G.R. No.
133495 September 3, 1998
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision
barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from
serving more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is
whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law
and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in
that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three
years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected
mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.1
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy
for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in
favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from
running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. 2 However, on motion of private
respondent the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. 3 The
majority stated in its decision:
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the
three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the
local official was elected. It made no reference to succession
to an office to which he was not elected. In the case before
the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the
position of Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He
succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for
the unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently, such
succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for
purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received
16,558 votes against petitioner's 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7,
1998, of the COMELEC and to seek a declaration that private respondent is
disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from
September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one
full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as
mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within
the contemplation of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution and §43(b) of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor
Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and
thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is
irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the
purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective
local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
This provision is restated in §43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office. — . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. . . .
Page 1 of 43
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of
enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only
stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office —
whether by election or by succession by operation of law — would be to
disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, §8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were
as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as
they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further
reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the
alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be
simply barred from running for the same position in the of the succeeding
election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. 4 Monsod warned
against "prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose" as a
result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft
constitution contained provisions "recognizing people's power." 5
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall
impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification on those
who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on
consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional
Commission. I would be very wary about this Commission
exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify
those who will already have served their terms from
perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission
achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive
terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service — in the case
of the President, six years, in the case of the Vice-President,
unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In
the case of the Members of Congress, both from the
legislative districts and from the party list and sectoral
representation, this is now under discussion and later on the
policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the
Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the
same. I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a
result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials
from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to
develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to
accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to
stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of
their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken
care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the
unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now
decide to put these prospective servants of the people or
politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a
perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking
away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving
as much to the people as we can in terms of their own
freedom of choice. . . . 6
Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying"
elective officials who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny
the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked,
"why should we arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people
want?" 7
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on
her colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion
and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself." 8
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave
[perpetual disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise
accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically mature?
Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when
it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who
may aspire to serve them longer?" 9
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived
from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged
stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that
the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be
preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving
by reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the
Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI,
§§4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to
the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to
rest for a period of time before he can run again?
Page 2 of 43
 MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before —
if the Gentlemen will remember — was: How long will that
period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years
or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner
Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following
the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will
be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this
particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a
period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's
stand. 10
Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people
should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. 11 To
bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms,
although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than
election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports
the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8 contemplates service by local
officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence
speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]"
from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his
full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be
one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms
an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for
which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official
he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, §7, which
similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more
than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that "if one is elected
Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no
matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the
number of successive terms allowed." 12
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in
answer to a query of Commissioner Suarez: "For example, a special election is
called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired
portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is
actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator
concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on
disqualification, Madam President?" Commissioner Davide said: "Yes, because
we speak of "term," and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the
unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator
and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House." 13
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a
member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies,
resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor
succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. 14 On the other hand, the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. 15 In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the
constitutional provision is to limit the right to be elected and to serve in
Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term.
Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, §8 with
regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds
another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, §4 of the Constitution which provides for
succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that
office. After stating that "The President shall not be eligible for any reelection,"
this provision says that "No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time." Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor
should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he
succeeds to the latter's office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it,
the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession, would
be qualified to run President even if he has occupied that office for more than
four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, §8 on elective local
officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It
underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which
one may have been elected for purposes of the three-term limit on local
elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by
automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the
Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for
election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the
Page 3 of 43
President in the event of the latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or
resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming, so is
entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-
President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the
electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill
the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the
Presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a
full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government
Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials
and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of
them. 16 It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event
of a vacancy in the Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks
the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should
not be counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or
situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor
by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before
the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter.
Can he run again for mayor in the next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor
by succession and subsequently resigned from office before
the full term expired, he has not actually served three full
terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under
Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was
elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for
which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be
considered to have completed one term. His resignation
constitutes an interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first
term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1
year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one
more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not
concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three
consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the
first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains
that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official
has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three
consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor
by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to
concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, §8. Suppose he is
twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the
next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the
first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law. Neither had he served the full term because he only
continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and
therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify
reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they
wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people
can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if,
on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the
people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for
reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of
applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the
understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should
be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about,
care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Page 4 of 43
G.R. No. 154829 December 10, 2003
ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA, respondents
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks
to challenge the resolution issued by the First Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27, 2001 in SPA Case No. 01-059
entitled, Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus Arsenio A. Latasa, respondent,
and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying herein petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Resolution denied due course to the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring him
disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur Province in the May
14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted,
and if he has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation null and
void.
The facts are fairly simple.
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos,
Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner’s
third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be
known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000
ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City
of Digos" or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end of
petitioner’s tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under
Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a
hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath
as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor
for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor,
and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms
as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for
city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny
Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For
Disqualification1 against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein
that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected
and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer,2 arguing that he did not
make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully
disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for
three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him
from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this
will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19, 2001.3
On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELEC’s First Division issued a Resolution,
the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the respondent’s certificate of candidacy
should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed
by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.4
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001,5 which
remained unacted upon until the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May
16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers From
Canvassing or Tabulating Respondent’s Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as
the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the Elections.6 Despite this, however,
petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having
garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private respondent Sunga
filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion7 which essentially sought the
annulment of petitioner’s proclamation and the suspension of its effects.
On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly
elected mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the
COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v.
COMELEC8 that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An
opposing party’s remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo
warranto within ten days after the proclamation.
Page 5 of 43
On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that
its very heart is something which this Court considers of paramount interest.
This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was already
entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to run for city
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In his certificate of candidacy, after the
phrase "I am eligible", petitioner inserted a footnote and indicated:
*
Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the
first time as city mayor.9
Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court
is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.10
The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a
rigid application of procedural rules.
The present case raises a novel issue with respect to an explicit Constitutional
mandate: whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the
position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely
to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is
an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
An examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional
provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact, they
rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there should be no further re-
election for local and legislative officials.11 The members, instead, adopted the
alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be
simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election
following the expiration of the third consecutive term:
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I
asked to speak because in this draft Constitution, we are recognizing people’s
power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter,
a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are prescreening
candidates among whom they will choose. We are saying that this 48-member
Constitutional Commission has decreed that those who have served for a
period of nine years are barred from running for the same position.
The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people
who are very skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a national
stature to be Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent and
with integrity. They get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we
provide for Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them into pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are
talking here only of congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden the
people’s choice but we are making prejudgment today because we exclude a
certain number of people. We are, in effect, putting an additional qualification
for office – that the officials must have not have served a total of more than a
number of years in their lifetime.
Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a
reserve of statesmen, but the future participation of these statesmen is limited.
Their skills may be only in some areas, but we are saying that they are going to
be barred from running for the same position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on
the day-to-day honing of his skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in
concern and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is going
to be barred from the same kind of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and
momentous decision with respect to many of our countrymen in the future who
may have a lot more years ahead of them in the service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures
that will perpetuate them, then let us give them this rest period of three years
or whatever it is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their
fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should not run. But let us
not bar them for life after serving the public for number of years.12
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to
establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the
deliberations:
Page 6 of 43
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
continuous service and frequent re-elections, officials from the President down
to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions
and to accumulate these powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on
indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a
subsequent election. x x x 13
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same
local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.14
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have
separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single
entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific
provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he
has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However,
he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it
attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local
government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code
provides:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land are shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more island. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.15
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one,
there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and
undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well.16 It is precisely for this
reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or
conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its
economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based on verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be
based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent
of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the
Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).17
Page 7 of 43
On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted
into a component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to
as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be
within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of the
Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until
such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have
already qualified and assumed their offices. x x x.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation
of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch
the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This Court also
notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to
exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city
officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct
from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction
of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be
their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for
nine years.
This Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled upon
this Court involving the same Constitutional provision.
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC,18 the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor who
became the mayor by operation of law and who served the remainder of the
mayor’s term should be considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Private respondent in
that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death of the incumbent
mayor, he occupied the latter’s post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter,
elected for two more terms. This Court therein held that when private
respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbent’s death and
served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served
a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional provision. The term
served must be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected."
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before he
assumed the position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local
government unit. The nature of the responsibilities and duties of the vice-mayor
is wholly different from that of the mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold office
as chief executive over his local government unit. In the present case,
petitioner, upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city,
continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction.
There were changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as local
government unit, but no substantial change occurred as to petitioner’s authority
as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC,19 petitioner was elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the
same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as
mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election
protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a failure of
elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC affirmed
this ruling and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate the post. During the
May 1998 elections, petitioner therein again filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that he had already
served three consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that petitioner
therein cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the
May 1995 elections, and that said petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as
mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having
involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion of Digos from
municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his
office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished
due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as
municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike
in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief
executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his
duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC,20 this Court was confronted with the issue of
whether or not an assumption to office through a recall election should be
considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. Private
respondent, in that case, was elected and served for two consecutive terms as
mayor. He then ran for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to his
Page 8 of 43
opponent. In June 1998, his opponent faced recall proceedings and in the
recall elections of May 2000, private respondent won and served for the
unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was questioned on the
ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms. This
Court held therein that private respondent cannot be construed as having been
elected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the May 1998
elections was considered by this Court as an interruption in the continuity of his
service as mayor. For nearly two years, private respondent therein lived as a
private citizen. The same, however, cannot be said of petitioner Latasa in the
present case.
Finally, in Socrates v. COMELEC,21 the principal issue was whether or not
private respondent Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall
elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the
immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials
of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor, Victorino Dennis M. Socrates. On
August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on the
ground that he cannot run for the said post during the recall elections for he
was disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term. This Court,
however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that the principle
behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of
terms, and that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the
end of his third term and before the recall election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a
break in the service of the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein
was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private
citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down
from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.1âwphi1
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included
an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of
Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over
the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by
the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v.
COMELEC,22 he should be deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest
number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held in Labo that the
disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the
candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of
the elections. As an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that the rule would
have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity
and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however,
cannot be said of the present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of
the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a
candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared
elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidate’s election a
nullity.23 In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private
respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa.24 The
second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that particular
election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby
created which should be filled by succession.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 180444 April 8, 2008
FEDERICO T. MONTEBON and ELEANOR M. ONDOY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION and SESINANDO F. POTENCIOSO,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition1 for certiorari assails the June 2, 2007 Resolution2 of the First
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 07-421,
denying the petition for disqualification filed by petitioners Federico T.
Montebon and Eleanor M. Ondoy against respondent Sesinando F.
Page 9 of 43
Potencioso, Jr., as well as the September 28, 2007 Resolution 3 of the
COMELEC En Banc denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were
candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the
May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On April 30, 2007,
petitioners and other candidates4 for municipal councilor filed a petition for
disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that
respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed
from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his
fourth consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the
service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004
when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying
for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.
In the hearing of May 10, 2007, the parties were directed to file their respective
memoranda.
In petitioners’ memorandum, they maintained that respondent’s assumption of
office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption
in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his
office as municipal councilor. They argued that, according to the law, voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official
concerned was elected.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that a local elective official is not
disqualified from running for the fourth consecutive time to the same office if
there was an interruption in one of the previous three terms.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for
disqualification ruling that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor
should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His second
term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be
disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.5
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division, as
follows:
Respondent’s assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in
January 2004 during his second term as councilor is not a voluntary
renunciation of the latter office. The same therefore operated as an
effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor.
Thus, in running for councilor again in the May 14, 2007 Elections,
respondent is deemed to be running only for a second consecutive
term as councilor of Tuburan, the first consecutive term fully served
being his 2004-2007 term.
Petitioner Montebon’s and Ondoy’s June 9, 2007 manifestation and
omnibus motion are hereby declared moot and academic with the
instant disposition of their motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.
The petition lacks merit.
The 1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving
more than three consecutive terms in the same post. Section 8, Article X
thereof states:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no
such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code also provides:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
Page 10 of 43
 in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,7 the Court held that the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.8 In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,9 the Court emphasized that
the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the
disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three
consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the
same position.10
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three
consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served
his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan
on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. 11 Section 4412 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. Thus:
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice
mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or
vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the
case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined herein. x x x
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due
to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest
ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is clear
therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be
considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of
voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service.13 (Emphasis added)
Thus, respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an
involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an
interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.
We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether
to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government
Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is
permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of
alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of
the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the
contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot
refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of
succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently
unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.
xxxx
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is
characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a
public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which
exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of
dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions.
It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.14
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The June 2, 2007
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division denying the petition for
disqualification and the September 28, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC en
banc denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Page 11 of 43
G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his
term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or
the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term
should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition1 seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City
for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007
terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office,
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected
and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore
violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s
favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-
term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the
2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division’s ruling in
its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the
following ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an
interruption of the three-term limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary
renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilo’s preventive
suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit
provision of the Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive
suspension on the continuity of an elective official’s term. To be sure,
preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public
official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on
Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal
with preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on
the term that an elective official acquired by succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
Page 12 of 43
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and
any difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years –
during which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of
Appeals,3 a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly
discusses what a "term" connotes, as follows:
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of
time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According
to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held.
Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to
holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto
cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by
which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for
which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].1avvphi1
4 Committee? This term "voluntary renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that "[T]he term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative – "no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms." This formulation – no more than three consecutive terms – is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact
indication of what to "serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the
meaning is clear – reference is to the term, not to the service that a public
official may render.1awphi1 In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provision’s express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the
public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation
mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not
affect "continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an
interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by
itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.5 It is an act that emanates
from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read
with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the
second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that
results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive
word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of
surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other words,
a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit
rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed
to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
on the term "voluntary renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the term
"voluntary renunciation":
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the
Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could
the Committee please enlighten us exactly what "voluntary renunciation"
mean? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent
the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary
renunciation" is more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.6
From this exchange and Commissioner Davide’s expansive interpretation of
the term "voluntary renunciation," the framers’ intent apparently was to close all
gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the
Page 13 of 43
way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of
defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional
provision, we note further that Commissioner Davide’s view is consistent with
the negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible
interpretation that it suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent
to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms
must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for,
values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive
suspension vis-à-vis term limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into
the concepts within the provision’s contemplation, particularly on the
"interruption in the continuity of service for the full term" that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the
public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public
official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully
served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis
supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or
to be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre8 and Rivera v. COMELEC,9 like Lonzanida, also involved the
issue of whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-
term limit disqualification. These cases, however, presented an interesting
twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the
contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were
never effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never
validly elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election
and service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the
following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election
was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after
the term of the contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and
continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of
the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a
contrary view – that the official (referring to the winner in the election protest)
would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by
virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually
served the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an
election. This factual variation led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who
finally lost the election contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere
"de facto officer." The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully served in
the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de
facto" officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office
that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation
because of what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not
actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation
because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for
three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-
term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term
limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections10 dealt with the effect of recall on the
three-term limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether
the disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election for the
supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term.
The Court upheld the COMELEC’s ruling that the official was not elected for
Page 14 of 43
three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years,
the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections11 also tackled recall vis-à-vis the three-
term limit disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor.
As he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the
election that immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 ½ years after
Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were
initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his
disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms
prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the
three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorn’s favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is
no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election
after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after
three terms.
xxxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.12
Latasa v. Commission on Elections13 presented the novel question of whether
a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run
as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a
city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the
cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until
elections were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the
conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the
municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the
city mayor – the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the
municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the
municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants
over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included
an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of
Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over
the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by
the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.14
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and
Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the
service between terms or tenure in a given elective post intervened.
In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective
office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private citizens for
two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that
the law contemplates a complete break from office during which the local
elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission
on Elections,15 where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the
position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he
subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was
an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the
operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had
intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly
deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective
official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen
Page 15 of 43
during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest,
however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and
assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he
ceased to be councilor – an interruption that effectively placed him outside the
ambit of the three-term limit rule.
c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than
the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily
left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to
occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict
intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous
stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being
involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in
Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise
the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered
an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to
office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a
reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost
the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to
render service. The latter occurs during an office holder’s term when he retains
title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by
law. Of course, the term "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to
office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be
rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X – both
by structure and substance – fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits
his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is
stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of
term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the
powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers
only to the elective official’s voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title
to this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of
power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:16
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over
the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
[Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension – whether under the Local Government Code,17 the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,18 or the Ombudsman Act19 – is an interim
remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been
charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily
indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when
the evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a
possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a
valid information (that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in
court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of
the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred
from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the
meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-
controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service
rather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection
of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the
functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his
position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a
temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated
when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
Page 16 of 43
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is
true in the exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and
the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited
power; there are limitations built into the laws20 themselves that the courts can
enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave
abuse of discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the
imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive
suspension from the extreme situation – that it can totally deprive an elective
office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective interruption of
an election official’s term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of
an elective officials’ service in office and they do not overlap. As already
mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and
of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily
exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is
triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without
any break. Its companion concept – interruption of a term – on the other hand,
requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or
interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with
respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this
point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive
suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption
of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of
the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy
exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and
prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional
violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision
contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary – some
of them personal and some of them by operation of law – that may temporarily
prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in
the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability
through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite
some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the
functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive
suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a
time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard
to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at
least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many
modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of
serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the
three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination
of what an effective interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not
involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the
indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the
basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension
does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation
embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to
office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that
an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is – by its
very nature – the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and
temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and
non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more
important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to
render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of
a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term
limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption
of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and
consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive
suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not
require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
Page 17 of 43
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution
expressly disallows as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive
suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term. Thus, the COMELEC
refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
when it granted due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy for a prohibited
fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal
to perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was
one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly
NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F.
Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of
Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent
Asilo.
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO
MULI, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set
aside the resolutions issued by the COMELEC First Division dated May 21,
1998 and by the COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190
entitled, In the matter of the Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate Romeo
Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales, Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo
Lonzanida, respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner
Romeo Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the municipality of San
Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor
shall not be counted and if he has been proclaimed winner the said
proclamation is declared null and void.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive
terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however
contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before
the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9,
1997 declared a failure of elections. The court ruled:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders
judgment declaring the results of the election for the office of
the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995 as null
and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San
Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the
COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and
re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling P1,720
votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the
COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post,
which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely
filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in
the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms
in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed
winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the
questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding
that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the
fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by
virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before
the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in
computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by
the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions
finding him disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998
elections. He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two
consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted
as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced by the COMELEC decision
dated November 13, 1997 in EAC No. 6-97 entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-
Page 18 of 43
Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-Appellant; wherein the COMELEC
declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Petitioner also argues that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral
elections; as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the
appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court
to sustain the questioned resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its
jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification. The private respondent states
that the petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the
May 1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the
COMELEC before the elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be
disqualified may still be heard and decided by the COMELEC after the election
and proclamation of the said party without distinction as to the alleged ground
for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election offense or for
ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on
the merits of the petition for disqualification were issued within the
commission's jurisdiction. As regards the merits of the case, the private
respondent maintains that the petitioner's assumption of office in 1995 should
be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of
mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before
the next mayoral elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent
COMELEC praying for the dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor-General
stressed that section 8, Art. X of the Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter 1
of the Local Government Code which bar a local government official from
serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of
"service of a term" and so the rule should be examined in this light. The public
respondent contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties
of mayor from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full
term, albeit he was later unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater
part of the term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as a de jure or
de facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of
the three term limit because the prohibition speaks or "service of a term" which
was intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt to
monopolize political power. It is likewise argued by the respondent that a
petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court is proper when the petition
for disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant petition for
disqualification which was filed before the elections may be resolved by the
COMELEC thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner
could not have served a valid term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed
office as mayor for that period because he was not lawfully elected to the said
office. Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the expiration of the term
and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one full term. As
regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the
COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the
petitioner's proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be
three years and no such officials shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-
term limit for elective local government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term
limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially
proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from
running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said
disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive
political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in
order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the
need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for
Page 19 of 43
office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials
from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was
compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a
powerful chief executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a
political dynasty. 1 The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact
that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years
of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after
serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates
to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local
government official should be barred from running for the same post after three
consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the
same office.2
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the
exception of barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms
was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin
Borja, Jr.; vs. COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr.3 where the issue raised was
whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of
law upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the
term should be considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose
of computing the three term limit. This court pointed out that from the
discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates
proceeded from the premise that the official's assumption of office is by reason
of election. This Court stated:4
Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of
service of term, derived from the concern about the
accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in
office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the
concern that the right of the people to choose those whom
they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the
drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the
officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is
clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional
Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI
sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of
Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question
with regard to the issue after the second
term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a
period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left
behind before — if the Gentlemen will
remember-was: How long will that period of
rest be? Will it be one election which is three
years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will
remember, Commissioner Rodrigo
expressed the view that during
the election following the expiration of the
first 12 years, whether such election will be
on the third year or on the sixth year
thereafter, this particular member of the
Senate can run. So it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years. That was the
Committees' stand.
xxx xxx xxx
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as
well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8
contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of
"the-term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such
officials" from serving for more than three consecutive terms.
The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official
may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states
that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected." The
term served must therefore be one "for which the official
concerned was elected." The purpose of the provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective official may serve."
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right
to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
Page 20 of 43
 enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995
mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was
ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated
November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which
declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio.
Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First,
the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in
the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-
appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared
by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void.
His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason
of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly
held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all 5 and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on
the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the
election protest.6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly
elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with
finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of
the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to
have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater
portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision
under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which he was elected. "The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC
to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold
office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from 1995 to March
1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term
limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground
to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between
petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years
and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he
was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the
petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to
any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover,
protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early
resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial
court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court's decision
declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume
office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is
not here shown to have intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay
in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his
chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over
the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit.
The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the
May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's
proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga
vs. COMELEC and Trinidad7 that the proclamation nor the assumption of office
of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the
COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing
the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Sec. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
Page 21 of 43
 Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case. — any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the court or commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition
for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after
the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward
the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to
impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
The court stated:
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word
"shall" signified that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced.
The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion
but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the
election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the
election, Silvestre vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R.A. No.
6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-
judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be
countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond
the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-
judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in
perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By
such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the
scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-
judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter
cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a
discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not
difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses
would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the
dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply
because the investigating body was unable, for any reason
caused upon it, to determine before the election if the
offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to
be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is
to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case
based on the commission of election offenses would not be
decided before the election. This scenario is productive of
more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose
of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had
assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC
of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and
eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam
v. COMELEC this Court held —
Time and again this Court has given its
imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC
is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made. The
fact that a candidate proclaimed has
assumed office, we have said, is no bar to
the exercise of such power. It of course may
not be availed of where there has been a
valid proclamation. Since private
respondent's petition before the COMELEC
is precisely directed at the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation, we perceive that
inquiry into this issue is within the area
allocated by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a
proclamation to be precluded from
challenging the validity thereof after that
proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily
supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification
proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is
Page 22 of 43
 deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation .

Accordingly, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC

declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral
elections are hereby set aside.1âwphi1.nê

Page 23 of 43
G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006 disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having,
FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty
vs. elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x---------------------x To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing
G.R. No. 163354 January 23, 2006 each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the
ROMMEL G. ONG, Petitioner, latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest.
vs. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No.
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON 6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the
ELECTIONS, Respondents. RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty
DECISION contest,4 albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had
fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to
GARCIA, J.: serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.

Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc.
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for certiorari with petitioner
Francis G. Ong impugning the COMELEC en banc resolution1 dated May 7,
2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting private respondent Joseph Stanley
Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31, 2004 2 of
the COMELEC’s First Division.
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
application for injunctive relief, filed by petitioner Rommel Ong, brother of
Francis, seeking, among other things, to stop the COMELEC from enforcing
and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en banc resolution in SPA Case
No. 04-048 pending the outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295.
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation
of these petitions.
The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed factual
backdrop:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong
(Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the
incumbent mayor.
Acting on Alegre’s petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis’ certificate of
candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC
rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution5 dismissing the said petition of
Alegre, rationalizing as follows:
We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those
obtaining in the sample situations addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja
case. Herein, one of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is
not present. Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of
1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however,
from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected
thereto. The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided his
election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was
the "legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente,
Camarines Norte." This disposition had become final after the [COMELEC]
dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the case having become moot and
academic.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida
case and applicable in the case at bench, Ong could not be considered as
having served as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because "he was not duly elected
to the post; he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which
presumption was later overturned … when [the RTC] decided with finality that
[he] lost in the May 1998 elections." (Words in bracket and emphasis in the
original).

On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office

a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy3 of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to
Page 24 of 43
Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, contending, in the
main, that there was a misapplication of the three-term rule, as applied in the
cited cases of Borja vs. Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-048, a
resolution6 reversing the March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELEC’s First
Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the …May 10, 2004"; (b) ordering the
deletion of Francis’ name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing
the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his
favor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the
aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to seek the
assistance of his political party, the Nationalist People’s Coalition, which
immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as
substitute candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past
the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his own
certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his
brother Francis.
The following undisputed events then transpired:
1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed
a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Rommel
Ong.
2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a
letter7 to Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza
Z. Cariño and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which he
appealed that, owing to the COMELEC’s inaction on Alegre's petition
to cancel Rommel’s certificate of candidacy, the name "Rommel Ong"
be included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES
Carino.
3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote8 to then COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V,
seeking clarification on the legality of the action thus taken by the PES
Cariño. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum
under date May 10, 20049 addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cariño,
ordering her to implement the resolution of the COMELEC en banc in
SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004.10 Said Memorandum
partly stated:
The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig
[Director IV, Law Department], which he quote your stand, "that substitution is
not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied due course.
In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of
Francis Ong was denied due course," and elaborated further that:
"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to include the name of a
substitute candidate in the certified list of candidates unless the substitution is
approved by the Commission.
In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate of
candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the
election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates."
The above position of the Commission was in line with the pronouncement of
Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which states:
"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy."
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said
Resolution of the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on
May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added].
4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would
seem that the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San
Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the
votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that
Board.11
5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Alegre as the winning candidate for the mayoralty post in San Vicente,
Camarines Norte.12
On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition for certiorari,
presently docketed as G.R. No. 163295. His brother Rommel’s petition in G.R.
No. 163354 followed barely a week after.
In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No. 163295 and G.R. No.
163354 were consolidated.13
Page 25 of 43
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order dismissing
private respondent Alegre’s Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being moot and academic.14
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its en
banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified
to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections and consequently ordering the deletion of his name from the official
list of candidates so that any vote cast in his favor shall be considered stray.
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied due course to Rommel’s certificate of candidacy in
the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or
not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as
full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner
Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed
assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three
consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elect in the May 1998 election
was contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of Daet,
Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues,
citing Lonzanida vs. Comelec15, that a proclamation subsequently declared
void is no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a
protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the
final outcome of the election protest.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as
follows:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.16
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present
herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no
dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving
the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in
full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term,
albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001
mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of
the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed,
therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term
limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the
full term", and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra,
barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case
No. 6850,17 that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.
However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal
use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did
not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the
Page 26 of 43
1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally
be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to
discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-
term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Court’s ruling
in, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,18 citing Borja vs. Comelec19. In Lonzanida,
petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then
ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged
his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and
filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision
dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared
the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner
Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the
office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May
1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to
disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually granted.
There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been
duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office. As the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida "cannot be deemed to have
served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in
fact vacated] his post before the expiration of the term."
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent.
For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a
nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence
thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed
by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary
severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an
effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present
case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in
the continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike
Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never
ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from running in the May 10,
2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due course
to his certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and statutory
provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official
cannot be sustained. What the COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004
assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence:
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the ruling in
the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the instant petition will be erroneous
because the factual milieu in those cases is different from the one obtaining
here. Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases
of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an interruption in the continuity of
service of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have
served continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full
term from 1998 to 2001 could not be simply discounted on the basis that he
was not duly elected thereto on account of void proclamation because it would
have iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards
a legally disqualified and repudiated loser with a crown of victory. (Word in
bracket added; emphasis in the original)
Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his discretion when he issued
the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the implementation of aforesaid May
7, 2004 COMELEC en banc resolution even before its finality20 is now of little
moment and need not detain us any longer.
Just as unmeritorious as Francis’ petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommel’s
petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel) challenges the COMELEC's
act of not including his name as a substitute candidate in the official list of
candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing COMELEC
policy21 provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in
the certified list of candidates pending approval of the substitution.
Not to be overlooked is the Court’s holding in Miranda vs. Abaya,22 that a
candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due
course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party
as that of the former, thus:
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or
accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who
had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where
the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied
due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.
Page 27 of 43
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions
where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case
where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial
and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there
can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a
nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or
cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were
otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons
whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled
under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any
certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.
xxx xxx xxx
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be
readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840,
November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no
candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that
Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate
of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably
cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy
has been cancelled and denied due course.
In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were
already passé, Rommel Ong’s petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en
banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-
048 AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE
GUZMAN, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" MORALES, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 170577 May 9, 2007
ANTHONY D. DEE, Petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" MORALES, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution are two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions
dated March 14, 2005 and November 8, 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc.
G.R. No. 167591
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN v.
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" MORALES
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent
Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga
for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or on
January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
On January 10, 2004, Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman,
petitioners, filed with the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy
on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive
terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160, also known as the Local Government Code.
In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales admitted that he was elected
mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
(first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the
second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the
office" or as a "de facto officer" because of the following reasons:
a. He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since
his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its Decision dated April 2,
Page 28 of 43
 2001 in Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 98-131. The Decision
became final and executory on August 6, 2001; and
b. He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft
case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
On May 6, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution
finding respondent Morales disqualified to run for the position of municipal
mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms.
Accordingly, his Certificate of Candidacy was cancelled. On May 7, 2004, he
filed with the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration.
On March 14, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution granting
respondent Morales’ motion for reconsideration and setting aside that of the
Second Division. The COMELEC En Banc held that since the Decision in EPC
No. 98-131 of the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City declared respondent Morales’
proclamation void, his discharge of the duties in the Office of the Mayor in
Mabalacat is that of a de facto officer or a de facto mayor. Therefore, his
continuous service for three consecutive terms has been severed.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 170577
ANTHONY DEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARIO "BOKING"
MORALES
On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was proclaimed the duly elected
mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007,
petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor, filed with the RTC, Branch
61, Angeles City a petition for quo warranto against the said respondent.
Petitioner alleged that respondent Morales, having served as mayor for three
consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or fourth term. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 11503.
In his answer, respondent Morales raised the following defenses:
a. He was not validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001 since the RTC,
Branch 57, Angeles City declared in its Decision that his proclamation
as mayor of Mabalacat was void. Petitioner Dee was then proclaimed
the duly elected mayor; and
b. He was preventively suspended for six months by the Ombudsman,
during the same term in an anti-graft case, an interruption in the
continuity of his service as municipal mayor of Mabalacat.1
In its Decision dated November 22, 2004, the RTC dismissed petitioner Dee’s
petition for quo warranto on the ground that respondent Morales did not serve
the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, but
petitioner Dee in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001, thus:
Respondent, Marino Morales, was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001 because
although he was proclaimed as the elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers, had assumed office and discharged the
duties of mayor, his close rival, the herein petitioner, Anthony D. Dee, was
declared the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the Decision
promulgated on April 2, 2001 in Election Protest EPC No. 98-131 filed by
Anthony Dee against herein respondent, Marino Morales, and decided by RTC,
Br. 57, Angeles City. x x x.
Petitioner Dee interposed an appeal to the COMELEC First Division, alleging
that respondent Morales violated the three-term limit rule when he ran for re-
election (fourth time) as mayor in the 2004 elections. Consequently, his
proclamation as such should be set aside. In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005
the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal. It held
that respondent Morales cannot be deemed to have served as mayor of
Mabalacat during the term 1998 to 2001 because his proclamation was
declared void by the RTC, Branch 57 of Angeles City. He only served as a
caretaker, thus, his service during that term should not be counted.
On August 12, 2005, petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC En Banc a motion
for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated November 8, 2005, the COMELEC
En Banc affirmed the questioned Resolution of the Second Division.
Hence, petitioner Dee’s instant petition for certiorari.
Both cases may be decided based on the same facts and issues.
It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected to the position of mayor
of Mabalacat for the following consecutive terms:
a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
Page 29 of 43
 c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE. –
Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1, 2003 to
June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth because his second term, July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served, may not be
counted since his proclamation was declared void by the RTC, Branch 57 of
Angeles City.
Respondent Morales is wrong. This Court, through Mr. Justice Cancio C.
Garcia, resolved the same issue in Ong v. Alegre2 with identical facts, thus:
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing
each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the
latter being subsequently proclaimed by the COMELEC winner in the contest.
Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No.
6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the
RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest,
albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully
served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve
the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elected for the municipality of San Vicente.
xxx
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or
not petitioner Francis’ assumption of office as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as
full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner
Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed
assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three
consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elected in the May 1998 election
was contested and eventually nullified per the Decision of the RTC of Daet,
Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues,
citing Lonzanida v. Comelec, that a proclamation subsequently declared void is
no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a protested
proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome
of the election protest.
xxx
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present
herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no
dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving
the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in
full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term,
albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001
mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of
the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed,
therefore, is whether or not Francis’ assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term
limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the
full term," and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra,
barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive terms for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case
No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.
However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal
use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did
not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally
be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to
discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would-under the three-
term rule-be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
Page 30 of 43
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Court’s ruling in
Lonzanida v. Comelec, citing Borja v. Comelec. In Lonzanida, petitioner
Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the
same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as
Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election
protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 8,
1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position
vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded
to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed
his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under
the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court
held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the
post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the
Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida "cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact
vacated] his post before the expiration of the term."
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent.
For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a
nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election," and, as a consequence
thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed
by an order for him to vacate the office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary
severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an
effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present
case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in
the continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike
Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never
ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above, Francis Ong was elected
and assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for
three consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998
election was declared void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte in its
Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by this Court, his service for the term
1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him.
Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to respondent
Morales who is similarly situated.
Here, respondent Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC,3 but also
Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections4 which is likewise inapplicable. The facts
in Borja are:
Private respondent Jose T. Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1998 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three
years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected
mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy
for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections, Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in
favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from
running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of private
respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. x x x
This Court held that Capco’s assumption of the office of mayor upon the death
of the incumbent may not be regarded as a "term" under Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government
Code). He held the position from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a
period of less than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that position.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC,5 this Court ruled that assumption of the
office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the "term"
contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b)
of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Court observed, there
was a "break" in the service of private respondent Ramon T. Talanga as
mayor. He was a "private citizen" for a time before running for mayor in the
recall elections.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He
was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as
mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre,6 such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Page 31 of 43
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit –
The term of the office of elected local officials x x x, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. x x x
Upon the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government
Code) clearly provides:
No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. x x x
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a
month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years.
In Latasa v. Comelec,7 the Court explained the reason for the maximum term
limit, thus:
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to
establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the
deliberations:
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
continuous service and frequent re-elections, officials from the President down
to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions
and to accumulate these powers and prerequisites that permit them to stay on
indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a
subsequent election. x x x
xxx
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a
break in the service of local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein
was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private
citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down
from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included
an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
having served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he
be allowed another three consecutive term as mayor of the City of Digos,
petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive
years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not
abhorred by it.
This is the very situation in the instant case. Respondent Morales maintains
that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a "caretaker of the
office" or as a "de facto officer." Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is
violated and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position
for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he
exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables
him "to stay on indefinitely".
Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of
Mabalacat.
G.R. No. 167591 –
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. The effect of the cancellation of a
Certificate of Candidacy is provided under Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646,
thus:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. – The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section
78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
in relation to Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
Page 32 of 43
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and
appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there
is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors
shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election
is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
xxx
19. Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or
in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall
be considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and
cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be
installed, under no circumstances can minority or defeated candidate be
deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner
Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo
(as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No.
105111).
xxx

xxx As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the

In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales can not be considered a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for
him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
G.R. No. 170577 –
Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo warranto has become moot.
Going back to G.R. No. 167591, the question now is whether it is the vice-
mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004
to 2007 term.
In Labo v. Comelec,8 this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot
be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:
contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,
Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Respondent
Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 is cancelled. In
view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor in Mabalacat, Pampanga, the
vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections is hereby declared mayor and shall serve as such
for the remaining duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The
petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for being moot.
This Decision is immediately executory.

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.

xxx

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified,

the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be
considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate
in whom sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of
Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any intention to
misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified
to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the
Page 33 of 43
[G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002.]
RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to nullify and set aside the
resolution dated May 9, 2001 of public respondent Commission on Elections in
Comelec SPA No. 01-055, which granted the motion for reconsideration and
declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., qualified to run for Mayor in
Lucena City for the May 14, 2001 election. Petitioner prays that votes cast in
private respondent’s favor should not be counted; and should it happen that
private respondent had been already proclaimed the winner, his proclamation
should be declared null and void.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001
elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor.
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the
full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he
lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground
that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served
the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full
term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the
unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election.
Petitioner contended that Talaga’s candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation
of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Sec. 8. — The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected City
Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms.
He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat
the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his
mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each.
Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for
13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of
the law and the Constitution. He cites Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), as authority to the effect that to apply
disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, two (2) conditions
must concur, to wit: (a) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that he has fully
served three (3) consecutive terms.
On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private
respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on
the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his
Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled.
On April 27, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that "three (3) consecutive terms" means continuous service for nine
(9) years and that the two (2) years service from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao who
defeated him in the election of 1998 prevented him from having three
consecutive years of service. He added that Tagarao’s tenure from 1998 to
2000 could not be considered as a continuation of his mayorship. He further
alleged that the recall election was not a regular election, but a separate
special election specifically to remove incompetent local officials.
On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed his Opposition to private respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration stating therein that serving the unexpired term of office is
considered as one (1) term. 1 Petitioner further contended that Article 8 of the
Constitution speaks of "term" and does not mention "tenure" : The fact that
private respondent was not elected in the May 1998 election to start a term that
began on June 30, 1998 was of no moment, according to petitioner, and what
matters is that respondent was elected to an unexpired term in the recall
election which should be considered one full term from June 30, 1998 to June
30, 2001.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private respondent
Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. It reversed the First Division’s ruling and held that 1)
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not
win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by
reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall
elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term
Page 34 of 43
disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms having lost his third bid in the
terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption May 11, 1998 elections, said defeat is an interruption in the continuity of
in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. service as city mayor of Lucena.

On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as the The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295
duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held,

Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the sole issue:chanrob1es virtual To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
1aw library to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITH consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9, 2001, apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following case or
DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., QUALIFIED situation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
TO RUN FOR MAYOR IN LUCENA CITY FOR THE MAY 14, 2001
ELECTIONS. 2 x x x

Stated differently, was private respondent disqualified to run for mayor of

Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections? 3 This issue hinges on whether, as Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
provided by the Constitution, he had already served three consecutive terms in suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after
that office. that, can he run for one more term in the next election?

Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city
mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the unexpired portion of the
term of office he served after winning a recall election, covering the period May
12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is considered a full term. He posits that to interpret
otherwise, private respondent would be serving four (4) consecutive terms of
10 years, in violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987 Constitution 4 and Section
43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the Local Government Code.
Section 43. Term of Office. —
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
x x x
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the
understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should
be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about,
care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

x x x Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999),
we said,

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.chanrob1es served three consecutive terms.
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Accordingly, COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent was not elected for
Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a
is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in
between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during Tagarao’s incumbency, he the 1998 elections.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
was a private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC in allowing
In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that private respondent respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X,
Page 35 of 43
Section 8 of 1987 Constitutions. 5 To bolster his case, respondent adverts to Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS
the comment of Fr: Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, ABALLA, JR. respondents.
stating that in interpreting said provision that "if one is elected representative to -----------------------------
serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will G.R. No. 154683 November 12, 2002
be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,
successive terms allowed." 6 vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent -----------------------------
only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government G.R. Nos. 155083-84 November 12, 2002
officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. 7 MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE,
SR., petitioners,
Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of vs.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary renunciation" for clearly it THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S.
is not. In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, we said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library HAGEDORN, respondents.
DECISION
. . .The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered CARPIO, J.:
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
The Case
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari 1 seeking the reversal of the
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral The Antecedents
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. 8 Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall 2 of
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as
public respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in Comelec Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA
SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay
1aw 1ibrary Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.

G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa
City, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL
ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman
Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong
Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution"
for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for
mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as
E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc3 promulgated a resolution
dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course
Page 36 of 43
to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7,
2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No.
5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited
acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign
period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E.
Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA
No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to
cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido
Ollave, Sr. ("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-
492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro
V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against
Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same issues.
The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified
from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having
served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately
prior to the instant recall election for the same post." Subsequently, SPA Nos.
02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First
Division4 dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The
COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The
COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September
24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC
affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall
election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated
August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding
the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal
infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall
Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to
adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally
deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new
electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the
resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA
proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public's
constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No.
5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September
7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that
the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7,
2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional
15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date
of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC
to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002
within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution
No. 5708 giving the candidates an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002
within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to
September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated
September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539
declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They
likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding
Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite the
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for
elective local officials.
Page 37 of 43
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to
desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further
orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached
petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo,
Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall
election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained
17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from
proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give
effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a
petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution and
scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for
mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24,
2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days has become
moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No.
5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by
petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to
130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members.
The COMELEC, however, found that –
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of
incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the
convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the
Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II
entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices
were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II and III of
the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the
Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were attached to the Petition and
marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass
media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the
following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast
media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national
officials, and DILG officials].
xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10
July 2002 certified that upon a 'thorough and careful verification of the
signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all
members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise
certified 'that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected
as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his
Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon proper review, all documents
submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted
the following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition
sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA was validly constituted and that
the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for
the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
x x x ."
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within
the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are
Page 38 of 43
patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which also dealt with alleged
defective service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that –
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA
members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a
function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The
factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in
the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the
COMELEC's findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the
Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were
seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July
15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when
the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not
yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no
legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of
the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA
proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and
of even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the
entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the
COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal
of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and
authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had
the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of
the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied
him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents
violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall
election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length
of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after
the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is
no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election
after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after
three terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
Page 39 of 43
 "THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:6 We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as
indicated on the blackboard, and these are Alternative No. I where
there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative
No. 2 where there is no immediate reelection after three successive
terms."7
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following
manifestation on the term of elective local officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would
proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and
local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of
three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three
successive terms)."8
The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection"
question in voting for the term limits of Senators9 and Representatives of the
House.10
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The
debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited
election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate
reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the
three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should also be
prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following
their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is
worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected."11
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the
Constitutional Convention is instructive:
"GASCON:12 I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue
after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of
time before he can run again?
DAVIDE:13 That is correct.
GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the
Gentleman will remember - was: How long will that period of rest be?
Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six
years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo
expressed the view that during the election following the expiration of
the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the
sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate can run. So,
it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the
Committee's stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at
the least."14 (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only
three years15 following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly
acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate
reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period
following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the
period of rest" of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full
extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24,
2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which
ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred
Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did
not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Page 40 of 43
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998
elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto
Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn
could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the
Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the
maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as
mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.16 Socrates
ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After
Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen
until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes
over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor
of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was
simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of
Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but
because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on
June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June
30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive
terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms
with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term
because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive
character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of
continuity of service in this manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar
any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although
short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of
his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or
hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for
any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an
elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,18 a unanimous Court
reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office
breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City.
In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G.
Tagarao. However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and
served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001.
When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo,
the other candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the
ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a
continuation of his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already
served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was
qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30,
1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity
of his service as mayor. Talaga's recall term as mayor was not consecutive to
his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break
of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office
interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from being
stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive
terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months
Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents
his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his
previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and
the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption
occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the
interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the
respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed
office after winning the recall election. Talaga's recall term did not retroact to
include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made
to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001
elections because he would already have served three consecutive terms prior
to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve
the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time
prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes
an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule
that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full
term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective
official's terms in office.
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In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the
tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the
September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June
30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term.
But to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting
to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last
September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as
consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are
not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a
legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their
leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of
the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing.
Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were
as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as
they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further
reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the
alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be
simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election
following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against
'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of the
proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'"19 (Emphasis supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start
of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election
serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself
one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the
following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
"SUAREZ:20 For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the
Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already
considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement,
plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the
meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he
will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more
term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower
House."21
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and
Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a recall election of
local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can
serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus
the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should
know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years.
This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall
election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24,
2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three
consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which
time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth
consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth
consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible
effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for
mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted.
No costs.
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[G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002.]
MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA, Petitioners, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B. ROMAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza
and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission on
Elections, dated August 15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare
respondent Leonardo B. Roman’s election as governor of Bataan on May 14,
2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution, which provides that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He
contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission,
the Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three
full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a
recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification
whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case)
to the nine-year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss the
petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639,
Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and
Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which
succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held
should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has
served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution
does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not
due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the
period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent
Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election
held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had
previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995–
1998 and 1998–2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term
for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He
argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a
contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to
less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent
monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the
voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received
97 percent of the votes cast. He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to
affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in a democracy the people
should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by
them in credible elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when two
conflicting legal positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice
should be tilted in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it
is clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if
the terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous. Hence,
service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation,
should not count to disqualify an elective local official from running for the
same position. This case is different from Socrates, where the full three
consecutive terms had been continuously served so that disqualification had
clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J.,
and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ., concurred,
holds the view that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising
the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term.
Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and
from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term
and contravenes Art. X, §8 of the Constitution. For this reason, she voted to
grant the petition and to declare respondent’s election on May 14, 2001 as null
and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to
grant the petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to
totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local
officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest
intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended that respondent
Roman’s election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed
by the Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS DISMISSED.
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