People vs.

Que
GR No. 120365
December 17, 1996
Topic: Rules on Procedure on Environmental Cases

FACTS:

The Provincial Task Force on illegal logging received information that a ten-wheeler truck with illegally cut
lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Que’s truck was spotted and discovered to contain cocounut slabs
with sawn lumber inserted in between. He failed to give the cargo’s supporting documents: (1) certificate
of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR,
and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. All he could show
was a certification 7 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs.

ISSUE:

1. Whether there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal documents
for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. Whether the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot
be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products
is legal.

HELD:

1. No, appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws
and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. However,
the suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. The phrase should be
construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other
forest products.

DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides that
the movement of logs, lumber, non-timber forest products and wood-based or wood based shall
be covered with the appropriate Certificates of Origin. The transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by CLO (Certificate of Lumber Origin).

2. No, because there are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705. In
the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting
or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR.
In the second offense, however, mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is
immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
Cudia vs. CA
GR No. 110315
January 16, 1998
Topic: Prosecution of Offenses

RATIONALE: If the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information
would not be a bar to subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty
to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

FACTS:
Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was
brought to Angeles City, where he was detained. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information
against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The Information states that he committed
the crime in Angeles City. The case was raffled to RTC Branch 60, Angeles City. Cudia pleaded not guilty to
the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that,
contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.
Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who
would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling
of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city.
Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.

However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the
same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56
of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in the first criminal case to file a Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused was made in
Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The trial court
granted the motion.

Cudia then filed a Motion to Quash the second criminal case on the ground that his continued prosecution
for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in the
first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be
put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash. CA
affirmed that there was no double jeopardy on the ground that the petitioner could not have been
convicted under the first information as the same was defective.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against
her

HELD:
It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information,
the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare information
for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to
be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by
the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing
the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to
it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express
provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent
officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in
the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution.
If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of
the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
first information would not be a bar to petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach
where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
(Cudia vs. CA, G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998)
G.R. No. 176819 January 26, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, and
SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, Respondents.