GODOFREDO B.

HERRERA, as municipal president of Caloocan,

vs.
ALBERTO BARRETTO, Judge of first instance of Rizal, and CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN

G.R. No. 8692 September 10, 1913

MORELAND, J.:

FACTS:

On 1st of March, 1913, Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a license to

open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to
issue it to him, began an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said
municipality, the officer whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain
a mandamus compelling said official to issue such license.

The plaintiff asked that the court issue a mandatory injunction directed to the defendant
requiring him to issue a provisional license under which the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit
during the pendency of the action. The court, issued such order ex parte without notice of the
defendant.

Thereupon the defendant in that action began a proceeding in this court against the judge
of the Court of First Instance who had issued the mandatory injunction relative to the provisional
license referred to, Honorable Alberto Barretto, and Constancio Joaquin, plaintiff therein, for a
writ of certiorari, alleging that the court below and had acted without jurisdiction

ISSUE: Did the court act with jurisdiction?

RULING:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case.
Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the
exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should
therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all,
and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction
of the person and subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions
arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

In States vs. Second Judicial District (24 Mont., 238), the court said: Certiorari may not
be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court."

That certiorari will lie only in case of failure of jurisdiction has been consistently held by
this court. The following are substantially all of the cases decided by this court referring
to certiorari or prohibition. We include those referring to prohibition for the reason that the
ground of its issuance is the same as that in certiorari, viz, lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 In the case of Bañes vs. Cordero (13 Phil. Rep., 466), the court said: "And, if the
jurisdiction has not been exceeded, there is not nor could there be any legal ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, because these proceedings can only exclusively be granted to
remedy abuses committed in the exercise of a power or jurisdiction. Sections 217 and 514 of the
Code of Civil Procedure providing for such relief unequivocally and specifically refer to the act
of exceeding or going beyond the jurisdiction; and this court has repeatedly held that, in order
that certiorari may issue, it is absolutely necessary to show that the respondent has exceeded his
power or jurisdiction.

It is not light thing that the lawmakers have abolished writs of error and with
them certiorari and prohibition, in so far as they were methods by which the mere errors of an
inferior court could be corrected. As instrument to that end they no longer exist. Their place is
now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court retains jurisdiction its errors can be
corrected only by that method. The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the
correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. It is
truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary
cases—cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in
the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever; where
the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would
be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension,
a recorded falsehood, a standing menace. It is only to avoid such results as these that a writ
of certiorari is issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to
prosecute it.

A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the
question of certiorari and prohibition fully support the proposition already stated that, where a
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, its decision of any
question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be reviewed by certiorari, but must
be corrected by appeal.

We cannot leave the case without suggesting that the applicant herein, before coming to
this court, should, as the better practice, have made the proper application to the Court of First
Instance for a dissolution or modification of the mandatory injunction, and thereby given that
court an opportunity, after full argument of counsel and citation of authorities, to pass upon the
question of his power and jurisdiction and, even, the correctness and propriety of his action,
should power and jurisdiction be found by the court to exist. Questions which Courts of First
Instance are required by law to decide should not be summarily taken from them and presented
to this court without first giving them an opportunity of deliberately passing on such questions
themselves. The most natural and proper thing to do, when such court, in the judgment of one of
the parties, has issued an injunction erroneously, is immediately to call the attention of that court
to its supposed error and ask for its correction. The strongest reasons of policy and courtesy if
not actual legal rights itself, require such procedure; and we discourage all attempts to come to
this court upon questions which a court below is entitled to decide without first invoking its
judgment thereon. There are special reasons for following this course in cases where the court
has acted ex parte. The writ is denied and the proceeding is dismissed.