Paper

 given  at  Global  Studies  Association  conference,  Challenging  Globalization,  Royal  Holloway,  London,  September  2009  
 
 
 
Globalisation  and  Economic  Determinism  
 
Luke  Martell  
 
 
Abstract  
 
There  has  been  a  reaction  against  economic  determinist  explanations  of  globalisation.  
This  paper  takes  anti-­‐economistic  arguments  in  globalisation  studies  and  argues  that  
they  unwittingly  show  the  importance  of  the  economy,  or  fail  to  undermine  the  
importance  of  economic  determinants  in  globalisation.  The  paper  looks  at  meanings  that  
economic  determinism  in  globalisation  studies  is  given  and  argues  that  economic  
determination  is  more  complex  than  it  is  made  out  to  be.  It  is  politically  important  not  to  
dismiss  economic  causality  as  out  of  date,  reductionist  or  too  determinist  because  
structures  of  power  and  inequality  in  globalisation  come  from  the  economy.  If  the  
determinant  role  of  the  economy  is  pushed  out  then  globalisation  is  made  to  look  more  
benign,  equal  and  democratic  than  it  is  and  its  darker  sides  are  concealed.    
 
 
This  paper  argues  that  criticisms  of  economic  determinism  in  globalisation  studies  are  wrong  to  
reduce  the  role  of  economics,  and  that  economics  plays  a  big  role  in  globalisation.  I  am  focusing  on  
criticisms  within  the  sociology  of  globalisation.  The  arguments  here  may  be  more  applicable  to  
British  and  European  sociology  than  to  sociology  in  other  countries.  In  the  USA,  for  example,  a  
political  economy  approach  within  the  sociology  of  globalisation  is  more  common  (see,  for  
instance,  Sassen,  2007,  2008).  In  the  UK  and  other  European  countries  it  is  more  likely  to  be  seen  
as  out  of  date  and  crude.  Nevertheless,  my  discussion  does  not  apply  only  to  sociology  or  the  UK  
or  Europe.  There  has  been  discussion  of  a  cultural  turn  in  the  social  sciences  generally  (e.g.  see  Ray  
and  Sayer,  1999).    
 
Arguments  against  economic  determinism  
 
Marxism  has  been  criticised  for  reducing  the  shaping  of  history  and  society  to  economic  
determinants  too  much,  and  anti-­‐economic  determinism  in  globalisation  studies  is  sometimes  part  
of  an  anti-­‐Marxism.    
 
It  is  also  a  reaction  against  the  first  wave  of  globalisation  studies  that  is  said  to  have  seen  
globalisation  as  a  singular  neoliberal  phenomenon  with  the  same  effect  everywhere.  In  early  
analyses,  globalisation  is  said  to  have  been  seen  as  economically  driven  and  homogeneous,  
sweeping  around  the  world  with  similar  strong  effects  in  all  places  (Held  et  al,  1999).  Anti-­‐
economism  is  partly  a  critique  of  the  alleged  economic  determinism  and  homogenising  
perspective  of  this  wave  in  globalisation  studies.  It  is  argued  that  non-­‐economic  factors  are  more  
important  than  was  recognised  by  the  first  wave,  and  that  globalisation  is  diverse  and  
multidimensional  rather  than  the  same  everywhere.    
 
The  tendency  to  anti-­‐economism  in  the  sociology  of  globalisation  has  been  identified  by  Larry  Ray.  
Ray  argues  that  ‘much  sociology  of  globalisation  has  been  highly  culturally  inflected  and  has  given  

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too  little  attention  to  the  transnational  economic  processes  that  shape  a  global  world’  (2007,  
p.16).  For  him  ‘previous  sociological  approaches,  such  as  development  theories,  were  rather  more  
in  tune  with  global  developments  than  is  often  the  case  with  globalisation  texts  in  sociology’  
(2007,  p.14).  These  earlier  approaches  paid  more  attention  to  economics  and  less  developed  
countries  than  some  of  the  contemporary  cultural  sociology  of  globalisation  that  is  more  focused  
on  rich  countries  and  elite  experiences  within  those  countries.  This  is  ironic  since  some  
contemporary  globalisation  texts  argue  that  older  sociological  approaches  are  too  
unreconstructed  to  understand  globalisation  (Beck  2000,  2006).    
 
The  critique  of  economic  determinism  in  globalisation  studies  is  not  only  about  a  reaction  against  
Marxism,  but  is  also  related  to  advocacy  of  a  more  pluralist  view  of  the  world.  If  globalisation  
cannot  be  reduced  to  one  single  causal  factor,  such  as  the  economy,  then  it  is  more  diverse  than  
economic  determinism  suggests.  Beck,  for  example,  combines  anti-­‐economism  with  support  for  
methodological  pluralism  in  his  critique  of  Wallerstein.  He  argues:  ‘this  line  of  argument  ...  has  two  
striking  features:  it  is  both  monocausal  and  economic.  Globalisation  is  exclusively  defined  in  terms  
of  institutionalization  of  the  world  market’  (Beck,  2000,  p.33).    
 
More  pluralist  perspectives  on  globalisation  argue  a  number  of  things:  that  globalisation  i)  has  
different  effects  in  different  places  depending  on  local  cultures;  ii)  operates  at  different  levels,  
cultural  and  political  as  well  as  economic;  iii)  is  not  determined  by  the  economy  at  cultural  and  
political  levels;  iv)  has  multiple  causes  behind  it  other  than  economic  ones,  ie  cultural  and  political  
causes  too;  v)  and  some  pluralist  views  emphasise  globalisation  as  a  hybrid  and  mixed  phenomena  
with  inputs  from  many  different  parts  of  the  world  and  not  just  westernised  or  homogenising.  In  
short,  pluralist  views  see  globalisation  as  mixed,  multidimensional,  localised  in  its  effects,  and  
multi-­‐causal.  All  of  this  goes  against  reducing  globalisation  to  the  economy  or  economic  causality.    
 
One  example  of  this  approach  is  Holton’s  (2008,  pp.7-­‐8).  I  pick  this  out  as  it  summarises  the  
approach  well,  not  because  his  analysis  is  especially  more  problematic  than  others.  In  fact,  as  we  
shall  see  below,  Holton,  to  his  credit,  also  recognises  the  role  of  the  economy.  Holton  says  that  
globalisation  cannot  be  reduced  to  economic  globalisation  and  is  not  necessarily  dominated  by  it.  
It  is  complex,  meaning  that  it  consists  of  many  processes  not  just  economic  ones,  and  that  some  of  
the  non-­‐economic  ones  are  not  determined  by  the  economy.  For  instance,  religions  (such  as  
Christianity  and  Islam),  culture  (such  as  music  and  visual  arts)  and  politics  (such  as  NGOs)  have  
forged  globalisation  and  done  so  without  themselves  being  simply  determined  by  economics,  but  
through  their  own  autonomy  and  force.  Forms  of  religion  and  politics,  for  example,  have  their  own  
non-­‐economic  values  and  beliefs.    
 
The  journal  Globalizations’  mission  statement  says:    
 
“Globalizations  is  dedicated  to  opening  the  widest  possible  space  for  discussion  of  
alternatives  to  a  narrow  economic  understanding  of  globalisation.  The  move  from  the  
singular  to  the  plural  is  deliberate  and  implies  skepticism  of  the  idea  that  there  can  ever  be  
a  single  theory  or  interpretation  of  globalisation.  Rather,  the  journal  will  seek  to  encourage  
the  exploration  and  discussion  of  multiple  interpretations  and  multiple  processes  that  may  
constitute  many  possible  globalisations,  many  possible  alternatives”.  
 
This  definition  combines  the  two  features  mentioned  above,  anti-­‐economism  and  methodological  
pluralism.  Roland  Robertson  is  a  leading  sociologist  of  globalisation  who  has  also  emphasised  
cultural  over  economic  causes  behind  globalisation,  in  combination  with  an  emphasis  on  the  
localization  of  globalisation  and  how  this  varies  from  place  to  place  (Robertson,  1992).  Robertson  

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(2009)  has  argued  for  cultural  over  economic  explanations,  and  Perkins  (2009),  commenting  on  
this,  notes  a  shift  away  from  economically  deterministic  explanations  of  globalisation  in  favour  of  a  
greater  focus  on  cultural  globalisation.    
 
Holton’s,  Globalizations’,  and  Robertson’s  arguments  are  important.  Explanations  of  globalisation  
should  not  be  reduced  to  the  economy.  They  should  recognise  the  variety  of  causes,  not  just  
economic  ones,  levels  of  globalisation  beyond  the  economy,  the  autonomous  impact  that  culture  
and  politics  can  have  on  the  economy  and  society,  and  that  they  themselves  are  not  just  
determined  by  the  economy.  How  globalisation  is  received  in  different  places,  whether  economic  
or  cultural,  depends  on  the  culture  of  that  place.  This  means  that  it  takes  different  forms  in  
different  places.  Globalisation  is  not  just  all  about  neoliberalism  but  also  culture,  and  not  just  
westernisation  or  homogenisation.  Anti-­‐economism  and  views  of  globalisation  as  plural  go  
together.    
 
Seeing  globalisation  in  these  plural  ways  is  valuable  and  an  antidote  to  monocausal,  over-­‐
westernised,  homogenising  views,  some  of  which  focus  on  the  economy  at  the  expense  of  culture,  
or  have  a  simplified  view  of  its  effects.  Pluralistic  views  of  globalisation  are  an  improvement  on  
earlier  sweeping  general  theories,  less  popular  nowadays,  which  see  globalisation  rolling  out  in  a  
similar  manner  across  the  world.  To  say  globalisation  is  multidimensional  is  helpful  and  brings  out  
its  mix.    
 
But  it  is  important  not  to  separate  off  the  plural  factors  of  globalisation,  focusing  on  each  as  if  
independent  from  the  others  and  distracting  from  links  and  causal  relations  between  them.  And  
we  must  be  careful  not  to  push  out  the  role  of  the  economy  too  much.  Giving  a  pluralistic  mix  of  
reasons  as  an  alternative  to  monocausality  is  not  by  itself  adequate.  There  are  dangers  in  seeing  
globalisation  as  a  hybrid  mix,  as  if  all  parts  are  equal  in  influence,  without  seeing  the  primacy,  
dominance  or  determination  of  some  over  others.  Often  some  causes  are  more  dominant  and  
some  have  more  of  an  effect  on  other  parts.  It  is  necessary  to  look  not  just  at  the  plurality  of  levels  
and  causes,  but  also  relations  of  determination  between  them,  and  whether  some  are  more  
dominant  or  driving.  Many  parts  of  society  and  causes  of  globalisation  are  interlinked  and  my  
argument  is  that  economic  factors  can  often,  but  not  always,  be  seen  to  be  the  driving  ones.  
 
Anti-­‐economic  determinists  supporting  economic  determinism    
 
One  feature  of  anti-­‐economistic  arguments  is  that  in  making  them  proponents  sometimes  make  
the  case  for  economic  causation  in  globalisation  as  much  as  undermining  it.  An  example  of  this  is  
D.K.  Fieldhouse’s  criticism  of  economically  deterministic  explanations  of  British  imperialism.  The  
latter  was  a  form  of  globalisation  –  the  spreading  of  economic,  political  and  cultural  forms  across  
global  extents,  followed  by  ongoing  and  reverse  global  links  in  the  postcolonial  period.    
 
One  explanation  for  the  British  empire  is  that  it  was  economically-­‐driven.  It  was  backed  up  by  
military  power,  the  state  and  ideology,  but  based  in  motivations  centred  on  commerce  and  trade.  
There  are  debates  about  whether  the  economics  of  empire  were  more  about  investment  or  trade  
or  the  expansion  of  commercial  or  industrial  capital.  But  the  historian  of  British  imperialism,  
Bernard  Porter,  argues:  ‘No  one  any  more  seriously  doubts  that  capitalist  pressures  were  the  
primary  reason  for  Britain’s  imperial  expansion  in  the  nineteenth  century’  (Porter,  1996,  p.  xv).    
Colonies  provided  raw  materials  and  produce  which  could  be  exported,  cheap  labour,  markets  for  
manufactures,  and  overseas  opportunities  for  financiers.  Imperialism  was  a  means  for  mobilising  
global  resources  for  Britain  and  for  British  economic  expansionism.  
 

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The  expansion  of  the  empire  was  not  primarily  culturally  driven.  This  does  not  mean  that  there  
were  not  attempts  to  spread  British  or  European  culture  through,  for  instance,  promoting  
Christianity,  the  establishment  of  imperial  education  networks,  or  attempts  to  socialize  local  elites.  
But  the  idea  that  the  British  were  trying  to  civilize  the  world  can  be  exaggerated.  The  most  
extensive  spread  of  economic,  political  and  cultural  networks  was  created  by  trying  to  maintain  
global  trading  and  economic  interests  and  was  less  involved  with  the  cultural  transformation  of  
colonies,  except  where  that  was  necessary  to  protect  economic  interests.  Even  then  cultural  
socialisation  affected  elites  more  than  ordinary  people.  The  capacity  to  ideologically  incorporate  
colonial  populations  was  limited  by  local  resistance,  the  problem  of  establishing  ideological  
penetration  on  such  a  broad  scale,  and  the  realisation  that  toleration  of  local  diversities  was  
necessary  for  taxation,  trade  and  order  to  be  maintained.    
 
Hobson  (1902)  is  one  who  argued  that  imperialism  was  not  about  civilising  locals,  but  that  civilising  
claims  were  used  as  a  justification  for  exploiting  them  as  tools  and  their  land  for  raw  materials.  
They  were  a  method  for  legitimating  imperialism.  In  countries  like  India  and  China,  he  argues,  
cultures  were  as  sophisticated  as  those  coming  from  the  imperialist  West.  Empire  was  more  about  
economy  than  exporting  culture.  For  Hobson,  financiers  promulgated  economic  motivations  for  
empire  more  than  other  sorts  of  capitalists.  Economics  was  not  the  only  motive  or  factor.  And  the  
economic  motives  of  capitalists  were  not  always  accompanied  by  net  economic  benefits  for  the  
nation,  because  of  the  costs  of  maintaining  empire.  But  none  of  these  qualifications  take  away  the  
importance  of  economics  as  a  key  motivating  force.    
 
Fieldhouse  (1973)  attempted  to  provide  a  counter-­‐argument  to  economically  reductionist  
explanations  for  British  imperialism,  from  Marxism  especially.  Fieldhouse  argued  for  non-­‐
economic  and  less  Eurocentric  explanations.  The  non-­‐economic  causes  of  imperialism,  he  
suggested,  were  political.  Imperialism  was  pursued  to  maintain  political  authority  abroad,  power,  
prestige  and  security,  or  jingoistic  attitudes  at  home.  The  non-­‐Eurocentric  angle  to  this  is  that,  for  
Fieldhouse,  attempts  at  imperialism  were  often  responses  to  problems  in  peripheries  that  
required  greater  intervention,  as  much  as  based  in  imperatives  originating  from  the  imperial  
country.    
 
But  despite  his  criticism  of  economic  arguments,  Fieldhouse  adds  to  or  balances  them,  or  shows  
how  they  are  more  complex,  rather  than  undermining  them.  He  says  that  many  of  the  political  
issues  in  the  peripheries  that  led  to  extensions  of  imperialism  arose  from  originally  economic  
expansions  based  on  trade.  It  was  where  imperial  powers  already  had  such  economic  interests  
that  other  reasons  for  intervention  that  were  not  directly  economic  arose.  Fieldhouse  sums  this  up  
like  this:  
 
‘Economic  factors  were  present  and  in  varying  degrees  influential  in  almost  every  situation  
outside  Europe  which  led  ultimately  to  formal  empire;  and  the  specific  value  of  many  of  
these  territories  to  Europeans  lay  in  trade,  investment  opportunities  or  other  forms  of  
economic  activity  …  the  original  economic  issue  had  to  some  degree  become  ‘politicized’  and  
therefore  required  an  imperial  solution’  (1973,  p.475-­‐6).    
 
In  short,  an  attempt  to  provide  a  corrective  to  Eurocentric  and  economic  explanations,  by  rightly  
emphasising  peripheries  and  political  factors,  makes  clear  that  European  economic  objectives  
underlay  such  non-­‐European  and  non-­‐economic  actions.  Political  solutions  were  required  to  
problems  of  what  were  economically  motivated  interventions.    
 

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I  mentioned  above  Holton’s  (2008,  p.7-­‐8)  argument  for  a  non-­‐economistic  understanding  of  
globalisation.  However,  in  setting  this  out  Holton  says  a  number  of  things  that  give  considerable  
power  to  the  economy  in  globalisation.  This  shows  a  creditable  openness  in  Holton’s  argument  to  
economic  factors.  But  I  mention  it  here  as  an  example  of  an  argument  against  economism  which  
also  gives  a  lot  of  emphasis  to  economics.  Holton  argues  that  there  is  far  more  to  globalisation  
than  global  economic  processes,  economic  power,  multinational  companies  and  free  trade,  but  
also  that  these  are  ‘very  important’  (p.7).  He  argues  that  NGOs  like  Médecins  Sans  Frontières  and  
Greenpeace  International  take  direct  action  to  ‘redress  social  and  economic  crises  that  
corporations  and  nation-­‐states  have  often  either  resisted  or  been  slow  to  address’.  So  economic  
factors  are  seen  as  important  in  the  action  of  these  groups.  Holton  argues  that  while  ‘religious  
movements  or  political  activism  often  challenge  or  resist  economic  globalisation,  or  utilize  some  of  
its  technological  infrastructure,  [this]  does  not  mean  that  they  are  simply  responses  to  it’  (p.7).  
This  is  a  good  point  but  also  suggests  that  economic  globalisation  and  the  technology  it  has  helped  
to  produce  are  often  behind  religious  or  political  movements  or  that  the  latter  react  to  the  former,  
even  if  there  is  also  more  to  it  than  this.    
 
Holton  argues  that  some  areas  ‘have  a  far  more  direct  connection  with  economic  globalisation’  
(p.8)  and  gives  migration  and  the  use  of  Information  Technology  and  New  Communication  
Technologies  as  examples.  He  says  that  much  migration  is  economically  motivated,  for  instance  by  
the  search  for  work  or  better  conditions  in  richer  countries,  which  have  an  economic  need  for  
migrant  workers  and  the  capital  to  pay  for  it.  Similarly,  he  says  that  the  internet  and  NCTs  are  
driven  by  economic  institutions  on  the  part  of  businesses  and  consumers,  for  instance  advertising  
or  ecommerce.    
 
None  of  this  is  to  deny  Holton’s  argument  that  globalisation  is  about  more  than  economics.  But  he  
also  suggests  that  economics  is  an  important  part  of  aspects  of  globalisation,  from  political  
movements,  to  migration  and  new  technology  and  media.  Arguments  that  set  out  to  caution  
against  giving  too  big  a  role  to  the  economy  give  it  quite  a  significant  role  in  practice.    
 
Economic  arguments  that  are  not  as  crude  as  anti-­‐economic  determinists  say    
 
So  one  way  in  which  economic  determinist  explanations  of  globalisation  hold  up  is  that  critics  
reinforce  them  when  questioning  them.  There  is  not  space  to  mention  all  instances  of  this,  but  I  
have  given  some  examples.  Another  reason  to  stand  by  economic  determinist  explanations  is  that  
they  are  not  as  crude  and  problematic  as  criticisms  suggest.    
 
Seeing  the  economy  as  often  dominant  does  not  have  to  imply  conclusions  that  critics  attribute  to  
this  perspective  or  that  may  seem  implicit  in  it.  Economic  explanations  in  the  way  I  am  arguing  for  
them  do  not  mean:    
 
1)  that  the  economy  itself  is  necessarily  determinant;    
2)  that  economic  forces  are  impersonal  structures,  as  opposed  to  driven  by  agents  with  choice;    
3)  that  political  and  cultural  factors  do  not  also  have  causal  power  within  the  context  of  economic  
causality;    
4)  that  economic  forces  are  always  determinant;    
5)  that  economic  determinism  leads  to  homogenisation.    
 
These  are  important  clarifications,  within  the  context  of  economic  motivations  being  primary  
causes  behind  globalisation.  I  will  look  at  these  in  turn,  and  in  the  next  section  give  some  concrete  
examples.    

5
  
1)  My  emphasis  is  on  economic  motivations  rather  than  the  economy.  If  globalisation  is  driven  by  
economic  incentives  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  it  is  caused  by  the  economy  as  a  structure  or  
only  by  economic  actors.  For  instance,  key  actors  in  economically  motivated  globalisation  can  be  
states  or  governments.  These  are  political  rather  than  economic  agents  but  might  be  motivated  by  
a  desire  to  secure  economic  benefits  for  their  territory.  So  while  economic  motivations  are  driving  
things,  the  economy  itself  or  only  economic  actors  may  not  be.  It  can,  for  example,  be  political  
actors  who  are  doing  so.    
 
2)  As  such,  economic  determinism  also  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  society  is  shaped  by  
impersonal  economic  structures  out  of  its  control.  Economic  motivations  are  often  the  creation  of  
actors  such  as  governments  or  corporations.  They  deliberately  and  actively  promote  their  
economic  aims.  These  or  other  actors  putting  different  goals  in  their  place  could  change  this.  To  
see  globalisation  as  driven  by  economics  is  compatible  not  only  with  non-­‐economic  actors  being  
behind  this,  but  also  with  agents  and  choice  rather  than  impersonal  structures  as  determining  
forces.    
 
3)  Focusing  on  economic  motivations  does  not  mean  that  politics  and  culture  do  not  have  an  
impact  on  economic  globalisation.  If  economic  motives  are  behind  globalisation  there  can  be  more  
than  one  way  to  pursue  them.  The  shape  economic  globalisation  takes  varies,  often  in  accordance  
with  culture  or  politics.  The  political  institutions  and  traditions  of  a  country  affect  the  reception  or  
shaping  of  globalisation,  and  it  can  take  different  forms  according  to  the  local  cultures  where  it  is  
received.  So  economics  is  politically  and  culturally  embedded  and  this  is  partly  why  economically  
driven  globalisation  does  not  have  the  same  outcome  everywhere  (see  [5]  above).  At  the  same  
time  it  may  still  be  economic  incentives  that  drive  globalisation,  even  if  taking  different  forms  
according  to  political  and  cultural  embeddedness.  The  latter  does  not  disprove  the  former.    
 
4)  To  say  that  economic  incentives  are  a  primary  force  behind  globalisation  does  not  mean  that  
they  are  always  the  primary  force  in  all  areas.  Forces  other  than  economic  ones,  cultural  ones  for  
example,  can  determine  domestic  politics  and  policies.  In  the  USA  socially  conservative  religious  
values  have  a  strong  influence  on  politics.  Religious  values  are  important  in  politics  in  Islamic  
states.  Gender  inequality  and  the  globalisation  of  it  are  often  perpetuated  by  economic  motives  –  
women  workers  from  the  developing  world  provide  cheap  labour  in  rich  countries,  for  instance.  
But  the  gendered  dimension  of  this  cannot  be  explained  by  economics  and  needs  to  be  accounted  
for,  in  part,  in  terms  of  patriarchal  culture  and  ideology.  
 
So,  I  have  argued  that  economic  determinist  explanations  of  globalisation  need  not  be  as  crude  
and  simplistic  as  critics  put  it.  At  the  same  time,  none  of  these  complexities  take  away  the  
significance  of  economic  causality.  They  show  that  economic  motivations  being  primary  is  not  the  
same  as  reductionism  to  impersonal  forces,  and  can  include  roles  for  agency,  non-­‐economic  forces  
and  diversity  in  outcomes.  But  they  show  the  form  that  economic  motivations  take.  They  do  not  
show  that  the  economic  is  not  determining,  or  imply  a  return  to  pluralism  alone.  They  show  the  
agency  and  role  of  politics  and  culture  in  economic  determinism,  but  not  that  economic  
motivations  are  not  often  a  primary  determinant.  These  complexities  to  the  theory  do  not  mean  
that  economic  causality  behind  globalisation  is  unimportant  because  of  the  fact  that  it  can  turn  
out  differently  in  different  places,  and  be  taken  in  varying  directions  by  non-­‐economic  actors  or  
contexts.  Economic  causality  still  shows  why  globalisation  happens  in  many  cases.  It  shows  why  
some  forms  of  globalisation  may  happen  rather  than  others.  It  helps  us  to  identify  the  key  powers  
behind  globalisation,  their  motivations  and,  therefore,  what  sort  of  directions  globalisation  could  

6
be  pushed  in.  Maintaining  the  sort  of  economic  determinism  I  am  arguing  for  here  tells  us  about  
causes,  directions  and  power  in  globalisation.    
 
Here  is  a  summary  of  some  of  the  key  arguments  about  economic  determinations  of  globalisation  
made  so  far,  or  to  be  made  shortly:    
 
1.  Being  pluralist  about  the  multi-­‐causality  behind  globalisation  is  good  but  not  good  enough.  We  
need  to  look  at  relations  between  plural  causes  and  see  which  are  more  dominant  or  have  a  causal  
effect  on  others.  
2.  Empirical  evidence,  rather  than  theoretical  presuppositions,  shows  economic  causality  behind  
globalisation  in  areas  such  as  culture,  migration,  politics  or  war.  I  will  come  to  empirical  examples  
shortly.    
3.  Economic  determinism  does  not  mean  that  the  economy  itself  is  necessarily  determinant.  
Economic  causes  may  operate  through  other  agencies  and  spheres,  such  as  corporations  or  
governments.  
4.  It  is  not  the  economy  I  am  saying  is  determinant,  but  economic  motivations.  
5.  It  is  not  the  economy  as  an  impersonal  structure  that  is  determinant,  but  active  agents  making  
economically  motivated  decisions,  although  these  may  be  affected  by  structural  factors  such  as  
capitalism,  investment  and  inequality.    
6.  That  economic  motivations  are  often  primary  does  not  mean  they  are  the  only  causal  factor.  
There  may  be  other  causes  at  the  same  time.    
7.  It  also  does  not  mean  that  they  are  always  determinant.  Sometimes  other  factors  will  be  more  
important,  for  example,  culture  or  beliefs.    
8.  Economic  causality  does  not  mean  that  globalisation  will  be  homogeneous.  Different  decisions  
are  possible  on  the  basis  of  the  same  economic  motives,  and  location  and  political  and  cultural  
factors  may  lead  to  differentiation  in  the  way  globalisation  turns  out.  
9.  That  there  are  such  complexities  to  economic  explanations  of  globalisation  does  not  mean  that  
there  is  not  still  economic  causality  and  that  it  is  not  important  to  identify  it.  Seeing  the  economic  
causes  behind  globalisation  helps  us  to  know  its  determinants,  to  explain  it,  understand  the  agents  
and  interests  involved,  who  are  most  powerful,  make  predictions,  understand  the  relative  weight  
and  mutual  effects  of  different  causal  factors,  and  have  a  more  exact  understanding  than  one  
which  sees  globalisation  just  as  caused  by  multiple  factors.    
 
Evidence  for  economic  determinants  
 
It  is  important  not  to  make  just  theoretical  arguments  for  or  against  economics.  What  is  
determinant  in  globalisation  is  an  empirical  question.  We  should  look  at  empirical  evidence  to  see  
if  the  case  for  economic  causality  stands  or  falls.  Looking  at  concrete  evidence  there  are  examples  
of  economic  causality.    
 
In  the  globalisation  of  media  and  culture  there  is  cultural  heterogeneity  and  hybridity,  rather  than  
just  a  global  homogenisation  of  culture  that  some  economistic  approaches  propose.  Culture  has  its  
own  autonomous  force  that  has  an  impact  alongside  economics.  For  instance,  religious  ideas  are  a  
causal  force  in  societies,  as  well  as  economic  motives.  Phenomena  like  blogging  allow  ideas  to  be  
spread  without  corporate  or  political  backing.  But  these  forms  of  culture  do  not  displace  
homogenisation  and  inequalities  of  media  and  culture  constituted  by  corporate  power,  but  exist  
alongside  and  within  such  structures.  Alongside  blogging  and  cultural  hybridity  exist  the  
domination  of  Hollywood  film  and  the  monopolisation  of  media  industries  by  a  relatively  small  
number  of  big  corporations.  Culture  often  spreads  through  the  attempt  to  buy  and  sell  it  to  make  
money,  i.e.  in  response  to  economic  incentives.  (See  McPhail,  2006).    

7
  
War  is  often  a  battle  over  the  resources  needed  to  stay  alive  or  drive  the  economy.  Wars  like  
those  that  have  been  going  on  for  years  in  Sudan  can  be  described  as  ethnic  or  religious  conflicts.  
They  sometimes  do  have  such  dimensions.  But  in  the  case  of  Sudan,  conflicts  have  also  been  over  
declining  resources,  reduced  as  a  result  of  climate  change,  itself  caused  by  economic  growth  in  the  
northern  hemisphere.  So  war  has  a  basis  in  economic  factors  such  as  growth,  material  interests  
and  economic  resources.    
 
Politics  is  driven  by  the  attempt  to  maximise  the  wealth  of  society,  amongst  other  things.  The  
state  of  the  economy  is  a  major  factor  effecting  voters  in  democracies,  and  the  revenue  the  
government  has  to  spend.  So  it  preoccupies  governments,  not  solely,  but  as  a  key  factor.  Material  
interests  undermine  global  cosmopolitan  democracy.  Agreements  over  world  trade,  climate  
change  and  nuclear  proliferation  break  down  over  states  wishing  to  maintain  their  own  economic  
and  material  interests,  for  instance  in  protectionism,  producing  carbon  emissions  and  maintaining  
nuclear  weapons.    
 
I  will  focus  on  two  examples  in  particular  –  discourses  of  globalisation  and  migration.  These  
provide  strong  examples  of  the  case  against  economistic  explanations  of  globalisation.    
 
Discourses  of  Globalisation  
 
Some  discourse  theories  of  globalisation  (e.g.  Cameron  and  Palan,  2004)  react  against  economism.  
They  argue  that  globalisation  is  not  primarily  an  economic  phenomenon.  Whether  it  is  happening  
economically  or  not  is  not  important.  The  key  issue  is  whether  we  think  it  is  happening.  Discourses  
of  globalisation  create  a  picture  of  the  world  that  legitimates  some  things  or  leads  us  to  behave  in  
certain  ways  in  accordance  with  the  idea  of  globalisation.  For  instance,  we  go  along  with  neoliberal  
policies  because  we  believe  they  are  required  in  a  globalised  world,  not  necessarily  because  they  
are.  It  is  discourse  rather  than  economics  that  is  determinant  and  globalisation  is  an  ideational  
force  as  much  as  a  real  material  one.  Discourses  theories  are  set  up  as  a  sophisticated  step  
forward  from  outmoded  economic  determinism.    
 
However,  as  discourse  theorist  Bruff  (2005)  has  argued,  discourses  of  globalisation  are  often  based  
in  economic  interests.  Economics  may  be  what  brings  ideas  to  the  fore.  Economic  expansionism  
creates  global  media  and  structures  on  which  global  imaginings  are  based  and  from  which  they  
develop.  There  is  real  globalisation  behind  the  idea  of  globalisation,  as  much  as  the  idea  
constituting  the  reality.  Corporations  promote  discourses  of  globalisation  to  encourage  policies  
that  favour  them,  such  as  lower  taxes  and  looser  regulations  to  keep  mobile  capital  in  the  country.  
Governments  promote  discourses  of  globalisation  to  justify  neoliberalism  that  they  have  an  
economic  or  political  commitment  to.  So  ultimately  the  discourse  of  globalisation  can  be  rooted  in  
the  attempt  of  corporations  or  government  to  pursue  their  interests  and  power  (a  point  also  
argued  by  authors  like  Colin  Hay  –  see,  for  instance,  Hay  and  Rosamond  2002).  
 
Bruff  says  that  whether  globalisation  is  happening  or  not  is  not  the  issue.  It  is  whether  we  believe  
it  is  that  is  a  key  thing  that  influences  our  knowledge  and  behaviour,  and  this  is  contained  in  
discourses  of  globalisation.  In  saying  this  Bruff  is  moving  away  from  economic  pictures  of  
globalisation  to  emphasise  ideas  more.  But  he  also  says  that  discourses  are  linked  to  material  
interests  and  agents  in  society,  rather  than  just  being  free-­‐floating  and  unrelated  to  economic  and  
political  bases.  There  is  an  economic  grounding  for  discourses  of  globalisation.  The  economic  
grounding  occurs  where  discourses  arise  on  the  basis  of  material  interests.  The  aim  should  be  to  
look  at  which  groups  and  interests  are  invoking  the  idea  of  globalisation  –  from  sections  of  capital  

8
that  will  benefit  from  free  trade  reforms,  to  governments  who  invoke  external  global  pressures  as  
a  reason  for  cutting  spending  on  welfare.  For  Bruff,  the  ideational  perspective  on  globalisation  
needs  to  be  combined  with  political  economy.  This  is  rather  than  making  the  latter  redundant  and  
overlooking  how  important  it  is  for  understanding  discourses,  where  they  come  from  and  what  
interests  they  represent.  Agency  and  contingency  at  the  level  of  ideas  are  combined  with  causality  
in  material  and  economic  interests,  capital  accumulation  and  expansionism.  
 
The  other  thing  to  say  about  discourses  of  globalisation  is  that  they  often  conceal  economic  and  
political  realities.  Economic  liberalism  or  global  human  rights  as  ideas,  rightly  or  wrongly,  justify  
western  expansionism.  Furthermore  they  disguise  something  beneath  what  they  say.  Beneath  the  
guise  of  free  trade  and  open  competition,  economic  liberalism  involves  a  discrepancy  between  
more  wealthy  and  powerful  nations  and  those  less  so.  Free  trade  gives  the  richer  and  more  
powerful  the  freedom  to  compete  openly  with  those  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  with  them.  
The  discourse  of  free  trade  and  open  competition  disguises  something  less  than  free  and  open.    
 
Global  human  rights  involve  Western  and  individualist  values  (which  are  important,  although  
inconsistently  adhered  to  in  the  West).  Some  other  perspectives  or  parts  of  the  world  stress  
collectivist  or  economic  ideas  of  rights,  such  as  the  right  to  food  and  water,  more  than  individual  
or  political  rights.  Or  they  see  values  such  as  collective  obligations  or  economic  equality  as  above  
individual  rights.  So  what  appears  to  be  a  universal  idea  that  stresses  freedom  disguises  a  Western  
idea  that  contrasts  with  alternative  values  in  other  societies  or  political  perspectives.  Global  
human  rights  disguise  their  own  lack  of  globality  and  rights.    
 
Globalisation  involves  economic  and  or  political  projects  to  which  meanings  are  attached  to  gain  
the  consent  or  acquiescence  of  groups  in  society,  legitimating  or  justifying  them  through  
categories  such  as  ‘globalisation’.  They  are  rooted  in  underlying  political  and  economic  objectives  
and  interests.  As  we  have  seen,  some  disguise  inequalities  and  power  as  equality  and  freedom.    
 
So,  it  is  possible  to  see  economics  behind  global  media,  politics,  conflict  and  discourses  of  
globalisation.  The  economy  is  not  the  only  casual  factor  in  any  of  these  spheres,  and  there  are  
instances  where  it  is  not  the  primary  one.  But  if  you  look  at  globalisation  in  practice,  economics  is  
often  behind  it  in  different  spheres  of  society,  even  if  not  the  only  factor,  and  with  other  factors,  
such  as  politics  or  culture,  sometimes  behind  the  economics  or  shaping  the  path  it  takes.  
 
Economics  and  International  Migration  
 
Another  example  is  economic  explanations  for  migration.  Do  these  hold  up?  Economic  
explanations  for  migration  are  easy  to  dismiss.  The  economy  is  an  impersonal  force  -­‐  how  can  it  
cause  things?  Don’t  actual  agents  such  as  individuals  or  states  make  decisions  about  whether  
migration  happens  or  not?  If  it’s  all  about  economics  why  do  people  often  not  migrate  when  
wages  in  their  country  are  lower  than  in  other  countries  they  could  move  to?  Surely  individuals  are  
not  just  economically  rationally  calculating  beings.  They  also  have  loyalties,  emotions  and  make  
non-­‐rational  and  less  individualistic  calculations.  Non-­‐economic  factors  seem  to  play  a  role.    
 
But  lots  of  migration  is  economic.  Migration  can  be  in  pursuit  of  better  economic  circumstances,  
or  in  reaction  to  things  like  wars  that  have  economic  bases.  Much  migration  is  labour  migration  
(King,  1995).  Economic  well-­‐being  as  a  motivating  force  has  been  a  major  factor  in  migration,  from  
pre-­‐modern  plundering  and  trading,  to  European  imperial  migration  to  colonies  in  pursuit  of  
economic  expansionism,  European  migration  to  America  in  search  of  a  better  life,  the  slave  trade,  
post-­‐colonial  migration  to  Europe  in  the  postwar  period,  Asian  migration  more  recently  to  

9
America,  and  Latin  American  migration  to  the  Northern  hemisphere.  These  examples  have  been  
dominated  by  economic  expansionism,  or  the  movement  of  people  in  search  of  better  economic  
opportunities.  They  frequently  involve  the  poor  looking  for  better  material  prospects,  or  the  rich  
trying  to  increase  their  productivity  and  profits.  As  such,  economic  causes  of  migration  are  also  
bound  up  with  inequality,  something  that  is  a  central  feature  of  globalisation  that  I  will  return  to  at  
the  end  of  this  paper.  On  the  same  theme,  the  rich  can  migrate  more  easily  than  the  poor,  for  
economic  reasons  to  do  with  wealth  and  income.    
 
Furthermore,  as  mentioned,  economic  explanations  for  globalisation  need  not  be  as  crude  as  such  
criticisms  imply.  Stressing  economic  motivations  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  economy  is  
the  cause  of  globalisation.  The  facilitating  of  globalisation  by  governments  or  states  can  be  
economically  motivated,  to  find  labour  or  contribute  to  production  and  growth,  for  example.  In  
situations  like  this  economic  factors  come  in  without  the  economy  itself  being  determinant.  
Globalisation  can  be  economically  driven  but  by  agents  rather  than  impersonal  structural  forces,  
and  by  actors  outside  the  economy,  such  as  political  actors.  It  may  be  economic  motivations  or  
interests  rather  than  the  economy  that  are  the  key  factor.  Economic  explanations  can  hold  
without  there  being  a  crude  economic  reductionism.  (For  a  discussion  of  economic  theories  of  
migration  see  Massey  et  al,  1998).  What  are  key  features  of  economic  explanations  for  migration  
and  how  is  a  good  economic  explanation  different  from  crude  constructions  of  it?  
 
1.  Economic  motivations  are  the  key  factor  I  am  stressing  rather  than  the  economy  itself.  An  
explanation  based  on  the  former  need  not  imply  the  latter  alone  is  necessarily  determinant.  At  the  
same  time,  if  structures  are  not  determinant  that  does  not  mean  that  economic  factors  are  not  a  
driving  force  
 
2.  A  focus  on  motivations  also  means  that  actors  make  decisions  rather  than  the  explanation  being  
one  that  involves  external  impersonal  economic  forces  or  structures.  So  economic  explanations  
are  compatible  with  agency  and  cannot  be  written  off  as  structurally  determinist.  It  may  be  that  
economic  structures,  for  instance  investments,  inequalities  or  the  capitalist  basis  for  economic  
motivations,  affect  migration.  But  there  is  also  a  role  for  agency  in  motivations  to  move,  whether  
on  the  part  of  migrants,  governments,  or  other  people  who  make  decisions  about  the  mobility  of  
people.      
 
3.  While  economic  motivations  are  a  factor  it  can  be  non-­‐economic  actors  that  have  them.  For  
instance,  governments,  households  or  individuals  are  actors  in  migration,  as  well  as  the  economy  
or  economic  entities  like  corporations.  Governments  might  encourage  immigration  for  the  
economic  reason  that  they  need  labour,  or  need  taxpayers  to  support  an  ageing  population.  
Individuals  or  households  may  decide  whether  to  take  up  the  economic  opportunities  of  
migration.  Migrant  social  networks,  or  social  capital  in  immigrant  communities,  also  play  a  part  in  
business  opportunities,  housing  and  employment  being  provided  for  inward  migrants.  Social  or  
human  capital  can  be  converted  into  economic  capital.  Economic  explanations  cannot  be  
dismissed  for  reducing  everything  to  the  economy  because  explanations  in  terms  of  economic  
motives  are  compatible  with  non-­‐economic  actors  and  networks  being  important.    
 
4.  Economic  explanations  do  not  need  to  assume  individual  rational  economic  actors  as  in  rational  
choice  or  neoclassical  explanations.  Actors  can  include  states  and  households.  And  an  
economically  motivated  decision  may  not  happen  only  in  response  to  the  economic  motivations.  A  
decision  by  a  family  member  to  migrate  to  seek  a  higher  wage  can  also  be  affected  by  emotional  
family  bonds  or  politically  enabling  factors,  for  instance.  Family  bonds  might  put  them  off  
migrating  or  make  it  easier  if  these  are  weak.  So  an  economically  motivated  decision  need  not  be  a  

10
rational  individual  choice  alone.  At  the  same  time,  the  fact  that  migration  is  not  just  a  rational  
individual  decision  does  not  mean  that  it  is  not  economically  motivated.  
 
5.  That  economic  gain  can  be  made  from  migration  because  of  economic  differences  between  
countries  is  not  a  sufficient  basis  on  which  to  predict  migration.  Economic  causes  cannot  be  
measured  in  objective  criteria  alone.  Sometimes  people  do  not  move  when  economic  gains  can  be  
made.  But  economic  explanations  cannot  be  dismissed  because  there  is  a  failure  of  actors  to  
migrate  in  economically  advantageous  situations,  as  there  are  other  intermediary  factors  involved.  
Often,  say,  wage  differentials  are  there,  and  are  a  key  driving  force  behind  migration  decisions,  but  
they  have  to  be  perceived,  and  seen  to  be  decisive  against  other  factors  such  as  the  costs  of  
upping  roots  or  migration  being  politically  possible.  At  the  same  time,  that  it  is  more  complex  than  
can  be  predicted  from  comparative  economic  indicators  alone  does  not  mean  that  economic  
factors  are  not  still  the  motivating  force  in  such  situations.  Once  other  factors  are  taken  into  
account  it  can  still  be  the  possibility  of  a  better  wage  that  is  the  main  motivating  factor  to  move.    
 
6.  Economic  motivations  are  filtered  through  other  factors  such  as  political  obstacles  to  migration  
and  networks  that  facilitate  migration.  So  economic  motivations  do  not  translate  automatically  
into  migration.  They  have  to  be  perceived  and  are  also  affected  by  factors  such  as  family  and  
community  roots,  government  policies  which  encourage  or  inhibit  emigration  or  immigration,  
networks  for  migration,  demographic  factors  (such  as  an  ageing  population  in  receiving  countries),  
costs  and  risks  of  migration,  proximity  and  distance,  colonial  or  post-­‐colonial  links,  and  channels  of  
investment.  Stressing  underlying  economic  motivations  as  significant  does  not  mean  they  are  the  
only  factor  or  sufficient  by  themselves.  At  the  same  time,  the  role  of  other  factors  does  not  mean  
that  economic  factors  are  not  significant  and  prevalent.  It  shows  that  they  are  filtered  through  
intermediary  influences,  but  not  that  economic  motives  are  not  important.    
 
7.  Once  you  take  into  account  economic  motivations  and  other  intermediary  filtering  factors,  then  
at  the  level  of  individuals  and  households  there  are  different  circumstances  in  the  face  of  similar  
economic  motivations.  Consequently,  where  there  are  common  economic  motivations,  whether  
migration  occurs  or  not  will  vary.  On  one  level  this  means  that  an  analysis  based  on  economic  
motivations  is  complex.  At  the  same  time,  while  economic  motivations  may  lead  to  varying  
migration  decisions  across  individuals  and  households,  and  that  you  cannot  therefore  easily  read  
off  outcomes  from  economic  data  alone,  this  does  not  mean  that  economic  factors  are  not  key  
motivating  forces.  That  there  are  a  variety  of  outcomes  because  of  such  other  factors  does  not  
mean  that  economic  motivations  are  still  not  the  driving  force.  It  means  that  where  they  exist  the  
outcome  varies  because  of  other  factors.    
 
8.  Where  economics  is  not  the  most  proximate  or  direct  incentive  it  can  be  a  factor  underlying  
what  is.  For  instance,  refugees  from  wars  migrate  to  escape  physical  danger  rather  than  because  
of  economic  motivations.  But  it  is  possible  that  the  war  could  be  caused  by  economic  motivations  
or  material  interests,  for  instance  the  desire  to  secure  access  to  precious  resources  such  as  oil,  
water  or  fertile  land.  In  such  cases  economic  motivations  may  not  be  the  direct  cause  of  migration  
but  underlie  the  causes  that  led  to  it.    
 
9.  Economic  motivations  can  be  linked  to  a  variety  of  economic  circumstances.  They  may  involve  
push  factors  in  the  country  of  origin  or  pull  factors  in  the  receiving  country.  They  can  be  linked  to  
wage  differentials  between  countries,  employment  opportunities,  the  possibility  of  remittances,  
or  general  economic  buoyancy  or  prospects  in  sending  and  receiving  countries.  So  economic  
explanations  cannot  be  dismissed  if,  for  instance,  wage  differentials  between  countries  do  not  

11
lead  to  migration  from  one  to  another.  There  are  other  sorts  of  economic  factors  that  are  
motivating  factors,  not  just  obvious  ones  such  as  wage  differentials  or  employment  prospects.  
 
10.  Furthermore,  the  question  of  degree  and  extent  is  important.  Whether  different  economic  
opportunities  between  countries  become  a  factor  in  migration  depends  not  just  on  them  existing,  
but  also  on  the  degree  of  difference.  Migration  is  a  risky,  complex  and  costly  business.  Small  
economic  gains  may  not  be  sufficient  to  make  migration  likely.  Migration  for  economic  reasons  
depends  also  on  degree  and  extent.    
 
So  economic  motivations  for  migration  are  complex.  Economic  explanations  cannot  be  dismissed  
by  making  them  crude  and  simplistic.  At  the  same  time,  that  economic  reasons  for  migration  are  
complex  does  not  mean  they  are  not  often  behind  migration.    
 
Why  it  is  important  to  keep  economics  in  the  picture  
 
I  have  argued  that  it  is  wrong  to  dismiss  economically  determinist  explanations  for  globalisation.  
Anti-­‐economists  can  unwittingly  make  the  case  for  economic  determinism.  Economic  explanations  
for  globalisation  are  more  complex  than  simplifications  make  them  appear.  And  there  are  
examples  of  where  economics  explain  globalisation.    
 
There  are  reasons  to  defend  economic  explanations  of  globalisation  beyond  that  the  economy  is  
significant  in  globalisation.  Economic  analyses  bring  out  other  dimensions  of  globalisation  that  are  
important,  that  a  dismissal  of  economics  conceals,  such  as  inequality  and  power.  Economic  factors  
need  to  be  given  a  significant  place  to  ensure  an  accurate  explanation  of  globalisation.  But  to  do  
so  is  also  politically  important.  
 
Economy,  globalisation  and  life  chances  
 
I  have  focused  so  far  on  economic  determinants  of  globalisation.  The  economics  of  globalisation  
are  also  important  for  understanding  peoples’  life  circumstances  globally.  These  cannot  be  
understood  by  a  focus  on  culture,  although  culture  is  important,  or  by  a  focus  on  culture  that  
separates  it  from  its  economic  determination.    
 
Culture  is  important  and  interesting.  Identity  and  cultural  experience  are  big  parts  of  our  lives,  and  
consciousness  and  culture  are  forged  out  of  global  inputs,  from  media  to  music,  migration  and  
food.  But  economics  and  politics  are  important  too.  Culture  is  affected  by  economic  and  political  
factors.  For  instance,  mergers  and  diversification  in  the  media  industry,  and  government  
deregulation,  impact  on  our  cultural  experiences  as  consumers.  They  have  brought  the  world  
media  into  the  hands  of  a  smaller  number  of  big  corporations  from  the  richest  capitalist  countries.  
The  roles  of  the  public  interest  and  diversity  have  been  diminished  by  these  developments.    
 
Economic  restructuring  and  international  political  power  that  seem  distant  have  big  consequences  
for  our  individual  lives.  The  global  economy  and  distribution  of  wealth  affect,  for  example,  our  
opportunities  for  employment  and  our  material  circumstances.  And  which  side  you  live  on  in  the  
constellation  of  global  political  powers  has  significant  consequences  for  your  life  chances.  
 
The  fact  that  I  live  in  a  rich,  developed  country,  one  of  the  core  powers  in  the  world,  and  relatively  
democratic,  peaceful,  and  free,  has  a  great  effect  on  my  life  compared  to  what  it  would  be  like  if  I  
lived  in  a  poor,  developing  country,  or  one  with  less  democracy  and  freedom,  or  more  conflict  and  
violence.  A  large  proportion  of  the  world’s  population  live  in  places  with  some  or  all  of  these  

12
problems.  That  I  can  watch  digital  television  and  access  the  Internet,  cultural  experiences,  does  
not  just  have  economic  and  political  bases.  It  also  pales  into  insignificance  next  to  economic  and  
political  factors  that  give  me  a  privileged  everyday  experience.    
 
Important  inequalities  between  richer  and  poorer  parts  of  the  world,  in  terms  of  factors  such  as  
wealth  and  production,  are  downplayed  by  anti-­‐economism.  North  America,  Europe,  and  South  
and  South  East  Asia  produce  about  85%  of  the  world’s  Gross  Domestic  Product,  and  about  85%  of  
global  exports  (Dicken,  2007,  p.39).  This  leaves  15%  of  these  in  Central  and  South  America,  Africa  
and  other  parts  of  Asia.  A  triad  dominates  the  world  economy  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  If  you  
focus  on  culture  and  downplay  economics  in  the  name  of  anti-­‐economic  determinism  the  
significance  of  this  inequality  and  power  is  left  out.    
 
The  number  of  people  below  the  $1  a  day  purchasing  power  poverty  line  exceeds  1.2  billion1.  
More  than  1  in  5  people  in  the  world  are  in  poverty  on  this  definition.  2.8  billion  live  on  less  than  
$2  a  day,  about  40%  of  the  world’s  population  (UNDP,  2003).  In  2005,  36  per  cent  of  people  in  less  
developed  countries  were  living  on  less  than  $1  a  day  and  76  per  cent  on  less  than  $2.  The  
proportion  of  people  living  in  poverty  is  falling  slowly  but  the  numbers  living  below  the  $1  and  $2  
lines  was  larger  in  2005  than  in  2000  (UNCTAD,  2008a,  p.2).    
 
There  have  been  big  improvements  in  populous  places  like  China  and  India.  But  in  sub-­‐Saharan  
Africa  poverty  below  the  $1  line  was  53.3%  in  1985  and  54.4%  in  1990.  74  million  more  people  in  
the  region  were  in  poverty  at  the  end  of  the  1990s  than  at  the  start  (UNDP,  2003,  p.41).    
 
There  are  about  195  countries  in  the  world.  54  countries  were  poorer  in  2003  than  1990.  In  21  
numbers  going  hungry  had  increased  and  in  14  the  number  dying  before  the  age  of  5  had  gone  up.  
In  the  1980s  4  countries  experienced  reversals  in  the  UN  human  development  index  (which  
measures  life  expectancy,  health,  education  and  standard  of  living).  In  the  1990s  this  got  worse  in  
21  countries.  In  the  1990s  development  assistance  from  the  rich  declined,  debt  in  poor  countries  
increased  and  the  price  of  primary  commodities,  which  many  poor  countries  export,  continued  to  
drop.    
 
In  Africa,  about  one  third  of  people  live  in  hunger  and  about  one-­‐sixth  of  children  die  before  the  
age  of  5,  something  which  is  not  improving.  In  1990  you  were  19  times  more  likely  to  die  before  
the  age  of  5  in  sub-­‐Saharan  Africa  than  in  a  rich  OECD  country.  By  2003  this  had  increased  to  26  
times  more  likely.  Because  of  population  growth  the  numbers  in  these  situations  are  also  growing.  
In  2000  4.5  million  children  died  before  the  age  of  5  in  Sub-­‐Saharan  Africa  and  3.6  million  in  South  
Asia  –  making  up  76%  of  global  mortality  by  5  that  year.  Life  expectancy  at  birth  is  49.6  in  sub-­‐
Saharan  African  countries  and  79.4  in  high-­‐income  OECD  countries,  with  a  world  average  of  68.1.  It  
is  in  the  low  40s  for  countries  like  Sierra  Leone,  Zambia,  Mozambique,  the  Central  African  
Republic,  Angola,  Zimbabwe,  Lesotho  and  Swaziland.  In  some  of  these  countries  70%  of  people  do  
not  live  until  40  and  in  many  Sub-­‐Saharan  African  countries  life  expectancy  is  on  the  decline  
because  of  HIV/AIDS,  other  diseases  and  factors  such  as  injury  (UNDP,  2003  and  2008a).    
 
A  critical  approach  to  globalisation  
 
These  figures  should  be  looked  at  in  the  context  of  commentaries  which  are  dismissive  of  analyses  
of  globalisation  that  focus  on  economics  and  inequality  for  being  out  of  touch,  reductionist  or  too  

1
This means they can afford in their own country what $1 would buy in the USA. It does not indicate that they have the exchange
rate value of $1 a day to spend.

13
negative.  The  alternative  picture  of  globalisation  such  commentaries  put  forward  is  of  the  spread  
of  global  human  rights  and  cultural  cosmopolitanism.  They  see  globalisation  as  a  positive,  
equalising,  and  democratic  process  bringing  an  intermingling  of  cultures  in  a  new  
cosmopolitanism,  and  the  generalisation  of  progressive  values  such  as  universal  human  rights.  
(See,  for  example,  Delanty  2009  and  Holton  2009  on  types  of  cosmopolitanism,  including  this  
positive  cultural  type  about  which  Delanty  is  more  favourable  and  Holton  more  questioning).    
 
It  is  possible  to  come  to  such  optimistic  conclusions  by  focusing  on  culture  in  separation  from  the  
economy.  Such  approaches  often  also  focus  on  elites  in  rich  countries,  at  the  expense  of  other  
strata  and  poorer  countries.  But  when  you  build  economic  inequalities  into  the  picture,  a  world  of  
cosmopolitanism,  cultural  hybridity  and  the  spread  of  rights  looks  different.  Themes  of  power,  
inequality  and  conflict  come  back  to  the  fore.    
 
Rejecting  economic  explanations  of  globalisation  as  too  economistic  undermines  an  understanding  
of  the  causal  role  of  economic  inequality  and  power  in  globalisation.  This  leads  to  an  image  of  
social  relations  that  does  not  show  how  they  are  unequal  and  power-­‐laden  because  of  economic  
and  political  structures.  If  global  society  is  looked  at  separately  from  economic  and  political  
relations  then  the  economic  and  political  power,  inequality  and  conflict  that  affects  it  is  
overlooked.  This  makes  globalisation  seem  more  equal  and  benign  than  it  really  is.  As  we  have  
seen,  it  can  affect  our  understanding  of  economically  determined  phenomena,  such  as  media,  
politics,  war,  discourses  and  migration.    
 
Some  sociologists  take  into  account  political  economy  but  separate  their  studies  of  cultural  
globalisation  from  their  observations  on  political-­‐economic  relations.  Consequently  their  
awareness  of  conflict,  inequality  and  power  in  politics  and  economics  becomes  separated  from  the  
more  optimistic,  equal  and  cosmopolitan  picture  they  have  of  culture.  Beck,  for  instance,  argues  
against  economic  determinism  and  for  cosmopolitanism  as  inevitable,  yet  also  outlines  separately  
how  the  mobility  of  capital  has  undermined  the  power  of  the  state  and  labour  in  Germany,  a  very  
economic  and  uncosmopolitan  phenomenon  (see  Beck,  2000,  2006).  Nederveen  Pieterse  has  
written  on  the  global  hybridisation  of  culture  but  also  elsewhere  about  the  role  of  American  
power  in  the  world,  something  that  has  very  unhybrid  implications  for  culture,  and  a  major  role  for  
economics  and  politics  (Nederveen  Pieterse,  2004a,  2004b).  Bourdieu  (1998,  2003)  on  the  other  
hand,  incorporates  political  economy,  and  so  also  power,  inequality  and  conflict,  into  his  sociology  
of  globalisation  not  only  into  his  studies  of  economics  and  politics  but  also  his  sociology  of  the  
media  and  culture.    
 
A  focus  on  culture  and  a  reaction  against  economism,  leaving  out  the  economy  and  the  way  
economic  motivations,  economic  power  and  inequality  structure  globalisation,  gives  an  over-­‐
benign,  harmonious  and  equalised  picture  of  globalisation.  The  consequence  of  cultural  and  
cosmopolitan  approaches  that  see  globalisation  in  this  latter  way  is  that  globalisation  based  on  
power  and  inequality  is  downplayed.  A  world  with  such  problematic  characteristics  is  validated  by  
being  defined  in  terms  of  the  more  optimistic  category  of  globalisation.  Not  only  is  power  and  
inequality  left  out,  but  power-­‐ridden  and  unequal  globalisation  is  positively  endorsed,  because  
such  factors  are  excluded  from  the  picture  by  anti-­‐economism.    
 
I  mentioned  at  the  start  of  this  paper  that  it  is  important  to  have  a  pluralistic  understanding  of  
globalisation  that  does  not  reduce  explanations  to  economic  or  other  single  factors.  At  the  same  
time  it  was  argued  that  it  is  important  to  see  the  links  between  different  factors  in  globalisation  
and  look  at  the  extent  to  which  some  have  causal  power  over  others,  rather  than  just  seeing  all  as  
equal,  separate  or  unaffected  by  one  another.    

14
  
The  search  for  resources,  trade,  production  or  investment  and  the  wealth  that  can  be  made  from  
these  has  been  a  driving  force  in  globalisation,  from  premodern  trade,  to  European  imperialism,  
and  global  capitalism.  One  result  has  been  global  economic  interdependency  such  that  small  
occurrences  like  the  2007  US  sub-­‐prime  crisis  can  have  ramifications  for  economic,  political  and  
cultural  life  globally.    
 
Similarly  phenomena  like  media  and  culture,  politics  and  migration  are  not  autonomous  from  
economics,  often  being  motivated,  unequal  or  structured  by  power  on  economic  bases.  To  dismiss  
economic  explanations  as  too  economistic  leads  to  such  causes,  power  relations  and  inequalities  
being  missed  out.  If  you  go  too  far  in  guarding  against  economic  determinism  then  you  leave  out  
the  way  these  economic  factors  determine  peoples’  life  chances.  Anti-­‐economic  determinism  runs  
the  risk  of  hiding  power  and  inequality  and  endorsing  a  globalisation  structured  by  these,  as  if  it  is  
not.  A  critical  sociology,  which  shows  relations  of  power  and  inequality  in  society  needs  to  
maintain  an  awareness  of  where  economic  factors  determine  globalisation,  even  if  critics  dismiss  
such  an  approach  as  old-­‐fashioned  and  past  its  day.    
 
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