OUTCOME VIS-À-VIS DESIRED END STATE

NATO's Objectives1

1. NATO's objectives in relation to the conflict in Kosovo were set out in the Statement
issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO on 12
April 1999 and were reaffirmed by Heads of State and Government in Washington on 23
April 1999:-

(a) A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence
and repression;

(b) The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;

(c) The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;

(d) The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;

(e) Establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis

of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the
United Nations.

2. Throughout the conflict, the achievement of these objectives, accompanied by

measures to ensure their full implementation, has been regarded by the Alliance as the
prerequisite for bringing to an end the violence and human suffering in Kosovo.

3. The desired outcome of the entire campaign hinged on these objectives. After
numerous attempts by the international community (with NATO in lead), tried diffusing the
situation, the campaign commenced on 23 Mar 99. After 78 days of campaign, Slobodan
Milosevic gave in to NATO’s demands. Now the question lies, what should have been the
desired end state of the campaign.

4. Keeping the asymmetry of forces in view, the desired objectives should have been
achieved by the NATO meetings held in May and Jun 1998, however this was not the
case. On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the situation, the NATO Council
authorized Activation Orders for air strikes. This move was designed to support diplomatic
efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing
an end to the violence and facilitate the return of refugees to their homes. At the last
moment, following further diplomatic initiatives including visits to Belgrade by NATO's

1
NATO’s role in Kosovo : A Historical Overview https://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm
Secretary General Solana, US Envoys Holbrooke and Hill, the Chairman of NATO's
Military Committee, General Naumann, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
General Clark, President Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called off.
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199, among other things, expressed deep
concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav
army, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict. In the spirit of the UNSCR,
limits were set on the number of Serbian forces in Kosovo, and on the scope of their
operations, following a separate agreement with Generals Naumann and Clark. However,
the elusive Slobodan Milosevic continued his efforts of ethnic cleansing. Inspite of the
Rambouillet Agreement and the agreement in Paris between the two parties, the Serbians
intensified their activities.

5. Desired End State. The desired end state should have been a swift and
short campaign, to paralyze the Serbian combat forces, with synergized appl of air and
grnd forces. This would have resulted in a campaign, which would have yielded tangible
results, both in mil, pol, eco and strat perspectives and ensured that the campaign would
have been culminated in a very short duration.

Outcomes

6. Constraints. NATO undertook Operation Allied Force with the

expectation of a short bombing effort. However, when a rapid capitulation failed to
materialize, NATO confronted not only an intransigent Serbian leadership but also the
acceleration of a large-scale and ruthless displacement of Kosovars. This was exactly the
cause the campaign was aimed at preventing.

7. Pol Pressure. The constant political pressure both internally and from the
larger international community to conduct a military campaign that kept NATO military
casualties to a minimum, minimized collateral damage to civilians (Serbs and Albanian
Kosovars alike) and restricted attacks on Yugoslav infrastructure. IN the same breath, the
international community also wanted a swift end to the ethnic cleansing and atrocities that
were ongoing. These multiple objectives were in clear tension with one another and were,
in many ways, contradictory. NATO’s military operation during those 78 days was shaped
by the need to pursue all the objectives throughout the course of the conflict. This had
profound consequences for planning, for execution of the air operation, and for the
deployment and employment of the U.S. Army’s Task Force (TF) Hawk.

8. Plg Fallacies. In view of the initial obj not being met, due to non compliance
of Slobodan Milosevic, the prospect of a protracted campaign came up to the fore. Very
little prep, both at pol and mil level were done for the same, keeping aside the cost effects
of the protracted efforts. Well before Operation Allied Force commenced, any prospect of
using ground forces as part of an integrated campaign were ruled out. The political and
military costs and risks of conducting a ground operation were viewed as excessive. Not
only was this option shelved, no serious contingency planning for air-land operations was
undertaken. The exclusive plg focus was on air and msl strikes. NATO’s mil plg therefore
evolved in a pol sustainable but mil disjointed fashion. It is a known fact that on 10 Jun
1999, when Slobodan Milosevic, finally acceded to NATO, it was the same time when
President Bill Clinton was contemplating the appl of grnd forces, finally. This could very
well have been the reason behind Milosevic’s decision. In that case, this option should
have been planned well in adv and though not applied, it could have very well act as a
maj deterrent.

9. Cost Factor. The protracted campaign, use of high end tech and precision
munitions, all came at a cost. The expdr incurred and its effect on the exchequer was
staggering. In fact, this saw surfacing of numerous fissures in the relns of the participating
nations of NATO, though the alliance held up throughout the campaign. The over
dependence on US by other partners was another critical issue.

10. Losses. The losses incurred by the civ as compared to both conflicting
parties, was humongous. To qauntify the various facets, the losses are categorised as
under:-

(a) Civ Cas In the 2008 joint study by the Humanitarian Law Centre (an
NGO from Serbia and Kosovo), The International Commission on Missing
Persons, and the Missing Person Commission of Serbia made a name-by-name
list of war and post-war victims. According to the updated 2015 Kosovo Memory
Book, 13,535 people were killed or missing in Kosovo during the conflict, from 1
January 1998 up until December 2000. Of these, 10,812 were Albanians, 2,197
Serbs and 526 Roma, Bosniaks, Montenegrins and others. 10,317 civilians were
killed or went missing, of whom 8,676 were Albanians, 1,196 Serbs and 445
Roma and others. The remaining 3,218 dead or missing were combatants,
including 2,131 members of the KLA and FARK, 1,084 members of Serbian
forces and 3 members of KFOR.

(b) Civ Killed By NATO Forces. According to the varied perceptions of

the two parties, the civ cas due to NATO bombings vary from 400 to 1500.

(c) Civ Killed / Disocated by Yugoslav Forces. Various estimates are

available on the same, with a contrarian view by both parties. However, an
estimated 8,00,000 civ were displaced and about 10,000 killed.
 (d) Mil Losses. The losses incurred by the NATO forces as well as the
Yugoslav tps, were minimal as compared to the displaced and antagonized civ.

Conclusion

11. In the hindsight, it would be prudent to assume that a more weighed decision of
using Grnd forces in an integrated appl with air, would have resulted in achievement of
obj in a much faster time frame and a much lower cost. The losses and excessive use of
force though, could have been factors to ponder about.