1. G.R. No.

100970 September 2, 1992

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate courtin
applying the principle of “expresso unius exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance
policysince death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance
policyconsidering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a
deliberate andintentional act of the assailant in killing the former as indicated by the location of
the lone stab woundon the insured. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent
which, by the very natureof a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.

ISSUE:
Whether or not death petitioner is correct that results from assault or murder deemed are not
included in the terms “accident” and “accidental”.

HELD:
NO. Petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction was denied for lack of
merit. The terms “accident” and “accidental” as used in insurance contracts have not acquired
any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.
An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation — an event that
proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not
expected. [I]t is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of
the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract
should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.

2. G.R. No. 184300 July 11, 2012

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINES FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. and REPUTABLE FORWARDER SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.

FACTS
Wyeth contracted a contract of carriage with Republic, a common carrier for the transport of its
goods and product. Wyeth insured the goods with Philippine First, while Republic insured the
same goods with Malayan insurance. During transit, certain goods were lost due to hijacking of
10 armed men.
Philippine first paid the proceeds to Wyeth, subrogating the rights of wyeth to Philippine first
which filed a claim against Republic and Malayan as a 3rd party defendant. Republic and
Malayan refused the claim of Philippine first. Malayan contended that there was double
insurance and that the first insurer, Philippine First, should bear all the loss.

ISSUE
W/N Malayan is liable? - YES
W/N there is double insurance? -NO
W/N Malayan is solidarily liable with Republic? - NO

HELD
Malayan is liable because of the insurance contract it executed with Republic for the indemnity
for the loss. The cause of the loss not within the purview of an excepted peril, having been
determined in the lower courts is conclusive upon the SC making Malayan liable for the
indemnity. There is double insurance when:

1] The person insured is the same

2] 2 or more insurers insuring separately

3] There is identity of
subject matter

4] There is identity of interest insured

5] There is identity of the risk or peril insured

against.

In the case at bar though the 2 insurance policy, one by Philippine first and one by Malayan
were issued over the same subject matter covering the same peril, it was issued to 2different
persons and to 2 different interest, Philippine first insured wyeth over its own goods
Malayan insured republic over the latter’s insurable interest over the safety of the goods which
could become the basis for liability in case of loss or damage.Malayan is not solidarily liable with
Republic because they have different sources from which their liability arose. Republic arose
due to a contract of carriage, while Malayan is that of contract.Solidarity exist only by express
stipulation of the parties or those provided by law, none of which is applicable in the present
case.
 3. [G.R. No. 152158. February 7, 2003]
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING INC. and SEACOAST MARITIME
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE & ASSURANCE INC. and
COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Inc. (Prudential) brought an action for
damages and attorneys fees against Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. (Wallem) and Seacoast
Maritime Corporation (Seacoast). Private respondent Prudential sought the recovery of the sum
of P995,677.00, representing the amount it had paid to its insured, General Milling Corporation
(GMC), for alleged shortage incurred in the shipment of Indian Toasted Soyabean Extraction
Meal, Yellow, with 6% legal interest thereon from the date of filing of the complaint up to and
until the same is fully paid, and 25% of the claim as attorney’s fees. Wallem
denied liability for damage or loss to the shipment. To prove its claim for indemnity, Prudential
presented witnesses. The trial court ruled that private respondent Prudential failed to prove by
clear, convincing, and competent evidence that there was a shortage in the shipment. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Petitioner Wallem moved for reconsideration, but its
motion was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in its decision finding Wallem liable?
Whether Prudential can subrogate under the insurance contract?

RULING:
YES. Court of Appeals erred in finding that a shortage had taken place. There could have been
no spillage while the shipment was on board the vessel because, the hatches were closed. As
the bill of lading indicated that the contract of carriage was under a said to weigh clause, the
shipper is solely responsible for the loading while the carrier is oblivious of the contents of the
shipment. Even if the shortage can be definitively determined, Wallem still cannot be held liable
because of the failure of Prudential to present the contract of insurance or a copy thereof.
Prudential claims that it is subrogated to the rights of GMC pursuant to their insurance contract.
For this purpose, it submitted a subrogation receipt (Exh. J) and a marine cargo risk note (Exh.
D). However, as the trial court pointed out, this is not sufficient. As GMCs
subrogee, Prudential can exercise only those rights granted to GMC under the insurance
contract. The contract of insurance must be presented in evidence to indicate the extent of its
coverage. The insurance contract has not been presented. It is curious that the petitioner
disregarded this rule, knowing that the best evidence of the
insurance contract was its original copy. Failure to present this original (or even a copy of it), for
reasons the Court cannot comprehend, must prove fatal to this petition.
 4. Asian Terminals, Inc vs Malayan Insurance Co., Inc
GR 171406 / April 4, 2011

Facts:
Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV “Jinlian” 60,000 plastic
bags of soda ash dense. The shipment was insured with Malayan Insurance.
Upon arrival of the vessel, the stevedores of Asian Terminals unloaded the bags from the vessel
and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping
pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to consignee. After all the bags
were unloaded, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad condition.
Malayan Insurance, as insurer, paid the value of the lost cargoes to the consignee.
Malayan Insurance, as subrogee of the consignee, filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
against Asian Terminals. RTC found Asian Terminals liable for the damage sustained by the
shipment. The proximate cause was the negligence of Asian Terminals’ stevedores who
handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. This was caused by their usage of the
steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags by
the stevedores, despite the admonitions of the Marine Cargo Surveyors. RTC orders Asian
Terminals to pay P643K to Malayan Insurance. CA agrees with the decision of the RTC
Asian Terminals argues claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000,
pursuant to its Management Contract for cargo handling services with the Philippine Ports
Authority(PPA). Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said
contract since it is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.

Issue:
Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and
the
PPA in determining petitioner’s liability.

Held:
Judicial notice does not apply Section 1, Rule 129 Judicial notice when mandatory – a court
shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the laws
of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is
clearly not among the matters which the court can take judicial notice of.
It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA is a GOCC in
charge of administering the ports in the country. the PPA was only performing a proprietary
function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner.
 5. New World International Development (Phils.), Inc. v. NYK Fil-Japan Shipping Corp

G.R. No. 131166

FACTS:
Petitioner New World International Development (Phils.), Inc. (New World) bought from DMT
Corporation (DMT) through its agent, Advatech Industries, Inc. (Advatech) three emergency
generator sets worth US$721,500.00. DMT shipped the generator sets by truck from Wisconsin,
United States, to LEP Profit International, Inc. (LEP Profit) in Chicago, Illinois. From there, the
shipment went by train to Oakland, California, where it was loaded on S/S California Luna V59,
owned and operated by NYK Fil-Japan Shipping Corporation (NYK) for delivery to petitioner
New World in Manila. NYK issued a bill of lading, declaring that it received the goods in good
condition. NYK unloaded the shipment in Hong Kong and transshipped it to S/S ACX Ruby V/72
that it also owned and operated. On its journey
to Manila, however, ACX Ruby encountered typhoon Kadiang whose captain filed a sea protest
on arrival at the Manila South Harbor on October 5, 1993 respecting the loss and damage that
the goods on board his vessel suffered. Marina Port Services, Inc. (Marina), the Manila South
Harbor arrastre or cargo-handling operator, received the shipment on October 7, 1993. Upon
inspection of the three container vans separately carrying the generator sets, two vans bore
signs of external damage while the third van appeared unscathed. An examination of the three
generator sets in the presence of petitioner New World’s representatives, Federal Builders (the
project contractor) and surveyors of petitioner New World’s insurer, Seaboard–Eastern
Insurance Company (Seaboard), revealed that all three sets suffered extensive damage and
could no longer be repaired. New World demanded
recompense for its loss from respondents NYK, DMT, Advatech, LEP Profit, LEP International
Philippines, Inc. (LEP), Marina, and Serbros. While LEP and NYK acknowledged receipt of the
demand, both denied liability for the loss. Since Seaboard covered the goods with a marine
insurance policy, New World sent it a formal claim dated November 16, 1993. Replying on
February 14, 1994, Seaboard required petitioner New World to submit to it an itemized list of the
damaged units, parts, and accessories, with corresponding values, for the processing of the
claim. But petitioner New World did not submit what was required of it, insisting that the
insurance policy did not include the submission of such a list in connection with an insurance
claim. Reacting to this, Seaboard refused to process the claim. On October 11, 1994 New World
filed an action for specific performance and damages against all the respondents before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in ruling that Seaboard’s request from petitioner New World
for an itemized list is a reasonable imposition and did not violate the insurance
contract between them.
HELD: YES. Itemized listing is not substantially necessary.
The record shows that petitioner New World complied with the documentary
requirements evidencing damage to its generator sets.
The marine open policy that Seaboard issued to New World was an all-risk
policy. Such a policy insured against all causes of conceivable loss or damage
except when otherwise excluded or when the loss or damage was due to
fraud or intentional misconduct committed by the insured. The policy
covered all losses during the voyage whether or not arising from a marine peril.
The policy enumerated certain exceptions like unsuitable packaging, inherent
vice, delay in voyage, or vessels unseaworthiness, among others. But Seaboard had
been unable to show that petitioner New World’s loss or damage fell
within some or one of the enumerated exceptions.
Moreover, New World has submitted various documents, namely:

(1) copy of the Supplier’s Invoice;

(2) copy of the Packing List;
(3) copy of the Bill of Lading;
(4) the Delivery of Waybill Receipts 1135, 1222, and 1224;
(5) original copy of Marine Insurance Policy MA-HO-000266;
(6) copies of Damage Report from Supplier and Insurance Adjusters;
(7) Consumption Report from the Customs Examiner; and
(8) Copies of Received Formal Claim from the following:

a) LEP International Philippines, Inc.;

b) Marina Port Services, Inc.; and

c) Serbros Carrier Corporation.

Seaboard cannot pretend that the above documents are inadequate since they
were precisely the documents listed in its insurance policy. Being a contract of
adhesion, an insurance policy is construed strongly against the insurer who prepared
it. The Court cannot read a requirement in the policy that was not there.
 6.) Caltex [Philippines], Inc. vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.

G.R. No. 131166

Facts:
On December 20, 1987, motor tanker MV Vector, carrying petroleum products of Caltex,
collided in the open sea with passenger ship MV Doña Paz, causing the death of all but 25 of
the latter’s passengers. Among those who died were Sebastian Canezal and his daughter
Corazon Canezal. On March 22, 1988, the board of marine inquiry found that Vector Shipping
Corporation was at fault. On February 13, 1989, Teresita Cañezal and Sotera E. Cañezal,
Sebastian Cañezal’s wife and mother respectively, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage against Sulpicio Lines.
Sulpicio filed a third-party complaint against Vector and Caltex. The trial court dismissed the
complaint against Caltex, but the Court of Appeals included the same in the liability. Hence,
Caltex filed this petition.

Issue:
Is the charterer of a sea vessel liable for damages resulting from a collision between the
chartered vessel and a passenger ship?

Held:

The charterer has no liability for damages under Philippine Maritime laws.
Petitioner and Vector entered into a contract of affreightment, also known as a voyage charter.
A charter party is a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the
owner to another person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment is one by which
the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or part of her to a merchant or other person
for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight.
A contract of affreightment may be either time charter, wherein the leased vessel is leased to
the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single
voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a
determinate period of time or for a single or consecutive voyage, the ship owner to supply the
ship’s store, pay for the wages of the master of the crew, and defray the expenses for the
maintenance of the ship. If the charter is a
contract of affreightment, which leaves the general owner in possession of the ship as owner for
the voyage, the rights and the responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer is
free from liability to third persons in respect of the ship.
 7. FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY VS. HERNANDO
Subject: Insurance Case No: G.R. No. L-51221
Topic: Casualty Insurance; Compulsory motor vehicle liability; Third party suit against
insurer
Date: July 31, 1991

Facts:

Silverio Blanco was the owner of a passenger jeepney which he insured against liabilities for
death and injuries to third persons with First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc.
for P30,000. The said jeepney driven by Blanco himself bumped a five-year old child,
Deogracias Advincula, causing the latter's death. The boy’s parents filed a complaint for
damages against Blanco and First Insurance, which was granted by the lower court. First
Insurance filed a petition for certiorari contending that the victim’s parents have no cause of
action against it because they are not parties to the insurance contract and that they may only
proceed against the driver based on the provisions of the New Civil Code.

Issue:
W/N an injured party for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the insurer

Held: YES Doctrine: Where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to a
third party, such third party can directly sue the insurer. The liability of the insurer to such third
person is based on contract while the liability of the insured to the third party is based on tort. It
cannot evade its liability as insurer by hiding under the cloak of the insured. Its liability is primary
and not dependent on the recovery of judgment from the insured.

8. People v. Luisito D. Bustinera

G. R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004

FACTS:
ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that appellant would drive
the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which he would return it to ESC Transport's garage
and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant
admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he
was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's
wife went to ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to
recovered. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft.
HELD:
Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified,
with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as
"AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When statutes are in pari materia
or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or
cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or object, the
rule dictates that they should be construed together. The elements of the crime of theft as
provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed
by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the
property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken
from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. On the
other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended defines "car napping" as "the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The
elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2)
the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car
napping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking
in theft, robbery and car napping being the same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being
accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping law and not the
provisions of qualified theft which would apply

9. Philippine American Life Insurance and Rodrigo De Los Reyes vs Hon. Armando
Ansaldo - Jurisdiction
of the Insurance Commissioner
234 SCRA 509/ G.R. No. 76452

Facts:
Ramon M. Paterno sent a letter-complaint to the Insurance Commissioner alleging certain
problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and public consumers of the
Philamlife as a result of certain practices by said company. Commissioner requested petitioner
Rodrigo de los Reyes, in his capacity as Philamlife's president, to comment on respondent
Paterno's letter. The complaint prays that provisions on charges and fees stated in the Contract
of Agency executed between Philamlife and its agents, as well as the implementing provisions
as published in the agents' handbook, agency bulletins and circulars, be declared as null and
void. He also asked that the amounts of such charges and fees already deducted and collected
by Philamlife in connection therewith be reimbursed to the agents, with interest
at the prevailing rate reckoned from the date when they were deducted.
Manuel Ortega, Philamlife's Senior Assistant Vice-President and Executive Assistant to the
President, asked that the Commissioner first rule on the questions of the jurisdiction of the
Insurance Commissioner over the subject matter of the letters-complaint and the legal standing
of Paterno. Insurance Commissioner set the case for hearing and sent subpoena to the officers
of Philamlife. Ortega filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging that the Insurance company
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that there is no complaint sufficient in
form and contents has been filed. The motion to quash was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency falls within the
jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.

Held: No. Petition granted.

According to the Insurance code, the Insurance Commissioner was authorized to suspend,
directors, officers, and agents of insurance companies. In general, he was tasked to regulate
the insurance business, which includes:
(2) The term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance business," within
the meaning of this Code, shall include
(a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract;
(b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as
merely incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of the surety; (c) doing any kind of
business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of
an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any
business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the
provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2[2])

The contract of agency between Philamlife and its agents wasn’t included with the
Commissoner’s power to regulate the business. Hence, the Insurance commissioner wasn’t
vested with jurisidiction under the rule “expresio unius est exclusion alterius”.

The respondent contended that the commissioner had the quasi-judicial power to adjudicate
under Section 416 of the Code. It stated:
The Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints involving any loss,
damage or liability for which an insurer may be answerable under any kind of policy or contract
of insurance, or for which such insurer may be liable under a contract of suretyship, or for which
a reinsurer may be used under any contract or reinsurance it may have entered into, or for
which a mutual benefit association may be held liable under the membership certificates it has
issued to its members, where the amount of any such loss, damage or liability, excluding
interest, costs and attorney's fees, being claimed or sued upon any kind of insurance, bond,
reinsurance contract, or membership certificate does not exceed in any single claim one
hundred thousand pesos.
This was, however, regarding complaints filed by the insured against the Insurance company.
Also, the insurance code only discusses the licensing requirements for agents and brokers. The
Insurance Code does not have provisions governing the relations between insurance
companies and their agents.
Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines v. Social Security Commission- “that an
insurance company may have two classes of agents who sell its insurance policies: (1) salaried
employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the company;
and (2) registered representatives, who work on commission basis.”
The agents under the 2nd sentence are governed by the Civil Code laws on agency. This means
that the regular courts have jurisdiction over this category.

10. [G.R. No. 131399. October 17, 2003]

ANGELITA AMPARO GO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, INSURANCE

COMMISSIONER EDUARDO T. MALINIS and NORBERTO F. CASTRO, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Treasurer and Vice-President of Wear Me Garment Manufacturing Inc. Due to a
fire on July 12, 1993 that gutted down Wear Me Garments factory as well as its machineries and
stocks, petitioner filed separate insurance claims against 14 insurance companies which total
P29,778,000.00. The insurers manifested their official stance to deny the claims of petitioner.
Petitioner then sought the intercession of several members and committees of the Legislature.
The Commission vehemently denied petitioners accusations. Petitioner filed with the
Commission a complaint for Revocation and/or Suspension of Licenses against the
fourteen insurance companies. The Commission was of the opinion that the administrative case
for revocation/suspension of license of respondents and the civil case for specific performance
with the Regional Trial Court involve the same set of parties, facts and circumstances;and that
the determination by the Commission of the validity of the claims might conflict with that of the
court, or vice-versa.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Graft Investigation recommended
the dismissal of the vcharges against respondents. However, Ombudsman Desierto ordered
further clarificatory hearings. Thereafter, the Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the
Graft Investigation Officer to dismiss the charges against respondents. Upon denial by the
Ombudsman of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: BEFORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BE PURSUED UNABATED AND

INDEPENDENTLY DESPITE SUBSEQUENT FILING OF A CIVIL CASE IN A REGULAR
COURT OF JUSTICE WHEREIN IN BOTH CASES, IT (sic) INVOLVE THE SAME PARTIES
AND RELATIVELY INVOLVE THE SAME INCIDENT?

RULING:

The conduct of separate hearings and issuance of the Order were all done in the regular
performance of duties by the respondents Insurance Commissioner and Hearing Officer
respetively (sic). Moreover, they were done within the purview of the rules of procedure
governing the functions of the Insurance Commission. The Code provides that the Insurance
Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints
involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be answerable under any kind of
policy or contract of insurance where the amount of any such loss, damage or liability does not
exceed in any single claim one hundred thousand pesos.
The Office of the Insurance Commission is an administrative agency vested with regulatory
power as well as with adjudicatory authority. Under its adjudicatory authority, the Insurance
Commission has the original jurisdiction to adjudicate and settle insurance claims and
complaints where the amount being claimed does not exceed in any single claim one hundred
thousand pesos, as provided in Section 416 of the Code. Such original
jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts
and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. In addition to such adjudicatory power, the Commissioner
has the regulatory authority to revoke or suspend the certificate or authority of an insurance
company upon finding the legal grounds for such revocation or suspension under Sections 241
and 247 of the Insurance Code.

G.R. No. 138941 October 8, 2001

American Home Insurance Company
vs Tantuco Enterprises, Inc.
Ponente: Puno

Facts:
Tantuco Enterprises is engaged in the coconut oil milling and refining industry. It owns two oil
mills both located in Lucena City. The two oil mills were separately covered by fire insurance
policies issued by American Home, 3M and 6M respectively to the two mills.

A fire broke out on September 30, 1991 gutted and consumed the new oil mill (6M policy).
Tantuco immediately notified the insurance company of the incident. American Home then sent
appraisers who inspected the burned premises and the properties destroyed. Thereafter,
American Home rejected the insurance claim on ground that no policy was issued covering the
burned oil mill, saying that the 6M policy insures the property located in building no. 5, while the
affected oil mill was under building no. 14.

A complaint for specific performance and damages was consequently instituted by the
respondent with the RTC. RTC rendered the insurance company liable on the insurance policy.
American Home appealed at the CA, but the CA upheld the same decision.

Issues:
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that the issue of non-payment of the premium
was beyond its jurisdiction because it was raised for the first time on appeal.
(2) The Court of Appeals erred in its legal interpretation of 'Fire Extinguishing Appliances
Warranty' of the policy.
(3) With due respect, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals giving no regard to the parole
evidence rule and the principle of estoppel is erroneous.
Ruling:
Petition is devoid of merit.

(1) In construing the words used descriptive of a building insured, the greatest liberality is shown
by the courts in giving effect to the insurance. In view of the custom of insurance agents to
examine buildings before writing policies upon them, and since a mistake as to the identity and
character of the building is extremely unlikely, the courts are inclined to consider that the policy
of insurance covers any building which the parties manifestly intended to insure, however
inaccurate the description may be.

Notwithstanding, therefore, the misdescription in the policy, it is beyond dispute, to our mind,
that what the parties manifestly intended to insure was the new oil mill. This is obvious from the
categorical statement embodied in the policy, extending its protection:

On machineries and equipment with complete accessories usual to a coconut oil mill including
stocks of copra, copra cake and copra mills whilst contained in the new oil mill building, situate
(sic) at UNNO. ALONG NATIONAL HIGH WAY, BO. IYAM, LUCENA CITY UNBLOCKED.

If the parties really intended to protect the first oil mill, then there is no need to specify it as new.

(2) Anent petitioner's argument that the respondent is barred by estoppel from claiming that the
description of the insured oil mill in the policy was wrong, we find that the same proceeds from a
wrong assumption. Evidence on record reveals that respondent's operating manager, Mr.
Edison Tantuco, notified Mr. Borja (the petitioner's agent with whom respondent negotiated for
the contract) about the inaccurate description in the policy. However, Mr. Borja assured Mr.
Tantuco that the use of the adjective new will distinguish the insured property. The assurance
convinced respondent, despite the impreciseness in the specification of the boundaries, the
insurance will cover the new oil mill.

(3) When the issues to be resolved in the trial court were formulated at the pre-trial proceedings,
the question of the supposed inadequate payment was never raised. Most significant to point,
petitioner fatally neglected to present, during the whole course of the trial, any witness to testify
that respondent indeed failed to pay the full amount of the premium.

(4) Petitioner argues that the warranty clearly obligates the insured to maintain all the
appliances specified therein. The breach occurred when the respondent failed to install internal
fire hydrants inside the burned building as warranted. This fact was admitted by the oil mill's
expeller operator, Gerardo Zarsuela.

Again, the argument lacks merit. We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that the
aforementioned warranty did not require respondent to provide for all the fire extinguishing
appliances enumerated therein. Additionally, we find that neither did it require that the
appliances are restricted to those mentioned in the warranty. In other words, what the warranty
mandates is that respondent should maintain in efficient working condition within the premises
of the insured property, fire fighting equipments such as, but not limited to, those identified in the
list, which will serve as the oil mill's first line of defense in case any part of it bursts into flame.

To be sure, respondent was able to comply with the warranty. Within the vicinity of the new oil
mill can be found the following devices: numerous portable fire extinguishers, two fire hoses, fire
hydrant, and an emergency fire engine. All of these equipments were in efficient working order
when the fire occurred.

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., vs CA G.R. No. 127897 November 15, 2001 Common
Carrier, Insurance
OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS:

Caltex Philippines entered into a contract of affreightment with the petitioner, Delsan Transport
Lines, Inc., for a period of 1 year whereby the said common carrier agreed to transport Caltex’s
industrial fuel oil from the Batangas-Bataan Refinery to different parts of the country. Under the
contract, petitioner took on board its vessel, MT Maysun, industrial fuel oil of Caltex to be
delivered to the Caltex Oil Terminal in Zamboanga City.

The shipment was insured with the private respondent, American Home Assurance
Corporation.• The vessel sank taking with it the entire cargo of fuel oil.• Private respondent paid
Caltex the sum of P5,096,635.57 representing the insured value of the lost cargo. Exercising its
right of subrogation the private respondent demanded of the petitioner the same amount it paid
to Caltex.

Due to its failure to collect from the petitioner despite prior demand, private respondent filed a
complaint with the RTC for collection of a sum of money.

 The trial court dismissed the complaint against herein petitioner. The
trial court found that the vessel, MT Maysun, was seaworthy to
undertake the voyage as determined by the Philippine Coast Guard
per Survey Certificate Report No. M5-016-MH upon inspection during
its annual dry-docking and that the incident was caused by unexpected
inclement weather condition or force majeure, thus exempting the
common carrier (herein petitioner) from liability for the loss of its cargo.

The decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In the absence of any
explanation as to what may have caused the sinking of the vessel coupled with the finding that
the same was improperly manned, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner is liable on its
obligation as common carrier to herein private respondent insurance company as subrogee of
Caltex

ISSUE:
Whether the payment made by the private respondent to Caltex for the insured value of the lost
cargo amounted to an admission that the vessel was seaworthy, thus precluding any action for
recovery against the petitioner.

RULING:

1. The payment made by the private respondent for the insured value of
the lost cargo operates as waiver of its (private respondent) right to
enforce the term of the implied warranty against Caltex under the
marine insurance policy. However, the same cannot be validly
interpreted as an automatic admission of the vessel’s seaworthiness
by the private respondent as to foreclose recourse against the
petitioner for any liability under its contractual obligation as a common
carrier. The fact of payment grants the private respondent subrogatory
right which enables it to exercise legal remedies that would otherwise
be available to Caltex as owner of the lost cargo against the petitioner
common carrier.

The right of subrogation has its roots in equity. It is designed to promote and to accomplish
justice and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one
who in justice and good conscience ought to pay. It is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out
of, any privity of contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues simply upon payment
by the insurance company of the insurance claim. Consequently, the payment made by the
private respondent (insurer) to Caltex (assured) operates as an equitable assignment to the
former of all the remedies which the latter may have against the petitioner.

Neither may petitioner escape liability by presenting in evidence certificates that tend to show
that at the time of dry-docking and inspection by the Philippine Coast Guard, the vessel MT
Maysun, was fit for voyage. These pieces of evidence do not necessarily take into account the
actual condition of the vessel at the time of the commencement of the voyage. As correctly
observed by the Court of appeals:

At the time of dry-docking and inspection, the ship may have appeared fit. The certificates
issued, however, do not negate the presumption of unseaworthiness triggered by an
unexplained sinking. Of certificates issued in this regard, authorities are likewise clear as to their
probative value, (thus):

Seaworthiness relates to a vessel’s actual condition. Neither the granting of classification or the
issuance of certificates establishes seaworthiness. (2-A Benedict on Admiralty, 7-3, Sec. 62)