Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal

Coordination during multi-agency emergency response: issues and solutions

Paul Salmon, Neville Stanton, Dan Jenkins, Guy Walker,
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DPM
20,2 Coordination during multi-agency
emergency response: issues and
solutions
140
Paul Salmon
Accident Research Centre, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Neville Stanton
School of Civil Engineering and the Environment, University of Southampton,
Southampton, UK
Dan Jenkins
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Sociotechnic Solutions, St Albans, UK, and

Guy Walker
School of the Built Environment, Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh, UK

Abstract
Purpose – Coordination between military and civilian agencies has previously been found to be a
significant issue that affects the efficiency of multi-agency system responses to large-scale
emergencies. The purpose of this article is to present the findings derived from a case study focussing
on the problems that abound when the military attempts to work with civilian organisations.
Design/methodology/approach – An integrated framework of human factors methods was used
to analyse a Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities training exercise, involving the army and seven
other responding agencies.
Findings – A range of factors that hinder coordination between agencies during multi-agency
emergency responses were identified. Potential solutions for removing these barriers and augmenting
coordination levels are proposed.
Practical implications – This research suggests that much further work is required in training and
designing multi-agency response systems and procedures in order to optimise coordination between
responding agencies.
Originality/value – This article presents the first attempt to apply structured, theoretically
underpinned human factors methods, to understand the problems that abound when the military
works with civilian agencies during large-scale emergency responses.
Keywords Disasters, Emergency services, Government agencies, Armed forces, United Kingdom
Paper type Case study

Disaster Prevention and Management
Vol. 20 No. 2, 2011
pp. 140-158
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/09653561111126085
Introduction
Due to the growing diversity, complexity, and scale of modern-day emergencies, there
is an increasing requirement for the military and civilian organisations to work in
tandem during large-scale emergency responses. For example, Hurricane Katrina, the
This research from the Human Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre was part-funded
by the Human Sciences Domain of the UK Ministry of Defence Scientific Research Program. The
work described was undertaken while all authors worked in the Ergonomics Research Group at
Brunel University.
 Gloucestershire floods, and the 2001 and 2007 UK foot and mouth outbreaks are all Coordination
recent large-scale incidents in which the military and civilian organisations worked during emergency
together as part of a multi-agency response system. Perhaps unsurprisingly, various
problems abound when different organisations with different cultures, procedures,
processes and systems attempt to work closely together. Amongst other things, one of
the more common issues seen during previous multi-agency activities is a lack of
coordination between the organisations involved (e.g. Smith and Dowell, 2000). 141
The aim of this article is to report the findings derived from research undertaken for
the UK Ministry of Defence, focussing on coordination between military and civilian
organisations. The aim of the research was first, to identify the barriers that hinder
coordination and interoperability between the military and civilian organisations, and
second, to specify guidance on how coordination and interoperability between the military
and civilian organisations might be augmented during emergency scenario responses.
The research involved a range of activities, including a literature review, retrospective
case study analyses, subject matter expert (SME) interviews, and case study analyses.
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Although referring also to the other activities described, this article focuses in particular
on a Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities (MACA) case study in which an integrated
suite of human factors methods was used to analyse a MACA scenario.

Multi-agency coordination
Coordination between agencies during multi-agency emergency responses, although a
key issue, remains a neglected research area (Chen et al., 2008). During such responses,
coordination between the different agencies involved is a major challenge (e.g.
McEntire, 2008) due to the complex conditions that typically arise. Chen et al. (2008), for
example, point out that such scenarios involve great uncertainty, sudden and
unexpected events, risk of possible mass casualty, great time pressure and urgency,
severe resource shortages, large-scale impact and damage, and the disruption of
infrastructure support necessary for coordination. This is further complicated by
factors such as multi-authority, personal involvement, and conflict of interest (Chen
et al., 2008). Most studies in the area have found that coordination between agencies
during disaster or emergency responses is poor (Banipal, 2006; McEntire, 2008; Smith
and Dowell, 2000, etc.).

Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities

This article is presented in the context of the problems that arise when the Army is
asked to work together with civilian organisations during the response to large-scale
emergencies occurring within the UK. When the response to an emergency requires
military support, civilian agencies may request support in the form of “Military Aid to
the Civil Authorities” (MACA), which is guided by three criteria:
(1) military aid should always be the last resort, with the use of mutual aid, other
agencies and the private sector all having been considered as insufficient or
unsuitable;
(2) the civil authority lacks the required capability to fulfil the task and it is
unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; and
(3) the civil authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks
readily available resources.
 DPM To orient the reader, it is worth discussing the organisation of a typical multi-agency
20,2 emergency response system. An agreed national command and control structure, known
as the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) structure, is used. Management of the
response is normally undertaken at three levels – operational, tactical and strategic
(Ministry of Defence, 2007a) – with the level employed being dependent upon the nature
and scale of the emergency. Initially, at the onset of an incident, the operational or bronze
142 level is activated. Bronze command is typically located at the scene of the incident. The
bronze level reflects the normal day-to-day arrangements for responding to smaller-scale
emergencies. Typically, bronze-level responders take appropriate measures to save life
and then assess the extent of the incident. Most emergencies can be catered for by a
bronze-level arrangement; however, more serious incidents requiring additional
resources invoke the tactical or silver command level. The silver-level commander’s
role is to determine priorities in allocating resources, assess risks and plan and
coordinate the response, obtain further resources as required, and consider the need for a
strategic level of command. If the incident requires resources or expertise over and above
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the tactical level, or if there is more than one incident or scene to coordinate, then the
response proceeds to the strategic or gold level of command. The gold level utilises a
multi-agency group, known as the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), comprising the
gold commanders from all organisations involved in the response. It is the SCG’s role to
take responsibility for the multi-agency response and to establish the policy and strategic
framework within which the silver level will operate (Ministry of Defence, 2007a).
According to the Ministry of Defence (2007a), the SCG will:
.
determine and disseminate (and regularly review and update) a clear strategic
aim and objectives;
.
establish a policy framework for managing the incident;
.
prioritise the demands of silver and allocate personnel and resources to meet
requirements;
.
develop and implement media handling and public communication plans; and
.
direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to
facilitate the recovery process.

The activities undertaken at the SCG level are therefore critical for coordinating the
activities of the agencies involved. It is important also to note that the SCG has no
executive authority; the police normally establish and chair the SCG but they do not
have command, rather discussion and consensus at the SCG level leads to SCG
representatives directing actions within their own agencies.

MACA case study

A MACA training exercise, recently undertaken at a UK army barracks, was observed.
As part of the training exercise, the multi-agency response system had to plan, coordinate
and manage activities as part of the response to the emergency. The case study focussed
on the SCG meetings held throughout the exercise. The scenario used was based on a
severe weather flooding scenario in which continued heavy rainfall had led to large-scale
flooding, which in turn was causing additional problems, such as a chemical leakage
incident, that required military support. The Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork
(EAST) framework (Stanton et al., 2005) was used to analyse the data obtained.
 Methodology Coordination
The EAST framework provides an integrated suite of methods for analysing during emergency
teamwork activities. The nature of collaborative activities is such that it is difficult, if
not impossible, to analyse them in sufficient detail through the application of one
human factors method alone. In response to this, the EAST framework proposes that
an integrated suite of methods should be used. Integrating methods has a number of
compelling advantages, because not only does the integration of existing methods 143
bring reassurance in terms of a validation history, but it also enables the same data to
be analysed from multiple perspectives (Walker et al., 2006). Underpinning the EAST
approach is the notion that distributed teamwork can be meaningfully described via a
“network of networks” approach; EAST analyses collaborative activities from three
different but interlinked perspectives, the task, social and knowledge networks
underlying teamwork activity. Task networks represent a summary of the goals and
subsequent tasks being performed within a system. Social networks analyse the
organisation of the team and the communications taking place between the actors
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working in the team, and knowledge networks describe the information and knowledge
(situation awareness) that the actors use and share in order to perform the teamwork
activities in question. This so-called “network of networks” approach to understanding
collaborative endeavour is represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.
Network of networks
approach to analysing
distributed teamwork
 DPM EAST is flexible in terms of the component methods applied. In this case,
20,2 observational study, hierarchical task analysis (HTA; Annett et al., 1971), the critical
decision method (CDM; Klein et al., 1989) and the propositional network methodology
(Salmon et al., 2009) were used. HTA (Annett et al., 1971) is used to describe the goals,
sub-goals and operations involved during the scenario. The resultant task network
identifies the actors involved, what tasks are being performed and the temporal
144 structure of tasks. The CDM (Klein et al., 1989) focuses on the cognitive processes used
and the information and knowledge underpinning decision-making during task
performance. Finally, the propositional network approach (Salmon et al., 2009)
represents situation awareness during the scenario, from both the point of view of the
overall system and the sub-teams and individual actors performing activities within
the system. Thus, the type, structure and distribution of knowledge throughout a
scenario are represented. The overlap between methods and the constructs they access
is explained by the multiple perspectives provided on issues such as the “who”, the
“what” and the “why” of collaborative activities. For example, the HTA deals with
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“what” tasks and goals, the CDM deals with “what” decisions are required to achieve
goals, and the propositional networks deal with “what” knowledge or situation
awareness is underpins the tasks being performed and decisions being made.

Participants
One gold-level representative from each of the following agencies was involved in the
meetings observed: the local Police Force, Fire Service, and Ambulance Service, the
local authority, the Environment Agency, the Met Office, the Brigade and a local
electric company. Various other participants from each agency were involved in the
EXCON (EXercise CONtrol) group (the group responsible for providing situation feeds
to the different agencies involved). Due to the nature of the exercise, it was not possible
to collect demographic data for the participants involved.

Procedure
Three analysts were given access to the SCG meetings and EXCON briefs. The
analysts directly observed the activities undertaken, and all activities observed were
recorded using a video recording device. Observational and verbal transcripts were
also recorded throughout. Analysts were also given access to planning products, SOIs,
logs, briefs and SMEs throughout the exercise. Upon completion of the exercise, CDM
interview pro forma were completed by a representative from each of the agencies
involved. To augment the data collected during the observations, analysts held
discussions with the SMEs involved throughout the exercise. Further, the analysts
were given access to after action review sessions held by the exercise organisers. Based
on the data collected, task and propositional networks were constructed for the
activities observed.

Results
Summarising the HTA output, task models give a high-level overview of the goals
involved, the activities performed, and the relationships between them during a
particular scenario. A task model for the SCG meetings observed during the training
exercise is presented in Figure 2. Essentially the SCG meetings began with an overview
of the current situation, given by the meeting chair (Police Chief), following which the
 Coordination
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145
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Figure 2.
SCG meeting task model

chair discussed action points from the previous SCG meeting. Each agency
representative was then asked to give an overview of the current situation from his
or her own agency’s perspective. This involved describing the current situation from
their own agency’s point of view, including the tasks completed, the tasks currently
being performed and the tasks required, any forecasted activities, the resources
available to the agency and the projected situational picture from each agency’s point
of view. All through this process, tasks were allocated around the table, based on
capabilities and resources, as and when they arose. Once each agency representative
has given their situational update the process of making MACA requests began. This
involved the Police Chief giving an overview of each MACA request to the Brigade
Commander, who then proceeded to interrogate and clarify the request in order to
make a judgement as to whether the request for assistance could be dealt with by the
military. Throughout the meeting, all actions and task allocations were recorded.
Distributed situation awareness (DSA; Salmon et al., 2008) is catered for by the
propositional network approach, which produces networks depicting a system’s
awareness, the information underlying it, the mapping between the different pieces of
information and the usage of this information by different parties (Salmon et al., 2009).
In this case the propositional networks were constructed via content analyses on the
verbal transcripts obtained from the SCG meetings. This involved identifying
keywords from the verbal transcripts via content analysis, linking the keywords (or
 DPM concepts) based on their relationships during the task in question and then identifying
20,2 the usage of each concept by the different parties involved. The output is a network of
linked information elements; the network contains all of the information that is used by
the different agents and artefacts during task performance and thus represents the
system’s knowledge. These information elements represent what the system and its
agents “needed to know” in order to successfully undertake task performance. To
146 demonstrate how propositional networks are constructed, Figure 3 presents an extract
of a verbal transcript collected during the case study; the keywords extracted from this
transcript via content analysis are highlighted in bold and the ensuing propositional
network is presented on the right-hand side of Figure 3.
For the purposes of the propositional network analysis, SCG meetings were divided
into two distinct phases: the first phase involved each agency giving their own
situational update and agency perspective (including tasks completed, in progress and
required, and situational projections), while the second phase involved the process of
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making, discussing and responding to MACA requests. For each of the SCG meetings
observed, propositional networks were constructed for each meeting phase. For
example purposes, a propositional network for the first phase of one of the SCG
meetings observed is presented in Figure 4. The propositional network for the second
phase of the same meeting is presented in Figure 5.
The CDM is a cognitive task analysis approach that uses semi-structured interviews
and cognitive probes in order to analyse the cognitive processes underlying decision
making in complex environments. Using this approach, critical incidents are
decomposed into decision points, and targeted interview probes focusing on cognition
and decision-making are used to identify the cognitive processes underlying operator
performance at each decision point. Upon completion of the exercise, the SCG

Figure 3.
Propositional network
example
 Coordination
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147
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Figure 4.
SCG Meeting 1 first phase
propositional network

representative from each agency was asked to complete a CDM interview pro forma
based on the emergency response activities undertaken. The pro forma contained a
series of probes designed to elicit pertinent information regarding the agency’s decision
making during the emergency response. For example purposes, the Brigade
Commander’s CDM transcript is presented in Table I.
 DPM
20,2

148
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Figure 5.
SCG Meeting 1 MACA
request propositional
network
 Coordination
Role: Commander
during emergency
Agency: Army

Goal specification What were your specific goals at the various decision points?
– Refine UK ops procedures
– Achieve task given 149
– Military make appropriate intervention
– Capability and capacity to civil authorities
– Enhance military reputation – need to succeed
– Priorities – North Tees substation, Bell Marsh substation, sea
walls

Cue identification What features were you looking for when you formulated your
decision?
– Understand detail of what’s required (not clear what problem
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and task was)

– To force gold colleagues to say exactly what they want
How did you know that you needed to make the decision? How did you
know when to make the decision?
– When plan is viable
– When all parties agree on plan (mutually develop the scope with
gold colleagues so I know that I can allocate troops to tasks)

Expectancy Were you expecting to make this sort of decision during the course of
the event? Describe how this affected your decision-making process?
– Know that you need to understand the task
– You know that people don’t know what they are asking for

Conceptual Are there any situations in which your decision would have turned out
differently?
– Know principles of what is required
– Know military capability (I know what we can and cannot do)
– Know only to ask questions on what things I can get authority to do

Influence of uncertainty At any stage were you uncertain either about the reliability of the
relevance of the information that you had available?
– I was clear that the situation was not clear to any of us
– I was challenging people to get as much information as possible
– I can be confrontational in order to get the information quickly

Information integration What was the most important piece of information that you used to
formulate the decision?
– I needed to know where I fitted in in terms of what were the
expectations of my civilian colleagues

Situation awareness What information did you have available at the time of the decision?
– Understanding of military capability (I went to check what was
available at the time in advance of the meeting)
– Results of the recce
– I took a long time to understand the priorities which meant that Table I.
the planning process was easier Brigade Commander
(continued) CDM transcript
 DPM Situation assessment Did you use all of the information available to you when formulating
20,2 the decision?
– Yes
– Was there any additional information that you might have used
to assist in the formulation of the decision?
– The results of the recce were slow to come through and I would
have liked to have flown over and visited all of the sites
150 personally
– Conflicting information so there were problems in getting the
true picture in what was going on
Options Were there any other alternatives available to you other than the
decision that you made?
– No there were no alternatives which greatly simplified the
planning. By the time we understood the problem there really
was only one course of action and there were no synchronisation
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issues as I had lots of troops

Decision blocking – stress Was there any stage during the decision-making process in which you
found it difficult to process and integrate the information available?
– It was a new team in the HQ so the rhythm had not been
established and because the team were working together for the
first time the passage of information between people was slow to
start with and once you learn how to work with each other you
learn the interlocking between individuals
Basis of choice Do you think that you could develop a rule, based on your experience,
which could assist another person in making the same decision
successfully?
– Direct military approach can be counterproductive when
working with civilian colleagues (civilians can refuse to do
things if they think you are being rude with them) but I thought I
could get away with it because it was an urgent situation
– I’m acutely aware that im not in charge and the gold team can be
led by the police or by DEFRA. The police are used to making
decisions quickly but DEFRA are not used to high tempo
operations and quick decisions
Analogy/generalisation Were you at any time reminded of previous experiences in which a
similar/different decision was made?
– I have extensive experience of working with civilian agencies
and the issues are common across multi-agency working (they
don’t like being ordered about or the confrontational approach
Table I. but it gets the information quickly!)

The analysis presented was used to identify the issues that hindered coordination of
activities during the MACA activities observed. Issues were identified through
reviewing the propositional network and CDM data and identifying instances where
issues affected the coordination between agencies and the efficiency of the response.
An example of this is presented in Figure 6, where the issue of unclear MACA
requests is highlighted within the propositional network taken from Phase 2 of SCG
Meeting 1.
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Figure 6.
Identification of problem
issues
 DPM Discussion
20,2 Issues
Our other research activities, including the literature review, retrospective case study
analyses, and SME interviews, have allowed us to identify a range of factors that limit
coordination between the military and civilian organisations during multi-agency
emergency responses. The factors identified can be meaningfully grouped into the
152 following categories: the organisation, information management, communication,
situation awareness, equipment, cultural issues, training. The factors identified are
presented in Table II.
A number of the issues described above were extant during the exercise analysed. A
common theme was the various problems associated with the communication of
information between agencies. For example, problems associated with information
sharing at the SCG level included a lack of information sharing between agencies, the
communication of inaccurate and/or incomplete information between agencies,
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agencies misunderstanding the information communicated, and poor information

management. The CDM interviews revealed that there are currently no standardised
procedures for sharing and managing information at the SCG level. Currently during
SCG meetings each agency is required to give a situational update in order to allow the
SCG to build a common operational picture, and it is the responsibility of the other
agency representatives present to take what information they wish from each update,
which is usually in note form. Further, task allocations, situational forecasts and
MACA requests are all dealt with verbally and again, it is the responsibility of each
representative to record the information as required. The CDM responses also
highlighted some of the problems associated with communication between agencies at
the SCG level. For example, the Police Chief suggested that there was a need for SCG
representatives to be better informed during SCG meetings; he felt that more
information was required at the SCG level and that decisions were, at times, made on
the basis of incomplete information. Further, in recommending a rule for further
similar situations the Police Chief suggested that SCG representatives should make
sure that they are in receipt of all available information when making decisions. The
issue of inaccurate or conflicting information at the SCG level was also apparent in the
CDM data. Most of the CDM respondents referred to the problem of inaccurate,
incomplete and/or conflicting information. The major problem in building situation
awareness cited by the respondents was the presence of conflicting, inaccurate,
unreliable or incomplete information at the SCG level.
The issue of lack of clarity when civilian organisations make requests for MACA
assistance was also apparent during the case study. For example, MACA requests
often lacked clarity in terms of what exactly was required (e.g. what effect, what tasks,
what capability, what manpower), when it was required, and why. Further, requests
were often not framed in a manner suitable for the military; requests focussed more on
actions required rather than the overall effect or desired end state required (the military
use a concept known as “effects-based operations”, which focuses on planning for
desired end states rather than the actions required). In addition, agencies often
misunderstood the capability of the military in terms of what they can and cannot do
and also what resources they possess. Finally, an additional problem identified is a
general lack of trust between the military and agencies requesting assistance regarding
the extent to which other possibilities have been explored by the requesting agency.
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Information
Organisation management Communication Situation awareness Equipment Cultural issues Training

Lack of clear and Poor information Lack of Inadequate levels of Inadequate Incompatible Lack of multi-
effective leadership management communication distributed situation communications procedures agency training
awareness technology exercises
Unclear command Lack of an Communication of Inadequate levels of Incompatible Lack of Lack of experience
and control structure appropriate inaccurate or meta-situation communications understanding of in working with
common operational incomplete awareness technology military concepts, other agencies
picture information processes and
procedures
Inadequate or Lack of clarity Lack of clear Lack of Poorly equipped Lack of
inappropriate regarding MACA communications understanding of command centre understanding of
command and requests links between each agency’s roles civilian concepts,
control structure agencies and responsibilities processes and
procedures
Lack of clarity Lack of a common Lack of
regarding each communications understanding of
agency’s roles and structure each agency’s
responsibilities capability and
resources
Inadequate multi- Lack of
agency response understanding of
frameworks, or each agency’s
procedures contributions
Conflicting goals

multi-agency emergency
Coordination

coordination during
Factors limiting

responses
during emergency

153

Table II.
 DPM Solutions
20,2 The problems of information sharing and management can be approached using a
distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995) and DSA (Salmon et al., 2009) theoretical
perspective discussed earlier. Both approaches advocate the importance of so-called
“cognitive artefacts” (i.e. information representations in the world) for acquiring and
maintaining awareness of what is going on. Situation awareness within a collaborative
154 system is seen to be distributed across human actors and the technology that they use
(Salmon et al., 2009). The use of cognitive artefacts allows information underlying
situation awareness to be present in the world (rather than in the heads of human actors),
which supports the development and maintenance of DSA within collaborative,
multi-actor systems. In this case the use of cognitive artefacts at the SCG meeting seems
a suitable way in which to ensure that the information required is displayed “in the
world” rather than in the heads of agency representatives. This reduces the load
associated with remembering the information presented by other agencies and also
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ensures that the information is displayed to all agencies, at all times, in a consistent
fashion. Hutchins’s (1995) seminal article entitled “How a cockpit remembers its speeds”,
for example, describes how, during landing, cognitive labour is distributed across the
pilots, procedures and displays used. Rather than memorise the required changes in
speed and associated flap/slat levels, display and speed bug devices (black pointers that
can be moved around the airspeed indicator dial – each with its own flap and slat setting
name) are set prior to the approach and act as external representations of the required
speed settings during the approach and landing task.
To demonstrate the concept of using cognitive artefacts to aid planning we can look
at how the UK Army currently undertakes the Combat Estimate “Seven Questions”
mission planning process (Ministry of Defence, 2007b). The Seven Questions process is
described exhaustively elsewhere (see Stanton et al., 2009). In short, the process
involves planners working through seven questions in order to understand the
battlefield situation and produce and refine an appropriate course of action for the
mission in question. Throughout the process planning staff use a series of cognitive
artefacts to communicate elements of the plan around the system and to maintain the
system’s awareness of the plan. Examples of the cognitive artefacts used include a
local operational picture, a commander’s critical information requirements whiteboard,
an effects schematic whiteboard, a mission analysis whiteboard, a commander’s
decision brief whiteboard, a task organisation whiteboard, a synchronisation matrix, a
decision support overlay, and a decision support overlay matrix. For example
purposes, a mission analysis whiteboard is presented in Figure 7, and an effects
schematic whiteboard is presented in Figure 8.
During the case study no such cognitive artefacts were used at the SCG level; also,
there is no formal requirement for cognitive artefacts, such as tasks and timings, a
common operational picture and a mission analysis board to be used at the SCG level.
It is our view that introducing cognitive artefacts, similar to those used by the UK
Army would be (with modifications where required) useful for enhancing information
sharing, coordination and DSA at the SCG level during multi-agency activities.
Examples of potentially useful artefacts are presented in Table III.
When placed in the gold command centre it is postulated that these cognitive
artefacts will support collaborative planning and coordination of activities by
presenting an agreed understanding. In another paper to emerge from this research,
 Coordination
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155

Figure 7.
Mission analysis
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whiteboard

Figure 8.
Effects schematic
whiteboard

Jenkins et al. (2009) present an overview of the development of these whiteboards for
multi-agency military-civilian emergency response activities.
The problems surrounding the clarity of MACA requests can be reduced through
the introduction of a simplified MACA request pro forma. Such a pro forma could use a
tick-box system in order to ensure that requesting agencies provide the military with
enough detail regarding what is required, why and when in order to ensure the request
is correctly framed and understood. Further, details of other avenues explored could be
included to remove the need for the military to question whether the agency had
thoroughly explored all available options. In response to this, Jenkins et al. (2009)
developed a pro forma for MACA requests.
 DPM
Artefact Description
20,2
Mission analysis record Provides a detailed breakdown of the mission, including the
desired end state, the specified and implied tasks, deductions,
constraints and the associated requests for information and
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)
156 List of resources Provides a breakdown of the resources available to each of the
agencies involved in the response
Effects schematic Provides a schematic of the overall mission plan, including a
breakdown of the nature and purpose of each effect
Critical information requirements Provides a detailed breakdown of the CCIRs relevant to the
mission
Synchronisation matrix Provides an overview of events in terms of when they are to occur
Table III.
and who is to undertake them
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Examples of cognitive
artefacts for the SCG level Record of actual events Provides a summary of all events undertaken and their outcomes

General guidelines
In addition to the specific solutions specified above, more general guidelines can be
used to optimise coordination between the military and civilian agencies. Ensuring that
the roles and responsibilities of the different agencies involved are clear is important,
and yet it was apparent in this study that agencies did not fully understand who was
doing what. Whilst this is important in terms of overall role and contribution to the
response, it is also important on a minute-by-minute basis and each agency should be
aware of what the other agencies are doing (and thus what they should know) at
different points in the task. This should include knowledge of exactly what tasks other
agencies are engaged in and knowledge of what other agency members should know at
that point in time (meta-situation awareness). Ambiguity in role definition can
adversely impact performance since it leads to confusion over who is doing what, who
knows what and who possesses what information. The issue of leadership was also
extant during the case study; the importance of effective leadership is exacerbated
when the “team” is distributed across different agencies. Leadership for different
multi-agency scenarios should be clearly defined in terms of which agency will take the
lead and how leadership is to be exercised and maintained. The use of regular
multi-agency training exercises is also recommended, both by the authors and by
others in the literature (e.g. Chen et al., 2008). It is apparent that when providing
multi-agency training, the training provided should include the entire multi-agency
“system” and should be undertaken within the context in which the team is required to
perform; Paris et al. (2000), for example, outline the concept of team-whole training in
which teams are trained within the context of the team and its coordination and
communications requirements. In particular, the use of large-scale emergency scenario
training involving gold, silver and bronze level command is recommended.
A clear definition of the information requirements of different agencies is also
required. Multi-agency procedures and support systems should be designed on the basis
of an in-depth understanding of the information requirements of each of the agencies
involved. This requires that the situation awareness requirements of the different
 agencies involved during emergency responses are specified in detail. Matthews et al. Coordination
(2004) point out that knowing what the situation awareness requirements are for a given during emergency
domain provides engineers and technology developers with a basis to develop optimal
system designs to maximise human performance rather than overloading workers and
degrading their performance; they suggest that the identification of situation awareness
requirements is a fundamental step in designing technological systems that optimise
work performance. It also imperative that these differing situation awareness 157
requirements are fully supported throughout task performance. It is vital that
agencies have access to the right information, in the right format, at the right time. Any
procedures, protocols, or systems used to augment multi-agency response should
therefore cater for these different, but compatible information requirements. It is also
important that agencies are not presented with information that they do not explicitly
require. Gorman et al. (2006), for example, suggested that, due to the specialised roles
apparent within typical command and control environments, the design principle of
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giving every team member displays which present all of the information required by the
entire team is invalid. Gorman et al. (2006) propose that it may in fact be prohibitive and
counteractive to give everyone mutual access to the same information.
The importance of compatible mental models in collaborative systems has been
outlined in the literature (e.g. Fox et al., 2000; Paris et al., 2000). Compatible mental
models are critical to a number of key team behaviours, including coordination,
communication and distributed situation awareness. It is therefore recommended that
measures are taken to develop shared mental models between agencies. This can be
achieved through joint training exercises (Endsley and Jones, 1997).
This research represents a first step at identifying, and solving, the issues that limit
coordination between agencies during multi-agency responses. It is hoped that much
further investigation is undertaken in the area, and that some of the issues identified in
this article are explored further. In closing, it seems likely that the requirement for the
military to work in tandem with civilian organisations will increase (e.g. large-scale
emergency response, disaster management and humanitarian assistance operations) and
so it is imperative that the problem of coordination between the military and civilian
organisations be approached through the application of structured research methods. It
is hoped that the ideas presented will lead to further research in the area. In particular,
research testing solutions to the problems raised is urged, as is further guidance on how
to promote coordination during multi-agency, emergency response activities.

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Further reading
O’Hare, D., Wiggins, M., Williams, A. and Wong, W. (2000), “Cognitive task analysis for decision
centred design and training”, Task Analysis, Taylor & Francis, London, pp. 170-90.
Rietjens, S.J.H., Voordijk, H.T. and De Boer, S.J. (2007), “Co-ordinating humanitarian operations
in peace support missions”, Disaster Prevention & Management, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 56-69.

Corresponding author
Paul Salmon can be contacted at: paul.salmon@monash.edu

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