A. WHEN DOES LAW TAKES EFFECT?
NCC 2 Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
1. PESIGAN VS. ANGELES
FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of
April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with
Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates:
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to
transfer or transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three
certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were
confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the towns police station
commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was
based on Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of
carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A, providing for the
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported
from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable
before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.
RULING: No. The said order isn‗t enforceable against the Pesigans on
April 2, 1982 because it‗s a penal regulation published more than 2
months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in A2 of the Civil Code and §11 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The word ―laws‖ in article 2 includes circulars &
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638
requires that all Presidential Executive Orders having general
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that,
every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a
violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation &
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that
they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The
summary confiscation wasnt in order. The recipients of the carabaos
should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said
executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of
the carabaos.
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
hereby. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of
that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.
2. PEOPLE VS. VERIDIANO
FACTS: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation
of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Quash the information on the ground that the info, did not charge an
offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, w/c was about the second week of May 1979 (date of issue of
the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the
motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the
check, September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense.
Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22
cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submitting for review the
respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.
HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in
May 1979 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of
making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the
fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the
special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979.
The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in
question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date
4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22.
Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed
of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viod,
then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and,
consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15
days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in
such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to
make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to
make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it
could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.
3. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
RULING: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be
published in the Official Gazette. The word ―shall‖ therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before
a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances
of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
4. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. HYPERMIX
FACTS:
November 7 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003
(Customs Memorandum Order). Under the memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat is
classified according to: 1. Importer or consignee, 2. Country of origin, and 3. Port of discharge.
Depending on these factors wheat would be classified as either as food grade or food feed.
The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for food feed grade 7%. A month after
the issuance of CMO 27-200 respondent filed a petition for declaratory for Relief with the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City.
Respondent contented that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with University of the Philippines Law Canter. Respondent also alleged that the
regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior
assessment and examination, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing to pay 133%. Respondent
also claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated and asserted
that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: 1. The RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, 2. an action for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 “who
may file petition”) was improper, 3. CMO 27-2003 was internal administrative rule not
legislative in nature, and 4. The claims of respondent were speculative and premature,
because the Bureau of Customs had yet to examine respondent’s products.
RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was proper remedy, and that
respondent was the proper party to file it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the requirements for the Revised
Administrative Code? Whether or not the content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
RULLING:
No, they did not. The petitioners violated respondents’ right to due process in the
issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the
Administrative Code which are:
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectively of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the
bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates,
no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least 2 weeks before the first hearing thereon.(3) In case
of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
No. CMO 27-2003 did not meet these requirements. For a classification to be reasonable, it
must be shown that 1. it rests on substantial distinctions; 2. it is germane to the purpose of
the law; 3. it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. it applies equally to all members
of the same class. Petitioners violated respondents right to equal protection of laws when
they provided for unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the
regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
5. MARALITA
DOCTRINE:
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws.
FACTS:
By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for military
reservation. Later on, Former President Marcos issued a proclamation amending such
publication, which excludes certain area of the reserved land. Again, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476 that further amended the proclamation that excluded the barangays
of Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village and a handwritten addendum which
includes Western Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The proclamation was published in
the Official Gazette without the handwritten addendum. Demolition of illegal structures
existed to prevent the area from the increasing number of informal settlers. Members of
petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot
Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the areas they are occupying as is
already alienable and disposable. COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was not published thus the areas occupied by the petitioners are in question alienable
and disposable.
NMSMI and WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Did the handwritten addendum of President Marcos have the force and effect of law
though it was not included in the publication?
RULING:
NO, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos did not have the force and effect law
since it was not included in the publication. We agree that the publication must be in full or it
is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. In
relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Under the
above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided.
In the case at bar, though Proclamation No. 2476 was published in an Official Gazette, the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos declaring the Western Bicutan as alienable and
disposable was not included.
Therefore, without publication, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos never had
any legal force and effect.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, NCC 3
6. KASILAG VS. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from
the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted
by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio.
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on
the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the
indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In Clause V, the parties stipulated
that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 years, the debt w/ interest
thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in
Clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by
the owner of the land; in Clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days
from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in
the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that
in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in
clause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to
redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 years, she would
execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee,
the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest;
and in Clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented
under Clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract
of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would
subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that
Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as
the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the
petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to
the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not
collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land
tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of
the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis,
are illegal and void agreements, because such contract is a lien and as
such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land
because he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale,
and further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited
by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that
there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is
invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a
possessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is
the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can
neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his
title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is within good
faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of
good faith but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based
upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of
the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of
the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter,
as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the
basis of good faith.
The petitioners being in good faith, the respondents may elect to have
the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the
value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the
land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its
market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
RETROACTIVITY, NCC 4
7. USON VS DEL ROSARIO
FACTS
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria
Uson. Maria Uson sought to recover lands held by Maria del Rosario who had four illegitimate
children with Nebreda, which the latter contends that her children are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights, and because these
successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect.
ISSUE
Whether or not the illegitimate children may have successional rights under the new Civil
Code by way of its retroactive effect.
RULING
NO. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first
time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. The law commands that the rights
to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The
new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson
over the lands in dispute.

8. ACOSTA VS PLAN
Facts:
Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against private respondent Magday at the CFI of Isabela.
Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they waited
for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to CA (as provided in Section 16,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on
appeal, hence this petition. Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was
indeed required to be filed by a pauper appellant although it did not have to be printed.
Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal is required for the
perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant
NO.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record on
appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This law was given retroactive
effect.
As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied
retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'
9. DACUDAO VS GONZALES
Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his
associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ
Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to
forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is
Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent
anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of
petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due
process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The
petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases
already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended
that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not
those already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of the
prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions
exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new
rights or take away vested rights but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of
a person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises
from procedural law.
ACTS EXECUTED AGAINST MANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY LAWS
10. BPI VS IAC
Facts of the Case
• On December 8, 1975, Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US
$3,000.00 cashfor safekeeping. The agreement was duly documented.
• When he requested the return of the money on May 10, 1976, COMTRUST
explained that US$2,000.00 was sold on December 29, 1975, the US$1,000.00 was sold on
February 3, 1976, and all the peso proceeds were deposited to his current account.
• Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly credited to Zshornack's
current account at prevailing conversion rates, BPI now argues that the contract embodied in
the document is the contract of depositum (as defined in Article 1962, New Civil Code), which
banks do not enter into.
• The bank alleges that Garcia exceeded his powers when he entered into the
transaction. Hence, it is claimed, the bank cannot be liable under the contract, and the
obligation is purely personal to Garcia.
Issues
Whether or not Garcia binds BPI in the transaction.
Whether or not the contract entered into was a contract of depositum.
In relation to the topic:
Whether or not the contract of depositum entered by both parties is an act against
mandatory or prohibitory laws?
Whether or not the any of the parties are still entitled to a remedy after committing an act
against mandatory or prohibitory laws?
Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis
Yes, Garcia binds BPI in the transaction of the contract. The cause of action was based on an
actionable document. It was therefore incumbent upon the bank to specifically deny under
oath the due execution of the document, as prescribed under Rule 8, Section 8, if it desired:
(1) to question the authority of Garcia to bind the corporation; and (2) to deny its capacity to
enter into such contract. However, no sworn answer denying the due execution of the
document in question, or questioning the authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or denying the
bank's capacity to enter into the contract, was ever filed. Hence, the bank is deemed to have
admitted not only Garcia's authority, but also the bank's power, to enter into the contract in
question.
Yes. The contract entered by both parties is a contract of depositum. The document which
embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping.
The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the
bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Under Article
1962, New Civil Code, a deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no
deposit but some other contract.
However, it was established that the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was
foreign exchange. Hence, the transaction was covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20,
Restrictions on Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions.Since under CB Circular No. 20, the
mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one
business day from receipt, is an unauthorized transaction, it must be considered as one which
falls under the general class of prohibited transactions.
More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other. "When
the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of
action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of
the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
11. DE BORJA VS DE BORJA
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco,
with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose
became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she
instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed
special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana
opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the
CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated.
HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the
heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to
any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from
the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
12. ASIAN CATHAY VS SPS GRAVADOR
FACTS:
On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asain Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (ACFLC)
extended a loan of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) to respondent Cesario
Gravador, with respondents Norma de Vera and Emma Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers.
The loan was payable in sixty (60) monthly installments of ₱24,000.00 each. To secure the
loan, respondent Cesario executed real estate mortgage over his property in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29234.
Respondents paid the initial installment due in November 1999. However, they were unable
to pay the subsequent ones. Consequently, on February 1, 2000, respondents received a
letter demanding payment of ₱1,871,480.00 within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Respondents requested for an additional period to settle their account, but ACFLC denied the
request. Petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage with the Office of
the Deputy Sherrif of Malolos, Bulacan.
ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the interest rates
imposed on the respondents’ loan, and the waiver of the right of redemption.
RULING: No. The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if
knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant
spoilation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man.
It has no support on law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any
reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that may be
sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first place, be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Additonally, the intention to
waive a right or an advantage must be shown clearlly and convincingly. Unfortunately, ACFLC
failed to convince us that respondents waived their right of redemption voluntarily.
REPEAL OF LAWS
13. GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE
FACTS: This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question
the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the
1990 budget. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled
"Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of
the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The
petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81,
Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to
restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget
pursuant to said decrees.
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the
aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when
he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the oneman
legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power
was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution
was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by
Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the
present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion
automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that
rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners
contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative
under Section 3, Article XVIII.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. Section 3, Article XVIII of the
Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted
by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then
President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force
and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are
otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM
14. MARTINEZ VS. VAN BUSKIRK
FACTS: Both parties agree that on the 11th day of September, 1908,
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila.
When a delivery wagon owned by the defendant which was used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached, was
coming from the opposite direction, the carromata in which the plaintiff
was seated went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon
pass by. However, instead of passing by, the horses ran into the
carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff‘s head and injuring the
carromata. However, the defendant contends that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also
claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle
Herran, and for that purpose the defendant‘s employee tied the driving
lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose
of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by
the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to
run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon
the ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for
the negligence of such driver.
RULING: It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent
in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have
not been destructive and which are approved by the society, are
considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted
by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could
not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an
injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero
negligent because of such circumstances.
Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious
and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a
time has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be
unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver
was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in
unloading his wagon.
LEGAL PERIODS
15. ARMIGOS VS. CA
FACTS: The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against
the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for
the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the private respondent and against the herein
petitioner. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8
June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of
appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed
the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing
of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee.
However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for the consideration of
the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
Petitioner‘s contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy
of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he
perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his
appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is
erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the
computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he
received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period
comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00
o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of
23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
HELD: Day is synonymous with Date; consequently the 5th day shall be
the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was
submitted. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the
time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed
by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday
or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of
Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of
the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins
to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to
be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the
time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a
legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as
synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a
different view.
16. NAMARCO VS. TECSON
FACTS: On October 14, 1955, the CFI-Manila rendered judgment in a
civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this
decision was, on October 21, 1955 served upon defendants in said case.
On December 21, 1965, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties,
assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as plaintiff in that case and
judgment creditor therein, filed with the same court, a complaint against
defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Defendant
Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription
of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence,
the appeal to the Court of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme
Court, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of
law, namely, pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement
must be brought within 10 years from the time the judgment sought to be
revived has become final. This in turn, took place on December 21, 1955
or 30 days from notice of the judgment -- which was received by
defendants on October 21, 1955 -- no appeal having been taken
therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on which the 10 years
from December 21, 1955 expired. Plaintiff alleges that it was 12/21/65,
but appellee maintains otherwise, because when the law speaks of years
xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960
and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 years of 365 days each, or an
aggregate of 3650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December
19, 1955. Plaintiff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that
when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one
year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is
the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong
to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one
year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is
barred by the statute of limitations.
HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its
theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the
connotation of each "year" - as the term is used in our laws - to 365 days.
[The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21,
1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in
terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19,
1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the
computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.
BINDING EFFECT
17. 15. BARRETTO-GONZALES VS. GONZALES
FACTS: The plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of the Philippines,
married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After
which they voluntary separated and have not lived together as man and
wife, they had 4 minor children together.
After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela
Barretto (plaintiff) for her & her children‘s support of P500 (five hundred
pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness,
and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. Shortly after
the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada &
secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of
desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through
the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children
with her.
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had
agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barretto and her
children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony.
Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after,
Barretto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm and
ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada, invoking Sec
9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the
Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their
children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents
died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
existing between Barretto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales
be ordered to pay Barretto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all
the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of
the children also filed as intervenors in the case.
ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause,
and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would
grant a divorce.
RULING: Art 9 and Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the
Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce
in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve
of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out
government believes is contrary to public order & good
morals.
Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15 says that ―Laws relating to
family rights & duties or to status, condition, and legal capacity of
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country‖. And the last part of Art 11 of the Old Civil Code, now in
Art 17 also states ―...the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts &
their property, and those intended to promote public order & good
morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered into in a
foreign country.
18. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO
FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before
Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed,
they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while
Escano stayed in Cebu then Misamis. While in Misamis, Escano asked
for petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her
non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the US without
informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extreme
cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then married
again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. On July
30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation and
damages against wife and parents in law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal.
RULING: No, the divorce and the second marriage are not recognized as
valid. As stated in Art. 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in
Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid.
The Civil code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of
the code, instead of divorce; legal separation is used, wherein marriage
is still recognized. To recognize a decree of divorce of foreign courts
would be violation on public policy and Article 17 of Civil Code.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and those
which have for their object public order, policy, and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It would
also discriminate in favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced
elsewhere. It would not make any difference if Tenchavez was also in the
court of Nevada when divorce was filed since mere appearance can‗t
confer jurisdiction on court which had none. Tenchavez now has grounds
to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone other
than her husband, entitling him to ask for legal separation under basis of
adultery. As result, the petitioner has grounds to file for legal separation,
and may recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees.
19. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time
with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,
1983, stating that petitioner‘s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as
the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.
20. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA
FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980
and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in
private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January
1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda,
latter ―had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983‖.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the
ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as
decree of divorce was already issued.
RULING: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery
and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
HUMAN RELATIONS
21. People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200,
and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime
the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her vagina. On
May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and
confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her
vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She
was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to
her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty
of rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As
evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also
testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from
that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object
has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3
months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to
the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
22. ARDIENTE VS PASTORFIDE
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold, conveyed,
and transferred all their rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It
has been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the account of Ardiente. On
March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected without notice. She
complained to the Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and she found out that the account
has become delinquent. She paid the three months due and wrote a letter through her
counsel to the COWD to explain why her water supply was cut without notice.
The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who
requested the disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against
Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the
ground that the defendants committed abuse of their rights. The ruling was upheld by the CA
on appeal with modification on the award of the amount for damages.Hence this petition
before the SC.
ISSUE: Are the defendants liable for damages?
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code
was violated. It provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of illegality (Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is exercised in a
manner that does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and the same causes
damage to another. The person exercising an abuse of right is thus liable for damages caused
to another. The herein petitioner is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of the water
supply of the respondent without giving notice about such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez
are likewise liable for damages by disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for
their subsequent neglect of reconnecting the water supply even when the respondent already
paid the delinquent account.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
23. DONATO VS. LUNA
FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was
filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based
on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the
petitioner‘s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978.
Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering
into the marriage which was Donato‘s second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage
was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to
the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years
proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for
which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with
pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with
Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that
Donato already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the
ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
RULING: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can‘t apply rule on prejudicial
question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered
as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was
proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by
means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order
of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
24. LANDICHO V. RELOVA
Facts:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in
the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which
marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action
was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent
Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio
because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner
and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in
said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party
defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice
of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the
second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and
intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the
first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal
liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue. "The mere fact
that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does
not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant
the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown
that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of
duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted
for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that
his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
NATURAL PERSONS
25. ROE VS. WADE
FACTS: Roe (petitioner), a pregnant single woman, brought a class
action suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws.
These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on
medical advice to save the life of the mother. Other plaintiffs in the
lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for
violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no
children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws on
the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county
District Attorney Wade (defendant).
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that
Roe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable
controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also
ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does‘
complaint was not justiciable. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial.
The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were void as
vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the
district court ruled that injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws
was not warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States
and Wade cross-appealed the district court‘s judgment in favor of Roe
and Hallford.
ISSUES:
1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those
required on medical advice to save the life of the mother, violate
the Constitution of the United States?
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution protect the right to privacy,
including the right to obtain an abortion?
3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws
prohibiting abortion?
4. Did the fact that Roe‘s pregnancy had already terminated
naturally before this case was decided by the Supreme Court
render her lawsuit moot?
5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?
RULING:
1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only
life-saving procedures on the mother‘s behalf, and that do not
take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other interests, are unconstitutional for
violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy,
including a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy, against
state action.
3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right
to terminate her pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in
protecting both the pregnant woman‘s health and the potentiality
of human life at various stages of pregnancy.
4. No. The natural termination of Roe‘s pregnancy did not render
her suit moot.
5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.
The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the
decision must be left to the judgment of the pregnant woman‘s doctor. In
regard to second trimester pregnancies, states may promote their
interests in the mother‘s health by regulating abortion procedures related
to the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states
may promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating
or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.
The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is
―capable of repetition, yet evading review,‖ is an exception to the general
rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review,
and not merely when the action is initiated.
The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. § 1253 does not authorize a party
seeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court,
review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal from
specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of
both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.
The Does‘ complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on
contingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore too
speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary
for the Court to decide Hallford‘s case for injunctive relief because once
the Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were
prohibited from enforcing them.
3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a childs PERSONALITY
In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines
26. GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for
the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she
became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting
on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant.
After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's
clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met
the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old
foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency.
The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for
his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz
we granted certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf
of his unborn child.
RULING: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that
if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity
as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur)
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly
limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is
no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
27. QUIMIGUING VS. ICAO
FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and
Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,
which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for
amendment of complaint. Quimiguing averred that the then already
married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through
force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts
and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed
for monthly support, damages and attorney‘s fees. The defendantappellee,
however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing‘s failure to
allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower
court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to
the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and
damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support
of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for
damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional
personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its
progenitors, even it is only ―en ventre de sa mere.‖ Article 742 of the
same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive
donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles
40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further
strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, ―for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused‖ per Article 21 of
the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides
moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.
28. DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA
FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a
cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant‘s brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have
his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and
had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant
and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of
Antonia‘s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February
1931, he even wrote a letter to a reverend father confirming that the child
is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was
out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her
to eat on time for her and ―junior‘s‖ sake. The defendant ask his friend
Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St.
Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in
Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year.
When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly
departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should
be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was
in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES: Whether or not the note to the padre in connection with the
other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves
acknowledgement of paternity.
RULING: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as
admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the
admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that
the writing shall be indubitable. ―The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status‖. Supreme Court held that they agree with
the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify
the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco
in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it
is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.
29. 24. LIMJOCO VS. INTESTATE OF FRAGANTE
FACTS: Fragante filed an application for a CPC to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan. Pending application with the Public
Service Commission (PSC), Fragante died and he was substituted by the
legal representative of his estate. The PSC granted the application.
Petitioner contends that the PSC erred when it allowed the substitution of
the legal representative of the estate of Fragante as the party applicant
in the case pending before the commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante can be considered as a
―person‖.
RULING: There would be a failure of justice unless the estate is
considered a ―person‖. Within the framework and principles of the
constitution itself, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil
rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural
persons, the term ―person‖ used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed
to include artificial or juridical persons. It was the intent of the framers to
include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature. Among these
artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence,
the Court held that within the framework of the constitution, the estate of
Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which include
the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and
the fulfilment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
30. DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTICS
FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28,
1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal
rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or
else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.
Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land,
which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an
area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the
sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as
security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long
before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria‘s death.
The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June
24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged
and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta,
Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1,
1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution
against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria‘s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment against Oria and execution against
his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
RULING: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just
learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The
Dumalaos‘ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was
unaware of Oria‘s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria
as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria,
thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower court‘s judgment
against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far
as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical
capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost
through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order
to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitled
to claim attorney‘s fees against the corporation.
31. EUGENIO VS. VELEZ
FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas‘ brothers and sisters unaware of the former‘s
death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that
she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of
habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana‘s body to
the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas
corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio‘s residence. The court ordered
that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but
Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
RULING: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that
―Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried
man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.‖ Albeit, petitioner claims
he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where ―a man
and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions‖. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana.
32. JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO
FACTS: On Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion,
and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela
Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. The
building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three
daughters who fell. Navarro Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didn‘t
want to leave so he left with his son, his son‘s wife and neighbor
Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the
rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. The German Club collapsed
trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela
and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for
three days. On Feb. 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy,
they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed.
The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin,
survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed the
reverse. If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of
succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of JN,
Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the CC or not is relevant to the
case at bar.
RULING: No, neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both provisions,
as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so
are not to be available when there are facts.
Upon the issue of who between the mother and son died first, in light of
the conditions painted by Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can be
arrived at that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The
presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.
Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial
or (4) inferential.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called
to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules
of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
JURIDICAL PERSON
33. SMITH, BELL & CO. VS. NATIVIDAD
FACTS: Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippine Islands; majority of the stockholders are British.
It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato, brought to Cebu for
the purpose of transporting Smith, Bell & Co.‘s merchandise between
ports in the islands. An application for registration was made at Cebu at
the Collector of Customs, but was denied. This is because they were not
citizens of the US or the Philippines. Based on Act 2671, Sec. 1172 of
the Certificate of Philippine Register; upon registration of a vessel of
domestic ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate of
Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of
Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. Domestic ownership,
as used in this section, means ownership vested in the (a) citizens or
native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the US residing
in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed
wholly of citizen of Philippines, or US, or both. Plaintiff‘s contends that
Act No. 2671 deprives the corporation of its property without due process
of law because by the passage of the law, the company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership of the
Bato and that they are left with a naked title they could not use.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the due process
of law by the Philippine Legislature in its enactment of Act 2761.
RULING: No. (judgment is affirmed, and plaintiff can‘t be granted
registry.) Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &
Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippine Coastwide trade,
falls within the authorized exceptions. Specifically within the purview of
the police power. Literally and absolutely, steamship lines are the
arteries of the commerce in the Philippines. If one be severed, the
lifeblood of the nation is lost. If these are protected, security of the
country and general welfare is sustained.
34. BARLIN VS. RAMIREZ
FACTS: The defendant Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff
parish priest, took possession of the church on July 5, 1901. He
administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until November
14, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a
demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and
cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other
prop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused
to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction
w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the
Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the
Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Manila.
In January 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against defendant.,
alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was
the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books,
money, and other properties, belonging thereto, and asking that it be
restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of
the properties which he had received and which was retained by him,
and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the
plaintiff.
HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church
has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made
with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years
any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian
eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still
worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious
consideration.
CAPACITY TO ACT
35. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS
FACTS: On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas, with one other
persons as principals, along with Vicente Sixto Villanueva, who with two
others as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay jointly and severally
Standard Oil Co. On April 5, 1909, Standard Oil sued for payment of the
debt. On May 12, 1909Villanueva was declared to be in default. The wife
of Villanueva, declared while the judgement was in execution; (1) that
her husband was declared insane on June 24, 1909 by Manila‘s Court of
First Instance;(2) that she was appointed as guardian on Oct. 11, with
authority to institute legal proceedings for annulment of bonds given by
her husband while insane; (3) that her husband was already permanently
insane when he gave the bond to Standard Oil an was insane and
unable to defend himself during the litigation and for this reason asked
the court to reopen the trial to allow for the introduction of evidence for
Villanueva regarding his incapacity to act at the time he gave the bond.
The court reopened the trial but concluded that Villanueva had capacity
to act at the time he gave the bond on Dec. 15, 1908.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva, appellant, was incapable of entering
into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908.
RULING: No, he wasn‘t. ―Capacity to act‖ must be supposed to attach to
a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such
capacity is presumed to continue so long contrary is not proved, that is,
at the time of his acting he was incapable, crazy or out of his mind;
which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in this case.‖
There was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of
the bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting
because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they
observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908,
but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15,
1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally
deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that
he was insane.
36. MERCADO VS. ESPIRITU
FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of
the four parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale,
these minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at the
time they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the
notary public. The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs, along with their
two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother
the sister of the defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, and
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum
of P400 as opposed to its original value. The plaintiffs demand the
annulment of the sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of the
thing benefited by the defendant.
According to the Defendant, the plaintiff‘s mother had sold a portion of
the original land to the defendant for a sum. The plaintiff‘s father
subsequently, mortgaged the remaining parcel to the defendant for a
sum to cover his children‘s welfare after his wife‘s death. The plaintiffs
had alleged themselves of legal age and ratified the absolute and
perpetual sale of the land in consideration of the P400. Cross-complaint
filed for damages due to the malicious and unfounded complaint by the
plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors
presented themselves that they were of legal age.
RULING: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid
since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty
and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors
pretended that they had already reached their majority.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to
act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations,
as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements.
Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves
from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their
annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on
estoppels.
37. BAMBALAN VS. MARAMBA
FACTS: Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned a piece of land. He
was forced by his mother Paula Prado to sell the land to Genovena
Muerong, since she was threatening Paula of imprisonment due to the
loan Genoveva gave Paula. To have the document of the sale
acknowledged, the respondent even purchased the cedula of the
petitioner. Isidro didn‗t try to conceal his age; in fact the respondent was
well aware that Isidro was a minor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the piece of land in question void or
valid.
RULING: The sale of the land is void because Isidro is incapacitated to
enter into such contracts, and because the land wasn‗t even registered
and hence, cannot be sold. The decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot
be used since the petitioner didn‗t try to hide his age
Art. 38 NCC provides that minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions
on capacity to act (aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
The land in question wasn‗t even registered in the Register of Deeds; the
sale of the land cannot be executed without registration as provided in
section 50 of Act. 496.
38. SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. ALCANTARA
FACTS: Rufino Alcantara and sons (including respondent Ramon)
executed a deed of sale dated August 3, 1931, conveying five parcels of
land to petitioner Sia Suan. A few days later (within the month after the
sale of the parcels of land), Ramon‘s counsel wrote to Suan‘s husband,
Gaw Chiao, disavowing the contract on the ground that Ramon was a
minor when the signing took place. After Gaw Chiao responded to the
letter, Ramon went to the office of Gaw Chiao‘s counsel to ratify the sale.
After ratification, Ramon received Php 500.00 from Gaw Chiao, as
payment for the sold parcels of land/ Meanwhile, Sia Suan sold the
parcels of land to Nicolas Azores; his son Antonio inherited it.
Nine years later, Ramon filed a case at the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, praying that the deed of sale may be annulled on the ground of
his minority at the time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao; action
was denied and Sia Suan, Gaw Chiao, Ramon‘s father and brother,
Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved. Ramon brought case to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the CFI Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon Alcantara‘s execution of the deed of sale
is valid, despite being a minor at the time of its execution.
RULING: Ramon may not be allowed to execute deed of sale, but due to
his act of ratification, the contract was given its binding effect. The deed
of sale is binding on Ramon, because he ratified it. Ramon is not allowed
to annul such deed, because he already ratified it. Mercado doctrine is
applicable in this case. Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith;
he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale and its
ratification, yet he summons the courts to annul the sale because he
executed it while still a minor. ―…previous misinterpretation has already
estopped him from disavowing the contract‖. The Court of Appeals said
that Ramon may not be stopped because of the letter, yet the Supreme
Court holds that he is already stopped by his misrepresentation in the
deed of sale, due to his minority. The Supreme Court is of the opinion
that Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao is hereby absolved, without incurring any
costs on their part. Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu,
herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal
age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long
as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. The circumstance
that about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee
informed the appeallants of his minority, is of no moment, because
appellee‗s previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract.
39. BRAGANZA VS. VILLA ABRILLE
FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille
P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in
writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no
paid, Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first
instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the
contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the
CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000
+ 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza
sons when they signed the contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are
to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed.
RULING: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in
the contract because they minority of her sons does not release her from
liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which
found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority.
The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence – ―in order to hold
the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has
been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age
does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of
deceit.‖
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still
liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art.
1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of
their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may
have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which
is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent
to P1,166.67.
40. US VS. VAQUILAR
FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his
daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses
testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the
commission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant was
complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The
witnesses‘ evidence for insanity include:
• ―appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating
at the time he was killing his wife.‖
• ―he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he
wouldn‘t have killed his family‖
• at the moment of cutting those people, ―he looked like a
madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random‖
• sister said, ―…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy
because he cut me‖
ISSUE: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare
the accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability.
RULING: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The
appellant‘s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal,
not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the
crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is
insane. The popular meaning of ―crazy‖ is not synonymous with the legal
terms ―insane‖. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail
is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in
the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after
the commission of the crime.
The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity
which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted
condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does
not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that
the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed
that he was in a normal state of mind.
41. PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN
FACTS: Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old and was hired as a
housekeeper by the mother of the accused. Accused Policarpio Rafanan
and his family lives with his mother. On March 16 1976 in the evening,
after dinner, Estelita was sent to help the accused in the store. At 11pm,
the accused called Estelita to help him close the door of the store and he
suddenly pulled her inside and said ― come, let us have sexual
intercourse‖ in which Estelita said she don‘t like. Despite the struggle of
Estelita, Policarpio was able to rape her and told her not to tell anyone or
else he would kill her. But somehow, the family of the accused was able
to find out which made Estelita leave the house. Estelita was crying on
her home and told her mother about what happened. During trial, the
accused pleaded not guilty but in the end he was convicted. He then
appeal to the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission
of the crime.
RULING: Schizophrenia is not an exempting circumstance. If there was
impairment of the mental faculties, such impairments was not so
complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness
of his acts. The testimonies negate complete destruction of intelligence
at the time of the commission of the crime. The fact that the appellant
threatened Estelita with death reveals to the court that the accused was
aware of his act. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person
accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of
insanity and the accused was not able to prove it. Although it is not a
exempting circumstance under art 12 of Revised Penal Code, it is a
mitigating circumstance under the art 13 of RPC.
petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the
position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law,
the matter of determination of the ―residence‖ is more on the principle of
―intention‖, the animus revertendi rather than anything else.‖ In this
regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence
to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her
Kananga residence, for as long as she had the animus revertendi
evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the
course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City."
HELD: In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the
petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to
pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she
established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers
herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to
abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The
fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does
not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common
among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided
specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents
and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.

42. ABELLA VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to

intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga,
Leyte.It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.
The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission
granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor,
hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second
highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of
Kananga, Leyte.
The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous
when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the