Section 11
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Accused-Appellant | 2000
Facts
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts1 is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
His "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As
Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the
primary ground of “mandate of sovereign will”. He states
that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative
in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents,
he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
Issue
w/n membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general
Discussion
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. However, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law. All top officials of Government-executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
Congressmen arises from a provision of the Constitution.
The history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense (1935
Constitution ArtVI Sec 15, 1973 Constitution ArtVIII Sec
9). The present Constitution adheres to the same
restrictive rule to surrender the subject Congressman to
the custody of the law. The requirement that he should
be attending sessions or committee meetings has also
been removed.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Section 11,
Article VI of the Constitution. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely
Disposition
Instant motion is DENIED.
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and
appellants, vs. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG,
defendant and appellee. | 1966
Facts
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by
plaintiffs of several sums of money, by way of damages
for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. The latter moved to
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter
is a privileged communication because at the time of the
said publication, he was a member or HOR and
Chairman on its Committee on National Defense.
The letter states that there have been allegedly three
opecal strategists. The first plan is said to be "an
insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to
"be prepared to become a candidate for President in
1961". Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etatrational
plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian politi ", in
connection with which the "planners" had gone no further
than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be
held in abeyance and subject to future developments"
and Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of
Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the
public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which
Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the
authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally
the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain
popular and civilian support.
Issue
w/n the open letter is covered by privilege
communication endowed to members of Congress
Discussion
Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution provides
“The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in
any other place.” The letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions. Congress was not in session when the letter
was published and at the same time he, himself, caused
the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was
not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Therefore, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
The Court is satisfied that the letter in question is not
sufficient to support plaintiffs’ action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the
control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as
“planners”, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas,
it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that “it
is of course possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of
the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge”. In other words, the very document upon
which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that
they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this
statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of
entitling them to recover damages, considering that they
are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are
by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein
described as “planners” include these two high ranking
officers.
Disposition
The order appealed is affirmed.
SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH
ANTONINO VS VALENCIA 1924 May 27 GR L-26526
NATURE: Court affirms in toto the appealed judgment
holding that defendant caused and was liable for the
issuance and publication of the libelous press release
attacking the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff
and rejecting defendant's defense of qualified privilege
and defensive libel.
FACTS:
1. Lorenzo Sarmiento, the official candidate of the
Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte, the
standard bearer of the Nacionalista Party for the
position of Davao governor during the 1963 local
elections.
2. Plaintiff Gaudencio Antonino, then a senator and
Liberal Party head, issued a statement that the
loss was due to the support given by Brigado
Valencia, then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to an independent LP
candidate which caused a division of LP votes.
3. In public statements widely quoted in the
metropolitan newspapers, Antonino stated that
had Valencia not “sabotaged” and “double-
crossed” the Liberal Party, its official candidate
would have won.
4. Antonino then filed a formal request with the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to investigate
the actions of defendant Valencia, as Secretary
of Public Works and Communications in
connection with alleged anomalous acquisition
of public work supplies and equipment.
5. On the same day, a two-page press release was
issued by the office of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications and the contents
thereof were published or reported on the front
pages of the six metropolitan papers. Defendant
said in the press release that he would also file
charges with the Blue Ribbon Committee against
Antonino regarding alleged anomalous acts that
can make him a disgrace to his senate position.
6. Plaintiff then filed on March 23, 1964 the present
civil action in the Manila court of first instance for
the recovery against defendant of P1 million as
moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary or
corrective damages and P50,000 as litigation
expenses and attorney's fees.
7. Defendant claimed in his answer that he did not
issue or cause the publication of the press
release; that at any rate, they were made in
good faith and in self-defense and that they were
qualifiedly privileged in character.
8. CFI Manila Ruling = The lower court ruled
against defendant, holding that defendant
caused and was liable for the issuance of the
libelous press release and its publication in the
papers and rejected his defenses of qualified
privilege and defensive libel.
9. As per the Court's resolution of March 3, 1969,
the motion of Senator Magnolia W. Antonino as
administratrix to substitute her deceased
husband as plaintiff-appellee was granted
ISSUE: WON said press release is protected as a
qualified privilege communication
HELD: NO. The said press release does not come
under the protection of qualified privilege
communication.
RATIO:
 1. The Court held that “there can be no serious
question as to the defamatory and libelous
nature of the statements in defendant's press
release which depicted plaintiff as a consistent
liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as
monetary board member and senator for
personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed
to him the commission of certain serious
offenses in violation of the Constitution and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.”
2. As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were
not made privately nor officially as to be
qualifiedly privilege under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly
held that by virtue of their defamatory and
libelous nature against the honor, integrity and
reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was
presumed.
3. It further correctly ruled that defendant had not
overcome such presumption of malice, not
having shown the truth thereof, or that they were
published with good intentions and with
justifiable motive or even from the most liberal
standpoint that they were made in the exercise
of the right of fair comment on the character,
good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
4. The trial court likewise properly rejected
defendant-appellant's claim of defensive libel
thus: "(S)tress had also been laid by the
defendant on the argument that he had been
libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former
was justified to hit back with another libel. The
emphasis laid had been misplaced and based
upon a wrong premise. The defendant was
charged with the commission of certain
anomalous transactions in his capacity as
Secretary of Public Works and Communications
and the same were filed with the Investigation
Committee (Blue Ribbon) of the Senate of the
Philippines and the Commission on
Appointments. Accordingly, the said charges,
even assuming that they contain defamatory
imputation, would not be libelous because the
letter sent by the plaintiff was a privileged
communication.
5. As to defendant's counterclaim, the Court finds
that the record amply supports the trial court's
finding that there was no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable for the
publication in the metropolitan press of his
charges against defendant with the Blue Ribbon
Committee and the Commission on
Appointments, — which were at any rate
qualifiedly privileged.
DISPOSITIVE: The appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed in toto. No costs
SECTION 13
LIBAN V GORDON 2009 July 15 GR 175352
NATURE: This is a petition to declare Senator Richard
J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in
the Senate.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners with this court a Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat
in the Senate. Petitioners Liban, et. Al, are
officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter while the respondent
Gordon is chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
2. During respondent’s incumbency as a member
of the Senate of the Philippines,1 he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February
2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has ceased to be a member of the
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of
the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
3. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which
held that the PNRC is a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in
accepting and holding the position of Chairman
of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held
that incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.
4. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not
a government-owned or controlled corporation
and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article
VI of the Constitution does not apply in the
present case since volunteer service to the
PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUES: Whether the office of the PNRC
Chairman is a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the Constitution.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
1. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing
Public Functions. President Manuel A. Roxas
signed Republic Act No. 95,7 otherwise known
as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit,
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian
organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian
assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion,
gender, social status, or political affiliation.
2. In the Philippines where there is a communist
insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion,
the PNRC cannot be seen as government-
owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC
volunteers be identified as government
personnel or as instruments of government
policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists
will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the
volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield
or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
3. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument
or agency that implements government policy;
otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and
cannot effectively carry out its mission as a
National Red Cross Society. It is imperative that
the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and
independent in relation to the State.
4. To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality,
and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned
or controlled by the government. Indeed, the
Philippine government does not own the PNRC.
The PNRC does not have government assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.
5. The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises
all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the
PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the
PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC,
respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all
PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private
sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of
whom are private sector members of the PNRC.
The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government
official.
6. The President does not appoint the Chairman of
the PNRC. Neither does the head of any
department, agency, commission or board
appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does
not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is
not an official or employee of the Judiciary or
Legislature. This leads us to the obvious
conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Philippine
Government. Not being a government official or
employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does
not hold a government office or employment.
7. The PNRC is not government-owned but
privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private
individuals, including students.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we declare that the office
of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION
16
OSMEÑ A VS. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863, OCTOBER
28, 1960)
FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to
this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief,
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such
Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity. He also asked, principally, that
said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his
charges of bribery against then President Garcia with the
admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause
why the House should not punish him.
Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the
Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House; second, his words constituted no actionable
conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable
speech and words, the House took up other business,
and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides
that if other business has intervened after the member
had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be
held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.
The Special Committee during the pendency of
his petition, found said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behavior. The House approved House
Resolution No. 175 declaring him suspended from office
for 15 months.
ISSUE:
W/N the House of Representatives can
discipline its members as in the case at bar?
HELD:
YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of
powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in
such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.,
139.)
Under our form of government, the judicial
department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department,
or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the
power committed exclusively to that department by the
Constitution. It has been held by high authority that,
even in the absence of an express provision conferring
the power, every legislative body in which is vested the
general legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which it may
deem sufficient.
The Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not
impair. In any event, petitioner's argument as to the
deprivation of the district's representation cannot be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the
case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative
bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of
their members to jail.
US VS. PONS 34 PHIL 729 (1916)
FACTS:
The respondent, together with Beliso and
Lasarte were charged with illegal importation of opium.
Pons and Beliso were tried separately on motion of
counsel. Lasarte had not yet been arrested. Each was
found guilty of the crime, charged and sentenced
accordingly. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his
appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
Respondent’s motion alleged to prove that the last day
of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for
1914 was the 28th day of February, that Act No.2381
under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was
not passed nor approved on the 28th of February but on
March 1 of that year. Also, counsel for Pons alleged that
the Assembly’s clock was stopped on February 18, 1914
at midnight and left so until the determination of the
discussion of all pending matters among which was Act
NO. 2381. to prove aid allegations, counsel argued the
court to go beyond the proceedings of the Legislature as
recorded in the journals.
ISSUE:
W/N the court may go beyond the recitals of
legislature journals or just take judicial notice of said
journals for the purpose of determining the date of
adjournment when such journal are clear and explicitly?
HELD:
YES. From their very nature and object the
records of the Legislature are as important as those of
the judiciary. And to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine government was brought into existence, to
invade and coordinate and independent department of
the Government and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature.
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. GIMENEZ 7
SCRA 347 (1963)
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7609 known as
the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central
Bank issued Circular NO. 95 fixing a unified margin fee
of 25% on foreign exchange transaction and a
memorandum establishing the procedure for application
for exemption from payment of said fee. In November
and December 1959, and in May 1960, Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. Inc., brought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid for the
margin fee therefore. Then as petitioner, the Central
Bank declaring that separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. When the back
issue corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund,
the auditor of the back issue the said vouchers upon the
ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary
Board is in violation of Sec. 2(18) of RA 2609, according
to the pertinent portion of the Act, “urea formaldehyde” is
exempted from the margin fee. The National Institute of
Science and Technology further affirms that “urea
formaldehyde” is different from urea and formaldehyde.
Hence, the separate importations of these two raw
materials are not excluded from margin fee.
ISSUE:
W/N the phrase “urea formaldehyde” as used in
the statute should be read as “urea” and
“formaldehyde”?
HELD:
NO. Hence, “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a
finished product which is patently distinct and different
from “urea” and “formaldehyde” as used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea
formaldehyde.” Petitioner contends, however, that the
bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction “and” between the term “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, not the latter as a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on the
floor of Senate, during the consideration of the bill before
said House, by members thereof. Furthermore, it is well
settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” is a conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by the
Congress and approved by the President.
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
DOCTRINE: Physical presence during session is
required. The attendance of the session showed that
majority of the members were present thereby
constituting quorum.
FACTS
On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with
the Senate Secretary charges against Senate President
Avelino. Sen. Tanada requested to give a privilege
speech during the session. With the leadership of the
Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. Sen. Tanada’s motions were
continuously denied of the common courtesy and ruling
Sen. Sanidad and Tanada “out of order!”. Senator
Avelino along with other Senators, walked-out of the
session hall. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz
issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the vacancy
of the position of Senate President and installing
Mariano Cuenco as Acting Senate President. These
resolutions were voted and unanimously approved.
ISSUE
W/N SC has jurisdiction - NO
W/N the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting
President of the Senate constituted a quorum - YES
RATIO
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in
view of the separation of powers, the political nature of
the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
the judiciary.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the
Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might
lead into a crisis, even a resolution.
The second question depends upon these sub-
questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled
with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21,
1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session?
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is
unanimity in the view that the session under Senator
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and
that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the
morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say
there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly,
because at the beginning of such session there were at
least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and
Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from
the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum,
"the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even
a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.],
p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the
House", the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members
of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being
confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at
most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be
most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one
that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of
the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by
that majority.
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
DOCTRINE: Separation of powers: Courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of legislature; Constitution
is silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress
other than Senate President and House Speaker
FACTS
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen.
Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to
the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2,
Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate
President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with
the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted
for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the “minority.” Thereafter, the majority
leader informed the body that he received a letter signed
by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By
virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed
before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto,
alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Petitioners argue that the Court has jurisdiction to settle
the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader.
They submit that the definitions of "majority" and
"minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution,
specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that
"[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members."
Petitioners contend that the constitutional provision
requiring the election of the Senate President "by
majority vote of all members" carries with it a judicial
duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and
"minority," as well as who may elect a minority leader.
ISSUE
W/N the Court has jurisdiction; W/N there is a violation of
the Constitution; W/N courts have the power to intervene
in matters of legislative procedure
HOLDING
Art 6, Sec 16 1987 Constitution; Senate Rules I & II
RATIO
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by
petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution,
the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices
of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number
of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater
than half or more than half of any total."36 The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by
any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise
the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body.
And there is no showing that the framers of our
Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings
of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority,"
who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is
there an open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Needless to state, legislative are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them." Being merely matters of procedure,
their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners
would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear
breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would
easily fail.
DISPOSITIVE
Petition DENIED.
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-
Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of
Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Civil Service, ET.AL, respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority
to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments
of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty
of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed
by Congress.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is
essential
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed
in the House of Representatives and then sent to the
Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate,
Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended
amendments thereto.
Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment
that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even
appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its
certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas
amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment.
Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed
copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary
of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the
Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the
President of the Philippines who thereby approved the
same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However,
when the error was discovered, both the Senate
President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
signatures.
Vice Mayor Astorga filed a petition with the SC, alleging
that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress
is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law - NO
Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail
over the enrolled bill
HOLDING
Field v Clark
RATIO
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills
duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
signatures of their respective presiding officers and
secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill.2 It
has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of
authentication,3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the
bill being presented to him has been duly approved by
Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection.4 The
function of an attestation is therefore not of approval,
because a bill is considered approved after it has passed
both Houses.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the
said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation
by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him.
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a
co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized
in this case by the fact that the Senate President
declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued
a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never
been approved by the Senate.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers,
is essential
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not
add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already
present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential.
When courts may turn to the journal
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of,
what evidence is there to determine whether or not the
bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in
the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. The journal discloses that substantial and
lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him.
The Court declared that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did
when they withdrew their signatures.
DISPOSITIVE
Petition DENIED. RA 4065, An act defining the powers,
rights and duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila
is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore
DID NOT become law.
[G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982]
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN,
EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R.
BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L.
LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate
Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G.
VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO,
SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and
ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Doctrine: Section 14, Article 6 of 1987C (then Section
11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution)
Facts:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of
the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private
corporation was held. Six of the elected directors were
herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group,
while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero
Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the
Board and of the management of IPI.
On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC
quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the
Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the
appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel
for the Acero group.
Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force,
provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel
before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an
administrative body. The prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance.
When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned
out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15
May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the
deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He
then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI
shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation,
which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case,
Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as
counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body
in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Held:
No
Ratio:
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said appearing as a
counsel which the appearance could theoretically be for
the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
However, significant circumstances arouse against the
intervention of Assemblyman. He had acquired a mere
Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after
the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested
election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had
been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of
the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was
objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing,
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in
the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an
indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative
body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in
some other capacity.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body
is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of
the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done
by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited.
Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the
SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent
Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman
Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was
reversed and set aside.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order
granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and
set aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore
issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs. SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN
HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO
ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
Doctrine: Par. 3, Section 16, Article 6 of 1987C
Facts:
The petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, are challenging the validity of R.A.
8420 (amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing “Sin Taxes”) by filing a
petition for for certiorari and/or prohibition. T
hey claim that respondents violated the rules of the
House which are "constitutionally mandated" so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution
when the Chair of the Committee (Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by
Rep. Arroyo during the committee report for the approval
of R.A. 8420.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different
versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation:
(1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the
proceedings in the session hall
(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to
3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the
Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21,
1996
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to
3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief
of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996
(4) the published version Petitioners contend that the
House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that "each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings" and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable.
This contention was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of
the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. In this case, petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial committee report had by then already been declared by
review. the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

Issue: As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining

this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art.
WON the Congress committed a grave abuse of VIII. S1 extends to cases where "a branch of the
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240? government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
Held:
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
No excess of jurisdiction."

Ratio: Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of

It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to
have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240
are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts
have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has
been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number
of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing
view is that they are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members have agreed to a measure (Chief Justice
Fernando on Power of each House).
internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that
there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum.
Lastly, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H.
No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of
a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved

but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to
this Court. The Court have no more power to look into
the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as
no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

It is not part of the jurisdiction of the Court since the

issue is based solely on the internal rules of the House.
The court also ruled that the statute is not ‘railroaded’.
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leader's motion, the approval of the conference