#62. Lichauco vs. Tan Pho, 51 Phil.

682, page 540

G.R. No. L-19512 November 21, 1923

FAUSTINO LICHAUCO, as guardian ad litem of the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco, and
of the incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
TAN PHO, TAN U (alias Tan O), CHUA GOC PIN, CHUA SON, CHUA MAR, CHUA HO,
CHUA PO, CHUA KA TI, and GALO LICHAUCO, defendants-appellees.

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G.R. No. L-19511 November 21, 1923

TAN PHO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AMPARO NABLE JOSE, opponent-appellant.

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G.R. No. L-19595 November 21, 1923

TAN PHO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AMPARO NABLE JOSE, opponent-appellant.

Facts:
The land in question is a 1,812 sqm parcel of land in Tondo, Manila. At the time the
contract of lease was executed, the owners of this land were: Galo Lichauco, 1/3 pro indiviso;
Zacarias Lichauco, at that time incapacitated (spendthrift), 1/3 pro indiviso; and Luis and Julita
Lichauco, minors and co-owners of the remaining 1/3 pro indiviso. Oct. 14, 1913 – Galo Lichauco
and the guardians of Zacarias and Luis & Julita executed a deed of lease of this land in favor of
Tan Pho. Among the conditions were: (1) Lessee to erect a building of strong materials for the
period of 20 years from date of execution of the instrument, for the price/rent of P1,560 monthly,
and (2) Upon termination of the period of lease, all improvements/buildings constructed on the
land shall become the property of the land owners, without the lessee being entitled to
payment/compensation. As the lease was for a period greater than six years, appellants [Faustino
Lichauco & Amparo N.Jose] maintain that the guardians of Z, L&J could not, without special
power, make such a contract, based on the prohibition contained in CC 1548 [OLD CC]: "No lease
for a term of more than six years shall be made by the husband with respect to the property of his
wife, by the father with respect to that of his children, by the guardian with respect to that of his
ward, or by a manager in default of special power with respect to the property entrusted to him
for management."

Three cases was then filed and jointly submitted by both parties in their oral argument:
Case #1 [G.R. No. 19512] – Deals with nullity of contract of lease of land and consequent rendition
of accounts. CFI Manila rendered judgment finding, among others, that the contract of lease is
valid.
 LEASE executed by: Galo Lichauco in his own behalf, Geronimo Jose as guardian of
incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco (spendthrift), and Amparo N. Jose as guardian of the
minors Luis and Julita Lichauco (lessors), and by Tan Pho (lessee).
 PRESENT CASE instituted by: Faustino Lichauco, guardian ad litem of Zacarias and Luis
& Julita; against Tan Pho, his principal Tan U, Tan U’s children, and Galo Lichauco

Case #2 [G.R. No. 19511] – Initiated in the original proceedings of the guardianship of Zacarias,
wherein Tan Pho petitioned the court to issue a nunc pro tunc order as of December 1, 1913,
approving the contract of lease. Amparo N. Jose, as guardian of Zacarias, objected to said petition
and moved that the case be considered together with the one on the nullity of the lease. This
petition for a nunc pro tunc order was impliedly granted in the decision rendered in the case which
is now Case #1. Amparo N. Jose appealed from that judgment.

Case #3 [G.R. No. 19595] – Same as Case #2, except guardianship proceedings were re: Luis &
Julita. The many errors assigned by appellants raise two fundamental questions: (a) the validity
of the contract of lease; and (b) WON the registration of said lease in the registry is final and
conclusive between the parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the contract of lease was actually authorized by the court.

Ruling:
No, the contract of lease was not actually authorized by the court.

In one of the decided cases explained nunc pro tunc means that, A nunc pro tunc entry in
practice is an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect
as of the former date, Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to supply an
omission in the record of action really had, but omitted through madvertence or mistake. It is
likewise that for the entry of a nunc pro tunc order, it is required that the record present some
visible data of the order which it is sought to be supplied by said nunc pro tunc order, whether it
is the data referring to the whole of the order or merely limited to such portion thereof, that the
part lacking from the record constitutes a necessary part, an inevitable and ordinary consequence
of the portion appearing in the record.

In the present case, there exists no data, partial or integral, in the record regarding the
judicial act of approving the lease in question. The conclusion we have arrived at is that, although
the lease in question could be approved by the court, nevertheless, such approval was neither
obtained in due time, nor subsequently, inasmuch as the approbatory nunc pro tunc order
impliedly entered in the judgment appealed from, is invalid on account of having been entered
without a sufficient legal basis therefor.