Summary Dismissal Board v.

Torcita
330 SCRA 153 (2000)

FACTS: Sometime in April 26, 1994, after attending a social function, the group of Alex Edwin del Rosario proceeded towards
the direction of Cadiz City riding a Mazda pick-up. Upon reaching Sitio Puting Tubig, it overtaken the red Cortina Ford being
driven by C/Insp. Torcita. Maj. Torcita signaled them to stop which they refused to abide and instead accelerated and
proceeded to Hacienda Aimee owned by Congressman Manuel Puey. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until
it reached Hda. Aimee where C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java alighted and the confrontation with Alex Edwin del Rosario and
Jesus Puey.
Twelve verified complaints complaints were filed against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, herein respondent, by Manuel Puey,
Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario before the Summary Dismissal Board (SDB) of the PNP which was later on consolidated into
one "major complaint" for "conduct unbecoming of a police officer." The complainants alleged that Major Torcita
approached and entered the compound of Hda. Aimee, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen,
confronted Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a very, very loud voice,
invectives and remarks. That such act of Maj. Torcita constitute Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer not worth of respect. In
his answer Maj. Torcita admitted that he entered the premises of the complainants, however, the same was done on a regular,
lawful and proper way for he was in the performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect who committed a crime in
his presence.
However, during trial, the witnesses for the complainants withdrew the statement in their affidavit and denied seeing
or hearing what happened. The only piece of evidence presented in connection with the incident which happened near
the gate of the compound is the affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his testimony. Thus, the Board dismissed the complaint.
However he Board find him to have committed SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY and is ordered
suspended for twenty (20) days and forfeiture of salary. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of
the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition
for certiorari in the regional trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which
he was not charged, "which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law." which the court
granted. Hence this appeal by the Private respondent.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the petition granted by the Regional Trial Court that the
decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction due to lack of due process.
2) Whether or not the decision of the SDB and Napolcom Regional Appelate Board has become final and executory.

HELD :

1) No. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court granting the petition for certiorari. The
SC held that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged.
Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that
he could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. The absence of specification of the
offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-
cut to the legal process. It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was
decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court. Memorandum
Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and
the findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of
the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of
same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. As it turned out, the
dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses
during the incident.
2) No, it is has not become final and executor. The SC held that a decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result,
a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence,
aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and executory.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is DISMISSED.

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JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

FACTS:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among
others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013
and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112
of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to
due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section
3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the
investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-
affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of
the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order
which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not
a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence

Page 2 of 8
of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts
obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for
a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence
needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more
than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the
concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of
proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are
finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint
Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted
Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The
Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond
what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary
investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations
without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present
procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed
by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against
the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause.
The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the
fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental
and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation
of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the
country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to
determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their
conviction violated constitutional due process.
Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.
Page 3 of 8
 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
G.R. No. 139466, October 17, 2000

FACTS: On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the SC dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to
file his comment with supporting evidence. On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration which was opposed by private respondent Jimenez on March 28, 2000.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action and Filing of
Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada
and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would
be granted. Private respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000
Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action, the
Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.

HELD : The Supreme Court held that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. As a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant
to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extradite especially by one whose extradition
papers are still undergoing evaluation.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not
akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The Court
held that for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the
precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure." Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the
right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak. The
court accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In tilting the
balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to
due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination
should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the
extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Page 4 of 8
 People vs. Estrada
G.R. 130487 June 19, 2000

FACTS: On December 27, 1994 while the Sacrament of Confirmation was being performed by Bishop of Dagupan City at the
St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez went up and walked towards the center of
the altar and sat at the bishop’s chair. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral who tried to push him away was
stabbed by the accused-appellant. After the stabbing incident the later got up, went to the microphone and shouted:
"Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded
and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. He was later on apprehended by the police and brought to the Police
station. Meantime, Maraac was brought to hospital but expired few minutes after. Estrada was charged with the crime of
murder.
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent
Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that
accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that
before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City.
He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. The motion
was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused-appellant.
Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day.
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellant's behalf.
One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing
him of accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether he
should remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-
appellant's counsel filed a
"Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Attached to this motion was a second letter
by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway
Association of the city jail. The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997 finding the accused-appellant guilty of the
crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death. Hence, this automatic reviews of the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant was accorded the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law.

HELD : The Court held that in the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at
the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant
was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of witness Santillan attached to the Information, there are certain
circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his
mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit in the Bishop's
chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jam-packed cathedral. It goes
against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter
at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least
attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly
approached the microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which the rational person
would have been made. He then returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public. It
has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To
put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial
and due process of law. By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a
fair trial.1 a w p h il The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason,
the proceedings before the said court must be nullified.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94- 00860-
D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the
court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to
stand trial, and for further proceedings.

Page 5 of 8
Lim v. Court of Appeals

G.R. 111397, August 12, 2002

FACTS: On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro
filed the case because policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work
permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations.6
Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a BUSINESS LICENSE , as well as the work permit applications of Bistro’s staff,
for the year 1993.
The Trial Court granted Petitioners’ application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction, and Respondent, and
any/all persons acting under his authority, are and (sic) ordered to cease and desist from inspecting, investigating and
otherwise closing or impeding the business operations of Petitioner Corporation’s establishments while the petition here is
pending resolution on the merits. However, despite the trial court’s order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistro’s operations
effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Hence, petition for review on certiorari1 of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has regulatory powers to has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business
establishment in Manila without due process of law.

HELD : The court held that Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila without
due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code.
There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the
Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions
of its licenses and permits. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance
with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power
violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. Lim’s zeal in his campaign
against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern for
his constituents when he implemented his campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no
excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial
court properly restrained the acts of Lim..

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CASTILLO-CO V. BARBERS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
CASTILLO-CO V. BARBERS G.R. No. 129952. June 16, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Josie Castillo-Co is a Governor of Quirino. Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor for alleged fraud against the public treasury and malversation.
(Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, and Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code.)

Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was reconditioned instead of brand new as required by resolutions of the
provinces Sanggunian authorizing such purchase. Other irregularities claimed to have been committed included overpricing, lack of
public bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery in violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code, and an
attempt to cover up such irregularities.

A week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under preventive suspension
for a period of six (6) months.

Said order was signed by Emilio A. Gonzalez III, Director, and approved by Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

Petitioners thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration. Both motions were denied in a Joint Order signed by Director
Gonzales and approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero.

Petitioner file for special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to nullify the Order of the Deputy Ombudsman directing her preventive suspension and claiming that the Deputy
Ombudsman has no authority to issue the preventive suspension against them.

ISSUE:

WON the Deputy Ombudsman has authority to issue the preventive suspension
WON petitioner was denied due process because she was not afforded the opportunity to controvert the evidence against her before
the order of preventive suspension was issued.

HELD:

1. YES. Petitioner claims that under Republic Act No. 7975, only the Ombudsman has the authority to sign the order placing officials
with a 27 salary grade or above, like petitioner-governor, under preventive suspension. In this case, the suspension order was neither
signed nor approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Rather, said order was signed by Director Emilio Gonzales III and approved by
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero.

There is nothing in RA 7975, however, that would remotely suggest that only the Ombudsman, and not his Deputy, may sign an order
preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above.

Moreover, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman similarly
provides:

SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. -- The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. Xxx

SEC. 9. Preventive suspension. Pending investigation, the respondent may be preventively suspended without pay for a period of not
more than six (6) months, if, in the judgment of the Ombudsman or hisproper deputy, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, (b) the
charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him. xxx
Page 7 of 8
Under these provisions, there cannot be any doubt that the Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend an officer or
employee, where appropriate, as indicated by the word or between the Ombudsman and his Deputy. The word or is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated. The law does not require that only
the Ombudsman himself may sign the order of suspension.

2. NO. A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before
the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty,[13] but merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that
the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure.
A suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is,
therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be
given an opportunity to prove his innocence.

The fact that the said order was issued seven days after the complaint was filed did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The
immediate issuance of such order is required in order to prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities.
Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to:

xxx give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints
involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

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