G.R. Nos. 72915, Etc Phil Bar Assoc Vs Comelec

3/28/2019 G.R. Nos.
72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 72915. December 19, 1985.]
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 72922. December 19, 1985.]
MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 72923. December 19, 1985.]
MP AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., ET AL., petitioners, vs.

THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 72924. December 19, 1985.]
THE MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 72927. December 19, 1985.]
THE LIBERAL PARTY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE

NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 72928. December 19, 1985.]
CONCERNED WOMEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,

petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO SAVELLANO, ET AL.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 72935. December 19, 1985.]
https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/56324/print 1/27
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

[G.R. No. 72954. December 19, 1985.]
VICTOR C. AVECILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 72957. December 19, 1985.]
NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET

AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 72968. December 19, 1985.]
LABAN NG BAYAN [LABAN], ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE

[G.R. No. 72986. December 19, 1985.]
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
Gentlemen :
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court

En Banc dated December 19, 1985. ATcEDS
"G.R. No. 72915 (Philippine Bar Association, et al. vs. The

Commission on Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72922 (Martiniano P. Vivo, et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72923 (MP Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. The Treasurer of the Philippines, et al.); G.R. No.
72924 (The Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI], et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.);
G.R. No. 72927 (The Liberal Party, et al. vs. The National Treasurer of the
Philippines); G.R. No. 72928 (Concerned Women of the Philippines, et al.
vs. Hon. Maximiano Savellano, et al.); G.R. No. 72935 (Alberto G. Romulo,
et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72954 (Victor C.
Avecilla, et al. vs. Commission on Elections); G.R. No. 72957 (National Bar
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.);

G.R. No. 72968 (Laban ng Bayan [LABAN], et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al.) and G.R. No. 72986 (Juan T. David vs. The Commission
on Elections, et al.). — After considering all the pleadings and deliberating
on the issues raised in the petitions as well as on the oral arguments of the
parties and the amici curiae in the hearings held in these cases, Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino and six (6) Justices, namely, Justices Claudio
Teehankee, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., Vicente Abad Santos, Efren I.
Plana, Venicio T. Escolin and Lorenzo Relova, voted to DISMISS the
petitions in these cases and to DENY the prayer for the issuance of an
injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7,
1986. In the opinion of Chief Justice Aquino, B.P. 883 is constitutional.
"Justices Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., B.S. de la Fuente, Serafin R. Cuevas,
Nestor B. Alampay and Lino M. Patajo voted to DECLARE B. P. 883
unconstitutional and to grant the injunction prayed for.
"Justice Teehankee is of the opinion that inasmuch as there are less
than ten votes in favor of declaring B.P. Blg. 883 unconstitutional, the
petitions in these cases are hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed
for are denied.
"This is in accordance with the opinion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC,
21 SCRA 802 and Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 141.
"Justices Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., de la
Fuente, Alampay and Patajo filed separate opinions.
"This resolution is without prejudice to the filing of separate opinions
by the other Members of this Court.
"At the session of January 7, 1986, the Court noted that its act of
dismissing the petitions had not been formally stated in its basic Resolution
of December 19, 1985. The Court therefore authorizes the insertion of the
following dispositive portion:
'Accordingly, inasmuch as there are less than the required ten
(10) votes to declare Batas Pambansa Bilang 883 unconstitutional,
the petitions in these cases are hereby DISMISSED and the writs
therein prayed for are DENIED.'"
"Chief Justice Aquino is of the opinion that the revision of the
December 19, 1985 resolution is totally unnecessary. It is clear. It is
understood that the petitions are dismissed. The public and the Comelec
understood that the petitions were dismissed." ETaSDc
Melencio-Herrera, * J., took no part in all these cases.
Very truly yours,
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
(SGD.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition for prohibition against

enforcement of BP Blg. 883 on the ground that no clear case has been
made of an absolute void of power and authority that would warrant its
nullification and that prohibition is not a remedy for acts done that can no
longer be undone.
The stated issue is quite simple: Is B.P. Blg. 883 calling for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 for the offices of President and
Vice-President of the Philippines ( for the first time since the pre-martial era
1969 presidential elections) unconstitutional, and should this Court
therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections?
Upon the filing on December 3rd of the lead and other petitions at
bar, four members of the Court (Justices Abad Santos, Relova, Gutierrez,
Jr. and myself) voted per the Court's Resolution of December 5th to issue
a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the Act and to hear
the petitions on last December 12th so as to maintain the status quo and
thereafter speedily resolve the issue and prevent the people's expectations
from reaching a point of no return. Our vote did not gain the required
concurrence of a majority of eight. Instead the Court granted the parties
substantial periods for filing of respondents' comment and petitioners'
replies and to hear the case only after two weeks on December 17th
(continued to December 18th) with a clear consensus to take a vote and
resolve the petitions immediately after the hearing.
It is of public knowledge and record, as pointed out by former Vice-
President, Senator and Executive Committee Member Emmanuel N.
Pelaez, amicus curiae, who helped in drafting the 1984 constitutional
amendments abolishing the Executive Committee and restoring the Office
of Vice-President as the President's successor, that such restoration was
not made effective immediately, but only at the end of the incumbent
President's term on June 30, 1987 in view of his oft-expressed "allergy to
vice-presidents." Hence, Sen. Pelaez submits that the President's letter of
conditional "resignation" (for the word is nowhere used therein) "did not
create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article VII of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election
for President and Vice-President earlier than the regular election for such
positions in 1987. The letter's intent was obvious: to circumvent the
constitutional provision which would, in effect, require the President to
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actually vacate his office in favor of the Speaker who would then be the
Acting President until a new one shall have been elected and shall have
qualified. . . . In prescribing the procedure to fill the office of President in
case of vacancy therein occurred during the term of President Marcos, it
[the cited section] excluded any discretion on the part of the Batasang
Pambansa to legislate on the same subject. In fact, given the very detailed
and precise steps to be taken by the Batasang Pambansa under [the first
four paragraphs] for the purpose of calling a special election to fill the
vacancy, there was no room for legislative action to supplement the same.
BP Blg. 883 which is a reproduction of Cabinet Bill No. 7, is in conflict with
the Constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office
after the calling of the special election. To put it another way: the
President's offer to cut his term short is valid. The trouble is he does not go
far enough: he should actually vacate the office forthwith." 1/ DCISAE
In the interval of over two weeks between December 3rd and now,
supervening facts and events have overtaken the Court and the petitions
at bar so much so that many of the petitions were withdrawn expressly or
abandoned impliedly. The political parties have since chosen and
proclaimed their candidates for president and vice-president and the
frenzied campaign is in full swing. President Ferdinand E. Marcos is
quoted as saying: "we have already spent a lot of energy and money on
this thing." 2/ The foremost exponent of the Act's unconstitutionality, M.P.
Arturo Tolentino who strongly held that "Mr. Marcos is not intended by the
Constitution to succeed himself before 1987 for an additional six years"
and that "the President must first resign from office in order for the
constitutional mandate to go into effect and for the Batasan speaker to
assume the post of Acting President" 3/ had laid aside his "personal
objections" against the bill's validity and has accepted the ruling KBL's
nomination as vice-presidential candidate with President Ferdinand E.
Marcos as candidate for reelection in the scheduled February 7, 1986
national elections. The heretofore divided opposition has unified and
likewise presented their standard bearers Corazon "Cory" Aquino and
former Senator Salvador "Doy" Laurel, for president and vice-president,
respectively. President Marcos himself in his letter to the Batasang
Pambansa 4/ "irrevocably vacati(ng) the position of President effective only
when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified
as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation"
urgently stresses that "there is no moment to lose", that "I am, therefore,
left no choice but to seek a new mandate in an election that will assess, as
demanded by the opposition, the policies and programs I am undertaking.
Such an election necessarily shortens my tenure. But the necessity arises
from no less than the time-honored principle of public accountability,
inherent in a democracy and explicit in our Constitution" and that the "final
settlement of these issues can be achieved only through a presidential
election."
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The unified opposition has likewise realized the imperative urgency

of seeking the mandate and verdict of the people. Rather than insist on
strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent
President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker
of the Batasang Pambansa as Acting President, their standard bearers as
the parties most prejudiced have not filed any suit or petition in intervention
for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. Instead, the unified
opposition, including almost all other political parties of standing, (with the
exception of a few who have lost faith in the electoral process due to past
sorry experiences) have rallied behind the presidential candidacy of Cory
Aquino. In short, they have taken the President at his own terms and
conditions and will confront him at the scheduled February 7, 1986
elections and have not insisted that he vacate the office of president and
its vast powers. As Senator Pelaez reported to the Court: "(T)he
Opposition's answer is firm" they are willing to give the President this illegal
handicap, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest."
The real issue at bar has thus veered from the purely justiciable
issue of the questioned constitutionality of the Act due to the lack of an
actual vacancy in the office of President and transformed itself into a
political question that can only be truly decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity in a fair, clean and honest election. (Javellana vs. Exec.
Secretary, 50 SCRA 30). Stated differently, may this Court at this
advanced stage stop the holding of the elections?
Labor Minister Blas Ople, an articulate KBL spokesman, stressed
that the people's minds have been prepared and conditioned to expect the
holding of the February 7th, 1986 presidential elections and that the Court
"from its ivory tower" should not stand in the way. (This nation-wide
perception that the great majority of the people want to express their will in
the special election as the best chance for democracy's survival is
reflected in all sectors of the press, be they establishment, neutral or
opposition.) As reported by the press: "Ople said the high court, which did
not issue a restraining order to stop preparations for the special elections,
"will have to take judicial notice of a fait accompli — the elections are on.
He said the KBL, and the opposition have formed a consensus by deed by
nominating their official tickets, campaigning and spending, while the
people 'from whom all sovereignty emanates' have been conditioned to
expect an election. . . . The people and the world, Ople said, will not
believe that the administration did not help influence a court annulment of
the elections, no matter how unfair this charge of interference in judicial
independence might be. Thus, he said, the cancellation of the elections
'can only aggravate the prevailing crisis and the President may find it
difficult to govern effectively. 'Here and abroad, Ople said, there will be
calls for the President to step down and allow an election under Article 7,
Section 9 of the Constitution, to clear the last remaining obstacle to an
election which, both sides now agree, should be held to 'break a
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dangerous stalemate in both the political and economic climates' in the

face of 'issues threatening national survival.' Ople said a political system
that calls an election and then calls it off after the momentum has built up
will not be received kindly by the people. An election, he said 'should be
treated with respect and the majesty it deserved.' It gives meaning to the
central directing principle of the Constitution that all sovereignty emanates
from the people, he said." 5/ cAHIST
Senator Pelaez formulated the same political question in this wise:

"These supervening events . . . may have converted the snap poll issue
into a political one, which would remove from the Supreme Court the
authority to stop present snap poll activities on its tracks. . . . From the
standpoint of constitutional government, what has recently happened
represents a giant step, the biggest stride yet made by our people in their
struggle for the restoration of freedom and democracy, which were
shattered by the declaration of martial law. Four elections have since been
held in 1978 for the interim Batasan Pambansa, in 1980 for local officials,
in 1981 for President, and in 1984 for the present Batasan. None of these
elections could be said to have been truly democratic, mainly due to the
absence of a strong, united opposition. Today, by some miracle, the
Opposition has become united, so that a truly one-on-one contest for the
Presidency can be held and the two-party system has suddenly become a
reality. These are substantial gains that should not be frittered away by
postponing the Presidential and Vice-Presidential election to mid-1987.
With these developments, the issue has been decided by the political will
of the people. This Honorable Court should not put obstacles to their
exercise of that will. Beyond these considerations, national survival
depends on the forthcoming snap poll.
"Then the President goes on to state that the mandate he received
from the people in 1981 is no longer valid and that to go on he needs a
new mandate. Here is a confession that he has reached a blank wall, that
he can no longer lead the nation, much less achieve his economic and
other programs on the basis of his 1981 election. The Presidency has lost
its capacity to govern. Hence the people must be given a chance to
decide; either to re-elect the incumbent or choose a new leader.
"I would like to commend the President for his manly response. He
seeks the people's judgment now. And it is a wonderful chance for the
people either to renew their mandate to him or elect a new leader. The
Supreme Court should not stand in the way."
A perceptive columnist has expressed the same view thus: "(T)o say
that the political situation of the country is unstable is to belabor the
obvious. The nation is struggling out of an unprecedentedly severe
economic crisis while fighting off a growing communist-led insurgency.
Government's credibility has been questioned, as has been President
Marcos' ability to lead the nation to normalcy, hence the coming political
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exercise. Indeed, the Filipino nation has been titillated by the prospect of a
change." He quotes MP Renato Cayetano's plea that "(I)t is only fair for the
Supreme Court to tell the parties and the people whether the questioned
law is only part of a charade or a serious attempt to seek a new mandate
for the incumbent in Malacañang. Cayetano says 'Any delay will only
exacerbate the political situation. The Supreme Court should not contribute
to the possible destabilization of the government. The consequences could
be horrifying.'" 6/
Retired Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla as amici curiae have likewise urged the Court not to
prevent the electorate from giving expression to the people's sovereign will
at the scheduled national election. Chief Justice Fernando has submitted
that "such a vacancy arising from a voluntary act of an incumbent of the
Presidential office inspired by the desire to seek a fresh mandate from the
sovereign people is a novel situation not contemplated by the framers of
the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution." Senator Padilla noting
that both the President and the Batasang Pambansa having acted in favor
of the holding of the scheduled national election, submitted that the Court
should defer to the exercise of the people's public right to vote and to
express their judgment, since there is no issue or question more political
than the election. AHEDaI
From the realistic standpoint, what should be borne in mind is that

President Marcos has, through his "post-dated resignation" effectively
shortened by sixteen (16) months his tenure (which would have lasted to
June 30, 1987) to February 1986, when his successor-elect, be it himself
or his opponent Cory Aquino, takes his/her oath of office after proclamation
as the winner. Similarly, the Act has accelerated the restoration of the
stabilizing office of Vice-President to succeed the President in the event of
the latter's permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation.
The scheduled election may indeed well be Philippine democracy's
last chance. UP President Edgardo J. Angara expressed it aptly when he
wrote that "(T)he threat to a democratic society comes either from the
dictatorship of the right or the totalitarianism of the left. . . . The snap
election will provide an opportunity for bringing these breakaway members
back to the center. In a sense, the election is a process of reunification
behind the democratic alternative. When the center of society which
constitutes the majority is given full and unhampered expression in the
polls, the democratic system triumphs and the national consensus that will
emerge is a strong force for future governance. . . . Whichever way the
votes go, what really matters is the majority act of reaffirming the efficacy
of the democratic process. For the center to emerge unified behind the
democratic system is the historic lesson which the snap elections may
provide. . . . Prescinding from the legal issues involved, the holding of the
snap elections seems to have gained popular support not only from the
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various political camps but also from other sectors as well. The prevailing
sentiment seems to be this — waiting for the 1987 Presidential race may
be too late for reasons already properly articulated in other forums."
I wish to express my appreciation for the valuable insights and
perceptions that the three distinguished amici curiae have furnished the
Court at the hearings. The events that have transpired since December
3rd, as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue
into a political question which can be truly decided only by the people in
their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, which hopefully will be
clean, fair and honest. (Let there be a fervent prayer that the Comelec with
its past flip-flopping decisions and orders as recorded in our jurisprudence,
will this time realize that any further desecration of a free and fair election
process will spell disaster for the cause of the peaceful democratic
process.) The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide
through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate
or to elect a new president.
PLANA, J.:
The narrow legal issue involved in these petitions is whether Batas

Pambansa Blg. 883 which provides for a "snap" election on February 7,
1986 violates the Constitution.
An examination of the Constitution, particularly Article VII, Section 9,
does not yield the conclusion that B.P. Blg. 883 is offensive to its
provisions. What is clear is that the Constitution does not prohibit the
President from tendering a resignation that is not immediately effective.
Indeed, there is no provision whatsoever regarding such kind of
resignation.
Not being prohibited, a Presidential resignation in futuro is allowed.
And in such a case, the Batasang Pambansa is not obliged to sit and wait
for the actual vacancy to arise before enacting necessary legislation. That
would be an unreasonable and absurd interpretation of the Constitution,
which is to be eschewed.
Quite apart from the foregoing, there is a strong presumption that a
law is constitutional, which is fortified by the rule that all reasonable doubt
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Hence, in assessing the
constitutionality of a law, "to doubt is to sustain." This approach is dictated
by a healthy respect of the courts for a co-equal department, the
Legislature, and the latter's assumed wisdom within the area of its
competence. This principle is doubly applicable as regards B.P. Blg. 883
which is the product of the joint action of the executive and legislative
departments. DTEAHI
Long ago, U.S. Chief Justice Marshall laid down an epochal

standard in evaluating the constitutional validity of a law: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
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which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." (M'Culloch v. Maryland, et al., 4 Wheat. 316.) That standard
remains valid till now.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petitions.
ESCOLIN, J., separate opinion:
In my view, petitioners failed to demonstrate that BP 883 clearly

contravenes any applicable constitutional provision. Besides, the issue
posed by these petitions is essentially political in character. And "when the
issue is a political one which comes within the exclusive sphere of the
Legislative or Executive Department of the government to decide, the
Judicial Department or the Supreme Court has no authority to determine
whether or not the act of the Legislature or Chief Executive is against the
Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of the courts in such case is
the issue involved, and not the law or constitutional provision which may
be applied". [Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al., L-1123, March 5, 1948,
78 Phil. 1, See concurring opinion of Justice Feria].
It appears that the President himself sought the passage of the
challenged legislation, in his quest for a "new mandate" in an election that
will constitute "public judgment now on policies and programs of a
fundamental nature". The Batasan Pambansa, in the exercise of its plenary
power of legislation, has authorized the holding of the election. The
positive response of the people to the call for such an election has been
overwhelming; and the body politic itself has decided that only an election
in this crucial time could deliver the country from the clutches of subversive
forces as well as the grave economic problems plaguing the country.
Given this environmental circumstances and a statute not clearly
proven to be violative of the letter and the spirit of the constitution, this
Court attuned to the realities of the situation, should not prevent the
electorate from giving expression to their sovereign will.
RELOVA, J., separate opinion:
Article VII of the Constitution, Section 9 thereof, as amended,

provides:
"Section 9. In case of permanent disability, death, removal
from office or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. The Batasang
Pambansa shall by law provide for the case of permanent disability,
death, removal from office or resignation of both the President and
Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then become President or
the manner in which one shall be selected. In case a vacancy in the
Office of President occurs before the presidential election in 1987,
the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa shall act as President until a
President and a Vice-President or either of them shall have been
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elected and shall have qualified. Their term of office shall commence
at noon of the tenth day following proclamation, and shall end at
noon on the thirtieth day of June of the sixth year thereafter."
As held in Gamboa, et al. vs. CA, 108 SCRA 1, [o]ne of the ways of
terminating official relations is by resignation. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation of public office, there must be an intention to
relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment and
a resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form,
express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish
the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. In Our
jurisprudence, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to
be operative and effective, "otherwise the officer is subject to the penal
provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . ." (Emphasis
supplied) In the light of the abovecited case, actual vacancy need not exist
on the day of the election. When, therefore, the Batasang Pambansa,
representing the people, enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 on December
2, 1985 and the President approved it the following day calling for the
elections on February 7, 1986, it, in effect, accepted the resignation
tendered by the incumbent on November 11, 1985 seeking a new mandate
from the people "in an election that will assess, as demanded by the
opposition, the policies and program I am undertaking. Such an election
necessarily shortens my tenure . . ." (Annex B, G.R. No. 72923). Thus, his
term of office was cut short by sixteen (16) months. As a consequence,
there is justification for the holding of an election before May 1987. Stated
differently, had the President not issued the letter-resignation, dated
November 11, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa was without authority to
enact Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, otherwise known as Cabinet Bill No. 7.
But, with the issuance of said letter-resignation, the Batasan and the
President were well within their constitutional powers to enact said law
which would give the people the chance to exercise its will through the
electoral process — an attribute of sovereignty. TSHEIc
Further, there is merit in the contention of former Chief Justice

Enrique M. Fernando, who appeared as amicus curiae, that "if a
resignation is prompted by a President seeking 'a new mandate' in an
election that will constitute 'public judgment now on policies and programs
of fundamental nature,' by its own admission, the above constitutional
provision does not necessarily apply. What appears indubitable is that such
a vacancy arising from a voluntary act of an incumbent of the Presidential
office inspired by the desire to seek a fresh mandate from the sovereign
people is a novel situation not contemplated by the framers of the 1981
amendments to the 1973 Constitution. . . ." (Summary of Points Submitted
for the Consideration of the Court) He submits that a legislative act suffices
because of the plenary legislative power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa.
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Likewise, there is merit in the submission of the Solicitor General

that —
"2. The legislative power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa is plenary and subject only to such limitation as are found
in the Constitution (see Article VII, Section 1 of the Constitution; Vera
vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29
[1950]; Occena vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 755 [1980].
The interstices of the Constitution are within the power of the
legislature to fill up. What is not prohibited by the Constitution can be
provided for by the Batasang Pambansa. Indeed, it is conceded 'that
the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field
than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature'
(Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 44-45 [1950].
"3. The calling of an election is essentially legislative in
nature (Ututalum vs. Commission on Elections, 15 SCRA 465 [1965].
All elections for President, Vice President, members of the legislature
and local officials in our country have been called through legislative
enactments.
It cannot be doubted that enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
883 falls well within the legislative authority of the Batasang
Pambansa. The narrow issue is whether the law violates the
Constitution, particularly Section 9, Article VII." (pp. 6-8, Consolidated
Comment of the Solicitor General.)
Besides, supervening events have occurred since the passage of
the law on December 3, 1985 and there would be no turning back now.
The Batasang Pambansa passed the law and the President has approved
it; but the Court failed to issue a restraining order when the petitions were
filed on December 3, 1985 so as to maintain the status quo. Thereafter, the
ruling political parties (KBL and UNIDO) have fielded their respective
presidential and vice presidential candidates in conventions and
proclamations attended by thousands of people. So much time, effort and
money have already been spent. We can take judicial notice of the fact that
the overwhelming sentiment and desire of our people is for the holding of
the coming snap elections and that they have tacitly consented and
approved the law in question. At this juncture, We cannot now deprive
them of this right of suffrage. The two coordinate branches of the
government (legislative and executive) have spoken. The judiciary should
not be an obstacle to the people's desire to select their Chief Executive in
the forthcoming snap polls.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the petitions.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Implicit in the republican nature of our State is adherence to the rule

of law. All acts of government must conform to the Constitution. Otherwise,
they have to be declared void.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39

Phil. 778, 787), this Court declared emphatically that "no official, no matter
how high, is above the law" and that "the law . . . is the only supreme
power in our system of government and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to
that supremacy and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives.'' IECAaD
Today, the above declaration warrants repeating. The law involved in

these petitions is no less than the Constitution, the supreme law of the land
enacted by the people in their exercise, in its highest sense, of sovereign
power. The legislative power vested in the Batasang Pambansa may be
employed only within the confines of constitutional boundaries. The
President is similarly subject to constitutional limitations and considering
his solemn oath, invoking the help of God, to "preserve and defend the
Constitution," he can execute only such statutes as do not conflict with the
supreme law of the land.
In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections (36 SCRA 228, 234) this Court
declared:
"The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to
the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on
its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in
deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what
is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review
to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental
measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law."
I am constrained to reiterate the above basic principles because
some distinguished counsel have come forward with the strange
proposition that inspite of the clear circumvention by both the Legislature
and the Executive of express procedures mandated by the Constitution,
"national interest" requires that we should overlook the violations and
dismiss the present petitions.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
All members of this Court have taken an oath "na aking itataguyod at
ipagtatanggol ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas." We do not preserve and
defend the Constitution through a circumvention of its requirements and an
ignoring of its mandates.
The policy nature of their concerns and the passion of politics now
animating them may mitigate the inattention of the Batasan and the
Executive to scrupulous compliance with Section 9, Article VII of the
Constitution. We cannot enjoy the same luxury. I personally feel that during
these critical times, more than in happier days, we should insist on
compliance with the rule of law in its punctiliously authentic form. National
interest and political stability cannot be premised upon violations of our
fundamental law. Political expediency and the momentary, easily forgotten
cry of the public are too precarious and shifting to become legal
foundations of a free and hopefully prosperous society. Indeed, much
depends on the forthcoming elections but even more is at stake in the
maintenance of constitutionalism upon which our democratic government
is founded and because of which popular and free elections are held.
I find no difficulty in concluding that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is
unconstitutional.
BP 883 calls a special election for president and vice-president. It is
elementary in the law of public officers that no valid appointment or
election to any public office may be effected if the office is not vacant. In
the normal course of events, the office of the President becomes vacant
upon the expiration of the term of an incumbent. A regular election fills the
vacancy. But we are not concerned with a regular election. There is a call
for a special or an emergency election. TcSHaD
A special election may not be called for just any purpose or on any
occasion. A special election becomes necessary only when a vacancy is
created by death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation.
I cannot accept the proposition that a simulated or fictitious vacancy is a
"vacancy" as understood in the law of public officers. The vacancy must be
real and in esse, not a parody or shadow of the real thing. In the same way
that death, disability, or removal from office must be actual and permanent
before the pertinent provisions of Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution
may come into play, so must a resignation be real and irrevocably
permanent. Inspite of all the learned arguments of distinguished counsel, I
still fail to see how special or emergency elections may be held for a
position which is not vacant. Or how the call for special elections can
become the means of creating in the future the now non-existent vacancy.
Or how a vacancy can come about only after special and emergency
elections to fill that very same vacancy have already been held. Credulity
can be stretched only too far.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
If the exigencies of national interest are pressing, now or in the near

future, and if the need for establishing political and economic stability is
imperative, that elections for a President and a Vice President can no
longer wait for 1987, the Constitution provides the remedy. The President
can resign and pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the
Speaker of the Batasan shall act as President until the President and the
Vice President or either of them shall have been elected in the special
elections called to fill the vacancy thus created and shall have qualified.
The muddling of the President's term of office shall also be obviated. By
the same provision of the Constitution, a new term of office, which ignores
the present fixed term of the incumbent, shall commence at noon of the
tenth day following the proclamation and shall end at noon on the thirtieth
day of the sixth year thereafter.
I find Section 9 of Article VII clear and intelligibly simple. Any layman
reading it can easily grasp its meaning and understand the contingencies
for which it was intended. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
speaking for the Court in J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration
(31 SCRA 413, 422) are appropriate:
"We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum."
Since the Constitution itself provides an easily followed remedy, one
which any fairly literate citizen can readily comprehend, I do not see why
the Legislature and the executive should adopt a new fangled, perplexing,
and constitutionally infirm method of achieving a most desirable end. I
believe that all of us in Government must sincerely demonstrate our
readiness to abide by the terms and procedures of the Constitution even
as we try to solve serious national problems.
Neither can the special elections be premised on the accountability
provisions in Article XIII of the Constitution. Snap elections to make the
executive accountable to the people are for parliamentary systems. We
have a presidential form of government. When the 1973 Constitution came
into force and effect on January 17, 1973, it provided for a parliamentary
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
system. Section 13 of Article VIII provided that "the National Assembly may
withdraw its confidence from the Prime Minister only by electing a
successor by a majority vote of all its members." Executive power was
then exercised by the Prime Minister assisted by his cabinet. The
President was only a symbolic head of state. The National Assembly could
remove the Executive by majority vote but the Executive could also have
the Assembly dissolved and have the questions on fundamental issues
resolved by the people in so-called snap elections. ITAaCc
Before this parliamentary government could be installed, we

amended the Constitution and returned to the presidential form. Any
lingering traces of parliamentarism carried over from the original 1973
provisions only serve to make our government even more presidential. The
dominance of the Executive over the Legislature is much more marked
now than in the 1935 presidential system. This being so, the accountability
aspects of parliamentary systems cannot be used to justify our legitimating
BP 883.
I share the sentiments of the respondents and some of the
petitioners in their desire for ascertaining the people's will. But I submit that
our basic law, the act of the people which regulates the entire fabric of our
government, must be followed.
I am, therefore, constrained to dissent and to maintain my original
vote to enjoin the holding of elections under a statute I find null and void.
NESTOR B. ALAMPAY, J.:
The basic duty of this Court is restricted to the determination of

whether B.P. 833 calling for a special election is in accord with or in
violation of our Constitution. Difficulty has been added to this task which
the Court has to accomplish because of the inconsistent and to an extent
bewildering positions taken and manifested by some of the petitioners
during the hearing of these cases. Members of the Court are puzzled as to
what petitioners really profess this Court should rightfully decree. Indeed, it
would seem that what was initially asked by certain petitioners in these
consolidated petitions to be done by this Court based on the grounds and
reasons stated in their respective petitions, such as to prohibit the
respondent Commission from implementing B.P. 833 on account of this
statute's constitutional infirmity, have been now abandoned by the same
petitioners who but recently assailed the legality of B.P. 833. The
unconstitutionality of said statute is still being insisted upon but,
nevertheless, it is prayed that such governing and decisive factor be
disregarded, ignored or even circumvented and that this Court should
cooperate in the alleged unanimous will of the Executive and Legislative
departments of our country that there be an election for the Presidency
and Vice-Presidency of the nation next February, 1986, rather than in
1987.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
It is my submission that the Court should detach itself from these

swirling and fickle attitudes that it has perceived and it should not be
moved by the rhetorical allusions to the alleged but unquantified desire of
our people to participate in an election which is at the same time
contended to be not sanctioned by and in conflict with what is clearly
provided for in our Constitution. The rash and reckless suggestions
suggested to the Court by petitioners will only create and give rise to a
dangerous precedent that could erode the stability that inherently should
attach and be reposed in the Constitution. Appeals to what is claimed to be
the present popular wish should assume no significance in the resolution
of the primary issue. What our Constitution decrees should be respected
and followed.
It is my considered view that the special election on February 7,
1986, called for pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 833, does not meet at
all the specific condition that there should first be an actual and existing
vacancy before a special election can be held to elect a new President
before the present term of the incumbent expires on May 30, 1987. Logic
and simple reasoning alone even without need of legal citations, will be
sufficiently persuasive to form a conclusion that no special election is
necessary to fill up a position which is not attended by a vacancy. The
absence of an actual vacancy negates and precludes acceptance of any
unwarranted and expensive special election. The searching analysis made
by other Colleagues in the Court who share with me in the above stated
views make needless a repetitious and extended dissertation on this
matter. Absent an actual and real vacancy, the holding of a special election
cannot be given color of legality by the reference to certain conditions
attaching to the imputed vacancy but which conditions most plainly would
happen only after the election had already taken place and with the
position to be filled up by the election uninterruptedly occupied by a legal
occupant.
On this simple view, I readily conclude that Batas Pambansa Blg.
833 should be declared unconstitutional for being violative of the spirit and
letter of our Constitution. I vote, therefore, to declare Batas Pambansa Blg.
833 unconstitutional and consequently, to enjoin the respondent
Commission on Elections from conducting the unwarranted special
election for President and Vice-President on February 7, 1986. IaHSCc
PATAJO, J., dissenting:
Fully aware as I am that all laws are presumed constitutional and

that all reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of their
constitutionality and only when the conflict between any law and the
Constitution is clearly beyond reasonable doubt, should said law be
declared unconstitutional, I approach the issue of the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 in the context of what appears to be a popular
clamor for the holding of a special presidential and vice-presidential
election on February 7, 1986.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
The common grounds alleged in the petitions assailing the

constitutionality of said law are that the only instance that the Batasan can
call for the holding of an election before the expiration of the term of the
President in 1987 is upon the occurrence of the contingencies provided for
in Section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution, namely the permanent
disability, death, removal from office or resignation of the President before
the presidential election of 1987 for in that case a vacancy in the Office of
the President has been created triggering the mechanism for the calling of
a special election to fill up said vacancy together with the election of the
vice-president in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section 9,
Article VII of the Constitution and that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 has in
effect shortened the term of the President elected in 1981 without going
through the process of amending the Constitution as the Batasan in
enacting said law acted in the exercise of its legislative powers and not as
a constituent body. Petitioners contend that the letter of the President
recommending to the Batasan the calling of a special election because of
the need for the President to seek a new mandate in an election that will
assess, as demanded by the opposition, the policies and programs being
undertaken by him upon his undertaking that he will irrevocably vacate the
position of the President effective when such election is held and the
winner is proclaimed and qualified as president by taking his oath of office
ten days after his proclamation is not a resignation which would create a
vacancy within the meaning of Section 9 of Article VII. That there is no
vacancy is evident from the fact that the President still continues in office
until the assumption in office by the winning candidate in the special
election instead of the Speaker who, under the provision of the
Constitution, becomes acting president in case of a permanent disability,
death, removal from office or resignation of the President before the
presidential election of 1987. What Section 9, Article VII contemplates is
an actual vacancy and not a vacancy in futuro.
The Solicitor General defending the constitutionality of said law
contends that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the
Batasan Pambansa in the exercise of its legislative plenary powers to call
for the holding of the special election for the Office of the President on
February 7, 1986 upon the undertaking of the incumbent President that he
will irrevocably vacate the position of president if an election is held for
said office and the winner proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath of
office ten days after his proclamation. The occasion for the holding of said
special election is the need of the incumbent President to seek a new
mandate in an election that will assess, as demanded by the opposition,
the policies and programs being undertaken by him.
It is my considered view that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is
unconstitutional.
While the 1973 Constitution, as amended, has adopted several
features of the parliamentary system, our government is still essentially a
presidential form of government and the term of office of the President is
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
for a fixed term of six years. Since the incumbent President was elected in
1981 for a term of six years beginning at noon on the 30th day of June of
1981 and ending noon of the same date six years thereafter when the term
of his successor shall begin, Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 had shortened the
term of the President without going into the process of amending the
Constitution. The shortening of the term of the office of the incumbent
President cannot be justified by the action of the President agreeing to
vacate his office on condition that a special election be held and the
winning candidate for said office is proclaimed and qualified as president
by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation. The President
can only shorten his term of office by unconditionally resigning therefrom
before its expiration in order that a vacancy is created and the Speaker of
the Batasan shall act as President and the Batas Pambansa shall call for
the holding of a special election to elect a president and a vice-president in
accordance with the provisions of Section 9 of Article VII of the
Constitution. aSTAIH
The letter of the President of November 11, 1985 recommending to

the Batasan the enactment of law calling for special election as there will
be a definite and inevitable vacancy in the Office of the President which will
pave the way for the holding of said special election because of his
undertaking to irrevocably vacate the position of President effective only
when the election is held and the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
president by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation does
not create a vacancy that will trigger the mechanism for the calling of a
special election to fill up said vacancy in accordance with the procedure
set forth in Section 9 of Article VII. Actually, the conditions mentioned by
the President for calling of a special election have not at all created a
vacancy because he continues in office as president up to the assumption
of office of the president-elect. As petitioners correctly contended, proof
that there is no vacancy in the Office of the President as contemplated in
Section 9 of Article VII is that he continues to exercise the functions of the
president instead of the Speaker who, under the provisions of said Section
9, becomes acting president in case of a permanent disability, death,
removal from office or resignation of the President before the presidential
election of 1987.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the provisions of Section
9, Article VII do not preclude the Batasan Pambansa in the exercise of its
plenary legislative powers to call for the holding of a special election for the
position of president in a situation other than that contemplated in Section
9 such as the need of the incumbent President for a new mandate is
without merit. While it is true that the power to call an election is exclusively
a legislative prerogative, such power cannot be exercised where its effect
would be to amend an express provision of the Constitution, more
specifically Section 5, Article VII fixing the term of the office of the
president and the vice-president to six years. The power to define the term
of the president and vice-president is not legislative but constituent and
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
can only be exercised thru an amendment to the Constitution in the

manner provided for in the Constitution. In effect, Batas Pambansa Blg.
883 has amended the Constitution by an act of the Batasan as a legislative
body, not a constituent assembly and without the ratification of majority
votes cast in a plebiscite.
". . . And we are asked to raise the power from the general
legislative authority by implication, to serve convenience and
expedition in making organic change. If it were conceded that an
easier and quicker mode of change is desirable, a concession not
permissible, if the views of the greatest writers on questions touching
government under written Constitutions are of force, a canon of
constitutional construction forbids the implication of the authority, for
it is the rule that where the means by which the power granted shall
be exercised are specified, no other or different means for the
exercise of such power can be implied even though considered more
convenient or effective than the means given in the Constitution; and
the Constitution gives special power to the Legislature, and provides
the means of exercising it, to effect needed changes in the organic
law. . . ." (Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336; 99 NE 1, 15). (emphasis
ours.)
Neither can the provision of the Constitution providing for
accountability of public officers be invoked to justify the holding of a special
election contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 883. Impeachment of the
President and the other constitutional officers is the recourse for holding
them accountable.
In short, a special election for the Office of the President before the
expiration of his term in June of 1987 is authorized only on the
occurrences of the contingencies enumerated in Section 9 of Article VII,
namely permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of
the President. The undertaking of the President to vacate his office upon
the qualification of the president-elect in the presidential election of
February 7, 1986 is not a resignation within the meaning of Section 9,
Article VII.
While I am not unaware of the popular clamor for the holding of the
"Snap Elections," a move initiated by the "opposition" and finally accepted
by the President in order to provide an opportunity to submit to the
electorate the acceptability of the President's program and policies of
government even before the expiration of his term of office in June 1987, I
believe the duty to uphold the primacy of the Constitution is a responsibility
that this Court cannot shirk. For as said by the Supreme Court of Michigan
speaking through Cooley, J.: AIHECa
"Constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public

opinion and desire; the will of the people therein recorded is the
same inflexible law until changed by their own deliberative action;
and it cannot be permissible to the courts that, in order to aid
evasions and circumventions, they shall subject these instruments * *
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
* to a construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in

the way of progress, and the duty of every good citizen was to get
around their provisions whenever practicable, and give them a
damaging thrust whenever convenient. They must construe them as
the people did in their adoption. If the means of arriving at that
construction are within their power." Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23
Mich. 499, 506. (emphasis ours).
In the same vein is what the Court said in ex rel Kinworthy v. Martin, 60
Ark. 343, 30 S.W. 421, that in construing Constitutions, Courts have
nothing to do with the argument ab inconveniente and should not bend the
Constitution to suit the law of the hour, quoting Greencascñe vs. Black, 5
Ind. 557, 565. 11 Am. Jur. 659.
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is a justiciable one
and not a political question which the Court must decide without
equivocation.
I vote, therefore, to grant the petition and declare Batas Pambansa
Blg. 883 unconstitutional.
In connection with the resolution of December 19, 1985 in the
above-entitled cases, Justice De la Fuente filed a separate opinion in the
Clerk of Court's Office on December 23, 1985:
DE LA FUENTE, J.:
For the reasons well stated by my distinguished colleague, Hon. Lino

Patajo, I am inclined to share the view expressed in his dissent that B.P.
Blg. 883 is unconstitutional. For it contravenes the intent, letter and spirit of
the succession provision — section 9, Article VII — of the Constitution. To
my mind the said statute would, if implemented, sidetrack or bypass the
cited constitutional provision designed to govern the selection of a
successor in case of vacancy in the office of the President before the next
regular election in 1987. A conditional or qualified "resignation" of the
President which shall take effect after the February 7, 1986 "special
presidential election" and only upon the proclamation and qualification of
the candidate chosen by the electorate, is not sufficient ground or
justification for a so-called "snap" election. In explicit language, section 9,
Article VII, provides for the constitutional formula or device in filling the
Office of the President the moment it becomes vacant by reason of the
incumbent's "permanent disability, death, removal from office or
resignation" at anytime prior to the end of his term in June 1987. Such
"resignation", as I see it, must be one resulting in permanent vacancy —
actual or in esse, not merely prospective or inchoate or contingent — as of
the time of the special presidential election, whereupon the Batasan
Speaker shall take over the vacated office as caretaker President until a
new President shall have been duly elected, proclaimed and qualified by
taking his oath of office.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
I have reached this conclusion after the hearings and upon due
consideration of the arguments and submissions for the petitioners and the
respondents, the former Chief Justice E. M. Fernando, and other legal
luminaries, especially those of former Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez in
an article entitled "UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 'SNAP' POLL", 1/
which he mentioned at the hearing as he gave his comments on the
constitutional issue before this Court. I reproduce herein-below the most
pertinent portions of his dissertation. 2/ I also find the observations of Atty.
Sedfrey Ordoñez in the petition and the reply filed for the Liberal Party and
former Senator Jovito Salonga as well as those of Atty. Raul Gonzales,
National Bar Association President, who appeared and argued at the
hearing, very persuasive enough to overcome the doubts I had entertained
earlier as to the alleged facial unconsitutionality of B.P. Blg. 883. I am,
however, unable to agree with former Vice-President Pelaez and others
who have stressed the unconstitutionality of the law in question but urged,
nonetheless, this Tribunal to allow its implementation by taking into
account "supervening events" transpiring since the filing of the petitions
and the "people's overwhelming desire to hold" the "snap" election, the
constitutional issue having "become a political one, beyond its [this Court's]
authority to enjoin."
While the practice followed under the Constitution and our election
laws has been to allow the President or an elective public official to submit
himself for re-election to the same office without vacating it (remaining in
office until the end of his term and during the election period), this
generally refers to a "regular" election, not to a special election called
precisely to fill up an existing permanent vacancy in the elective office. The
device or formula found in Section 9, Article VII, having been so conceived
and designed in detail to meet a possible sudden vacancy occurring during
a short period before the regular presidential election in 1987, respect for
the will of the Filipino people who ratified the constitutional amendment in
1984 demands, I think, no less than strict adherence to the afore-
mentioned succession provision. B.P. Blg. 883 constitutes, plainly, a
deviation from and evasion of that provision. SHDAEC
Finally, if the objective of the so-called "snap" election law was to

enable the President to ask the Filipino people for a vote of confidence, the
most appropriate and adequate vehicle for that is a referendum as
suggested by MP Arturo Tolentino and former Vice-President Pelaez. A
negative vote would surely bring about a vacancy in the office of the
President, which can then be filled up in accordance with the succession
procedure provided by section 9, Article VII. The other option, also
suggested by both, is a constitutional amendment incorporating the
features of B.P. Blg. 883, to be submitted to the people for ratification.
Footnotes
* Revision consists in the addition of paragraph 7 and statement that
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1/. Emphasis copied.
2/. Phil. Daily Express issue of Dec. 18, 1985.
3/. Times Journal issue of August 4, 1985.
4/. Idem, Annex "A".
5/. Bulletin Today issue of December 17, 1985.
6/. Bulletin Today issue of December 16, 1985, Jesus Bigornia.
DE LA FUENTE, J., separate opinion:
1/. Published in the November 23, 24 and 26, 1985-issues of Bulletin
Today.
2/. "The question of the constitutionality of the 'snap' election for President
— and maybe Vice-President? — on Jan. 17, 1986 proposed in Cabinet Bill
No. 7 is a very serious one. Grave doubts raised on its constitutional validity
must be resolved before any favorable action is taken on the proposal.
Otherwise, the political controversy now rocking the country could
degenerate into irreversible national disunity. Worse still, the rule of law in
our country, the very foundation of a free and democratic society, would be
irreparably compromised.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . a severe blow on it at this time, like holding an unconstitutional
presidential election, could irreparably destroy it.
xxx xxx xxx
"The consequence of all this was: as ratified by the people, the present
presidential succession procedure, which was adopted together with other
constitutional amendments on Jan. 17, 1984, is definite, precise, and clear,
leaving no room for the Batasan to change or add to it one whit. No
discretion whatsoever is given to the Batasan to exercise its legislative
power either to amend or to ignore any portion thereof.
"The Batasan's clear duty is circumscribed solely to implement the
presidential succession formula now embodied in the Constitution and
nothing more. Its role in putting it into effect is purely ministerial, which in
layman's language means automatic, mechanical, not requiring the exercise
of judgment. To test the validity of the foregoing assertions, let us analyze
Section 9, Article VII — the only section of the Constitution that deals with
presidential succession — sentence by sentence.
'Section 9. In case of permanent disability. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"The first sentence presupposes that a Vice-President shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It provides that in case the Presidency
becomes vacant by reason of permanent disability, death, removal from
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
office or resignation, the Vice-President shall automatically become

President. This is the 'spare tire' concept of the Vice-Presidency which our
people are familiar with and easily understand from experience . . . The
provision does not apply to the present where we have no Vice-President.
"The next sentence provides that in the absence of a President and Vice-
President, the Batasan shall by law provided for a further line of succession.
This is one of only two instances where the Constitution authorizes the
Batasan to take a hand in the presidential succession procedure. The other
one is found in the fifth and last paragraph of Section 9 above-cited, in case
of death, permanent disability or resignation of the Speaker.
"In other words, where the Constitution wants the Batasan to legislate on
presidential succession, it expressly says so. The clear implication is that,
where the Constitution itself mandates the precise procedure to the last
detail, as we shall presently see, the Batasan must keep out.
"The logic of this position is unassailable. If the Constitution were to permit
the Batasan the discretion to revise the presidential succession formula laid
down by it with meticulous exactitude or, as proposed in Cabinet Bill No. 7
[now, B.P. Blg. 883], adopt an entirely new succession procedure, we would
have a situation where every Batasan could be tinkering with the matter.
The inevitable consequence would be the nullification of the procedure laid
down by the Constitution. The plain language of the Constitution's directive
to the Batasan is: you may supplement the line of succession, as in the two
instances above-cited where you are expressly authorized to do so, but you
may not touch what is already prescribed by the Constitution or, much less,
replace it with another.
"The third and following sentences prescribe the succession procedure if a
permanent vacancy occurs during the term of President Marcos, that is, until
its expiration in June, 1987. The trigger mechanism which would set off the
events enumerated in these provisions is the occurrence of a permanent
vacancy a real, not a "paper" vacancy. This is sine qua non. Without the
occurrence of an actual and permanent vacancy, the presidential
succession procedure cannot come to life. With its occurrence, the events
take place, domino-like, automatically. The Batasan has no authority
whatsoever to contrive another cause, like a post-dated resignation to take
place only if the President loses in the (snap) election proposed in Cabinet
Bill No. 7, to justify such an election. This would nullify the succession
procedure of the Constitution and would be grossly unconstitutional.
"Let us, by re-reading the third and succeeding sentences, pinpoint the
specifics of the succession procedure mandated by the Constitution.
"Upon the occurrence of a permanent vacancy in the Presidency during the
present term of President Marcos, the following events would take place:
1. The Speaker of the Batasan automatically becomes the Acting President.
He shall serve as such until President and Vice-President, or either of them
shall have been elected and shall have qualified. The language of the
Constitution is clear enough, requiring no explanation or elaboration.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
2. On the third day after the occurrence of the vacancy, (a) at ten o'clock in
the morning, (b) the Batasan shall convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call — the constitutional provision itself makes the call in
advance; and (c) within seven (7) days enact a law, (d) calling a special
election to elect a President and Vice- President; (c) not earlier than forty-
five (45) nor later than sixty (60) days from the time of such call.
"Please note how the Constitution goes into painstaking details. The
convening of the Batasan must be on the third day from the occurrence of
the vacancy — not on the first or second or fourth and so forth but on the
third. Even the hour of convening is set at ten (10) o'clock. The Batasan is
given a deadline of seven (7) days within which to enact a law calling for a
specified election. The candidates to be selected are specified — the
President and the Vice-President. The Batasan is given very little leeway in
fixing the date of the election: it must not be earlier than forty-five (45) nor
later than sixty (60) days after the call. This minuteness of detail had a
definite purpose, as we shall presently see.
"The provisions of the above-mentioned Section 9, Article VII, are contrary
to all traditional notions of constitution-making. The standard knowledge is
that a constitution must be couched in general terms, allowing the
legislature to flesh out the constitution's broad outlines with details. As
above-shown, however, the above-cited Section 9 does not follow the
traditions. The Constitution itself supplies the details. It allows the legislature
no leeway to do so.
xxx xxx xxx
"The foregoing circumstances reveal the clear intent of the Constitution: to
prohibit the Batasan from legislating at all on succession, except in the two
instances above-cited where the Constitution expressly authorizes it to do
so.
xxx xxx xxx
"The 'law' calling a special election under the presidential succession
provision, Section 9 of Article 7, is in effect, a measure sui generis wherein
the Constitution has acted both as the fundamental law of the land and as
the legislature pre-empting any claim of the Batasang Pambansa to any
legislative authority to change or replace the constitutionally prescribed
procedure of presidential succession.
"The claim that the Batasang Pambansa may now, in the exercise of its
power of general legislation, enact a law on presidential succession to call a
special election, under circumstances other than those enumerated in the
Constitution, thereby amending and short-circuiting the very precisely laid
down procedure in Section 9, Article VII on the subject, is utterly baseless.
Neither Article VII (on powers of the President and Vice-President) no
Article VIII (on the powers of the Batasan) of the Constitution grants it the
authority claimed.
xxx xxx xxx
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
"On the basis of the foregoing detailed scrutiny of the pertinent

constitutional provisions, there can be no doubt on the Constitution's
meaning the intent: such a special presidential election during President
Marcos' term must take place and must be carried out strictly in accordance
with the circumstances and procedures specifically laid out by the
Constitution.
"Cabinet Bill No. 7, however, would openly defy the Constitution. Consider
the following:
(a) While Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution would authorize a special
election during the term of President Marcos only in case his office is
permanently and actually vacant, the cabinet bill would authorize a "snap"
election without the occurrence of such a vacancy. (President Marcos' letter
of "resignation" categorically states that he will relinquish the Presidency
only if some one else is elected to and qualifies for the position. Since the
"resignation" would be simultaneous with the assumption of office or any
person elected other than President Marcos, there would actually be no
vacancy.)
(b) While the Constitution would install the Speaker as Acting president from
the moment the vacancy occurs until a President or, in his absence, a Vice-
President, shall have qualified, so that, in effect, it is the Speaker, as Acting
President, who would oversee the election, the cabinet bill would brush the
Speaker aside, (and with him the Constitution), and allow President Marcos
to usurp the Speaker's role and oversee the election in which his own
fitness to continue as President would be the crucial issue.
(c) While the Constitution specifically directs the Batasan to meet on the third
day after the vacancy occurs to enact a law calling for the special election,
within seven (7) days, the cabinet bill would blithely ignore these specifics.
"If the proposal becomes a law and is upheld, then the constitutional
provisions on the same subject would be set aside. It would be a dangerous
precedent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"If we would but . . . hold uppermost in our minds the future of constitutional
government in our country, I believe there can be an accommodation which
would bolster rather than subvert the rule of law. In this connection, may I
offer the following suggestions, . . . :
"1. In his speech in Cebu on Nov. 15, 1985, the President stated, more or
less, that a 'snap' election was crucial because his leadership had been
assailed abroad and it was necessary to show the world that the people
were still with him . . .
"If this is the objective, rather than holding a 'snap' election in violation of the
Constitution, I would endorse the recommendation of Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino that the exercise appropriate for the purpose should be a
referendum on whether or not the President should continue in office.
3/28/2019 G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,
"If the vote is in the affirmative, the President would then have the necessary
weapon to counteract what he believes to be a campaign of destabilization
against him . . .
"If the vote is in the negative, then the President should resign without delay.
A vacancy in the Presidency would then occur, in which case the
constitutional succession procedure would be operative . . .
"2. Another alternative would be to amend the Constitution. The Batasan
should meet as a constituent assembly and approve a resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution authorizing the calling of a special
presidential election more or less in the manner proposed in Cabinet Bill No.
7 or as may be agreed between the majority and the minority in the
Batasan. The resolution should then be submitted to the people in a
plebiscite . . .
"In either case, the Constitution shall have been shielded from further
assaults on its supremacy . . ."

G.R. Nos. 72915, Etc Phil Bar Assoc Vs Comelec

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3/28/2019 G.R. Nos.

72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954,

[G.R. No. 72915. December 19, 1985.]

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE

[G.R. No. 72922. December 19, 1985.]

MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 72923. December 19, 1985.]

MP AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., ET AL., petitioners, vs.

[G.R. No. 72924. December 19, 1985.]

THE MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

[G.R. No. 72927. December 19, 1985.]

THE LIBERAL PARTY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE

[G.R. No. 72928. December 19, 1985.]

CONCERNED WOMEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,

[G.R. No. 72935. December 19, 1985.]

ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

[G.R. No. 72954. December 19, 1985.]

VICTOR C. AVECILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 72957. December 19, 1985.]

NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET

[G.R. No. 72968. December 19, 1985.]

LABAN NG BAYAN [LABAN], ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE

[G.R. No. 72986. December 19, 1985.]

JUAN T. DAVID, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court

"G.R. No. 72915 (Philippine Bar Association, et al. vs. The

Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.);

Melencio-Herrera, * J., took no part in all these cases.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) GLORIA C. PARAS

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I vote for the dismissal of the petition for prohibition against

The unified opposition has likewise realized the imperative urgency

dangerous stalemate in both the political and economic climates' in the

Senator Pelaez formulated the same political question in this wise:

From the realistic standpoint, what should be borne in mind is that

The narrow legal issue involved in these petitions is whether Batas

Long ago, U.S. Chief Justice Marshall laid down an epochal

In my view, petitioners failed to demonstrate that BP 883 clearly

Article VII of the Constitution, Section 9 thereof, as amended,

Further, there is merit in the contention of former Chief Justice

Likewise, there is merit in the submission of the Solicitor General

Implicit in the republican nature of our State is adherence to the rule

As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39

Today, the above declaration warrants repeating. The law involved in

If the exigencies of national interest are pressing, now or in the near

Before this parliamentary government could be installed, we

The basic duty of this Court is restricted to the determination of

It is my submission that the Court should detach itself from these

PATAJO, J., dissenting:

Fully aware as I am that all laws are presumed constitutional and

The common grounds alleged in the petitions assailing the

The letter of the President of November 11, 1985 recommending to

can only be exercised thru an amendment to the Constitution in the

"Constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public

* to a construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in

For the reasons well stated by my distinguished colleague, Hon. Lino

Finally, if the objective of the so-called "snap" election law was to

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

office or resignation, the Vice-President shall automatically become

"On the basis of the foregoing detailed scrutiny of the pertinent

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