G.R. No.

198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage
of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit
her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the
very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired
any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the
sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued
the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage
in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely
gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and cons equences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter
into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and,
therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of
particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have
been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12
Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple
at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage
fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the
couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be
noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence
of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and
in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not
to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or
ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x
x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation
will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that
they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to
enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the
husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to
obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing
with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both
the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27
It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no
genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order
to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them
to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage
void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall
be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead.
Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right
to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or
no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void.
Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed
under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering
into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article
47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further
trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after
they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and
Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.

Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.

Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.

Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto
Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig,
Metro Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three
(3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter
named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3,
1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed
Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus,
on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision
of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).

On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended
complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with
the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs
pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo,
p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as
they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the
parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).

The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children.
On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:

It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application
to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).

However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:

The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children
of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)

The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of
the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their
said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).

On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in
the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor,
and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net
estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given
due course by the court on December 7, 1981.

The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of
the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their
successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of
the complaint filed by the private respondents.

The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that
"during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously
enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on
intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that
plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent
(Ibid, p. 10).

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the
status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, t he Court of Appeals
correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause
of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).

It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the
nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief
demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).

With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the
private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated
by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able
to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present
(People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation,
85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption
of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).

The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth app earing in the civil register
or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of bir th referred to in the said
article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private
respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously
enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom
their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941,
the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay
pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and
therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not
run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117
SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible
and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165
SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents
and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice
of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had
not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed
and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by
the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of
their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate
of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents)
share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some
shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of
Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from
the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may
not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had
registered in their names the lots involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina
Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish
Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario
H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime
in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao
City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be
declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of
Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid
marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon,
Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R.
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO
Manila, started only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were
totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a
wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once
a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for
damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a
common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed
Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns
in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against
respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her marriage to
Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the
other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and
(2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of
the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest
who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the mar riage of Tecla to
Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage
to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that
it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National
Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in
this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of
verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been
married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same
as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of
marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of
the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves
as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient
proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in
accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we
said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s
birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda
de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded
the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when theinstrument itself
is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs
of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic
papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents
but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said
that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the
signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he
loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination
in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was,
and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been]
lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage c eremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by
[Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by
the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or
by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and
(2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No.
28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the
certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage
between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993

IRENEO G. GERONIMO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner.

Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 338501 which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro Manila in Special Proceeding No. 10036 declaring valid the marriage
between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman and appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana Geronimo.

The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:

This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the estate of Graciana Geronimo-Esman.

On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the heirs oppositor Antonio A. Esman and describing the latter as "husband
of the deceased". On April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now
describing the latter as the "live-in partner of the deceased" after finding out that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent was a "nullity
for want of a marriage license".
It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two brothers
Tomas and Ireneo, her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A. Esman. . . . However, the husband's capacity to inherit and
administer the property of the decedent is now being questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between oppositor and
the decedent was celebrated without a marriage license.

The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint a judicial administrator is whether or not the marriage between
Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman was valid.

Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister and oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no
marriage license issued to the parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage license number was not stated in the marriage contract (Exh. "I"); and that the marriage contract
itself does now (sic) show the number of the marriage license issued (Exh. "J"). Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which was issued to
the deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to
Pasig in October 1959.

On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned
documents (Exh. "I" and "J") would show that except for the phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage contract
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the certified copy of the
marriage contract which was attached to the original petition which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply
asked that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage license number o n the Registry of
Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955
to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by the Bureau of
Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to various provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already
used in the printing of the marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the same forms in the succeeding years.

Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the deceased and oppositor were married. David Montenegro, an employee of
the National Archives & Records Section, testified that a copy of the marriage contract between Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo
celebrated on January 7, 1955, is on file with their office.

Msgr. Moises Andrade, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that he was asked to come over to teach in Guadalupe seminary and
stayed in Pasig as assistant priest of the parish of Immaculate Concepcion from 1975 to 1983. Here, he came to know the spous es Graciana
Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman whom he attended to spirituality, conducted mass for, gave communion, and visited them socially. He had
occasions to go to the couple's garment business, Gragero Lingerie, and observed that the couple were quite close with each other and with the
people working in their business.

Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business testified that she was aware of the marriage which took place between
Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; that they lived together as husband and wife in Bambang, Pasig, after the wedding; an d that is the
oppositor who has been successfully supervising the lingerie business after the death of Graciana Geronimo.

Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office testified that she is in charge of all accountable forms being taken in the fourteen (14) municipalities
of the province of Rizal which include marriage licenses; and pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses nos. 5038751 to 5038800 was taken by the
Municipality of Pateros way back in October 9, 1953.

Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila, testified that in the entry of marriage book of Pateros, particularly page
no. 23 of book no. 2 and reg. no. 51, there is no column for the marriage license; that they started putting the marriage license only in 1980; that
they have a copy of the questioned marriage contract in which the marriage license number is recorded; and that the records of 1959 were lost
during a typhoon, but they sent a copy of the marriage contract to the archives section.

Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana Geronimo on January 7, 1955 in Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage
license no. 5038770; and that he was introduced by the deceased to the public as her lawful husband. (Decision, pp. 1-3)2

In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:

It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do not bear the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of
Graciana Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the number could only serve to prove that the number
was not recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license. On the other hand, the marriage
license number (No. 5038776, [sic] dated January 7, 1955) does appear in the certified archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit 7 and sub-
markings). The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-
a-vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which requires that the marriage license number would
(sic) be indicated in the marriage contract itself.3

Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman is
void, and, perforce, the latter had no right to be appointed as the administrator of the estate of the former, the petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any
factual issue by now posing the following question in this petition: "Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites — license
— is absent?" Doubtless, the query has been framed so as to apparently present a question of law. In reality, however, the question assumes that
there was no marriage license, which is, of course, a factual contention. Both the trial court and the public respondent found and ruled otherwise.

In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,4 which collated representative cases on the rule of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals and the exceptions thereto, we stated:

Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this
Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being
conclusive. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of
law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support
in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, they must stand.

There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of endings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the finding of fact of the Court
of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above exceptions.

On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse the mind of the petitioner, we shall proceed to discuss the issue
regarding the alleged absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman because the copies of the marriage contract he presented
(Exhibits "I" and "J") did not state the marriage license number. The flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the
respondent when he presented a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section (Exhibit "7") where the
marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to assail this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit
"V," a certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1 October 1976 in favor
of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals thus:

It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the Government like the Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A)
come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial numbers. These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal
treasurers concerned. But the serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding years when the
same forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the serially-numbered forms do not follow the same pattern.

This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the appellant refused to acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage
License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer
of Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits "1" and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo in
their marriage on January 07, 1955, another, marriage license bearing the same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig
in October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1"). Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No. 503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay City
on June 29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 31-32)5

At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the non-recording of the marriage license number but certainly not the
non-issuance of the license itself.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners, v. LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated August 6, 2012 and the
Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision4 dated July 23, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard
Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment
of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De
Asis dated October 25, 2002.7chanrobleslaw

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony
on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while
Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.8chanrobleslaw

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer
Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCT No. 60069/T-301 (now TCT No. 11106-R),

3. TCT No. 5109/T-26 (now TCT No. 11107),

4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),

5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and

6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10
When Severina died on September 21, 2002,11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis
on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637
and 8003.

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory
heir of Severina.

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial court considered as the Answer of her husband, Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered
that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship
which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented
through another Partition Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the
said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's
properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any husband.

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer,19 stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis
and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife - a relationship
which was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they
acknowledged that they were living together as common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in
common. Hence, Luis already received his share in the properties20 and is estopped from denying the same.21 After the termination of their
cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left
under the guardianship and custody of Severina.22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of
Marriage23 (between Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office.

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which included a certified true copy of his marriage
contract with Severina, cralawred the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence. The Spouses Salgado
disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further
claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage. Luis had also
admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed
in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the
conformity of Luis.

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature
and may only be controverted by evidence to the contrary. The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration,
which the trial court denied. Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.
Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled hearings
before the trial court.

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division directed the trial court "to
properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by
stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]"whereas the CA Ninth Division
dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch.

In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in more specific terms,
denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right
to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the
marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage. The
trial court also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA where the validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license number on
the marriage contract.41 The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which
cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against [the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:

1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated
January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and
11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively)
to the conjugal community of properties between [Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING
OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated
October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds.

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on September 11, 200747 and August 28, 2007,48
respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus Order49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and
Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the CAon December 13, 200750 and April 24, 2009,51 respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement52 which was approved by the CA in its Decision53 dated October
26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses Maya's appeal.

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado. The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not present and formally offer any testimonial and
documentary evidence to controvert the evidence presented by Luis.57 The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish the absence
of a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at
the very least a certification from the said office that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or
before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said
certification and present evidence during the trial."58chanrobleslaw
The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration59 which the CA denied through its Resolution60 dated November 26,
2012.

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC
decision which declared the marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want of marriage license based on the Marriage
Contract61 presented by Luis which has adequately established its absence.62chanrobleslaw

Luis, in his Comment, opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari. He also countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory. If the existence of the
marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence.

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to
the propriety of the filing of this petition for review on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the
basis of a marriage contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an
exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is, as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of
law, there are exceptions recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity
is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional
character,70 renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3). It sets forth:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages
are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification
of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."71 To reiterate,
in any of the aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears
therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the
reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage
license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage contract is not only
a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997
Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract me prima facie proof that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any
church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall
merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the
eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are
exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this
exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to eac h other in accordance
with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil cer emony officiated on
December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis in open
court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Atty. Francisco:

Q-You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were married to the late [Severina].

A-Yes, sir.

Q-Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A-As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1) year old. That was 1966 December something like 28,
because she was born December 30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year old two (2) days before we
got married here in San Juan.
Q-So, when was she born if you can recall?

A-Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q-If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A-Yes, sir.

Q-If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A-It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73

xxxx

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to [Severina]?

A:Yes sir.

Q:When do you say you marrfied] her?

A:Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28, 1966.74 (Emphasis ours)

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant
to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77
of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious
ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license
is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the
time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove
that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption
of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has established
that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the
marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to
prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain
about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q-How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and [Severina]?

ATTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your Honor.

COURT:

Answer.

What preparations were done?

A-There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time and the Mayor is a close friend of ours. So, when he knew
that we are traveling, we are going to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him in Thailand, he told us you better get married first
before you travel because your daughter will be illegitimate.75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q-Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A-We did not.

Q-So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A-No.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-]

There was no marriage license?

A-Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:Not necessarily.

A-But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the house of the Mayor.

COURT:But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization of your marriage, did you apply for a marriage
license?

A-No.76

xxxx
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF [LUIS]:

Q-Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well as a question was raised by the Honorable Court
whether or not you applied for a marriage license when you got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court
what you meant by that?

COURT:By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you answered no.

WITNESS:I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before we went to the house of the Mayor to get marry
(sic) but that was about - - I cannot recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q-You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you referring to?

A-[Severina].

Q-And, yourself?

A-Yes.

Q-In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the solemnization of the marriage?

A-It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police. I cannot recall. It
is inside the Munisipyo of San Juan.

Q-Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A-The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed (sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what
it is.77 (Emphasis ours)

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the
latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part
stating that the marriage is of an exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of the marriage license
number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the absence of the
marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein that
the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More
importantly, the husband of the deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records
Section where the marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage l icense must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties." Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein
that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that
the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80 the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license based on a fabricated
claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation.
In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were c omplied with. The Court
held that to permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since
all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement
of a marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for
it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of
marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as
a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."82 "The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic 'autonomous social institution."

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement84 in
November 1980, which divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement on the ground that
"the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving
the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void."

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86 the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x."87 It provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the c are and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.88 (Emphasis ours)

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their
marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code,
are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a
marriage license."90 "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family household.'"91chanrobleslaw

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is
stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is
precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval
for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the
Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.92 It also remains uncontroverted that he already
received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null and void
or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of "due search and inability to find"
a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license,93 such certification is not the only proof that
could validate the absence of a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer,
coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances
which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is
suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until Severina's death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her.94 All those years, he never
presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any
other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent
marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration
of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge
that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have
been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same
person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative
Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan,
a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragrap h 1 of the Family
Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article
8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.
2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon.
The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to pr ove the latter's
malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite
this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr.
and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was
not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they
knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having
borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven
years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample
reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this
judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to
have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not
falling under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code,
thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and
Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or
place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of
the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system
of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times
make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area
which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised
to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.

HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the
latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional
question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national,
were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by
the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved
a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed
and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case,
"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and
the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary
of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department
of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence,
Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment
and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before
the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by
the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner
and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered
by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September
8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez
acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move
for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested
in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while
the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and
no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such i nitiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in
fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not
apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes"
or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and,
as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to
bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior
to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant
as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of
such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution
of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband
of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse,
as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such
when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on
the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time
the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married
to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja
Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions,
this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of
no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal
Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though
it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning,
any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination
of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory
reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised
as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the
husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in
case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized t he woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the
same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his
American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their Nati onal law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he
calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of
the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be
valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an
injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would s eem that under our law
existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American
husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino
wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the
husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in
case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the
same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his
American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their Nati onal law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he
calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of
the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be
valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an
injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would s eem that under our law
existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American
husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino
wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the
same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also
referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of
Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled
hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with
or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without
the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their
extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval.3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage
existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased
as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 19874 only petitioner and Ruperto were
declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate
heirs.5cräläwvirtualibräry

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased
as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on
15 February 19886 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate
to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during
the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance
that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27
November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.8
On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual
issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent;
and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved
in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are
proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other
than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution
of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to
inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule.11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained.12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.
This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.14 Petitioner opposed the motion but
failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippin es."16 It maintained that
their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the
time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;17 it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner.18 In the
present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered
that she was since 1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not
bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as
his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under
Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.20cräläwvirtualibräry

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the p resent petition be
dismissed for forum shopping,21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue.22 The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of
titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The
order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely,
Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is
likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of
petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused
to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom,
the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne
was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their
wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to
her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and
wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where
she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the
marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44
of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of
the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license,
the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section
44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be
promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed
the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple
unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of
Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties
must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a
marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or
Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations
to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what
constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil
Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17
The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the present
case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as
the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing"
by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles
3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form
or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second
requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge ma y examine or cross-
examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken
against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bar s it from belatedly invoking
any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support
Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey
disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to
show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing"
into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount
interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact
laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery
of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law
were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage
ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case,
the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law
were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense
of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of
determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance
with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of
the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine
National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and
practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the
immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of
this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos
nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by
the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in
the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is
that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was
not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation
of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613
which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,

vs.

NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his
death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement
and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of
affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as
"a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing
a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the spec ial contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction
as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumpti on that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that
the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.
19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages
have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion
is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No.
T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

[G.R. NO. 179922 : December 16, 2008]

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL
CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases
commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary
judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance,
sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd -
Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to
5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo.
of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to
6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-
SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por
el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50
mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por
el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01' E,
82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance
taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered
by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case,
the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo.
The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The
parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third
and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following
causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence
of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He
also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such
certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended
that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that
Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before
the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the
justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In
the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was
made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated
that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of
collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by
the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered
by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child
of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid
safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of
appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to
annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a
marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount
to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the
matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned.
The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the
annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for
a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved
the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that
the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the
formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract
for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement
as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's
rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said
appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely
purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture
of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his
life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the
premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA
denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for
reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this
case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule
19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary
judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed.
So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the
pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the
trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that
the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by
the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage
has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17,
viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed
except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of
marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is
applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the
State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given
the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at
this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence,
the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of
the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The
rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who
can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously
the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance
with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased
spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages , compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is
within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application.
Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person
can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?cra lawlibrary

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest
and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

x x x

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it
is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks
legal personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the
ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding t o the estate of the
decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a
personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven
to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the
entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that
Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence,
does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit.
This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the
RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition
of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo
II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just resolution of the case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was
adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined
to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For
the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty
provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born
or conceived within a valid marriage.37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money
must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the
validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED
to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED