CORPUZ v.

PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money
to casino players and, upon hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry
on commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00. They both agreed that petitioner
shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of
60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the
pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that
he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz. On the prosecution, it was established
that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia. Petitioner denied having
transacted any 
 business with Tongcoy but admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not
even see. RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed with modification the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months of prison correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of
prison mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional 10,000 pesos or a total of 7 years.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the demand to return the subject the subject jewelry, if 
 unsold, or remit the
proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of
the RPC? (YES)

2. Whether or not there is a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties
(excessive fines) that the courts continue to impose against property committed today –
especially in estafa. (RELATED TO THE TOPIC)

SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a)
that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the
offended party on the offender.

RULING:

1. According to the petitioner the last element of estafa, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proven. The Court disagrees, as no specific type of proof
is required to show there was demand. Demand need not be formal; it maybe verbal. Should a
written demand be necessary, the law should have stated so.
2. Legislature pegged these penalties to the value of money and property in 1932 when the RPC
was enacted. There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties
that the court continues to impose on crime against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money 80 years ago in 1932. The court however
cannot modify the range of penalties because that would constitute juridical legislation. As the
Constitution vests the power to enact laws on the legislature, the courts cannot arrogate the
power to enlarge the scope of the crime, introduce matters that the legislature clearly did not
intend, redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the statutory language, or modify the
penalty to conform to the courts' notion (out of the innumerable number of notions) of justice and
fairness.

However, this does not render the whole situation without remedy. The framers of the RPC
anticipated this matter by including Art. 5, which is the duty of the court in connection with acts,
which should be repressed, but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties.

Chief Justice, Sereno: Concur with the ponencia in affirming the conviction of petitioner but votes
to apply the penalty for estafa adjusted to the present value of the thing subject of the offense.
The current penalty imposed has remained untouched for 83 years.

Justice Brion: Concur with the conclusion that Lito Corpuz is guilty of estafa beyond reasonable
doubt. Modifying the penalties (as proposed by some justices) is not judicial interpretation but it is
judicial legislation that is unconstitutional and illegal breach of the doctrine ofseparate powers.

IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC (INTERPRETATION OF WORDS & PHRASES):

The Court should resort to the canons of statutory construction only when the statute is
ambiguous. However, in the present case as the meaning of the penalties imposed is clear and
needs neither construction nor interpretation. The language of the penalty clauses of Article 315
of the RPC is plain and clear; no reservation, condition or qualification, particularly on the need
for adjustment for inflation, can be read from the law, whether by express provision or by
implication. The clear legislative intention to penalize estafa according to the “amount of fraud” as
enumerated in the law, therefore, should be deemed complete – Article 315 embodies all that the
legislature intended when the law was crafted.

As the words of Article 315 are clear, the Court cannot and should not add to or alter them to
accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the law or from legislative history, i.e.,
to remedy the perceived grossly unfair practice of continuing to impose on persons found guilty of
estafa the penalties that the RPC Commission pegged on the value of money and property in
1930.