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BIRAOGO VS PTC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ


G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption commi􏰀ed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, se􏰀le, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
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(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and se􏰀led jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the la􏰀er’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury a􏰀ributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds
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reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers ma􏰀ers of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
a􏰀ention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
commi􏰀ees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into ma􏰀ers which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
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The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Facts:
GR No. 200370, Jun 07, 2017 MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI v. PEOPLE
In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, Veridiano was charged
with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Information read:
That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
one small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a
certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain
alias "Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal
drugs.
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin
Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who were both on duty.[10] Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello
and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They allowed some vehicles to pass
through after checking that he was not on board. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano
inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked
the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check
for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana."
PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised
of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station.
The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal
possession of marijuana.
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. He asserts that his arrest was illegal. Petitioner was merely seated
inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give the
police officers reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or that he was
committing a crime. Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is insufficient to constitute probable
cause that would support a valid warrantless arrest.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except
for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either
arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint
was set up to target
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the arrest of the accused. ISSUE:


Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest that would vest the court with jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
HELD:
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c)
any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through
a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived
and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."
The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is
that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused."
Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when
an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate
and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.
______________________________________________________________________ As to the legality
of the search and seizure made:
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is
made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed." For
there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest
may also be effected without a warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
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The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test as explained in Cogaed:
For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer."
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed,
or is about to be committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches. Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches.
While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a
suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and
the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on one (1)
suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give
police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons
will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis
or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered
through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence. Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."
The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances. This
may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the presence of
coercive police procedures."
The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the warrantless
search.
Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle.
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Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of
individuals and ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is
in danger. Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to a
certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine
inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte
blanche to perform warrantless searches.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except
for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either
arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint
was set up to target the arrest of the accused.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except
for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either
arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint
was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

YNOT v. IAC DIGESTS


FACTS
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said
order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may
see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the
Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He
sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on
the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be
produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the
executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On
the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE
Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.
HELD
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of
the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b)
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the
Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor
man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the
order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved
and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male
and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit
for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the
same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is
unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the
animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty
in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if
assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it
amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case,
here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police
and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and
hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary
destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are
justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to
correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the
confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers
mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion.
The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution
are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the
exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
----------------------------------
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court
said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
---------------------------------
OGAYON V PEOPLE DIGEST
DOCTRINE: The courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled
to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. The relinquishment of a constitutional
right has to be laid out convincingly.
FACTS: Petitioner Honesto Ogayon (Ogayon for brevity) was charged with violation of Sections 11
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. During his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
Facts according to the Prosecution: Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera, together with the other
members of the Albay Provincial Police Office, proceeded to Ogayon’s house to enforce the search
warrant. Upon reaching the house of Ogayon, the police team notice several persons inside a nipa hut
located nearby. Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held, the police team restrained two of
the five persons and immediately proceeded to Ogayon’s house. SPO4 Caritos informed Ogayon that
they had a warrant to search his place and handed the same to Ogayon, who allowed the police team to
conduct the search. During the search, they found two (2) small, heat-sealed transparent sachets that
the police team suspected to contain shabu, four (4) disposable lighters, one (1) knife, used aluminum
foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil and a “Dorco” blade. The aforesaid items were all found in the comfort
room located about five (5) meters away from Ogayon’s house. The police team thereafter arrested
Ogayon and the two (2) other persons who had earlier been restrained.
Facts according to the Defense: Ogayon disavowed any knowledge of the prohibited drugs and claimed
that he saw the seized items for the first time only when they were being inventoried. He claimed that
the police team did not present any search warrant before conducting the search, and it was only during
the trial that he saw a copy of the same. He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two groups,
conducted a simultaneous search of his house and the comfort room located nearby.
The RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the two criminal charges against him. Relying
on the presumption of regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayon’s frame-up defense. Ogayon appealed to the
CA. He questioned the validity of the search warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He argued that
the search warrant was defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted an
examination of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses. However, the CA upheld the search
warrant’s validity due to Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection against the warrant during the trial.
The CA affirmed Ogayon’s conviction for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Petitioner Ogayon waived his right to question the legality of the search
warrant.
2) Whether or not the search warrant had been validly issued.
RULING: (1) NO. The right against unreasonable search and seizures is one of the fundamental
constitutional rights. Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its
stealthy encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put in place for its
protection are observed. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights; their non-
compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of the
constitutional requirements. The courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights. The court should not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. In People v. Decierdo, the Court declared that “whenever a protection given by the
Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the
waiver.” The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was his failure to make a
timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress the presentation of the seized items
as evidence. This failure alone is not a sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly,
and intelligently made a waiver.
(2) NO. The Constitution requires the judge to conduct an “examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,” after which he determines the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant. Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his
witnesses is indispensable, and the examination should be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary
or a rehash of the affidavits. Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, the Court found
nothing in the records of the case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined
the applicant and his witnesses. The records bear no evidence from which the Supreme Court can infer
that the requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue
the search warrant was derived.

PEOPLE v. RENANTE COMPRADO FBRONOLA, GR No. 213225, 2018-04-04


Facts:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01156 which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Misamis Oriental (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-
appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.

On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

Version of the ProsecutionOn 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CI) sent a
text message to Police Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander
of Police Station 6, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of marijuana together with a
female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a
backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. At 9:30 in
the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus
with body number .2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added that
the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus,
at about 9:45 in the evening, the police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front
of the station

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July 2011,
at around 6:30 in the evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in
Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him
to carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City

The RTC Ruling... the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. It held that
accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was merely requested to bring the bag to Cagayan de
Oro City, did not prove his innocence; mere possession of the illegal substance already consummated
the crime and good faith was not even a defense.

premises considered, this Court finds the accused RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime defined and penalized under Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No.
9165, as charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00], without subsidiary
penalty in case of non-payment of fine.

The CA Ruling... the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined that accused-appellant
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he raised no objection as to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment

It added that while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives from the
media and other personalities required by law were present during the operation and during the taking
of the inventory, noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and would not
render inadmissible accused-appellant's arrest or the items seized from him because the prosecution
was able to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. The
CA disposed the case in this wise

Issues:

I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence;
andIII. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling:

The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[14] This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4)
Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.[15]

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled [to] the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and frisk committed by the
police in People v. Cogaed (Cogaed)[24] In that case, the police officers received a message from an
informant that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La
Union, to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.

The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street
and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she
allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.

The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records
reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime.

As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.[30] Thus, it becomes
imperative to determine whether accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.

Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite accused-appellant's failure to object to the regularity of his arrest before
arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law
violates:

The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;


The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution;
and
The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
ISSUES:

Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the Constitutional right
to equal protection of the law.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in
the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market
Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of
the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt
from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770,
which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as
it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version
thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug
cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure


Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in
nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. By
the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing
criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,”
“essential,” “highly desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality –
can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right
nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that
the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not
amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor
and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength
or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand,
the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.

TIU V. CA (1999) | EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

February 5, 2017
G.R. No. 127410, 37 SCRA 99, January 28, 1971

DOCTRINES:

The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under
like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same
obligations.
The classification based on a valid and reasonable standard does not violate the equal protection clause.
FACTS:

RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into other productive uses. Section
12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which includes the City of Olongapo,
Municipality of Subic and the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and granted special privileges.
Thereafter, EO 97 was issued to clarify the application of the incentives provided by RA 7227. Sec. 1 of
EO 97 provides for the tax and duty-free importations shall only be applied raw materials, capital goods
and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of
other goods into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises, resident individuals are subject to the taxes
and duties under Philippine laws. The exportation or removal of tax and duty free goods from the
territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippines shall be subject to duties and taxes under
Philippine laws.
Section 1.1 thereof grants the enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives to the business and enterprises
and residents within the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It excludes the the first two
component cities as provided for by Sec. 12 of RA 7227.
ISSUES:

Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the laws?

RULING:

No, EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection of the laws.


The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses.
The Government provides enticements as to persuade and attract investors to pour in capital with the
said military bases. Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2)
tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the
zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the
grant of resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and
workers.
The purpose of the law is to convert former military base to productive use for the benefit of the
Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.

G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013


RAY PETER O. VIVO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR),
Respondent
FACTS:
By petition for review on certiorari the petitioner seeks the review and reversal of the decision, whereby
the Court of Appeals CA) reversed and set aside the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
and was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from
office.5 .He received a letter from the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources
Department, advising that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-
mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence;6 that
he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed
under preventive suspension.7
Petitioner’s counsel assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for
placing the petitioner under preventive suspension.
Petitioner received the summons to attend an administrative inquiry, requiring him to appear before
PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU).8 At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was
conducted at his residence. He was furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations
against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. The memorandum of
charges was based on the statements of PAGCOR personnel who had personal knowledge of the
accusations against him. However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the
statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already been afforded the
sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him during the administrative
inquiry.
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear in order to address questions
regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be
available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the
presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings.
PAGCOR dismissed the petitioner from the service.11A motion for reconsideration was filed, however,
denied. Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the CSC which ruled that PAGCOR had violated the
petitioner’s right to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. In fine, the
Commission finds that the right of Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office
without the corresponding Board Resolution that should have set out the collegial decision of the
PAGCOR Board of Directors.
PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA. CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the
decision of the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process. The
CA remanded the case to the CSC for the determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the merits,
specifically the issue of whether the dismissal had been for cause.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioner’s right to due process was violated.
2. WON CA’s decision was contrary to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and
settled jurisprudence.
HELD:
1. No..
The Court ruled that the petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he was afforded the fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain his side. That was sufficient to meet the requirements of due
process.29 In Casimiro v. Tandog,30 the Court pronounced:
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due
process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by
PAGCOR. In contrast, the petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by
PAGCOR as set forth herein. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.19
2. No.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel,
to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made
known to the parties affected.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that P AGCOR had properly observed the
requirements of due process in its administrative proceedings against the petitioner.
Therefore, the petition for review on certiorari was denied.

PEOPLE VS. MANAGO GR NO. 212340, AUGUST 17, 2016


FACTS On March 15, 2007, P03 Antonio Din was waiting to get a haircut at a beauty parlor when 2
persons entered and declared a hold-up. The policer officer and 2 suspects exchanged gunshots, after
the shootout one suspect boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a Toyota Corolla. Plate
numbers were noted by P03 Din. P03 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan conducted a “hot pursuit” operation one
day after the robbery incident, setting up a checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the vehicle.
The police officers ordered Manago to disembark, searched the vehicle and frisked Manago resulting in
the discovery of 1 plastic sachet suspected to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Manago
denied the plastic pack recovered by the police officers. He requested for a lawyer and a copy of the
warrant of his arrest, but both requests was unheeded. He was granted bail, but the CA affirmed the
RTC decision, undaunted he moved for reconsideration which was denied. Hence the instant appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was validly exercised

HELD
No. Sec. 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional
provision. Sec 5, rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Under the provision, there are
three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just
been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In warrantless arrest made pursuant to sec. 5 (b) it is essential that the element
of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be
nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered
inadmissible. The forgoing circumstances show that the element of personal knowledge was present,
but the required element of immediacy was not met. As the Court sees it, the information the police
officers had gathered therefrom would have been enough for them to secure the necessary warrants
against the robbery suspects. However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which,
considering the lack of immediacy, unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements therefor. Thus,
there being no valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling that
Manago was lawfully arrested.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR 139465 (Jan. 18, 2000) FACTS: Department of Justice (DOJ) received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to Commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire,
Radio, or Television, False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of Another. During the
evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the petitioner, Secretary of
Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S. government, that he be given
ample time to comment regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime. The petitioner,
Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP – US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S. in any proceedings
arising from an extradition request. The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner
Hon. Ralph Lantion (presiding judge RTC Manila Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition
to enjoin the petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to the
extradition of the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice and
hearing. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due
process over the government’s duties under a treaty? RULING: Yes. According to the principle of “Pacta
Sunt Servanda”, parties to a treaty should keep their agreements to good faith. However, Sec. 2 of Art. 2
of the Constitution (incorporation clause) provides that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land”. Incorporation clause is applied when there
is a conflict between the international law and local/municipal law. However, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal court. The fact that the international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. Rules of international law are given an equal standing with, but
not superior to, the national legislative enactment. The principle of “Lex Posterior Derogat Priori”
clarifies that a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. And the Republic of the
Philippines considers its Constitution as the highest law of the land, therefore, both statutes and treaty
may be invalidated if they are conflict with the constitution.

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of the aforequoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to
both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the
filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones,
the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification
be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-
Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no
valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains
his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his
certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
_____
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third
and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the
differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of
the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of
the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may
justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost
respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will
of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of
the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the
public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it
wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition;
and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3)
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
_____
The ruling basically paves the way for justices, judges, election officials, military and police officers,
members of the cabinet and all appointed civil servants to continue exercising the functions of, and
holding on to, their appointive office while campaigning to get elected for an elective position.
The legal ramifications are of great significance. As Justice Carpio pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
imagine if the Provincial Commander of the AFP files his COC for governor on 1 December 2009 for the
10 May 2010 elections. If he is not considered automatically resigned from office, he has until the start
of the campaign period on 26 March 2010 to remain in his post, in command of hundreds, if not
thousands, of fully-armed personnel. The same is true for judges, cabinet secretaries, and other heads of
offices who have some kind of influence and control over certain personnel and government resources.
There are even reports that some Comelec officials themselves have filed their COCs for certain elective
positions.
Next elections, it would then be possible that the Chief Justice, the Comelec Chairperson or the AFP
Chief of Staff become a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator while serving the office to
which they were appointed.
The decision does not seem to prevent the evil that the Constitution, in so many words, seeks to
prevent. In fact, Article IX(B), Section 2(4) of the Constitution expressly provides that “No officer or
employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign.”
Furthermore, if they lose, they just continue occupying their appointive posts. This is illogical because
Section 6, Art. IX(B) of the Constitution provides that “No candidate who has lost in any election shall,
within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government of any government-
owned or controlled corporations or in any of its subsidiaries.”

G.R. No. 209588, February 18, 2015 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC ROSAURO Y
BONGCAWIL, Accused-Appellant.
Facts: The accused-appelant, Eric Rosauro, was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No. 9165.
According to the Prosecution, on July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that drugs
were being distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus a buy-bust
operation was conducted by the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental. There, the
officers saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent and after the transaction, Rosauro was
arrested. Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to an officer, who taped it, marked it
with the marking “Exhibit A”, and placed it inside his pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the
drugs. In the police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory
Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime laboratory. The Forensic
Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination on the contents of the
sachet, on accused-appellant, and the marked money. The examination of the seized item yielded
positive result for shabu; while the accused-appellant and the marked money tested positive for the
presence of ultra-violet fluorescent powder.6 However, Rosauro claims he was merely a victim of
instigation. He testified that on July 3, 2004, the police asset went to his house four (4) times and
convinced him to do an errand for him. Rosauro refused to buy shabu as he did not know where to buy
one. It was the confidential informant who told him to buy the prohibited drug from a certain “Kael” and
to deliver it to the former’s house. It was also the informant who gave the money to Rosauro to buy the
shabu. But Rosauro was not able to meet or buy directly from Kael because it was a young man who got
and handed to him the shabu on the road. When Rosauro went to the house of the confidential
informant as instructed, he was arrested. The sachet of shabu was not even recovered from him but
from the confidential informant.7 The RTC convicted Rosauro after finding the evidence of the
prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant. Rosauro appealed before the CA,
arguing that the RTC erred in convicting him since his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA
affirmed the RTC Judgment, thus accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking a review of his
conviction. Issue: Was there irregularity in the chain of custody of the seized item? Held: NO. The chain
of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules
and Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.22 However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody
should ideally be perfect, in reality it is “almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” The
most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure
to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under
Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible.
CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run
accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest
following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live
ammunition 2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo 3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 4.
6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His
arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no
papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the
RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4
months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The
Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue
order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other
petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed
“Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro). Issues: 1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule No. Anent the first defense,
petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the
arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure—a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioner’s
warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all
those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run
and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances
when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
? Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid
warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence
inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects
whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant) Search of moving vehicle ? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest
recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test
of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within
arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner
would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that
curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private
citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON
the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject
firearms No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1)
the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s possession via a valid
warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same
was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as
our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were
mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from
respondent court’s incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by
a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is
not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which
would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms
higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. 3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution Anent his
third defense, petitioner faults respondent court “in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic)
and a non-subversive context” and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous
laws on illegal possession of firearms
since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty
of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in
contravention of the Constitution. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court
and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant’s commission of
the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not
be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous averment. The
severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. Moreover, every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in
question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify
nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld
twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of
firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution…” Appellant’s grievances on the wisdom
of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts
them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we
reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of
firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to
“10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.

JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIA GR.no. 170672

Facts: Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez. Petitioner
alleged that while he and his family are on their way home, these two officers requested them to
proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly
taken and was searched without warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and he was arrested.
Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. The trial court found
that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that
the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that
petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense was
in his possession. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of
the firearms were valid and legal, thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up. Issue: Whether the
warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure; Ruling: No. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt.
Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and
learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down
petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially
agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying
to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. The seizure of the
firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The police authorities
were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the
firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place
and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers
that the firearms may be evidence of a crime, hence they were justified in seizing the firearms.