 per day in the salary of workers) and Wage Order No. 02 (providing for a P12 daily
increase in salary) of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of the National Capital Region (RTWPB-NCR). Such
refusal was aggravated by the fact that prior to the issuance of said wage orders, the employer allegedly promised at the collective
bargaining conferences to implement any government-mandated wage increases on an across-the-board basis.
- The union SM requested the implementation of said wage orders. But they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-
board basis. Respondent TFM refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to
avoid wage distortion. TFM granted the P17 increase under WO#01 to workers/employees receiving salary of P125/day and below.
The P12 increase under by WO#02 was granted to those receiving the salary of P140/day and below. For employees receiving
salary higher than P125 or P140.00/day, TFM granted an escalated increase ranging from P6.99 to P14.30 and from P6.00 to
P10.00, respectively.
- SM filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC.
- Petitioner’s contention: TFM's act of "reneging on its undertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor practice through
bargaining in bad faith." It charged TFM with acts of unfair labor practices or violation of A247 of the Labor Code, as amended,
specifically "bargaining in bad faith," and prayed that it be awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages. In its position paper,
the union added that it was charging private respondent with "violation of A100 of the Labor Code."
- Respondent’s contention: In implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, it had avoided "the existence of a wage distortion" that
would arise from such implementation.
- There was no agreement to the effect that future wage increases mandated by the government should be implemented on an
across-the-board basis. Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated and expressly stipulated in the CBA. It quoted
the provision of the CBA that reflects the parties' intention to "fully set forth" therein all their agreements that had been arrived at
after negotiations that gave the parties "unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any subject
or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining."
- Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal at the NLRC, same was dismissed for lack of merit. MFR
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether private respondent Top Form Manufacturing committed an unfair labor practice in its refusal to grant across-the-board
wage increases in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02
2. Whether there was a significant wage distortion of the wage structure in private respondent as a result of the manner by which
said wage orders were implemented

HELD
1. NO
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties. Thus, only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and
complied with. Where a proposal or a promise raised by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA it is not a part thereof
and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation.

- If there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part of TFM to obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-board wage
increase, union SM should have requested or demanded that such "promise or undertaking" be incorporated in the CBA. After all,
petitioner has the means under the law to compel private respondent to incorporate this specific economic proposal in the CBA. It
could have invoked A252 of the Labor Code defining "duty to bargain," thus, the duty includes "executing a contract incorporating
such agreements if requested by either party."
- A252 also states that the duty to bargain "does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or make any concession." Thus,
petitioner may not validly claim that the proposal embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it finally
entered into with private respondent.
- SM’s contention that the Minutes of the collective bargaining negotiation meeting forms part of the entire agreement is pointless.
If indeed private respondent promised to continue with the practice of granting across-the-board salary increases ordered by the
government, such promise could only be demandable in law if incorporated in the CBA.
*Granted that private respondent TFM had granted an across-the-board increase pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727, that single
instance may not be considered an established company practice.

2. NO
The issue of whether or not a wage distortion exists is a question of fact that is within the jurisdiction of the quasi-judicial tribunals
below. Factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and even finality in this Court if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Thus, in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court said:
The issue of whether or not a wage distortion exists as a consequence of the grant of a wage increase to certain employees, we
agree, is, by and large, a question of fact the determination of which is the statutory function of the NLRC. Judicial review of labor
cases, we may add, does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials' findings
rest. As such, the factual findings of the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but also finality provided that its decisions
are supported by substantial evidence and devoid of any taint of unfairness or arbitrariness. When, however, the members of the
same labor tribunal are not in accord on those aspects of a case, as in this case, this Court is well cautioned not to be as so
conscious in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, let alone the conclusions derived therefrom.
Unlike in above-cited case where the Decision of the NLRC was not unanimous, the NLRC Decision in this case which was penned
by the dissenter in that case, Presiding Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez unanimously ruled that no wage distortions marred
private respondent's implementation of the wage orders. The NLRC said:
On the issue of wage distortion, we are satisfied that there was a meaningful implementation of Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02. This
debunks the claim that there was wage distortion as could be shown by the itemized wages implementation quoted above. It should
be noted that this itemization has not been successfully traversed by the appellants. . . . .
- In this case, NLRC unanimously ruled that no wage distortions marred private respondent's implementation of the wage orders.
There was a meaningful implementation of WO#01 and #02. SM’s contention on the issue of wage distortion and the resulting
allegation of discrimination against the TFM's employees are anchored on its dubious position that TFM's promise to grant an
across-the-board increase in government-mandated salary benefits reflected in the Minutes of the negotiation is an enforceable
part of the CBA.
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM MANUFACTURING UNITED WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(SMTFM-UWP), its officers and members v. NLRC
G.R. No. 113856
Romero J.
September 7, 1998
Topic: unfair Labor Practice

Facts:

 Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing — United Workers of the Philippines
(SMTFM) was the certified collective bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of
private respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc
 On February 27, 1990, A the collective bargaining negotiation was held.
 The parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic issues. According to the minutes of the meeting, Article
VII of the collective bargaining agreement was discussed.
o In the minutes of the meeting, across the board wage increase was tackled but it was not stated
anymore in the CBA since the union dropped such proposals relying to the undertakings made by
the officials of the company
 As expected, the union requested the implementation of said wage orders. However, they demanded that
the increase be on an across-the-board basis.
 Private respondent refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases
purportedly to avoid wage distortion, thus the issue of this case

Issues:

(1) whether or not private respondent committed an unfair labor practice in its refusal to grant across-the-board
wage increases in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, which was stated in the minutes of the
meeting on their discussions on February 27, 1990?\

(2) whether or not an employer committed an unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith and discriminating
against its employees?

(3) whether or not there was a significant wage distortion of the wage structure in private respondent as a result
of the manner by which said wage orders were implemented?

Held:

1 No. Since the across-the-board wage increase is not part of the CBA
a. The petitioner’s main point that the Minutes of the collective bargaining negotiation meeting forms
part of the entire agreement is pointless, it could only be demandable in law if incorporated in the
CBA, but in this case it was not.
b. The Minutes only reflects the proceedings and discussions undertaken in the process of bargaining
for worker benefits in the same way that the minutes of court proceedings show what transpired
therein.
c. If indeed private respondent promised to continue with the practice of granting across-the-board
salary increases ordered by the government, such promise could only be demandable in law if
incorporated in the CBA.
d. Moreover, petitioner union had the right and the opportunity to insist on the foreseeable fulfillment
of the private respondent's promise by demanding its incorporation in the CBA but they did not.
i. Because the proposal was never embodied in the CBA, the promise has remained just
that, a promise, the implementation of which cannot be validly demanded under the law.

2 No. With the execution of the CBA, bad faith bargaining can no longer be imputed upon any of the parties
thereto. All provisions in the CBA are supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by
the parties. This is not a case where private respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards collective
 bargaining because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner union. The CBA is proof
enough that private respondent exerted "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining."
a. Moreover, private respondent may not be considered in bad faith since As earlier said, petitioner
union had, under the law, the right and the opportunity to insist on the foreseeable fulfillment of the
private respondent's promise by demanding its incorporation in the CBA. Because the proposal
was never embodied in the CBA, the promise has remained just that, a promise, the
implementation of which cannot be validly demanded under the law.
b.
3 Since it is a question of fact, the NLRC has the jurisdiction. As such, the factual findings of the NLRC are
generally accorded not only respect but also finality provided that its decisions are supported by substantial
evidence and devoid of any taint of unfairness or arbitrariness.
a. the NLRC Decision in this case which was penned by the dissenter in that case, Presiding
Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez, unanimously ruled that no wage distortions marred private
respondents implementation of the wage orders.
i. On the issue of wage distortion, there was a meaningful implementation of Wage Orders
Nos. 01 and 02. This debunks the claim that there was wage distortion as could be shown
by the itemized wages implementation quoted above. It should be noted that the
itemization has not been successfully traversed by the appellants
ii. the petitioners contention on the issue of wage distortion and the resulting allegation of
discrimination against the private respondents employees are anchored on its dubious
position that private respondents promise to grant an across-the-board increase in
government-mandated salary benefits reflected in the Minutes of the negotiation is an
enforceable part of the CBA.

Disposition: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC

By: Reannah Reonal

SAN MIGUEL CORP. VS HON. LAGUESMA and NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA SALES LABOR UNION-
INDEPENDENT
G.R. No. 100485. September 21, 1994

FACTS:
Private respondent union filed for a petition for certification election among all the regular sales
personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Area. This was opposed by the petitioner and
questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining unit to be represented by the union. It claimed that its
bargaining history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit for each
sales office. During the hearing of the petition, the substitute lawyer of the petitioner withdrew its
opposition and agreed to consider one bargaining unit in the mentioned sales office. Upon the order of
the Mediator-Arbiter certifying the union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular
sales personnel in the North Luzon area, the petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor contending a
mistake in the decision brought by its substitute lawyer. In a petition for certiorari,the petitioner contends
that the prior collective bargaining is the most pervasive criterion in determining the approriateness of
the CBA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the union represents an appropriate bargaining unit.

HELD:
Yes. The court ruled in accordance with the tests in determining an appropriate bargaining unit.
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity
of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. Contrary to
petitioner's assertion, the Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining
history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate
bargaining unit.
Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought to be
represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of
employment and working conditions as evinced by the type of work they perform. In the case at bench,
respondent union sought to represent the sales personnel in the various Magnolia sales offices in northern
Luzon. There is similarity of employment status for only the regular sales personnel in the north Luzon
area are covered. They have the same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar compensation
and working conditions. The commonality of interest among he sales personnel in the north Luzon sales
area cannot be gainsaid. Further, the petitioner cannot insist that there should be one bargaining unit.
What greatly militates against this position is the meager number of sales personnel in each of the
Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent
union in the entire north Luzon sales area consists only of approximately
fifty-five (55) employees. Surely, it would not be for the best interest of these employees if they would
further be fractionalized. The adage "there is strength in number" is the very rationale underlying the
formation of a labor union….
Solidbank Corporation v. Gamier
November 15, 2010 | J. Villarama Jr.

G.R. No.159460
Petitioner: Solidbank Corporation (now known as First Metro Investment Corp.)
Respondents: Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola & Ophelia C. De Guzman
[RESPONDENTS 1]

G.R. No.159461
Petitioners: Solidbank Corporation and/or its successor-in-interest, First Metro Investment Corporation, Deogracias
N. Vistan & Edgardo Mendoza, Jr.
Respondents: Solidbank Union & Its Dismissed Officers and Members (129 names) [RESPONDENTS 2]

FACTS:
 Solidbank and Solidbank Employees’ Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-
2001 CBA to cover the remaining 2 years (2000-2001). Negotiations commenced but seeing that an agreement
was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike on December 29, 1999.
 In view of the impending actual strike, then DOLE Sec. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
in an Assumption Order dated January 18, 2000 directed the parties “to cease and desist from committing any and
all acts that might exacerbate the situation”. In another Order dated March 24, 2000, Sec. Laguesma resolved all
economic and non-economic issues submitted by the parties.
 Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Union held a rally in front of the DOLE Office in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous
with the filing of their MR. On April 3, 2000, an overwhelming majority of employees, Union officers and members,
joined the “mass leave” and “protest action” while the bank’s provincial branches in Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga
followed suit and “boycotted regular work.” The union members also picketed the bank’s Head Office in Binondo
on April 6, 2000, and Paseo de Roxas branch on April 7, 2000.
 The employees’ work abandonment/boycott lasted for 3 days (April 3 to 5). On the 3rd day, President of Solidbank
Vistan issued a memorandum declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work
starting April 6, 2000 “provided these employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their
co-employees into participating in this illegal act.” Out of the 712 employees, 513 returned to work and were
accepted by the bank. The remaining 199 employees insisted on defying Vistan’s directive (which includes the 3
respondents in the 1st GR No. and the 129 individual respondents in the 2nd GR No.) They then filed separate
complaints for illegal dismissal, ULP and damages, which were then consolidated.
 Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the complaints of RESPONDENTS 1. But decided in favor of RESPONDENTS 2.
 NLRC: Reversed both.
 CA: Decided that the dismissal of ALL respondents were illegal. REASON: the mass action was a legitimate
exercise of their right to free expression, and not a strike proscribed when the Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction over the impassé between Solidbank and the Union in the collective bargaining negotiations.

MAIN ISSUE: WON the protest rally and concerted work abandonment/boycott is equivalent to a strike. (my own words)
– YES.
RATIO:
 Art. 212 LC defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of
an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions
of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employers and employees. The term “strike” shall comprise not only concerted work
stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment
and facilities and similar activities. The substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
 In the case at bar, considering that the mass actions stemmed from a bargaining deadlock and an order of
assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, there is
no doubt that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor dispute.
 Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission  Union
contends that the protests conducted are not within the ambit of strikes as defined in the LC, since they were
legitimate exercises of their right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
relying on the doctrine laid down in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization. However, the
Union fails to realize one major difference [in the factual antecedents]: there was no labor dispute in Philippine
Blooming Mills. In the present case, there was an on-going labor dispute arising from Toyota’s refusal to recognize
and negotiate with the Union, which was the subject of the notice of strike filed by the Union. Thus, the Union’s
reliance on Philippine Blooming Mills is misplaced. (applicable in here as well)
 Moreover, Sec. Laguesma in his 1st order already directed that the Union and its members should refrain from
committing “any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation which certainly includes concerted actions. For
all intents and purposes, therefore, the respondents staged a strike ultimately aimed at realizing their economic
demands.
 Note that a strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or
certification is a prohibited activity under Art. 264(a) of the LC and thus illegal.

Court’s Other Decision:

 Only the Union officers who participated in an illegal strike may be validly terminated from employment. It is only
when a worker commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. (Art.
264(a) of LC) Hence, with respect to respondents who are union officers, the validity of their termination by
Solidbank cannot be questioned. But for the rest who are union members, since there was no proof that he or she
committed illegal acts during a strike, they are entitled to reinstatement without backwages. But since reinstatement
is no longer possible given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, not to mention the fact
that Solidbank had long ceased its banking operations, the award of separation pay of 1 month salary for each
year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.